Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or vice that tends to dishonor or discredit a person. There are five elements required for libel: 1) an imputation of a crime or defect, 2) publication to a third party, 3) malice, 4) identification of the person defamed, and 5) tendency to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt. Two Supreme Court cases are discussed - one where a newspaper article was found to be libelous for not providing a fair report of legal proceedings, and another where columns criticizing a "conference organizer" were found to not clearly identify the plaintiff and thus were not libelous.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or vice that tends to dishonor or discredit a person. There are five elements required for libel: 1) an imputation of a crime or defect, 2) publication to a third party, 3) malice, 4) identification of the person defamed, and 5) tendency to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt. Two Supreme Court cases are discussed - one where a newspaper article was found to be libelous for not providing a fair report of legal proceedings, and another where columns criticizing a "conference organizer" were found to not clearly identify the plaintiff and thus were not libelous.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or vice that tends to dishonor or discredit a person. There are five elements required for libel: 1) an imputation of a crime or defect, 2) publication to a third party, 3) malice, 4) identification of the person defamed, and 5) tendency to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt. Two Supreme Court cases are discussed - one where a newspaper article was found to be libelous for not providing a fair report of legal proceedings, and another where columns criticizing a "conference organizer" were found to not clearly identify the plaintiff and thus were not libelous.
Libel: Art. 353. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Elements of Defamation:
1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance.
2. That the imputation must be made publicly.
3. That it must be malicious.
4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person or one who is dead.
5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed.
1 st Element: In testing whether the utterance is defamatory what is important is the meaning that the words in fact conveyed on the mind of persons of reasonable understanding discretion and candor taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances where were known to the hearer or reader.
Where the comments are insincere and intended to ridicule rather than praise the plaintiff, the publication is libelous. Praise undeserved is slander in disguise. (Jimenez v Reyes, 27 Phil 52).
2 nd Element - Publication: It is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person or persons. Examples:
1. Delivering the article to the typesetter is sufficient publication (US v Crane 10 Phil 135)
2. Sending to the wife, a letter defamatory of her husband. (US v Ubinana 1 Phil 471)
3. Sending a letter in an unsealed envelope through a messenger. (Lopez v Delgado, 8 Phil 26) Sending a letter not shown to be sealed is also publication. (US v Grino 36 Phil 738; People v Silvela, 103 Phil 773)
4. Writing another person about the person defamed. (Orfanel v People 30 SCRA 819)
3 rd Element - Malice: The malice or ill-will either must be proved malice in fact; or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation malice in law. Malice in fact may be proved by ill-will, hatred or purpose to injure. Malice in law is presumed from a defamatory imputation.
4 th Element: Identification of the offended party is required. It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed; it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Defamatory imputation directed at a class or group of persons in general language are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then, no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that there is room for persons connected with the body to pursue an up-right and law-abiding course. Blind items can be actionable if it is clear who is being referred to in the publication.
Purpose must be to injure the injured party.
5 th Element: Any imputation will be sufficient if it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Dishonor disgrace, shame or ignominy Discredit loss of credit or reputation; disesteem Contempt state of being despised
Art. 354. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (This is rebutted by evidence of malice in fact or if there is no reasonable ground to believe that the charge is true.)
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters, which are not related to the discharge of their official duties, may constitute libel)
3. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. (Borjal v CA ruling)
To rebut the presumption of malice, it must be shown that:
1. the defamatory imputation is true, in case the law allows proof of the truth of the imputation; 2. it is published with good intention; 3. there is a justifiable motive for making it.
Two types of privileged communication:
1. Absolute Not actionable even if done in bad faith. Congress, official communications, pleadings, answers in hearings. 2. Conditional or qualified - privilege is lost if there is proof of malice. Privileged would be the two exceptions in Art. 354.
POLICARPIO vs. THE MANILA TIMES
Publication of 2 articles- claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages.
NEWS ARTICLE: Policarpio was charged with malversation- had used Unesco stencils for private and personal purposes and estafa- fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaints, and Action Commission today-
Yung chnarge siya ng PCAC is untrue. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that the plaintiff was guilty. It had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were. It presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to.
Issue: is the paper guilty of libel.
To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only be true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks.
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks.
Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable motive in falsely stating that the complaints had been filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by the PCAC? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, then the publication would be actually malicious. If they did not, or if they acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement, for the consequences of which they are liable solidarily (NB This therefore allows for libel by negligence which would be a dangerous precedent.)
BORJAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WENCESLAO
On Libel and Public Figure Definition a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Wenceslao sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns.
Whether or not Borjal is guilty of libel. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar.
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The letterheads, printout and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as organizer.
(NB: A blind item not clearly identifying a person will not result in libel.)
Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. Tinawagan pa niya- uncertain. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when he supplied the information through his letter to the editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case falls.
ARTICLE 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and, 2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith (debate sa Congress). Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez 21 and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals 22
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.'
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy efflorescence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Kahit na sabihin hindi siya public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official/figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
ALONZO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Angeles
Alonzo conducted inspections sa medical clinic. Sabi niya sa report: violations + husband is a judge (untouchable)
Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code. For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: "(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable."
Her authority to conduct the inspection and to submit the corresponding report was not questioned by the private respondents. Her questioned report was a qualified privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made her report in the exercise of her official duty or function.
There was, in law, no publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a communication made by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of officers having a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication does not amount to a publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. Sila mismo nagcause ng communication of the libelous matter to a third person nung inentrust nila kay Balasabas para bigay sa lawyer nila eh.
LEDESMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Ledesma sent a letter addressed to Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart Center and furnished the same to other officers of the said hospital. Inargue that the said letter contained slanderous and defamatory remarks against Torres. Ledesma asked for his professional fees- no equal distribution of labor + kulang amount nung kanya.
Pero ang sabi the subject letter was privileged in nature In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable."
When a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. The reason for such rule is that "a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him." In this case, petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospital; she did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was no "publicity" and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the Penal Code.
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
Sabi niya Virginia was constituting enrichment thru corrupt practices through a telegram which was addressed to the DPWH Secretary purportedly in line with Marcos' appeal to the public to give information on undesirable employees in the government service. Privileged communication daw.
Respondents- absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith, petitioner having been motivated by vengeance and ill-will as established by his previous conduct viz a viz the private respondent: the filing of several complaints, both administrative and criminal aimed to malign her good character and reputation which were subsequently dismissed or closed for lack of merit and/or insufficiency of evidence.
The Supreme Court held that qualified privilege communication may be lost by proof of malice, that the prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving malice in view of petitioner's conduct towards private respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.
Whether or not this is a case of privilege communication.
A libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained incriminatory master which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms.
A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his conduct. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice.
GUTIERREZ vs. ABILA, CLEMENTE and FRANCISCO
Whether or not this is privileged communication.
For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions are absolutely privileged when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false or malicious such utterances may be.The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified.
Repeated litigations between the same parties might indeed be tiresome, even nettlesome, but this alone is not sufficient cause for calling another "dirty-minded," and of a "limited mind," "twisted mind" or to characterize his act as a "devise of wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's traits.'' It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the entire dimension of the defendants' answer, with almost every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and ill-will. The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of inquiry and have no place in a pleading. The defendants' answer is quite complete and sufficient without the derogatory statements in question, and their inclusion therein was clearly made solely for the purpose of giving vent to their ill-feelings against the plaintiff, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Besides, the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
MALIT vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES On Libel (Court Proceedings)
Being cross-examined asked if she knew the person who "made" a certain exhibit. Evading the question, Dr. Macaspac stated that she did not understand the word "made." Malit: "I doubt how did you become a doctor." The Supreme Court held that the utterance made in the course of a judicial or administrative proceedings belongs to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged. (considered in the interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects)
Issue: Whether or not the utterances is privileged communication. Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.
As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The master to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. It is thus clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong to a class of communications that are absolutely privileged. The privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION vs. Mindalano Clan
It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. We have accordingly examined in its entirety the subject article "A Changing of the Guard" which is in essence a popular essay on the general nature and character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new political leader in the province of Lanao del Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained about and quoted above, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in the essay. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the article. The language utilized by the article in general and the above excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character, matter- of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications or nuances appear detectable at all, however closely one may scrutinize the above excerpts. We find in the quoted excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article here involved.
Personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant" in the community and it is to community standards not personal or family standards that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION
Members of the union picketed its premises displaying placards and signboards containing the following: "PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNB-NIDC?
SC dismissed the complaint for libel as the offensive words, uttered in the exercise of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution, are usually expected in confrontations between labor and management.
The judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free press.
It is a fact of industrial life that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite. Such being the case, there is no affront either to reason or so the law in a complaint for libel being dismissed.
What appeared in the placard was characterized in the appealed decision as lacking in "libelous imputation." Another reinforcement so such a mode of appraising the matter is that there was a labor controversy resulting in a strike. The labor union made use of its constitutional right to picket. The Supreme Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. EUGENIO LOPEZ "MANILA, CHRONICLE vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS Fidel Cruz: people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings. HOAX pala he merely wanted transportation home to Manila. Manila Chronicle devoted a pictorial article. Unfortunately, ibang picture na may same name ung nalagay. Together with the foregoing correction, petitioners published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four lines the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made.
1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate that no action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture. No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes within all embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. Such is the case in a far greater measure in the United States. According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. "There was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' ... The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. 2. There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right "The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good." On this aspect of the question which, as answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege." In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed differently in this wise: "So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." In the language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned the opinion: "The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item under Consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words." "We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor Policy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law. ... Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency is quite obvious. No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases moan anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. 3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press freedom that petitioners would seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing case appeared in the headline. It was without basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself. Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with vigor and clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no liability was deemed incurred by the then publisher of the Manila Chronicle A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words." The above ruling, coupled with the requirement in the New York Times decision of the United States Supreme Court, would for the writer of this opinion, furnish a sufficient basis for the success of this appeal. The Court, however, is not inclined to view matters thus. Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by such decision which from the facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not ignored, but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not have a controlling significance. So we hold. This rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it. Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration. Acts Punished: 1. By Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him or his parents, spouse, child or other member of his family. 2. By Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money consideration. Blackmail Defined: Blackmail, in its metaphorical sense, may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime hush money. (US v Eguia, 38 Phil 857) Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned. Elements: 1. That the offender is a reporter editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine; 2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another; 3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person. n.b. The prohibition applies even though said publication be made in connection wit or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned. This is otherwise known as the Gag Law. This law must be viewed against the jurisprudence laid out in cases like Borjal Versus CA though. Considering this, this law is more likely applicable only when the person involved is not considered a public figure. Rep Act No. 1477, amending Rep. Act No. 53 Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court of a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the state. Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Slander is oral defamation. Note that oral defamation need not even be heard by the offended party. Two kinds: 1. Simple Slander 2. Grave Slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature. Factors that determine gravity The gravity of oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. (People v Jaring CA, 40 OG 3683). Defamatory words constitute either grave or light slander depending not only upon their sense and grammatical meaning, judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. (Balite v People, 18 SCRA 280) The social standing and the position of the offended party are also taken into consideration. Thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held previously the office of Congressman, Governor and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President. (People v Bosier, CA, 53 OG 2202) Slander committed against a teacher looked up for exemplariness of character was held to be grave slander. Examples of grave slander: 1. Words imputing to unchastity to a respectable married lady and tending to injure the characters of the daughters. 2. Scurrilous words imputing to the offended party the crime of estafa. He Has sold the union. He has swindled, the money. He received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 and another P6,000.00 He is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists. He has spent he funds of the union for his personal use. Examples of Simple slander: 1. Accusation that offended party has been successively living with different men, intended to correct an improper conduct, uttered by a kin of the accused. (People v Clarin 37 OG 1106) 2. Calling a person a gangster. (Arcand v People 68 Phil 601) 3. Uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. (People v De Modesto, 40 OG Supp. 11, 128) 4. Defamation uttered in political meetings Common slur expressions does not necessarily result in defamation. Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
Definition: Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act which casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. This involves an act and not words.
Elements:
1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor. 2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons; 3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.
Kinds of Slander by Deed:
1. Simple 2. Grave, serious nature (depends on social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc.,
Examples:
1. Slapping the face of another is slander by deed if the intention of the accused is to cause shame and humiliation.
2. Fighting with intention to insult him is slander.
3. Kissing a girl in public and touching her breast without lewd designs, committed by a rejected suitor cast dishonor on the girl, was held to be slander by deed and not acts of lasciviousness. (People v Valencia, CA-GR No. 4136-R, May 29, 1950)
4. The act of holding a school teacher by the hair and shaking him violently in the presence of school children and other teachers, because he had stopped a boy from pursuing another, is not maltreatment but slander by deed, because of (1) the public office held by the offended party and (2) the nature and effects of the maltreatment inflicted upon him. (People v Velez, GR No. 41234, Aug. 31, 1934)
Unjust Vexation, Slander by Deed and Acts of Lasciviousness distinguished:
1. Unjust vexation: Anything that annoys or irritates another without justification.
2. Slander by Deed: Aside from annoying and irritating there is publicity and dishonor or contempt.
3. Acts of lasciviousness: Aside from annoying and irritating there is present the circumstances provided for in Art 335 on rape (use of force or intimidation, deprivation or reason or rendering the victim unconscious or if victim is under 12 years old, together with lewd designs.
Art. 200. Grave scandal. The penalties of arresto mayor and public censure shall be imposed upon any person who shall offend against decency or good customs by any highly scandalous conduct not expressly falling within any other article of this Code.
Elements:
1. That the offender performs an act or acts. 2. That such act or acts be highly scandalous as offending against decency (propriety of conduct) or good customs (established usage, social conventions carried on by tradition and enforced by social disapproval of any violation thereof). 3. That the highly scandalous conduct is not expressly falling within any other article of this Code. 4. That the act or acts complained of be committed in a public place or within the public knowledge or view (US v Samaniego 16 Phil 663), giving rise to scandal to persons who have accidentally witnessed the same.
When the acts are performed in a private house but seen by a person that is not grave scandal.
How about private sex shows? Is this grave scandal? How about private rooms in ktv establishments? Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon: (1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
How about the children of god cult? What if they raise the issue of freedom of expression? Argument in the Devils Advocate movie regarding religion and the illegal act of killing the goat. (2) (a) the authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same; (b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit, indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, and good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts; (3) Those who shall sell, give away (distribute) or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. (As amended by PD Nos. 960 and 969). This offense in any of the forms mentioned in the article is committed only when there is publicity.
Moral implies conformity with the generally accepted standards of goodness and rightness in conduct or character, sometimes specifically to sexual conduct.
Author of obscene literature is liable only when it is published with his knowledge.
Test of Obscenity: The test is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprive or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands such a publication may fall and also whether or not such publication or act shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Indecency is an act against the good behavior and a just delicacy. (US v Kottinger, 45 Phil 352). This case though looked at isolated passages and madea decision. In the Kalaw Katigbak case, the work was viewed suing the dominant theme of the work to see if it appeals merely to prurient interests.
Mere nudity in pictures or paintings is not necessarily obscenity. The proper test is whether the motive of he picture as indicated by it is pure or impure or whether it is naturally calculated to excite impure imaginations.
LEO PITA- PINOY PLAYBOY vs. CA
On Obscenity
Magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were confiscated and burned.
"Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw-Katigbak measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work rather than isolated passages
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it. What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. Lack of uniformity as to what constitutes obscene.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action.
As so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. We have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene".
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALOVA
Exhibit sa building ng immoral scenes and acts- act as performers or exhibitionists to perform and in fact performed sexual intercourse in the presence of many spectators- highly immoral daw.. tapos police after the show conducted a raid and made arrests..completely naked, lascivious acts, consisting of petting, kissing, and touching the private parts of each other. When sufficiently aroused, they lay on the bed and proceeded to consummate the act of coitus in three different positions which we deem unnecessary to describe. The four or five witnesses who testified for the Government when asked about their reaction to what they saw, frankly admitted that they were excited beyond description.
We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. Kotinger
The postcards/ pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." (gets?)
Section 12 of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, provides punishment, among other things, for any person when keeps for sale, or exhibits, any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book or other matter. The phrase in the law "or other matter," was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." The rule of ejusdem generis is by no means a rule of universal application and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative intent.
The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastity; decency, or delicacy.
Indecency is an act against good behavior and just delicacy.
The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Laws penalizing obscenity are made for society in the aggregate and not in particular. The test, therefore, is: What is judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by the publication or other matter? What is the probable reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society extending to the family?
The pictures which depict the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as they actually live, without attempted presentation of them in unusual posture of dress, are not offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. Pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions, in which they live, are not obscene or indecent.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GO PIN
exhibited in a recreation center, a large number of one-reel films allegedly indecent and/or immoral. For the sake of art- X offensive
Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of the kind are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of art but profit would commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and the case of art only of secondary or minor importance.
Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. (This is a dangerous test as the venue would dictate whether a work is indecent or not. What about books sold in fully booked?) GONZALEZ- MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, BRMPT The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." There is the further issue then, also one of first impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the objections raised. Thus the relevance of this constitutional command: "Arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the State.
may pinapadelete- impermissible restraint of artistic expression The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification. 1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. The "importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. 13
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. 4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity and rightly so. "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance, unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. 5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene. "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity. 6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever on guard against any impermissible infringement on the freedom of artistic expression calls to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Bustos, 22
decided in 1918. While recognizing the principle that libel is beyond the pale of constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in determining what constitutes such an offense, a court should ever be mindful that no violation of the right to freedom of expression is allowable. 7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous. 24 Further: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. 25
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to respondent Board "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, 26 words which can be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. 27
That is a constitutional mandate. It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. As so wen put by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, "the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit" 28 in this sensitive area of a man's personality. On the question of obscenity, therefore, and in the light of the facts of this case, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision 29 citing the language of Justice Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 30 it is "an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. 31 As thus construed, there can be no valid objection to the sufficiency of the controlling standard and its conformity to what the Constitution ordains. 9. This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the amended petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes." 32 Further: "Respondents further stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film." 33 Petitioners, however, refused the "For Adults Only" classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari. 10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. 34 it cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.