JONI J.

JONES (7562)
DAVID N. WOLF (6688)
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Facsimile: (801) 366-0101
E-mail: jonijones@utah.gov
E-mail: dnwolf@utah.gov

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

M. J. aka ELISSA WALL,

Plaintiff,
v.

WARREN JEFFS, THE FUNDAMENTALIST
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER
DAY SAINTS, formerly known in part as The
Work or The Priesthood Work and also known
as the CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,
THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER
DAY SAINTS, THE UNITED EFFORT PLAN
TRUST, and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,

Defendants.

UT AH ATTORNEY GENERAL`S
ME MORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF
MOTI ON T O I NT ERVENE



Civil No. 070916524

Judge Keith A. Kelly



Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) and 24(a) and (b), the Utah Attorney General
('Attorney General), through counsel, hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of his
Motion to Intervene.
I. I NTRODUCTI ON
The Attorney General seeks to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of
conducting discovery to uncover the purpose of the settlement agreement entered into between
Plaintiff, Elissa Wall ('Wall) and Alan Steed ('Steed), the man she has accused oI sexually
abusing and raping her when she was a child. The settlement agreement between Wall and Steed
raises concerns that they may be conspiring to defraud the Trust. The Attorney General only
recently learned of the existence of this settlement agreement and, thus, his motion is timely.
Moreover, given the Court`s recent ruling reopening discovery and continuing the trial date, the
Attorney General`s participation in discovery will not delay the proceedings or prejudice Wall.
And, the Attorney General is uniquely situated to assist the Trust and the Court in discovering
the truth in this matter. While Wall has denied claims of a conspiracy to defraud, Steed has
refused to answer questions, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Unlike the Fiduciary, it is within the Attorney General`s discretion to grant immunity from
prosecution to Steed or others who may have knowledge about the settlement agreement, but
have concerns that they may incriminate themselves by disclosing such knowledge. With a grant
of immunity, individuals with knowledge of the settlement agreement would no longer need the
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment and, thus, the truth about the purpose of the
settlement agreement may be discovered.
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I I. F A CTS
1. On May 26, 2005, the Utah Attorney General filed a petition in the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, seeking the removal of the then current trustees
and the appointment oI new trustees Ior the United EIIort Plan ('UEP) Trust.
2. In its petition, the Attorney General also asked for the appointment of a Special
Fiduciary to protect the assets of the UEP Trust.
3. On June 22, 2005, the court granted the Attorney General`s petition and appointed
a Special Fiduciary to protect the assets of the UEP Trust.
4. On October 25, 2006, Judge Denise Lindberg reformed the UEP Trust.
5. Over the past eight years, the UEP Trust has been inundated with litigation.
6. Included among the litigation that has been brought against the Trust are Wall`s
claims that are before this Court.
7. Wall has alleged, inter alia, that Warren Jeffs, a former trustee for the UEP Trust,
used the Trust to facilitate crimes of sexual abuse and statutory rape.
8. Wall seeks to hold the Trust responsible for the wrongful acts of the former
trustees.
9. On May 15, 2014, the Fiduciary provided the Attorney General with a copy of a
settlement agreement entered into between Wall and Steed.
10. The Settlement Agreement contains a confidentiality provision, whereby Wall and
Steed agreed 'that the terms of [the Settlement] Agreement shall be held in confidence and not
disclosed to any individuals other than [Wall and Steed], their attorneys or any court of
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competent jurisdiction in the event of a breach of this agreement . . . . See Settlement
Agreement 8.
11. Paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement provides:
Once Steed`s claims against Wall have been dismissed from the Civil Action,
neither Steed nor his counsel will participate in the Civil Action in a manner
which is confrontational or adversarial in regards to Wall or her legal interest, nor
assist the Trust in any way in defending itself against Wall`s claims. Steed agrees
that neither he nor his counsel will participate in the scheduled deposition of Wall
and that his participation at the trial of this matter will be limited to defending his
own personal interests that remain subject to third party claims at the time of trial.
Any examination of Wall or any witness called by Wall at trial shall be limited to
subject matter necessary for the defense of third party claims, and shall not
include hostile questions. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to deprive
Steed of his right to counsel in relation to the Civil Action and, subject to the
foregoing, he retains the right to defend third party claims which have not been
anticipated as of the time of the execution of this Agreement.

12. Based in part of the content of the settlement agreement between Wall and Steed,
the Fiduciary filed a Motion to Dismiss.
13. A hearing on the Fiduciary`s Motion to Dismiss was held on May 21, 2014, aIter
which the Court took the Fiduciary`s Motion to Dismiss under advisement.
14. The Court`s docket indicates that on May 23, 2014, the Court held a telephonic
hearing with counsel of record and issued its ruling.
15. The Court denied the Trust`s motion to dismiss, but granted the Trust`s motion to
continue the trial date and reopen fact discovery. The Court specifically stated that '[t]he court
will make remedies regarding the failure to disclose. The settlement agreement that plaintiff
made with a third party defendant to be fully disclosed with no cover ups. Failure to cooperate
with discovery may result in pleadings being stricken and deIault entered.
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16. Discovery has been reopened and trial is now scheduled for January 20, 2015.
17. The Attorney General is charged with protecting the interests of the beneficiaries
of the UEP Trust.
18. The Attorney General also has an interest in assisting this Court with protecting
the integrity of the judicial process.
19. The Attorney General seeks to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of
conducting discovery to determine whether Wall and Steed have conspired to try to defraud the
Trust.
I I I. ARGUMENT
A. T HE AT T ORNE Y GENERAL SHOULD BE AL L OWED T O I NT ERVENE
AS OF RI GHT.

'Under rule 24(a), a court must allow a party to intervene if that party can establish that
(1) its motion to intervene is timely, (2) the party has an interest in the subject matter` of the
litigation, (3) the party`s interest is or may be inadequately represented,` and (4) the party is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action.` Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495, 500 (Utah 2005)
(quoting Moreno v. Bd. of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996)). The Attorney General of Utah
meets the test for intervention in this case.
1. The Motion to Intervene is Timely.
On May 15, 2014, the Utah Attorney General first learned of the existence of an
agreement between Wall and Steed. A confidentiality provision is contained within the
agreement, which prevented its disclosure absent a court order. On May 9, 2014, this Court
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issued its order granting the Fiduciary`s motion to remove the settlement agreement`s
confidentiality designation. On May 15, 2014, counsel for the Trust provided the Attorney
General with a copy of the agreement. The Attorney General has acted quickly in seeking to
intervene in this action. Had Wall or her counsel disclosed the agreement earlier in the litigation,
the Attorney General could have intervened earlier. Thus, it was Wall`s decision to withhold the
document from public view that has delayed the Attorney General`s intervention in the litigation.
Accordingly, Wall should not be heard to complain that the Attorney General`s intervention into
this case is not timely.
2. The Attorney General Has an Interest in the Subject Matter of This Litigation.
The UEP Trust is a charitable trust. The Attorney General is charged with protecting the
interests of beneficiaries of charitable trusts. Over the past two years, the Attorney General has
been working with the Fiduciary, the Arizona Attorney General, and Judge Lindberg to appoint a
new board of trustees and return control of the Trust to the community. The new board, if
appointed, would be free to decide whether to distribute Trust assets and, if so, how best to
provide for the interests of all Trust beneficiaries.
Wall seeks damages against the Trust in the amount of $30 to $40 million. If Wall
obtains the judgment she seeks, the Trust will be required to sell homes in which other Trust
beneficiaries currently reside to satisfy the judgment. The Attorney General recognizes that Wall
is entitled to prosecute her claims against the Trust and may seek damages from any defendant
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who caused her harm.
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However, because the Trust is a charitable trust, a more orderly
distribution of Trust assets is preferable to the race to the courthouse that will likely ensue if
Wall obtains a judgment against the Trust based on the wrongIul acts oI the Trust`s Iormer
trustees.
Moreover, the recent allegations of fraud, collusion and conspiracy threaten not only the
assets of the Trust but also the integrity of the judicial process. Wall and Steed entered into the
settlement agreement on February 18, 2011, the very same day that Steed was sentenced for his
crimes against Wall. The Trust contends that Wall agreed to speak in favor of a more lenient
sentence for Steed in exchange for Steed not testifying against Wall`s interests in the civil action
she had filed against the Trust. At the recently held hearing on the Trust`s motion to dismiss,
counsel for the Trust further asserted that Steed has agreed to withhold the truth and even lie to
advance Wall`s claims against the Trust because Wall threatened him with advocating for a life
sentence in prison should he refuse.
Wall disputes the Trust`s contentions, claiming that her cooperation at Steed`s criminal
sentencing had nothing to do with their settlement agreement in the civil action. Steed has
refused to answer questions related to the settlement agreement, invoking his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Wall`s prior counsel, who drafted the settlement agreement, has
refused to answer questions about the settlement agreement based on claims of attorney-client

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On March 12, 2014, the Trust filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal raising issues concerning
whether the Trust is legally responsible for the prior wrongful conduct of the former Trustees
and, thus, whether the Trust is an appropriate party to this action. On May 23, 2014, the Utah
Supreme Court granted certiorari and accepted the Trust`s Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
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privilege. The Attorney General seeks to intervene as a party to this action for the limited
purpose of conducting discovery to obtain information concerning the intent of Wall and Steed in
entering into this agreement. The Attorney General has a duty not only to the beneficiaries of the
charitable trust, but also to the integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, the Attorney
General must be allowed to intervene as a party in this case to attempt to discover whether Wall
and Steed have attempted to obstruct justice by entering into an illegal agreement to suborn
perjury for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against the Trust.
3. The Attorney Generals Interest Is or May Be Inadequately Represented.
The Attorney General, as intervening party, 'has the burden to show that the
representation of its interests is inadequate. State v. Bosh 266 P.3d 788, 792 (Utah 2011)(citing
Beacham v. Fritzi Realty Corp., 2006 UT App 35, 8, 131 P.3d 271)). 'However, this burden is
minimal, and the intervenor need show only some evidence of diverging or adverse
interests. Id.; see also Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92
S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972). Here, the Attorney General`s interests in this litigation are not
fully represented by the Trust or its counsel. While the Fiduciary has an interest in preserving
Trust assets, the Attorney General`s duty is broader as he seeks to assist the Court in protecting
the integrity of the judicial process.
In addition, the Attorney General may be better situated to help uncover the truth in this
matter. Unlike the Trust, it is within the Attorney General`s discretion to oIIer Steed immunity
from criminal prosecution. Presently, it is unclear what conduct Steed seeks to protect by
invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Double jeopardy prevents the
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State of Utah from trying Steed twice for the same crime. However, Arizona did not file
criminal charges against Steed based on Wall`s allegations oI sexual abuse and statutory rape.
Accordingly, if Steed is invoking his Fifth Amendment rights to protect himself from Wall`s
allegations of sexual abuse and statutory rape, then only Arizona would be able to offer Steed
immunity from those crimes in exchange for his testimony concerning the intent of the
settlement agreement. However, Steed could also be concerned that disclosing the truth about
the settlement agreement may subject him to criminal charges for suborning perjury, obstruction
of justice, witness tampering or theft by extortion. If Steed is invoking the Fifth Amendment to
protect himself from admitting to crimes for which he has not yet been prosecuted by the State of
Utah, then it would be within the Attorney General`s discretion to offer Steed immunity from
prosecution in exchange for testifying truthfully about the settlement agreement.
4. The Attorney General Is or May Be Bound by a Judgment in this Action.
Rule 24(a) states that a party may intervene iI the action may 'as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest. A judgment against the Trust could have a
significant impact on the interests of the beneficiaries. The Attorney General is charged with
protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Moreover, a judgment obtained by
nefarious and perhaps illegal means tarnishes the integrity of the judicial process. The Attorney
General has an interest in assisting the Court to try to prevent such an injustice from occurring.
While it is possible that an illegally obtained judgment could be subsequently set aside, see Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (6), it is far preferable to allow the Attorney General to intervene prior to any
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judgment being entered in this case.
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B. T HE AT T ORNE Y GENERAL SHOULD BE PERMI T T ED T O
I NT ERVENE.

Utah R. Civ. P. 24(b) states:

Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene;
or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or
defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a governmental
officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon
timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

In this case, the Trust has raised the defense of fraud. The Trust claims that Wall
and Steed are attempting to defraud the Trust out of tens of millions of dollars. The
Attorney General shares a common interest with the Trust in uncovering any fraud that
may exist. Accordingly, the Attorney General should be permitted to intervene as a party
in this action for the limited purpose of assisting with discovery to uncover the truth
behind the settlement agreement between Wall and Steed.
The Attorney General recognizes that this case has been litigated for many years.
The Attorney General anticipates that Wall will claim she is prejudiced by the Attorney
General`s intervention into this action because it will delay the proceedings. However,

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'As a general rule intervention is not to be permitted aIter entry oI fudgment . . . . State v.
Bosh, 266 P.3d 788, 791 (Utah 2011) (quoting Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Utah 1983))

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any delay that may occur cannot be 'undue delay. Balancing the respective interest, it is
clear that ensuring the integrity of the judicial process and preventing possible fraud
against the Trust outweighs any minimal delay that may occur. Moreover, the delay that
may occur could have been avoided had Wall voluntarily disclosed the existence of the
settlement agreement. Instead, she and her counsel chose to hide the agreement and
fought against its disclosure. Under these circumstances, where it was Wall`s conduct
that caused the delay, Wall should not be permitted to claim she will be prejudiced by the
Attorney General intervening in this case at this time.
Moreover, given the Court`s recent decision to reopen discovery and continue the
trial date, allowing the Attorney General to intervene in this action for the limited
purpose of participating in discovery does not prejudice Wall. Instead, the Attorney
General`s intervention will enhance the likelihood that the settlement agreement is 'Iully
disclosed with no cover ups, as is expressly required by the Court`s May 23, 2014
ruling. And, the Attorney General will comply with the discovery and motion schedule
currently being negotiated by the parties` counsel pursuant to this Court`s May 23, 2014
ruling. Accordingly, allowing the Attorney General to intervene will not delay these
proceedings or prejudice Wall in any way.
I V. CONCLUSI ON
For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant the Attorney General`s Motion to
Intervene.

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DATED this 29
th
day of May, 2014.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL`S OFFICE


/s/ DAVID N. WOLF
David N. Wolf
Joni J. Jones
Assistant Utah Attorneys General


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CERTI FI CAT E OF MAI LI NG

I hereby certify that on May 29, 2014, I caused a copy of the foregoing Utah Attorney
General`s Memorandum in Support of Motion to I ntervene, to be served on the following by
electronic filing with the court:
ALAN W. MORTENSEN
MICHAEL A. WOREL
LANCE L. MILNE
JEFFREY L. SHIELDS
JOHN E. HANSEN
MARK L. CALLISTER
DAVID S. BRIDGE
JACOB D. LYONS
DUSTIN D. GIBB
JIM C. BRADSHAW
MARK R. MOFFAT
and the following to be served via U.S. first-class, postage prepaid mail:


William G. Walker
WILLIAM G. WALKER, P.C.
177 N. Church Avenue, Suite 700
Tucson, AZ 85701

/s/ Cecilia Lesmes