Kevin J.

Bulotano
ALS 1B
Legal Writing


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT


LITO CORPUZ
Petitioner,

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent

DECISION

Petitioner Lito Corpuz filed a petition for review on certiorari in relation with the
Decision and Resolution of Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration promulgated by the
Honorable Court of Appeals on March 22, 2007 and on September 5, 2007 respectively.

The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the petitioner Lito
Corpuzs appeal and affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando
City with a modification on the imposable prison term such that Corpuz will instead
suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus an additional 1 year for each P10,000 embezzled
garnering a total of 15 years.

The Honorable Court of Appealss Resolution still found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of estafa and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
they have stated in their Decision.

In his petition, Corpuz questions the constitutionality and validity of the penalty
that has been imposed against him.

Facts

Danilo Tangcoy, private respondent, met petitioner Lito Corpuz at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City in 1990. They were both employed in JBL Incorporated.

On May 2, 1991, Corpuz asked Tangcoy if he had any pieces of jewelry that can
be sold. Tangcoy had pieces of jewelry amounting to P 98,000 at that time. Corpuz told
Tangcoy that he was interested to sell the jewelry. Tangcoy agreed that Corpuz would
sell the jewelry within sixty days. After that period, Corpuz shall return the proceeds or
will return the pieces of jewelry if not sold.

The 60-day period lapsed on July 5, 1991. Corpuz failed to remit the proceeds and
return the pieces of jewelry. Tangcoy was able to locate Corpuz after two months. The
latter promised that he will pay for the jewelry but still failed to do so.

Corpuz was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75,
Olongapo City. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for four years and two months to
fourteen years and eight months.

Corpuz then filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Honorable Court of
Appeals Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Courts Judgment. However the penalty
was modified to four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of
prision mayor as maximum with an additional incremental penalty of one year for each
additional P 10,000 that totaled to a maximum of 15 years. Corpuz filed for a motion for
reconsideration in the same court but was denied.

Issues

The main issue that this case will answer is whether or not the Court, given their
power of judicial review, can modify the penalty imposed on Corpuz under the felony of
estafa. The Office of the Solicitor General provided in its comment a specific outline of
other related issues in lieu with the main issue. They are as follows:

I. Whether or not the penalty imposed on Corpuz should be modified by
considering the present value of the thing subject to his offense adjusted to the 1932
prices, considering that the legislature decided in the amounts subject to these penalties in
1932.

II. Whether or not that portion of Article 315 that imposes a maximum penalty
based on the amount of fraud exceeding P 22,000 should be declared unconstitutional and
void for being disproportionate and excessively harsh in view of the decline of the value
of money since 1932.

III. Whether or not the Court can exercise the power of judicial review despite the
fact that the petitioner failed to raise any constitutional challenge.

IV. Whether or not a mode or duration of penalty can violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Unusual Punishment Clause.

V. Whether or not Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code violates the Equal
Protection Clause and the Unusual Punishment Clause.

The Court will answer the issues outlined by the Office of the Solicitor General in
order to provide an in-depth analysis of the case.

Discussion

I & II. The penalty imposed on Corpuz should be modified because there has been a
failure in properly expressing the legislative intent of the provision that resulted to a
harsh and unfair decision.

The penalty imposed on Corpuz should be modified because it is unjust and unfair
for the accused. Corpuz was not accorded the proper application of the penalty under the
felony charged against him. There is a clear disproportionality between the amount of
money embezzled and the imposable penalty as a result of the misapplication and
misinterpretation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, it is important to first note that such mere disproportionality between
the embezzled value vis--vis the penalty is not the sole reason for Article 315 to be
considered unconstitutional. Article 315 is not void for simply being disproportionate and
excessively harsh. The Court considers that the provision does not render Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code in violation of the Constitution in this manner. This matter would
be separately discussed below.

The penalty imposed against Corpuz should be modified not because it is merely
disproportionate and harsh but rather it should be modified because it does not clearly
express the legislative intent behind the provision. The clear disproportionality between
the embezzled amount and the penalty is only a proof for such wrong interpretation of the
law.

The Revised Penal Code was promulgated in the 1950s. The basis of the
legislature back then for the penalty under the felony of estafa would be none other than
the value of money during that period. Half a century has already passed and the value of
peso has drastically declined over time. Literally applying the provision without taking
into account the possibilities of deflation and other economic factors that could contribute
to affect the value of peso would result to absurd decisions involving individuals charged
with grave penalties for amounts of money that is considered little in value in contrast
with the value of money during the 1950s. The legislature did not expect such change in
value of money and was not able to take into consideration the possible deflation of peso
in Article 315 and other similar provisions. But it cannot be similarly said that they
intended the values used as bases to be fixed absent any proofs. Hence, the Court should
interpret the law to provide clarification.

Visually speaking, an amount P20,000 in the 1950s would have a higher value
than that of an amount P20,000 during the present time due to the decline in the value of
peso. It would be unfair for a person in the present time who embezzled the amount of
P20,000 to be imprisoned for the same length of time similar to that of a person in the
1950s who embezzled the same amount. Given the value of money and its decline over
time, the person in the 1950s has embezzled an amount of money higher in value than
that of the person who embezzled the same amount in the present time. Again, it would
result to an absurdity involving a person who committed a felony of a lesser degree but
imposed with a higher penalty.

The penalty imposed on Corpuz should be modified because there has been a
failure in expressing the true intent and meaning of the penal provision of Article 315.
The law is capable of varying interpretation, particularly those amounts used in
determining the penalty that will be imposed on the felon. The amounts included in the
penal provision of Article 315 could either refer to: a) an exact amount as provided and b)
a value that is capable of changing due to inflation and economic reasons.

It is a well-known rule that any penal law should be strictly construed against the
State and should be in favor of the accused.
1
The Court should not easily decide on cases
when the law is obviously unclear and capable of multiple interpretations. Agpalo
comments on the matter that if the statute is ambiguous and admits two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its
provision is to be preferred.
2
Hence, in order to accord justice to the application of the
law and the legislative intent behind the promulgation of the law, the Court must modify
the penalty given their power of judicial review.

The legal maxims legis constructio non facit injuriam (the construction of the law
will not be as such as to work injury or injustice) and lex semper intendit quod convenit
rationi (the law always intend that which is in accordance with reason) provide that any
interpretation of a given law should be that which is free from any resulting infirmity.
Given the possible interpretations of the penal clause of Article 315, the courts should
choose that interpretation which would appeal to reason and avoid injustice the
interpretation that the amounts included in the provision simply reflects a particular value
of money during a specific period of time.

In addition, a literal interpretation of the penalty clause of Article 315 that has
been done by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals would run counter
against the legal maxim verba accipiendi sunt secundum subjectam materiam (a word is
to be understood in the context in which it is used). The amount of money and property
specified in the provision, absent any clause that requires for its strict interpretation and
any notes for its literal interpretation, should be understood in the context of the period it
has been promulgated. Hence, the values of money used as bases for the penalties that
shall be imposed to an accused should be understood as equivalent to those values during
the period when the Revised Penal Code was promulgated because the legislature at that
time would not have any other basis for such. Hence, before applying such values to
present crimes, a conversion of the values must be done to reflect what the legislature had
in mind back then.


1
People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21734, September 5, 1973, 66 SCRA 545.
2
Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction (Manila: Rex Bookstore, 2009), 399.
In order to avoid any further disparity that would result into unfair decisions, the
Court should modify the penalty in lieu with the proper interpretation of the law.

III. The Court can exercise the power of judicial review in this case.

Article VII Section 1 Paragraph (2) of the 1987 Constitution states that Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

This judicial power is not without its limits. Jurisprudence cites requisites for the
application of judicial power. First, there must be an actual case ripe for adjudication.
3

Second, the person challenging the constitutionality of an act must have legal standing,
i.e. he must have a substantial interest in the case.
4
Third, the challenge must be raised at
the earliest opportunity.
5
Lastly, it must be the lis mota of the case.
6


Based on the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, the issue regarding
the application of the penalty under Article 315 has been rendered moot and academic on
the grounds of a) it has not been raised at the earliest opportunity and b) the issue is not
the lis mota of the case. Hence, the Court would not have any power over deciding on the
matter.

The Court does not agree with the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.
The petitioner was able to raise the issue of the laws constitutionality at the earliest
period. Corpuz immediately questioned the validity of the imposed penalty upon its
modification by the Honorable Court of Appeals. Also, it is certainly the lis mota of the
case because the constitutionality of Article 315 is important in the determination of the
penalty that shall be imposed against the accused.

Even if the Court takes into consideration the comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General it will still be able to exercise its power of judicial review albeit the
missing requisites pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General. According to David
v. Macapagal
7
, there are exceptions that can allow the Court to decide on the
constitutionality of an issue even if it is moot and academic. There are four requisites that
must be present:

a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
b) The situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved.

3
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955).
4
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 58, 89 (1937).
5
Ibid.
6
Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 522 (1946).
7
David v. Macapagal, G.R. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
c) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public.
d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The case has met all of these requisites. First, the misinterpretation of the law and
the misapplication of its penalty is a grave violation of the Constitution. Second, the case
is of an exceptional character that involves paramount public interest specifically
involving the clarification of the law and its proper application to real world situations.
Third, a judicial review of Article 315 and other similar laws which use the value of
money as a basis for its penalties is required to provide a clear guideline with regards to
its implementation. Finally, the issue is capable of repetition. A number of cases might
appear in the future raising their concerns regarding the confusion that such an
ambiguous law can provide. In order to prevent such scenario from happening, the Court
should decide on this issue now.

Either way, as presented above, the Court will still be able to use its power of
judicial review in order to test the constitutionality of the questioned law.

Again, the Court is able to exercise judicial interpretation in cases wherein the law
involved is ambiguous. A law is ambiguous if it is capable of admitting two or more
interpretations or meanings.
8
A law or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of providing
multiple interpretation; in such scenario, the Court should exercises its power to construe
the law and provide a clearer and proper meaning that reflects the legislative intent
behind its promulgation.
9


Garcia v. Social Security Commissions provides that:

Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the
judge to apply them regardless of personal belief or predilections when the law is
unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative.
However, where the language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an interpretation
thereof is resorted to.
10


As mentioned in the previous section, the penal provision of Article 315 is
capable of multiple interpretations. The amounts stated in the provision that were used as
bases for the imposable penalty could either refer to: a) an exact unchanging amount and
b) an amount that can change through time due to economic reasons. In order to provide
clarity in such an ambiguous situation, the Court should use its power of judicial review.

The Court can indeed interpret the law and modify the penalties by its power of
judicial review as discussed above. However, it cannot decide on the basis or coefficient

8
Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction (Manila: Rex Bookstore, 2009), 124.
9
Ibid.
10
Garcia v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 179635, December 17, 2007
factor that such modification of penalty shall rest. The Court is not able to determine the
declination rate that the value of peso has experienced over time because it is not an
expert in such field. The Court leaves such duty in the hands of the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to determine the coefficient factors that
shall be used as a basis to modify the penalty of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
and other similar provisions because they are experts in the said field.

IV & V. The duration of the penalty violate the Equal Protection Clause but not the
Unusual Punishment Clause.

The equal protection clause simply requires that all persons similarly situated or
are in similar circumstances be treated alike. The law should not favor anyone in
particular given a scenario wherein all persons are similarly situated. In other words, the
law should not be unevenly applied to all people situated in similar conditions.

The requisites for a valid classification under the Equal Protection Clause are as
follows:

a) It must rest on a valid substantive distinction.
b) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
c) It must not apply to present conditions only.
d) It must apply to all members of the same class.

The interpretation of the penal clause of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
done by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals will render Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code as a violation to the Equal Protection Clause. It does not meet all of
the requisites for a valid classification because of two reasons: a) it cannot be considered
germane to the purpose of the law and b) it does not apply to all members of the same
class.

First, such application and interpretation cannot be considered germane to the
purpose of the law. Article 315 takes into consideration the value of money during the
time it has been promulgated. This is the most reasonable interpretation of the law absent
any written clause that says otherwise. If that is so, then it can be said that the legislature
during that time has intended the penalties provided to be only applied using the amount
and value of money during that period. Applying the law literally side by side with the
present day standard value of money would run against the intent of the legislature.
Hence, such interpretation would not effectively give justice to what the purpose of the
law is.

Second, the classification does not apply to all members of the same class. Taking
the previous discussions into consideration, a criminal who is charged with the felony of
estafa during the 1950s could not be considered to be in the same class of criminals who
commit estafa in the present time because the value of the property that they have
embezzled are not of the same value even if the written amounts are equivalent. This is
due to the difference in their values caused by economic factors. Hence, such felons
should not be considered as members of the same class since one class embezzled a
higher value of property compared to another. In other words, they have embezzled
different values of property. Yet, the interpretations done by the Regional Court and the
Court of Appeals seem to group them in the same category.

On the other hand, Section 19 Paragraph (1) of the 1987 Constitution deals with
unusual punishment. It reads as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted.

As can be seen, the unusual punishment clause deals with two types of penalties:
fines and physical punishments. What the Constitution forbids are excessive fines and
cruel physical punishments. The case involves the penalty of the deprivation of liberty - a
type of physical punishment. Hence, the Court should discuss whether or not the penalty
under Article 315 is cruel, degrading or inhuman in relation with the guidelines that
jurisprudence has created for physical punishments.

A penalty or physical punishment that seems harsh and excessive does not
immediately equate to being cruel, degrading or inhuman. According to People v.
Estoista
11
, a penalty must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community in order to be considered as a cruel and unusual punishment. In other words,
it should run counter to the moral values of the society for it to be deemed as cruel.

Furman v. Georgia
12
provided the requisites necessary to determine whether or
not a penalty is cruel or unusual:
a) A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the
dignity of human beings.
b) It must not be applied arbitrarily.
c) It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
d) It must not be excessive.

The penalty of deprivation of liberty provided in Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code does not breach the unusual punishment clause. A clear disproportionality between
the violation and the penalty does not result with the penalty being deemed as cruel or
unusual. There should be gross and pervert character behind the penalty involved in order
to be treated as unconstitutional for being cruel or unusual. Deprivation of liberty, in
itself, is not gross or pervert. In order for such penalty to breach the unusual penalty
clause, the deprivation of liberty should involve additional acts that are considered as
physically and emotionally inappropriate and harsh in such conditions like torture and
other similar gestures.

Conclusion

11
People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655.
12
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 1972.

The Court could not always question the constitutionality of a law. It cannot even
modify or express any form of construction when the law speaks clearly. However, the
situation beforehand is an exceptional one. The penal provision of Article 315 is
confusing and is capable of misinterpretation.

It should be noted that there has been a significant decline in the value of money
over time. The provision of the law in question does not take into account the possibility
of any changes in the value of money. Given that the value of money involved in the
crime of estafa is critical in the resulting penalty the felon could be imposed with, should
the courts decide on the matter by simply reading the law plainly as it is written? It
should not. A plain reading of the penal provision of Article 315 would result into absurd
decisions resulting to accused individuals who embezzle a small amount of money who
will be imprisoned for longer periods than they should be. Also, doing so would be a
failure to properly express the reasoning of the legislature behind this law. Hence, a
judicial interpretation with regards to the application and construction of the law is
needed in order to give justice to the spirit of the law. The Court can do this by modifying
the penalty scheme through the conversion of the base amounts written in Article 315 and
other similar laws with their present day value using a coefficient factor based on the
trend in the decline of the value of peso and other similar economic reasons. The
conversion of the amounts present in Article 315 and other similar provisions will help in
the determination of a new standard for imposable penalties a fair and just standard that
embodies the intent of the legislature and reflects the economic changes affecting the
value of peso.

However, the Court cannot take the duty of creating a conversion/coeffcient factor
between the values of money included in the penal clause of Article 315 and other similar
provisions with that of the present day money because the Court is not an expert in such
field. Hence, the Court requests the help of the Department of Trade and Industry and
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to enlighten the judicial body in such area of concern and
help the Court in postulating fair penalty schemes for felonies that use values of money
as basis for the imposition of penalties by providing a conversion rate which reflects the
decline in the value of money due to economic factors.

WHEREFORE, in view of the above, the petition for Review on Certiorari is
AFFIRMED. The case shall be returned to the Court of Appeals to be reviewed taking
into consideration the discussions of the Court found above. The Court of Appeals shall
be remanded to modify the penalty of the accused using the economic standards that will
be created with the help of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas.

SO ORDERED.