SMALLWARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940
CHAPTER VI
INFANTRY PATROLS
-
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFPICE
WASAINGTOK :1340
S t i 1 ~ 1 i 1 !YE~I,s J ~ ~ I I I I I : I ~ . 1:. S. %I : I I . ~I I I , , 1!)4(l> ( . ; <t qi + i* 1)11lilisl1v<L
i:,I t c l ~ i ~ p t e x . s :IS f r ~l l c t ws :
( . I l i \ l ' l > ~ 1. IS' rl i ot)U(' rnOS.
11. Ot10ANlZi\T10S. ,
111. IIK~l RPI<' B.
IV. 'rIlAISINf:.
V. INITIAI, OPN:llri'l'lOSS.
YI. ISF,\NTIlY I*A'F1iOLS.
p&d
UNCLASSIFIED
SMALL WARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
(IH.\~TICR YI
INFANTRY PATROLS
Par.
SIGCTION \VIL ... . .6- I I - - 5 I. SJI.ILI, T.LCTICR..
Ir. f)llDKIlS AND GENF:IIAI, 1S-
srrLnCTIONs .. 6- ii to ii- 8
111. OI ZC. ~I ZI NG INFAXTHI- THE
YATILOI ...-..--........ . .6- 9 to 6--30
XV. FEEDING I'GHSONXEI,.. 6-31 to 6--37 TBE: .
V. TIIE: ~I ARCI Z ._...6-38 t o6-56
TTI. R s c o x s ~ ~ s s ~ ~ c s a ~ ~ 6-57 to 6-68 SECUIIITI.
V11. I,.\vlrG A ~ ~ ~ u s n e s .... 6-69 to6-74
VIII. ATI~.\CKIXG S n r n r r s ~ ~ s .... 6--75to 6-79
1X. ATTACKING HOUSESA S D S~. \ l , l ,
111vou.~cs. .....-. . .. 6--80to 6--82
X. STIIATAGE:MS .. to 6--87 ASDKUSES. .. 6~-83
XI. ILIvI,;~ (Iitossr~cs. . .. .. .. ... 6-88to6---97
XII. SPI:CI.\LOPEI~ATIOXS. . . .. .. . 6-98 to 6 - 9 9
S~:crrctz1
SMAI,I. WAR TACTICS
Ir*. I N*
'i'srlir.6 dovi:ig ir8iti:tl
'rnriirs dl i ri n)~tatcr 1
It~ll~8ct,ce of tcrraiil
'Tho pritrcilda a1 tlio ofierriir-1,. ..
'l'li<! lirit~cipicno f lt~&L%;,l ~ t ~ ~ v ~ ! r x ~ c t 8 t , : ~ur$~ri s c, : u t ~ l wcltrity
.
(i l
(i 2
6:i
(1 ,&
6 i
1
1
2
2
2
(;.I. 'racticn during i ni t i al ph:tsex.-- I )r~ri:igt l ~ vi ~ t i t i t i l~ll~:rxes of
i r i t ~~r v~r ~t i <~~r , : I I I ~ irtI:irr<l i1111y II~.o ~ I ~ I o ~ ~ : I I \vIieri the I:tiiili~~g I I I O~ ~ ~ I I ~ I : I I ~
11.v r i ~~~~~~: r r t c t i ~c ~l y ~ ~ l(sil> itrg:i~iiz<~d, eqtrij~l~<~el l:~rg<<, 1 1 >r i i cI Irwstilc>
f<ircrr?tlic. 1:rctiua cnll~loyecl :lye p~ne?t~trlly thi~iu of :I force of silliiln~.
i ~ n ~ ~ r g t l i onp:rgc~d io irlttjcrr \v:rrf:~re. a cr~lslritip :r11<1 c~~ni l ~asi t i o~r If
tliafe:rt vrrl: u11o11 tlvac. forctes, the i111rne11i:ttc~ In: ir~fIi<.ted wssatiun of
xr1:11-d opl ~wi t i or~ rrir:y rpsr~lt. 'l'l~is is selclurr~ :rci~itrvrd. IJsrlelly t11cb
Iro.ilile forces will witlrdrs\v as II I KI ~S illto tllc. I I I ~ I ~ R 1)irrt~ ri!itl<~te of
r l ~c . colrrrtry, or rrsill LK! tlispc~enli r r t cr I I I ~ I I I C ~ I I I S srt~all groops whicl~
contiirae t o 1Cve11 tlro11g11 tire rcscognize~l oppose the oci~olrt~tio~i.
1e:lllers rntly caltitrilate. s ~t l w~r ~l i ~~nt e oftcli rofrrs ci~rrrr~r:~r~ilers to abidt.
Iry t110 tarrns of calrittrlidiorr. Escspiirp to tlln Itintcrlnod, 111(!y as-
&~~eiblc' rrrroc.r! I~etc?r.o~g~!neo~rs glotrps of pal riotic a,lcliem, rz:oIcorlft~~rts,
~totr~riorrs out l a\ ~s, rrr~rl impl-r!ssecl civili:rrrx, :oitl, by rneruls of grlerrill:r
rval.farc, eoritirrrrr: l o Irnrass :ii:d 01)11013(: tltc! i~~tt:r-v(:nir~p in i t s ~OSCP
oltetilpt to restore I>t*ace rrlld g<toil c~r.dc!r tlirortglrout tire roenlr). u s :L
wbolo.
(i-2. 'I'ztctics duri ng later phases.--1'0 corr~l~irt s11r11 icctior~, tllc i t : -
terverlil~g ftrt?.~~ rrlr~st reror-t to t.ypical xtr1:11l w\.nr o~inrntiorrs, with
rrrcrlrc?mlrs iirfatrtry ~rat rol s srid ~ ~ t ~ i o s t s i~ witle area, ~lispew!d over
i l l onlnr ti1 rlftonl tlio ~r~aximtrrn to Il ~o inlr:~bit,ant? ~~r i ~t cct i on irc!a~.efi~l
of tlie cottrltry itocl to st& ctlrt nllcl rl(*ntl.c,g tile iioxtile ~ " " I ~ I I I S . T11c>
tsi~tios of R I I B ~irlfi~~rtry pn.trols r\re 11:lsictllly tlrc! ~r~ilit.:lrf r~~t~tliodu,
prirsi[rlas, rirrtl doctrirlc*~ of rtiinor t:tctie:sl ill ilie a~a~ri ral s trs ~~lescribl-d
~wt c~i ni ri g The ma- tc, tile conrbat l)riiicililas of tlie ~ i n i t uci~ncetr~ccl.
jorit,y GI( COII~:IU:~S is irr tlic. or sur- in st~iall \VILYU iratlriu. ctf arnlt~tdres,
prist3-rncxting erlg<t:ll(learents, i ~ rwbict~ tlrtt \,itrioos s~rlxlivisi~rnii of :I
etrrnll patml may be t rroegl ~l a1111i)st si~n~rlttrt~eor~sly IBcr otrerriirg o ~ ~ < l r r
Irostile- fire. ' n~i s Ilrcwents the tiorrnul clc?veloprnerrl ancl deployrrest
SWM 63-3
, s>f , t ~, t , \$-.\I: ' :.\c-~I(' s
1:1rg1~ IH>XY?Y~T. of r111'
q,f t l ~ ?i~ornn~nr,<i for i~iir~~it;it.
~ I I II;I~I,O~S> 111051
ZI I : I ~I I b n ~l , ~ <C*C:~I[N!i l i c , IIIII-$~ fi r<, :111ck ~ ~ t t ~ l s ~ ~ ~ l l t ~ l l ~ ~ ~ III:I>- i ~ \ i t i : ~ l c t f 1ll:lY
t ~c- d,,\~,-l~>p-tl f~ SOI~I~.>:I~ fr(111~ ~(I~~IIIIII 21t11l , 1 ~ 1 d ~ ~ , ~ t ~ l tl l ? ITIII~C~I i n 1111
<>r t l l <~<l ~l x llltiilll~~r.
(;-.:I. I nl i t l erl ce of terrai n.----' l ' i ~+~ t i I i p:ltI'(l[s ill
~~~o! i r ~r : ~ti,fir5ir i i ~~. rai i i 9eIllr. as t ~t osl rill olribll crS1.r :ire,. ill gl~lr(~r.;il. I l l 1 1
~ ~ - : ~ r f s ~ r e i n 21 111:1,i<jrt st ~r. Si ~i c <~ tt>rr11i11i s 11111ri~ tlrl- ~II~-V:I~~!JIIS , ~~I ~I I
V~III~:I~~WI!~ r~g111!ir tl i t* I:ttter, 1ist121lly t r y i t ! t roo^>,- t1,:11it o i vr , ~g~~l : ~r s,
t o :rv<,i~l i'r,ltill:tt III~<~PI. t l ~r s~x is :I ~I'SIIII, ~~: i t I ' ol s ~~o~i f i i t i o~i s , ii~fitt~tr!
+ ~ ~ t ~ ; ! ~ + ~ l i n 11115 1111tbr~I~I;ISI>S c a r SIII:III gi*t~vz,:~Ily \v:irs o l ) e i ' i ~ l i i ~ ~ ~ s I I I I I S~
i . o p ~\ vi l l i tlrv ~ r i i l i t t ~ v ~ I~~I(.(IIIII~I~I.I'(~ill ~ I T I I I I ~ ill 11101111- ~T~U~,/I-IIIS
i:tit!c~trs,\ ~ < ~ ~ t l t > t l I~vniiil* \vi111 tlt!? II~~I~III~IIII~ \ - i si t ~i l i t y : i ~i ( l l i ~ ~ ~ i t t > t l IIIVIC
<,f c t ~t i t ~~: ~l i z ~~, i t v>~~t r ol , 'S'i~(-s(s1;1rii,,<: t r ~ :III:I~O~~IIIS t o i 11ci s1~ l,rl3-
I I I I : I I o r ~I I I I I ill \voo(lc<l ~I~(>:IS ill IIIII~II~
~\ -: ~rf l l vt ~.
I ; - . I . The pr i nci pl e of t he ofl ensi ve.--~Srl inrig 31s tllt-rt. is ltr~~ir(l
ol q~~,si i ti c>~ir l t r tl i r f i ~r cc i l i ast 1nai11tai11 10 , ~<, c~~l , : ~t i <i n, i ~ ~ t c ~ r v c ~ ~ i ~ i g
I i t f I s i c 11~lt.fc~r~si\,e I f i t i ~t i t r l ~t s irttitacli. 11y
L'xr.:istr~~i~lg IIIIII.I~ (.ili(,s :111d~OYI.IIS i v i t , l l ~ i ~ t IIUCIIIII- o111yIIIC ~ITI~J(I~~IIII~
p:111yi11g r.or~rIrat. 11;ltrols t l i r ~~ugl ~c i ~t t . ti l e tlic!nter o f c~perstic~ns, r ni ~~ol .
o ~ ~ ~ ~ w i i t i ~ i ~ r inart*nseto a l i ~ r r ~ r i ~ ~ g h to t the force vi.ili sc~nt l ) ~: o~) or t i o~~s.
gt l erri l l : ~ itrnrter., if t ~nrnol o$t e~i t he impressiorl inhi s activities, c r e i ~ t ~ : ~
nmotrg ti l e nnt i ve pi i [ ~~dat i i m that t l ~ e irctorvt.rling forces nra i afc.ri or
t o llirrr : l u~croi t u f1or.k to Iri s strrndnrd, arrc1 t he r ~l pi cl p:i ci fi ci ~ti on of
tlis ctrur~tr.~wi l l lit, j ~opnri t i eei l . Sl tcl l i i osti l e ~I' OII~B wi l l seldont
c*1)1!11ly :i l tsck Liter i5c~gular wi l l pi l l i i gc deft:t~s(?k:sii IO\\,IIS, gfirriaorts, i ~ n t
trioled l l l c lwncc.frlI eitizcrlry, al l tl i nt(*rft?rc wit11 tl te systi!rr~s of sttpjrly
atlid corrrrrr~~nicstiorr i j f rllc. forct) ctf occitpation. 'I'he likt,tcr rmisi,
tlrcroforc-, i ~l l opt : MI l l ggl r ~r ~i v a seek out, cir1)trlrr. nl t i t r l ~l eill ortlol. t.1~
ilftstrr~y.I JI . clisl)t.r.;i, 1111: I l ~r . i l i l c\ gc.onf~s i rrl tl ~ l r i v e t.lrein frlr~ntli,,
CI~IIII~~.~. (Set. also Scv:ti(~t~ 11. Cl~;~j,tcrI. " l ' s y ~ ~ l ~ o l o g ~ . ~ ~ )
(;.-:;. The pr i nci pl es of milst% movement, surprise, and security.--
(1. ;lln~s.--I~r rtfv:~rl y cyveqy c~t~g~~gerri er~t,. grt.1up8n.ill i!,nl- Lire I ~oi t i l o
IIU~II~RI. the irk fi l ntry pat,rc~ls oli[~osc:tl t o t l ~el rr. Tl i i s strpt?ri ori ty ill
r r r r r i ~l i i ~~r IIIIIH~ IN? OV<:~(:O~IIO l ~ y i rl crel ~wdfirt,. I>OIVC~ 11t r ~~11gl ~ t.he IIIT)IX?L.
cl npl ~ryntcnt o f kmttc~r irrnlittrrt'rtt, snjrerior t r r r i ni r ~g ilrrtl morale, :inti
cl evel o~~rnent c ~ ft111r spi r i t of the offer~sive.
b. ~~fonri~~~nt.-lrifartt.ry of t i l o foKX,Illlist, ~ r i ~ t r o l s i t r l l
tlnvalof~ rnol ~i l i t,y <3qnibl to ttrrl t of ti l e O[)I)(IH~II~ ~ O ~ C P S .'I't&&? grJctvvi1Irk
gI'OlllJS Itlust h!eortti i l nn~l y hrrrt~slietl by pcbtmls s(,rkirlK tllrood,-
out tl i o theater of r,p+mtion.
SWM 6-5
r. 2Vr<?ft?<8@.-q~~rl>riw 11)- ~: \ r yi ng the r03.it<~, :LII<I i s i~?ltie%-e<l tlt!trs.
Irottr.: of clnpnrl~tri*of cltrr~bst 11ntrals, b? :irr<l liy stwi!ig*rns r ~~ol ~i l i t y.
:rt!d t . t ~ ~ s . ;!.-t.et~rof tlrr- pi16*rrillasdc<:r-etiitwiri prt,. 'Tlrts i~riclligv~icc
~w~r t i r ~r ~ to rht. r~t ~i i ~i l i l y :t:1,1 :i~tlttl,er I I ~ f'11111111\-i~~l l~i111.01~ in ill? tllfl:,..
try of trlt(\rgttions.
1 . , , I If~ri~lcxn~y tila f<lr<+i7 irl;~si t s ic.rt-ict: of - ' of to
swurity d t i r i l ~ ~ ph:lser; of itlust bv t t ~ t *I!rtcil. srrrall \r-;i~. og~~-l.sliorts
vnl ~frdl p pnnnlr~d nptrir~st. Secarity on tllc. tnr~rclr arm a t rrst rlllts! II~, ,
~r ~~r s t nr ~t l y erlfo~.cerl tlirougirout the eltti1-e 11erioi1 i r f cxct~gr:rtion.
SE~TIOS T I
ORDERS ANDGENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
IVritten i,rrlrrs. - - - - - - - - ~. -
l?>r.
Wi
I'RCP
5
: I - - - - - . . . fi-7 5
General iartrnclions-.-~ (i-S 6
6-6 Writtenorders.-Vl~enever possilile,orilersto:t lratrolIca<lcl.
shnuld be iss~ieilin mrit,ing. This is especially true \ T ~ I ~ I I sel-era1
patrols areoperating sirnultaneot~sly in t,hesalnogeneral area. ' l ' h~
patrol leacler lr~ust assure himself t hat lie n~~clerstaiids the orders
iss~~t?d S~~bordinate. t he t o him. leaders nnd the ot11er nrenrhers of
putrnl shouldbo thoroughly infi)rmetl of such parts of the order 21s
millenablethen1tocnrry<jut themissioil of theparticular patrol,i11lc1
of theforceasn ~l rol e. For the p11rposeof secrecy itissometi~rles
necessitry t olimit the information impiuteil to itl(lividn:~l ~nemnbrrs
of thepatrol. Written ordersf~,llo\r the,gelleral for111of a ~' rgular
c~perat i o~~ order.
6-7. Verbal orders.-Because of the nature of small wav opera-
tions, verbal orderswill beissued to patrol leaders more frequently
than written orders. Suchverbal orderssliouid be as comnplete as
the situatioilperinits, andwill follow t he general formof 3x1 opera-
tions order. Patrol lenders shoul(1reduce to writing any verhal
orders or verbal modifications of writ,te~i orders received.
6-8. Generalinstructions-The forcecommandershouldpublish,
i i r the foriri of gener:~linstn~ctions, t he policies which mill goverll
tlre uctiorl of patrols i l l the theater of operat:ionsi n regard to the
following:
(I. Firingupon suspiaiotcsil~diviclt~:~ls before I I P ~ I I ~ orgr i ) ~~ps fire(l
llpoll.
6 . Firingu l m guwrillasnccornpn~lir(l by rnolnm :111i1 el~ildren.
c. 'l'he seizure of property irnd foodstuffs for the heliefit of the
patrolort oprevent itsuseby hostile forces.
d. 'The destruction of lionses.
c?. The clestruction of cropswhich mayhe of value t otlw hostile
forces.
f. Otller pertillei~t. instructioi~s regnrrlinggenerillpolicy.
SWM 6-0
SECTIOX111
OR(;ANI%INC; THE INFANTRY PATKOI,
hr. rs*e
-
H
8
Q
St.lectirrztwof units.. fi la !I ~
~ l i t ~ ~ i t t i ~ t i t ~ t &~ ~ i ~ y s i c z ~ l l ~ ~ t i I:& I(! of t,i~,? ut t f i t ....
I'd,rc,l nzi'i xulx,rdiriat<:Ir:&<l~m t i I 0 .. .. 1.5
(t--5). Definition.--21 trol is :Iilc~trrclurrt~r~t of i~ifirr~try
It i s
:I r~~iiittivy tlisl~ose(li t 1 s!!cIr :L tx~:i~~rrcr s:~l~ilivi-
11f visitirtg clc!siprirtr~l :lrerls for cornbat crr fur ot,tlt:r[ ~~~r j r ost ~s.
1:11it til:rt, i t s \,:&rii~t~x
si~rrls urtr ill sr~itflble forrnati(~~rs to engage tl~r:rl~c!trryitt~~~tctlii~tirly
srftcvcoi:t;~ctis trlrktle. 111 gerleri~l,L k ~ eirif:rr~try 1r:&t1'<11 ~11t ~t 11 ~ I Iit
\Y,II. tliffers frtstr~ ooc io a major war i n thc f ol l on~i ~~g rpsltrrts:
u. It is 111rgcr.
I) . iti s ,notSccap:tblt~ :~ctiols. of ir~del~c.n(lt!~~t
0. 1:L o[rt.r.uteo ut.gru!:tler distances, in rriibbs1rr111It i t i rrs of i~riiri:l~ir~g,
flrr~rri t s k,irst%or sl~pportitig trrqss; :L clistr~r~ct~ t s 111ftr6' of 50 t i ~ i l ~ - . j
i s ttot.I ~ I I C ~ ~ ~ I I ~ I O I I .
(1. :IL eorrtluctsitsOI ) ( *I . I L~~I I I I S for II 11111grr ptv.iot1 of tinrf;;~f~i(isi(snd
of 10 dayso r erurutlrtrativrr :II'I, ltot r~r~~~si rt ~l .
; .
SWM f-11
Oiii:,lS:%lS~; 7'lIi: 1SFA511:S l ' . ~ ~ T l l < > l ~
r.. I t is oftort C ~ I ~ I I I I I ~ ~ P ~ ~ ~ 1t-j II~ ~ ~ t i ~ ~ , ~ r t i o r i i ~ ~ c l y l:trgi' i.oii~lt:tliuiitt.
ci-lrl. Factors which govern its or gani zat i on...-St111it: ct P ilrc E:rr-
tom ti~:rtgiirc,r.n the aim ;irld c( i l t t l ~i si l i <r ~i i ri f ~%rt t ry ill :I OF : LI I ~):i tr<~l
St l l t LI l WSIY :Ire3:
n. Xi.;:qi,ni.
h. I i i f c ~ r n i s t i n ~ ~ f or ~: t ~, rif i l r(> Ir<vitilt,
e. 'Plttb pmkn:riiilit~-c t f <~*1111i;rt.
,I. S~I.CII~~~I 1111t1:Ll'llllllllt!lll 0f tile CIICIII\-.
I.. X:tt!il-t. %%-it11 reft'r~tt111. t oi t s ~ifi('f,t 1311 of 1111,tt,rr.:i i :~~ f ~: t t . t i c~i l i t ~.
t l i r ~fortltntion : i r ~ ~ l of nrcxr r~r(i i i recl I r t i @t ~ o f t hecolirrrtt~, tl i i *~r ni t ~l i er
<,ti ,.<,rricr of >t ~t i r i t , v> tilt- ~srirlc t u srrc1111s CI!II~II~ tri i i l ?. ; r l t t I ~<$I>I.~
[. I ' r t ~x i r ~i i t y of fritbri<Ilyt voqi s,
//. i t si at i <~r i~ r r i t l t l i ~ I ~ . v or ~~l ~i r i l I I : .
srll?[airt. I r ~ r ~ t ~ i i r l i ~ I ' t i ~III'I {M.I.:.(I~III<,~.t v : ~ r : i i ~ t ~ vf
~vormdt ~d.
I , . I ' rr~ont ~6. l : rs: ~i l i i l ~I v Sibr i r ~si ~t r i t r t ' r i i i t ) i l sc 1~1it1~11. t l t ~i t . t*tfi ~i t*i tcy
1111<1 :l rri l l l l l l rl l t.
X:itivv t roop$t ~v ~~i t ; i l ~l i ~. : ~ r i < lII~~~I:IIII~~II~. tItt,ir t~fIit~it~rt?,v
j. Xi i t i v~, . r t o~~i r r i l i t r i r y si r ~l t :is gt i i t l (~s7 [II~~*I~IIII(:~:rvr~iItrk~lt~. ii1tc<r1jre-
tous, r t i l c l tr:~~rsl w)rtati orr lmrsctnocl.
k. Ti me:mtl clistuit~:ri ~ r ~ ~ d r c d .
I I'roblonr oE sr ~pl ~l y.
rrr. hIc!tlroda cxf cosrrninnicntioo.
'rhv : ~l nt vi ~ f i wt rt rs art. nvrrsider(!d i n the c!atintnit! o f t l re sittiutioxr
wl r i cl ~ pret:erlea the orgtrriizntiorr of nrry pat.r.01.
&-1I.Size o f the patrol.---a. Oencr.i~l..--The ~: i t v ol In!Inrge s l ~ot ~l c l
~-i %oegl r to t l t . f qbr ~t any utlerrry force t l t ut itci t nri!asotrably esp+!t:t, t i t
t~trcouni~:r. i n t l i efrcdd. It slr~rttlcl Ilcu b b toirsatinir t11r.tlefcraivo snt l
H ~ I C T C S ~ I I ~ ~ ~ ~r osi i l e rl t t t ~cks ~ s h i l ~ : i ~ ~ ~ r ~ f r ~ r c f ~ r t r r ~ ~ i ~ ~ . i t ~ ~ s L : t t l ~ ~ ~ t ~ v i r i t i i ~ g
i f i t cri rc~t~i i t~.r.s ctterlry frtrctes of nnexpeotc~rl s t r c r ~~t l l . I t i sdt*iirr:l~ic,
i o kerq~ tht* [ ) nt r ol ira nrn::il as i scttrixistc:llt wi t httlcr r i en~i r n~r l i s l r t r ~~~~~t
c t l its ririssioli. 'I'lrn I >i rgvrt t re piitr'ol the mctrc*tlillicrtlt i t u control
irh r.crnit,:tt, tlit* tnor.c. co~l l j rl i rrrl f.i l itr rr11)1~1y~~r.rrltlerirr, i ttrfl t l r ~ r i t ov~~
i ti.nerifict:.; i r k ill(! s~rcl sc:crc8cyof rrmvc3rrrttnt. wtiy of conc.airlt~~i:.i~l
%. h'#':~r of mi~wiort.--.'rire rrrissiort :rs%ignt*clnn i i i f i r r t t r ~ patn,l iii
;Ixrnrrll wnr, xiiclr :IS ri~eotrnrtis@irrtce, seettr-ity, liaistrrr, convoy, nritl
~*critibat,i sitrrnl(goiint f , I l i ocnr~+rs[w~rrrlirt$ inrnujor. vi l r hr e. i ~l i asi (tt$
: t t ~ t Iwi l l ikfttct 1111~ strt*r~gtIr soritesi tttthi i t.~~rs of the p;tt,rt~l. it wi I l
Iu, tiesirrthle t o tr:ruc l i re p~rtml s~tWcieatlgIsrgt!t (t ertuttii?;itrt tcrtt.
~ ' o mr yo r p+?rrn:irtetdbiise i n itte tlrenterof q~er ut i ons fvorn t ~l i i cl i it
c.::it t r~i ri ri t ui ~r pntroi uinti l efield. uri eornrc)recci t r~t ~ut
H
SWM 612
G] RGASI ZI ~- G 'TtTlS lS?'As-cl<Y l~21-rlxo~,
c. Eff'ccLof terrai??.-'i'lle llatllre of t he terrain i ~r \vlriclr the patrol
~vill ol~erate has it marked inflrtnlce on its size and composition. I n
fairly open country. ~ ~ i t h roads available \vhiclr perinit tho use of
norxrlal distances \~-itl~im the c~~lollltl, reenforced rifle company or a,
1:lrger organizntio~~s opernte v i t l ~ reasonable a~nt r ol and battle can
efficiency. I n rnotintainous, rvooded terrain, where t he coluir~n must
march in single file over narrov, ~~. i udi ng trails, the ree~rforcetl rifle
platoon wit11 its combat train lras h e n fomld to be tilt. largest. unit
that car be co~itrolled effectively on t he nlarch and i n combnt. It
is the basic combilt unit in tlre later l~lrascs of snrall Ta r operation.;.
If, ill suclr terrain, the. situation requires n strooger patrol tlla~r 2%
reeuforceil rifle platoon, i t is advisable tu divide tlre columl~ into
combat, groups equiv:~lent to a l)latoon, ~narcllirlg over the same
route airrl ~vitllin supporting distance ( 5 t o 15 ~ni~iutes) of each other.
Liaisoi~ slloultl be establislrell het ~~een t he rt.111~ leadil~g patrols iuirl
head of the following patrol during halts and nt prearranged tilnc
illtervals cluriug the day's march.
6-12, Permanent roving patrols.-It is soinetiir~es desirable t o
orgai~ize a few per~nanent combat patrols wit11 roving com~nissions
tl~rougl~out tlre thentcr of operations? irreq)ecti\.e of area boulrdaries
or otller limitations. These patrols sllould be as ligl~tly equipped as
possible commellsurate with their tasks. .kuthority should ba granted
tllern to secure from the nearest outpost or garrison suclr replacmneuts
of personnel, animals, ecl~~ipnrent, aud ratious as may be requireil.
Aviation is uor~nally their nrniu source of supply while in tile field.
613. Selection of units.-a. Pewnanent o?ganizatim.-When-
ever possible, an illfantry patrol sl ~oi ~l d be composed of persoi~~lel
permn~reirtly assig~:llt!d to orgt~nized wi t s, sue11 as a squad, platoon, or
comp$tny. This applies also to attnehetl machine-gun units or otlrer
supporting \veapons.
b. Hastily o?guni~ed pafraola..-111 the rapidly c h a ~ ~ g i n , ~ situatiolm
encountered ill wars, the operatious may require the s~multaneous
movement of more pntrols tlra~r can be furnished by a single organiz:x-
tion. 111 some instances, t vo or more units from different posts mill
be combineci into a single patrol for an emergency operation. Other
situations mill require t hat supply train escorts and special duty men
berelieved and made available for patrol duty. The result of this
pressing need for nte~t is the intermingling of pe~ssonnel from several
different organizations, whose individual combat efficiency is un-
kuown to the patrol leaders, or to one another. Although such
llastily organized patrols sltould be avoided whenever ntasible, they
alu often necessary.
9
SWM 6-14
FX4. Elimination of the physically unfit.-Men 1~110 are pllysi-
c;illy unfit. for duty in the field or wliose presence mould hinder tlie
oprations of a patrol should be eliminated f n~m the organization.
They inclnde t he folloxving:
I,. T1ioSP. who hnre bee11 rece~~t l y those who 11rrvr ill, t~riil RSIIPC~>III~
recently had malaria, dysentery, jlnnndice, or a rcnereal disease.
b. Those sllffering from deforniities or diseases of the feet, pi~rtic-
ularly flatfoot, Iiammertoes, bunio~is, conis, or severe tricl-~ophytosis
(athlete's foot).
c. The old or fat,, or those of obviously poor physique froni i ~ny
cause,.
d. Tile lleurotic or mentally uristable; ilnd the i~icol~ol ndclicts.
~ ~ 1 6 . Pat rol and subordinate leader.-a. Officels and nonconi-
l l l i ssi o~~d officers assigned t o the. theater of active operations in
small Tars will generally co~nmand s~naller elernents than t110se as-
signed to them in innjor warfare, for the follol~ing reasons:
(1) A patrol oil an independent mission is nsunlly f ar ren~oved
fl-o~ntile direction and control of more experienced superio:-s.
(2) The sutddonness ~x.itli ~r hi ch tlCtion may break, and t,he necessity
f or rapid and priictical employinent of all the small elements in tlie
patrol. An officer or experie~iced noncommissii~ned officer should be
with each small group to facilitate its control during combat.. This
is especially t r ue in wmded terrain 1~11ere t,l~e limited visibility
and short battle ranges usually restrict. tile patrol leader's control
over the situation to his immediat~ vicinity.
(3) The possible dispersion of the troops in column a t t he moment
of contact, auld in the subsequent attack and assnnlt.
(4) The powibility that the troops are not tl~oroughly trained.
b. Two commissioned officers should accompany every rifle pla-
toon assikmed to :In independent combat mission. I f this cannot he
done, tlie second in comniand must be an experienced, capable, senior
i~oncomix~issio~~e~l to the rekwlsr comple- officer mho i s in addition
ment. This requirc,meiit is nwossnry to insure a continuity of effort
in the event the patrol leader becomes a casualty. The nortnal
complement of officers is usually sufficient if the coinbat patrol con-
sists of two or more rifle platoons combined under one cornmantlcr.
010. The rifle squad.-IVherever possible, the rifle squad is em-
ployed in sn~al l wars in the same manner as i n rnajor warfare. 111
many situations in small war operations, how-ever, i t will be desirable
t o divide the q u a d into two cornbat teams of four or five men each,
i)ne of n-bich is commanded by the corporal, the other by t he second
SWM 6-17
OWGSI ZI SC~ THE ISl'hST1:Y PATROL
in command. Such co~r~bat tei~llls call he profitably employed a s
tile point f or :I combat patrol in close.coontry,asflnnk patrols, and
for reconnaisnnnce or other security missions. I n thickly woorled
terrain, it is often inipossible for the corporal to maintain control
0ve.r tho entire squad is1 combat. Uncler suc11 conrlitions, the tm.o
combatteii~ns most fight :IS indepmdeiit mrits 1111tilt hesitnation 01-
better visibility pennits the corporal t o regain direction irnrl coil-
trolof the squad asa wl~ole.Automatic anilspecialweapons ~vithiu
the squad sliouldbe equally divided l=tween the combat teams.
6 1 7 . Theheadquarterssection.-a. Theheadquarterssectionof
acoin11:rt.~, ntr<ll~ rifle platoon or reenforced rifle pln- consisting of u
toon,must benugniet~tecl bycertnilr ixrso/rlrdwho ale iiotorganically
assigned t o it. Sncli persollnel includes one or more con~pe.tent,
cooks, a medicnl officer or one or more clualifiecl 11ospit:llcorl~smen,
arida, radiornaii when tileputvol isequilqxd~vitlr a portillrle mtlio.
6. I f the l~ostile forces arenot ~:omplyi~rg ~vitll thi:"Roles of Land
IVarft~re,"the inedical personnel sliould be anned for self-defense.
6 1 8 . Attached units.-In the future, most combat patrols of tlre
stinigtbof 21 rifle platoon ormore,ol>e.rating in hostile areits, prob-
;rhlyxill bt: reenforced by attached supportingweapons. With the
adoption of tllesemi-automaticrifle as tirestandard infantry arm or
:IS a replacement for the Br o~~i l i ng antomatic rifle, a light lnaclrine
gun sqrsad or section ancl a 60-irrni. mortar squad or section \vorrlcI
appear tobeappropriate nnitsto:~ccompany a rifle platoon assigr~ecl
acombirt mission. These organizecl unitssllould be attaclle(1to the
platoon from tile headquarters platoon of the rifie company. A
combat patrolconsisting of ariflecompanymay recl~iire the support,
of a lleilvy machine gun section or platoon and un 81-mm. ni or t i ~~
squadorsection. Tlieseshouldbe attachedto thecornpartya s iiltttct
unitsfromtheappropriateorg:inientiorrs of thehnttr~lion orregiirierrt..
(Forfurther details, see Section III?CIixpter 11,L'Orgunizatior~.")
6-19. Guides and interpreters.-a. Native officials anct foreign
resictentsareusuallyllelpful in securingreliable&piides and interpre-
terswlieilevertheiremployment isnecessary. Local inhabitantswho
11:~r.e sufferedinjury fromthe liostile forces and tllose llavirigmem-
bers of their families who have so suffered, ofte~i volunteer their
servicesf or sue11 duty. Theintegrity of tlirse meri nlustbe tested
inthefield beforethey canbe coi~sidered entirely reliable iinrltnlst-
\vortliy. I n tnariy cases, their employment in any capacity rnakes
tliem subject to hostile reprisal mensnres and the intervening force
inustassnrrleresponsibility fortheir protection.
1 o i g r l to I I ~ ~: r t i i r t l , t , tcrr:rl! s l ~ n ~ l l ~
:!11t1 trails I Y~T\ I ~I I : I I I ~~ : i i ~ r\ vc~sl ci ~~, ~ of t11 tl16*is secto~5. 21 k~wrvlt~cige
lonil 1:111gt1:1gt. ::s glrirkly :IS poi-il~ltas<t t l t : rt t1ri.y 1112i.v t l i qr t ~~~s t ~ wit1
tlle cirrployrr~c~it of 11ntivp I ! I i t insc,f:rr :IS tl18
aituntirm pcrrrtiia.
1;-20. Native transport pe~~sonnel.-~.~fri sit~r~ltiux~s. rrr<~..t t11e i ai ~i
1~11tyrnent of i r c9tllc.r transpor trrttivr p1~1.1r.l.i (carrir.rs). 111111~tt.i~i.s.
~n*r. ; oi ~u~l will lw t.i~r~!iiucil witir mch vi,i%~lrat patstil. P'I,~fntll~e
<ir~tail~, stst, C."h:rt,tcr 111. '.l,ogistics."
(921. Nat i r c troops.-(r. TVllen ilirtivc* troop^ rive ~t t : ~i l r ~bl ~, t.lre!
u,ay hc irlcl~t~lcii Iti trcldition to tlwir corr~l,et. dutks in t l r ~1)atcol
tlrt-y xi l l l i f ~~vi ~l x- r l y t l t ~trittrh to estrrblistr fri~lldl! iu~lt~ctrirrt~ted,
r~~lntioris ~ O R ~ C hratmt,rvr tllc. 11i!iicefirl illhahittr~rts :lrld tllc i:lt(~rvetti~lg
h. Sat i re troolrs are. vil~ecixlly ralr~ablc for ~cvcmnnis.;rr~t~<~ 111rr
krwlrity nrissioll~. 'f'11c.y \ \ i l l irc~tict. irlirl (.twrt~tly i11tes[1wt t l r~i -,
sipr.: ~r.lriclr i ~~t l i c~: r t ~~ I I ~ clnir!cl~ tht- Ijt.cb.ieilit3 tlri* t.lrtsnl,v 1rrnr11 rrti>r~
sltd it~nsiy ~ I I ; I I I I of :L fot.t.igr~ firer tl~r a\-cl.;lgv ~rrc~rrrlw*~.
:~i~:icr~r~itr,~~rriI t ~ i ti114 I. (DIIII~I. ?. .
c. l Vi ~ ~ , l < git>ir11 1111ty t i i i r ~ tIIC t l i v i ~l r , ( l: r r l r I [lrrqliir : I I I I I ~l i st ri 1~1t t ~~cl
tii,~inlly betwt!ct~ t l r ~~ C ~ I X I I I I . firwe'. ill111 ~S<J( JLI S.1111d fi.i(.tioi ~ r r ~ t i w
Iretvt,cli the t wo orgr~liznti,ins irnwt. r:voiilt~iI.
,i--L. native civilians.--cl. :iclvis:iitlr\ t i v; ~ I'rominent I t is $ I ~ l l l ( ' t i l l l ~ ~
iiicltrde protniitent riotivo ciriliarrs or ~fi i ~. i i l l s flri ~ OVP I . I I I I I R I I ~ ill
~r:tt,rol. Tlrey <:an (lo rn11c11 to explain tire rrtissiolt of tlio i nt ~r vci r i ~r ~
f(,rc.ces irr the co~nrnrinity, q)rt~acl tl1i5 g1sl114 of ptsirc.e, frierrdly relit
tions, sntl coopevetirrrr, and coiiotc~r tlre ~~l . (, pagr~i ~t l ~r of the eneniy
'rbe iuttivc~s of tlre n~mrrrtrrtity ura r r l l potr:~rti;rl ctrt~mir!~ arld rtii~irj
will htw,nrt*. sctivt,ly Iiostile i f t11c.y are trot crnrvi~icetlr r I the trlrt
objer:tire of t,he ('errpt~tiotr,
h. If political ~rligrr~rlctrts arltl lrniretls itrcb virilc in tlre stu:i~, tlrr
luttrol lentlev I I I I I S ~I ~ c a very rircnlo.ipt>ct irr tire choice. of civiliarrs urlcl
govc~n~~~rwrt tllc [, r~t rol I f tltc ~) i ~t r ol offjcirilil n.lro tic*.~~iri~~:riiy is silk.
1~1~ctt.tl O F prrliticirl lfiirtina~islrii~, ( i f tlio ~rvtrlrlr~rrts ~bilcific:atioil itray bi
itrtc~~rsifierl.
r.. Frcrlrterrt ly ltvoir~ir~rvrt oivilirrrrs will furrlisl~ ;ulrl \vr>ll-i11foi~irrr11
~nluat,lc$ ii~fo~.rri:~tit~ti, ptrrvitlr*cl tlrcir ide11tit.y is ilot tlisc:lowil n r ~ t lthc!~
:~rc: :lot rt~iluirc:cl to act as gttieles or. otllerwire opeirly il$.icrciate tlleril.
nelvcs witkt tlic? itlterrt!nirig force. 'I'llt8ir ~ ~ ~ i s l r r ~ . ; slrolil~lkn3 rrqrt.ct.zt1
it1 order to gitili their corrticletrce rirril o1)tiiiti tla. iriforrn,ttion -tr.l~icdi
tltey possess.
SWM 6 2 3
(L2.1. Transportation.-a. Tl ~e nleans and t ~ ~ ~ ~ o u l r t of tmnsl~orta-
i i o ~ ~ in an infantry patnd \\-ill influence its co~nposition, its i~~cludecl
~nobility: t he lellgtlr of tirne that it can s t ag away from its base.,
its combat efficiency. I n general, i nfant ry patrols shonlrl carry only
the ~riirti~num eqoipment a u d supplies necessary to accomplish their
~nission. Themore nearly they car1 approac11 the Iloslile forces ill ihis
r~spect, tlrc more efficient. they will beconlo ilk tlre tield. It is s conr-
rtl(rn failing for troops engaged in snrall war operatio~rs to decrease
their mobility by transl~ortilrg too much equipment a n ~ l too I ~ Y ~ I I ~
varietl, c1esir:ible but nor~essenti:~l silppliM.
b. The pri~rcilml lrlealrs of t l a ~ ~ s l ~ r ~ r t a t i o ~ ~ rrnl)loyetl by infantry
11:ttrols i ~ ~ c l ~ ~ d e :
(1) All o r 1);trt of tlra eqni p~i ~c~r t su11plii.s carriecl OI I tile 1)1?rso11. t u~d
(2) Native l~c~rtcfrs.
(3) R' i di ~~g altd pack anirnals.
(4) i)rirpla~~es for cvac~iation of the \vounded and supply by plane
(Irops.
(5) Motor transport.
c. I n hot, troljical climates, the. personnel shotlld not b e required to
carry packs if it can be avoided. The weight of the rations mhicl~
troops call transport in addition t o t l ~e i r equipment. will limit the
r:elge of a combat patrol unless i t can subsist almost elltirely off the
country. On the other hand, a rrconnnissnrice patrol whose rnetnbers
are iuureil t o tlre local f a r e can often ttccornplish its n~issiolr Inore
successfully if it is not encumbered ~ ~ i t h a t r h .
~ 1 . For further details concerning transportation, see alapter 111,
"Logistics," and Chapter IX, "Aviation."
6-24. Weapons.-a. Th e \yeapons carried by an inftu~try patrol
!rill normally be those organic:tlly assigned to the squad, platoon, or
con~pany, pl us i1ttacl1e.d units of supporting weapons i f the situation
inclicates the necessity therefor.
h. I f t he rifle units a r e a~mpletely equipped nit11 the semi-
:rutomatic rifle, the inclusion of CIIIY f nl l shoulder weapon in eac,lr
squad is not wnrrar~ted. I f the basic nrm in the patrol is the bolt-
action rifle. the armament of each squad should include two semi-
nl~to~natic. or two Uro\vninn automatic rifles. or one of each. This
,~~~ - -
1xvl~ortio11 of elnomatic slic~ttl~lrr \ve:tpous 111 bolt-i~ctinn ride-; sh11111el
121rt.ly. if ever. be excettdc~tl. . III~IIIIII~I~~(~II s u p ~l y i n SIII~III \\.t113
,rlx~r:ttions i s n c1iRic11lt problzo~. Vol un~r of fire c1111 seltlon~ iq~lscc*
;scotr~,cyof tirc i l l :I
,.
01 gucr~. illi~ SIIIHII \\.i~r. II I ~~t ~or i ~l t : forct.s i-
lictlc ~lffe~ctecl hy 111r loss uf ;I 1)al.cicolar ihsitiol~, but it ia sc~rie)usly
S WM 6-25
ORCJSI ZI SC T1rl.E ISPASTRY PhTROI,
nffrcteil by tlie il~rmher of casualties sustained in combat. The 11x1-
joritS of tlic person~lel ill an illfantry patrol sllould be rrr~lled, tliere-
f or e, with \\-enl)ons that are cap:~Lln of rleliveri~lg deliberate, :tinled,
acumt e fire i.i\t,lier tl1:111 \\.it11 \veal)o~is \\-hose chief cl~i~racteristic is
tlle delivery of n great of fire. 'I'he :lutornatic r o l ~ u l ~ e 1re:tpons
sl ~onl d be utilized t ( ~ protect t l i e exposed flr~~rlis, hostile or to silel~~ce
auton1:rtic weapons.
c. \\'Iietlier or not the bayonet is i~lcltlrled i n the nrnlarne~rt. of the
pat rol depends 1.1po11 the terrain, the nature of the particular oper-
n t i o ~ ~ , tlie t r ai ni ~r g of tlre men, and the npi ~ri on of the p: ~t rol 1e:kder.
1x1 ju11~1e terrain, tlie bayonet impedes the movement of t he indi-
vidurrls both 011 t he march :~rlcl n.lien dcljloyed for combat by snag-
gi ng on l i nes a n d tlie dense ilnderbrosli; i t is doubtf~ll if i t (:nil k ~ ?
ase(l effectively, eve11 in t he i t ssa~~l t , I n fai rl y ftpeir in such terraill.
country, tlre b a y o ~~e t as ~ I Iregular slrould Im carried and employetl
warfare. It. is an esse~itial weapon in l~iglit. attacks. The bayonet,
is practically useless in tile, lrands of untraine(1 troops who have IIO
confitleiice i n i t ; it is a very efrective xvmpon in sm:~ll mar oper-
ations x ~ l ~ e ~ i employed by t n q s ~vlro lri~ve been thorouglily trz~inetl
i11 its use.
d. For f ~~r t l r e r \\.capons, Sectio~r details regarding irifantry see
111, Chapter 11, 'LOrg:inization."
C-25. Ammunition.-a. In past small wnr operi~tions, t h e average
expenditure of small arms an~munition for a single engagement has
seldom exceeded 50 rounds f o r eacl~ person in the patrol. Tliere
have been a very few instances where t he expenditure has slightly
exceedetl 100 rour~ds per person. It is h l i e ~ e d that the follolring
is a reasonable basis for the quarktities of to he cnr- a~r ~mu~i i t i on
r i ed for each t ype of weapon with infruitsy patrols :rssignecl a cam-
b a t mission in small war oprRt'1011s:
(1) On thr! pernos-tho fk~l l cnpi~city of tlic brlt or other carrier
issued to t l ~ c i~rtliviilnal.
(2) In,1 7 ~ unit of fire. co~rcbatbl'ccin-Y2
These quantities sliould be n~odificrl as ilictateil by exper i e~~ce or as
i ndi c~~t ei l a 1)artir:ular patrol. by the sitnation c o ~l f r o ~r t i ~~g
6. Earergency replacements of some typt:s of ammunition call be
clropped by plane.
c. If the regular ammunition contni~iers are too heavy for the
~ne a nsof transportation i n t he combat train, the anirntu~ition is re-
packed irnd the i~rdiridunl loads nurde ligl~ter.
SWM 6-26
d. Cartridge 11elts :111d 0t11er ci~rriers \\-ith the pat1.01 rllllit be ill
l~erfect coirditiolr to prwe.11t the loss of :~~onnoritior~.
6-!Xi. Si gnal equipment.-a. sigiral eiluipl~lellt 111ust The. f ol l o~~i r r g
he talten wi t h every patrol :
(1)Airplane panels, Coilt,s, : I J I ~ picli-u1i eqni l )i ~~!~l t .
( 2 ) I'yrotecl~nics.
b. The following signal t~qoipme~it slrould Ile a::rrieil wit11 tlle
p"trol xrheu i t is aui~ilnble :
( 1) Port:thle r:~ilio.
(2) Ot her sliecial i:quilrnrelrt. rle~n;itr~leil l ~ y tlrt! situation or
the use of whicll carr be foreseen. iliec. Sectii~ll111. Clranter 11,
"0rpanizatii)ir.")
6-27. Medical supplies.-a. \\ ith The pat rol le:iiIrr, ill co~l j nnct i o~~
the rnedical pevsoirnel, nr l ~st :Issure lri~rlself of tlre sufficiency of Iris
iireclic111 eqnipmellt :tlld supplies. If chari t y medic:tl rvork xrnong tl~c.
tintive inl~abittrrrts is :~nti'ipated, additional wlq>lies innst he pro-
vi<lerl f or t l l ; ~t . l~urljoso
b. Besides the regular ~xre~lical ki t cilrried by the hospit:~l corps-
nran, reserve supplies shollltl be 111nile LIP into sevnal assorted kitv
ilistributeil tlirouglrout tlle colnnrn.
e. Sufficient ampoules should be c:lsried for elllosination of water
for the duration of t he patrid. 'Tlre Lyst er bag, if cnrried, sho~ilcl bo
carefully insliected f or lettks, particularly at, the taps, and should
be cleaneil aud dried. Four to six yards of rllusli~l f or straining
tr21sl1 from the. ~ ~ n t e r Tile bag should be rolled should be prorided.
and sto~ved s o tlrat i t will n o t cliafe i n carrying.
d. A few "sai~it.ubes"s11ouId he carried for l~rophylnxis and for the
treatment of certrtin skin clisenses.
8, Sever:~l additional first. aid pirclrets, tltJ3Ps of iodine, and a finial1
roll of adliesivi? sllould b e carried \\.it11 patrols to xvliicll rnedical
lierso~rnelis not attached.
f . I'reparations to rnnst be riiadr before the. carry tlre r ~o~~nt l ecl
patrol leaves the garrison. 111 addition to the nletllocls described in
C1i:rpter 14, "Li~ndinp Force M:~nual," LTSTSN, the cnnvas field cot
cover is ensil? ctrried ancl c:tn be qiiidcly coi~vestecl i r ~ t o $1 stretcher
in tlre field.
6-28. Miscellaneous equipment.-Such of the following articles
ai nrt:y be necessary should be carried wi t h the patrol:
a. Native nr~~clletes, f or cuttuig trails, fosap. fi~~.r~-ooil, fields of
fire., and material for bivouac shelters.
6. XIatches ill containers, >I ~~a t e r pr oof flasl~liglrts, cairilles, and
lanteln for the lriess force.
15
SWM 6-29
OI t OAS I ZI U~THE ISFlNTRY PATIIOL
c. A quantity of hemp rope to assist the patrol in classing danger-
ous streams.
It can be stretched across the st1ta111 :t11(1 used xs :L
hanmcl hold while crossing, or it cr~n be used i n building a n inlpro-
vised raft.
d. Entrenching tools or 1'1r.ger eirglnerrirlg tools as demanded by
t he situation.
c. A horse-slroel's k~t , if the ilumber of nrlinii~ls with t he patrol
nlalies it adrisitble.
6-29. Personal clothing and accessories.-a. Gen~~ccl.--The per-
sonnl clotlni~g : l i d :~ccesborieb\\ 01.11or cariietl hg the 1~1trol must he
~eclucedto the minimuun consistent n lth the l e i ~gt l ~ of time t he patrol
I\ i l l be absent from its base, irnd the climate and se~~son of the year.
Clothing shoulil be in g o d condition when tlle patrol leares it base.
It i s better to rely on alrplane supply for necessnrg replacements in
t he field than to overburden t he patrol with t oo much impedimenta.
Surlx~fioons articles n ~ l l increase the transportation problems, and
decrease the quantities of essential ammrinition and rations which
can be mrried. Personal coinfort and appearance must always be
of secondary importance as conipnred with t he efficiei~t accomplisl~-
ment of the assigned mission. Officers should fare no better in these
lpsperts than the enlisted men o f the organi2;ation. The inclusion of
officers' bedding rolls, field cots, and similar equipment is un\var-
ntnted in patrols operating from a base in t he theater of operations.
6. Clothing zornn by troops.-Shm9 should fit properly, be broken
in, and in good condition. New shoes, though of the correct size, will
~tsually give trouble on the march. Socks should be clean, free from
holes and darns. Flannel shirts, which absorb perspiration, rain,
oild water freely, and still afford warmth a nd protection at night,
are pi%fernble to cotton khaki shirts even in t he tropics. The scarf
shonld not be worn. The value of canvas leggings in the field is
questionable. The woolen sock pulled over t he bottom of t he trouser
l eg is a satisfactory substitute.
c. Clothino und accessories ccw7ied in the urn&..-Tire follo\vina ar-
" -
titles are considered reasonnble quantities to be carried in t he pack
or roll of each individual with a patrol operating 111 a vrarm climate:
(1)A shelter-half, poncho, or light native hammock, depending
ul>on the nature of the terrain, the season of the evenr. and the 1,er-
w~ i a l (lecisio~~ of the 1111trol 1endt.r. The shelter-half v:111 b+ dis-
I E I I S ~ ~ :Ire 11viiiI:1i11~~ the field for til? t.o~~:tri~<. wit11 if 11.1:1trri:~l> ill
tion of 1r:i11-tos l ~i *i t t ~~. ~. i + 11ti1iz1,~l n ~ ~ ~ v v r 111 t l ~ i sc:ix,. the poi ~cl ~o :IS
f or the pack or roll. The poncho is primarily useful as protection
ORGASI ZI SG THE ISI' ASTRP PATROL
from the darn11gronnd while sleeping :~tnight. It interferes xvitli
l~:overue~it of all indiriclual if worn OII the. march, xncl is a distinct
im[~ediiiie~it if Jrorn in co~nbat. The hammock llas lnar:? adv:ui-
tages, but i t is bulky arid adds considerable mi ght t o the pack or
roll. Di11.ing the rainy season, t vo of these articles limy be desirable.
If the sl~elter-half is ciirried, the tent pole iuid pins are ilwluded
when necessary.
(2) One blanket.
(8) i \ mosclaito ~ l r t is clesirablc in ~nalarioiis col~ritries. I t is
bulky and quite lieary. Soiiie combat l ~at rol s in past olreratioi~s iu
tropical coilntrics did not carry tlie net ill the field :uid di d ilot incur
;my apparent. h,tnnful conseqoences.
(4) One change of ~unilerwear.
(5) At least two pairs of woole~l socks; four pairs are reconi-
mended, if t h e patrol is t o operate for 2 weeks or l o ~~g e r .
(6) One clialige of oilter clothing.
(7) Toilet. articles: soap, small bath towel, tooth brnsli and pow-
der or peste, comb, and mirror. A razor, shaving hrnsh, and sll:r~--
i ~i g soap may be carried, nltlioiigh t h y ar e not co~isiclered esse~itial
items.
(8) Tobncco, as desired.
(9) Toilet pitper, :L sniall qi~antity to be carried by each incliridnal,
the remainder ~r i t h the mess equipment.
d. Pe?;swiccl~1:lsanZine~s.-Abath should be taken and soiled clothing
should be wasl~erl as frequently as opportunity affords. Si~uply
soaking clothes in water, wringing t hem out, and permitting then1
to dry in t he sun, is better than not washing them a t all.
6-30. General preparations.-Prior to clearing its base, the patrol
leader of an infantry patrol personally verifies or arranges for such
of the following as may be pertinent to t h e pnrticular situation:
a. Auiatim; tuppo?*t.-
(1) Liaison, reconnaissance, and combat support.
(2) Regular and emergency supply by plane.
b. Inf o~mation. -
(1) A personal airplane reconnaissance over tlie area, i f practicable.
(2) A map or sketch of the area, including the route or alternate
routes t o be followed. B rude sketch. however. inaccurate. is better
than none.
(3) Airplane photogri~phs of villages and important terrain fen-
tu~es, such as stream crossings, possible or former ambush positions,
etc., if practicable.
SWM 6-30
(4) The co~~cl i t i on of tl:e rtlncls altil tlails, tllrr :tttitiule of tl:e local
inhabitar~ts, :utd tho possible food sr~pply.
c. Inspection of .-
(1) Men; indiviclual, conlhat, co:nto~uricati~ra~s~ medical ~t i p- nnil
plies and equipment; trrril itl~itr~alu? l~ilcli, u~til ri di ng ecl~iipntnlt.
(2) Cleaning matet.inls f r ~ i tlte \\-c:tpenrs, eslteci:rlly oil for
autonlatic arms.
rz. Liai.?0l~?o%t?l.--
(1) Native officials, ~r hen ilesirnblr.
(2) Native troops, or ot l ~er persons ilclt of t he co~nn~:lncl, \\-l~oare
lo stceompany t he patrol.
(3) Other friendly patrols opefitting in tltc are:\.
e. Encploy~~lcnt of.-Niltire tral:sportatiotr l~ersonnrl, illtellige~ice
:agents, gnicles, and interpreters.
f. ;Vo,zey, in slnall elello~ui~~tttiol~s, of f or t he purcllasr supplies,
elnergellcy trnllsportntio~i. a ~ a l inforn~ntiol~. 111 soiue countries, ::r-
ticles sltclt :IS soap, salt, tol~acco, etc.; \rl~icll ar e esl,c:~si\.e : I I I C~difticult
to r>bt:tili locally, :tre mcrre acceptable t o tllo 1::ttives t1::tn inoney.
SWM 6-31
FEEDING THE PERSONNEL
Responsibilityof patrr,llondor.. . . . . .... .. .... . . .......-.
Thefieldration
Dutohcring on t he I
Fw~lingnative pcrminrz
Emergencyrat,iorrs....
6-31. Responsibility of pat r ol leader.-'rhr pntrol lender slloulrl
confex with the mew officer nt the garrison or base f r om 1v1licI1 t he
patrol will operate, anil, ill conjunction wi t h the mesi ser-
geant or coolcs, determine what suitable food~t l ~ffs ale availabk. for
the patrol. Also, lrc n~us t clecida d a t kltchen eq11i1)rneilt is required
and proc~ure it. Ivritten irleiru~ for hl fi ~kfast nl r r l cupper for eacll
day of the 1~rol)o>ed opel.r~tions are prppal.e[l. It i q llot desirable
to make miildny llalts for t h e purpoie of coolcing a meal, although
it mny be desirable in some situ::tions to prepare cold lur~cbes mllirll
may be issued to the men prior to bl.pirking ctllrlp in t h e morninn.
F
Based on these menus, a check-off l i h t o f the necessary rations 1s
prepared, the rntions drit1~711 and carefully verified betfore loading.
There~ft er, t h e ratiolrs are issued as required and notations nir~de on
the clleck-off list. The rutions remaining in the t r ai n sl~ould be
ii~ventoried periodically while t l ~e pat rol is in t he fielcl. Canned
goods should bc inspected f or s\ ~el l i ~i g o f tllr top doe, to detei-iora-
tion of the co~:teilts, f or leaki, and for bacl iletrt~. Such calls should
be rejected, or destroyed.
G:32 Mess equipment.-cl. 'nre anlonnt of oles5 rquipnlei~l cat-
ried by the patrol should be l%cluced t o a rniniin~~m.
b. The cavalry pack kitchen is satisfi~ctory for a l a r p pntrol which
includes pack nnimnls. for Tl re complete uni t loss l l a~~gei % the
Phillips pack sadale, weigh? 118 pounds and constitutes one pack
load. It iq adequate for feeding 200 nlen in the fielcl. Pat r ds of
between fifty and one hundred men can eliminate nuneces~ary pieces.
It is questionable whetller n, patrol of less than 50 men should carry it.
c. I f a tegular pack kitchen unit is not used, issue or improvised
cooking equipment mill have to bu provided. The following points
are pertinent :
563053--4-4 19
SWM 6-33
FEli1)ISG TXE I ' I I I ~SOSSI ~I A
(1) hltlrot~gllG, I. buckets nre selclom n s d for cooking in gar-
rison, they are useful for that 1)urposo in t he field.
They can be
sot on a fire or suspended over it.
They nest. \re11 mnil do not r ~t t l e
if leaves or sinlilnr inaterials 81-C?paclietl between them.
(2) In coml~arison ~r i t l l tin l)oilers, buckets, and roasting pans,
lr~rgc. iron lcettles nrr not. so fl.agile> do n( ~t burn food SO qllickly.
lrold lleat bet,tc.r, can be used f or frying, r ~nd pack better. Packed,
one on each sidc of the xnim:rl> they can carry the. cooked or uncooked
foodstuffs neccsst~ry for the evening mp111, tllun espediting its pro1)a-
mt,ion. Suitablt. ircn licttles can genonrlly be purcllas~cl 1ot:ally in
the tlreater of ol,erntiol~s,
( 3) h small nlrtnl $rill bout 2 feet s(111~1.e i111d fitted \\.it11 f011r
collapsible legs faciliit~tes conking in tlre field.
d. Dur i ~~g or i n :weas ~rlrctre nlang stre:n:~s ]lave to 1.aiuy ~1-t~ntl1t~r
be forded, some provision must be made t o protect sucll foo~lstnffs 21s
sugar. salt, flour: coffee, rtc. Rags nrade of canvasl leatlrer! or of
cnnvas material co:~tecl \rith rubber. and t,z~rl~t~nlins l~iecas of or
c:tnT7ns, l l a ~e been usecl successfully in the past,.
c. IVhen a pt ~t r ol is to be inade into urrfa~niliar country wl ~ere the
existence of a n adequate irate^- supply i s doubtful, drinking water
may have to be transported in the trnin. 6-g:xllon cans may be used
f or this purpose i n the absence of specially designed equipmnent.
f . A limited amom~t of soap should be cnrried as an aid i n cleans-
i ng the cooking equil>~ne~rt..
6-3'3. Weight of rations.-a. The. aggrrgi~te n-eight of tlre rations
carried by a patrol is influenced by:
(1)Nnmber o f Inen in the patrol.
( 2 ) Native fooclstnffs :~vailable in tlre field.
(3) Issue foodstr~ffs available.
(4) Rations t o be suljplied by plant,, drop.
(6) Repleuisl~~rients exl>ectetl from ol~tposts and otl~er p;trrisoos
i n tlre area.
(6) Tile ability oP tbe cooks.
(7) The ability of the pnso111ir.l to adjust tlremselre?; to cliiniuislred
rations.
(8) Tho methocl of tri~nsljo~.t irtrd tlnt: l>recletermined size of the
combat train.
6.The noi ~nal field ration weiglis npproximately 3 pounds. The
normal garrison mtion weight,s about 4 pounds. The average pnek
animal found i n most small-wars countries can carry 30 man-day
garrison rat,ions, conlputed on the assumption that no foodstuffs can
SWM &34
PEEDISO TIIE PCK5OSI\'GL
be procured in the fielrl, 40 man-day complete field rations. or 50
re<lncedfielcl rz~tions.
ri-:34. The field ration.-rt. Every cffortsl~oul<l hi:. matlt!to build
up the supply of rationsa t thrr :idritiiceci patrol bases :tntl outposts
tcotil they approncli orecpial the 1lo1.1nz11 girrisorr r;ttio~i i ~ : qu;nltit~
and variety. A patrol operntii~g from t'llose bases, sllould never
CRSrJ7 rmom, andnrny often carry less, t hanthe componei~ts of the
field ratioi~,~lnodifietlii,~ accorclnnce ~vi t l i tlie probable foodstuffs
75-hic11canh e obtained in t heare:\. Empl~asis should be p1:tced 011
those articles ~vhichgive t h e grratest retllrn in food v:rlne for the
b~rlkandmeiglltcarried,tinct t,hreasewit11~d~i-hich he1,rans- tBeS cw~i
portecl. Thi slrlagnot I . P S U~ ~ ratio~n. bnt thedcficie~i- ill t~ "b: ~l : ~~l c~d"
ciese~~connt ered in the field conbecor~rpensnted forilpi,n tlie ret,~ulx
of t,lle.patroltoitsbtise. Th e ge~iertll ter~de~icy of troops isto ctlrvy
100greata val,ietpa ~ ~ d of fo(~ilstiiffs patrols too1:rrge n. (~11t1111ify xl.itli
i l l the field. BIall slioul~l bwome accustomed to the nnt,ive fare as
qoickly aspossible. I f propttsly led, they \rill soon learn that they
<:in subsist quitc~vell in~clopemtr efficiently on mnch less tlra~i tho
rrg~l ; l r garriso~i ration. Thi s is a 11r:tt.terof training md is in-
flue~~ced in a large iine:~sure by the attitude of the patrol ]alders
tmrl othercommissioi~ed nud 11oncornn1issionet11office^^.
h. Theprescribed field rnt,ionis: ~~~pr osi mnt el y :is follows:
Coaliioitt'rt nrtielr* Bnbstitrrtn rrr-tic1r.r
1%frefihbread, or
I>$ p01,,1dsflour.
.....1% poundssaltmeat,or
1% poundssmokedmoat,,or
1%poundsfreshma t , or
1% 11,oundsfreshf i ~l i , or
1%poundspoultry.
1%poundsfresh vcgotxl,lcr,or
3gillsbeansorpcns,or
9; poundriceorothereort.nl.
2o~nrct~s 2onncescooon, or ao
$4 ol~tico tea.
1nnnceevaporatedmilk.......... ....... . . %6 quart fresh rrrilk.
Saltandpepper-
C. S~~ir>iI)lv fro111rlt,, reg111:1r i w~ e i11cl11t1~: rollecl iw(1~111ffs r i ~ ~ ,
oat<.11o111i1iy gt i ~s, ( I r j be:118s.~, : I I I I I ~, I I I ~>: ~I I +. 110rl; : I I I <I r1>1,1it*il h t ~ f
11:1sl1, st i l ni o~~, corl~e<l t~erf, chil111t~d beef. I,;I\.oII. Virlll~i~ s;ios:~gt~, ]lard
Iir.r:1~1. cll.it.cl fritit.;.cheese, sug:ir,cotfrv. trtr.empor:ited ortlricstl iiiilk.
rillt,11lnrk~) i y) ~) w, 1111il limitrd: I I I I O I I I I ~ ~ ill' r:t1111e(I 1111ttitoes :i11dV V ~ P -
t:~hle~. 111 gei~et.iil. r:11111tvl n11cl sl, , , ~~lil frt' il~f r ~ ~ i t s iiot he c;lrrictl.
SWM 6-35
Small sked cans arc. usually prefernhle t o the larger sizes f or issue
to p:~trols. Generally a coinbat patrol sllould carry such foodst'uffs
tl181t nr~t inore. t ht n one compo~ie~lt, other than tell or coffee, l-equires
cooking for encli meal in order to reduce the nuinber of cooking uten-
sils t o be carried and the time of prepamtion in the field.
d. Natire foodstuffs soinetilncs foluid i n inh:~bited areas inclnile:
beef on the hoof, fish, chicker~s, eggs, bc?ilns, rice, corn, coffee: and
frui t s and vegetables in season. To thme 1 x 1 : ~ ~ he :idded sucb ~~i l c l
game as mny be killed by the pirtrol. If Ilostile groups are actire ill
the area, the arttilablo snpyly of li:~ti\re food will he limited.
6-35. Butchering on the march.-a. 1':ach patrol operating in the
field should include a inan fal~liliitr ~ ~ i t h the. killing ancl dressing of
livcstocli and gnlnc. If the pr~trol is depcnderit nllon tho n)uiltry for
its meat silpply, snitable stock sllonl~l be prov~~red during tlle clay's
march icnless it i s definitely lilion-11 tllt~t. the clesircd rtnimals mill be
amilahle s t or near tbe t~ironnc.
b. The. anirnnl shoulci be in~tvhered in su1:11 :L manner that it will
bleecl profnsely. I t should be. ilresseil, cut-up, and cooked wl ~i l e it is
still warm. Meat cookeil after rigor mortis has set in will be tong11
~ml essit is cooked in a soliltion of rinegar or acetic acid, or allowed
to season for at least 24 hours. Excess beef nl:q be barbecued and
utilized the following day.
W6 . Feeding native personnel.-Native personnel attached to
patrols may provide their own foot1 and cooking arrangenients. 111
certain situations they may be given a cash allowance which will pw-
mit them to eat with the local in11:~bitants. When circumstances
require them t o subsist with the pat,rol, they should rece,ine t11e.ir pro-
port,ionate shme of the available food. I f the. patrol is living off the
coiintry, eqnitnhle treatment given to the natives attached to the
patrol will usually be more. tha11 repaid by their foraging ability and
by assistance in preparing palntrcble dishes out of the foodstl~ffs ~ l ~ i c l i
nre indigenous to the 1ocalit.y.
6-37. Emergency rations.-Either a specially prepared, commer-
cial eme.rgency ration, or one composed of available materials, sllould
be issued to each individual and carried on t he person at. all times
while operating in the field. Thi s ration should be eaten only 011
the orders of a responsible commander, or as a last resort if a n indi-
vidual becomes separated from his patrol. Frequent inspections
should be made to insiire troops are comnlying with these instruc-
tions.
SWM 6 3 8
SECTIOXV
THE MARCH
Par. l'rge
23
.......................................... 6-39 23
23
Ioaotorsitifluoncingrunrclrfnnrratiolls.. ........................ 6-41 24
111Reenceofterrainon ~l t ur r i l forlnat,iorr.. . . . . . . . . . . . 6~- 42 25
R o d s ................................... (i--43 25
1,ocntiouofpatrolandsobordinatclendersinnra~.chfi,l.nistioti li&44 26
1,aentionoft heoombattrail1 .... I>-4.3 26
1)oscripiive ~nar e h formations.. ......................... ti-41; 21i
March fonnationr;for IL reenforcedriflc cumpair>-.............. 6-47 27
hlarolrfonnatiorrsfurareenforcedriflcplatooit.. ........ (i-48 29
Mlnrclr formationfor:L rifle platoon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49 30
Ma~.ch iornlation forarilleq u a < (i-.50 31
6kdl 31 Marell discipline.
Marchorttposts.. 6-52 32
6--53 32
6-54 33
6-55 33
Uirouacbeds.. . 6..,31! 34
CX3S. General.-The coudl~ct of marclles vill vary considerably
with the condition of tho men,their state of training, t heconlditioll
of t l ~eroads or trails,theclimate,the eatheher, t l ~e tacticalsituation,
arld vnrious other factors. Whenever it call be avoided, the men
sl~ol~ld I bt arriveatt,lleirdestinationinSL stateof exhaustion.
Ck30. Hour of starting.-In srr~all wars,breakftlstusuallyshould
se~libled and loaded, :hiid t hemarch begun as soon after daylight as
Inen and animals, a ~l d to permit packs tind equipment t osettle itud
ailjust themselvest oboth personnel and animals.
be served:tt da m, allimitls fed and watered,camp brolren,paclcs as-
p<~ssible.Themarc11 slloulrl begin slolvlg inorder t o .rT7armup the
0.Rat e Thefirsthal t sl~ould bemadenotlater of march.-a.
tllan three-quartersof anhourafterthestart, nnd should be of about
15 minutes duration, so t hat tlle men can adjust their equipment,
check and tigl~ten the pack.loadsin tlret mi n, and attend tothecalls
of nature.
b. tT11de.rnor m~l co~lditions, troops osunllghalt 10~ni m~t es every
hour after t he first halt. This c a ~ ~ ~ ~ o t b e accepted :rs doctrine in
s ~nal l wr s operations, in whielr tlre rate of niarclr is depe~~dent upon
tlie state of trz~ining and efficiency withill tile cornbnt train. Tlre
colulni~must be liept closed up at all times. Liniro~l s1iould kM2 coli-
stantly maintailred tllrougllont tlre colurnn FS word of mouth. T3'1ie11-
ever a pack needs reiidjustn~ent, or an animr~l hccl~nies bogged in sotire
mudhole, or airy other delay occurs x~itlri~i tlie column, a halt sl~ould
be called 1111til t he defect i s re~nedied and tlie patrol rez~dy t o move
forward as II body. If the re,gult~tion 50 nri~iute mi~rclr, 10 lninute
hal t sclledule is maintained, even n small p:~trol inay become so
elongated that several nliles will separate t he head tind tail of tlie
colunrn at. the end of the day's march. ils tlre men become trained
in such operations, forced lralts will become more infrequent. and of
shorter duration, and tlie ~ a ~ r ~ n r t l inns& sclierlule m:tg IE acl~ievecl.
To avoid disaster, hol~erer, it is essmrtial tllat liz~isou be niaiutained
througllout the entire lengtl~ of tlle coluom a t :111 times, regardless
of the frequency of the halts.
c. Uncler normal coi~clitions, intervals of marching sliould be modi-
fied to take advantage of good l~alting places, csl>ecially tllose which
afford proper security to tlie column.
6-41, Factors inllueneing march formations.-The march fonr~a-
t i on of a patrol in small mars is infloeilced by t l ~e following factors:
(1) The natnre of the terrain.
(2) The strength, con~position, and arnlament. of the patrol.
(3) The size of the combat train.
(4) The necessity for security, observing the principle that se-
curity elements should increase proportionately in strength from the
point to the main body.
(5) Ability t o shift rapidly and automatically from a colunln to
a line formation that mill face the enemy, cognizance being taken
of tlre pssibility of the enemy being in several different directions.
(6) The necessity for dividing tlie patrol into small, mutually
supporting; maneuver units, each one capable of developing i t s offen-
sive power independently and immediately at short, battle ranges.
(7) Sufficieilt distance between elements t o enable one or nlore
units in the main body to escape the initial burst of lrostile fire, thus
assuring some freedom of maneuver.
(8) The did.ribution of snpporting weapons t.limugho~~t the col-
nmn to facilitate their entry i nt o action in any direction.
(9) The rapid development of maximum fire power.
(10) The necessity of ~vit,hholding an initial reserve.
(11) The degree of darkiless iinring night marches.
SWM 6-42
THIS >IhRGIX
6-42. Influence of t errai n on march formation.-a. Open f cr -
~.ain.-In ope11 country, t he distribution of the troops in the column,
itnd the distances betx~een the rarions ele~ncnts, \\.111 be similar to that
enlployeil by u force of comy)arable strength in inlijor warfare.
6. Close tem-ui~c.-(l) 111the mno~~ntaino~~s, heavily wooded terrain
In which tile inajority of small war operat i o~~s occur, pntrols are
usnnlly forced to ntan.11 in a column of filch. Underbrush en-
croaches rcpon the trails, ~vliich are narrov :tnd tortuous, and visi-
billty is ofleii limitt-(1 in every direction t o onlj a few yards. A s a
result, the columl~ is greatly elongated, the distances betmen securit)
elolnents and the iuain hocly are reduced, and the patrol leatler crul
personally see and control ouly : L snli~ll portion of his command.
(2) There sho111d be sufficient distance beheen subclivisiorrs in the
column to itvoid the interlningling of units, to fix in the minds of
each incliviclual the maneliver unit to which he is attached, and to
sltbject as few men as possible to the initit11 burst9 of hostile fire
delivered a t short mnges. The distance between nnits sho111d be
sufficient to ellable one or rnore of them t o get free to maneuver, thus
creating an opeiiing for t he employment of lire and movement. On
the other hand, the various elements in the column nus st be mutually
supporting a s too much distance between the~li ntag enable nn aggres-
sire enemy to defeat the patrol in detail.
8143. Road spaces.-(1. Depending on the lnevniling conditions,
the distances between men within subdivisions of a patrol operating
in thickly wooded terrain get~ernlly will be about as follows:
6t'bdi*ia1011 Dldtalro bctraeen tner
Point................................... 10to 40yards.
Advnncc party...................... 5 to 20 yards
s t..........................-.. 3 to 10yards
Main body.............................. I) to 5yards.
Rear gt ~ar d ..........-........................ 2to 20 yard%
b. The distance.: between the various s~~bdivisions in the colum~l
will vary from 10 to 50 yarcls or more, depending upon the strength
of the patrol and the nature of the terrain through which it is
mai.chirrg.
c. The distances given above should never be considered as fixed
and immutable. They usually will be changed several tintes during
a clay's march an the orders of the patrol and subordinate leaders
as required b y the nature of the country.
d. The road space for a &ing or paek animal is considered to he
5yards. This includes the man assigned to ride, lead, drive, or guard
the animal.
25
SWM 6-44
6-44, Location of patrol and subordinate leaders in march
formation.-a. I'ati-ol icad(?~.-Tlie patrol leitder will nsi~:rlly nlarclr
witli or n t the lleacl of the ~ ~ l n i ~ l desirable. I~odj-. Tliis is l ~~r t i e ~~l a r l y
i i ~the ease of large l~trt,rols. I11 s~riall patrols, the leader lnay hnve to
tiltenlate x\.itl~ a sohorclinate a s com~nairder of the ircl\.ance guard.
'l'hc 1e:rder of t he patrol sl l o~~l d not. nlillre. practice of ~nar cl ~i ng in
llle point tinless necessity reqltires it. If ire is at the lieacl of t he nlain
body, he can nl\vays Inore forw.arc1 to tlie poi ~l t t o i~idicate t l ~ e route to
be folloned or to ~iurke sonle otlier i n ~ l ~ o r t u ~ ~ t clecisioi~ \vhicll cannot
bc assumed by t,he i~ilrnnce guard comnrai~der.
h. St~bo~dinate 2eade1:s.-Subordillate leililers of 1111elemne~its in the
l)txtrol, except, the point, no~,~rially 111arcl1 at ox. uear the head of their
res~)ective units o r subdivisio~~s. Tlre point commnncler should ma1:c11
irear the center of tllat gronl, so that he inny rffecti\-cly control all
of the. lrten ill the? point. Lcaclery of supporting n~rits: sucli :IS a
niac~iine-gun sectio~i or 1~l:rtoon. normally rrlarcll close to tlte p~t r ol
commander.
6-15, Location of the combat train.-'l'lle. locrrtion of tlie co~~ibat
trail1 in tlie co1~11lln depends upon serentl factors. tlie ?'lieso i ~~cl ude
stre~lgtll of t l ~e patrol, the probability of co~nbat, tlie normal tactics
of the enemy, anil the size of the trnin itself. N ~ r ~ ~ ~ a l l y , the co~iihat
t r ui i ~s should follo\r the n ~ a i ~ i body! preceding t l ~e rear gnarcl of tlie
column. If, as is often tlie case i n s~ilall wars, attack may be expected
frorn trny direction, it 111i1y be advisable to place the combat. t r ai n near
tlie center of the coluinir, or t o split it into txvo or more seetioils
interspersed ~vitli e l e r ~~e ~~t s If t he traiii of t he i~iitiil body of troops.
is exceptionally large? it may be cleti~ched fro111 tlic coillbnt elenle~~ls
of the patrol and ~rrarcl~ed (secl cl ~. VIII, "Carl- as a se11ar:tte c on~~oy
.iroys and Convoy Escorts"). Wliaterer its locatio~l in tlie col~unn, t . 1 ~
reserve supply of ai~rmunition sliould he distributed throughout tlra
t r t ~i n so that solr~e of i t rlray reasoilably be expected to escape the
initial burst of hostile fire in tlre event of ambnsh.
( t 4( i . Descriptive march formations.-a. Ge?rc?~aZ.-Tlle 11iarc11
formations described in the next three succeecling paragap1:s illns-
t rat e se~reral of t l ~ eprincil~les pre~iously described in this chrtpter.
They should not be consideretl as the o~i l y for~nations mhicl~ organi-
zations of comparable size and coiuposition nlay adopt. I t is believed
tllut they will be effective under the conditions assu~ned. E~ e r y
experienced patrol leader will have his own opiniotl of lrow his patrol
should be organized. He shoulcl not hesitate t o r~~ollify the fonna-
SWM 6-47'
tiun or redistribute tlie personnel oiliis co~ri~liand (o nlect the l>:~rtic~l-
lar situation wllich conf o~l t s 11im.
6. Assumptions as t o terrain.-1.11 e:tcli inst:lnce, tlle terrain in
~~l r i cl i the follol~ing patrols are opel'rcting is assumed to be mountain-
ous, l~cavily \vended cotn~try, wi t l ~ only narrow, winding trails
available.
647. Mar ch formations for a reenforced rifle company.-u.
Gitsrctio?~,.-~\ reenforcetl rifle company consisting of : n head-
q~~nr t er s platoon which includes a light inaclline-en section (4
Browning t~ntomatic rifles, modifiecl), a 60-111in. mort,ar sect,ion. (2
60-nlm. mortars), attaclrecl signal ilnd ni cdi ~al enlisted personnel, a
native guide, and an interpreter; 3 rifle plt~toons of 3 sqnads enclr,
armed 7vith semi-automatic rifles; an attactle(1 machit~e l>l;rtoon( less
1section) wi t h 4 nlacliine gnns ( 2of rrhic!h ara for defense cbnly) ;
an attached 81-mm. mort ar section; an nttacl~ed squad of native
troops; atid a comnbnt train of 75 pack aninrals nncl 20 ~iative mule-
teers; has bec?ri orclelwl to proceed to an outlying village to establisll
an aclra,nced base aall col ~i l ~l ct further patrol activities tl~crcfro~n.
The village is 3dnys march from the point of clepartnre. The total
strenptli of t h e patrol is 220 officers and men and 30 native soldiers
turd civilii~ns. The road space for t he patsol in column of files is
cs t i n~nt ~d 1,140 yards, o f .ivIlich the combat tri1i11 (less 6 niiles at
carrying organic machino-gun and 81-mm. mortar equipment), will
occupy 350 yt ~nl s. A hostile guerrilla force estimated a t 600 men
lins been iictive in t he area %,hich must b e traversed. Th a t force is
\re11 led, and arn~ed ~vi t h bolt action rifles, automatic slloulcler
weapons, and some rnaclii~line guns. I n previous engagemnents, the
onemy has attempted to arnbush the leading elements of the main
body, but t hem has been one instance i n \rrhich he created a diversion
;it tlle head of the column and directed his main attack a t the rear
ele~ne.~lts.
b. For-nultion '(A.'"
Bl et ~et l t Coabl,onctiar$
i t 1 rifle sqd. plus sqd. nntivc troops
commanded by a Sgt.
Distnece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
..... ;\d~uuecxl~15rt . v. . 1 rifle pint. (less 1sqd.)
Lt xa sect. (less Isqa.1
BO-mm. sect. (lens1sqd.)
Commander by Lieut. "Ilifle Plat."
SWM 647
Blenaerlt Com,iosilinn
Distance. .~
3l i ~i n bod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patrol romrnrn~rirr.
Sative guide.
Native interpreter.
Fwd. escir., Co.IIdqtrs.
I rifle plat.
1NO plat. (less1set . )
181-n1m. sect.
1)istance...............................
Cvrnlx~t tr:tin nud t r r ~i n gnani.. . . . . . . . . Rcnr escl~.,Co. Hdqtrs.
Soyi11y~Irrsonnel andrnnimmition sad.
from attacllrtl onits.
%sqd. uative troops.
Comalandecl 1by Lt. "2,l ill commllnd."
Distltlnee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Retlr .yarty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commnmrd~clliy Lieut. "Itifle Plat."
DisInnce...............................
1rifle plat.
Lt. 31G sqd.
Cirnm. sad.
(less 1sqd.)
Rcar point. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commanded i)g n Sgt.
c. Formation"23."'-
Elenlent (i . omp08i t i O~
Point...................................Ih sqd.
% sqd. native troops
Commanded by plat. Lt.
Distance.......--.....----.--..---..----
1st section of main body.---.----.----.. Patrolco~nmander
Native guidc
Native interpreter
Fwd. est!h., Co. Hdqtrs.
1rifle plat. (less 1sqd.)
Lt. JIG Sect. (less1sqd.)
ORmrn. sect. (less 1sqd.)
Distance................................
Combattrain andt r a i nguard.~~.-..-_..-. Approximately 1/3 combat t nl i n
Rear eseh., Co. Hdqtrs.
% sqd. native troops
Commanded by Sgt .
1)istance.................--..-..--...-.--
Rerlr point.............................. % rifle sqd.
Commanded by Sgt.
1 rifle sqd.
SWM 6-48
5 t ?t i , t ! t t <' s ?!!arc7tillo ~ l i ~ ~ f u ~ l ~ ~ ~
7.;ze,,,et,t r,,str,nriti~n
1 .......................................... % riilt, ajil.
Conlm;ln(leii I > > SKI.
I>istEl,,e<~
%I at~ctlon of l nni uiiotlg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1JIG plat. (1r.s~ 1r;t3ct.)
1 S1- ~nm.sect. (It:ss I sqt1.1
Corrrrn;8nd~dhy 1,ir.nt. "IliRr. Plat."
I)isia!rrc......
I t I I 1 I . 4 . riimlint trtlin.
&IG: ~ z t ~ ~ n , t ~ ~ i t i o ~ tl ~ r s o n 1 ~ 1 s t ~j ~i ) i y
( ' r ~l l nni ~n~i r ~l ity Spt.
l)istnnce..... ............
1trm:lt. joint.......................... 'A rifle sq~l.
L'otrkmsnded by Sgt.
Pai , ~t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1rifle pint. (less 1sqd. )
'hrifle sqd.
('onrmtt~rdedby Sgt.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3dse.ti011 ilf 1112~i l l body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I ritle plat. (less 1sqd.)
Lt. MCr sqd.
R>mm. sqd.
81-mm. sqd.
Vommandrri by Lieut. "Rifle Plat."
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distnnre
. . . . . . . -. . . . . . Cwnbat trrtiu n l ~ l traritl gllilrd
1)islnncr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I<r:tl.,mint........................................ %rifle sqd,
Commandtxl by Sgt.
So~~:.-Conta~t bet nce~~ e~taO1l~ned ~ltbdirliiionsof tllc r~ltrol IS ollce each llortr an fol-
101~s: 1stsecd011hillt~.28 ~f . ct i ~l l Asad section gains contact milkeneolltaetand lmlts.
with 26 aeetloa,wo1.d la pslaed furwardto 1stsoetlon, whichresumes march.followednt
;)-?nln,zt(! intervals by 2d and :idsections.
crlS. March formation fora reenforced rilleplatoon.--a Sittr-
(/ ti o~t. -I t is a s ~ ~ r n r ~ l t l l at a. reenforce11 riflepl nt ool ~,C O I I S ~ S I ~ I I ~ o f :
Our i i f l t . ~ ) l n t ( n ~ n t hr e e s a i ~ a t l s ar111edw i t h r r ~n i - n i i t o ~l l : ~t i c of ~.iflri:
c111oligllt. mi l chi ne s ect i on (4Bms ~l i nga u t o m: ~t i crifles, md i t i e t l ) ;
OIIP WI-111111.I I I OPI I I ~q i ~ a d ; ill1offi ~~r, u cook, z111dil 110spitalcurpsnI:IIl
fnai v o u ~ p ~ ~ ~ l y a i 1nerpret i . r: hra(1quarrers; n i ~i t t i vegr~ide; ! l at i r e
: I I I ~:I COI I I LU~ t wi l l of 15 1x11-k n~t l l r s ,1riding rnl l l e for s o ~ ~ t ~ t l r r l ,
:III(I 4 t l : ~t i ven~uleteers;has been ordered to proceed from i t s base
1101.1110-(Illy<.cmlblt patrol ~ n i c s i ~ o ~ ~ s . of thrpatrol 'l'lir totals t ~ v o g ~ h
App. Y3 eombnt t rai n
81-n~m. ammunition qd.
Comn~nndtxl byLt.'Sd incemmnad"
SWM 6-49
ha\-t is 57 officersant1eiilistpcl ition:: ~ ~ i < l 6i~:iti.rcs. Hoslilngr ~t ~r r i l l ns
I ~e e n active iii the viciiiity.
b. Put ~olfo?.irratio~i.--
I ' l ~ , , ? Cl l f ( ' <>ni j roi i t i ol l
~' ~i , , t ................................... 3% ride sqd.
(:r,mol;~n(l<~l i n ? ; I Sgt.
Dist:ntw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
afilillbully ................................ I'atrui cnrlilnn~~der.
Kntire gni(le.
Sntil-eilltc!rl)reter.
Fwd. cseir. 1'l;ll. Hdqt~s.
1 rifleplilt. (ICES 1 sqd.I .
Lt.AI G, se.ct. (iess1sqd.).
(i0-111tn. sqcl.
Di st n~~ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C<rmlmttrain unri triliu guard. . . . . . . . . . . Ill!av e<eh. 1'i;tt. Hrlqtrs.
1,t. aro sad.
C*,~tlm;nided b>-Lt."31iili corrrm;nid."
1JPs ~l l l l r ~l ........................
1 o i l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Co~nnrarrlicdby a Xyt.
6-l!). March formation for a rifle platoon.-(1, Siturti%o??..-It is
assumed that a riflelrlatoon corisistiiig of thrccsquads, each armed
\vit,lr bolt nctioil rifles and t ~ v o Bro\viiing ar ~t om: ~t i c or seu~i - rifles
;rr~tornnticrifles; an officer, a cook, and n 11osl)itill corpslnan fro111
ccnnpany headquart ers; ib native interpretw: a1111a combat trail1 of
10 lm& intiles and 1r i di ng niule (for wounded) :md 3 native
nruletecrs; lins been orclcred to pn~ccecl from its base on a. 10-clay
patrol illto a sect i ol ~i n ~v h i c h hostile gnerri l l ns :wt: k n o \ m to be
operat i ng. Tllet ot al stre~igtliof theyatrol is33 officers iuld enlistcd
meil,md4natives.
b.Pat;rol f o wn a t i mr . -
RI OVI P I I I Co?l~aoxition
'%rifle sy8.
Point. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C<nn~narrdrd a Sgt.
Vixklncc.................................
&I:~iu bodx. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
% riflc sqd.
1':1troI co~nmw~~ier.
Natire illterpretw
Fwd. rsell. 1'int. Hd~l r s.
1riflepiat. (less1sqd.).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distance
train guard. . . . . . . . . . .
Distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rearpi nt--------------.------..--- ~ ~AL rifle s(zd.
Cumnlt~niledbyLt."211in co~muimd."
Combat trnin nnd Heilr csch. Plnt. Hdqtrs.
Commanded by 8gt.
SWM 6-50
'rtii~>[.itt(:ir
6-50, March formation f or a rifle squad.-.\ rifle stlnail slronl(l
~.;brely, if ever, be sent. as 21, p:itrol on a combat mission. Its ~rovlnril
employme~rt i n sinall ~r ar s, as in a major \\-sr, is tlrat of reco~u~nis-
sailer? se-urity, or 1i:i.ison. The duration of the 1)atrol \\-ill seldom
esceed 1day's march. If it extends over 1 clay, i t \!.ill nsually siibsist,
off the country ancl slroul~l not be encumbered ~vitlr a tixin. It, may
often be mou~ited, in \vlricll cascs the riding ai ~i ~nal s \\-ill carry the
necessilry impedimenta. Tile fornr:rt.ions of a. apiad acting ns an in-
dependent patrol are basically tlrose prescribecl in FM 21-4;. Tl ~e
i n~por t ~nt points 81%: i t must provide for all-around seciirity by
means of a point, rear point, :mil fairk ohserration or fl:~nkers; tlrc
patrol lender should be near the head of the ~nnin body, ratller tlrirn
in the point, so tlrat he c:rn contrnl tlre action uf the t,~ltire ptttrol;
the i~ntornatic weapons ~ i t h i n the patrol shoultl be located near the
lender in order that he may control tlreir initial action Lefore they
become committed or pinned to the ground in tho first burst of hostile
fire; a. get-away man slionlcl h desigilated. The distances bet\\-ern
the indivicluirls in the patrol ~vill del>r,iid nrtire,ly ~1x111 tlre natnre of
the terrain through wlrich it is pasing, bearing in mind tlrat mutual
support must. be assured.
6-51. March discipline.--a. Xilence esse?ifial.--,\ co~nbat patrol
operating ill a hostile. area, must ninrch i n silence. The noises, in-
c,Iuding voices, maile by the pntrol at i~ halt should not be loud enough
to be liearc1 by the outgoards.
b. Main.tcin:ing dixtm:es.-(1) The distances t o be maintnined be-
tween snbdivisions of the patrol, and bet~veen individuals, are clesig-
ni~tecl by t he patrol leader. I f these distances are temporarily
rleereased or incieased due to the terrain or for otlrer u~rvoidable
e en sons, they slioiild be resumed as soon a s warranted by t he situation.
(2) Distances sliould be maintained wi t h respect t o tlre elemeiits
both in front. and in rear. If an individual loses contact with the
man next in rear of him, word should be passed forward :md the.
rate of march decreased o r t11e patrol temporarily lullted until the
gt~p is closed.
(3) It requires particular effort to prevent men from honclring
at stream crossinaa. fallen trees. large mudholes. and si n~i l ar obstacles.
( 4) The rlrm signals "11~lt" and "for\vanl" sl~oold la. used ffrcael!.
to indicate to t11p111611in rear what is I I ~ P I W I I ~ I I ~ tw t l ~ei r front.
P. C~~t o . a l n~rnmbers of the pl~trol sllo~~l(l r11lei.-.4ll comply \\-it11
s11c11of the follo\vinp rules :is prrtl~in to the sitnation:
t 1) To noise or '.skylnrkil~g" to be per~l~itted.
SWM 6-52
'TI115 \I\RCH
( 2 ) Tl'eapo~ls anil ; i ~~r mu ~~i t ~o n ctl~ried by indiviilnnls vi l l be re-
tailled 011 tllrir person5 T11t.y will not be qecuretl to r~tlillg or pack
a~limi~ls.
( 3) ,Ini:tri leaclilig an unlmal \rill not secnre the lead line to his
person or equipnlrmt.
( 2 ) The riding :~rrlnl:il for the \lck \\.111 march 1st the rpnr of the
traiu.
( 5 ) Hr alert at all times. I>o not rlrprn<l entirely on the leading
elernr~ilt~ for recorrllalwarrce.
(6) So snioking except when authorized.
(7) Do not leave articles foreign or strange to the locality on tlle
trail or in camp sites.
(I)) Only the patrol leader will questiou nat i ~es mcom~terrd on
the tri:~l for information about distance, an11 dlrritions. TVhe11 11e
does so, he ,110olcl ail1 for ilat;~ tthol~t se\.er;ll laces so ns to cIl$gliist~
llle route to ire tnkeu.
(9) So co~r\ersations .irlll be erltel?(l into 17-it11 natives excc11t lry
the patrol leadrr, tleslg~~ated \ubor(l~nares, or interpreter.
(10) Tlle native guide ~r l l l not talk to other 11at11-es except 111 tile
presence of the interpreter.
(11) When passing or halting i n the vicinity of dwellings occupied
by p~aceful natives, do not take fruit, eggs, o r other things ~vithout
f ai r payment; d o not gamble or drink nl t h natives; do not enter
native houses without clearly understood invitation; do not assume
a hostile attitude.
(12) All distarlces mill be maintained a t temporary halts as when
marching.
6-52. March outposts.-March outposts should be established at
every temporary halt. The advance party, or, in small patrols, tlie
main body should balt on ground vhich can be easily defended. The
point should proceed a t least a hmtdred yards along the t rai l and
take up a position in observation. Other routine security measures
:ire followed, such as reconnoitering and observing laterill trails, re-
connaissance of commanding ground t o the flanks, and security to
t he rear. Tllese requirements a n fully :I.; important in small xxl.
operations as in major warfare.
65.3.Camp sites.-+. If the patrol is to bivouac on the trail, the
dtty's march sl~ould cease at least 2 hours before soddo\rn.
6. When tlie location of the camp site is not clefiuitely known, ilre
patrol loader should begin looking for a f avor ~bl e site at least 3 liours
hefore sundown. In peaceful territory, inquiries may be made of
SWM 6-54
friendly natives but t h ~ s is lnarlr~ialrle i l l a hostile region. Too
niucli rel~ance ctrrnlot be i~lacetl 111 t l ~e 111fo1nratlon received. liiunllj
the natives accompa~~ying the patrol a i guides. ~nterpreters, or ii~ulp-
teers will be able to give fairly d e f i ~ ~ ~ t e regartlrng good i ~ ~ f o ~ ~ n : ~ t ~ o i i
callip sdes.
c. The carnp area should be a lerel or sligl~tly rolh~ig, clenrctl, dry,
n-ell-drained field with firm turf free froni stones, stu!~ble, aud brush,
and ample i n size to accorriniodate tlie corinna~id ~vi t hout c~o\vd~lrfi
Water is c~sse~itinl. Fuel and forage sliould be urailahle. The 7 I-
cinity of s\\7anips, marshes, and imtive liouses should be particularly
avoided because of the danger of insects and cl~sease. Carnp sitei
rrce~ttly used by other troops ~ a re~i~leiirahle ~:uiless they liarr been
left in good police.
(1. Dry stream beds and ravines are ~~ndesi r : ~l ~l e l~ecan.;e of \ \ : I I I ~ I ~ ~ I ,
poor venttlntion, and the danger of floods.
r. Part or all of the desirable features for n camp site rnity h a ~ c
to be dis~egurded in hostile territory \\.hen proper clefensc. of the
bi~ouac will be paramount.
654. Making camp.-When the 1,atrol 1s hulted f or ti16 night,
march outpost security is immediately enforced until the regular out-
guards can be formed, instrncted, and posted. Reconnaissnnce pa-
trols slronld be sent orer all t l a~l s ri~dlating froni tlie camp site for
a distance of at least IL hi ~l f mile, inclucling the route which has just
been traversed. Outguards m~ll usually be detailed from the unit
which has furnished tlie advance guard f or the day. I n sn~nll pa-
tlnls it is often necessary t o detail some personnel from the main
body for this duty. Plans for tlie defense of the bivouac should be
for~nulated, and every element of the patrol instrncted acrordingly.
Squads and other units shouldbe bivouacked as organizations and in
relation to their respective sectors in the defense. Working detitils
ure assigned t o procure water and fuel, to dig latrines, and to per-
form other necessary tasks.
M S . Shelter.-a. Tile shelter tent.-In gooil weather it is often
better to sleep in the open rather t han to construct temporary
shelter. If some shelter is desirable, the sl~elter tent is generally
thebest type for troops in bivouac.
6. Thc ifan-to.-When necessnry materials are avi~ilahle lean-tos
can be constructed almost as qnickly as shelter tents c:11 he erected.
They are roomier than the shelter tent ancl afford better protection
during heavy rains. The lean-to consists of two forked uprights,
a cross pole, and a rough frame~rork which is thatched with large
SWM 6-56
THI". 3I.LRCH
lenr-es, such as inanac:t, banana, palm, etc.: or ~vitlr grass or reed
tied in bur~clles. 'I'he uprights may be t xo convvnic.nt. forked tree3
or saplings. After the cross-pole is securad in placo, tho fmme-
1,-ork is leaned agxinst it, and the covering secnred in place. The
varioos parts of the, 1e:tn-to ar e lashed togeth~v~r i t h vines ~vhich
are tssually found in the vicinity. A 1vc~11 iuiscle lean-to will last for
3 or 4 weeks before it has to be, recovere(1. (See Plate I.)
c.The cu,nZucm Zcra?i-to.-'rl~is con~biries cevtadn desis,able f eat ~~r es
of hot11 the shelter tent a.nd t.lle thntched lean-to. It consists of :I
frarne of light i ~ol es with a tarpaulinl tent fly, or several shelter
1l;slves or ponchos thro~vn over it and staked down on one edge,. Tho
tmo ends are enclosed. The front is left open like a lean-to. This
she.lter is strong, quickly built, >n1(1 makes use of various sizes of
mnvas.
rl. Native 6ulldinga.-Nat,ive buildings gei~erally should not. be
usecl by patrols f or shelter. Most of them are unclean and infested
v-ith insects. They are tistsally nlore ditficult t o defend than bivouac
~vhi chcan be selected wit11 its defeuse in vie.^. Sometimes, vacant
b~si l di ng rn:ry contain mines or bombs laid by the hostile forces to
explode on contact.
6-56, Bivouac beds.-a. h,Ien should not sleep on damp ground.
I n temporary camps and in bivouac, they should raise their beds
with leaves, boughs, or makeshift bunks in addition t o placing the
poncho between them and the. ground. Satisfactory bunks can be
n~xde from sm:ill poles placed together on crosspieoes raised about
6inches from the ground. The poles should be covered wi th leaves
or similar material. Bamboo can be split lengthwise, the joints
crttcked, and the piece flattened out t o make an excellent, spring-
like bunk when l ai d on crosspieces at the head and foot.
b. N~t i ve hammocks made of ligllt material :Ire of practical use
in some operations. The sleeper can protect himself from the rain
by stretching tr line between t he hammock 1:rshings and hanging a
shelter-half or poncho over it.
SWM 6-57
SECTION VI
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY
I'IIP. Pnge
a i s s : ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ilecoenoitering by seonts .............................. 6 5 8 .q' s a
Cnrcfol viauul recannniss;n,c~~. YS
Iblsty viauili recon~misst~llce 3- ......................
R(*onnnissunre by fire ..-..-. 8S
I ~ c ~ o ~ ~ n a i s s a ~ ~ c e ................. 89 by aviation &~rsori t rd. . 04,2
Airplillle recon~missunee hy patrol 1c;tde~r.. .................... GVJ 351
Intelligenct? agents ............................................ ~ 6 4 39
Qeestioai~ig inl~ntritaets for iafonnatio~b....................... CA5 :<!I
Dogs on reconnaissancr................................................. G66 3%)
Security on the march . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I e t l o l of 6-57 3i
0 . 8 7 30
Security nt rest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6-57. Methods of reconnaissance.-The varions methods of re-
connaissance and security employed by patrols in small wars do not
vary in principle from t,hose used in lnajor warfare. Because of the
nature of the terrain in which most, slnall war opcmtions occur, the
difficulties of mconnaissance and security arc increased. Several
months of active operation i n the field ar3 required to t rai n average
individuals as efficient scouts, and only a small proportion ~vi l l acquire
the ability of o native to interpret correctly tho things observed along
the trail.
G5X. Reconnoitering by scouts.-a. ' rho most certain method to
uncover an enemy is to send scouts to visit suspected positions. Tlie
disadvantages of this method iilclude:
(1) It slows up the progress of the patrol.
(2) Dense underbrush, and mountains, broken terrain :\re difficult,
t o ne.got.iate and will rapidly exhaust the personnel.
(3) Scouts itre likely to be in the line of fire when the battle
commences.
In spite of its disadvantages, the results of this met,hod of recon-
nais&nm are so reliable t hat it should normally be employed.
6; Scouts sent to reconnoiter positions which may be occupied by
the enemy a t any time during the passage of the patrol, such as com-
manding positions, and roads and trails intersecting the route being
GOS *I
SWM 6-59
l : I : COSS~~I i S. \ S( , ' ~ SII:CUlt?J.'Y ;\XI1
trnl-erspcl, slror~ld remain ill positioil 11nti1 tile p:ltrol co~npl'tes its
p~smge. TTl~is is the principle of "cro\v~iiiig ilrr lleights."
+SO. Careful visual reconnaissance.-'l'li$% cnrcfnl visllal recon-
naissance of s~lspected positimrs \vliile nppro;tclliug and passing illen1
enables patrol to inarch mrjre rapidly, bnt it is not as cert:~in
t o disclose the presence of an enerny as t he inetl~od of reconuais-
snllce by scollts. Escellent. field glasses ar e essential f or efficient
obserrntion.
6-60, Hasty visual reconnaissance.-n. I n some situations recoil-
~laissa~lce ZL liasty visrial i~lspection of dangerous \vill consist only of
RIICI s~lspicious places. Hasty visual reconnaissi~nce may be employed
wllrn:
(1)Patrols :Ire opratiug in supposedly pcac,ef~.~l arrns, o r ill arras
which hare been recently vacxtecl tby the enenry.
(2) Airplane rea~nnaissancr 11i1s indicntetl tlmt the area is free of
tlre enemy.
(3) Military necessity rerlnires the patrol to expedite its nr;~rcli.
7,. It nlllst. 1,s understood t hat to carefrilly reeounoiter every con-
n,;intling position and suspected alrlbuslr site will, in some terrain,
allnost immobilize tlre patrol.
6 6 1 . Reconnaissance by fire.-&. Recon~laissaiice by fire attcnlpts
to i~~veigle the enemy to disclose lr~isposition b y returning fire directed
against n suspected hostile position. This method should never be
used by patrols assigned to aggressive or offensive missions.
7). Some of the disadvantages of reconnaissance by fire are :
(1) It cliseloses the presence and location of the patrol to the
enemy ~vitllin range of the sound of the gunfire.
(2) I t prevents the capture of guerrillas lv11o may be traveling
alone or in small groups.
(3) It expends valuable. trmmunition, the supply of which may be
lin~ited and all of ~x.bictt inny be needed in a crisis.
(4) I t has a tendency to n~uke the nien on service of security less
obscroant.
(5) There is always thechance that a well-controllecl ene~ny force in
ambusll will not return the fire.
(6) The members of the patrol lrnro difficulty in distinguisl~ing
betwen the reconnaissance fire and the i ni t i d slrots fired from an
ambush.
G. Reconnaissance by fire ]nay be reasonably employed by :
(1)Liaison patrols which a r e too weak t o engage in cornbat ~ ~ i t h
llostile forces.
SWM 6 6 2
(2) Patrols r~l ~ose nlission rnlnircs tlieiir to reach their destination
t ~squickly as possible.
(i-62. Reconnaissance by aviation personnel.-a. 1teconn:rissance
by plane is invalnable in small 1rn1.s opetatior~s. I t 11:1s the follo\ring
disadvantages, ho\rever:
(1) Difficulty of detecting tho t!neniy in \voodecl country.
(2) I t iuny dirulge the location of frienclly grouncl patrols.
(3) Tlre difficulties of maintainiiig continuous reconnaissalme.
(4) It. does not relieve the ground patrols of their responsibility
for continuous close r~cor~naissance, altlrong11 i t often gives tlle~n a
fnlsc senso of secoritr.
6. For further det:~ils, see Chapter IS, "Aviation."
(;.fi:l. Airplane reconnaissance by pat rol leaders.-l'atrol leailers
sl~ould lntikc an airldt~ne reconix~issance of t l ~e area of operation at
every opport,ul~ily in or(ler to study terrain fei~tures. This is espe-
cially i~nportant if accurate i11:1ps of the. area are not availahle.
6-04. Intelligence agents.--I<eliable inte,lligence agents can sollie-
times be e~nployed to reconnoiter an area prior to the arrival of a
patrol, and t o continue their recor~naissance in conjunction \\-it11 the
patrol's activities.
6-65, Questioning inhabitants for information.-Patrol leaders
must evaluate cautiously information obtained by questioning inllabi-
t:~nts encollntered on tlie trail. A 1>crso11 ~vlio resicles in a community
overrun by guerrillas ge ~~e i dl y is sympathetic towards the111 or
fearful of their reprisnls.
6-66. Dogs on reconnaissance.-Dogs may sometimes be profit-
ably enlploycd nit11 outguards u ~ d security iletaclinients on the ~mtrch
to detect. the presence of hostile forces. Unless they are cnrefnlly
:md specially trained, their usefulness f or this purposc is do~~btful.
667. Security on the mareh.-a. Gene~a2.-Whenever practica-
ble, the neth hods of security e~iiployed in normal warfare are used
by patrols i n sn~all wnm.
b. IZrcukiwg cu!r~t,p.--Sccurily nreasurtLs 111usl nol be relaxer1 wl i e~~
breaking camp. The exit from the cnmp sl~ould be reconnoitered and
tho patrol should be vigilant \rlie,n getting into its march forination.
6. Duties of the point.-The primary fur~ction of the point is recon-
naissimce, t o disclose the presence of hostile forces on or near the
route of mnsch before the ncxt st~cceeding unit in the colunnl comes
nnder fire. It is a security detachment rather than a combat unit.
There is n tendency in smlll war operntions to overlook this im-
portant principle. If n patrol leader assigns too large a proportion
SWM 6-68
RECOSS. ~ISSASCEAND SI$CI:lLI:PT
of his force to t he point, he sacrifices his frc.edom to mnne~lver in
cornbat. The leadii~g man of t he point sltoultl never bearmed nit11
t111 auto~imtio rifle. He, more tllnil n~ry other illnu in thC patrol!
is likely to become n casualty in the initial bmst of hostile fire
from ambuslr. Point duty is c1itngerOus and fntigning. Me11 as-
signed to the poirtt sl~ould be relieved every 2 or 3 lours dnring
the day's march, and uiore frequently in dtulgerous localities.
d.Flank senc.vity.-The ir~ost difficult feature of securi t . ~ for a
patrol marclling through wooded territin is adequilte protection
against ambush and attack f n ~ m t11e. flitnks. I t is usually in~possible
or untlesimble to mairltnin flank patrols coutinuonsly i n suclt cotntry.
An experienced patrol leader mill often detect, tho presence of a
hostile force in t he vicinity by signs tllong the tr:lil. At t hut time.
he shoold estnhlisll f l ai ~l ~ or sligl~tly in rear of tlle p~l r ul s abre:tst
puir~t., e1,en t11uugl:h the rate of 111:irch will be atlversely affected. Ex-
cept under these conditions, flank securit.y is ge~lerally maintniiletl
by observation, and recoinlaisstti~ce of intersecting tririls.
6-68. Security at rest.-u. See pnragrapl~s 6-52 and 65+.
6. Camp fires should be scree.iled at nitrht t o i,~.erent tho personnel
- A
from being silhouetted neai ~~st
..
them in the event of a hostile attack
~
c.. SIII the III(~SSdetail. niorv tlli111 50 Irerceut of the pt~trul, itlvll~di~~j:
111t.11 \vtlsl~il~g : I I I ~ \vorki~lg pilnit's, sl~ullld or b>~t hi ~~g, separutetl
I h i e h i l y i g l 1 1 r Ul l r i ~~g the night. :ill
111t.11 hhn~~ltl \ V~ ~ : I ~ UI ~ I S keep t l ~ r i ~ . 11tvtr rhrir l)ersotlr.
SWM 6-69
S~.c.noxT'II
LAYING AMBUSHES
Definition ............... ..................
I'nr
?A;!)
I'rpr
41
Selection uf po\ltron ........................ ti-i0 -11
Uxn:~l cllnmcteri~trci of :rn inal,nsl~ ..- . . .Gil 41
Orcupsing the i>rts~tlon .........
Tho nnlbush eapape:emc*nt.. ...... , . . . . .
.. 072
.t i 3 3
4.5
4s
I':mplosment of il~inntrr v\c:k~x,n\ .................... G i 4 44
6-09. Definition.-An alr~llrr~li is tlie l eg~t ~~r l at e dis1)ositi011 of
troops in conce:tlment for the poipose of ntta<.klng all rllcxny by ulr-
prise. The laylug of a successful arnbn511 in hostile trrritory in a
inla11 war is a clifficult operation.
( ~70.Seleetion of position.-a. Offensive ambush.-Ail oftensi~r
ainbush sl~oul(l be 4 0 located as to facilitate thr assault after the in-
itial bnrst of file.
b. Defenvive antbush.-A clefel~sive aii~bush presupposes an inabil-
ity to assault and the probable necessity of :L ntpid withdrawal. I t
should beso located as to facilitnte defease, nit11 natural obstacles
het~vmn the l>osition and tlie enemy, and routes of withdmn~al should
be carefully planned, reconnoitered, nncl l>rep:uod, if necesstlry.
These requirements usually liinit the location of n defensive ambush
t o tlie military or geogrtlphicnl crest, wlie~% the n ~i t h d r a ~a l will be
~)rotectecl by t he reverse slope.
c. Ijirection of loid.-The amnbusll site shoold be selected so that
the odor and IIO~SCI, of the men \\.ill be carried awny froin t he enemy's
route of approach.
d. Obatacles.-Slream crossings, large m~~cll~oles, fiillc~r trees or
across the trail, are all useful obstacles. They generally cause the
a~nbusl~ed troops to bunch tip before tlie firing starts, and liinder
their move~nents after~vards. Intersecting stream beds and trails a t
the position should be enfiiaded by fire.
6-71. Usual characteristics of a n ambush.-Every ambus11 must
lmovide suitable firing positions and concenlme~~t in close proximity
t o the hostile route of marc11. The usual position is located on the
forward slope and a t a benclil in the trail. Automatic weapons or
machine guns ar e placecl in prolongatio~l of the probable clirection of
march at the bend in order to take the enemy in enfilade. The main
h d y of the a~nbuscade is placed parallel to the hostile route of
march to facilitate the assault after the initial burst of fire. Tlre
security element.; of the enemy shovlld be nelmitted to pass by tha
41
position ill order to secure t he nraximtv~n effect agnillst t he itostile
rllailr force. A positiolt tllttt perlrrits ellgaging the errelrly columll
fl.0111 both ffanks si~rlulta~leously i s l~ossible o~l l y if the trail lies ill a
rierp rttvine. Evert tlten tliere is considerable danger that. ficocllets
;tirrl wild shots fro111 one fl:rnI< will cans? casu:tlties to the other flulll~.
A -Machine Guns /
SWM 6-72
LA\I>(. i\IBChHE'
8-72. Occupying the position.-a. To a,nzb~cth a pcowtkng fame.-
I n the event a coinbat. pntrol \~isIres to ambush a hostile force
known to be follorring over the same trail, it inust proceed \\-ell
lwyoncl the t~mbnsh position selected. At a-suitable point, sucl~ as :I.
stream, it is led off the trail :nid connter-n~arclie(I, parallel to: but
cle:tr of the trail, until i t reaches the reverse slope iinrrrecliately ill
rear of tlie selected ambush. The men then move ii~diviilu:~lly, as
carefully as posqible., into t1r6ir firing positions and renlain motionless.
6. To ambush a n ~ e t i ? ~ g is more. difficult. t o lay a suc- fom.-It
cessful airibnslr apnirist a meeting force t han one ~vhicli is pursuing.
unless the p:ttrol lea.der is tlroroughly fanliliar vi t h tlre terrain and
l ~nsilrfii~iteinformation of tlio npptroacl~ of tlic lrost,ile pa.rty. Tlrc
:imbuscade mnst leave the trail solno distance in advi~nce of thc
selected l?osition. It then mores into firing position a s before ant1
a\\-nits tlie appro:mh of t h ~ elrerrry. Any inove~nent alotlg the trtlil
i n ac1v:ulce of the nn~bush vi l l disclose its location by footprints, or
other tell-tale s i g~s .
c. Ni ght rtmbw8h.-In some situ:~tions i t may be clesirable to occupy
i111 a mbu~l ~ This iimnenvi.v requires a definito position at night.
kiiorrledge of t he terrain, ancl good gnides.'
d. A?~zbu.sl~ oubliosts.-An ontpost, must, be estxblished at the point
tho patrol lei~ves the main trail to intercept and ct~pture any persol!.
trnveliirg t l ~e trail v\.llo iniglrt inform the hostile. force of the locntion
of t l ~e t~inbusl~.
c. Obxewution post.-iin observation post slro111cl be established iir
a position that will enable tlre observer t o give timely ~ v a r ~ ~ i n g of the,
enemy's a,plwarnnce. The most desirable position is solrie distance
from the ambush and in the direction of t he enemy's approach.
f . Fivir~g poaitiona.-Each lnnn should select n good fi ri ~i g position
:IS close to the trail as is consistent wit11 complete concealment.
g. Tell-tale signs.-Every effort mnst be made t o avoid moving
foliage or earth for purposes of cover, shelter, or camouflage.. Tht?
keen eyes of t he ene.my inny detect tlre t.nrning of a leaf, the break-
ing of a b i g , or tlie appearance of a hanclful of new dirt.
6-73. The ambush engagement.-a. The enern?/ approaches.-As
the enemy appmachm the ambush, the nlen lie f we downward and
remain mc~tionless until the s i p 1 to "commeiice firing" is given. I f
they raim tlit?ir heads, the position mill us~~al l y be disclosed by the
outline of tho heads or headgear, by movement, or by the reflection of
light f r o~n their eyes and faces. Too often; some man will become
so excited t.ha.t he cannot resist firing prematurely at tlre first enenry
he sees.
43
b. The sign& t o eo?)~. ~nel~ce fi,.i?~g.-The patrol leader sllonld give
t he sipi~al to comn~el~ce firing. An excellent rtletltod of doing this
is by opening fire with an :lrrtorn:itic \reupon. He slrould be on the
flank tornard the eilemy, or in n coinn~n~~clir~g position that mill en-
nble him t o observe the entire eltellly force.
o. Actima af t er ol~e?lilrg @e.-Deper~ding upon the sit,nntion, the
heavy initial fire will LH: follo\\.ecl by atr assault,, 21 de,fe.~lse, or a.
~ritbdva\~al.
6-74. Employment of infantry weapons.-31nchine gulls should
be sited to: enfilade a portion of the tmil. Trench mortars, hand
gre~lades, and rifle grenades a r e dillici~lt to employ in :m offt.nsive
itmbnsh because of tlre da~lge,r of such projectiles falling ainong
friendly assaulting troops. They are of \.nluo ill clefensire ambushes.
SWM 6-75
S E ~ O R VI I I
ATTACKING AMBUSHES
&I.. I'age
Muoui prcwraiio~~: - +75 45 -.--.--------.-~.-----...-------------..
Prrsrrnrrged s r . l t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s r d nl xnenrn 8-78 45
Sliirit of tile off<?twi!w G.77 4 i
Fire :urd nrorczrlcril 6-78 4 i
Auti~orityof sul,ortlilr;itt's 10 act onI ~ \ - I L initi:iti.i'c 6751 4X
6-75. Mental preparation.-l'l~i. lirincipal objective of an offen-
sive ambush is to t:~ke arlvantage of surprisr. The closeness ttuil
suddenness of the atit~ck is supposetl to disorganize a l ~ d dr:moralizr
the enemy. A neeessiirg protection against con~plete disorganiantion,
and possible demoralizatioa~, is to prepare the troops mentally for
the shock of a~nbusli. .They ~nnst be steeled to \vitlistand a sudden
blast of fire a t close quarters rind to react. to i t in :L manner that
will unnerve the enemy. To accomplish this, the troops must. have
a thorough understanding of ahat is likely to happen if they :are
ambushed.
6-76. Prearranged schemes of maneuverla. &nerd.-9' lnce
the great majority of a~nbushes Iitrve certtrin similar cllaracterist.ics,
the nature of tni ambush at,titck can be z~nticipated. Usually there
mill be n burst of automntic fire from t,lle front that mill enfilade
the column, combined with un attack from one flank. Both of these
attileks mill be delivered a t sho~t. ranges and from positions located
in thick cover on comma~~ding ground. With this sitt~ntionin
r ui ~~d, the putrol ca~i be indoctrinated with simple prenrri~ngecl
scliemw of mane,uver to combat such attacks.
6.Actio?~.~ of the train and. tru;,~~ gum-d.-(1) I11 the event the
train is riot uuiler fire \vlien the engagement commences, it should
be closed up on the forrarcl elements' in the column. As soot, ns
closed up, or ~~~1.11en endangered by hostile fire, the animals are. driven
into positions affording cover or shelter. Wl~en possible, the ani-
mals are tied to trees to prevent them from running away. This
enables the trnin guard to use its weapons to protect the train, and
assists the nat,ive muleteers t o control the train. I n some situations,
particularly rnhexp, the aren is heavily wooded, the animals tired,
and t.11e enemy aggressive, the mtio?~ and bnggage animals am
nbnn(1oned until after the battle.
45
SWM 6-76
('2) Men leading animals carrying weapons nird :r~nmnnition re-
t ai n possession of them. I n desperate sitnatioils, it nmy bo necessary
t o shoot these. animals t o prevent. them front bolting into t he rnrniy
posit.ionls.
(3) I f heavy machine guns or 81 nnn. mcrrt:~r units are attaclred.
- t o the patrol t he cre,as take their loncls froln the pack arrin~als :rncl,
nlooirig "by hand," prepare to go into action.
(4) The train guard keeps the ~nuleteers and animals under con-
trol. It is assembled under t he train connn:tniler and is available t o
augment the patrol reserve.
c. Pn~oZres.o~-~e.-Apatrol reserve should be withheld flwm the
initinl action. An alert enemy may fire upon the leticling elements
from one flank only aud, once the patrol has been committed, lnmlcll
a n unexpected attack from tlte rear or soine other (lirection. A s
soon as the hostile positi(rn has beclr f11lly developed, however, the
reserve may be employed to envelop lils flnnlr or :IS otlier~vise required
by the situirtion. I n lnany situatkins the rear guiird will constitute
t he pntnd reserve. Certain automatic 71-rxpons sl~onld be clefitiitely
assigned to the patrol reserw.
d. The ?-ear qua'ri1.-If the patrol is nrnbashetl from eitther flank,
t he rear of the column becomes an exposed flmli. The primary hnc-
tion of the rear guard is t o protect this flank, and i t should not lm
committed to action until the situation makes it mandatory. The
rear guard co~nmander map, i f necessary, send part of hi s unit. to
assist the train guard in contl.olling the animals and native mule-
teers. I f tlte rear p a r d constitutes the pat.rol reserve, it may be
employed after the train is secure(1 and the train guard has been
~s s e mbl dt o assume. the functions of the reserve.
e. Anticipated action aqainst an attack f7.o.m the front and a for-
wctd payt of t he ~ i q h t (kjt) flcmk.-In the majority of a n ambnsh
t he attack will ht, delivered against the front and forward part of
t he right (left) flank of the column. The point (advance firlard)
and the leading elenients of t he main body usually are immobilized
hv the initial &rst of fire. Thev return the fire and act as a hold-
"
i ng force, developing the hostile position. The rear elements of the
main hndv imm~dintplv maneuver t o envelon and ovenlln the ex- ~~~.~~~~
..
~ - ~ ~ . , ~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~
~ ~ ~~
posed Ilostile flrrnk anil c:rptnre tlir mrrr~y'q nl~tolnt~tic A< lvr:Ipons.
t ho :rttack 11rngtrws. the l~omilr ftrn.r will fn3gi11 to \'ithclr:~\r.. 81ncl
t he pi nt (;rdr:rlrrr hatird) tlnd 1e;rding unit.; o f t l i t y n~r ~i n hr1~1y \rill
hn e~inblecl to p:lrticipate in t he filllil :i=~aitlt of 1111' position. The
SWM 6 7 8
happe~~s
~novement, or the rrflectio~~
seize his automatic IT-eapons I t often that. some slight
of light, fro111 hostile. weapons, will dis-
close the location of an enemy ambush before the first shot. has been
fired. I f this occurs, immediate action of some sort is imperative.
To stand still: even rnomenti~rily, or silnply t o attract the itttention
of the person nest in column. is usually Idril. If ths individual or
uni t ~ h o ohseures the amhnsil rusllres for\v\.nrd immediately, not io
s straight line hut in a zigzag conrse depending upon t he uature
of the terrain, t he enemy may break from his position. I n any
event liis oper~inp burst of fire will be erratic and comparatively
ineffective instead of deliberate and well ailnod. The lush slioulrl
be accompanied by a yell to v t ~ ~ ~ ~ the remainder of the patrol, which
ill also disconcert the enemy. Tlris :1ctio11 is effective even though
t he bayonet is not carried or fixed to the riflc, nor is it any more
dangerous than taking up a firing position near the trail whicli is
almost certain to he &hin t he beaten zone of soroe hostile we:ipon.
It is i~iralogous t o the final :~ssault which is the objective in eveq
combat.
CWS. Fire a nd movemenk--a. If an immediate assault is not ini-
tiated against the hostile position, the ambushed patml mnst seek
cover and engage in a fire fight. Even though the patrol is anned
with superior weapns and is better trained i n combat firing than
t he enemy, it is a t a disadvantage in a purely passive fire fight. The
hostile faces have the advantage of commanding gro11nd and con-
cealed positions. So long as they are not forced to disclose their indi-
vidual positions by actual or threatened personal contact,, they are
free to break off the engagement at any time. The eventual loss of
ground means nothing to the guerilla. If he can withdraw with
110 casualties or only minor ones after delaying and harassing the
patrol, the engagement has been a success. The objective of t l ~e
pa.trol mnst be, therefore, to iuflict as many casualties upon t he enemy
:IS possible. This can be accomplisl~ed in a fire figlit only if t he spirit,
of the offensive, with movement, is employed. During the fire fiK1lt,
~nembers of the patrol must move forward a t every opport11nit.y in
order to close with the enemy as quickly as possible., or make him
disclose his position so that he may become a definite target. The
culmination of t he action is the assault, t o overrun the enemy, cap-
t ur e his weapons, and pursue hi m by fire to t he limit of visibility.
G79. Authority of subordinates to act on own initiative.-u.
Considerable authority must be granted all leaders to act i ~ ~ d e p n d -
ently and on their own initiative. In the absence of orders, action on
SWM 6-78
SWM 6-80
S~c vr osIS
ATTACKING HOUSES AND SMALL BIVOUACS
I':,,'. T':%:P
&XI 51 Attxcltit~g IIO\IS(?S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attiteliillg sln:~II ti-SI 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I
eill~t~~rrd biron:~~.; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6-80. At t acki ng houses.-a. In s~rrnll m-ar operntions, it is fre-
quentlynecessaryt oseize inrliriilnalsoratt,:lcklrostile gvonpsknown
t o IE tat acertainhouse. ; I I J ~ I ~ I I Y riltlrougli tlir: t;lsl<III:I!- ttobeS ~ I I I ~ I ~ P .
itisoftendifficultto:iccomplislr succi!.isf~rlly.
b. Thet?illo\\.ingi~rstvoctiorrs :we ge~lerally al~plic:~Lle i n l ~ l : ~ n u i ~ ~ g
1111 :itt;lck agitilista ]rouse:
(1) Secrecy i sesse~rtial. Xrlatives, syn.~patl~izers, or iutimid:~teil
natives ]nay \vnrlr tile er~el ~ry of the 11i1trol'si ~~q?rmcl i . 111 SCIIIIO
i~rst:inces, they harebeen IT-ariierl beff~re t he pr~trol c1e:ired its home
st ation.
(2) Tire location of the house and tlie nature of tlre t s r r :LIII ~111'- '
roo~r(l i ~rg i t ~r i ust be definitely know~l; either by perso~rill recoirnais-
s:tnce, a sketch, ortl~ror~glr t he~rrediu~rr of IL grriile.
(3) 'rile p:~trol should usuillly :~ljl~roaclr and occupy i t s 11ositio11
rurdr~r comrof dark~ress.
(4) Donotuso:L li11'gerpiitroltlrtil~ ilecessarytocnrvy oiitthe illis-
i A largepatrol islrarilt o a~nt rol , difficultto conceal, aildnml;rs
tooarrtchnoise.
( 5 ) 'rile apl)~.oaclrmust be n~ade clirietly anrl cnutiously. Bark-
i ~ t g (l ogw~ft ei i I\.:I~Ithe inlii~bit:i~lts of tilt? approach of t he patrol.
(6)I'tilize al l nvnilnhle corer.
(7) Corer allavenues of escape, either pl ~ys i a~l l y or by fire.
(8) liayonets should be fixed. The p:itri~lis sometimes u11:111le
ro ope11fireduetotlre presenceof \\-omen, children, or unidrntifiatl
1)cs~wns~ received or becartso of i ~~st ruct i ons from bigher ~~rt l rori t y.
(9) If the~nission isthe captureof tlre occupants and arnieil rr-
sista~rce isnot espectt,il,surrourrd theIror~so andapproaclr itfro111t ~ l l
sitles.
(10) If tire missiol~ is to nttack the Irouse, and itrnlned resisti~nce
maybe expected, the patrol i n~r s t be located sothatevery sideof the,
building will becovered by fire. Ptlrticular care nusst be taken to
makecertain tlrnt rro ilre~rrber of the p,itrol \\-illbe i ntlre lineof fire
of nay otlrer inili<idual in t hepatrol.
51
I S ~
I)eatroyi!ig f-82 Z2
.,'l~-r.,,.'~<Txl; :r<jrsv,; . \ xi +;>1'\1,1, I;lY(~l-,\ss
1;-51. i \ t t a e k i n g s mal l bivouacs.-ir. :itt:rch- <)II :I 110s- .\~i i ct : t ~~sf i r l
t i l v i!ii-i,iinr t t f t vr i i i :i s ;Ii i t!i rt\ c*fFt*ct t l r nn :t c l ~ f ~ i t tit~ri~,~l-;iliziir,g i n
~>rf l i rr: i l . y txiix:rgr.illeiits.
!,. hliirry (8tl kv i i ~st st i <, t i o~w t11 for ii(t:wi<iirg l >t , i r s t ~:1rtt : I ~I ~~I ~~~: ~~I I ~~
; i $i >i vl <i t r ~ i ~cl di t i o~>. { mi r ol 111:1ki1l$ 21 bi %.vi ~ti c>. TI I t11e Iwi11t-r ot' :I
s t r p r i s ~ :ttt:rck <HI :I~ i r ~ t r l l sl r i i r t l ~lt w gr r i cI ~~<l errvi3iy for(,(* irr l ~i vi t t i t ~c
I r y i i r i , I i of tlrt. fo!lix\virin iiistriivtiorr.; 31s i ri i i ytit, :1[11ilit,:ktilt! i r i t l i cp:i r-
tivr1111rt q~t , rt i t i <~: i :
(1) Svt,tivt%11 ICII<?%VH t t l ' tlrt? I ~i i - ~) i r : ~c. gliit11' n - i ~ o tl i e t>s:i,~t l oci i t i , , ~~
I f hc is :r irli:kl,lc. f r i r i r i l l j - n: rt i wl :rtl i ~ l f o r i ~hoi i i cl l ~ t * r l i : ~t l r to i i nrt !
1,i ri i r t ~, ~<o: ~r i ~i i l er :if11irintvt1totit(, l ~ i u t i ~ : ~ ~ . :I gii<>fl
( 2 1 1 iI I ! I I : I of t l ~i . I,i r<tri sv :I:ILI i t s
r ~ i ~IIII i l ~ i i ~ t l ( l ! ' Thi s 1x1trac<.ci on tlrtk g1*1ii:i(l, .1111t~IP:I~c~
i tri d!. il i : r r cf r r l l y. l mt ilrt>irl,l irt* { ~r . t q~i r t . f ~l i l ~, f t r ! i I 'iitiiiitii)11 11, t i i r l l 111,.
qui t (, tlifY<~rvirt fro111t!i:rr r * s p ~ ~ ~ t r . < l ,
(:I) ;\tt:ivk wi t i i FI SI V t:irri. .iIt,:r!l~:.i i r ~cl t \ vot ~t r r t i s of forrr ~r i er i
v:i<.lii . ~ gv or t ~~ :I ~i r i t : i l ) l t ~ for, r r ~ost sitii:ili i ) ~i s .
( 4 ) . \ r . r i i tlrr. rri :l j ori ty or of t he l >sttr,l \ritli :i i ~tc>i rrf~ti <:st~rrii:iirt(!-
i ti nti r. ".rnImIS.
( 5 ) X~*:i vt' 1111. t r t r i l rissoori :I.;t ~~r ~i vr r i i er r t the! 11i r l ~t 1u~~ ar i d~ ~ [ ~ l r r o a r h
fro111~ilic~spc!ttecl tlirchetion. 7VI1etr i n tl119 v i ~ i r i i ~ y tfl t! of II~VO~I~IO,
:I~II".o:N.II sl r ~wl >i i r ~ ( l ctirrtiotrsly.
( t i ) .\ftc!r t hc It.i t~l cr.;lioulil rrt akr cnref ul si gl r t i i : g t h c s t ~i vt r r l i ~c,
r i ~~. : o~~r i t t i . ~~i i i r ce I ~ t ~ t ~ : r r r r i ~ r i ~ i g icn%tiori 11f t he [ ~r i r t - of i t . ttrc (!xrrct
c i pnl ~P' IIIIIS of t heenclrty f or cv i sgc*nr r al l y ~l i l i i i cul t. FV11t.n ccltxfi-
<lc.iit i rf t i t @IO(*R~~IIII t h e lt~:~dc-r n f tlit! i i r aj ~t r [ i ort i ~nri of tht! cnerriy,
1)uiltii1111:Ifirla1f i r i ng l i r ~c.
( 7 ) Wl i c~r i t l i e I i r i r i gl i i i e i s i n1nrsitior1: i ~ ~ t l (q~:vi fire, ~ir~!l):ireilICI
IIIC~ tha ~.vc.rltt l r t ?yrc~ftrso, leader. nsclers tlrc! t!ricriry to s~rrrerrdt*r. III
tllc: It>:r(lrrsigririls, "Colnrrreocc* E'irirlg." .I11 n r ~ r i tlirt:ct t,lic.ir fir%?
i r i t otlrc Irivouii<..firiligr:tl,idly. bnt sarrri-:ri~torr~aticirlIy.
( 81'11li(?[ n ~ s ~ i l ) i l i t y :isss~irll~;II(I vi ~i i ni ~i - of II~I :I 1111rsr1it%Ii oi fl d
t,rc*tl, i j ri t tlic, 1itc.k of t~:ry(tric?tr, tire rr:it,rrr*~of tit<!tc.rr.:~irrover \ vt i i i : l ~
t i i t , (zrityrn.swi l l flut*,i i t l ~ lt he i i g i l i t ~ of t ho elir.rrry. wi l l r ~f t t . : ~ i c i ~ c l c c ~
sr r r l i efri i rtu f r ~t i l e.
fi-k?. Destroying c apt ur ed hivouaca-.-'l'lrc. rnl t t eoE a i ~i v ~: i i r ( . $13
; r known rtletny ot mp~ i t e i t . sl i ot r l dhc ct r nsi ~l r r vdiwt.c~rc!, d e s i ~ . o y i r ~ ~
(&t rt +n. i l l i ~s 11nrt+a\ve:tkrlc%+ forr%cupyi ri gt i t r npsitcm t hey 11irvrpr e-
s i i r r t c l ~ f i ~ u n i l airtisf:lrt<~r:y.yrrt rt i col r~rl yi f irltc:lters hr i vn t r cm col i -
structei1. 'I'lra l,rtr.rritrg r ~ f trivortnc shcdtcrs rrrrt:ly %.r.vtw :rrty r ~vef nl
IIIL~~II~$~+ L I ~ I ~ I ! ~ r ni l i t i i r ~y storesof st~racrvrtlirt.. tlrc?y<:r~ttt:~iti
SWM 6-83
SECTION X
STRATAGEMS AND RUSES
I't,?, I?$K,,
Rule8 of land mar , . S:I
Clenrirlg the static YS
Ap~~rebcndingi nt o 53
Spielfollolving :I iltlt .33
Guerrilln ruses arrd s r;it:ig YA
C-SB. Rules of land warfare.-1':ttrol al ~vt ~ys ol,enttii~~is f ~~r ni sh
opport.unitiesfortheemployme~lt of strat;tgcll~s aud ruses;ho\~ere~.:
sncli as are used lrrrrst bo i n accordancewith the acceptecl Rnles of
Ltrnd Warfare.
(G4.Clearingthe station.-.i ~ : ~ t r o l slioulil Ile able t oclear its
stations mithont that fact.beingt r >~~~s ~ni t t e d to the hostile forcesby
their intelligence agents. The follo\ri~rg rr~ethotls 111t1ybe used to
deceivetheenemyasto the plansof tlie patrol:
(1)Having decided to attack a certain Iri~stile hivot~ac, :I ~ L I I I I ~ I .
isstartedamongthenativesthatthepat,roli sto~onrclr to some place,
i nthe opposite direction. Thepatrol clearsthe tow11in that direc-
tion and eventually circles at some ilistanee froill the station and
lnarehestowardsthe objective.
(2) Clearingthestatiou lateat right.
(3) Theinembersof the patrolfiltrateont of t l ~e camp tlnring the
rlicy or night andassemble ata rendezvous solue distance. from the
station.
(i-85, Apprehending informers.-Guerrilla spies n-110 lire near
thegarrison arearo~istant. menact.. While they :Ire often snspncted.
itis very difficultto apprehend them in a $uilty act. One~v:~y of
doingthisistoestablish sentinelsonthetrailsleadingfromthe stil-
tion to the hostile areas. After the sentinels hare reached their
posts, organize a patrol and allom word t o be pasr,ed amoug tlie
nativesthatthepatrolisclear-ingforthehostilearea. Thisinforma-
tion may cause theinformers to start for t heetletnp camp in order
t owarn them, thns permitting the sentinelsto intercept and detain
them forq~test~ioning.
M6. Spiesfollowing a patrol.-Hostile intelligenceagentsnlay
foilom a pttrol, but at a safedistance. Oneway tocapture them
SWM 6-87
STIL.YrhOY.3lS :\XI) Ill:Sl<.i
i s to lenre an outpost. sel-ern1 hmlclred yards i n rear of 21 si!lectecl ctiulp
site. The men i n the o~ltpost take corer and captllre ;III)- sr~sl~iciorrs
])ersons follo~\-ing the patrol.
GY7. Guerri l l a ruses and stratagems.-For l)lW170WS of p i ~ ~ t w-
tion, a ci~reful study must. be mado of the rnses nud str:~tagems prilc-
ticed by the enetny, and the filcts learnetl sllo~lld IK! pnhlished for
t l ~ einfornrntiori of the regular forces concr~.nt:d. Ilnses and stmta-
gcrilq~racticerl i n warfare bet\\-(!en forces of irregulars, or by irreg-
ulars :~g:ti~rst regulars, incln(lr :
(1) Inveigliilg tlle e,nerny intc! an attack and pursuit alxd then,
\\-he11 he is disorgailized nvld scattered, m:~ke n violent counter-attack
ik nrodification of this method includes :~banrloning ir~li~nnls and sop-
plies ilnd tl~en, when the i~ttacking force is lllore interested i11 booty
tlriur lmrsuit, t o connter-att:~ck.
(2) A gronp of tlre enemy nl;ly retre;:t bcfore the at t t ~cki ~i g force
a11d lure it into a cnrefnlly prrl);u.r<l ::~rrbush.
(3) Ui sgui si ~~g tlreir fotxs, sonietimes wt5ar- tlre~nselres t o i . t ! ~~~~r bl c
ilrg a si~nilnr nnifonn.
(4) Having their men o ~ i serricr of sec~irity disguised l i ke tlreir
foes.
(5) On one pretext or nnotlior, to lure a small enemy force into
: ~ u ex[ ~sed position nncl destroy it. Examples:
(a) Cutting 2% telegraph wire and then destroying the repair party.
( b ) Raiding a commnrlity with a small group and tlxerell striking
t he patrol sent to its relief wi t h a st.ronger force.
(6) A guerrilla group snrprised in an area may hide its firearms
and nssulne the apl)earanrr! of a peaceful group of citizens busy in
t hei r fields or clearing tr:iils.
SWM 6-88
SE'TIONXI
RIVER CROSSINGS
Par, I'ag,
Introduotio~l .................................................. 6 8 8 5.3
Availabilityof meatis
Swimming.. ..........
55
55
................ G-91 56
Boats.. ........ 57
Ferries. ....... 57
Fovds.. ....... 58
59
Crossir~gunfardable strean~sxrith u s ~~a l . f ~ 9 f i infantry equi p~~~ei i t. . 69
Crossinghorsesandmules................................... 6-97 63
C-88. Introduction.-a. Tliepassageof npatrol acrossastrean1ill
smallwarsoperationsissimilartothepassageof a defile. Itshonld
lx assr~med t hat every crossi~lg will be opposed by tlie enemy, 2nd
necessary precautions should be taken to effect the passage with n
re~~sorlable The security measures taken and the degree of safety.
tactics emplo;e,d toforcea crossingagainstoppositioninsmallwars
donot differ fromtl~ose of rnajor warfare.
6. Allstrenn~s act as obstaclesto a greateror lesserextent. Some
means must be devisecl to get the troops andmaterial across with-
out disorgnnization and in condition effectively to resist an enen~y
attack before, during,and aftercrossing. Crossingmay beopposed
or unopposed. The probability of opposition is frequently the de-
termix~ing factor in tlie choice of a crossing site.. Poorly adapted
sitesmay halve tobe used by the reconnoitering parties. Time is n
factorinevery crossillyand themeans employed must be thosethat
will pornlit a crossing in t he niiiiimu~n of time to avoid continued
sepanrtionof thepartsof t l ~ e patrol by t heriver.
6-49. Availability of means,-&Ieans of wossingmay iredivided
intofords,boats (including rubber boats of the collapsible variety),
rafts,ferries, permanent andtemporary bridges, and swiiinming. It
may be iiecessnry t omake. useof several or all of these expedients
o r thecrossi~tg of abt l gof troopswithi t ssupplies. Itmaybesaid
thatfordilly ands~vimming willbe thenormal meansof crossingi n
s~nall warsonerntions.
- ! O S w i n I t IIII~C, ~, I~IIII, ! t.;l,r(i;tlly i l l r ~ ~ ~ i ~ l l S ~ I . C ~ I I I I I ~
\v:trsol )c~rat i ~, ~~s, l r b cn)ssnl,ir~itially at S \ V~ I I I - \\illlri~vr t t , lr.a>t.I I ~
SWM 6-91
RITISIt CIIOS51SO.i
nring, until protecticn for the rnai~r crossing l ~a s been estnblishetl 011
I 111. opposite b:rnk. Most men will be irlc:~l>al)le of ~ ~ ~ i n ~ m i n g ere11 :I
rlivrt distance wit11 their rifles, belts, and cIotl~in<v and mould 1x5
9
l~elpless and naked when they landed on t he oppos~te hniik if tiley
discarded this eqoipn~ent. S~vimming is therefore usually cornbi~led
with some sucli method as tlie use of inclividual Hoats or rafts, or the
use of the fen, bonts available f or the transport. of arrns and supplies.
Such floats may assist the sn.irrin~ers in l~eeping irHoat while orossing
rclatil-cly .ir-ide. rivers. TITlreli tlie ~nen 1:11id, they establisl~ them-
selves in a position t11:lt will protect tlre crossii~g, assist o n tlie f ar
side in construction of bridges, ferries and similar ~rleans of getting
t110re~naining troops :nrd supplies across, or proceed on their assigned
~nission, d i c h may he to drive an enenrg detachment from a Inore
suitable. crossing place. Life lines ]nay be stretclletl across the river,
ullc above. :tnd one below t,he crossing, as safety measures t o prevent
lrren from being svel ~t avny downstream by t he current.
6-91, Bridges.--a. The, construction of bridges for the passage of
>ill arms reqnires considerable time and inaterial, and : L certain amount
ctf tecllnical engineering t.raining. Bridgrs are most useful at cross-
ings on the line of co~n~nuni cat i o~~s and have the advantage of pro-
1-itling a. permanent means of crossiitg a. river. Only those forlns of
bridges easily eonstruoted with materials or tools available at tlie
bridge site will be. considered here..
6. Felled t.ree.-Very narrow streams may be bridged b y felling a
large tree across the stream, staking dol~-n o r otherwise securing the
ends, and then cutting off the branches above the water so t hat troops
can rwlk across. A line can be stretched as a l~andrail i f necessary
from bank to bonk omr the fallen tree. trnnk.
c. Foot br,idge of Aao o.r more trees.-\Vhere~ one tree not reach
across the. stream, t~vo trees mag be felled on opposite sides of the
stream, and their branclres and tops secured together in midstrearn.
Lines should be mnde fast near their tops before felling, and the line.
s~trtbbed to other trees ell upstream and eased dowristretun by the
ropes unt,il tlie two trees iritertwine. Then the tops should be securely
laslred together and the branche~ cleared t o provide a footpath over
the tree. trunks. Stakes on either side of t he felled tree trunks may
be used to strengtlten this bridge. Athird tree, felled so t?lat its top
falls on the point where the other two meet in midstream, but at an
angle to them, will strengthen tho bridge, ns it provides a tension
11rembe.r against the force of t he current.
SWM 692
1IIVI~;I'iCROSSISC4H
d. Flonti?ig h?*iilr/e.s.-Floating bridges mag be constrnc.tec1 of rafts
or boats, wit11 planks laid across the gunxralrs. These boats sl~o~rld
bti sccurely ancliored cir moored wit11 their b o ~ ~ s
Scc-
upstrram.
tio~ls of t l ~ r brirlp~ nay be constrticted :mtl floated do\>-nstream into
lilacc. I t i n to hi1170 all the, floats of ab~i ~i t drsi~.:~hle t he s~line r:t-
p~city, to avoid cxt ra strain on the pl:inks or other flooring. Tlre
ltirger boats or rafts may he placer1 at greater i~rtervals tllan the
sm:~ller, to nccomplisl~ the same impose. Rafts or floats rn:~y be
made. of timber, casks, lxtrrels or anytl~irrg at hand that will floi~t.
(i-92. Boats.-o. IIIthe countries in 1r11ich small x7-ars 01)erations
uwally occnr, sonre n:~tivu b(~:its will he fonnil in the vicinity czf
river crossings ~\-llicl~ are too deep to he fordt~ble. T11eso \rill nor-
nially be of the (hg-out type wlrich are qciite unstable, but unsink-
:ible. Tl ~ei r c:~p;tcity r i l l range from small, t ~ o - mi n ~ to boats,
h~t eausof 80- or 40-ma11 capacity. If tlre crossing is opposed, it. is
desirable to 11:t17e a sufficient number of boats available to execut~
the crossing of the patrol promptly. I f t,he passagc: is unopposed,
even one small bo:rt will be found of irrestimable vt1111e.
6. I f no boats calk be found in t l ~e locality, i t is sornr. %timesneces- '
sary t o constrr~el makesl~ift boats from available m:ttrrials. I11 rr-
rent small n7ars operations, boards found i n a local d%relling Irere
used t o construct :I 6- by 22-foot boat, caulked wit11 gintee fro~n Ilu:
Bospit:~l corpsman's kit. It was employed to ferry a patrol of 133
(~Aicers a11i1 mell and '70 animals across :I. stream swollen wit11 tqr-
lential rains \rhich made the customary forcling impossible. Tl ~e
c~lrrentwas so swift that t he use of a r af t mas imprtlcticable.
c. Collapsible rnbber boats, ~v l ~i c l ~ be carried by pt~trols in can
the field or clropped by aircraft i n case of necessity, will proB:rbl~
he used extensirrly in future small wars operations.
ti-!):%. Ferries.-a. Ferries may be eitl~e,r "flyiug" ferries or "trail"
and i n most streams the current can be nsed to propel t l ~en~.
SWM 6-94
ltITI'.lt CROSSISGS
telegraph mires twisted together nil1 do for a small boat) across tlre
stre:lm and rigging 21 pulley so tl~nt i t will t r t ~r el on this line (L'slieer
l i e ) A line is then fastened to the pulley fnim tl~t, hov of the
boat. Some ferries, especially in slo~r. streams, must be ~ont rol l e~l
by a born and a stern line ("n~aneuverii~g to tlie rop(3s") i~ttt~clled
pulley. 13y hauling in olr tlie how line nncl slackening tlie stern
line, or vice v e ~ ~ t ! the boa- m:ry be set a t sncl~ an t~ngle to t l ~e
cnrrent t l ~at tbe force of tlie current acting on the hull ill cause
tbe boat to move across the stream. In a, swifter current, b be re
{lie botrt points inore nearly upstream, s pt~ddle ~nny be 11eld over
t.lre downstream side a t t11e stern, 01. a rudder may be used.
c. Flying ferry.-A flying ferry nses the san~e means of propul-
sion, but in place of the "slieer line," t l ~ere is an :nichorage upstream
to ~vhich$1 long l i ~ ~ e bow of the bout., e.nt~bling is fastened froin t l ~e
t he boat to s\\-ii~g like a penclolurn across tlie st,reanr. The. line is
sup1~ort~cI so t h: ~t i t will n( ~t by floi~tsat iiite~.~~:rls, trail in the \vatel.
and slo~x. I I ~ or even stop the ferry. I n narrow streams it may be
l>ossible to find a curva in the. stretun that will pernit the anchorage
t o be on Ianrl, but, still above tlle center of the stream a t tlie. point
where the ferry crosss. An isliuld is also a convenient loczltion for
an anchorage. The cable must be long enougl~ so that tile f e y will
not have difficulty in reaching both banks.
d. Rufta. as fern'es.-Rafts be used in all types of ferries, but
they sliould be so co~wti-ucted tltat the current will act against them
efficiently, and so that t11e.y may be easily maneuvered but hart1 to
swamp.
694. Fords.-a. The requisites of no a good ford are lo~v I~:~nks,
abrupt changes i n depth of water, the bottom offering n firm footing
f or men and animals and t he current. moclerate. One of tlie first
cluties of the reconni~issnnce parties of a, patrol or larger detacl~ment
on arriving at a stream is to reconnoiter for fords and bridges in the
vicinity, nncl when found, to test them allti define their limits. Dan-
gerous fords sllould be marked before use by the main body. Fords
t 11nt shoxv signs of use are likely to be passable, but care rnust be taken,
to allow for t he bight of the water above normal. Thi s may Ix,
~scertained by ti11 examination of the banks, especially of the vegeta-
tion oil the banks and of small trails piiralle,l to the water. When
fording swift sliallo~v streams with native pack animals, each animal
should be led and not herded across. FVhen t h e ~vtvtlter is deep er~oudt
to reach the pack, tile cinch may be loosened and t ~vo Inen accompany
each anirnal, one on either side to raise the sugar, coffee, and similar
SWM 6-95
ILIVICR l>R05dlSGS
r~,n(ls to tlreir slrool(lers in the deep \\-t~ter. Rain in t he uplands,
\vhicl~ are draint?d by rivers, nlay caasi: suclrle~i floods. These. floods
rapidly clescend the rivers, and make it t1:uigeroas to use fords u~ltil
after tlie swollen st,re:mis subside.
h. Fords.~ilaybe improved in very swift streams or during fresl~ets,
by felling trees across the stream and laslling their ends t(tget11er
(narrow streams only) or by fasteni~~g line of floating obstncles a
sucl ~as logs or barrels above the ford, to cut down tire current, at
least on tlie snz.face. A life l i i ~e slronld he streteller1 across tlie streuiir
for the crossing of large ~nrii~bers of troo])~, a~id inen sl~ould hold on
t o this line. Crossi~igs sl~o~rlrl be gnartled by go(rd sxvirntners anrl
Ily boats do\vnstrei~rn if arailable! to takc ~ 1 1 . ~ niay be rrf tl~osc ~v h o
swept. off their feet, or \vI~o irlay stray froiri tlie ford. Infantry ]nay
ford a stream in u colu~nn of sqt~ads, by nletr in ei~cll railli holding
OII to each other abre:~st.. The distance bet.~veen milks is greatly
lengthened t o avoid tlie increased resistance which nlight be c:tnsetl
by partially danm~ing the stream. M<~orrted men pi~ss over tlie f ( ~r d
in column of t ~ o s or files.
6-96. Rafts,I(;rfts limy be constrncted of ally ~lrnterials that will
furnish sufficient buoyance, and ~vhicl~ are avnilable at o r very near
tlie point of crossing. &Iany woods do not have enough bnoynnce
even when dr y, ancl this is especially true of greeir hard\roods.
"GI" cans \!,it11 burlirp or other cloth under the covers, to make them
\vatertiglit, casks and barrels, gasoline drums and other containers
may be used t o give buoyaiicy to a raft. 111general the construction
of rafts to effect a crossi~ig will be inadvisable except for the heavy
articles that cannot be conveniently crrosed by other means. Rafts
drift. more t han boats, and must therefore be started across farther
upstream tlr:tn boats. Rafts may be used f or carrying equipment of
Inell who cross by s\virnniing or for the assistance of those who do
i ~o t swim ~rc?ll enougli. These individual rafts may be made of tn70
logs wit11 a board or two across thein, reeds bound together (or bound
balrana stacks), or inflated rubber bags. Large rubber bags hare
been carried by patrols operatiirg on or near tbe rivers. These bags
were made from coffee sacks by coating t11e sacks with crude rubber.
Tiley were larger tlitin wabags, and would hold one man's persqnal
belongings and qi pmei i t . When partially filled with air and t.11e
mouth tied securely, they floated indefinitely, with sufficient buoyancy
t o sunnort a man in tlie water.
. .
ti-90. Crossing unfordable streams wi th usual infantry equip-
ment.-~. 1l~ve111 SCOIIIS i.t:-lllt~'(l rxl,erinle~:tsIjy tlic l' l~ilil)pi~~e 11>1\.e
SWM 6-96
IiIVliIt CROSSISOS
i ~ r :I inetlrod of streitm crossing making use of little else besides tho
csquili~tlt51it usl~ally carried. Tl ~ i s ~nethotlis believed to be superior
t o I I I OS~nretlrods of cnissi~rg by srrimming. I t issuitwble f o r crossi~rg
i n tlre face of olqjosition, its rapidity gives i t gre:ct t:lctical \.alrlet
ali(1 slloold cut do!!-~i cnsonlties co~rsidurnbly.
6. The tti:o-~r1(11~ float can he prepared by t.\\.oi11r.11 njl~j%o(rf.-This
i n 7 rninntes. T l ~ etwo sllelter h:llrcs (one on top of ttre otllor) :IY*
~>lncedor] the ~r ou~r cl , packs and tlre and tire rem:tinder of tile t ~ o
clotlring of tile two soldiers a r e 1)laced in t he center of tire convas.
S o ~ vthe rifles are placed (crossed to give rigidit,y) on t op of t he
packs arrd clothing. Tlre float is comp1etc:d by binding tire 4 corners
of the outside shelter hi~lf t o the four estre~nities of tire rifles by
nrc:alrs of the slrelter tent ropes.
TWO-MAN FLOAjC I7SlXG POSCIIO
I
"111 a similar mminer, using two X-foot sticks or sl1elte.r tent poles
initcad of rifles, a i~~:iclrine gull eom1)lete ~ : I I Ibe floatcd i n a shelter
{"I~lfni~try .Jour~lill" for i\Iarch ancl April? 1035.)
c. 111the a~tlstriiction of t he ;ibove float, bajol~etsr are attaclleil to
rifltls, n.illi tlrcr n~nM~arils A very little 011, to give greater length.
mttyiug will make the rifle available to t he ~ilarr after landing oil
tlle opposite side since slip knots arc? used. i\s 1x1 arlifitio~ml mrtte-
riiils alee required t l ~i s metliod is suitable f or almcrst sng. stren~ncrons-
irrg, eve11 for ilc,ep fi~r<Is, wr l ( l is ;\milable t o detaclnne~lts vrl1o must
go up or ilow~l tlre strenil1 t o nlal<e n 1;uld att:~ck on forces opposi~lg
the use of a ford or ferry. C;inr:~iis rlnore nc:;lsly \I-aterproof if
webted before znsking 111' t l ~ e float.
d. Use of poncho i ~ r t.u!o-nuzr~. jloob with l ~mes 7t oc ,.olIs.-
(1) method of co~~stnictiirg a. t~vo-inan floilt rising l>onchos :r;i<l
tilt: equipnient usually ct~rriecl in srnall var s operations was deve,lilpe,l
at the Marine Corps Schools along tlle lines stated in soblxiragrnpll
b above, and 1x1s met tests satisfactorily. Tlie float is made up of
tile rifles, ponchos, atld shelter tent goy ropes. I t contains: the
lrorseshoc ml l s consisting of one blanket, sixire suit of under\\-par,
toilet articles, food, the callridge belts, canteeirs; haversacks, :ind
BIOUIU: :I,-Irluiahed float.
Plouna 4 . 4 r o s s section of Rant.
SWM 6-96
(2) I $ w$~a the @/t.-(a) Remove tbr po~~chos and shelter tent
guy ropes from the horsesboo roll. Fold t,1te poncho t110 long may
with the head bole at. tlre side, and lay it. flat on the g.lUld.
(a) Lay t,he two cart~ridge, b&s on top of the center of the
poncho, xmmnnition pockets dowl, so tllat one bayonet a1x1 one
canteen Cl1 be on ewb side.
(c) Lay the 1~01~sh0~rolls 011top of one ~not1w.r11 the cartridge
belts with t~lmir long dimensions pan&J to the longest. side of the
folded poncho. Buckle the two a&ridge belts uowd both rolls and
slip the end of en& bnyonet under the ntlrer cnrtridgc belt to hold
the sides of the bundle rigid. See Diagram No. 1.
(d) Take tbc bwwsacks and place theI n on edge in the space
in the center of the horseshoe rolls. I ~I on ren~ove their shoes and
place oe pair on each side of the bundle so as to build oat the sides.
(e) Lay the two rifles, crossed to form an X, on top of the bundle
with their a& pointed at the four corners of the folded poncho.
Lash the rifles where they cross, with x waist belt to hold them in
place. See Diagram No. 2.
(f) Then, the two men, stwting at opposite ends of the szuoe rifle,
fold the corner of the poncho up over the rifle end, and wrap the
sides of the poncho corner up zwonnd it, lashing the poncho around
t.lte rifls end with one end of the shelter tent guy rope.
(.p) The two men, nest pass to the other rifle and wrap its ends in
the two remaining corners of the poncho, lashing them in place with
the bight of the shelter tent guy rope. The remaining end of the
rope is then lashed to the next rifle end so that the float will be held
in place by lashings bet,ween all four rife ends. Cwe should be
taken to wrap the corners of the poncho around the rifle ends za~l
I ns11them so tlmti rater will not enter the float readily if one corner
dips under. Diqxun No. 3.
(h) Place t.he other poncho, folded twice, over the top of the
eq$xnent in the float and tuck the sides down wound the edges of
the equipment.
(3) When making up this float,, stow the equipment and lasb
the rifles, in such a wa,y that the float will be regular in shape,
flat on the bottom, and not too high, so that it will float I I ao
e~eo keel and not tend to upset easily. The two men swimming
62
SWM 6-97
RIXTI<R CI<OSSISGS
xrith the floz~t slrould be on oppc)site sirlcs of i t and nse w side
stroke to SIX-im, leaving one 11wlcl free t o guidr the float. If <It:-
sired, tile Inen can take turns pas11ing the fluat. illlead of ~IIBIII .irit11
both hands, thtr float keeping their l~eatls out of \\.titer \\-l~ile t11r.y
p:~cldle wit11 tbeir legs.
(4) Tmined men need :tbout 5 mi~rntes to make t11e.s~ floats, ex-
clusive of tlre time t11e.y spencl removing their clotlring. Care. sl~oulil
be taken in lasl~ing the float t o use slip l ~i t cl ~es tllat can be re~noreil
quicldy ~vhen the line is \vet,, so tlrat. the rifles can be asocl insti~ntly
i~nce tile river is cros?cil.
( 5 ) Similar 1:~rger flo:~ts i11;ly l ~ c improvisrd. l)y u s i ~ ~ g vall. etc..
tent flies with the nprigl~t. polcs 01. ridge polr!s.
e. Otlwr onnvm floats.-All can\.:is flo;~t:: slii,i~lrl be ~vi d~: etroug11
1.0 l~revent their capsizing easily, a~i d the loiiils sIroul(1 have sufficient
hulk in proportion t o their weight so as to give bnoyaucy to t l ~ r
\vlrole. float. A light frame of hoards or sticks mill help in the
case of he:tvy ariicles. 1':ltrols arid 1:trget- clrtachmerrts may r a s i l ~
cnrry ext,ra line for use in establisl~ing lifelines for crossing streams,
for starting a1ii11111ls into tho water, etc., by xvl'i~pping about. 30 feet
of line, one-fourtl~ inch in iliameten, about a mrtn's body just belon-
the belt. (hfany natives 11abitn;rlly carry such a line on their hodips
whe.11 contempluting c ms s i ~~g Stronger lines may be car- streams.)
ried by patrols using pnclc :~nirnnls carryix~g the lines as top loads.
These lines serve as picket lines during l~:~lts, ant1 may be used in
the constn~ction of ferries. Extra canvas may be carried in the
for111 of tent flies, whictt are nsed to const,ruct flonts, and as sheltcrs
for galle,ys or ot,her purposes in eamp. T l ~ einclusion of t,l~ese fen.
pounds of ext,ra equipment may act ~~al l y r~ increase the mobility of
pntrol. If stroug vines grow near the river, they nmay b used as
ropes in Inslling trees together to obstrnct the current, in lashing
rafts together, as lines for s~r ~nl l It, fiying ferries, or as life lines.
is presumed t l ~a t all patrols will inclt~de some mael~etes in their
equipment \x,lren operating i n tlre small ~va r s situations.
6-97. Crossing horses and mules.-a. A. strean1 that is too cleep
t o be crossed by fording presents a very serious obstacle to a mlit
which inclrtdes riding or pack animals, and particularly so if the
unit be opert~ting in hostile country. Horses and mules can ford
with relat,ive ease streams t hat are difficult if not impossible to ford
by men on foot. To cross animals, their cargo loads and equip-
nlerlt over s strean1 too deep or too swift t o be forded is nn opera-
SWM 6-97
RIVER CROSSISGS
tion t obe undertttken only ~vlrentlre sitnrition permits of no ot,l~er
course of action. T l ~ edifficolties of such :I crossing increase ~ r i t l ~ :
(1)Width of the streg~rn.
( 2. ) Swiftnessof thecurrent.
(3) Sizeof thoconinra~td (No.of i~nimals).
(3) Slopeof thebanks, particularlyon tlte farside.
(5) Hostile opposition encountered.
'I'lie width and tlre current art: difficulties wlricli are correlated.
For anygiven widt11 of stream, tlie animal will be mrried fartlier
ilo\~-nstream asthe current is incrc;~sed ancl likewise for any given
current,tlie animal illbe carried farthcr do~vnstrenni astlre ~vidth
is increi~sud. Since some ani~nnls will nntnrallg s \ ~ i ~ n faster tllan
<11hers, they n~i l l arriveon thofarbank dispersed over n wide front,.
r ~
Illis front. v\ill sonr(.ti:nes be se\.eral hundred yards wide. When
tlte ani~nnls ;trrire on tlre far bunk, they mustarrive at a point,
~vliere the bank is not too steep or the footing toopoor for them
to get ont of the water, Many lrorses will be drowned if n good
i:uiding placn of sr~it:tlrle slope, .rvidtli,and footing is not available
on thefarbank. U~ifordi~ble strerimshave h e n andcanbe crosse(1
by singleridersand byvery s1n:~11 patrols biit even tlie most daring
and boldest.leaders Iiave hesitated to cross sucli streams. Many of
tlie smaller streams rise and fall very rapidly. The unit leader
sliould bear this i n mind. Frequently it will be advisable t o in-
crease the rate of march so as t o arrive at n crossing hefore 811
expected rise, or t o clecyeasethe rate so as t o take advantage of
it11expected fallbefore.crossing.
b. l\'lilren the patrol includes riding or pack animals, these are
nsually taken across the stream 1~ swiniining. Monnted patrols in
srnnll \vatsusually crossby swimmingwit11 full equipment. Somne-
time the saddles mid all equipment except t he halter and snaffle
bridleareremoved andferriedacrossby boat; or mft,andtlie rider
removes most.of his clotlling. Pack animalsireunpacked and IIII-
saddled. Therider then mo11nt.s andrides the horseintothe water
at n point well upstream from n good landing place on the other
side. The reins shonld be knotted on tire neck, and only used
\\-l-hennecessaryt oturnthehorse, andbefore t hehorse gets beyond
liisdepthinthe\vat.er. Horsesthat.areunwillingto,takethe water
mtty bbe ridden bel~iiiil other horses or tied behind boats or rafts.
nTIientholiorseentersdeepwate.r,theriderslidesout oft.liesaddle,
SWM 6 9 7
RIVKR CROSSIXGS
or off tlie animal's back, and hallgs onto the inane or halter 011
the downstream side, keeping low in the, water and stretching out.
Care must be taken to avoid lx,ing struc,k by tlie llorse's fvont, feet.
and not to throw the aninlit1 off balance by putting too nmch ~veigllt,
on his head atid iieck. A s\~imming animal nxly be easily guided
;icmss :I stream and prevented from turnirlg back by t he rider rest-
ing sliglitly forward of t he \\-ithers kind pushing the horse's head to
tlie front with either hand if he attempts to turn. If the horso
get3 too excited, it imiy b t . necesyary t o re1e:lense the halter or inane,
ant1 tlicn catch the horsc's tail :incl l1ol~1 on. The liorse sl:ould be
1;rpt lieiicled upstrcttrn, especially io a swift current.
c. A mucl ~ quicker and. easier inetlrod of s\\-iinlriiiip animals is to
Ilu~,cl tliein ;,cross, but ailimals not trained or practiced i n s\~iiiiiiriiig
:tn. often cLiffic\~lt to herd into nlter, tirid often turn around aiul comr
hnr;lc \\.lien tuilfv~ay across. (Herding sEloultl not be ~tteiillted in
a s\\-ift current.) Sorii~~ti~nes the tippearance of a few horses or inult~s
on the opposite bank d l help to start tlie herd across, ii~ld those
\ ~l i i cl ~ see11 to tun1 back in midstream nlay be kept out of tho are
lrerd and crossed individually later. Some animals mill have to be
forced into t,he water. Thi s may be done by passing a strong line
ncross the rump of the animal and manning each encl, tl gm~I rider
then mounting the animal, and having PI long lead line pulled by a
iiian in a boat or on the other side of the stream. I n dange.rous
streams it may be necessary to run a strong line across, and have :L
lead of at least 10 feet long tied to a pulley or sliding ring on the
line and tied to the horse's halter with two leads of smaller line
on tho ring from each bank. The hdm is then put into the \vater,
head upstream, and drawn over to the other side by men pulling
on the line and by the horse swimming. The ring is then drtl\rn
back for further operations. If the ropes do not. fail, no liorse c:nr
he ~evasl~ecl downstretirii, and if dorie promptly, none shoultl be in
dangc~r of drom~iing, as the tendency of this pulley method is to
force the horse's head up. Sht!t.r lines for trail ferries may be used
in this manner, but it is usually more economical to lead the Iiorre
behind tlie ferry. A few difficult horses may be crossed by simply
carrying a line from the horse to the other side of a narrow swift
strenm, holding it at a point upstream from tlie landing, and letting
the horse swing across the streilm and land on the other side (as is
described in par.'27-? e, f or Flying Ferries). As this requires more
ILIVEK CROSSINGS
trollble tlrrrrr ally of tlrs otlrer inethocts, it should be. used o n l ~ ri11'1l
thert; are fe,v stich dificolt stni~uals, itnd \ ~- l ~en fail. otlre,r l l ~et ho~l s
(/. JIoi l ~~t ed Marines should be tltorougl~ly tra.iined i n swimming
tlrrir mounts a11c1 in fording. I'ractice of t hi s ki~rd ~nrlkes tl:e a~ri~irals
willing t o enter tlre ~v:~tc?r, Wi t h i~rrdstive much t i me in nnerge~~ci es.
liglrt equi~trne~rt, mourrts inay be cn)ssecl by swimming with tlls
sadclles 011. T11e cat~tle 1.011 aids bnoyu~cy rather t ban d(?t~-acts
fro131it.
SWM6-98
S~mr o sXI1
SPECIAI, OPERATIONS
Pal: Patgo
.. t i 9S 6 i
ES
6-!IS. Trai l cutting.-a. sit,u;~tio~ia SOIII~. n.ill require thc i nt t i ~l g
of tlxils tlrlvugl:ll \roode(l terr.;li~i. Olre cutter at tlre lrc:~clof ; I s11lt111
colurri~~ \ d l suffice. Wllen i t is desirable t o O ~ I I a trn i l L,I. pacl;
:uritil:~ls, tlic.re sl~ould he tliree or four ctrttc.~..;.
h. l'hc 1c:ltling cotter is cllargecl witlr clirectin~~. 111ge11er:11 t11~-
11,xil will follow :I atmptss azi ~nut l ~, wit11 necessary vari:ttions to thc!
riglit a~r d loft 21s detcr~nined by the terrain features: t he ease of
cutting, etc. As a ljrercqnisitc to tri~il cutting, the yatml leader
nlost have :I ge11er:tl koo\\-ltrclge of the al,cta, tllr directiou of Aoxv of
the more i~riportt~lrt ridge lines, t l ~ c strt.:lm lines and the i nt er veni ~~g
dist:l~rcc to his objec,tive arrcl its genelxl rliltecti(r~r from t he point of
. .
orlgln. A f:lirly accurate map, an airplane n1os:tic or a preriolls air
recon~iaissnnct: omr the route .ir.ould be of i~lrstii~lahle ~:llue, but,
probably none of the111 will be avnil:~blc. Native cutters slro~tld be
employed, if possible, and t hey call usunlly bo relied upon to select
t l ~ ebest and shortest route. This does not relieve tlre patrol lender
of his responsibility of cheoking the general direction of the trail
from conrpass bearings.
c. The second cutter \\-idens to the right, the third to t he left, allcl
so on (1epelidi1l.g upon tho number of cutters and ~r i dt h clesired. I f
the trail is t o be used by mounted meu, a sea)~~cl group of cutters
should follow the first, increasing tlie height of cut.. All ciitters
should be eqllipped with suitable m~lchetes. The cut.ters have a
fatiguing t ask and sliould be relieved sf t er from 10 to 30mit~t~tes,
dep~ndi ngU ~ O I Ithe speecl of move~ne~lt. clesired, the thickness of t.lie
underbrush, H I I ~whether native or enlisted cutters ar e employed.
The speed of ctldti~~g \rill vary from an eight.11 of a mile per hour
for a large t rai l tl~rough tlie worst sort of jnngle, to a rrlile or more
an hour for ilhasty trail tlirougl~ lighter growth. Tlie lienviest briislt
will be found irr t l ~e river botton~s, while 1.11e ridge lines \vill usnally
be comparatively open.
SWM 6-99
SPNCIAI, OPICRrYL'IOSS
71.
6-99, Night operations.-a. G87re1ul.--Siglrt operations present.
i n general, tlre sanle. l>roblems that are ta::socintrd \ritll s ncl ~ opera-
tions in lnajor warfare.
Night m@rchcs.--Nigllt marches :rue ~xirrniely erliaosting for
both men and animals. The rat e of marc11 is approximately half that
of a day march. Tlie distances betweell men and snMivisions in the
col~rnln \rill liave to be less than during dzty operations. 111 Iiear-ily
woodecl terrain: i1 niglrt march is impossible on a dark n i g ~ t u~lless
artificial lights :Ire used. When marching over bnd trails on clear
or inoonliglit lights in such terrain, i t will be necessary t o march
slorly and wit11 only comfortnblz \ralking distance bet\\-een men
and sl~tdirisions. Nigl~t marches are practicable, and desirable un-
cler sonle circumstances, wben conducted over knomn tlxils. They
:Ire of very iloubtf~il value if ntade over routes ~vliich are k i n g
traversed for tlre first. tinie.
c. Night aftmka.-h night attack, to be snccessfnl, implies a11 ac-
cnrnte knowledge of tlre locatio~i and dispositio~~s of the enemy, of
tile routes of trl)proach, and of the terrain i n the vicirlity of the llcrs-
tile position. Ettcll man particip>rting in tlie operation should wear a
clistinctive nhi t e arni band, or otlrer identification marker. A nigl~t.
trttnck slrould be an assault only, wit11 the bayonet. Indiscrinriotrte
firing by the attacking force is folly as dangerous to frie~idlg l%rsort-
nel us it is to the enenly. The problems of control tire p-eatly ill-
creased. The favorable outcome of an attack is so doubtful that this
operation slroold be atte.mpted only after the most ctrreful cotlsidern-
tion. These remarks do not apply ti) attacks tlrnt are la~~nclied ;it
dtt\rn, bnt only to those tlist :rre nlade during the llours of darkness.
0
SMALL WARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE COWS
1940
CHAPTER VII
MOUNTED 1)ETACWMENTS
v
UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Sinall Wars hltmutil, U. S. bftirine Corps, 1940, is l)clblisl~ed in
15 chnl~tersas follows:
CEAFTERI. 1NTROI)UCTION.
11. ORGANIZATION.
111. LOGISTICS.
IV. TRAINING.
v. INITIAL OPKILATIONS.
VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.
VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.
VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ISSCORTS.
IX. AVIATION.
X. RIVER OPERATIONS.
XI. DIS. ~Rl IAJII~S' C POl2l'I..YI'IOX~. 0 1 :
XII. ARlIICI) S.$TI\'I: OR(;ANIZATIOSS.
XIII. MIIJITARY GOVERNMENT.
XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.
XV. WITHDRAWAT,.
I11
UNCLASSIFIED
WD
SMALL WARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MOUNTED DETACHMENTS
SECTI~XI
INTRODUCTION
Par. Page
Porpose...... ..-...-...... ~. .~. ............. ......... 7-1 1
Use of auimals all oxpcdieo 7-2 1
Need far training in anima 7-3 1
Solno dificult,ies in employing a~iimnl 7-4 2
-
(-1. Purpose.-This cllaptrr is ,lrsip:led to present in cor~venie,nt.
form the minimum i nf or ~~~at i on required by Marines t o procure ~ I I I ~
handle pack and riding n~:inli~ls in tl:e theater of operations, to or-
ge ~~i z r ~nonl~tetl and to set tc.mporary anil I ) ~ ~ ~ I I ~ : I I I ~ I I ~ detn(>lmme~lts,
forth the uses, limit:itkrm~s, :mnd cllamcteristics of such detacl~nlermts
ill small wars. Exl::r\lstive trr:rtmrnt of the snhject of al ~i n~al 1n:trl-
agement, training anil ci~nditioning of a~~i mal s and men, and mountecl
tnittics, is beyond the scope of this chal)ter: However, sufficient de-
tail is included to provide the bt~sic essentials necessary for the suc-
cessful handling of animals in the field. If the principles enu~lciated
in this chapter are applied in small wars, many of the difficnlties
associated with the employnient of animals mill be obviated.
7-2. Use of animals a n expedient.-The use of animals in small
wars by the Marine Corps is a move ~iecessitated by expediency. The
tables of organization of the Marine Corps do not include animals
for any purpose whntever, but the probable theaters of small-mars
operations present transportation and tactical problems which usually
require t he nse of animals for their successful solut,ion. In those
theaters where animal transport forms n basic part of t he native trans-
pol-tation system, it ge~lerally will be found necessary for Marine
Corps forces lo employ animals, at least for translsportation of sup-
plies, and, generally, to some extent, for mounted ~ ~ o r k .
7-3. Need for training in animal car e and employment.-The
value of animals for military purposes is direct,ly proportional to'the
skill and training of the personnel charged with their handling. It
is therefore essential in our sniall-wars operations t hat a~nsiderable
attention be devoted to t he manner in which animals ar e handled and
employed and to the proper training of personnel.
SWM 7-4
i-4. Some difficulties in employing animals,~. Tlre empl oy
nient of animals by J.I;lrine Corps uni t s should be wtteirded by carefill
plannirrg, intensive training, and close attcntiori to detail. The cliffi-
rlilties and res~ronsihilit,ies of im officer eornrnairdiirg a. unit enrployirig
animals are multipliecl and such commander rnust realize these re-
sponsibilities and rnzrlre proper preparations to overcome these
rlifficult.ies.
b. Some of t hc Irxndici11)s I\-lrich tirnst he fared by 11nits einployil~g
nirinrals ar c-
(1) Lack of person~rel exprrirrictxl i n Irindling nnimals ilnd animal
cquipmerit.
(2) 1,aclc of tilo necessary specialists, i. t?.. lrorsesl~oers, veteri-
~ ~ a r i ~ u i ~ s , etc. stable sergeants, pack ir~ssters,
( 3) iihsence of :lny a i r i r n ~ ~ l - ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ i ~ w ~ ~ i ( ~ ~ r t 01. I , HI I I O~I I I ~si~rvict?.
(4) Necessit,y for subsisti~ig n~~i i l l r ~l s the colnrtry due to pmc- otF
tical clifficultic!~ of providilig iun adcqn:~te S I I ~ I ~ I I ~ of grain and forxgo
t o units.
(5) Lack of per s o~~~r el in the tacticill lrandling of c. l r~~ri e~i cet l
monnted units.
(6) Possible nec(~ssity for tritnsporting nnimals to theatre of
operations.
SE(I.IOS I I
CARE OF ANIMA1,S
Par. I-:r.n
3
3
4
P,
n
9
9
LO
10
I I
L1
14
I6
Care of the fee 17
17
7-5. Knowledge of ani mal management required.-Successf~tl
handling of ani~rulls i n t,he field demands ilt letrst nliwittxl k~l owl -
c:tlge of t,lre basic principles of nnimul mansge~n~ct~t. 'Ilris sdijet:t
it~cludesi~ ge!oner:ll study of tile frulnework ant1 structure of tlitt Irorse
and ntrtle, the colors tlrltl milrkings, ft>cding and w:ttering, gr wn~i ng,
conditioning, first-tiid treatllrent of dimases t ~n d i nj l t r i ~s i111d (tar(% of
tlte animal's feet.
*
6-6. Nomenclature.-a. The regions of tlrtr Itorse anrl titt~le a m
slrorvn i n plttto No. 1 (p. 4) .
6. The pritrciprtl bo~l es ur~d joints of sItorso ilnrl innl(3 are dro\ rs~
in plate No. 2 (1). 5).
6. All oscers and ~~orrcon~rnissio~red officers cl~arge(l wit11 tllct I I ~ I I -
d i n g of turin~als sl~oultl be tt~oroitdily familitrr ~ ~ i t h t hc matter con-
t , ~~i ned bec:rIletl t he in tlleso 2 pliltes a s they colrstit~rte wllat n ~ i g l ~ t
"no~nenclature" crf t he militilry animal. All nternbers of regt~larly
orgnniztxl nlounted detachmen(s aud lrlerr it1 clroirge of pnck anirn;~ls
should be instructed in t hi s "nonrenclat.ore."
7-7. Identification.--a. ?'here irrc ctwtai11 pr(11oi11ent ri:iiL prrrttn-
nertt cllaracterist,ics by ~vhiclr nun a~rinrul may be identified. Tltc3se
characteristics are, color, murkings, ~r r r l lhtrigllt. A KrrolEr cxeeuliozr
of the arrintal descriptive cnril ((F(s.rrr NJlC 790) reclt~ircxlF1.y ii~rticle
21-.2. fICM.. t~ect.ssit.atesa familiarity witlr these cl~ilrttcteristies.
, >
i
4

-
l
I

C
1

C
)

Z

m

7

*

%

p
I
r
l
T
n
1
.
-
a
e
g
i
o
n
r

o
f

t
h
e

l
i
u
r
s
e

u
l
d

m
u
l
e
.

7). The colors of horses nlrd luules are sl~o\~-lr : l ~ l o \ ~ -
(1) Black is npplied t o tlre cant of 1inifo1.1~1 black llairs.
(2) Clrestnut is R lnedinrn golden color.
(3) Bay is a reddish color of medium shade. Black points.
(1)Brown is the color of the coat. almost rusty black and distill -
yi shed tl~erefrom by tlie reddish roloration arourld the nostrils,
elbows, flanki;.
I
X U . , ... W"."
oien;rriui c&noor P u w a Awl wr u
:)a*4
:$,;a4
l i ar Rid<"*. l hi i i nd, or om:, .....................
Mu!<:lhJC Fbi. n R+dr$%..........................
. . . Ne m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At<. . "a"
(8) Ktr~~tr ih applr(*<l of MI, 1tt1c1 11l;tch t o a uctz~t(~orn~xr~ecl wllite,
hrrirs, ohuillly rvd HI I C~~vllite011 i n~i ytwitll b1eu.k nrnuct urld tail.
(9) Hi~ckhkini s a~rl~licti to a coat of i~nifortr~ yc*llowihl~eolorc~tl
II~L~ITI.
(10) PieInilci in nl~ylinltu tho rtvnt cliviiltrl into 1)atrIres of \ \ \ t i t %*
$1 r i d hlsck o ~ ~ l y .
SMW 7-7
CARE 01" AXIJIALS
(11)I'iecl Black, I'ied Btky, and I'ird Roan are terxns used to desig-
nate tile patclled coats of T!-lrite and black, rlrite nnd bay, or ~~l r i t e
ar:d roan. I f tlre color other tlran white predo~ninates, t he tern1 11it.d
slro111d follow tlre predomint~ting color, as black pied, bt17 pied, or
roan pied.
(12) I)iq>ple is prefixed t o tlre designation of any color .ivllen spots
lighter or darker :tbont the size of n silver (1oll;rr overlay the htrsic
color.
c. The follolving are tl:e 1)rincipal ~vl ~i t o o? other colrt,rnsting hair
markings fomrd on horses a l ~ d ntoles:
(I)White Hairs is a term 11srd to tlesignate $1,few xx-lrite llairs on
the forehead, at tlre ju~rction of the ncrk and \vitlrors, on t1:c sl~onklers,
the coronet, over the eyes, etc.
(2) Star designates :I snlall, elearly clefinrtl :rretL of \vllitg l~trirs on
the foreheid.
(3)Rt:ce designates a narrow s;ril,t. down tlre face, usnally in the
center a~i d frirtlrer drscri1)rd as "slrort" when i t dcxs not reach tire
nose.
(4)Snip designr~tes 11 white nrark between the nostrils.
(5) Blilze designates a bro:td splash of wlrite dovn t he face. It is
intermediate between a Race and White Fsce.
(6) White Face means t111t tlre ftice is white from forellead t o
muzzle.
(7) Silver Mane and Tail clesignittes the reflection of white in these
appendnges.
(8) White Pastern means tllat the white extends from coronet t o
and including the pastern.
(9) Qnarterstocl~ing means that. tlre white hairs extend from co1.u-
net t o and including tlre fetlock.
(1.0) Halfstocking designates that the leg is \!.lrite from the coronet
to an inch or two above the fetlock.
(11)Three-Qrrartorstocki~~g means tlrat the wlrite lrairs extend to
midway bet,meen fetlock and knee or hock.
(12)Ful l Stocking designates the leg ~ ~ l r i t e to or including the knee
or hock.
(13)Cowlick is a term applied to a t uf t of hair presenting an in-
verse circular growth. They are permanent distinguishing eharacter-
istics, which should be recorded.
(14)Black Points means black mane, tail, and extremities.
(15) Ray designates the da?k line fonnd ;11o11g t l ~e back of son.ie
Ilorses, and many mules.
SWM 7-8
ChiLl', 01'. \ S13IALS
(1G) Cross designates the. <tl;~rk l i ~i eovt,r the withers from side to
side.
(li)Zebra Marks designates the cl:trk, horizontal stripes seen upon
the foreann, the knee, and the back of the cannons.
d. Tlre height of horses imd mules is expressed in "lmnds." xi hancl
is 4 inches. The animal is measured by first plac,ing him on level
footing and causing liim to stanil squn~rly on all 4 feet. Tlre per-
pendici~lwr distnnce ftcm t l ~e lrigl~est point of t he \vitliers to tlir
ground is tl~en measured wit11 : L stick that is graduated in l~inids and
iliclles.
7 4 . Duties of officers charged with care of animals.--(,. Offirers
liavirrg n~ri~naal attached to their units should keep them in such train-
ing and health ns \rill enable them to [lo their work lo the best ad-
va11t:lge. This requires careful instruction of the men in the treatment,
\\.atering, feeding, grooming airrl linndling of anini:~ls, anrl sucli con-
tinuous superrisio~~ snd i~ispeclion by officers as will insure that these
ir~structions art3 m~flcrstood and carried out.
b. Officers in charge of animals should know t he symptoms and
treatment of comnron diseases, first aid treat~nent of injuries and
shoul<lbe familiar with the principles of horseshoeing. This infor-
mation can be obtained from TM 2100-i0, "The Horseshoer."
7-9. Rules f or handling animals.-a. All moil connected with the
care and handling of animals must be taught, and most thoronglily
un~lerstand, the fol1owin.g rules for the care of arii~nals:
(1) Animals require gentle treatment. Cruel or nbusive treat-
rrrent reduces tlre rni1it;iry viklue of :~rlimsls hy ~r ~wki l ~g them difficult
to liandlr.
(2) When going up 10 1111 : ~~i i n~i t l speak to hi111 gently, tlreu up-
proach quietly.
(3) Never pnnisli an xninial except at the tinla be co~nn~i t s an
offc?nse, and the11 o ~ ~ l y in anger. in a pr opr inaiiner-never
(4) Never kirk i111 :lnimal, strike lrirlr abin~t. the head, or otlirr\rise
abuse him.
(5) Never take a r:~pid ::>lit until tlre :lnimal has been by
gez~tle exercise.
(6) Animals that have become heated by work should not be al-
lolved t o stand still but sl~onld be. cooled down gratluitlly by walking.
(7) Never feed g a i u or fl.t~sli grass to :III r ~~~i r na l whpn heated.
Hay mill not hurt. i~ heated animitl.
(8) Never vrrat<?r an auinlal \vlien I~e~ttr(l or ex- u111ess tlie ~rlrlrcl~
ercise i s to be im~ne~li:~tely rrsumecl.
SWM 7-10
c"tA1It i l l ? , \ Sl 3l >\ I , S
(9) . ~ I I ~ I I I : I ~ S i , l rr~roi ~~l j l y ttftcr t x~~r k. IIIIIS~,~ I C > gr i ~) nr t ~l
7--10. St abl es and corrals.-.-.St:~blt.:: 11t.crl 110t 1w ~rl.oriiled ill t,l.opi-
cnl clinrittes, if sonre t ype of sl ~ed is avt~ilirble for proteetiim from
I . If stables are usect, they sl ~oul d ie.well ventilated, but \ ri t l ~out
dmugl~ts. Stalls sl~ould te yo eonstrricted t.l~at the n ~ ~ i n ~ : ~ l s ci%n lie
down in comfort. Stables nrnst ha \r-ell drnined, a n d st:cblc yards
:rnd corrals nus st he so situ:rted tl~rtt. even 11rtavy rains mill drain otf.
Sand is >tgood stin~dirrg fur nninr:~ls, either i n stalls or cor ds . A
corrnl sllot~ltl l~nvt? n strong fence anid pi~te, nntl lrnve some slraiie,
ri t l ~er natnral or t~rtifici:~l, A rnnnger sllonlcl at 1111 11oo1.sof the day.
be pr' c~~irletl Ti is lriglrly rlesil.:~blt. to h:~re water i f grtri~ri s tcn IH. fell.
available a t t rl l tinres in corritls.
*
1-17. Grooming.-([. 'I'lri~l.ri~tghan11 efticie~lt ilaily grooming 11ns n
very close reliit,ion to tlre gornl cr,n(liIioo wl~icll is so essentii~l i n
:tnimals Llr?in~r used in military ol~eratic~nii. Proper grooming :lids
?
greatly i n nr:tnrt:rini~rg t he skin of tlrc? srli111111 in II 11e:tlthy rcnr(liticm,
p r r n v ~ ~ t s and red~~ceri 1x~rasitic skin rliseasei: i ~nd infc(.tio~~s, to a great
c!xtent. tht. incidence of str<lrlle sorrs.
b. Tlrc,. follrnving 1roi11ts are i nr r ~or t : ~~~t tlic pr opf ~r grooming of i l l
:rnimals:
(1) The currycomb should not I I ~ nst,<l no Iliv legs fro111 the knees
IIIICIhocks clonn\rnrd, nor 1111ove the Irtrnrl.
(2) Fi rst use tlre cnrrycornb oo (me side, of tl~ct nnimals beginning
al. t he neck, then chest,, shooidrss, foreleg tlo\vn to t he knctes. t hen
back, fltr~rk, l ~dl y, 111ins arid rnnlp, t he 11irrtl leg down t o Iwk. I'ro-
reed in si n~i l ar lnanner on the other sicle.
(3) Next, hr11s11 tlre thnirrri~l in tlrc? salrne order as wl ~en cnrrycomb
~vil.; u%cl except that in brusl~ing legs go down t o t he Ela~f.
(4) In using tlle brnsll, sti~ncl well awt~y from t l ~r : nni~nnls, keep
:Ire arm stiff, : u~d t t ~ r i ~ w the weight of t l ~e hotly i~gairrst the brush.
( 5 ) Th e vnloe of grooming is d~:pmcIent t11~1n the force \<,it11 which
t l ~ebrush i s used rind tire thorc~ughness of the work.
(6) We t aninlais slto~ild he dric?tl before grooming.
(7) Th e feet sltould be cleaned and t l ~ eslroes exttrnined.
(8) Sponge out the eyes, nose, and dwk.
(9) Officers and noncon~missionec~nissionel ufficem shoulil, by continnal itncl
personal supervision, see that the grooming i s properly done.
7-12. Forage.-Forrtge can be conveniently divided into t,wo
rlussc9; rougliage, including silch types a s hay, grass, scipi-cane tops,
leaven of trees, etc., and gnrin, including stich as onts, corn, and Kaffir
corn. Grai n is not necessriry to the animal's existnicc. if he is doi ng
UACI: OF : SI ; \ I AT, S
no ~vork, butformilit:lry :~nimals isaconcerrtrntedenergy-producing
foocl,which enablest heaninialto dot,hesnstained work required of
him. Itrequires muchinoretime forn horseor mulet oetrtexrough
grassor hayt osupportlifeiind keep inconditiontlla~l if the rot~gli-
age is snpple~nenteilvith :r reasonable anrount. of gsniu. An eco-
~ronrictrlmethoel of fi,eding is to make tho ftrllt,st possible use of
piisture. Bulk isanesserrtiillfort hodiet of lrorsesa~rrl ~nules.
Con-
centrated foods, i i r l mat,tc?rlro~v nourishing, can~rot alone maintain
an animalin condition. ;\II r~rilimiterl sl~pply of grniu cannot take
tho placeof rouglruge.
7-13. Principlesof feeding.-a. Thefollowingprilmiplesof feed-
ing arcthe results of long experience niid sho~l i l be arlhesed to as
closely asthecircumstances will permit:
(1) 1V:~ter before fet,iIing.
('2) Feed in wrnill (l~r;~l:tilirs T l ~ e sto~naclr of :tnrl oftcn. the
horse i~ird nrule issnli~ll ill ~(~nir~:trisoii witl~ the restof file digesti~c
tractant1thereforecannotdigestlargeffeediags. Threeormore f e d -
ingsa day arcdesir:~blc.
(3)Donot lvorklrardafter a fullfeed.
(4) I)o not feed u tired liorscr: L fullfeixl. li'trilusoto observt3 this
principle frequently results in the most scrvere colic, in laminitis
(fwd founder),or both.
(5)Feedht ~y beforegrain. Thisisnot necossmy fort,hefirst feed-
ingintlnemomringbecausehay hashrm available all night nncl lias
tliireforetaken theedgeoff thei ~ni n~i ~l ' s hunger.
7-14.Watering.-a. ?'lit! follo\ving rules for watering should be
adheredto:
(1)I n corralsitisdeiir:~blc thaL tlni~nals s11o11ldlravc free access
t owiltoratalltimes. If thisisiml~ossd~le ani~nitls slioulclbe matered
mollling,noon, and owning.
( 2) Wntcr before feeding,ornot nntil2hours afterfeeding.
(3) Ani~nals lnaybewat e~~cl :itmorkbut, if hot,they sllould ~t hi l e
be kept moving until cooled off.
(4) 011themarch tlreoftener tllcnnirnals :Ire nntrred tlic hotter,
especially ns it is not usually known mhc+r~ an(1t11erwatering place
willbe leached.
(5) I n oarnp, where watrr i s obtai~~ecl fro111 11river or strenm,
:animals must be \\.iatelwl a\)ove the place deslgnntrd for bathing
and f or vashing clothes.
(6) Animalsshouldhr \~atere(I quietly andai t l ~out confusion.
i-15. Conditioning.-n. Conilition as applied to animals used for
il~ilitary purposes uleans health, strength, airrl endurance sufficient to
perfitrrn without injury tlre work required of them.
b. Good hard condition i s the best preventive against loss of nni-
mals from any causes except accidental injury. The importance
of proper conditioning cxn~iot IJC ~~tverestinl:~trd. More animals are
incapacitated itr die in 111ilital-y openitions from lack of proper condi-
tioning than from any other cause.. This is rspecinlly t nl e in those
countries where ni~tive animals are prmureil locally. As s general
rule., sucll 1101.ses or mules ar e of the grass-fed variety accuston~ed
to working 1day and gr ~~z i ng the next 3 or 4 days.
c. There i s only one m y to condition nni~rmls, \vhether they are
required for riding, pack, or for draft. Tl ~e only methird is :L
judicious combinntion of sufficient good feed, and healtd~fnl work.
continued over a11 exte,nded period. The tmnsfonnation of fat,
flabby flesh into hard, tough mtlscle cannot be forced. A regular
~)mgramof grtiduated work is the only \Tray to accomplish it. Some.
:tnimals require longer periods of conditioning thnn others depend-
ing upon their age and the amount of previons work they have per-
formed. Individual attention to each animal is required in condi-
tioning. All work shonld be light a t first. aud g r ~ d u ~ l l y increased.
7-16. Management of animals on the march.-a. l\'ithout condi-
tion, it is impossible for aninlrils to undergo the fatigue and exertion
incident to any pn~long~xl When military necessity requires effort..
the mawhing of nnconilitiou animals, unless the situation is such as
t o override it11 thought of loss, the space and time must be comparil-
tively short, otlierlvise exluuustion, sore hacks, and sore shoulders
will shortly incnpacitate t he mnjority of t he animals and the mobil-
ity and efficiency of the tunit will he very greatly reduced. From
the vieu~point of the animal's welfare, tlre length of the march is to
be estim:tted not. only in rrliles but also with regard t o the number
of hours t hat the load h:~s t o be carried. This latter consideration
is freclue~itly the more iniportant of the two. Particularly cines this
latter consideriitior~ allply t o pack iu~imnls. Tlie advance of a column
in small wars is sometimes as slow as 1mile a11 hour and even less.
IJncler such circumstances a. short march may, in reality, demand
extreme endurance of the animals i n the column.
6. Prior to starting, a special inspection of the saddles, packs,
harness, and shoeing should be made to inswe that all is in order.
After the halt for the night all animals nnd equipment. should be in-
SWM 7-16
sp~:tcr\, ric,cc.--:lry tn,atmi~ntn1111 rc:p;rirs lrrrlclr, nurl all p r r 1>1:t(.r%l
i o orrler so as11c3r. toilcl:iy tilt:. Irorlr uf stnriil~g itr the ill<t!.:ril~g.
r. IVith N I I ~ccr~r.ii~Ir:r.:~l,lt~ of :~liin~al.: it is nllrnl~~r in the r~ol~:l~rr~.
sc!ldotn ;adviinbl(!11,sti11.tIwforc~ clnyliglltrscept for purely lrrilitary
I . crrrrlroi 1% wti*frrc:torily IIItlw dark. ft:crli~rgattd ~v:<(c%rirrg
I111niIler1; ~;n~ltllc*r~ 11:ickii.:111(1 Ii:rrr~r~ia I I I I I ~11111 11' pro[)('rI?.:r(lji13te1I
and it is grn~i>tic:~lly to 1,roln:rly insprct impi;il,la ~ I I P adj urt l oe~~t
of cxluipei~lrt. 3I:rriy sort' It:r{.k,<will rt.s~tltfntl~rsad(1lr.hlarrkct,q
and patls I K ~ I I ~ fc,lelt~cl irk t he dsrk~~c~ss. irnl~rol~++rly Siglit nr:rrcl1t-5.
with :\II,V crrr~si~lt~n~l~lu of nrrimnls i l r tlr(:columl~, will prove 11111nln3r
rlrnst rlifiir~~lt :lrr(l ~rli.;;ltisf~rctoryirnlc?.;s tbr l~rsonrrt!lis tlioro11g111y
t:,x~r<*ric~~tr~c~~I l~:r~rcIlir~g. saildlit~g, t~ridlil~g? i11 11:1ckirrg811ritxr:tIs. i l l :1r1(1
cf . A fix-st llrtlt ~il~(~rlliI lx I I I : I ~R afti.r Ilt~illg illril~r xvity for ten (10)
or fi fi t w~( 16) tt~irr~!t(~s ITII!II t I l t * ~r r . tit I I I I OW I I I I ~: I I I ~ I I I : I I ~ io rc!Ii(w!
~ I v ( * R , At. this tillre. is :t<ljlistc~l~ girtlls. tiglrtr.r~ecl lu~ei[irrlc~r~i ill?
rllld :ln inslwctiotl rn:~tltb. to irrirtn-tlr:tt t11c* ;iatlctles, packs, nrld 11:tr-
I . I i l l I I ~ I I I
.
I
~
lli'iIri~li isI I I I I S~illlpot-ttl~~t: i!q~e~i:rIlyfor the
I of i l r t k i ~ ~ g s : i r I ~ c i Hlbssx\oentlg n I .
s f 1 1 . I I I I 5~i ~1 1 1 c~I I I t . I I ~ I I ~ . At rrrrell hrrlt
t~i~rll rlrrt\llcllrn~krrvebrI r i s anilrlr~l, extrrrlinill): the feet nrrd t,lle lllrrli
ndjnstrrrc?nl. of :trrin~:ila~l ~i ~rl ~l crrt li~als. Sotrcc11rrr11issio11~!~1 snit
oflicem sholtl~lt w i11dru;t rilti~tc'iltu erlftlrce illis irr~pectioll.
ri. dininrillssl~o~iltl w:ttrr~!dwithin r~.uc;istr ~rl ~a~rovcr 110 an oppor-
trrnity c~~'irm, rspc:cirrlly on hot d:r.y~.'I'lm principle of wnter.irlp
tmfont fercii~lg i.i of cortrmnrll~eru~il trt or1 the.rn6trch btlt, i f astretttu~
i s amsmil all ltcritr rtftcrr feetlil~p, t.hc!y Inn)' ngaix, allowc~rll o
clritlk if c:irc.t~~r~ul:trrc~c~~ [lettoit tlrcr eleltry. Ifits.c~spe~cinlly t,tlt! c.ur11,
slwolcl bo rt~~rloverl \vIrolr it. is irrtttntlr:tl to give: $1 frtll wnt<:r-it~g.
tVlrilr watrl.iri):. ovi~ren~~vclit~gtm! pn'rr~rte(l, alrilplerlty of t.,irtlr I I I I I ~ ~
giver1every sni~~ritl t(r tlrirlkIrisfi l l . (irrt~ll)~ uf rrr~irrtrlls shorlltlcorr~t:
I I I : t r i r I t o c t t I I t i If they :trr
rr~uvcsl awrty ir~rlivi~lrr:tlly, otttr.:.s ceitse (lrirtkirlg:trl<ltry 10 follc~~v
tkc~n. h,t.tlle c a r r r l of ill@ dtty's I I I I I ~ : ~ ~ is in:st i t to ir4icvc tllc alli-
rrlrrls (IF t l ~ pwciylit crf il~cir al~tiltrnel~t rvitltorlt clr,l:ty ~rtrcltr*fore
wnttrirre.
I I I I : I I I I ~ I I ~ I I i I I t i l l I t l t t . I i r t -
g(~(.l,llily 01 111t' Ic:t~l~r ~ ( I I I I I I I I IL V I I I I I I ~ I I ~ I I ~~. t , ~~. i ~l t . ~. : t l #l t ~ o f :III,V ;I 1111111-
Iwr (of I I ~ I ~ I I I I I ~ ~ . tird 5f t s 11 I I I V . ~ I I I I ~ < I I Iof t l s i > prtok,Iv111 is t c ~ 'I'IIQ* i l l
ii~,iortvir~:ttc rl~or.~lopl~i~- ihr, rii$brini- irx tlip &x'inriplrl tltrtt the ariirrlol
,rr~<it>r lit, tlinv not for his cilrr i$ ,goi~ig tn srrtTe~r i f think of arid
his anint:il or1 sl l occasi~ms. It mtisi Lwomc R t n~ t t e rof sii?i])l~
~.ootiae f or him to care for his rrrlim:il st every prwit>le opportutrity.
At every Iinltt if it is st nll 1r1isihle~ he, milst pcnrrit his nr~irtlalio
kmze. Zllnny st;irrdit~g cnrps ~~rc,vi<le na(l nin? ~xcellrrit ti1lr.r bt*
ltscd for fcc~tling thi: anim:rls, or i f ei~:oir~~tnrrccs prr,rnit, 11 sufficiei~t
quantity may be cirt ar~cl carried to proride for the n ~ x i iinlf.
g. Feccl hags slro~tl~l Iw provided for itsistnl~ for the prrrpow of
fi:c~tli~~g of gmin fronr the grtrund grain ori the rr~:xreh. 'I'tir ft>edir~g
i~ ii~lt otrly liighly xs-astt!f~~l C:III?(P (if ~ert>re I I I I ~. is tilt' fr(%qtrt'r~t c(lii(..
.
I
,
h(:sc, hngs call tu txsc~tl ffix carrying grrtiri on tllv nrrrrcb by fillirtg
tlreni nricl ~rritring the olwlt ct~tl. 'rl~py RI W ciirrit'd nt- ~~~ttc~r:tlly
tncheil to the pornme1 [of tlir saildlc ori riding ~~r~irnttls n~tcl8s a t op
lonti i i n psc>k nirirri:~ls. A s~ipply of corm or other grain along the
trrril sl ~or~l d witliout ridilling the elr~pty feed bags. ofaverl rpns~c~tl
With tlip f ( ~ d ilng, the principle I, fecnlieg little and often citn 1%.
nclhen>tl t o with grcsnter fncility. 'The invt t . yp for rnilitaq i18e is
that at pnwrit issucxt t)ptlm hrzny. If no feed irngi rre nvnilnhle
they sbc,trld Is iml~mvised horn canvasor 11thc.r dr~ntblt. tnntorial.
h. It frcxli~rntly will 1 ~ . to lrirlt. for the night rrt ~ m ~ ~ i h i ~ places
when small eticlojerl prtntnlm :tm arniltrhlt.. If srrch Eu the case tlln
nrrimals sho111d bC perrr~ittetl to gritze throogIz(,r~t. thc rtigbt.. Tt
will, of course, Iw necesmtry to provirl~: an itdecltlnto pastere gurtrtl
io prevent the seis~xre or elcat,n~ctioa of tho atrirnnls in ens s rrigtrt
zrttack. When posible. I& site within or a(1jntrnt t.ct a sr.iitable on.
c1osf:cl prtstnrc. shor~ld ire e;iwterl. Otherrvise g ( ~ n n d Bill mo~tgkito
provide level standing f or R wit41ble leagtli of picket. line should Ixs
~e1ecti.d. Mnrsliy pro~rnd shoizlrl be uvoiclrd if piwsihic. rZ nc.rrrt?y
wntar snplily stlitahle f or ri~c:o arrtl rrnimnls i s esgent.int. I t shor~ld I M~
as rlc.irr tlic* rrilrlp ris p,ssihle hr ~t some srterifiee mag 11nveto IKZ rnit(le
i l k this rr?.ipect in order to occ;nr~y a ytairiori sclitnl,lt. for xright de-
fense. 11% sontr! areasit will r i r i t h prrrisil~leto grnzt. ~nriininla nt siipl>t.
I n sttcli ~ ; r l i ( ' ~ sorrlc fortn of rriit,ratiot rnrlst in? rrfititl.
4 TIISmost srrtishctrrry rr~et hd of seetrring 8t1irnal.q a t night i i s
to Recrlrc? thettr to n picket lirro r a i d $1or 4 fcer akrve t.11e p&rrt~il.
This line sliorild b! strekhhed taut hebween t:riwsrtit~thlyxpnceil or
between other stxitahle seppnrts, After the anirnalw have h e n sa-
a ~ t r ~ d on wntalt t o the picket l i mit Is mn t i n l t.h& (L man fm k~pt ,
t o prevent tlrn urtirrrrtlx frontbecmrning entungled urrd ir~jarihg thmi-
wcrtvas. Hrry, tall &Tamsg xrr(Inrcarie, (:~)r(r(:~md crto., ~Lltirlld arrd
18
CARE OF A3131ALS
placed vithin reach of the allimals a l o ~ ~ g t he line as it will make
t he ~u stand more quietly and provide them with nourishment.
7-17, First-aid treatment.-a The ericlenee iudicates illat in
small wars casualties among animals 11nre occurred in the following
order of frequency:
a ~i d i~ijuries. (Pack ar~tl saddle lujrrries accoru~t for
most of these.)
(1) Wot i ~~ds
(2) Loss or ~vailt of c o ~~d ~t i o n nud extmustio~~.
(3) Intestir~al diseases. (Colic.)
(4) Contagious (liseases.
6. Loss or vant of co~~clit~on. and pack a ~ i dstrtldle injuries, accou~lt
f o r the bulk of tlie losses in small wars. These are to a large extent
preventable. Wltlle tlie animal is fit and in coudition, llc~rdship a~lcl
exertion car1 be borne ~vi t l ~out injury, but t h e unconditioned a~llmal
soou becomes unfit and a handicap hecar~se of illjury or disease. The
prevention of injuries and disease is f ar more important than their
treatment. And particularly so as there a r e no veterinarians avail-
able. Injuries a r ~d emergency cases must be dealt with in n common-
sense manxler. If veterinary rervice is obtainable it should be
rltilized.
c. The healthy animal stands with the forefeet square on the
ground; one hind foot is often rested naturally. The pointing, or
resting of one forefoot or the constant shifting of the weight on the
forefeet indicates a foot or leg ailment. The pulse of the healthy
animal is thirty-six (36) t o forty (40) beats per minutes; the res-
piration a t rest nine (9) to twelve (12) per minute; the temperature
ninety-nine (99) to one hundred (100) degrees Fahrenheit. The
temperature is taken by placing a clinical thermometer in t he rectun~
f o r about three (3) or five (5) minutes. The droppings of the
healthy animal should be well formed but soft enough t o flatten
when dropped.
d. Lass of appetite, elevation of temperature, ilccelrrated breatli-
ing, listless~~ess, dejected countenance, stiffness, profuse sweating,
nasal discharge, cough, diarrhea, pawing, excessive rolling, lame-
ness, relucta~~ce to move. and loss of hair or intense itching are sofine
o f the most common indications of disease.
e. Pressure o n the back will often oause swellings, which by further
rubbing and pressure become open sores. While unbroken, swellings
may be cured by removing t he pressure and soulring with cold water
packs. I f the animal is to work, fold or cut away the saddle pad
SWM 7-17
CARE OF ANIMALS
so that the place is left free. If open, saddle sores, like other
~vounds, must be kept clean and flies kept out. of t hm.
f. Wounds \>rill heal naturally if they are. kept clean and well
drained. Almost any grease that. is unappetiaing t o flies nil1 help
t o heal the monnd. Screwworn~s and maggots, the larval for111 of
certain flies, are f ~~quent l y Lard with a little found in >rounds.
sulphor mixed in it is usually available. If the ingredients can
be obtained, tlie following mixture will keep the flies out of wounds:
ounce ci-eolin.
1ounce linseed oil (or oil of tar).
10 oiinces olive oil (or salad oil).
If close inspection shows the presence of xorms or maggots, or
if there is a t,hin reddish discharge from the wormtl or sore, the
following treatment is indicated: swab out thoroughly ~ ~ i t h a soft
cottoll swab dipped in creolin. The edges and especially the lo~ver
edge where t he wound drains sllould be greased, to prevent. burning
by the creolin or tlie spreading of the sore by the discharges eoxnirig
in contact with the skin. This treatment nil1 kill t he n-orms or
maggots and they will slough off with t he dead flesh. All nouncls
should have some. opening through which they ~ n s y drain, at t l ~e
lowest point i n the wound, and grease slioi~ld be used t o prevent
the drain causing running sores. Pus in the feet is drained off
through the sole, and treated like any other ~vound.
g. Colic is t he term given t o the symptoms shown by nnimals with
abdominal pains. This pain may be caused by any of numerous
conditions. The predisposing causes are: small size of stomach com-
pared to the size of the animal and capacity of digestive tract, and
inability of t he aninla1 to vomit. The chief escitiug causes of colic
are:
(1) Over feeding.
(2) Feeding or watering exhitusted animals.
( 3) Feeding wilted grass.
(4) Sudden changes of food.
(5) Working hnrd after a full feed.
(6)Lack of sufficient water.
(7) Eating hay or pa i n o n sandy soil.
(8) Eating mouldy hay o r grain.
(9) Eating green grain.
(10) Intestinal tumors, abscesses, etc.
h. The symptoms of colic are uneasiness, increased perspiration
depending upon the degree of pain, pulse a nd respiration accelerated,
SWM: 7-18
CARE OF ASI XI A1. S
pawing, turning head towards flanks, lying down, sometimes rolling
and rislng frequently, and excessive distension of abdomen.
i. A compliance with the prillciples of feeding and watering as
set forth in t hi s section mill reduce the incidence of colic t o a mini-
mum. Prevention is far more important t han treatment, and there-
fore it is most important that the principles of feeding nncl nateri~rg
be adllered to closely. Military necessity may sometimes prevent a
strict adherence to these principles.
j. Berl down a space wit11 hay or dry grass and tie the ani ~nal mith
just enoug1:h sllwnk to allow hi m to lie down comfortably. In ordi-
nary rases give one aloes ball or the following drench: r aw linseed
oil one ( 1 ) pint, turpentine one ( I ) ounce; if not relieved repeat
t he drench in 1hoar. Induce tlraanimal to drlnk bnt withhold food
until the acute sjmptoms subside.
k. Any ordinary long-necked hktle properly wrapped t o protect
it from breaking nay 1mused in giving a drench. The anin~al's
head slrould be raised until t he mouth is just slightly higher than
t he tbroat to provide a gravity flow to the throat. The neck of the
bottle is inserted in the side of the mouth and a small amount of
t he drench administered. Thi s mnst be s~vallowed before more is ad-
ministered. Repeated small amounts are administered in this way un-
til the required an~ount has been given. I f the animal coughs or
chokes his head should be immediately lowered to prevent strangling.
7-18. Communicable diseases.--. Prevention is again the prime
aim. Proper conditioning and seasoning, plenty of wholesome food,
good grooming, and protection from undue exposure t o t he elements
and mud, keep the animals strong and in such a state of health that
they can resist considerable exposure t o infection. When a disease
appears among a group of animals, there ar e certain rules of pro-
cedure that have been found absolutely necessary in checking the
spread t o healthy animals and in stamping out the disease. These
measures are:
(1) Daily inspection of all animals in order to detect nelv cases.
Thi s insures t he prompt removal of the sick as a source of infection
a nd the initiation of the proper treatment or destruction.
(2) Quarantine of exposed animals.
(3) Isolation of sick animals.
(4) Disinfection of infected premises, equipment, and utensils.
6. The treatment of the various communicable diseases of the
horse and mule are beyond t he seope of this chapter.
7-19. Care of the feet.-Animals that have to travel over hard
and strmy soads should be sl ~od, at least in front,, to prevent excessive
wear of the l o r n of the lroof. On soft going and in pasture, shoeing
is neither necessary nor desirable. Shoes should be flat, ~vitl~out
calks, and should fit the outline of the hoof. Wl~ell the hoof wears
too much, the a~rimal goes lame, hut a rest i n pasture allows the hoof
to grow agaiu. Shoes left on too long do not permit t,lie natural
gromth and wear of the hoof, and they should be rernoved from
ariimals wl~ich are expected t o remain out of service for a co~aider-
ahlo time. A properly fitted slme i~l1on.s t he animal to stand flat OII
a level floor without strain. Neither comrnercbl slimrs nor mem-
bers of the detachment should be :lllir\~-erl to cot away ally of the
sole or frog o r to rasp or t r i m the outer surface of the hoof. TBe
thick calloos of the frog a nd sole protects the, animal's foot from
bruises, ar ~d the n)mpression of the frog circulates the blood throog11
the foot. Tlte natural varnish of the outside of the hoof retains t he
moisture in t he I~oof, and keeps i t from rotting. Hoofs should be
cleaned out a t grooming time and befow starting out, to make sure
that tl~ere ar e no stones or sr ~~al l sticks caught in the hoof between
t l ~efrog and t he snle. Feet shoulrl be ii~spccterl by riders and drivers
at each halt.
MO. Veterinary supplies.-Standard surgical and ~nedical sop-
plies for t he treatment of common ail~nents are obtained by
requisitio~~ t o t he quartermaster or in emergencies from t he medical
department. (See art. 21-5, MCM.) In sn~al l mars where ally con-
siderable number of animals i s employed, it is highly desirable that
Stable Sergeant's Veterinary Chests, supplied by the Medical De-
partment, U. S. Army, be requisitioned in suficie~~t These number.
chests are quite complete and contain suficie~~t ~xieclicines and
instrun~er~ts f or :dl ordinary veterinary cases.
SWM 7-21
SECTION 111
PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS
Far. Page
..... Nece~sit,?for local pnrchase .............................. 7-21 19
Pmourement agenh .........................
Nati5.e dcaler~. .............................................
........... -. 7-22
7-23
19
20
................................ Purchasing from ~l ot i vcdcnlcrs
...................... Minimum specificatiorlsfcr aoimnla.
7-24
7-25
20
20
Hoight qualifiorttion
Age qualificatiorrs.....
F:ramination forsorl~tdtre
20
21
22
Marking of purchased an'
Use of Vnited State
24
24
i-21. Necessity for local purchase.-a. Animals ha1.e seldom
been traiisported with expeditionary forces to the theater of operd-
tions. Mourited detacllments ;u,d pack trar~sl>ortation have been em-
ployed only i n those areas ~rhere horses arid niules were used locally
and in which the supply of animals mas reasonably adequate. Acare-
ful study of the theater of operations should indicat,e whether the
type ancl number of aiiiinals available mill be adequate f or themilitary
needs in t11at particular ai-ea. For special operations a nd for special
cargo loads the type of animal procurable in t,he theater of opera-
tions mny not be suitable. I n some opemtions it has been necessary
to bring into the occupied col~ntry United States bred mules for use
in transporting pack artillery. Present pack ar$illery weapons can-
not be broker1 do~vn into loads snfficientlp light to be transported on
mules weighing n~uch under 1,000 pounds.
b. The. great majority of animals used i n small-wars operations mill
probably be procured within or near tlie tlienter of ope,rntions. This
section \rill der~l, therefore, prirnarily with the problem of prncure-
ment in the theater of operations.
.
7-22. Procurement agents-a. procurement is ~r i ~nar i l v \\'liile a
supply or clrlitrrerinastrr fl~i~(.tion, t l ~ r geiien11 practice llus bvei, to
nuthoriztb units in tlie firltl t o procure their own iuiimnls. K~~t l r r t l ~i s
system the cluanermastrr 11as rjiniply set a masimum price mid all-
va~~rrt l thrrit.c+,sary fiincls t o tilt, unit commander in the field and Itr.
or nl i offirer appoir~ted by hiin, 11ns acted as the purchasing agetit.
\\'l~ilr t l ~i s S ~ S ~ F I I I necessary to provitle animal. quickly is fvcq~~e~i t l y
SWX 7-23
PROCCREMISST OF ;\SI\IAI,S
f o r immediate use in the early stages of the operation, i t has tlle effect,
of ri~pidly running up the price of al~imtlls due to t,l~e fact t hat there
mill be a number of purchasing officers in t he niarket competillg for
t he more serviceable animals.
6. As soon as practicable, it is :~dvir;ahl' t o estnhlisli n single pro-
curement agency with the f unct i o~~ of selecting. purchasing, clistribut-
i n g and accounting for all a~limals procured hy the Force. This
should be done with a vien- to provi di ~~g better selection of animals, :I
to facilitate acconntability, ancl to effcct a saving in animals and in
money.
7-23. Native dealers.-It, is me11 to i~tilizo native dealers in pro-
curing animals. The average cost per hencl thus vill possibly be
higher than it wonld be othrr~rise but this is offset by a saving in
t i me and energy. Moreorer, tlle native rlcaler d l know where the
desired types ar e to be, fotunci. I t is most essential l r o~~ever , to con-
vince the dealer at the outset tlliit he. must deliver for insl~cction only
such animals as conform to the lnillimuni st:tridards.
7-24. Purchasing from native dealers-The purcllaser of native
aliimals should determine by thorongh inquiry hat prices have been
nsual among t he natives for the best types of animals. Although
economy in expenditure of government funds may be temporarily
subordinate to military necessity, it is never wise to pay excessive
prices for animals.
7-25. Minimum specifications for animala-a. All animals de-
livered for insaeetion as saddle animals or nack animals should have
a l l of the following qualifications:
(1) Be reasonably sound.
(2) Have been worked under ptrck or been ridden enougli to re-
quire little or no further training.
(3) Be mature; innnature animals are useless for military purposes,
n o niatter how sound they may be.
(4) Be of the size required for the purpose for which intended,
this should be fixed only after careful consideration of the types and
capabihties of the mounts available, but it ?rillbe found unprofitable
to go below the minimum, once fixed.
(5) Be as nearly as possible i n condition for use; it is not necessary
to require that a n nnimal be i n perfect condition, but he slloloold be
abl e to carry his load the day of purchas.
7-26. Height qualifications.-In most small mar theaters the
native animals ar e undersized according to United States standards.
Moreover, the nvei-dge she varies sornewhtit i n the various countries.
SWM 7-27
PROCITIIRJIBST OF.iNI>I,ALS
An average a s l or as 13.1 hnnds has been used ill past espeditions.
Thepttrclrnser can soontletcr~nine, l~owever, a fair:weragein heigl~t.
fromobservat,ionof theanimalshe finds i nuse. Heshouldthen set
a height standard and nse this ill his selection as the first step in
eliminatingundesirableanimalsfromtheherdt11e dealer issl~o\vi~~g.
7-27. Agequalifications.-a. The dealer shonld be givendefinite
age limits, a s a glide toward satisfactory animals. Sisto twelve
yews isthe ntost satisfactory period. Theanimalunder 6years of
agecannotenduretheexertionsandprivationsincident t o takingthe
field. Since fewmatured nativeanimals canbe found thatwill not
show the whiteln~irs and scarsof sores andinjuries, t hepurchaser
will be strongly tempted t o choose i n ~ma t u ~t ani~nals in order to
obtain animalsfree from blemisl~es.
b. Itisbetter to choose older horses because they \\-ill generally
have become thoroughly broken. This factor is most i~nportantat
theoutset becausethe majority of men detailed to handlethem \\.ill
havehadlittlerecent practice \\-it11 animals.
c. Thetwelve(12)front (incisor) teethaffordtheeasiestandmost
reliable means of determining theage of a horse or mule. These
teeth consist of six uppers and six lowers and, from sideto center,
are k1101vn asthe L'corner~," "later~ls,"and"centmls." The horse
(mule)hastwosetsof teeth:
(1) Thetemporaryorcoltteethwhichar eetist.off \ vl ~e~~-t , he perma-
nent teeth erupt. Thissheddingof the temporirry teeth begins ?!-it11
the"c.ent,~als" at aboutt heageof tl~ree and is completed when the
"corners" ar eshed at about fiveyears.
(2) Thepermanent or second set of teeth. Thepermanent teeth
have alleruptedandareinwear a t the ageof 5% years. The tem-
porary teeth can be distinguished from the pernianents by their
milk-white color. Thepermanent teeth stainvery qi~ickly and gen-
erallyhavet he dullappearanceof oldivory.
d. Theincisortooth incrosssectionis s h o ! ~ ~ ~ below:
eornr INCISOR TOOTH OF HORSE
21
SWM 7-28
e. Wear of t he i~rcisor t r ~t h . The principles of age determinatio~~
fro1116 years upnard are based primarily npon the wear of the
incisor teeth. The tooth attains its greatest length the second year
after eruption. Daring the sncceeding years. teeth do not grow but
uutlevpo a r e gul ~r process of destruction from wear and froin the
locedi~g of the bony socket margin. As tlie tooth wetlrs cl o~~n, the
C I ~ I finally disappears. The table surfilce of the tooth change? fro111
oval to triangular and finally becomes rounded.
f . Some of t he more iniportant lneans used in age deterin~nation
are :
(1) Los5 of teinporxry teeth and eruption of the permanent teeth.
This has been completed at t he age of 5.
(2) Disappearance of tlie cups. All cups have disappeared a t
8 years.
(3) Shape of taMe surface of teeth. At 10 to 12 yeazs t he centmls
and laterills ar e tr~;ulgullar. At 16 to 20 tlie table sl~rfacrs are rounrl
or flat froni side to side.
(4) Anvle of inc~clence. The angle of incidence between the upper
".
and lower i nci s~~r s becomes more and more acute as the age increases.
(5) Space be t ~e e n the teeth at the gums increases as tlie animal
grows older.
g. Procedure in determining the age. The angle of incidence and
the presence or absenre of temporary teeth should be noted. The
mouth should then be opener1 and the teeth examined f or cups and
tlie shape of t he table surfaces noted. The lower incisors are more
reliable as a guide than the uppers.
h. The follom-inp classifications are listed :
(1) Animals under 4% years; temporary teeth present; 1)ermxnent
teeth erupting.
(2) Animals between 5 and 8 years; cups present, table surfaces
oval: angle of incidence about 180'; all teeth are permanent.
(3) Animals over 8 years; absence of cups; ttihle surfaces tri-
angular or round ;angle of incidence more acute ; spam between teeth
at the begins to show as the animal ~mts oldw. Old horses
begin t o show g a g hairs around the eyes and nose, and the depres-
sions over the eyes become more sunken.
7-28. Examination for soundness.-a. The examination for
soundness should be as thorough as the circumstances, t he n~railabil-
ity of trained men, and the knowledge of the buyer permit. How-
ever, the average officer call buy horses and mules without having
had any special training, if he uses good judgment and buys what he
- -
SWM 7-28
considers to be sound a~limals. The following points ar e suggested
as glides, ancl vill :tssist, the inexperirrrced horse buyer until he
acquires experience. :
(1) Observe the horse a t a Ivalt? noting whether lie i s very lean
or obviously cripplerl.
(2) Examine the head and neck. Check for blirrdiless by looking
a t the eyes and by passing t he hand suddenly over each e.ye it1 turn.
I f the horse does not blink, he is blind in that eye. Pass the lrairtl
over the head and face, and see if there i s evidence of any sores or
injury. See i f the mouthand nostrils look healthy, and if t,he ai~i~rral
breathes freely.
(3) Examine back, noting scars or sores caused by packs and
saddles. Many animals mill be found x1-it11 scars, but these need not
be rejected, if the scar tissue appears to be healthy. I n many cases,
animals without them will t ur n out to he young and untrained, and
actually less desirable. Al l animals mith actual puffs slid sores
should be rejected.
(4) Examine the legs. I f any variation in symmetry between the
legs of a pair be found, it is safer to reject the animal unless yon
know enough to differentiate between temporary and permanent
disabilities. Legs should be reasonably near t o the same ~ert i cal
plane, fore and .aft, and the animal shonld put his weight o11 all of
them. Joints should not be swollen.
(5) Examine feet. The feet and pasterns shonld not be sore to the
touch. There should be plenty of horn on the hoofs, and they should
not show any split or crack. The frog should rest on t he ground,
but since it' is quite usual to pare the frog and sole, do not reject on
this account, but trust the f r og to grow later. Examine the coronet
and press i t with the fingers. A prick i n the sole of t,he foot vill
sometimes result in pus breaking through at this point (just above
the horuy part. of the foot).
(6) Examine the hindquarters, sheath, tail, anus, etc.
b. Animals which have passed these tests should be segregated from
those already rejected and those awaiting examination. If no seri-
ous and obvious defects have been noted, and the animal ha s a general
healthy appearance, an alert bearing and a reasoliable amount of flesh,
then have him led on a loose rope directly away from you and their
-
dilpctly tovrnrcl you, at the walk aud trot. If the nuinla1 is lnlrre or
11as badly formed legs, this will uautllly Lx. apparcsrrt. .\ lunie ani~nill
'.fartws" the larr~e fcmt, atljrtstinp his \\.eight w as to put very little
weight on it. Since his head is his princil)al nlrulrs of doing this,
SWM 7-29
I'RC)CCllli\ll:ST 01' .\Sl\l h1.S
yo11 will w.4, his llcrrtl <l rrq~ 11s11t5 1111ts tlr:, irwc for~t clo~m. If all fi vt
are: I~urrt:. tlre ar1inr:tl will trot verj slr(~rt :rrrtl rr:I:rct;r~rt~lg. BIuit
Inrt ~t , r~t . i l i in i r ~ tllp f t ~%t .
c. II;rvtx t ~ ~ c h ?;:~ikllr<l and rirl(lcr~ for a rltort. :tni~~rttl r~ricl rr~cr~~titt<l.
rlistulrce, m tlt.rt~r~r~str.;ttc. V; I I I t1ct Ir:rr~rllr~~l. not rt.cjuirc 111:1t hv I h
!flat n gzrit, eaci:l~t tllr. walk. as malry of Iror:se, Ilnvc :illy ~r : ~r t i r ~~l : ~t
tllo 1x:st will I I XYVhvf*r1 p1it5-ti i n a \\-:I? not i;:litatrl~ fnr ~irilit:~ry
~ r I i , I I a t g ' ~II(, barpirrirlp 1 1 t r : ~ i ~ i r ~ .
rrtay a.t,ll in. I n y r ~ l r rlo~v. Hare tlm :ttlirr~:rl rsctrked :I& a trot or
c:lntcr f or a f t w rttir~~rtr~s, 111 lo ly.? if lie aprw:irs to ~ I B VCgiml qwixid.
this r~or~rtr.clinrr, : i t ~ i ~ i l a l a brand nrnsc~rler btvrtnt ie t o he, tlrr!. with
pntfcrlu~tl to ctrlc wit11 3 verx trarnrw hronst, :is i t s wirld is usually
t,!t*tter.
i-2!). FISarking of purchased anirn:~ls..---.\sFOCIII irs nrl nrtimnl II~IS
I t t f ~ i ~ i . ~ I I I I I I Ir t i I ( I X f 7 I re-
cf~~i nl t l 21-.-%XIC.\I :111d I I C C I I ~ B ~ ~ ~ J by nrtic+ slroulcl \HI C OI I I ~ I P ~ P I ~
fillt~cl itr allc~tvit~g all 111:1r1(ilrg~ he shctllld I>:, : L I I ~prvtirr~rtt dat : ~ ~ I I I ~
itn~rrt*tlirr(oly 11r;tnclc~cl. 'I'lle cltstoltrary mt!thtrl is 10 11mrnL the t~r~itrr:~l
trrr 1111. left xl~oolrler with tlrc. Ic!ttc~s "U. S." (Str: par. 7-7
IIIBSTI~U,~TlO~.)
c,-..a). Use nf Uni t ed States ani mal s in smal l wars--W11en ., i t is
nrscssplry to transport IJrliterl St t ~t rx nr~it~ruls to the tllastcr of opcm-
tirnlr;, rr ~horirulof ~ ~ ( . i ~ ~ ~ e r : t I i ( i ~ ~ :&ft,er th(3 NIKI ~ci : l i n~~Ii %i rt i c)~~ t r ~ ~ v e t
will !I(? neef!sq?try. 'Tlre rr~tnrcturnl ~~~rvi n)~rrr~errt errcl the l wk cbf itdc-
qttrrtct exerciw! irrcitleltt fo N I * ~ .~ r r r r ~ l d~bi l i t f t t ~ a i l i n~a l ~ UII f , ~ t ' f ~f e~t t
dcpe~tilr?rit. ujwa tl18 lertgI11 arrtl c:lrav:~ctrr of tlrc voyaky. After a
pwicxl of n!aupt~r$ttiouar~d :r~cli'rnetizirtiotr, z~rlcl irftc!r the arritnnlx
Iinre trec19111~3 g r ~ d ~ t ~ l l y of f(utiI rre~i!ssiti~t~:d it(tj~tsft!d to 11114. CI I I I I I ~C~S
t y tlie t(hcul forage sttrrply, t hsy s ho~~l ( l thrisca pnrcticnlly :us s e l l ws
tile rrativtr anilrrtrln. 'I'lle iitrger Urrited Stntt* bred turirnnl, being
vc.qrril~ed to carry n n!clrtirr*s a ity grt*utrr loatl, grcatcsr c~ut ~r ~t <I
gt'ain rrrtci rouglti~ge t i c1 lice11 lrinr i r ~cot~clitioir. Stlch l(&w!s i.rt Ijr~itecl
Strc(en rrrliarrls 11s ttr~vo l ~! et ~ iirrlrewtl i n tlrc r~iist, aperittivrrs 11:1r.e
tu!c*~rtloc! pri~tci[)rtllyto lack <IF ft-id i t r ~t lto 11t18kiIIeiI l~n~rdlirtg,
SWM 7-41
SFLTIOS I V
MOUNTED 1)ETACAMEWSS
Pair. 1' ~er
2.5
26
25
27
25
2'1
2%
IIorsct , r t v i p z r t ~ n 211
Itl di ~i <l l l %1 29 cqui(
Arrurrt nt i ar nt r t s r 30
31
................ i 4' L 3I
:3 I
32
3''
Tru*ticulu~nof nturt~tlte<! clutarhrnarttx.. .................. 7,,4H 32
Chrtdset.oflrlotlrrtfcipatatruls.. ............................... 7-47 33
Grrilrut pi% 34
Anrbntibcc;.......... - :%
7--31. Valueof mnunteddetachments.--n. Iti s rertsct~lrrble iuex-
[jyttlrnt smnil.~vur orrclatiitrrs trf tlie fnturo, like ttmmof tlrn past,,
will reqiciro the use of rrrot~oted tletitchrtartts. l l r c ! vttlnc! of
n~our ~t ed dcpcncl trpcrrr tlhertutnmof t.hetermin, the ciet:~chrurcntx r'ill
c\ wrart erof ther c~i ~t l l r l ~c! , tllo est ~l l l t of t t l ~ o[n:fllti~rllii~ illld, tillniIy,
tirt, rrrir-sii,n~ ~s i i g~r l ' d totttern.
I.'I'lrr,. rtrhtrtre crf ttre tc+rr:iir~ lrus tr tlirect.in!itring rtlnlrl tlrc? v111t1:*
icrrd use t1r:lt isto1- rrrncla of rrro~urkd dutae11rncrnt.s. 'rhn! irlortt ~ J [ I ~ I I
flat.I rolling tarzvuir~iri rtlon, fevciralil(%for ttrc! stccc<rst;fnlc m -
~ I I I ~ I I I W ~ ~ of rrrorrnt<!tI cletucltrrirrrts, Asthe i:ounLry laconlei: rltora
nro~rrrti~irri~ns, rtrole give. r~ to jirlhgld gron.th or n ~ e c s ~ ~ Innttu, t be grtt-
em1 nw! ct E rrrountcrl tlt.t.au:l~rrrertts tn!ccnrrr*xlew ftr.nc:ticalrli~. E'crrtlrt?r-
tlrorr.,t hetxromUIIIW)~II~IIC~~YI I L~@R?( nrfrlegs fnvcs~.:rlrle*, I I I I ~i ~n~t t l t i vi ~t (?l l
for ttte g<?:c?nwirluw of? rnol~ttterl cft?tnelnr~c!r~ts.As t.110 ccrttrrtry i s
rnom giver1 over to a mt a luni,h it kcc:crtnlr;irror<!rxittglydiific:illt t o
rauirrtain mcturrtcd ckatsahm~rrts in the fielrl.
e. ( I ) Thee l ~nr uc t e ~ will trnvt, ccmrirlcr- of rct$istnoecrerrctitct~t~md
ahloeffeckboth011 t,hegenttrul c?ftuctiwrt~ess cof rrsountcrtldetacktrctrt~ts
2t
SWM 7-31
MOUNTED DF.TACHUENTS
and on the manner in v-hiell they should Ire employed. If the enemy
tends to retain a well organized unity, the mounted detarhinent can
be employed by attaching it to the force or column sent in tho field t o
destroy this resistance. If, on the other hand, the enerny retains
n o definite organization but uses guerrilla tactics the mounted de-
tachment can be best employed t ~s an area or district reserve to be
available for independent action on special missions. Again, in a
situation where the enemy operates to any estent mounted, it may be
necessary to use mounted cletachments in place of foot patrols for
regular combat patrolling.
(2) The effectiveness of mounted detachnients alcu varies ~vith the
t ype of armament in use by the enemy. Prior to the advent of
automatic weapons, mounts were of some value after contact was
gained. They could be used f or shock action or for maneurer even
i n the immediate presence of the enemy. Tlre modern high ponered
automatic weapon in the hands of small war opponents has made the
horse not only of little use, but an actual handicap once contact
is gained. The mounted detachment is extremely vulnerable to am-
bush by guerillas armed with automatic Keapons.
d. The more extensive the operations, the greater vi l l be the T-alue
o f mounted detachnients. I f the operations include the occupation
o f the seaports and a few of the important inland towns only, the
need for mounted detachments will be limited. As the operations
extend farther and farther inland and over wider areas, the need
f o r these detachments will become greater.
e. Regardless of the individual efficiency of mounted detachments,
their value will depend upon their employnlent by the higher com-
manders who assign them their m~ssions. A thorough understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of mounted units and due con-
sideration of the factors which affect their combat value, is required
f or the proper assignment of missions to these units. The mounted
and foot patrols should be assigned missions that enable them to work
together and not in competition.
7-32. Basis for organization.-ii definite basis for transition from
the normal dismounted organization t o a mounted organization status
should be adopted. To this end the dismounted organization given
in Tables of Organization should be adopted as a basis for transition
with such obvious modifications as may be necessary. The conver-
sion of an infantry unit to a mounted status requires more t l ~ a i ~ the
simple addition of horses and equipment. The converted organiza-
tion, even with the minimum of necessary moclifications, presents diffi-
SWM 7-33
culties of : I I I ~ tactical Tlrr officer training, tril~~li~ristl. atiq use.
;irsig~rrcl to ovg:urizc~. :I 111ount~t1 rnrit. will fi~ril hinrsctf so beset with
t l ~~fn~l ri l i ar of son~t. systrnt is prtrctically (Ietnils t11:tt tic. adopt i o~~
I I I > I I I ~ : I ~ O ~ ~ . \vhich becnrne nlq)arelrt 1112ry bo reme- 'I'll(! deficic~~eies
died as the orgallizi~tion ~)rogrcss~s, the ge~~er i l l \vitllor~t (l i ~t : ~i . l ~i ~l p
sclte~ne of o~gu~~i z a t i o~~.
-
( 3 3 . A mounted rifle company.-Assunte that n rifle colnpal:y is
to be brga~~ized as a ino~inted det:rcIur~t.nt. 'rho Tables of Orgsnizzr-
lion proviile for n ronllmny ht~aclquirrters r~ncl three platoons o f three
,.
is suit:lble for t i mou~~tc!d sq~~trcls t~trch. Illis ~ r g i r ~ ~ i ~ t ~ t i o ~ i colnl)any.
'Ll~t? 111111~,0115art: s~~iirll to be 11:111dled UIIOII~!I, ertw tl101:glt il~oul)tt?tl,
i r r n~ost situt~tions by o~i eofficer. 'f'lre :~(ltlition of tho rrecessirry horses
: I I I ~ ~ r q: ~i l ) ~l ~e ~~t , wit11 tlro atlditio~rul training and ilpbeep togetlrt!r
i ~~ci dcnt al to tlrr t1.;111sfornlntio11 from (l i s~~roo~~t ed ti) moontcd status,
will require sollie cssc~itial changes in the enlisted perso~lnel provided
i r l tho org:~~iizatio~l A stttl~lc?, a llorsesl~oer~ a nd :L t:rbles. sergeant,
r;riddlt~r, trll h e i ~~g ft)l. :I ~rnrst be I : CUI ~SS: I I ~~ 1no1111ted org~nizr~tion,
:tcltlrd t o the conlp:ury Iresrlqr~artevs. I t is also irecessnry to provide
;rl)ilut fivo drirt?rs i l l cotlrpmy l~eadquarters for the rlecessary kitchen,
cargo, :ir~rl nltion pack animals. 'I'he camp:tny sllould beable to
oper>tte independently; it must therefore be organized to carry s uc l ~
s~~ppl i es as will e~rable i t to remtrin amrty from its hase for a t least
8 (lays, whicl~ period can be taken us a minimum patrol period. For
longer periods away from the base provieir)rr will Ilave to k,made for
adrlitionnl tlrivers, arrangements made for rat,ion drops, visits t o
fiendly outposts plnnned; or for t he unit to srlbsist itself off the
country, or some combination of these metl~ods.
7-34. Machine-gun and howitzer units-a. It is not contem-
plated that mrxcl~ine-grin companies or howitzer platoons will be
rno~~nted ns units in srn:rll \ r ~ r operations. U11(111estionably, honr-
ever, subdivision of such units wi l l have to bcrnou~~ted and at-
tached to tho mou~rted riNe detachments. The attacl~ment of two
or more machine-gun squads to each mounted company will $most
invariably have to be made, and i n some situations, i t lnay be
necessary to attach 37 mm.and mortar sections. For this purpose,
i t is simply necessrrry t o mount tlte attached units wit11 their weapons
placed i n pack, the weapon crem acting as drivers for their own
weitpon and ammunition pack animnls.
b. It is rbbsolutely essential that the attachment of these units to
the mounted companies homade a s early as possible so that the
personnel and animals can hoproperly tluined and conditioned for
SWM 7-35
tlleirinouritedduties.
' Ihe ;rttacl~nre~rt of tltvsot~rtits %rill rrol rt!quirc
itdditional specialists rxcept possibly orie xctditional lrorseshcvr per
mounted rifle conrpany.
7-35. Animalsf or mounteddetachments.-'rhe betterarrimalsof
the occupied c;ountry will uot be avail:~hleupon li~nding.Great
effortandiugenuity mill be necessary to obtain suitable arlirllals in
sufficierrt numbers. The best nnimals obtainable will be necessary
for nrou~rtedorganizntiorra The ~nrclrase of animals s ho~l d bo
undertaken as early as possible in order t o coudition the aniruals.
v-36. Spare mounts.-Afonnted service in small mar expeditions
isespecially tryitlgup011the mounts. Experieuce inclicntestlrst the
number of mounts should exceed the ~runrber of men aothorised for
theorgairization by from20 to :30 pereelit. The excessshouhl fur-
nish replnceme~~t~s or dc- for the lanre, sick, sore-hrcked, ~vor~r~ded,
bilitated mounts,certsi~l to derwlop inhard field ~1.nty.Thisfigure
rnay decl-ase asmen andanirnirlsbecome arcustonre11 to sac11other.
and as thecondition of the a~limals improves.
7-37. Assignment of mounts.-a. .Every oRci3r and man in the
mounted organization should be assigrred :I horse. Tmo horses for
each officer:rmill usuaIIy be required. The assignments of horses
should be kept permanent. Changes sl~ot~ld be nr:~ilc orrly upon the
decision of tire organization commimder in encl~ case. Sickness and
injuries to ariimals will require changes from tirrle to time. St1c11
changes should be un(1erstood t o be distirrctly temporary. Men
wlrose animals are sickor irrjnreil slroultl kn, Iemporarily mounti*tl
from, t hesparet~ni~rrals of the.org~rnization.
6. TIlg mi%intenuoce of :mimals111 collstarrtfit~ress*for di1t.yis one
of ttle most difficulttasksof the comrrrandr:r of t hemoonted organ-
ization. & car~notdo this effectively unless Ire holds every incli-
vidultl urlder his corrlmr~rrcl ~wp o ~~s i b l r in turn f or the snimal he
rides. Tllis individual ~~sponsi bi l i t y nlost celtninly will he e.va<letl
by enlisteil me11 if tv~ro or more riders are permitted to use the
samemount.
o. I n changing horses a definite Ioss in efficiencyresults hecause
the man who knows u certain horse will, as a rule, securethe best
performance front t hat pnrticlrlnr horse. Also a manwill normally
hecome fond of Iris horn after he bcornes ncqr~nitlt~d with him.
This in tun1 prompts e a t e r i~derest in the ~velfare atld tPt~itling
of the animal.
d. Itsometimes ha~t pe~rs certain man and a certain horse that :L
will not get aloirg well with each other. The commander of
AI O~ TSI ' : ~ : ~I)P:PACFK~IICSTS
111oninted or,rrailiiratio~r sl~onl(l IK: co~~st ant l y on 1110 looko~rt for suclr
:tsitnatio~r and, irf1c.r assr:ring lri~rrsrlf tlr:~t a l~on:~ fide case of inutiial
unsoit:ibilit,y exists, correct i t by re;~ssigrrmont. of rnonnt and man.
a. The officers nird the se~rior noircomirrissirnred officers must have
the best l ~orses available to the organization. Their duties require
them to exert. their horses t o n greater degree than is required of
Inen in the ranks.
7.38. Horseequipment.-a. Tlre following is tlie miniinu~n neces-
s ~ r yequipment,, one set of ~vlriclr, rnodified to suit tlrc conditions of
the operations and its availitbility, is issued to each man:
1s:r(lille, MeCIdlan.
I blmiket, saddle.
I bridle, with s~mflilcbit.
1 l~catlstilll, haitc.r.
1i~:rIt?r I ic. TOIIP.
1 sl~rcillgle.
1 ])air s;tddlr.l~:~gs.
3 fcrd bag.
I grni ~lbag.
1 cnrrycomb (preferably oxre equiplml wi t h il hoof lbork).
1 brush, horse.
1pair spurs.
1. *air BI~SI)QII~~!~S, Cartridge hrlt, t)istol.
1 ilrsehetn.
6. Grain arid feed bags a1.e mrried strapped to tlre pommel. The
rmtl bag slrould cover the filled grain bag, to protect the gmin fro::^
rain ntid from ot11t.r irni~rri~ls thc! bag. ch?wing tlrror~gl~
c. The sr:afAe bit. is listed, but the curb bit. ]nay prove mole s:rtis-
filetory for some lrorses.
(I. Tire machete slrould be carried in :Lsheath attaclred t o tire suddle
on the off (riglit) side, in a lroriaor~titl position, hilt to t he front. If
issue s:~ddlel~aga are, carried, it ~rrtlybe i~ecessary to attach the mil-
ehete to the off (right) pommel :ind let it hang. The rnachetes are
not intended for use as weapons, but are provided for c ~~t t i ng trails,
clearing ca111p sites, bl r i l di ~~g sllelters, and even more important, for
cutting forage, soclr as grass and cane tops.
7-39, Individualequipment.-*. Thew are three general ways of
carlying emergency rations, mess gear, b~oon~i ng kit, toilet articles,
etc., each having certain advantages, all being practical, as follows:
(1) Saddlebags (standard equipment) ar e two large leather prtcli-
ets, fastelled togelher, in a size. t~pproximntely to a full-sized cavalry
mount rather than to a small lrorse (mule) vhich fits o n the cantle
of the MeClellan wddle. As tliey are large, they must not be over-
29
lo:rcl~.il~ tlrns~rrrs~~rit "11 IIII* Il$1111is :rlt<l i(,~li;c*r(~tt't~t i11g$ t n 3 s ~ ~ ~ e cll:rtirig
of t.lie?s t i t l t ~~ I I ~I JS. :IIIII
('2) I:c;* of i~rfnntr>- c.qt~ilirnentw isiiuc~l~ tint :\tt:rcl\ t l e blnnkrit,
mlltotlrn ~;idrllth, l'lle caiitwrrs11(1111d :~lw>~\-ii OII I%*(,:lrl-i.~d tht' InbIt.
(3) t,Ise <if t \ w) S( ' 0 I ~: t \ ~et ~s : ~( ~l ~~ t < ~ itrlo 1xbrI TI : ~I T>f:ist1~11i'<1t11<*
r:lllftebytheirhorllirtIl1'0llgI1~ ; l l l t I ( ~ . l'illgi.
,
1
.
ll13st*IrIRy ill5 {l l ~l ~<~d 0110
o~r r.::cl~ sido.
' rl ~i sI I I I *~I X<KI 1vs.s ~I I : I I I tl113, s:~(l<lle: <,itrriesI I I I . I ~ . ~ I II:I&ZS~
btlt.is I I I ~ I V I ~ c:r~sierI PI I IIII,, I I <J ~SP, i ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ c i $ ~ l l y I.%%s111~rt. i f I l i a C~ I I I ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ I ,
b. i\ 6k::t,~xi,l+! ~, xnl l " ~ v i l lox(lir~:~rily i111prltr(11or mi In3 <,:~rrif,d tilt*
~rinrelr. It, allol~l<l i l t i . l ~t cl i ! tllcrsck xriiclca nc,t r~et:dr:d ltlrtil cirnrp is
ll~arlofor tl118riigllt, ~vltir~h 1111. ~seldlelri~gs. rro ni~t etisily cnrrial irr
C:rrt.I I I I : ~ ~ t11:it rolls rtrtrr~irt slr~trll rr~icl ligl~t,. :lrrd tlir~t. tile i wr tnlic.~~
jvpight is divitlcrl n~~rttll?; I n: t r vnt ~tire siil<*s< ~ f 'VIII- t l ~rtrte,llirt. rid1
I I I I I I : I I I I I I : I I I t s i y . It. i.;
a~rt. ird si rr~l ~j n~<l tip111u r i of tlrv i;:rtl(llr,tlir e~rils[In- 111' ~ I I I !<,;~r~tlc*
t t -r~~l i ~l g : t l al t ~l21sf:ir 11st l t c r (.:11111c! I)-riirp,110piirt rl on. ~~ <[~r:irl~.rrlrill~
of it. ~ O I I V ~ I ~ I I ~ III~I, . . ~. I I I I ~, 1111 i t $ ~- . i gl t t , I I ~ J l ~ ytllo s:~iI(ll~~. I I r v lxeld
'I'ltc. followit~gl i d I I I , ~I I C I * ~ ~ lllt~*i~-. 1x1 is r~ot i~al~n:~stivr~, ill1 i i r i ~~qs
c:i~rrit\cl ort car(*ry 1x11riil:
1 blnt~ket, rsia~l.
1 pair n<n.k3.
1 stlit. ~tr~~l@r~vt~zrr.
1 ~""lcl0.
1rnosqrritoni!L.
C>rrnrinilr~tiotti( rrt:ry itil 1)1:1cst<lill 01ts(!trtls of the twll,RIII. ~will ln:
mom ciixily nturic~~l the** l h r r r ~ i r r esw:inlly if tlro s ~ I ~ ~ ~ B ~ R ( I I ; , in
r r 1 1I . rt~:idc I I ~ , tl~sctl~enitlp If tltcroll ine:~~r~lully f:i1c1 forrned
by t,l1t3edge ottire prrrtclin illr~~i!tl tllrrt itwill not catch writer,the 8c:
ntll is tuilti~nw~f ;III(II I P I I ~ ~ ~ ~~t i t ~r pr oof .
7-40, Arms and ammunition.--u. Tho amlssrril atr~rr~n~~ibion cur..
ried t ycrct:lr nr:111 nrc.rit.~ulutr.ri i t r tlli5sanlc nrnllrtt*rtrr~rl lry ti113 sriltre
cot~airictr~~rt,iort trcrtps. ils for ilisr~rou~~tc~(l It will be: noted tlrnt pis-
tc~lrinncl riflctsrat~t~irr<ls U I ~ PC- I~nvct lrr~t lwelr irrclt~rletl irk l~tininrt~tn
qe'rr%fnttr~Ls ( ~ C ~ J I C . ~ L ~ I I ~ J I ~ S . for ihstleto trrert~x~tc:(l If the rifle sc!alrttranl
i. i~sttrd, cam trltliithcr t al ~er ~ t r o o l ~ ~ tt~trt ate so traitled illattherewi l l
k ~ s rrir dattrger of their being st~pilt.iitt~d frorrt tlleir rifles tvht!tr Lhog
dirirnilrrnt. Tlto riflesi:nbl.~:irrIhas tlrc. disrr~lvrct~tage to of iet~~. ute~~ing
~otr~c! uxtarrtwith the seat of therider rrlcl tlre rrc~rntsil ;1cli1111 u t very
fi~nrillhow%tm r t l s d~ goitrg ilrrct at increrrsc!rl gaits, r t r ~d ,hitsteniny
rutit, mrt1t.r field conctitictrrsi ~ y retaining ,rtwistnre. 'I%<*. rifkscak)km"d
xhtruld sctt ix! r~w:<lit, ti?rritory wl1er.e contrrot i s at, !111 g~robnble.
SWM 7--41
JIotuntecl lnen shoultl he ornrerl vith tlie Lapnet. and indoctrinated iu
its use. The rifle, ~totolnwtic rifle, alrrl ssubln;~cliine gun may be car-
ried by the mounted me11 slu~lg in tlie same manner as they are
carried disnlounted, or the butt nrny be rested on tlie thigh, or t he
rifle niay be held by t he right. hand at the sn~all of the stock, t he
b:blance resting on the pommel of t he saddle.
6. All grenades and other am~nunition sllould br carried on t he
l~ersons,not. only to save the horse ("live 1o:ids" n1-e easier to carry
than L'ile:~d londn"), hnt also to have tliem always available in an
emerge,ricy. All such loads ~1:lloulcl be supported on the shoulders
of the man, eirrried 1iigl;ll ot~ouyh so as rot t o interfere with his seat
in tlre saddle; that is, ~~ot l i i ng ~xtelrcl lolver tlrall the bot- sl ~ot ~l i l
tom of his belt in front or reitr. I f tlte :O-round drums for t he
Tllo~npso~r sc~bmacliine gulls are carried, solno form of sling shonlrl be
provided for them, or t1ie.y should be attached t o tlle left side of
the. belt, to keep tliem off the s:trldle. Carriers for grenades should
be as lriglr on the body as possible.
741. Pack equipment.-The
-.
I'hillips packsaddle, xhich is com-
ing more and nrore into ~rr~ieral use, should always be used by
rriounted detachmerrts if it 1s obtiiinable. This saddle can be used
at tho walk, t.rot rind, when irecessury, at the gallop n.ithout i n j u ~ y
to the arrintal or derangement of the load. The mobility of t he
detachment,, therefore, is not reduced when accompanied by pack
horses using the Plrillips saddle. I f this saddle is not obtainable, a
special stutly of nt~tive equipment available urill have to be made to
determine the type most suitable f or military use. I F the Phillips
saddle i s used, tho necessary hangars for weapons, ammunition, pack
kitchens, and other spacial loads should be obtained. (See art. 3-30.)
7-42. Training, general.-For t he general training of mounted
detachments see U. 8. Anny Trnining Regulations 5 M . '$The
Soldier; Instruction i\lounted witliout Arms."
7-48. Training f or specialists.-a. For the training of specialists
such as tlie stable sergeant, packmaster, horseshoer, packers, a nd
saddlers, the follo~ving publications should be referred to:
(1) Animal Management, the Cavalry School.
(2) FRI 2&5, 'LAaimal Transport."
(3) TM 21-25, <'The Saddler."
(4) T M 210030, "The Packer."
(5) TM 2100-40, "The Horseshoer."
(6) BFbf, Val. I, Chapter 8, "Fluipment. & Clothing, Mounted
mrd Dismounted 0rmt.nizations."
SWM 7 4 4
hIO7JSTr:n DETACHMENTS
(7) Depnr t ~~~ent These give the names of Agriculture Pamphlets.
and kinds of fced found in foreign countries, with their nutritive
ratio t o oats, the form irk which they are usually fed, and other
useful infonnstion.
b. All of the above except ANIXALMANAQEMENT may be secured
by the Quartenm~ster from the Government Printing Office at from
5 to 15 cents per copy. The Ilcpartme,nt of Agriculture pamplllet,~
may be secured from that Department direct. In this connection,
application slroulcl be rrlltde for the pamphlet or pamphlets applicable
t o the country in qucst,ion.
-4. Time required for training.-Sufficient tinre for thorougl~
training in nll details \\-ill seldom if ever be available. Tl ~cmountetl
unit co~nmander is usually ordered t o be ready to t ake the field witlri~r
a. short time iifter organization. TVllatever t he situation, thc
mounted rtr~it co~nrn;~r~der the must ildnpt his twining s(:hrdole to
t i n~e n\rail:~bla He makes every effort to secure a rena)n:~ble time
for twining. Six \~eelrs rimy bo considered a minimum requirerr~er~t
after t ho order for mounting is received. Failing this, he conclucts
his initial operations in the field with due regard to the limited
tr:iiuing of his men and the cmditioniug of his animals.
745. Combat training.-The cornbat lrnining of the morrnted de-
tachment cannot be neglected. This training is al l important and
must he carried on concurrently \\-it11 the moulded t~aining. Since
the mounted dot:~cl~ment will Imbitually fight on foot its small wars
combat training will be practically identical to tl~at, of n foot pxtrol.
When contact is m:de the mtrunted unit will habitually dismount,,
turn over i t s mounts to hornholdem, and thereafter fight on foot.
The combat t ~xi ni og of mounted detachments should include numer-
ous and varied combat aaercises, which require t he men t o dismount
rapidly alli3 without confusion and to go instnntly iut,o dismounted
action against a simulated or outlined enemy. Only by repeated
exercises of this type will the mounted unit become indoctrinated
in the schemes of action for combat.
7-46. Tactical uses of mounted detachments-a, Some of the
tact,ical uses of mounted detachments are:
(1) For normal patrolling in pacified areas. Smaller numbers
of troops can patrol larger areas wi t h gmater facility when organ-
ized into mounted detachments. A show of force in these pacified
areas can be made almost continuously over wide areas and with a
small force by the judicious use of mounted detachments.
SWM 7-47
3IOUPiTED UETACIIAIICSTS
(2) As a mobile unit, attnclred to a large combat column. The
commander of a large colum11 in some small wars situations may
require a ~noutlted detachment for the execution of specinl ~nissions
such as distant ~connai ssa~l ce to the front and flanks, escort for
evacuation of wounrled, foraging, investigation of towns or district
along the route of march, etc.
(3) As an area or digtrict reserve. Such a re,serve can be used
for the accomplishmeut of specit11 urgent missions such as the relicf
of towns which have been attacked, the rescue of the personnel of
planes making forced landings in hostile territory, as an escort for
area nnd district co~nmanders on ilapection trips, and for other
special missions of a similar nature.
(4) 'l'o augment aerial reconnaissance.
b. From a study of the above tactical uses of the mounted de-
tachment, it, ~ : I I Ibe seen t hat it is not contemplated that the mounted
detachment will perform t he uormal patrol work in small mars. I n
bush and jungle, warfare where the situation is always vague and
the eneruy never definitely located, the foot patrol is more effective
for combat patrols arrd p:il%icularly so when the enemy habitually
fights on foot. The foot patrol, whose primary combat training is
that of infantrymen, will give a better account of itself in this
type of warfare when contact is made arld such a patrol is far
less vulnen~.ble to amb~lsh. The superior mobility of the mounted
dett~chnret~t metins very little if there is no definite objective on
which to move. But there are special missions in most small wars
oprutious i n \vhich strong and boldly led mounted detachments,
well organized, trained and equipped, mill be of great value. When
such detachments are t~vailable t o a commnnder in n hostile area
they may be moved rapidly on a defixtite objective when aeroplane,
radio, or other commuuication or intellige,~~co agency indicated its
use a t a particular point.
7-47. Conductof mounted patrols.--a. I11 country that is open
enough to permit marching at the trot, patrols may move at better
speed mo~unted than cfistnounted, and arrive a t t,he destination or
point of contact with the hostile force, in better condition to fight.
Agreater load can be carried without nndue fatigue by the mounted
man than by the dismounted, but loads should not be such as to
cut down mobility. Over average dirt roads, with few steep grades
and with small horses i n fair condition, a platoon should march
about 30miles in 1day, or 80 to 85 in 3days. Longer daily marches
may often be made, but losses in condition must be made up by rest
SWM 7-48
~IIOUBTED~ ~ I C F L A I I ; J T S
aft er tlle march.
These fi pres xi11 not be, foim(L accurate n~icler all
circnmstances, but fall~ng much below them mtlkes tho mounting
of the men unprofitable, as seasoned infalltry ciui Inore in small
bodies for limited periods at rates ilearly approaching these.
6. Pltrols required to reiriaiu out for long per i ds slioald take ad-
x7antane of all facilit~ei of friei~rlly parnsons, so as to preserve their
?
mobility. Sick should be lrft a t the first post passed through, sop-
plies replenished if they can be spared by the garrison, and inform:^-
tion excliang~d a t every opportunity.
c. 'Timely preparations shoulcl be made for any inarch, to insure
t hat inen and anirnnls nrc in tho brit conditio~i pousihlc, t hat the
required equipment and srrpplies :Ire lrrrsc~rrt and lo:lclerl tis reqlnred
and that provision is nude for t l ~ r r,uc and e\i~caation of t he dis-
abled.
d. 'The strict obsewance of 1rlarc11 rllicipline is most essential in
mounted iuiits. It i 5 ~irainta~nrcl only by frequent and rigid inspec-
tions by officeri :md iio~~coniinissio~iec on nlarch officers hot11 tlrr
and at all halts. The object of tlwse Irispectloni are:
(1)To keep tvpnpmeut, espec~allj saddle5 alld packsaddles
correctly adjusted a t all times.
(2) To require all nders tomaintnin the correct scat in the spdclle.
Slouching in tlte saddle has a tendency to injure the animaI's back.
(3) To maintain tlre prescribed gaits ~r i t hi n subdivisions of the
column.
(4) To require all nders t o dismount, when there is no need for
remaining mounted. This is especially important. A horse stand-
i ng still, and with h ~ s rider sitting on him i s not able to relax and
rest.
(5) To permit indivicluals t o leave the colun~n only in case of
urgent necessity.
(6) To police halting places and camp or bivouac areas.
748. Combat patrols.-a. Most patrols sent oat in smull mars
must be ready t o accept romhat, even if not wnt oat p r i n ~ a r i l ~ with
the mission of seeking it. Usually psychological considerations will
require that no patrol glve ground, and patrols are habitually made
strong enough t o repel expected attacks. Heconnilissanee and other
special patrols, therefore, are considered with combat patrolq and
not as requiring special formations. The essentials required of
mounted formations are the same as those of dismounted formations.
There must be idequate control by tile leaders of parts of the patrol,
mutual support, power of rn:tneu\-cLr n111sl be preserved as long as:
X i 0 (:\~' I1l~Il I ~ I C ~ h ~ f l \[l?S'L'S
possible by Itolcling out. supports, ant1 tire pat1.01 must. he protected
from surprise fro111 ally directtion. Tlic principles of the disrnoonted
patrol formations may therefore be follo\ved, modifying distrtnces
aild intervals t o conform to t he different cap:~bilities of t he mounted
Inan. For short distances, a horse can easily travel twice as fast
as ;I man, und thus support car1 Ixfunrished froni a greater distance.
b. When the point comes under fire, the men of the. leading squad.
slrould dismou~lt at hnee and take firing positions. There will scl-
clom be time f or tlrese merl t o smule their horses. Other squads, not
actually engaged, 111ay have tirrre :in& opport~i~rity to secure their
rriounts by 11i~ving (one m:~nhold four of them, rnrd i t mill sometimes
be p~~ssible, especi:rlly in ~a t r ol slarger tliair trro squt~cls, for units
~rof enga:'ecl t o nlake a ~nou~rt ed position fro111 which they daslr to r~
can 11121ke ndiwnonrrted : ~t t : ~ck Units 011the enemy's flank or xp.:ir.
not act~lt~llgengaged slio111cl maneuver? either mounted or dis-
mounted, to t a l ~ the oppositiolr in flarrk or re:w, but always attack-
ing dismounted. Actions of this type may be pre:trr:~ngetl ancl
practiced, but niust be kept so simple as t o be flexible in applic:~tion,
and must, not pennit ulry par t of the 1)atrol to go beyond effective
control of the leader mit,l~out definite orders from him.
6: Distances are sl~ortened in woocls ancl len~~llened in more open
country. Details for flank reconrraissance are usually arranged be-
: & fore tlie march is begun, so that signal by the leader will be suf-
ficient t o start the ~wonnaissance.
d. Mounted patrol formations are identical with those of foot
patrols with the exception t11:~t allo~vance mnst be made for the
greater road space required by mounted units. For patrol forma-
t,ions, distribution of woapons, tactics, and otl~er dehils seeInfailtry
Patrols, chapt,er VI.
749. Ambushes.-a Many areas afford innun~erahle good ambush
positions. I f all such positions are carefully reconnoitered by
mounted patrols operating in such a r e a tlie rnte of march will be
reduced tot hat of foot troops. The ~nourlted detachment when em-
nloved on an urgent mission renuirinr ranid movement on a definite
- <, - " A
objective avoitls being ambushed not so much by cautious movement
and careful reconnaissance a s by rapid and secret movement and by
rtltlicul changes of diwction to deceive t he enenlp. 'I'lie nrounted
unit Ieatler, for this mason, muit 11uvr as thoro~igh k~lowledge of the
trrruii~ as possible and m~rst h a v ~ rhr brst fl~i<l~*x ol~tainahle.
1. The above [~unlgrn~)It i s not :IS to be const r ~~~clrc.lir\~iiip tlrc
n~n~tnted co~t~i~i:~n(lvr of ] ~r ovi ~l i ~~g ~ I ~ ~ : I C ~ I I I I V I I ~ of t11e r(~spu~~sil~ility
reasonable security for Iris column \ ~l ~ei r tlir inarch and of enre- on
fully investigat,ing any position wl~iclr Ire ltns renson to believe is
occupied. If the attack be from a flank on the. center of tlie col~rrnn,
tlre leading and following elements do the manenvering, :tnd tlre
attack is still ~lormztlly driven home on the flank or rear. Tho horses
of the elements caught in tlre initial burst. of fire will generally have,
t o be temporarily abandoned. Tired ho~ses will not stray far and
those not mounded or killed can be recovered as soon as t he enemy
posit,ionr is takni. 'nie l i ~ ~ s e s e1enient.s net cnnglit under fire of
shoultl be titr~ied over to the al,pointerl horse 1ioldr1.s of t he sqnscl
who will get. t,liern nnder sue11 covey :IS is arail:ible.
SWM 7-50
SF~TION V
HASTILY ORGANIZED MOUNTED PATROLS
I'AI. rag?
INflnitiolt :?!,<I n.;<.s. 7-.50 S i
,--
~ ~~ IjiKllssio~t .... . ,.-;>I 39
3!J
39
m "
I-;,(I. llefinition and uses.-a. I~Isstily ( ~r pni zr i l nrountrd patrols
i!.r(3 units I I I O I I I I ~ ~ ~ pat r ol l i ~~g for i~nn~'~li:lte s.itliout l ~r i or twining
i l l r i ~l i l ~g 'I'l~i.; rxl,etlic?rit. Il:~sbraen r es~r l ed to frc- or :1ni111:1l C; I ~( ?.
clne11tly in tlie li:~st,. It uscnrlly s~iggcst.: itwlf i l l :Ireas \\.liere suit-
ithle r i d i ~ ~ g anirnals arc n\r:~ilablc i ~r coi~si(leri~ble ruinh hers. Whetlier
fo!. increasing the nrol~ility of the p:tt,rol, 01. eonserving the strez~gtli
of tlre men, tlue co~~sitler:~t.ioi~ given to the ail\~i~iitages sliorrld be
:ind disad\~ilntages of such prc~edureas indicated in this sectio~~,
prior to the adoption of tliis expediel~t.
b. 'l'he leaders of infiuitry units often err when they decide to
exccute combtit patrolling (nl monnts instead of on foot. Past opera-
tions bave definitely indicatetl that tl1el.o are, cert:iirr ndvt\ntnges and
disndvantages of hastily organized inounted patrols. Some of the
considerations ~ ~ h i c h hear upon the advisability of orga~iizing hastily
lr~oulited patrols are set fort,h belov:
(1) The mounted pntrol i s inore formidable in appearance and it
affords an easy \v:ry to nlake :I (lispltiy of force in fairly peaceful
territory.
(2) For a marc11 of not over 1or 2 days' drcration and with suit,.
able terrain, t he hastily mounted pi~trol cat^ trnvel mow rapidly and
cover a greater distrillce than on foot.
(3) Mou~ltedmen can, for short mardrrs, curry berwier individual
loads tlvan me11 on foot.
(4) A mounted man can give all his attention to observing the
terrain and looking for signs of the enemy. The mount will select
its own footing on the trail. A man on foot on bad trails must
s pnd much time looking a t the trail to pick his route.
(5) A man on horseback presents a smaller target than a man
standing. Hi s body appears shorter and is partly protected by the
horse.
87
SWM 7-50
1 i 1 : 1 I':iT11OI~S
(G) B 111o11n~ed 011foot nnd he can scc luau i s Irigl~rr ilrnn n man
farther.
On sctnie terrain his eyes \rill clcar bniilr orel. \\-hicb the
man on foot cantlot see. This surricti~ries e11:tbles a n~o~uitecl nlan to
rlete-t a waitinq eilenry at a clistaiice denied t o a lruir oil foot; par-
ticularly if tlie ene~riy is lot n-ell stlrr~ol?(l ill lyilig in ;~lrlbusll.
(7) The rnorinted patrol is eilsier olr t l ~c ~rlen. 'nley r i l l arrive at
their destination ill :I Icss esli;iristixl colidition.
(R) The r:~piclity of rrrove~iieirt. and the clistal~ce covered n-ill de-
crease tnateri:tlly :is tlie size of the patrol is increirsed.
(9)For rxteilded n~arcl~es t he foot patrol, untrained in riding, and
i n tho care arid I-iandlii~g of animals, will make better progress on
foot day in and day out than if mounted on ai~iinals.
(10) For large patrols, even nnlurclies of or11g 1or 2 days' duration
can be rnade wit11 greater facility on foot than if hastily mounted.
(11) I f the niarch is to be ext e~~dr d, i t is esser~tial that tlm load on
t he ridden animals be kept as light as possible. The average, loitd
carried by tlie ridden animal in the field is about 250 pounds. I t can
readily be seer1 t11:~t this load p1:rces corisiclerable burden on sniall
nati\~e anirnnls and every effort shoultl be made to reduce t hi s load
by the use of accompanying pack imimals.
(12) The aninial casualties i n hastily orga,nized mounted patrols
will be excessive because of poor handling and lack of coildition in
t he animals.
(l a) Lack of training in dismounting and securing animals, places
t he hastily organized mounted patrol at a distinct disadvantage once
contact with t h ~ enemy is made.
(14) The mounted man is generally more conspicuous, and more
clearly outlined, and he cannot hit the ground, take cover, a nd return
t he hostile fire as mpidly as a man on foot. At any given range,
therefore, he is more exposed t o the l~ostile init:ial bursts of fire.
(15) A foot patrol lras the advantage over a. niounted patrol \~rlien
it rinls into an enemy :rmbosl~. I n ti niounted pntrol the animals mill
suffer severely and the men will be inore exposed. I f any men or
horseholders have to concern tllernsel~~es \17ith the animals the,y are
not much help against the enemy.
(16) A mounted patrol is nrore risible from a distance t han a foot,
patrol, particularly if the colors of tlie animiils do not blend with the
background. Natives on one moonhin ciin see nionnteil men march-
i ng on another mountnin tl~en, under the sarrro conditions, they could
mo t see foot troops.
SWM 7-51
' I I . AS~I I , YOI <( ; I \ XI XI , ; I I AI ( I CI S' I ' I S; I I ~~~vrnor, s
111i1lio (.:IIIII) ( t i ) h foot 1):1(rol V:III : I I I ( ~ III.c:I~< 111o1.c lapiclly il1a11 a
I I I OI I I I ~ , ~ ( ~ IIIIICII concerned abont :I site tllat. will 11:itlr11:111(l is I N I ~:IS
f ~ ~ n ~ i s l t Ilastily org:inizerl inounted pntrols of any fortrge ;unI water.
size are ~lotoriously slow in hre:~king camp.
(18) A mounted 1,atroI is more expensive tlia~i a foot patrol. The
esl~encliture fol. anitirtrls and animal eqt~ipment, in past. operations,
118s been est,remely liigll for hast.ily organized n~ounted prtrols.
(19) :it the end of the clay's march the work of the mounted man
21:1s just. beglul. The animals, pack and ridden, lrave to be groomed,
watered, fed, the sick :11ic1 injtlred treated, nllrl, in hostile territory,
gmrd<led dur i ~l g the night.
(20) The general consideration that riding is less fatigning than
walking is apt t o o~~t nei gl i other more important. considerations in
tropical countr;es where there is ever present a stroug t nl de~~cy
.
to
avoid botlily exe.rtion.
(-81.
.
1)iscuasion.----'rhoabove considerations indicate t hat tlre use
of the 1r;rstily org;~i~izc(l patrol in hostile territory is rarely ~rioturt~d
j~ii;tificcl. 0111y for snlwll palrnls n-lien equilr~ne~il and con~litionetl
aoi ~~~t i l s :we ini~rrt~diatcly :~vail:ible, ~ ~ l l e n the n~arcli is not in excess
of about 2 days, ~~11nl the p:itrol is to be ~nn(le in fairly peacef111
territory, atitl \vhen rngid movement. is desit-able and practicable
are the conditions suitable t o justify the organization of a hastily
mom~ted patrol.
7-52. Type of animal t o employ.-In some locnlities there may be
x choice between horses an11 mules. The chamcteristics of the mule,
as set forth i n article. 3-27: make him more snitable for riding and
llandling by irntraioed men who for the most part make 111) hastily
organized nio~mted patrols. However, for srnall ptitrols on short
argent missions the horse c:~li \\ell be used to advantage.
7-53. Other details.-The organization, tlssipnier~t of duties and
animals; marches, equipment and other details of a hastily organized
mounted patrol should be based upon a study of the preceding sec-
tion, section IV, and should approximate the standards set for r e p
l ar ~nounted detachments.
0
SMALLWARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1940
CHAPTER VIII
CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS
UNITED STATES
GOX'XRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHIXGTON:1940
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tlre Slrrall Wars JI:~nual,I:. 9. A1:iriiic. Corps, 1940, is poblished
in 1; cliaptors :is folIo\x-s:
Cn. i ~. i ~sI.ISTliODUC*rION.
11. OHG:\NIZA'LION.
IIT. 1.OGISTICS.
I V. THAINISO.
V. II\'ITI.iL OPEIIATIONS.
VI. INFASTItY PATI(0LS.
VII. XOUSTED DHC!!ACEIAIESTS.
VIII. COISVOI~S ANDCONVOY ESCOIiTS.
I S . AVI1TIOS
S.ItIVEIl OI'EKATIONS.
XI . D1S;LRMAMBNT OF POI'UI.hl'IOS.
SIX. .\RUI<:D NATIVE ORGANIZWTIOSS.
XI I I . AIILITARY GC)VF;ILSJIEW1'.
S I V. STJPB:IlVISION 01.' P:LECTIOSS.
SV. ~ V I T ~ I D I ~ ~ ~ Wh L .
I11
SMALLWARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
CHAPTERVIII
CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS
1'8k..
Dmnr mo ~ s 8-1
Mrssros_--_.-__.-_-..---..-.---...-------. 8-2
ORO~IXTZATI~S 8 3
--._-_.---_--..--_______.._.__.___.- Coxvo~T Y P ~ 811
>IARGII CONVOYS 8-5 OF -------..-.--.------.---.------
Drsr~)sr~ros OX TILE ~[ AXCEI 8-6 OF n 1 E ESCOI~T ..._.--.-_-
DIZESSF:OF ,\ ----- COSVOY ..-.__-------.-.-------- 8-7
AT~ACK OF A .-----------------.----------- COXTOY %8
_ SFCTJKITY hTTHE HALT ~IE~SORI: S --_-_-..-. %9 ..EhEhEhEhEh
&I. Definitions.-a. IYhm a nnir~ber of pnck animals, carts,
xagons, or trucks are t o he sent from one place to another, they ar e
formed into a train. The train is called a CONVOY.
h. When carts, vagons, or trucks ar e used at least oue man armed
x~i t h rifle or automatic n-eapon geuerally goes with each rehiele, or
me11 so armed are otherwise disposed throughout t he length of t br
train. These men constitute what i s known as t he TICAIX GUAI~D.
They stay mith the convoy and fight only for the close protection of
the convoy. They ar e under the direct command of the convoy
commander.
c. When operating i n dangerous territory troops ar e flirnished f or
the protection of the convoy. These troops are called the CONVOY
Escos~. The officer ill charge of the escort is io roinmand of, and is
responsible for, the convoy. He defers to the recommendations of
the convoy comn~aitder insofar as is consistent mith the necessary
safety precautions.
8-2. Mission.-The mission of the convoy escort is to insure t he
uninterrupted march and safe arrival of the convoy it is detailed ta
protect. All formations adopted and all 1)lans of action must he in
accordance with this mission. This does not and should not preclude
offensive action, hut merely requires that the attack must have as i t 5
purpose the safety of t he convoy, rather than the destructioi~ of the
enemy. Pursuit that carries the escort, or any par t of it, to such
distance that it can no loi~ger act in defense of the convoy violates
the mission of the escort and such action may he iust the onaortunitv
" "
for which the enemy seeks. The rate of march is limited i;the rat;
of the slo\ved element of the collroy ov r111. ~ ~ O I I V U ! ~ c.ncut.t.
%3. Organization.-u. Eco1.r T:II:,. ill . ~ t r r n ~ ~ hr o~~q) os i t i o~~ 2111tl
~ i t h the sir* and inlportanre of the col~vo!.. 111~Ie11gwhof the 1nnrcI1
the riature of the trrri~in. H I I ~the typ(: of ~ ~ ~ S ~ S I I I I I C C Dt.. tnzlwcted.
c:icllments f ~ o n ~ \\.it11 the nrce:,arj the rifle cu~npa~lic> nlucliinr gun!
COSTOX\ AS TI COSYOX ESCORTS
nttachecl will usually constitule the escort. When the rate of marcli
of the convoy exceeds that of infantry, the escort should he provided
with R, rneitns of transportation which is 110 slower than the convoy.
For other than COI I VO~Sniounted detachments nvay be entployecl rev!.
effectively for this duty.
b. For large trains the vehicles or pack animals should be formed
into sections, each under a responsible officer o r noncommissio~~erl
officer, before the rnarcl~ begins. The train guards placed CIII tlre
individual vehicles o r within the pack-animal sections, should come
under tlie control of the section commattders.
8 4 . Convoy types.-a. Convoys of pack aninlals are difficult. to
protect because of t he vulnerability of the animals theniselves ant1
beCarise of the extended road space required on narrow trails. When
possible, t l ~e pack ar~i ~nal s should be herded in groups of about fire
nni~nals hut gcneri~lly it will be nezesTary to have them travel in
single file. l'ack trains of untrained or poorly trained animals mill
take more roar1 space iinll will require more men. 111 extreme cases,
a ~ n : ~ n to lead each ar~inial rnay be nect.ssary, but usually the animals
may he led i n strings of two or tluree, fastened together, "head to
tail." If train guards :Ire placed in tlre pack-ani~nal sections, tliey
may be ernployed by the section leader to lead ani~n:lls, particularly
ordnance wnimnls. Comparatively speaking, pack convoys are not
economical and sllould be used only in very difficult terrain.
7). Trains of native packmen (porters or carriers) are sometimes
necessary. The average useful load of ai paekrnan is about fifty
potmcls. These trains, like all other trains should be organized into
sections, eitch section under its native leilder, when any considei-able
nnmber of packn~en is employed. Trains of packme11 have the dis-
:idvantage of extending to great length on the line of march and of
requiri~tg strong escorts. The packman, unlike the pack animal, fully
appt'eciates (lange,r, and, a t its first appearance, is likely to abandon
his load and seek safety in flight.
c. A trtiin of 100 bull carts or wagons whin well closed up occupies
a road space of about 1mile. The difficulties of control and pro-
tection of such trains will naturally increase with their lengtli. In
dangerous territory i t will seldom be advisable to operate very large
trains because of the difficulties of protecting them. Close pl-otec-
tion should he provided by having train guards armed with rifle or
automatic weapon ri de on the individual carts or wagons. I f marine
drivers are employed they shortld be armed with t he rifle or an auto-
ntatic weanon (110 wistol or revolver). Communication should be
SWM 8-5
COSVO\ ~SAS D CONVOY KSCOIITF
maintained bet~reen sections of the trail1 by inottnted messengers.
Tlie protnpt discovery of breaks in the column i s dependent. upon
continuous co~~in~unic%tion between sections of the train by inou~lted
messenger. Each element of the convoy must guide on the eleinent
next in rear. If contact with a rear element is broken the lending
elen~ent nmst irnmediately halt on ground that will afford the ani-
mals rest and wait for the rear element to close up. If this is habit-
ually done, serious breaks in the column cart be averted. Proper
consideration for defense mnst he given in the choice of such halting
places.
d. Motor convoys are mad@ up of military niotor transport nnits or
of hired or unrequisitioned motor vehicles. In any crrse, the convoy
shonlcl be pmperly orga.nized before starting tlte inarcl~. The escort
inny be ca.rried on the truin or in separate vehicles capable of at
least tlie same speed as the cotwoy. The slower elements of t he
convoy should be placed in the lead. With suitable roads, motor
transportation is pecnliarly advantageous for convoys because i t is
less vulnerable to small :lrins fire, rind because of its speed and
ability t,o travel long distai~ces with few halts. F ~ s t tanks, armored
cars, or trucks convertecl to serve as armored cars, nlay be employed
to great advantage in escorting motor convoys. I f the enemy has
made a practice of using land mines, it may be advisable to have a
pilot cargo truck precede tlie point.
e. For river convoys and escorts see chapter X.
8-5. March of convoys.-a. Convoys should be assentbled in suffi-
cient time prior to the march to orpni ze them into sections and to
appoint and properly instruct the section leaders in their duties.
Carts, wagons, and motor vehicles should be l ode d the day prior
t o starting the march, and should be so ltxatecl th* night before
that there u,ill be the miitimurn of confusion in forming tlie column
i n the morning for the inarch. Newly organized pack nnd bull cart
trains should be marched only 8% very short distance tlie first day,
preferably only a few miles beyond the limits of the town front
which t he march originates. This first day of march cnn then be
used to perfect tlte organization of the convoy, t o comwt any de-
ficiencies in equipment, and to indoctrinate the escort in their duties.
Spare vehicles or carriers should be provided to carry the burden
of those that may be disabled enroute. When this is not practicable,
the loads of disabled vehicles or pack animals must be distributed
amongst the convoy, or destroyed.
SWM 8-6
CoSVO\. .\ST)COSr Ol 1 iCORTS
6. I t may happen, as it has in past operations, through misinforma-
tion, i~albili>y to foresee road conditions or other circumstances, that
large convoys will begin a ~nit~-ch gseently overloaded. When such
a condition develops, the escort commallder is faced with a serious
problem which requires immediate action to save the cnnvoy from
serious difficulties, or, In extveme cases, from complete break-dam.
If the convoy has not proceeded far from its base, i t may be ad-
visable to r et nn~ and reorganize tlle convoy with lighter loads or
to procure additional animals or vehiclcs from the base or in the
vicinity of the halt. If this is not practicable, it will be necessary
to lighten the lonrls by the establishmerlt of a durnp or by destruction
of the excess cargo. I t is far better to make a radical reduction of
the loads as scmn as it beeo~nes apparent that the loads are excessive
t han to make small reduct~ons fro111 day to day as the animals he-
come ~ ~ o r n and exhnnsted fl.o~n carrying excessive loads.
c. The available route shonltl be considered carefully. Long dis-
tances, poor roads, steep gmdes, many stream crossing%. sharp turns,
defilei, close country, and exposure to view from considerable dis-
tances along a11 open r ~dge are objectionable fqatures. The loss of
a fern animals shot down by a handfnl of men in ambush, or the
disabling of a few trucks or tractors might seriously delay the convoy.
Generally, the best road, even thougli it may not he the most direct,
is t o be preferred. The route should be selected with a view to avoid-
i ng probable hostile forces, and a detour is justifiable if it be reason-
ably certain that a n ambush may thus be avoided. Provision should
be made for temporary repair of roads and bridges and f or the
crossing of fords.
8-6. Disposition of the escort on the march.--a. The escort cnm-
mander, after assigning the necessary train guards to the sections of
the convoy, should divide his force into an arl~~ance a main guard,
body, a rear guard, and fl:tnk gaardc: as necessary. The functions,
armament, and tactical d~sposition of these elements are t he same
as t hn~p c~rrtlspond~ng in combat pxtrol formations. e l e n~e ~~t s
b. The advance guard precedes the train in the convoy in the usual
patrol formation. Critical places on the route of march, such as
fords, defiles and trail crossings sl~ould be reconnoitered and com-
manding positions occupied before the convoy is committed t o them.
Over some terrain, the convoy can be protected best by having the
advance guard proceed by bounds fmm one position to another. The
head of the convoy is never permitteil to enter a defile until the nd-
vance guard is in pssession of the farther end.
cosvoyr ASII (' OZVOY EWORTS
c. 'l'lre erain lwrly is c.lrnrge(l~rrinrarily with tire d?ft*~rsr> of t he
convoy. I t is tIrcref<~r.v likrly t o tiglrt OII tile drfrnsivc. this twing
forcad o t ~itby its tnission
. .
alltvid 111ttn ~a i n iraly 111:iy tx. mnrel t ~~l
of tile convoy; but, if this is don(^. :ul(~~rmte tmirr peartls nusst. tw
provided witliio t h ~ sections of tlrc train r~nclthr war guard 1r181st.
bt! sufficientlys t n~ng t o fiplrt i ~r~l cpt ~i ~cl t -~~t l y m: ~ch ~t nt i l s l l l ~p r t CRII
i t frnnr t11v mnin h<aly. For very lcrrrg eotrvoys, it m:ly 1%ncces?a~ry
t o sl ~l i t tile I I I I I ~ ~ :rntl lrnvt. tl~tase c.lirisiunsof tlrc IIIII~IIlmdy botly
~rrnrch 1wtarrr1sc.ctiir~rs cr f tlre c(,nvoy.
d. ' f i t , rear pnarrl 111:1rchcsn slrol.t ,li.;t:~nct~ i l l rtSar of t l ~o convoy
.ivitllthoni;sal r?ar.-prrlrtlf ~~r r ~~: ~t i r t : t . Rcrrr gnnr(lsslrc~uld nut m:tnerl-
vc8r i ~ r su1rl ~"t of adri~lrce of~ I I P t >l ~n~ent s i-scortif lry (loingsutherear
of tirecon.i2oy isleft tc>t,:~lly t u~prol ~ct t ~t l . ('r,~ltlitiorrs irlt~y so~r~(' tittrt~s
wnrralrt tlre detnclrtne~rt of rr 11t1rtof tito k n r gt~nrcl t < ~ n1:lneuver in
snl r ~xr t of t~rlranct~, e1c.mr11tsof tlrr escort,brrt snficirnt force slrol~ld
nl ~~r i ys be rrt;ti~rc(l by the rr.:~r yunlrl cooi me~~t l cr to protect. ill+*
train from;~tltick ill t l ~ n t <li~r.rtii~lr.
c.'I'lre fle~rks of :I convoy :Ire I I I OS~. roloc~rrrtile arril ;rrt~~trrticel:rrly
ciifiicolt tn plrltect in 11e:lvy 11rnsl1,jr:~l$r, or nrourrtninous rotrrrtry
\vhore1jz~n~llel TIIsrirt~ termin i t isoft en rondso r trails(loIIOIexist.
not ~~r:rctienl t oemploy flank gr~amls 21s t l ~ey \vili slow the mtt*trf
march i.o too grrrit a n extent. lVlrt!never jrrrieticnl, adeclautefl:tnk
p~urdssltol~lil tx! prnvitlod. 111 tr:rr:tin for tile employ- not ~~r act i cal
I I I ~ I I ~ of flr~rrk gtlrrrds, 1110fli~rrlcs \\-ill gr~~~er: ~l l y har eto be prnt~%tr.d
by 11ct~refrrl re(:or~~raissr~~~cc n.rlrlby the czcupu- hy tlre :rdr:~nee g ~ ~ s r d
tion of co~rrn~unding positions end intarswtirig rontle or trails fry
elementsfro111 ttreadvxrrcopuiird. Thew olorner~tsjoitr tire pc~rtrtl
when t h e convoy lrris p:ts%d.
R-7. Defenseof a convoy.-'l'l~e ewortfightsn~rl y wher~ nrc~e~snry.
Tile niission of tlre $>wort. ist o protect tilt?trrlir~and t oinsure its
urlintern~pled progn.sii. If the ttnerny is rliscovc~rr~ct lioltling :I coxn-
~ n i ~ n ~ i i n g p(eitionor:I, deiilenri tire lineof rrrrrch, 1115sl~c~nltl tx: ilin-
lodger1!tnd (1rive11 ~ f f tx!fore tlrt! convoyis ~rerrnittt:dto proceed. I n
m&t srr~irll ir%rsit,lrntic,~~s, tlw corr- lrostilc?forctssattempt t o n~lrhonl~
voy. Prenn~l ~rge(I ill cliaptckr VE sclrern(*sof nrfmerlver, $18tIe%t.ih!d
should be prepared to sleet srtcli i l ~nl ~~rsl ~es. of 'rhc? s ~~t i or r s t11o
corlvoy under tile immediate protc!ction of the t rai n pniirds slrould
seekrrny nv:rilable a1vt.r t11:rt will yrt.w!ot t hetiost,ilr!tr*t~>ps from iir-
irtg i nt o ttre tnlirt. If it hcrnntci c?vident:thnt theeal&~lreof (.ha
tr:~irrby theenc?mg crrr~riot prevented,thetrnnsporiand it3contr.nts
should he dustluyed.
SWM 8-8
COSVOS AS D COSVOY EsCORTS
8-8. Attack of a convoy.-Tlre most favorable tinre for an attack
against. a convoy is ~vhetr it is passing tlrrollglr 11e:lry \voods, jungle
growth, defiles, or stream crossings; \rhen it is ascending or descend-
ing steep slopes, or passing over bad sections of the roacl; when the
convoy is making or bmttking camp; :und ~vhen animals are being
~vatered. Tlie objective of the attack is always tlie transport and not
tlre escort. Tile :~ttncking force slrould first bring the convoy to a
halt and tlren throw it ikto confusion hy attacking from a n unex-
pected direction. ?Iie firo of ai~tomatic weapons and tlre attacks of
:rirplnnes flying a t low altitude ar e very effective. When a convoy is
captured, the parts tliat cannot be carried off should be. destroyed.
8-0. Security measures at the halL-a. During slrort halts, ele-
ments frorn tho escort sllould be sa disposed as t o afford protect,ion to
the convoy for the period of the halt. Corr~mnndir:g positions and
intecsecting trails particularly sho~ild be guarded and the train
grrsrds sl~ould h3 kept on the alert.
b. For long halts and l~iilts for tlre night, the train must be so parked
t.hat i t ~vill afl'ord tlie maxin~urn protection to t he convoy escort. At
(,lie same time the train sl~ould be ready to move out witflout delay
wlren march is resumed. I n dangerous territory, when no suitable cle-
fensive positions ar e available, t l ~ e cargoes and the pack saddles of
pack convoys may be so placed at night as to serve as breast<~orks.
I n very close country, titis use of the cargoes is particularly valutible
as it provides a clefinite line on x~l~icli tlie escort can fonn i n case
tire convoy is nislred in 21 niglrt attack. Carts and wagons ciln be
amnnpd in a circle or hollow square with tlre escort located ~vithin
the errclosed area. This dispositiorl shr~nld not relieye tlre escort com-
nrander from the responsibility of t.stablis11ing outposts. The ani-
ntals sl~oulil be afforded such protection as is possible. Motor rehi-
cles shonld be w) parked for night halts as t o plvride maximum
protection for the mdiatols, motors, and other vital parts of the
vehicles fro111 s~ii:~ll-i~rors fire in case of night nttncli.
0
SMALLWARS MANUAL
UNITED STATESMARINE CORPS
1940
CHAPTER IX
AVIATION
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OWICE
WASAINGTON:1940
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Small Wars Manual, CT. S. Marinc Corps, 1040, is publisl~edin
15 chapters, RS follows:
CHAPTERI, INTRODUCTiUN.
11. ORGANIZATION.
Il l . LOGISTICS,
IV. TRAINIKG.
V. INITIAI, OPICRATIOXS.
VI. INFAX'TRY PATROLS.
VII. IvSOCNTED DI3TACTIMI:Z"T':
VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVUI ESCORTS.
IX AVIATION
X. RIVER OPERATIOXS.
XI. DISARMAMENT OF popx~L. k~rxos
XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIOXS.
XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.
XV. WITHL)RA\VAL.
UNCLASSIFIED
SMALL WARS MANIJAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
AVIATION
l'ilr.
SECTION I.INTRODUCTION .................. 9-1 to 9-2
11. COVFOSITION 9-3 to .ANDOIIGANIZATION. 9-8
111. SEI.F;CTION AND PREPBIZATION OF
BASES. ...................... 9-9 to9-14
IV.GENERALCONDUCT OFAIROPCR-
ATION^.................. 9-1.5 to9-17
V. EMPLOYXENTOF RECONNAIS-
sAhrCE L~ v ~ &T~ o N .. . ...........9-18 to9-22
VI. CO.MBAT 9-23 to9-31 Surrom..............
VII. BI I ~Tn a ~ s r o ~ r . ............... 9-32 to 9-36
V
SWM 9-1
SFLTKON I
INTRODUCTTON
1':tr. I'nxr
e i . ...--. .---. I ~ ~ $).-I
Slrrt.ixl sir t;tcties i ~~rol rt ?d (L2 ~.. 1
9-1. General.--(. The opposition ~tsutally encotuitered ill snlail 71-ar
operations consists of scattered b:~ncts of irregular troops, \yell armed
and extremely mobile, hut deficient in disciplined morale. Logistical
iirrarige.inents for wch forces are apt t o be very primitive and sketclly,
offering IIO substantial target for bombing aviation. Air opposition is
usually nonexistelit or negligible. The Marine air force is thus able
t o concentrate almost entirely on the close support of ground units.
1). In order t o secure the full measure of cooperation betxeen t he
air and ground forces, it is necessary that each uncterstands t he
problents of the other. The avii~tor must know something of the tac-
tics of t he grolnld pttrol, and he must be ready and willing t o assunre
any justified risk to assist the ground commander. On the other hancl,
the ground comlnarlder should nnderstrmd the hazt~rcls ancl limita-
tions imposed on aviation operating over difficult terrain, and sl~ould
not expect the impossible.
9-2. Special air tactics involved-a. The employn~ent of avia-
tion in small wars is c,liaracterized by the operation of lnllny sn~al l
units, two or three plane patrols, over nwide area. Normal scouting
missions will in most. cases be modified to search attacks, performed
by airplanes of the scout i ~~g 01. observation class armed %-it11 light
bombs and machine guns.
b. If attack or light ho~nbing units ale included i n the force, t he
tactics of their employrrier~t will not differ greatly from normal pro-
c ~ l u ~ e . They shor~ld constitute an aerial reserve, to be dispatched
only ngiiinst definitely located targets, and in such force as may be
necessary. Occ~tsions will arise where one six-plane division may be
ample force for tlre task at hand; in fact., the e~nployment of small
striking units will hefrequent, and independent missions for the divi-
sion the rule rather t han the exception. The usual absence of air
opposition in sruall wars gives to an air force a freedom of action,
and the ability toemploy small onits independently, not enjoyed i n
major conflicts. If air opposition sl~ould exist, it inust of course be
countered by fighters in the normal way.
1
SWM 9-1
c. 111the past? Marine air forces hare been equipped generally
wit11 dual-purpose airplirnes of the two-seater type, suitable for ob-
servatio~r or scouti~ig, and equipped wit11 t11e ar~namerit llecessary
for limited ground attack. The observatio~~ and liglrt bomber types
were so sinrilar that they me.m used i r~di scri mi ~i t ~t el ~ on whntever
mi ssi o~~ While it. is true that such diversion and canre first to hand.
substitutio~r is still possible for 'urergelrcy situations, modern desig~r
of airpla~ies turd engines is along specialized lines ar ~d does not per-
rnit tlie wide lntilu(1e of tt~ctical employme~it prncticed with tllr rriore
simple xnncl~i~res of fonner years.
SWM 93
SFX:TION I1
COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION
1'2,r. I'I,~"
mpe~ w a
Recmnaissauet*aircraft $&f 3
COI I I ~ I I ~ aircr81ft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tmnswrt aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
%5 3
St3 3
Orfiar.?nin~tion -. @.-i 4 .-..-----
4
9-3. Types.-'n~e cr>inpositioilof an air force organized for small
mars operations czii~rrot be defhiitely prescribed, ilor can its compara-
tive streugth in relation to the ground force be determined prior t o
a careful rstimate of t he situation in each case. Mucli depends upon
the character of the cxmpaign, and tipon the nature of the theater of
operations. The film1 choice will be intlueticed by the type of ai r
units imlriediately available. The discussion contained in this chap-
ter assumes a typical situiltion wherein an indepei~dent brigade or
force is supported by a composite group of aircraft.
%4. Reconnaissance aircraft,I'rirnary consideration should a1-
mays be given t o recoiii~ai~xnce types in the organization of a snal l
wars air force. Due t o the advisability of operating in small forma-
tions :md t o the frequent calls for ai r reconnaissance to be expected
from the coinmal~dels of independent columns and patn~ls, a t least
twice the number of observation or scouting airplanes will be required
for the support of a, force engaged i n a campaign of this nature nn
\\-auld suffice for n o ~ ~ n a l operations.
9-5. Combat aircraft.-Tlie inclusion of combat types of aircraft.
in addition to the dunl-purpose scouts may be advisable or necessary
in many sinall wars situations. I11 making a decision rrq to what
types t o include in the air force, considerntion should be given t o
the existence of objectives which are beyond the capabilities of t he
dual-purpose scouting airplane.
9-6. Transport aircraft.-This type of aircraft l i r ~s proveil indis-
pensable for sniall wars operations. The lack of railroads, improved
n~otorroads, and navigable waterways in some of our probable thea-
ters of open~tion makes the supply and transportation of t,roops by
air more or less mandatory. Two types of transports ilre standard :
the multiengined cabin land plane; and the multiengined cabin
ampliibin~~. Botli sltould be inclucled in the air force; both are in-
cluderl i n the orgmization of t l ~e i~resent. utility sqwtdron. Tlre ratio
of land pla~les to amphihitins ,\.ill clopend upon ope,rating conditious
to be eucountered.
9-7. Organization.-The present squadron orgatiization of the
Marine Corps is sntisfactory for sinall mars operations. The only
problem of organization is the select.iou of the units which ar e to
compos the gmup. 0110 he,adquarters ancl service squadron, one
utility squndron, and two scooting squadrons may bo considered as
tlie mioimuni basic force for the support of a brigade or similar unit.
To tlrese slrould be added soch trr1ditiona.l transports :~nd cornl~:~t.
units a s tlie si t . ~~i t i on is flesible a i ~d dem~nds. The co~nposite g~. oop
e:lll take care of several opcratilig s~oar~rorrs additional \rillmot
o~~erllead.
9-8. Movement t o the theater of operations.-Aircuaft sl~ould
a l ~ ~ i y s be Bown to t he tllenter of operations nlrenever distance and
the situatin~l will pelmil.. Air units so transported arrive in tho
minimt~m of time with less hazard of darnage en ronte iind are ready
for immediate nctioil upon arrival. This method presupposes avail-
able inncling fields mitllin the theater of operations protected by
Marine detnclunents from naval vessels, or by friei~dly native troops.
I n most cases intermetliate refueling stops nrust also be available,
either on foreign airdromes or on board own aircraft carriers.
SWM 9--9
SECI.I~X 111
SELECTION AND PREPARATION O F BASES
I rape
Main airdrorn 5
6
Advsuce landit 6
G
6
Minil~iuxnsize of laudilig fields . . .... . .. ..... .~. .... ..... 9-14 7 ~ ~
9-9. Main airdrome.-a. The. niaitl nirtlrolr~e witlrii~ tbe theater
of operations sl~ould be located ~vi t l ~i n a reasonitble distance of Force
He:tdqtrnrters anil nrust be accessible by niotor trans11ort or on a
navigable \rater\vny. The rtir columnnder innst be able t o main-
tsin close personal contact ~vi t h the Force staff', nncl, conversely, t he
various clepartii~ents of Force Headquarters sl r o~~l ~l l ~ar e easy access
t o the airdrome facilities. The main airdroine should be of such
size as t o permit heavily loaded transports to operate during adverse
weather and field conditions. Existent lmliling fields which meet
all of t he requirements xvill seldom be enconntered, and provision
mnst be made for labor illid construction materit~ls to clear N I I ~
prepare lancling surfaces.
b. The. ground activities of n main airdrome can be conducted
under canvas, but the use of per~ni ~nent or teii~poraly buildings will
greatly facilitate shop work and improve the general e5ciency of
the organization. Provision must be made for t he underground
storage of bombs and fuzes. Protected areas f or the storage. of
gasoline ttnd oil n~ust be selected. and preferably fenced off from other
ai r d~r ~me Should there appear t o be danger of sabotage, it activities.
may be advisable to fence off the more areas of t he v~~l ner abl e
tiirdromes wit11 barbed .sir($ entanglements. AircXro~ne guards, in
addition to those furnisl~ed by the air units themselves, may be
necessitry. Shonld the opposing forcesposse~s aircraft, antiaircraft
protection most be provided for the air(1rorne. For defense against
sporadic air raids which might be expected from a weak and poorly
trained opposing nir force, the air units would be able to organize
their own antiaircraft machille giln crews for emergency protection,
provided equipment were i~lacle available. In other cases, it would
SWM 9-10
SE1,I:CTIOX AXD Pnl3PARhTION OF BASES
be necessary to :lrrange. for a stronger defense by regular allti-
aicraft units.
9-10. Auxiliary airdromes.-In xv:lrs situations the use of s~~l al l
i\uxiliary airilrolnes is contemplated, not for the dispersion of air
units for protrction. but to facilitate the provisio~l of air support
for serni-independent commands. Territorial departments are or-
ganized R I I ~garrisor~ed by subordinate units of appropriate size.
The headquarters of these clepartments may be situated in isolated
regions wit11 incliffere~~t. t.ransport facilities, and so remote from the
main airdrome as to serioutsly curtail air support, during periods of
unfavorable \venther. Auxiliary airdromes established in the viciu-
ity of depnrtn~ent headquarters, lightly stocked wit11 supplies of
fuel, bombs, :ttnmicnition, and spare parts, and sti~ffeil ~vitll skeleton
ground crews, en:~l)lr the air co~nrnander to detach s::~all units for
t,he close soppirt of depti~tmental operations. Furtlrennore, the
uninterrupted tmnsportntion of troops a ~l d supplies by air is de-
pendent upon the existence and ~naintenance of such auxiliary
airdromes.
9-11. Advanced landing fields,Eacl~ cletacllcd post and outlying
detachment camp sl~onld have a field of s~~fficie~lt size to permit the
operntion therefrom of scout :<nil combat planes. Many of these
fields need have no specin1 facilities, other than the larrcling area,
but. certain ones in key locations should be provided with storage
facilities for limited amounts of fuel, bombs, and ammunition. It
nay be desirable to l~nve one or more meclianics stationed at such
fields. Necessary protection and assistnnce in handling airplanes
on the ground sl~ould be provided by the garrison of the st a t' lon.
9-12. Emergency landing fields.-'rl~ese are n~erelg possible land-
1.
,laces, located! cleared, aud properly marked. The,ir primary
f unct ~o~: is to provide ili%lbled or meatl~er-bound ::irc,raft with
emergency laz~ding places. Tl ~ey rmay also be useful in making
evacr~ations of sick and mounded men from isolated patrols, or for
facilitating air wlpport in um~sunl situations. As niinly as possible
of these fields sho111d be provided throughout the area of operations.
9-13. Specifications of landing fields.--u. nor~nal condi- U ~ ~ d e r
tions current types of military airplanes in taking off and landing
tlsnally roll on the ground for a distance of from 500 to 700 yards.
This distance will be increased by the load carried, by a rough or
muddy surface, by hot dry weather, or where t he airdrome i s situ-
ated at high :~ltitndes. Therefore, in order to allow a reasonable
factor of safety in operating airplanes under the varying conditions,
SWM 9-14
landing fields sl~outld have ~ni ~~i mr ~nr from 700 yards dimensio~lsof
for all con~bat. airplanes u p t o 1,000 yilrds for tral~spclits. The liu~cl-
ing fields slionld be sn~ootli, of film surfaco,'a~~cl without obstructioirs
within or near its boundaries.
6. I f obstttcles sucli as hills, trees, or large strnctures are near the
boondirry of u 1:mding field, its dimensions must. bo increased in
order that t l ~ o ailplane may clear the obtacles in taking off or
landing. Obstacles near t he ends of rullmtiys must not ]lave a l ~ei gl ~t
greater tliali one-tenth of tllcir ilisttunce from the field, i. e., a tree
50 feet. high catitiot be closer tl~itn ,500 feet to tllr end of the rlcnn.ay.
c. Under wrying co~rditious of termin it \\-ill frequently be im-
possible to locate or colatroct landing fields n-liicl~ will pennit air-
planes to land and take off i n all dil.ections. Un~lelersn~,lt conditions
tile r un\ ~: ~ys or lo11ger ~l i mensi o~~s the. landing field slianld, if of
possible lie in tile direction of the prevailing wind for tililt locality.
(%14. Minimum size of landing fields.-
Load Conditions, land and fake-otr 1 Tzz ~
~~~~~~ ~~~ .- ....
SWM 9-15
SECTION IG
GENERAL CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS
1 ' I' ~gfl
Control and Conrmuad Sl: ! J ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
1)etalls of Ollcrntioas ~-~ S l f i !I
Reputs...-..----...-. rk17 10
9-15. Control and command.-a. The sc~iior aviator on i111ty ~vitli
a com~nand exercises a dual funetir,n sin~ilar to that of tlie force
artillery commander. He com~nunds the ai r force atid xct s as nctvix~r
on air matters t o the Force Commander. The air com~nan(ler will
gen~ri ~l l y of tlie area in mlliclr liave tin extensive cie.t:iiled kno\'leclge
operations are being cooductecl-first-lla~~d knowledge XI-liicli may
not be available otlierwise-and he slioulcl ~naintai~r close contact
with the. Force Cotrrnx~nder and skiff through the meclimn of fre-
q11811t. confere~ices, An aviat,ion liaisorr officer may be detailed to
~xprese~it the air comn~ancler rtt hearlrluartors during t he absence
of the latter or1 flying mission.
b. Norlnally, all ilvintion attriclred to a small wars expeditionary
force will operate from the main airdrome under centralized con-
t,iwl. Holve\,er, nlien distances aregreat and weather conditions
nncertai~r, i t may become advisable to cletacli aviation nnits to sub-
trrdinato commancls, t o beoperat.etl from auxiliary airdromes.
9-16, Details of operations.-a. At tho close of each ilt~y's opera-
tions the air conimander estimates the situation for t he following
clay, and ilnparts his decision to his staff and unit commenclers.
Formal operation orders :we sel~lom xvritten i11 advance, their sub-
stance being posted on the opel.atitn~s board and explai~led to the
pilots concerned. Tlle hour for publishing the clt~ily orders will
norn~ally be late enough i n the d:iy t,o permit the commander to
analyze the day's reports and receive last-minute inst,rt~ctions from
tlie lligller command, but shcrtlld not. be so late us to interfere with
the crew's rest. FVl~re possible, the board sl~ould be made ready for
inspeetion a t a given hour each evening-:~t 7 or 8 o'clock for
~,s:tn~r)le.
b. T)uring cl;~yligl~t 11oul.s the i~iq,l;lnrs : I I I ~ (.rtbw not schrd111ed
for ttigl~t 11cl11lcl he kept I I i i n of rc.ntlinrss t o t;ike off
i t 20 US 3 i u t s SnlulI \V\.UI.S s i t ~ut t i o~~i oftell ~ecluire 1)r0111pt
SWM 9-17
0. The air operations ofice consoliclatcs the information contained
in the individual flight reports into the operations report, which i s
suh~rlit,ted daily to Force Headquarters. The air fore6 coinmantler
is responsible for the accuracy of these reports and for their imme-
diate tra~lsmission when urgent action is r e qt kd. Normally, u brief
summary of i~r~portant or unusual information is telephoned to Force
Headquarters immediately, or the ai r cominander calls in in person
to discuss the results of iniportant flights. Radio reports received
from airplanes in flight slroul(1 be handled in t he same manner,
nnless Force Hendqunrters also miiintnins a radio rratch on tho avia-
tion frequency. Standard procedure d l govern as to the priority
of transmission. Forinal reports :we intended as a siunmary of the
clay's operations; vital information sllould never be ~vithhelcl p ~l d i n g
their prepaxation.
SWM 9-17
CTRSII.R.41, COS1)TTCT 06 1111 OPT~IR.R.~TIOSS
action on the pixrt of tlle supporting air force. Nigllt operations
~vi l l seldom be required, due to the nature of the snpport rendered,
but should occasion demand, the air units nus st be equipped to per-
form nigllt reconiiniss:~nce or combat missions. Operations ~uiider
mifnvornble wcntllcr conditions mill be the rule, rather than the
exception, in the a.x7e.rage sin:i11 >Tars theater This factor, and the
necessity for operating small independent units rather t han large
formations, requires a large percentage of seasoned and highly
trained pilots. At least half of the fliglit perso~lnel sliould be in
this category.
c. Co~istarlt two-way ~~i t l i o conirnnnicatiorr is desirable between
t he air pi~trols and the airdrome operations office. Present. equip-
~rrent ~vill permit such co~nmunication within reasonable distances
by radio telephone; radio telegnlpl~ is available in tllr. same sets
f or longer range transmission.
9-17. Reports.-a. Upon the conrpletion of each tactical flight tlie
pilot and observer should compare notes and submit their report on
a standnrd f o ~ m which mill contain i~ brief chronological record of
the flight., including a statanent of the mission; tirne, and place of
observation; action taken; comments on tlie situation; copies of all
messages sent o r received; weather conditions encountered; amniu-
nition expended ;and casualties inflicted or suffered. Reports should
be limited to observed facts, and opinions given sparingly. Deduc-
tions, except where immediate action is indicated, should be left
to the Force staff or appropriate commander. It must be under-
stood, however, that tlle air observer in small \mrs operations must
be given a gn:ater latitude in estimating a situation on the ground
t han he ~ ~ o u l d be giver1 in a conrpamble position in major operations.
Often the rapidly inoving situation mill not permit of delay in the
transmission of informdon to headquarters, but requires immediate
positive action on the par t of the air patrol cornmantler. I n such
cases, of couise, the written report mill eveiitunlly be made, wit11
notatioil of the action hken. I n any event,, flight reports are sub-
mitted immediately upon coinpletio~l of ei~cli mission.
b. In addition t o the formal reports submittccl [upon landing, flight
crews may gatlier information to be dropped to troops in the field,
or they may snl>mit fragmentary mports prior to the completion of
t he flight. Expediency will govern the method of disseminating
information, but i t is doctrinal for observers to transxnit important
information with~ont delay to the units most inlmediately eonc%rned.
The airdrome radio station guarding the fligbt nil1 habitually copy
al l intercepted messages.
10
SWM 9-18
EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION
Par. Page
Geaeralconsiderationn.. .................................... S18 13
Strategic (dintant) recon~raisssllce ............................ 9- 19 14
Tactical (close) recot~tiaissa~ioe.. .......................... 9-20 14
Theinfantrymission........................................ 9-21 15
Specialcombatmission.--. ................................ 9-22 16
9-18. Generalconsiderations.-rr. Tlie eml)loymentof reconnais-
ance avi:tt.ion i n sroall wars situations follo~vs geilerally tho tactics
l)rcscribc~l for ninjor operntio~is.Tlie principal rliffcreilce lies in
tlro conrlrron usage in small wars of the reconnaissance airplane in
tlru tlual ~nissioiis of scouting aiid at.t:lck operatioils a@iiist gro~rnd
targets. Thelrithitunlc~npl oy~nei ~l of scoutsillpsirsorsm:ill fornia-
tioil, primarily for nr~ltual protection, favors tlre dual inissioil for
thi.;tjpe.
b. Reconnaissanct, may be 'lssiified as strategical or tactical as
t oa~ission; visual or pliotogr:~pliicasto method. Viwill reconnais-
sance villbe theprincipal liiethod of obtaining information i11 the
typicalsmallwarsoperation. Thetypeof country,unusut~lly densely
~~oo(Iec1, and thefleetingnature of tlie cozitacts to be expected wit11
hostile forces, mill probably linlit tlie 11% of photographic observa-
tionto mappingoperations.
o. Tlre effectivenessof air rrcoirnaissance is dependent upon: the
ri:~tureof the terr:~in, whether open or densely wooded jungle; the
11:tbitsof the oppoiing forces nith reqpect t oconcealment from air-
craft; ilnd,to a greater extent tlrir~i any other factor,upon tlie skill
andtrttiningof theobserver. Generally speaking, :I.trained observer
willdetect tlie nrovementin opencountry of smallgroups, while in
densely woodecl country he will have great difficul~y in locating 8
force the size of a company or larger. Hornever, it will be very
ilifficult for a hostile forreof ally considerable size to movein day-
light without disclosi~rg some i~ldicalion of its presence, wblle the
rnerepresenceof airplanesi ntheareawillbe n deterrent t o guerrilla
oprations. Intensive low altitude reconnaissance over restricted
areas will seldom fi~il to discover the presence of hostile forces, al-
though aviation cannotbe expected to alwaysfurnish reliablenegil-
SWM 9-19
t i r e~ ~ ~ f o r n ~ a t i o ~ i occopa~rcg of deuiewoods, \~it11respect t otheliost~lr~
tonns,andvilltiges. I nsmallwars,asin majorones,i ~i r reconnilis-
sance st~pplen~ents does replace, the nor~nal metlsures of but not
security.
9-19. Strategieal reconnaissance.-o. T'rior to the initiatloll of
the land campztig~~, shonld disl~atch sucli reconoais- theco~iln~ancler
sancoaircrafta s may be availablctomakes generalairsurreyof the
l~roposed theater of operations. Tlris miss~on may inclutle aerial
i n: ~p~i ng, wrifiratiou of existingmaps, the lomtion aud dispos~tion
of lrostileforces, their rnethocls of operation and st ~~) pl y, location of
airdromes and bi~ollac sites, and the scouting of puss~bler0utt.s of
advance into t heinterior. During this period the flying pelion~lel
will fan~iliarize tlie~nselves ?Tit11the trr~ilill :111d ( ~ I I I I I ~ I ~ I C colldltior~b
of thecountry.
b. Stmtrgicnl rerormaissn~lre nlay pretede the ii~itial land~ng of
troop\, if l ~at r ol smpl:tncss, sll~pbnsedrnpla~les, or carrier-based
aircraft are avi~ilat~le. Tl'Ilere t ~me is an inrportalrt factor, niuch
f;tratepic:~l i ~~f or nmt ~on ciul be secured in n sillfileflight, althongh a
periodof severaldnys nraybr needed fora con~prrl~ensive ai r survey.
Landplanes or amphibiansshouldbe used forirrla~ld reconnaissance
when a.r~ailable, nlthougli the urgency of t hr situation lnsy require
t he dispatching of seaplanes on such missions. I n any event, the
importance of a thorough ai r reconnaissanceprior to t he advance
inlandwilljustifytheemploymentof whatevertypeof aircraftmight
beavailable.
9-20. Tactical reconnaissance.-a. After ageneralpictureof the
situation has been obtained andtheground forces have startedtheir
movement inland, reconnaissance becomes more tactical i n nature.
When contact becomes imminent,reconnaissanceaviation maintains
e close surveillance over local hostile activities, keeps t he ground
commandersconstantlginformed,and furnidiessuchconlbat support
asnray beurgent. Theprincipaltask of aviatioli operating in close
uppport of an :~dvarrcing columnistosupplementtheilorrnal security
measures taken by the ground forces againstthe l>ossibilityof snr-
prise. Ambush by gnerrillsl,ban&isa constant menace. hirpla~ies
&ould reconnoiter alread of t heground colu~nni, paying particular
: ~t t ent ~on tothoseloralitiesrecognizedbytheskilledobserverasbeing
dangerous ambush sites. Thi s precaution \\.ill protect t he pound
unitsfrom surpriseby ahr ge force. I t mustbe remembered, how-
ever,thatdetectionof $ma12forcesof irregnlars,not in ~lrrifor~n and
with no distinctive formation. in heavily wooded country, or in a
SWM 9-21
C\Il'I,OL\IF.ST OF RECOSSAISSASCEAYIATIOS
jumble of nnouutain boulders, is extremely difficult and largely a mat-
ter of luck for even the most skilled air observer. The itabttual
presence of airplanes i n t l ~e vicinity of our column will d'isco~~rage
operations of goerrilla forces, even though they escape detection,
hence it is advisable t o conduct more or less continuous reconnaissance
throughout the 11oclr.s of daylight over the area occupied by our ad-
vancing forces. Flights at irregular intervals may accontplislt t he
same purpose with more economy of force.
b. Tactiral reco~~naissn~rce conibat becomes immediately prior to
more ii~tensive and is central~zetl to a clefinite locality. Detailrd in-
formation of tlle hostile positions, strength, movement, and disposi-
tions will besought out by aircraft and con~municated to the friendly
ground units witl~out delay. Ground o1)servation will usually be
very limited because of tlie nature of the terr~iin, a nd cibservation of
the enemy positiou f ~ . o ~ n the air may he absolutely essential for tlie
fonnnlation of plans rund for the concluct of the action. Airplanes
eng~ged in close recoonaissai~re missions may participate in combat
by employing bombs and machine-gmn fire against objectives particu-
larly claltgerous to ground troops, especially mhm requested by the
glwun(1 commander. It shoold be borne in mind, however, that com-
bat is secondary to reconnaissance, and attacks which are not coordi-
naterl wi th the gronnd force action shoultl generally be avoided.
9-21. Infantry mission.-a. I n small vars there ctoesnot exist t he
same line of demarcation between the tactical reconnaissance ntission
and tlre infantry ~xtiission as is prescribed in air tactical doctrine f or
major operations. The functions of each merge into the other.
Perhaps the best definition of the term "Infantry mission," as under-
stood f or small wars, refers t o a daily or periodic ai r patrol whicl~
flies over a given area and contacts all the ground patrols and station
garriso~ls located withi11 this area. Tactical reconnaissance is con-
ducted by these air patrols incident t o their passage from one ground
unit to another, and they tire prepared to attack hostile ground forces
~ p o n discovery. Their primary mission, ho~vever, is to maintain
commtind litlison nvith detached units of friendly ground forces, and
to keep these forces informed of the situation confronting thein. The
infantry airplanes may be used for the emergency transport of men
and supplies, or they may be called upon to assist some ground patrol
in a difficult situation by attacking the hostile ground force. I n
5hort, t he airplanes assigned to the infantry mission, operating habit-
ually in pairs, support the ground forces in whatever manner is
expedient, regardless of their normal function in major warfare.
E&IPLOY3IEX'P OF RECOSSA13SSCE AVIATION
h. Occasions ]nay arise r her e i t is desirable t o dispense vith eir
s u p ~~o r t for some special operation. Considerations of secrecy of
moven~ent for sotne ground unit niay justify t he responsible com-
mander in making such a decision. Should it be de~i ded that air snp-
port will not be furnished a. ground patrol, the patrol commander
should be so informed, and pilots instrocted not t o communicate ~vitll
this unit, nor t,o disclose its presence in any way. Hovever, to avoid
being fired on, the ground patrol sluot~ld display an identification
panel \vI~enever possible. Wlrile t he infantry airplanes may disclose
the position of a ground patrol to t he enemy through efforts to estab-
lish a contact, i t is lilrervise possible to deceive tlte eLllelrly as to tlre
true location of our forces by having the airplanes simulate contitct
with fictitious units i n various otlucr places.
c. Contacts hetwt.cn the infrurtry airplane and grolcud nnits are
established by JI I ~RI I S of panels and drop messages, and ~rlien:, oprn
ground is avail;tble, by message pick-ups. ?'he use, of radio will be
more pre,valcnt ill t,hc futnre than lras been the case in the past.
9-22. Special combat missions.-Airplanes engaged in reconnais-
sarlce missions will be l~repared t o attack hostile growud forces, in
order tlrat emergency combat support may be. rendered friendly
ground units without delay. I n small Tars operations targets ar e apt
to be fleeting and time may not permit the dispatch of regular attack
units. If the enemy is to be struck vhile he is most vulnerable, Ire
must be attacked immediately by t he air patrol whicll discovers hilll.
When time permits, a contact report should be made, but the patrol
leader must l n ~ k ~ This doctrine is appli- t he decision in each case.
cable mainly to jungle warfare, against s~nal l gi-oups of irregulars,
where the offerrsive paver of a pai r of scouting airplanes vould 116
of some avail. I n more open country, against. larger and better or-
ganized forces, searcll-attack missions by slnall air units ar e not
generally recoinme~uded. I n any event, i t must be re~riemberecl that
the primary mission of recor~naissance airplanes is not combat, but
the procurenlent of informution, and the Inere existeuce of offensive
armament should not encourage their needless diversion to combat
tasks.
S m o ~ VI
COMBAT SUPPORT
PBT. Page
General discnssion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fighting aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
!W!A 17
S2 4 ,<l -
Attack
IIombing :rvintion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . on troop coi t ~n~ns Bttaeks ix~ldtriiins
0-25 18
S2U 18
(L-27 18
Sti~rportof anrchiof n,lr,n~lt 10
Btt:icks on hostile positions. 20
Attacks on ton.ns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i)30 20
S 3 1 20 Ariation 11su mobile reserve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q-23. General discussion.-'rlre primary mission of combat nria-
tion in t~ small mar is: the direct support of the ground forces. Tl ~i s
implies generally t hat a11 conlbat aviation will be used for ground
attack. Air opposition will usoally be nonexistent or neak, and
friendly aviation should be able t o operate. against hostile grc~und
troops at will. Fighting squadrons, if included in the force, nlay be
employed as light bombers; while t he bombing sqnadrons will find
more use for their lighter bombs and offensive ~rincl~ine guns than
they will for their major weapon-the heavy demolition bomb.
Attack aviation, or its substitute, t he dual-purpose scout, is the best
t y ~ xt o cope with the targets likely t o be encountered in small mars
Troop colunms, pack trains, groups of river boats, occupied villages
of flimsy co~lstiuction, mountain strongholds, and hostile bivouac
areas ar e all volnerable to the weapons of the attack air plan^--the
light bomb and machine gun. Occasionally, targets of a more sub-
stantial nature nlay require tho use of medium demolition bombs. Bs
the t ype of campaign approaches t he proportions of a major con-
flict, so will the employmeut of the different types of combat aviation
approach that prescribed for major aarfnre. For the typical jungle
country small war, the division of missions between the different types
is not so clearlv marked.
"
9-24. Fighting aviation.-This class of combat aviation will be
included in the small ma s air force when there exists a possibility
that opposition mill be provided with military aircraft. The fighting
~quadrons should be used to neutralize the hostile air force early in
the campaign. Thereafter, the fighting units could bc macle avail-
SWM 9-25
COil1J311T ScPPORT
able as a part of the general air reserve to be emplo)ed for ground
nttack against part~cularly favorable targets.
9-95. Attack aviation.-The eiuploytuent of attack aviation (or
dual-purpose scouts acting as sucli) differs little in tactics or tech-
nique frorn the doctrine prescribed f or major operations. Sucl~units
as are availnble shonld be held in central reserve t o be dispatched
only against clefinitely located targets. The six-plane division, in-
stead of the squ:tclro~i, will usually be ample force t o employ against
the average s~iiall wars objective.
9-20. Bombing aviation.-The medium dive bomber is a versatile
weapon, and although there mill probably be little call for the em-
ployment of tlie 1,OO-pound bomb against small wars objectives,
this type of aircraft can also carry t he lighter demolition and frag-
mentation bombs, aud is armed ~vi t h offewive machine guns. Bonlb-
i r ~g units lnuy thus be employed agaiilst personnel and the lighter
ni ~t er i al targets usually assigned t o attack aviation. Legitimate
targets for bolnhiilg units include forts, village strongholds, rail1~)nd
rolling stock, motor trains, a i d the larger sul~ply boats; secondary
targets are troop columns and pack trains. When attack units are
available for strufiirg missions, the bombing quadrous should, like
the fighters, be considered as part of the gel~eral air reserve, and
their use against misuitable targets avoided.
9-27. Attacks on t roop columns and trains.-a. Troops and ani-
mal trains marching in close formations on roads or trails are ex-
tremely vulnerable t o surprise air attack. Such attacks should be
cttrefnlly timed t o hit columns as they pass through narrow defiles
formed by tlir hills or jungle growth. If the terrain permits, a low
altitude strafing nttack is preferable, as it favors surprise, and per-
mits a more erective employment of air weapons. An attempt
should be niade to enfilade the colmnn with machine-gun fire and with
fragmeiitation bombs tlropped in trail, repeatir~g tlie attack as re-
qmred. Should tlir hostile columii be encountered in very moun-
tainous country it may be necessary t o employ the diving attack, each
airplane in tlie column selecting a part of the target, in order t o
cover t he whole effectively on the first assault. Surprise will be
more difficult to obtain when the diving approach must be used,
although a skilled leader should be able to launch a n effective assault
without giving the enemy more than a few seconds' naming. Re-
pe a M diving assaults are made as required, although tlie objective
may be much less vulnerable after t he first surprise attack. In the
attack of a long column which cannot be covered in one assault by
SWM 9-28
the air force alrailable, the head of the column should always be
chosen as the initial objertive, regardless of the method of attack
employed. This v7ill erlsure t l ~e ~n a x i s n ~~n ~ of delay and confusion,
and facilitate relxated ass:iults.
b. The snccesful attaclr of a. column by an organized air unit is
depen,ldeut npon the p~.ompt trnnsmission of inforn~ation by the recon-
naissance agency which nlitkes the discovery. Small columns of
inobile troops mill usually be attacked on the spot -\vllen discovered
liy reconr~aissar~ce If the irrlportance of the target and t ho patrols.
i~ature of the terrain appears to warrant. the delay necessary t o
lao11c11n concentrated attack, the hostile colunm should he kept. under
surveillance, if it can ba dm18tcibhout smvifce of s ur p i s e , and a ful l
report be. made. by radio to the air commander. Upon tlie receipt
of such n lnesaage the air commander should communicate with t he
Force Cosmnander ~vhile airplanes are being prepared, advising him
of tlrp conten~plated actioii. Speed of movenient and surprise of
execrit~ion will be the essence. of success in the air attack of a colonlli.
9-28, Support of a marching column.-a. \\'hen the size of a
column, or the haztlrdous nature of its advance makes the wssignnre.nt
of combat aviation advisable, t vo irlethods of general support are
possible. h division of airplanes can be kept continuo~~sly in t he
air o ~ e r the column; or the coln~r~n can be contacted at short intervals
by a combat patrol of appropriate size. I n most czses the latter
form of support will suffice, bearing i n mind that t he colurnn would
normally hare a pair of infantry planes with i t a t all times. The
reconnaissance airplanes seek out ambushes and enemy positiosls
along t he route. of march; the air combat units assist the ground
forces i n ronting hostile opposition. Air attacks may be coordinated
with the ground attacks if cominunication facilities and the tactical
situation permit., or they niay be launched ii~depeudently to prevent
hostile interference with the rrrlarclt of the supported column.
b. Ground commandcrs supported by aviation should be careful
when i n action t o mark the position of their advanced elements by
panels, and where the force is held u p by fire from a given locality
they should also indicate by the proper panel signal the direction
and estin~ated distance to the enemy position. The ground com-
mander should also indicate, by whatever means is expedient, just
when and where he wishes the fire of aviation to be concentrated. I n
short, h e requests fire support in the same manner as he would from
artillery. I n addition t o complying with these requests, the air com-
mander will be constantly on tlie lookout for the location and move-
SWM9-29
<'ilSllid\'I' sl'l'l~l>lrT
tilent. of rrsiy cbnrnly f ~l r~rs iii tire vi$.ilrit.st : r l i <l will IN' 1>r r ~t ~r e( l to
exi)ic,ii, ariy ~III;CPSS i i f tire, gr<!riird f<twesI J ~ tile irtrtrir?~Iit~t~~~ of' pi~rstrit.
rerre?:rting 18~1~1 ilc t rool8?..
$4-20. Attackonhostile pctsitions.-Cc,rrilrnt aviation nray LIO uwl
:is a solntitrttc frir :,rtillr~r,v i t 1 tliv <~rprt~izc.rl attitcks of liostilt; stnlog-
1 1 . ;\s st~cli i t for tli* [rn~litriiiri~ry of tile [i~.l~rirIcx rrcluction
iro*;tile clefi:trsrs ir,v Ia~itihit~g, tlrr i~rtr~rdiction f c ~ of litws of ctnlr-
ti~irnicoiiorrr r t ~ r l si11q81.. lltid f or t t r ~ (l i r~ct ~Ii ~se-i i i of the s ~ r p ~ i r t
:~tt:rc.kirig i nft ~nt ry 111 Iyiiig t l e t \ ~ - ~ r a hnr~.:ikwof tnncttine-gurr Liillr~ts
arid frngmt~~itatir,ir l)~>i)rl)u All these mis- on ilrc or my fror~t lines.
sioiit: ~iriir~ot of ~(ttirsi!t~ 1x!rfetrtr:t*d by i8ne air r~riit; ~~11eci11Ics of fire
rtiuat in? we~r.ki~<l :rnd csc~r.~rtecl r ) ci t , titrrrtl tvitlr tlrc. irrfsntry t~<l\-arirt..
i ~ ys~rccussive\v\.uc~!Rof ttirc:nift. Dct:riis of illis fo1.11iof air S I I ~ ~ I O P ~
:rrc. vc-(~rkt*d out try t l i ~. r r i t . usitrg iri(.It : ~ r ~ d cr~rt~rti:~trclt~r. ~r t i ~r r t n~r ~tyllt's
f : I I I : r i i i l : r I l : i I y . '1'1ie gror~ri<l COIIIIIIRIII~CP
tnnst. s111111iit 1111rt1 i f : ~ i r ~tt:rvk is t c~110 ~( mr di i ~at i ~d :I d~f i i r i t i ~ ;otlrc~r-
rviw,the :iir cotitru:itr(ler or1 tire spnt i~rristaw Iris ~<IV(.B11s (~i i [~~rt i rt t i t y
c~ffe~.r;.111 trririor ntt:teks the 1attt.r pr oce~l nr ~ will l~robnbiy be tire
r~tle.
!l-:SO. Attacks ontowns-IVhrn Bostili! forces ~ n > k t he stteller of
<8cxupiwl towns n r i d villnges, itir coinbrrt rttlq~ort <.ruioot lw giver1 tlir
ntti~ckiag trboops withortt endurigeritig tho lives of r~oncotrrbrttnnts.
llowever, it, nrsy tte fc~:~eibln drop wnrr~isrg r n e s : ~ g ~ ~ ttie in- to to
Irrtk~itnrtt?i, and allow t1rc.111 tloffioient tirtte to evact~nte initiating tn>fc~n~
e n attack. 011ce ttrtt :rttltrk is (lec.idcll upon, aviatiaa agriti perforrne
tl~r. ~) l i r of urtillrwy. Orre tmt~rtt, pc~octrnlirig the mof of n small
irot~na Isfirre. exg~l t ~l i ng vill eiTeot ivrly neutralist? all (n:citf~:irits; Lliose
sol: hrtiri~ killetl or wo~~rrtleol will inmretlirtely eenpe to the S~FE( *~E
to ku?co~t~o Corrtinrtoas bi~mbirrg frrrws tire titrgets f or ttr:tclrioe jiurrs.
clc*:fr.rrcIera fntrn t hei r slr(*lters :111(1 fitt!ililirt@s tlrc?ir CUI ) ~I I P~: 111. defeat.
Iry tlic grcrrtncl fotrtt~s. l'he trrctics rrild tcr.itrriclr~e involvtnl in tlte air
nttnck of a to\vrr dl, clot cliffrr nri~terially fmrn those risetl ttgi~irrst. rtr~y
~ltbfatrded ~tcisit~ior~, crsrept thnl rtri!diutn ~livrr horrtbt~rs nrny in! trsd
Irere t o k~ttc?r ~dvnrtt:tg* ttinrr they corrld in? in rrl<ryt srrlrill wnrs sitria-
tioris. Care stit~flt.\%. tcrktttt 11ot to endai ~g~. c ndvarrcing fric!~idly
troops.
9-31, Aviationasamobilerenerve.-'She enrployrnet~t, of aviation
61sIL reserve for irkflllttry in krahtln is rnerely an application of tlre
prirrciltle of qttictk coiic.c!ntrntion of sa[n!riw force r i l the ctmi8i.r.u
p ~ i r ~ t . The ~rinhility ~rirl striking rmww of corrrbtit aviation favors
;uctc eo~liloyatenliri ~ni l ~or operations.
20
SECTI~X VI I
AIR TRANSPORT
General consicierations........................................
I'ar
8-32
Page
21
Troop trnnsportntiorr. ...................................... 933 22
Transportation of si~pplieb ..........................W 4
Ih'oi~ping of stil~plies ........................... ..-.-.- <%Xi
22
23
13vnenation of sick anti wounded ........................ 936 24
932. General considerations.--a. The tra~isl~ortation of troops
and supplies becomes of increasing importance as t he ground forces
in a small mars campaign work inland, sway from the navigable
vaters and railroads usually found i n the coastal regions of tropical
countries. Roads for wheeled transport ere apt to be poor or non-
existent, anti dependence for bupply of certaiir u ~ ~ i t s may have to be
placed on slow animal transport. As distances from the base of
operations increase, this forni of supply tends to break down, especi-
ally during rainy seasons, and the most advanced ~f t he ground forces
may be partially or altogether dependent upon air transport f or
months a t a time. The ai r force, then, should include a much greater
percentage <oftransport aircrnft than is required for the normal needs
of the ai r units tl~emselves.
b. Ai r transportation is justified only d e n more economical forms
of transport will not serve; it should he considered only as an emer-
gency supplement for land transportation, and its use rigidly coil-
trolled by Force Headquarters. Factors which may influence t he
decision t o use air transport are: unfavorable condition of roads and
trail.;; long distances through l~ostile territory necessitating the pro-
vision of strong escorts for land transport; and emergency situations
requiring immediate action. When air transport is planned, the ai r
force will usually establish regular schedules for transport airplanes.
Force Headquarters will arrange for routine and priority listing of
supplies and replacements t o he forwarded to outlying stations.
Routine evacuation of the sick and wouniled i s accomplished on t he
return trips, and only occasionally should the necessity for emer-
gency flights arise. The air force should generally have priority i n
the use of air transport for its own requirements. Where small ai r
units ar e maintained and operated on outlying auxiliary fields, t he
SWM 9-33
AIR TnAXSPORT
pmblem of supplying fuel! anim~u~itior~, b<)mbs, and other sopplies
becomes n col~siderable task.
S33. Troop transportation.-n. Possibilities for the transporta-
tion of troops in airplanes are limited only by tlie nunrber of trnnsl~ort.
aircraft available and the 'xiste,i~ce of soitable landing firllls. I n
small wars ol>erations, the ability to cotlcentrate forces q~iickly in any
part. of the theater, through t he medinrn of air transport, inay mate-
rially influence t l ~e planning of the campaign, and offers a solution
t o the grave difficulties of moving forces through a country devoid of
cornn~ur~ication facilities. Sinall forces, not to exceed a battalion,
can be trans1)orted and supplied by air everyvhere within the oper-
ating radius of the aircraft, l>rovidecl landing ft~cilities ar e available.
The utility squadron of eight tr;ui.il,orts \\.ill carry apl~roximately one
rifle company per trip, includii~g combat equipment. While these
figores indicate the maximum troop movement ~rossible with the
amoont of air transport normally providecl, they by no means imply
that movemerlts on a larger scale are impractical. I n t he typical
campaign of this nature, t he moreillent of a force larger dhan a
conipany will be exceptional.
b. Troop cornrr~airders of units ordered t o xilove by air should be
advised in advance of tlie weight limitations per man, i n order that
excess equipment may be stored before embarkation. Moronrent
orders should be specific as t o time of arrival on the airdrome; details
of loading will be supervised by a representative. of the air operations
officer, who will be guided, insofar as possible, by the principle of
tactical unity in the assignnlent of troop spaces. On outlying air-
clromes, the senior aviator present is charged with these details and
is responsible t hat safety limitations are observed. While in fligbt.,
t he regularly assigned pilot of the aircraft exercises command analo-
gous to that of the commander of a surface vessel on which troops
ar e embarked.
c. A general policy classifying persons and articles considered eli-
gible for air transport, with priority ratings, should be adopted and
published by Force Headquarters. Pernlits for air travel should be
issued by Force and Area Commanders, and passages coordiriated
with scheduled or emergency movements of transport airplanes.
Requests for special airplanes should be rigidly controlled by Force
and Area Commanders.
M 4 . Transportation of suppliea-u. Gen~rnlly spaki ng, the
t ransport ~~t i o~l only for 1 , 1 1 1 ~ of bulky supplies by air is eco~~omic:~l
haul$ in regio~ls of poor couin~o~~ication. Qrtestio~is of tactical expe-
SWM 9 3 5
AIR TRANSPORT
diency will often outrreigl~ tllose of economy, l~omer~er, ancl ~rhere :iir
transport is availtible it will norrnally be used to capacity.
b. I n order to handle properly the inany calls for ai r tr:a,iislnrtn-
tion of supplies, regulate priority, and expeclite the more nrge~tt.
phipments, a special s11ipl)ing office, under the control of t11o :tir com-
~nand'r, sl~ould h,maintained at the b a s airdrome. This agency
acts as n regulating depot between the rear ec.l~elon and t,he nnits in
llle field. I't receives and prepares shipments, loads nncl unloads tile
airplanes, and arranges for the storage and del i ~er y of iiicolni~lg
rhiprnerrts. ildequate storiige : u~d transportation facilities slioulrl be
made avitilable. Shipping :ige~mics s l ~<~ul d also be providetl at the
more important nuxiliitry :~irdromes if tlte volunie of supplies appettrs
to warrant sucl~ installations. Personnel for these regul:rt,ing sta-
tions is supplied by tlre Force Qnartermt~ster, as requested by the
aviation supply officer who is respo~~sible for the preparation and
loading of all air slripmeuts. Tllc air operations officer is kept in-
formed a t all times regnrdiiig amounts and priorities of sl~ipments,
:ind mill issue the necessary ii~structiorrs for the :~ctual loading of tlie
:tirplnnes.
9-35. Dropping of supplies.-a. Supplies transported by air may
be delivered by landing, or !q droppi~lg from the airplane while i n
Bigllt. at. low altitnde. To nroid 1111dne loss by breakage, nrticles to
be dropped must have special packi~ig. Skilled pr s o~mel can ~ r m p
iilmost any t~rticle so tluit i L will not be injured by contact wit11 the
-.
nround after being dropped. Explosives, detonators, liquid medi-
clnes, etc., may be swathed in cotton and excelsior and dropped safely;
matter ill half-filled canteens may be dropped from low- altitades wit11
no protection other t l ~an t l ~ e canvas cover; dry beans, rice, sugar, anil
similar supplies ntay be dropped by enclosing a half-filled sack in t~
lnrger one. The gorerr~iilg principle i n packing is t o arrange for
cushioning the impact and for expansion within t l ~ e container.
Machine guns a ~ ~ d similar eqrtipment should be disitssen~bled prior
to packing for rtir drops, although in emergency such loads could be
dropped intact by using parachutes. I11short, it is possible. to drop
safely any article of supply provided i t is properly packed.
6.The dropping ground should have a clear space a t least 100 yards
in diameter, wit11 no obstr~x(:tions \vhicli would preverit the airplane
from approacl~ing at lo\v altit,ude and minimum speed. An identi-
fication panel sho~ild mark the center ofthe ares. Men and animals
must be kept clear, or casualties will occur from Inen being struck
by heavy falling articles.
23
SWM 9-36
A I R TRBXSPOIIT
c. Emergency supplies of medicines, food, small arlns ammtmition,
clothing, money, and mail ar e usually transported to detached units
i n the field by the daily air patrols. The observers stow the arti-
cles in their cockpits and drop them T~lierr contnct. is established. The
standard scouting airplane will safely I~andl c run overload equivalent
t o the weight of an extra man, provided room cnn be fonrid for stow-
age near the center of gravity of the plane. U111ess a larrdi~lgcall
be macle, however, the load is limited to hat the observer cnn stow
i n his cockpit.
9-36, Evacuation of sick and wounded.-The ovncnatio~iby uir
of the sick and wounded personnel reduces the percentage of per-
manent casualties, relieves the units in the field of responsibility for
their care, and enhances the momle of troops engaged iri pntrolling
or garrisoning remote are,as. Air anibu~lance service should llarc
priority over all utility r~~issions, and shoul~l he second only to nr-
gent tactical requirements. The riornral flow of sick and slightly
T~ounded persotnlel are handled on the return trips of regularly
scheduled transports, or by smaller airplanes from the more renrote
districts where no transport fields exist. When i t is known in ud-
vance that casualties are to be evacuated, a medical attendant shoulcl
aewmpany the transport or ambulance plane on its outbound trip in
order that medical escort will not have to be provided by the nnit in
the field. Emergency cases mill be handled by the senior aviator
present without waiting for formal authority for the flight. Stretcher
cases can be moved only b y tmnsport or ambulance planes; the
pt i ent must be able tosit up if evacuation is to be effected from a
small field by a two-seater scout..
0