THE

I L l
R E B E L L I O N
.
L I NDA BENSON
THE
I L l
R E B E L L I O N
~
An Em! Gate Book
M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Armonk, New York
London, England
THE MOSL EM CHA L L ENGE
TO CHI NESE A UTHORI TY
I N XI NJ I A NG
1944-1949
I
H- Y LI B
(Wj
O{,c801/1
tWlY A A D-Y I /iCH111; UBI U.I h
HARYMO UNIVEIlS1TY
2 DIVINITY AVENUe
DS
793
.S 62
B37
1990
YJ Nm
SEP 281990
-lC; 2%,1. 7~
A n East Gate Book
Copyright 1990by M.E.Sharpe, I nc.
A ll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form without written permission from thepublisher, M.E.Sharpe, I nc.,
80 Business Park Drive, A rmonk, New Y ork 10504
A vailable in the United Kingdom and Europe from M.E.Sharpe,
Publishers, 3 Henrietta Street.L ondon WClE 8L U.
L ibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Benson, L inda K.
The llirebellion: the Moslem challenge to Chinese authority in
Xinjiang, 1944-1949/ by L inda K. Benson.
p. ern.
I ncludes bibliographical references.
I SBN 0-87332-509_5
1.Sinkiang Uighur A utonomous Region (China)-History
2.Sinkiang Uighur A utonomous Region (China)-Ethnic Relations.
3.I -I i Ha-sa-k'o tzu chih chou (China)-HislOry 4.I -li Ha-sa-k'o tzu
chili chou {China)-Ethnic relations. 5.China-Ethnic relations.
1 Title.
D8793.562B37 1989
951 .6--dc20 89-37237
ClP
Printed in the United States of A merica
@
ED 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
CONlENTS
Preface
vii
Tables
xix
A bbreviations and Measurements
xxi
Maps
xxiii
I
I ntroduction
3
2
National Minority Policy in Republican China
10
3
Geographical and Historical Background
to the Rebellion
19
4
The Establishment of the East Turkestan Republic
42
5
Xinjiang's 1946Coalition Government
67
6
The Xinjiang Coalition, J anuary to J uly 1947
104
7
Xinjiang A fter the Collapse of the Coalition,
1947- 1949
130
8
Conclusion
177
I
I
u
Appendices
A The Peace Agreement of January 2, 1946
B Government Pol itical Program
C Chinese Transl iteration of Turkic Names
D L ist of I nterviews
E "WhyAre We Fighting?"
F "Struggl efor the Motherl and"
Notes
Gl ossary
Sel ected Bibl iography
I ndex
185
188
193
199
200
200
209
235
243
259
PREFACE
I n November 1944, in a remote part of northwestern China, agroup of
Turkic Moslems and White Russians rose against the Chinese government
and established an independent I slamic state.Their ultimate goal was to
oust the Han Chinese from the whole of what they referred to as East
Turkestan, the Chinese province of Xinjiang.
The formation of a new republic is likely to be a matter of international
interest, but the newEast Turkestan Republic, remote asit was, receivedal-
most no attention at the time of its formation; up to the present day no
detailed accountnt I ts.existence has been published.in.EngI iSh. When I first
read of this small state in the middle of the Eurasian continent and dis-
covered that it had existed for six years before it was swallowed by the more
powerful revolutionary forces of the Chinese Communist Party, I became in-
trigued by this fascinating subject and the many questions-indeed, mys-
teries-that surrounded it.
Who were these rebels, and what was the motivation behind their "Three
Districts Revolution"? Were they the agents of the Soviet Union, as most
available sources suggested? Or were they Turki patriots, fulfilling the old
dreamof an independent Turkestan? A nd what was the fate of the leader-
shipin 1949?
A search through libraries revealed that there was little information on
Xinjiangasawhole for this period.and detailed accounts of the region's his-
torywereDot to be found outside afewspecialized libraries.Part of the rea-
son for this appeared to bethat Xinjiang isphysicallyremote fromthe cen-
ters of civilization in Europe and A sia-a geographic fact that makes the
region oneof theworld's most mysterious and romantic.Xinjiang lieswithin
Ch~p_an..of.jt, fouhe peoples and history of this region
are more closely related to those of Central A sia, of which it is anatural ex.
-
I
----------
viii PREFACE
tension both culturally and geographically. Deserts cover much of its ter~i.
tory, and the remainder boasts high mountains with lush past~reland I~
their foothills suitable for animal herds but not for traditional Chinese agn-
culture. Thus: despite the fact that Xinjiang formally became a p~ovi?ce ~f
China in 1884 it attracted few Chinese settlers. Those who did amve Inthis
land "beyond 'thejade gate" were mainly soldiers sent to man the garrisons
and through whom the Chinese continued their hold on the region; a small-
er number were government officials and traders, hoping to acquire some of
Xinjiang's fabled riches.I n the 1940s the majority of the population was the
same as it had been for centuries-Moslem Turks. The largest group, Ecople
l~ k~own~I Ijgh~ in the region's oases while smaller, more I ra-
ditiona peoples like the Ka:laksrollowed their herds in the region's rich
pasture lands.
L ike a true crossroads of great cultures, Xinjiang's history offers muc~of
interest. The region has been scarred by past waves of invasion, rebelh~n,
and Short-lived independent states, seeking to control the lucrative Silk
Road which once directly linked the area to both China and the Middle
East.Even in more modern eras, only the most intrepid of explorers-and
the inevitable Chinese government officials-reached Xinjiang, a situation
that has only recently begun to change.
Xinjiang offers much to interest scholars in many disciplines, but little
work has actually been done.The reasons are only partly due to its extreme
geographic isolation. There are also linguistic barriers. The greatest amount
of information available is in Chinese, alanguage that takes time to learn to
use.Other relevant materials are inTurkish and Russian, of which the same
is true.A nother major difficulty lies in locating the SOurce materials. They
are scattered and difficult to find; moreover, When located, they are difficult
(0 obtain access to, due to the politically sensitive nature of this area. I n
other cases materials are available, but they remain unclassified and un-
registered, so that COnsulting them is time-consuming and somewhat hap-
hazard. When material is found, it is SOmetimes in forms difficult to read,
due to the aging of a poor-quality medium, or damage. The reason why
many works on Xinjiang have relied On existing English language sources
becomes obvious.
Y et the questions about Xinjiang and the East Turkestan Republic
remained, and as I became more involved in the search for information
these questions quickly were joined by new ones. For example, it was often
hard to make out J UStwho the people inVOlVedwere, Where they came from,
and what they did.I rene of them was met only through anon-Turkic source,
then his very name stayed in doubt. If be was met in several sources in dif-
ferent languages, then it had to be established Whether he WlL '> one or several
persons. (I hope I have avoided the POSSiblepitfalls; I have COmeacross one
secondary work where the existence of two versions of one name has led the
PREFACE tt
author to believe two people areinquestion.Hedeservessympathy)
Themore Iinquired, the moreinvolvedIbecameintryingro untangle the
events and answer some of the questions about this mysterious republic of
Uighurs, Kazaks, and Russians.Thisstudy isthe result.It isaninvestigation
of Chinese government policy inXinjiang between 1944 and 1949 asseen in
the Chinese response to the IIi Rebellion and the establishment of the East
Turkestan Republic. It is based on sources drawn from many repositories
and collections. It is not an exhaustive work-no study of Xinjiang can be
when major sources are incomplete and records not available.But it does
manage to move beyond currently available sources on the period and so
contribute to our understanding of what occurred in this region during the
period inquestion.
Before beginning the story, it is necessary to ask the reader's indulgence
and present a certain amount of introductory material.The following lin-
guistic note explains the choices of formand of romanization for terms from
the various languages, so that the reader is prepared for the "new" form
some proper names assume. The next section offers adescription of the
sources used and abrief discussion of the problemof political bias, whichaf-
fects almost everysource used.
The text itself begins with ageneral introduction to this research, outlin-
ingiL Sscopeand purpose, as well as establishing the historic and theoretical
context.Chapter 2introduces the general field of Republican China's na-
tional minority policy; chapter 3offers geographic and historic background
to Xinjiang.Together, these chapters provide the necessary background for
an understanding of the IIi rebellion and the Chinese government's
response.
L inguistic Note
Xinjiang lies geographically within Central A sia.A saresult, materials con-
cerning iL Shistory are to be found primarily in three languages-Chinese,
Turkish, and Russian. Problems occur in rendering all of these languages
into English and in translating between them, especially in the case of
names.The followingdiscussion on forms of romanization used inthisstudy
indicates the extent of someof theseproblems.
There are currently several methods of romanizing Chinese, the most te-
cent of these being thesystemcalled "pinyin" developed in the People's Re-
public of China.A s this formis the simplest and easiest formof romaniza-
tion currently in popular use, it is the formused in this study.However.
certain names that have awell-established and generally accepted English
form, such as Chiang Kat-shek and Sun Y at-sen, havebeen used as such in
the text.A ll Chinese names are listed in pinyin, Chinese characters, and the
Wade-Giles systemintheglossary.
-
x PREFACE
The form of romanization of the Turkic languages used is modern Turk-
ish, which, with one modification, has been adopted for sev~ral reaso~s.
First, Xinjiang's Turklc languages form one branch of Turkish, to which
they are closely related. Variations among the Turkic languages are small so
that speakers can generally understand each other whether they were born
inTurkey or northwestern China.
The Turkish "c" is pronounced as an English "[," I n this study the "j"has
been used to replace the usual "c"so that names are more readily fe.cog-
nizable-e.g., A hmer J an instead of A hmer Can.With only afew excepnons,
such as the "c"and the "g"(which is silent), the vowels and consonants a~e
pronounced as in English. A pronunciation guide to the Turkish alphabet I S
given in appendix C.
Second, although the People's Republic of China (PRC) has developed a
romanized formfor Uighur and Kazak based on the pinyin system, it bas
created newwritten symbols that make recognition and pronunciation of
words and names by English speakers difficult.Furthermore, dictionaries
for the pinyinformof Uighur are of limited vocabulary and do not include
proper nouns and names, so that there is no authoritative guide to thewrit-
ingof names and titles-an important consideration in this work since the
names of Turklc individuals have often been a cause of confusion to re-
searchers and readers alike.The useof Turkish to systemize transcription
helps to clarify the identity and proper titles of imponant figures in Xin-
jiang's modern history.
A funher impetus to the use of Turkish is the fact that there are now
manyworks availablein the Turkish languageconcerning Xinjiang, written
in most cases bypersons--or their direct relativeS--Who were involved in
Xinjiang's modern history.The names in these books are in their Turkish
forms and are far more complete than the names of Turkic individuals in
Chineselanguageaccounts, Whichare oftenabbreviated to the point of con-
fusion; for instance, "A isha" is COmmonlyused to refer to Mr.I saY usuf
A lptekin.Theuseof themodemTurkish formisclearlymoreaccurate.Fur.
rher discussionof theChinesetransliteration ofTurkic names is inappendix
C, which includes a list of Xinjiang Turki people's names, along with their
Chinese forms in characters and inpinyin, aswell as their common English
renderings, manyof whichreflect their origins inChineseSOurces.
There are, however, some exceptions to the use of modem Turkish for
Xinjiang placenames.Bea1usethe region ismultiethnic, manyof the towns
andcitiesaswell asgeographic features bear several names.A goad example
is thecity that the Chinese call "Tacheng" on theSinO-5oviet border.Inad-
dition to itsChinese name, it also appears onSOmemapsas"Chugacbak'' or
"Ooqek," This is the town's Mongolian name.Because the area is also the
homeof Manchu troops sent out to man theborder under theQing Empire,
it has also been called "Tarbagatai," the namegivento this outpost of the
PREFACE xi
Manchu Empire by the Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century.How-
ever, Xinjiang's Kazaks call the same town "Savan." This example can be
easilymatched elsewhere in theprovince.The question of what to call acity,
or a mountain, or a river, has consequently been something of a problem.
The PRC has clearly had its own troubles decidingwhether to use the local
language name-and if so, which local language name-or the Chinese
form.They have compromised, so that today the regional capital is called
"Urumqi," the old Uighur name for the city, whereas the Chinese name
"Tacheng" has been retained for the town on the Sino-Soviet border.
Chinese names have been given to "Y ining" (formerly Kulja), "Kashi"
(Kashgar), and "Shache" (yarkand), while local names are retained for
"A ksu" and "Emin." This practice is a clear recognition of the problems of
nomenclature in Xinjiang.
I n most cases, names in this work followcurrent Chinese practice.I n in-
stances, however, where the currently used name isnot easily recognized as
the name of a city that also has a generally accepted English formof its
name, thelatter isused, aswithKashgar and Y arkand.
The romanization of Russian names has also been problematical: some
occur only in Chinese or Turkish sources that do not include the original
Russian.Moreover, in the instances whereEnglish sources refer to Russians
in Xinjiang, the forms used do not appear to conform to any particular sys-
tem.As a result, Russian names are not given in strict keeping with any
standardized form, although the names of authors follow the standard U-
brary of Congress form.
Sources
I n general, the history of the independence movements among national
minorities inChinaduring the twentieth century has receivedlittle attention
from scholars of contemporary Chinese history. One reason for this has
been the difficulty in locating primary sources, a problem that has also
plagued other areas of research for the Republican era but whichis particu-
larlytrue of events intheborder areas.
I n recent years, however, two factors have made previously unavailable
materials accessible.One isthat the political climate has changed sufficient-
ly in various countries to enable foreign scholars to use formerly in-
accessible records and documents related to this area.The second factor is
that the thirty-year period for which many Western governments' files
remain closed has nowpassed for the events of the 1940-1950 decade.Thus
relevant materials in the United States and Great Britain are DOW available
for examination.A s a result, it bas been possible to explore more rullythe
manyquestions related to minority issues insuch border areas asXinjiang.
The existence of national repositories likethe U.S.National A rchivesand
xii PREFACE
theBritish Public Record Officegivesthe neophyte falseillusions about the
location of sources.Not all countries are so fortunate. I n the caseof China,
materials in theNational L ibrary in Beijingare not alwaysavailable for con.
suttatlon, and there are fewopen depositories of official documents. ~e
National L ibrary has organized a group-to collect materials related to Xln-
jiang and I slam in China, but what it will produce is still conjec!ur.e.I n
Taiwan, many moresources are available but in various places and I Dvary.
ingdegrees.I t is to be hoped that in the future more materials from these
two placeswill beavailableto interested scholars. .
The major SOurcesfor the present study include both newly accessible
materials and previously available but unexplored materials in Chinese,
English, Turkish, and Russian.Of basic importance are the official Xinjiang
Provincial Government records and the local Xinjiang newspapers of the
period.Certain records of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (of the Re~
publican period) are available at the National History I nstitute (Gu~hl
Guan) in Xindian, Taibei, Taiwan.Other repositories of relevant materials
in Taibei are the A rchives of the Guomindang Party History Commission
(Dangshi Hui) at Y angming Shan, and the Bureau of I nvestigation (Diao
ChaJ u] at Xindian.A ccess to these materials remains on a formal basis;
usuallyonecanonlyseethosedocuments that one specifically requests, and
as some documents remain unclassified, finding relevant materials can be
problematic.A fter spending aconsiderable amount of time in Taibei, how.
ever, and havinghad the good fortune to elicit the sympathetic interest of
officialsaswell asof local scholars interested in Chinaborder arearesearch,
I wasableto seemanyitems fromtheseTaiwancollections.
One of the important holdings of the Guomindang A rchives is the Xin-
jiang Daily in itsoriginal form.A s this newspaper was the official organ for
the Nationalist government in the region, it offers an excellent viewof the
Nationalist interpretation of local events as they happened. Unfortunately,
neither the Guomindang A rchives nor any other institution holds a com.
ptete run of this paper.A s aresujr, it has been necessary to collect runs of
the paper held in the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and
Taiwan.Between the microfilmsof the L ibrary of Congress in Washington,
D.C., and the National L ibrary of China in Beijing, as well as the Taiwan
COllection,I haveseen agreat deal of theXinjiang Daily covering the years
1944--1949,but acomplete run of the paper does not now appear to exist,
evenusingthesevarious repositories.It should also be noted that the China
microfilmsweremade frompoor originals (as can bereadily seen from the
fragilecondition of the issues available inTaiwan).On occasion, therefore,
the notation "unclear'" is entered for SOmenames and data--indicating an
especiallyfadedor torn original.
..I n~ddition to theXinjiang Daily, other important newspapers fromXin-
pang I nclude two published in the East Turkestan Republic between 1946
1---------------
PREFACE xiii
and 1949.These are the Minzhu baa (Democratic daily) published in
Chinese in Y ining, and a few issues of Minsheng bao (People's livelihood
daily). also published in Chinese, in Tacheng. Some issues of these papers
are held at the L ibrary of the Hoover I nstitution on War, Revolution and
Peace at Stanford. A lthough the collection is fragmentary, most of it dating
only from the year 1947, the available issues make a fascinating addition to
sources on Xinjiang during this period.
I ssues of important Chinese periodicals on Xinjiang are also held at the
Hoover, including Aertai (A ltai), Hanhai chao (Desert tide), and Tianshan
huabao (Tianshan pictorial). These offer some of the most nationalistic of
the Turki writings of the period. (The British L ibrary in L ondon also holds
good originals or the latter.)
No less important than the Chinese sources mentioned above are the files
of the Public Record Office (PRO) and the I ndia Office Records (lOR) in
L ondon. The information derived from the careful, detailed reports of the
British consular officials who served in Urumqi and Kashgar is I ndispen-
sable to an understanding of the period and its complexities. These British
materials are among the most accessible and complete of all foreign govern.
ment records for Republican Xinjiang.
A lso interesting and important are materials in the National A rchives of
the United States. A series of reports by the U.S.Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) and by U.S.consular officials in Urumqi complement the British and
Chinese sources. A portion of the U.S.consular reports are contained in the
series "Foreign Relations of the United States; The Far East" (FRUS),
which includes both Xinjiang consular reports and other correspondence re-:
tared to the situation in Xinjiang during the 19405.
A nother important cache of materials exists in the Soviet Union. A l-
though direct access to these holdings is not possible, there is indirect
knowledge of Soviet runs of East Turkestan newspapers, for instance, in the
dissertations of Kutlukov and Mingulov. I n particular, the studies by Kut-
lukov frequently citeA zad Sharki Turkestan (Free East Turkestan), so that it
is possible to ascertain the contents of many of that papers issues. The
heavy reliance on Marxist interpretation, however, occasionally intrudes to
detract from otherwise interesting work that has useful comments to offer
on the driving force behind the rebellion and on several key events during
the period in question. There is also in his work a tendency to take at face
value and without critical comment any information published in the East
Turkestan newspapers, but this nonetheless adds to our knowledge of the
East Turkestani press.
Together, these materials, in Chinese, English, and Russian, present a fas-
cinating picture of the political maneuvering and conflict in Xinjiang among
the Chinese, the native Xinjiang population, and foreign powers, all of
whom pursued their own goals in this strategic region after World War I I .
-I
xiv PREFACE
Collections of secondary printed sources dealing with Central A sia used
in this research include the Owen L attimore Collection held at the Brother.
ton L ibrary, University of L eeds, England. This consists of L attimore's own
extensive collection of books and pamphlets on Central A sia, including a
wealth of titles on such wide-ranging topics as geography, ethnography, and
politics.In L ondon, other interesting collections are held at the British L i-
brary, the Central A sian Research Centre, and the University of L ondon's
School of Oriental and A frican Studies.A ll of these have holdings in both
Chinese and English.
Collections of books in Chinese that provided general background for this
research include those in the libraries of National Zhengzhi University in
Taibei, the library of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (Taiwan), the
University of Hong Kong library, and the holdings of the University Services
Centre in Kowloon, Hong Kong.
In addition to the above sources, yet another language, Turkish, offers
materials on Xinjiang's modem history. A fter 1949, many Kazak and Uighur
refugees from Xinjiang made their way to Turkey, where the govern-
ment-and the closeness of traditions and language-made them welcome.
A lthough many were not welt-educated people, the tradition of oral records
among the Kazaks, especially, has meant that accounts of their histories
have been kept alive in the traditional way.Today, books based on this oral
tradition have been published, many of them dealing with events inXinjiang
between 1944 and 1949; their origin in traditional style accounts for the
scarcity of dates and, certainly, for the heroic style in which most are written.
Many also reflect the bitter intervening years of refugee life in a foreign
country, but nonetheless, used with caution and restraint, they also con-
stitute a valuable SOurceof information, especially on the current Kazak in-
terpretation of the 1944-1949 period.
Where possible, I followed up the use of these primary and secondary
printed SOurces with interviews. By far the largest group of interviewees are
former residents of Xinjiang, many of them national minorities from the Iii
valley area. A mong those interviewed are people of Uighur, Kazak, Sibo,
HUi, White Russian, and Han Chinese nationalities. The list (given in ap-
pendix D) also inclUdes both British and A merican nationals who were in
Xinjiang during the period in question in official and unofficial capacities.
Besides often being a pleasant and extremely stimulating experience, in-
terviews also served several important functions. First, they often cor-
roborated existing accounts; they also resulted in the addition of further
details ~o these accounts, part~cularly with regard to personalities active in
the region at the time. I nteI Vlcws also furthered my understanding of the
role played by rumor in a region where communication was notoriously
~r and a general lack of education among the popUlation made them es-
pecially susceptible to the forces of rumor.
! pi' - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PREFACE xv
A fternoon talks held with Xinjiang Kazaks over bowls of hot salted tea
offered a vital sense of the limes in which these events took place. The in-
security, the doubt of official versions of the news, the fear that marked
everyday life for many people in Xinjiang, and the complexity of the rela-
tionships between nationalities were clearly conveyed during memorable in-
terviews withfonner Xinjiang residents.
Most of these interviews took place over a period of time, although some
individuals could only be interviewed once or twice due to extenuating cir-
cumstances.A s most of these people were trying to recall events that oc-
curred some forty years ago, specific dates and sometimes details were
missed, and often, depending on when and where the individual was living in
Xinjiang, their individual accounts of the period were incomplete. The edu-
cational level and political bias of individuals were also factors that had to
be taken into account when assessing a particular individual's contribution.
But much information could be checked, at least partially, against existing
accounts. Generally speaking, the interviews with members of the national
minority peoples to a large extent reflected the records of "professional" ob-
servers such as the British and A merican representatives in Xinjiang; in
many cases interviewees were able to fill in certain gaps in existing accounts
with information that appears both reasonable and accurate. I n cases where
the accounts of interviewees are uncorroborated, however, this is indicated
in the text or footnotes. I n instances where important individuals have not
been available for interview, autobiographies have had to substitute. Fortu-
nately for this study, several important individuals have been able to record
their memoirs, including Burhan Shahidi, Isa Y usuf A 1ptekin, and Mehmet
Emin Bugca (now deceased).
A lthough today much material and many individuals are available for
consultation, it must be pointed out that virtually all are influenced to some
degree by their political views, which reflect in turn their national origin.
This bias can most easily be seen in the fact that some printed sources, for
instance, choose to omit information on entire incidents or series of events
if the events tend to reflect negatively on the author's country or govern-
ment. A t several points in the following pages, there is discussion on the
conflict of opinions among sources or the deletion of materials in some ac-
counts. This type of discussion has been included primarily to show that,
first, the establishment of the actual course of events in Xinjiang during this
time is, in itself, a difficult task, and, second, that caution in using virtually
all the materials is a constant necessity, with sources being carefully cross-
checked against each other at each stage of consideration.
A nother problem is the patchy nature of much of the material. A s men-
tioned earlier with regard to the Xinjiang Daily, complete runs of some
newspapers do not exist, and the discovery of government documents is
sometimes no more than serendipity. This has made it necessary to extend
.M PREFACE
the search for relevant materials to institutions in various countries and in a
number of languages. The gaps in the historical account have thus bee:
n
reduced, and the interpretation of Xinjiang's modern history can once a~m
be brought out into what will hopefully be fruitful discussion in the coming
y~u. .. .
For much of its history, Xinjiang has been an isolated area; this snuanon
was just beginning to change When, in 1949, another kind of isolation began.
A fter Xinjiang's incorporation into the PRe, the region was, for some years,
closed to all but the most sympathetic of journalists. Today this situation
has changed in at least one respect. Parts of Xinjiang can now be visited with
relative ease, via train and air links with most major cities in China. Re-
search facilities in Xinjiang and throughout China are not, however, yet at a
point at which they can accommodate all interested foreign scholars. Even
when access is gained, many materials remain unclassified and uncollected;
persons in authority often seem unsure as to what exactly the holdings of the
nation's repositortes are. Nonetheless, the acquisition of valuable microfilm
from the National L ibrary of China in Beijing and books acquired in
Urumqi both contributed to this study.
While in Xinjiang, I was also able to observe for myself something of the
continuing difficulties between Han Chinese and Moslems in the palpable
tension visitors experience when traveling in the region. A personal visit
also conveys SOmething of the grim grandeur of the Gobi Desert, and the in-
credible logistic obstacle this presents to any Chinese government intent on
binding this vast territory to the Chinese state. A ltogether, there is today a
wealth of firsthand material on Xinjiang available to the researcher, albeit
only in COuntries that are literally at opposite ends of the earth. Used to-
gether, these materials now permit the presentation of a reasonably full
analysis of the twists and turns of Chinese Nationalist policy in Xinjiang and
its response to the formation of the East Turkestan Republic, A bove all,
this information points to the growth of nascent Turki nationalism in Xin-
jiang, rooted in the pervasive anti-Han Chinese sentiment that, more than
any other factor, marks Han Chinese-national minority relations during this
period.
I n writing and researching this book, I accumulated debts of the most un-
repayable kind, and I gratefully acknowledge those to whom I owe so much.
The COunsel of J ames Macdonald, Univeuity of L eeds, England, has been of
inestimable value; indeed, without his guidance and encouragement. this reo
search might never have come to fruition. I am grateful to the many friends
and colleagues I have had the pleasure of meeting during the course of my
work.L thank them all-s-in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Great Britain, Sweden, and
the UnI ted States, for kindnesses great and small. Special thanks are owed
to Makbule Wang Shull and her family for unfailing support during my
PREFACE xvii
yearsinTaiwan and for an enduring friendship.I narather different sense, I
amgrateful, too, to the people of Xinjiang to whomI owemuchfor serving
asasource of inspiration.Finally, I thank all the membersof myfamilywho,
despitethe miles that so often separated us, werenonetheless alwaysthere.
TABLES
22
23
26
30
70
74
79
79
81
92
138-39
1 Sino- Soviet Mineral Trade in 1938 and 1940
2 Soviet- Xinjiang Trade, 1942- 1949
3 L ocal Administration of Xinjiang under the Qing
4 Xinjiang Popul ation by National ity, 1945
5 Xinjiang Provincial Government Council , 1946
6 Appointed I nspectors- General , 1946
7 District- L evel El ection Supervisory Committees
8 County- L evel El ection Supervisory Committees
9 Xinjiang Province 1946 El ection Resul ts
10 Food Price I nfl ation, 1946- 1948
11 The Government of the East Turkestan R epubl ic
12 Comparison of Price I ncreases in Vining
and Urumqi,1941- 1947
13 Mesur Sabri' s Administration
14 Partial El ection Resul ts: District I nspectors-General, 1947
15 Xinjiang' s 1948 Del egates to the National Assembl y
148
157
161
162
A BBREVI A TI ONS A ND MEA SUREMENTS
A bbreviations
CCP Chinese Communist Party
Cn Chinese Central Government currency, Republican period
ElR East Turkestan Republic
GPP Government Political Program
MPR Mongolian People's Republic
PL A People'sL iberationArmy
PRe People'sRepublicof China
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
Xn Xinjiang dollars, Republican period
Measurements
charak
hectare
jtn
sheng
20 pounds
2.471 acres
2.205 pounds
31.6cubic inches, or approximately one pint
._-,
-'1"'---------- _
MAPs
Eurasia
Political Map of Xinjiang, 1940s
Xinjiang's Natural Resources
A rea of Xinjiang controlled by the
East Turkestan Republic, 1944-1950
xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
2
'~~-
,i
,
,
,r" ..1
r
\
l
" ~~
;-...-:
\, .)
, y
1..-./,........ ,,/
;
c
i
\
j .... - .....
,- .
, - '
r
........
i
, I
I I :
' ' :' 1' 0
L : ,;
-
---_I
I
I
I
!
(
',
,.
j
I
i
.....'
,
'-.~~~'\.
I
\,
0_._'-'
Il'-~-i
.... ... -V
J
"
L .__
=- - - - - - - - - - -
THE
I L l
R E B E L L I O N
-
------------.
CHA PTER 1
I ntroduction
In the early morning hours of November 7, 1944, Moslem Turks in China's
far northwestern province of Xinjiang attacked the Chinese garrison sta-
tioned in Y ining, the principal city of the IIivalley, near the Sino-Soviet bor-
der.Despite the fact that the Moslemrebels were, at the outset, vastly
outnumbered by the Chinese troops, they quickly gained effective control of
the city and within days had succeeded in forcing the Chinese into the coo-
fines of their main headquarters, the local airfield barracks, and a temple on
the outskirts of the tOWD. Secure in their expectation of ultimate victory, the
Moslemsdeclared the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic (ElR)
on November 12, 1944.This new Moslem state's declared objectives were to
establish freedom and democracy for the I slamic peoples of the Turks' an-
cient homeland, and to oust all Chinese from the whole of what they re-
ferred to asTurkestan, the Chineseprovinceof Xinjiang.
By 1945, the military forces of the ETR had successfully driven Chinese
troops fromall towns and border posts in the three northwestemmost dis-
tricts of the province.Their troops pushed as far east as the Manas River
andwerepoised for anadvancethat wouldhavetaken themto theverygates
of the provincial capital itself.Hurried diplomatic activity and a personal
appeal to the Moslems byChiang Kai-shek ledto negotiations between rep-
resentatives of the independent three districts and the Chinesecentral gov-
ernment, whichresulted in apeaceagreement, signedby both sides in 1946.
The course of this rebellion and succeeding events in this remote part of
the world have long been a subject of interest, but nearly all of what hap-
pened-especially the interrelation of political and ethnic forces-chas been
shrouded from view and described only in the briefest form.in reference
works of a general nature. Today there are newly available materials that
3
4 lNfRODUITION
provide information that makes it possible to elucidate the development of
Chinese policies in this strategic border area between 1944 and 1949 and so
assess acomplex and fascinating period in Xinjiang's modem history.
Such an assessment is the object of this study.Through an examination of
Chinese objectives and policy implementation during the existence of t!'e
ETR, it will be demonstrated that Chinese policies in Xinjian~served to ~_
crease local antipathy among Moslems toward the Han Chinese and, m-
advertently, to foster the nationalism nascent in Chinese Turkestan for
nearly a century. While aiming to bring about "unity among nationalities"
(minzu tuanjie) in Xinjiang, Chinese policy and implementation were in ~et
divisive, ultimately driving Han and Moslem farther apart and exacerbating
existing tensions in the region.
Further, despite clear evidence presented to the central government byits
own representatives in Xinjiang on the need for immediate and extensive
reform in provincial administration and in Chinese border policy in general,
such reform was never seriously undertaken. A n extensive program of politi-
cal, economic, and social reform was indeed adopted by the region's first
multiethnic coalition government in 1946, but a state of tension constantly
existed between this and the basic objective of the central government,
which was the restoration of the region as an integral part of China. With
this objective, Xinjiang was treated on different levels, one responding to
the nationalities problem, the other reasserting the status of the area as
basically that of a Chinese province. Despite recognition of the demands of
the region's multiethnic population, the core of Chinese policy continued to
be military and political domination by the Han Chinese minority.
The provisions of the Peace A greement of 1946-which might have led to
real reform on the locallevel-were never fully implemented. A major rea-
son for this was the interference in civil government by the local Chinese
military establishment in Xinjiang. They were assisted in foiling the attempt
at reform.by many Chinese bureaucrats who continued to wield the power of
great inertia; their resistance tochange and the constant lobbying of govern-
ment by local Han Chinese intent on maintaining the predominance of Han
Chinese in government posts slowed the effects of any reform. directiveS
issued by the coalition. The reforms begun under the coalition faltered by
early 1947, and with the removal of the coalition chairman, Zhang Zhi.
zhong, in May 1947, the reform movement ccdapsed.
A further aspect of Chinese policy-one that worked directly against
~ina's own interest in maintaining its position of supremacy in Xfn-
J iang-was the central government's chosen interpretation of the signif-
icance o~the "I I i I ndd~nl," as it iscalled in Chinese history. Even before the
full .details of ~e alf.alr were available, Chongqing decided that this was a
Soviet-backed msurgency movement, Despite later information to the con-
trary, which emphasized the need for immediate reform. to ensure lasting
lN1RODUCTJON 5
peace among the region's nationalities, the central government continued to
blame the incident on the USSR.Military reports emphasized the propin-
quity of the three districts and the Soviet Union, and Chinese officials,
anxious to absolve themselves of any blame or responsibility for the events
of 1944-1945, privately condemned the Soviet Union for its action.
There was undoubted tacit support from the USSR, but other factors ac-
count for the widespread attraction of the ETR movement. One was in-
creasing Moslem hostility toward all Han Chinese as a result of the excesses
of Sheng Shicai, under whose rapacious hand countless underground resis-
tance groups had formed, particularly in the northern, Kazak-dominated
part of the region. Such hostility, in tum, contributed to the upsurge in
Turki nationalism that made the ETR of 1944 initially a popularly supported
nationalistic movement, aimed at establishing an independent Turki
homeland.
The central government itself also contributed directly to the fostering of
Turki nationalism by its intransigence on the questions of autonomy and
self-determination in China's border areas. Representatives of Xinjiang in
the Chinese capital had long been lobbying the Nationalist government to
give Xinjiang Moslems consideration equal to that accorded the TI betan
and Mongolian minorities in China. But, with the formation of the indepen-
dent ErR, the Chinese attitude on this issue hardened. Chiang Kai-shek's
conviction that the Soviets were behind the ETR gave him.full justification
for repeated refusal to entertain any discussion of the possibility of
autonomy for Xinjiang or to accord it any special status beyond that of an
ordinary Chinese province. By not recognizing the political aspirations of
the proud and determined Turki population, the government even managed
to alienate the members of the Turki elite who had previously been pro-
Chinese.
The events in Xinjiang during this intriguing period of modem history did
not, of course, occur in a vacuum. The dramatic takeover of a Chinese gar-
rison town in remote Xinjiang in 1944, and succeeding events in the region,
form pan of an overall pattern of fragmentation within China that began
with the birth of the Chinese Republic in 1911.By the time Moslems were
establishing their own government inXinjiang in 1944, the Chinese Repub-
lic had been struggling against national disintegration continuously for over
thirty years.
CbaI lenges to central control came first from among the Chinese them-
selves, with warlords and political factions straining to pull parts of the 03
lion under their control. Between 1910 and 1928, in particular, the nation
was torn by factionalism. When Chiang Kai-shek emerged as bead of
government in 1928 he won recognition from many of the principal warlords
and political groups of China, but during the chaotic period that led to
World War I I , his government's control over much of China was tenuous,
6 INTRODUCTION
and in the country's borderlands, including Xinjiang, Nationalist Chinese
control was virtuallynonexistent.I nthese remote regions, warlords ruledin.
dependent of Outsidecontrol and, whilesomepaid nominal allegiance to the
Nationalist cause, men such as MaBufang in Qinghai province and Sheng
Shicai inXinjiangwereableto ruletheir respective provinces asprivate fief-
dams into the 1940s.
The J apanese invasion of northeastern China presented a more radical
challengeto central government authority. Chiang used this threat to rally
Chinesefactions in a common cause.It enabled him in the early 1940sto
unite dissident Chinese political factions and to launch a drive to reassert
Nationalist influence in many of the regions that had been formerly quasi-
independent.Chiangsuccessfullylured, cajoled, or forced militarist regimes
intheareas of Y unnan, Qinghai, and Sichuan back into the nationalist fold.
A major coup camein 1944when hewas able to remove the warlord Sheng
Shicai fromXinjiang and appoint his own man, Wu Zhongxin, as governor
of theprovince, thus endingadecadeof virtual independence of the region.
EvenastheNationalist government began to drawsegments of the nation
closer to the central government, in the Chinese borderlands the non-
Chineseinhabitants increased their own efforts at establishing or, in some
cases, maintaining their independent status vis-A-vis the Nationalist govern-
ment inChongqing. A mong such groups were the Turki peoples of the far
northwest who rose in rebellion in the Iiivalley before the new governor
couldCOnsolidateNationalist power inthe region.
Chiang viewed the problem in Xinjiang as similar to the situation else-
where in China where local warlords or factions challenged his authority.
Chiang's basic objective in Xinjiang was thus the same as in other areas of
opposition: to maintain the traditional borders of China and to prevent any
person or group fromestablishing regional power bases that could threaten
hisowngovernment.
The circumstances in Xinjiang, however, were in many ways quite unlike
conditions that prevailed in provinces populated by Han Chinese.These cir-
cumstancesmakethe I I i Rebellion" of particular importance to students of
history, geopolitical behavior, and international relations. First, there was
thegeographic reality of the situation. Xinjiang was (and, to alarge extent,
remains) a remote, rugged region of mountains and deserts, populated by
non-Chinese, thevast majority beingMOSlemsof Turkic origin who were, at
bes~reluctant citizens of the Chinese state.Even during the most peaceful
of umes, Chinese authorities had found it difficult to maintain control over
the.a.rea, and t~e increasingly beleaguered Chiang government was in.no
posmon to constder useof militazy force, the traditional means of enforcing
ChinesedOminanceinthisborder region.For this reason, anewdirection in
Chinese border policy had to be followed at least until the situation in
Chinaproper stabilized, ,
INTRODUCTION 7
Second, the three districts of the ElR were contiguous with the Soviet
Union, which had a J ong-srandfng interest not only in the three districts
themselves but also in the rest of the province. From the late nineteenth
century onward, the USSR had established itself as the province's foremost
trading partner, a status that was strengthened under the rule of Sheng
Shicai in the 1930s. Furthermore, it had stationed its own troops in Xin-
jiang asfar east as the town of Hami, ostensibly to prevent anyJ apanese at-
tempt to cut off theregion fromthe rest of thecountry.
Besides commercial and military involvement, it was also in the Soviet
Union's best interests to maintain acareful watchon thedevelopment of na-
tionalismand independence movements among Xinjiang's Moslempopula-
tion since such tendencies could influence the USSR's own Moslem
minorities. Clearly, the Soviet Union could not afford disinterest in Xin-
jiang's affairs.
Well aware of the Soviet position with regard to Xinjiang, the Chinese
government was developing and consolidating Sheng's belated attempt to
reverse Russian encroachment in the region when the ill rebellion took
place, with at least the acquiescence of the USSR; when the local Moslem
forces outmatched the substantial Chinese forces then stationed in the
region, the Chinese turned toward an international solution, seeking to use
diplomatic means to restore their control. The "IIi I ncident" tbus moved
beyond the sphere of purely domestic politics and became part of the com-
plex negotiations among the USSR, the United States, Britain, and China
during thesummer of 1945.
Third, the situation was a challenge to prevailing Guomindang ideology
on the subject of China's national minorities and the border regions.The
Guomindang emphasized thesanctity of the traditional Chinese borders and
the responsibility of Chinese leadership to preserve such borders intact for
future generations. Chiang himself wrote the Guomindang doctrine that
declared that all national minorities were, in fact, simply branches of the
greater Chinese race, varyingin culture and languageonly by virtue of their
relative isolation fromthe Chinese mainstream over a period of centuries
(see chapter 2).Being thus defined as Chinese, the diverse peoples of the
vast border regions had no historical or cultural justification for demands of
separation fromthe Chinese motherland.
The ErR was adirect challenge to this ideology aswell as to continued
Chinese control over the whole of Xinjiang province.I nmeeting thischal-
lenge, Chiang did not swerve from his primary objective of maintaining
direct Chinesecontrol over theborderlands, but hewas forcedto follownew
policiesof compromise and conciliation to end this IIicrisis.
Problems related to the minority peoples of China have usually been
considered as a part of China's domestic politics. This was a natural devel-
opment, in terms of academic study, since Chinese political and military
8 IN1RODUcnON
control periodically extended to the vast homelands of the peoples who are
today termed "national minorities" by the People's Republic of China. Fur-
ther, information on Chinese relations with national minorities was mainly
in the Chinese language, so that anthropologists and historians whose initial
interest had been China and Chinese culture began the modern studies of
minority affairs in China.
The key to interpreting the events of this century in the Chinese border-
lands, however, lies only partly within a Chinese framework. Because the
cultures, religions, languages, and histories of these peoples are the result of
historic development quite different from that of China and the Chinese, it
is more useful to place these peoples and their twenneth-century struggle
for independence in a different context.That is, first, to view their modem
history as emerging from circumstances and perceptions uniquely their own
and distinct from that of the Chinese, and second, to view their struggles
against Chinese domination not as "rebellion" against Chinese rule, but as
an attempt to win political and military control over what they themselves
viewed as their traditional homelands. I n other words, the peoples of the
Chinese borderlands were waging what are today referred to as national
I iberauon struggles, their aim being to set up independent states free of out-
side control. The framework for discussion thus moves beyond the realm of
Chinese domestic politics and into the volatile sphere of twentieth-century
nationalism.
Placing China's nationality question into this context means that the is-
sues and questions involved are seen not only as an aspect of Chinese
politics, of which they remain an integral pan, but also as an aspect of a
greater international phenomenon of the years after World War I -the rise
of nationalism among minority nationalities throughout the world. 'Ibis
basis for analysis is particularly useful for Xinjiang, whose peoples have
strong cultural and historic ties to three great cultural traditions: China,
Russia, and the Middle East.
Such an approach also serves to emphasize the [act that the upheaval in
Xinjlang in the 19405was similar to that of other colonial or "subject"
peoples who were contained within larger political entities; and whose unity
of purpose was supplied by unified Opposition to the states of which their
homelands constituted a part. The cohesion this opposition provided has
been aprindpal element in many national independence movements.
Parallels belWeen events in Chinese Central A sia and other areas on the
peripheries of the USSR and China also take on new significance viewed
from this Standpoint. Of particular interest for Xinjiang studies are the
movements in I ran and I raq durtng the same period, where Kurdish and
~rbaijan republics were established under Soviet tutelage. While com-
panson of the Soviet role in the various Moslem republics established on
the Soviet periphery during the 194& is beyond the scope of this work, (0.
INTRODUCTION 9
ture research maybebetter ableto describe the parallels anddifferencesbe-
tween events in Xinjiang and these regions as a result of the information
presented here.
Nationalist Chinese policy inXinjiang, the primary subject of the present
work, is also placed in an extended context for, in essence, Chiang Kat-
shek's government was facedwith the same problem that challenged many
governments after World War I I , namely, how to respond to the newly
awakened nationalism of ethnic minorities which increasingly threatened
the old national boundaries and the established international order from
Asia to Europe.The reaction of the Nationalists to thisproblemwas similar
to that of other governments which, havinginitially refusedto recognizethe
nature of these struggles, were forced bycircumstances to come to some
kindof agreement withthe newmilitant nationalists' demands.Thus, thein-
teraction between the Nationalist government in China and the "rebel"
government in northwestern Xinjiang in 1944is a part of the post-World
War I I pattern of breakdown in the old colonialist and imperialist system,
and the seemingly inexorable growth of national liberation struggles in the
twentieth century.
;")1 t.;:1.:l u' '\
CHAPTER 2
National Minority Policy
in Republican China
During the course of its long history, the Chinese state gradually expanded
into thevast and sparsely populated lands that surrounded it.aprocess that
followedtherhythmof theriseand fall of dynasties in itsmovements of con-
quest and retrenchment. Characteristically, this involved the Chinese state
in the need for military and diplomatic policies, the classic version of the
former being pacification and of the latter the exploitation of differences
amongthe peoples of the border territories, using the barbarians to oppose
the barbarians, in order to prevent the coalescence of forces that would
threaten theChinesestate.
While China had formally incorporated some borderlands such as
Mongoliaand Xinjiang into the Chinese state by the end of the nineteenth
century, theseregions continUedto challengeChinese effons at control.The
advent of the twentieth century and theChinese Revolution in 1911 did ~ot
endcenturies-old divisions; on thecontrary, insomeborder areas, the des~e
to be free of Chinese rule gained new impetus from the anti-imperia~t,
anti-colonialist winds that gathered force after the collapse of the Omg
court.
I nterms of Chinese attitUdes toward the border areas, the Revolution of
1911 meant little actual change in traditional Chinese policy.A lthough
Dr.Sun Y at-sen eventually adopted the Wilsonian call for selt-determlna-
non for ethnic mlnortnes in China as the basis for Guomindang policy, the
Successivecentral governments established after 1911 took no positivesteps
toward a formal national minority policy.Weak and facnonalized, during
Sun's lifetime the central government was barely able to maintain its own
often superficial hold on the reins of power.Thus warlords continued the
oldimperial styleof rule inmanyof theborder regions, employing both mil-
10
NATIONAL MlNORlIY POllCY 11
itary force and "divide and rule" tactics to maintain their positions of power.
I n Tibet and what was formerly called Outer Mongolia the local govern-
ments maintained virtual independence from the central government from
1914 onward. Tibet continued its guarded relations with the various Chinese
governments established after 1911, but the Chinese, who continued to
claim sovereignty, never exercised even a small degree of control in the re-
gion.t Mongolia, having eliminated most of its Han Chinese population at
the time of the Chinese Revolution, came under the protection of the Bel.
shevik government after 1917.From that time onward, Chinese control was
limited to brief periods of dominance in I nner Mongclla.e
With Chiang Kai-shek's assumption of Guomindang leadership on Sun's
death in 1925, the latter's program of autonomy and self-determination as
the basis of the Nationalists' national minority policy was dropped. Chiang's
primary objective with regard to the minority areas was to hold these terri-
tories as an integral, indivisible part of the Chinese state. A ll political action
in the borderlands was designed to serve this one paramount aim.
Sun Y et-sen's National Minority Policy
During the first decade of the Chinese Republic, while the problem of na-
tional unity dominated political affairs, relatively little attention was paid to
the national minority question. But under the influence of Wilsonian doc-
trine and Soviet advisers, Sun gradually turned his attention toward mfnori-
ty affairs. Writing on the subject in 191&, he called for the eventual "dying
out of all names of individual people inhabiting China.',3
A t that time five nationalities were recognized as being part of the Chi.
nese nation: Manchu, Mongol, Tatar, Tibetan, and Han. L acking detailed
information on the many ethnic groups living within China's borders but
aware of the need for unity within China if it was to survive as a modem
state, Sun advocated the "dying out" of names of nationalities so that China
could follow the example of Switzerland and more especially of the United
States, which, in his view, was a nation able to "satisfy the demands and re,
quirements of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political
whole.'04
On the basis of such statements Sun's early views on the question of eth-
nic minonues have been called assimilationist I n the sense that Sun hoped
for a united China where all national groups were integrated as part of the
state, he can perhaps be termed as such, but Sun's use of the United States
and SWitzerland as examples for China to emulate clearly shows that he
would have found a kind of cultural pluralism acceptable even in the early
1920s.A longer quotation from the same source makes this evident:
There are still many people suffering from unjust treatment; the Chinese
people must assumethe missionof settingfree these peopleCram their yoke, in
a
12 NA170NAL M/NOR/1Y POUCY
the sense of direct aid for them or uniting them under the banner of a single
Chinese nation. This would give them the opportunity to enjoy the feeling of
equality of man and man, and of a just international attitude, i.e., that which
was expressed in the declaration of the A merican President Wilson by the
words "self-determination." Up to the moment of reaching this political stage,
OUf work cannot be considered as finished. This is the meaning of national.
. .,
ism----but "positive" nationalism and to this we must give Special aueauon.
As Sun's thinking on the minority question evolved, he became com-
mitted to the idea of self-determination for China's ethnic minorities.In
J anuary 1923the Sun-J offe Manifesto was issued calling for autonomy and
self-determination, and the following year this call was made part of the
Guomindang's political platform adopted at the first National Congress in
A pril 1924. A rticle 4 of the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction drawn
up by the congress stated unequivocally that racial minorities in China were
to be helped and guided toward self-determination and self-government
should they so desire.6
The two basic principles that, theoretically at least, underlay Guomindang
policy with regard to national minorities were basic equality for all nation-
alities in China and the right of self-determination for those peoples who
chose the road of independence. As neither the party nor the central g~v-
emmenr was then in a position to act on such principles, however, no details
of how such a policy would be implemented were I ssued.
PolicyChanges Under Chiang Kai~shek
Major changes in the basis of minority policy began with the assumption of
COntrol over the Guomindang by Chiang Kai-shek, successor to Sun upon
the latter'S death in 1925.
Chiang's view of the minorities within China was that they were simply
one part of the greater Chinese race. A lthough centuries of relative isola-
tion had led to SOme distinctive differences in language and culture within
China's borders, Chiang COntended that all had originally been pan of the
ancient Chinese race.The ethnic minorities were not, in his view, minzu, but
rather they were zhongzu. The former leon can be translated as nationality,
but the latter means simply one branch of a single tribe.7
As all of China's peoples were of a single basic root, Chiang declared that
there could be no reasonable basis for granting any minority group the right
to seek self-determination or independence from the motherland. Rather,
Chiang foresaw a return to the original state of affairs in China inwhich all
peoples were assimilated into one single race.This would be assisted by an
assimilationist government policy that was almost totally unyielding inits ef-
forts toward enforced national unity.
Where Sun's views had been formed by Soviet advice and Wilsonian doc-
NATIONALMINORIlY POllCY 13
trine, Chiang viewed all the old imperial Chinese territories as permanent
and indivisible parts of China.The Provisional Constitution of the Political
Tutelage Period, promulgated in Nanjing in J une 1931, pointedly included
the defacto independent regions of Mongolia and Tibet as part of the ter-
ritory of the Republic of China, and the proposed Constitution of 1934, in
Part I , A rticle 4, listed all the provinces and the "areas" of Monlolia and
TI bet, adding that no alteration should be made in this territory. I n 1943
Chiang himself wrote, ''There is not asinglepieceof territory within these
areas ... whichcanbe tom awayor separated fromChina, and noneof them
canforman independent unit by itself.,,9
Chiang'sviewsdominated official policy, but theywereby no means unan-
imously supported by all his staff or all political factions.General Zhang
Zhizhong, who becamegovernor of Xinjiang, and others in the government
were cautious proponents of cultural pluralism, advocating the acceptance
of the various nationalities as semi-autonomous units with the right to
eventual self-determination and, in the interim, the right to control their
own cultural and local affairs.
One school of thought went as far asto advocateafederalist formof gov-
ernment as a possible solution to the continuing rebellions against Chinese
rulein the "frontier" areas.l'' A sOwenL attimore haspointed out, however,
only the Chinese Communist Party openly proposed afederalist type of gov-
ernment. Based on Soviet policy, in 1930the First A ll-China Congress of
Sovietsannounced that non-Chinese nationalities in Chinashould havethe
right to determine whether they wished to secede or remain within the
Chinese state.t 1 A lthough by 1945Mao Zedong no longer included seces-
sion as a right, hecontinued to advocate the right of national minorities to
self-determination.
Chiang Kai-shek's own seemingly intransigent viewson the question of
self-determination were modified only once after hisassumption of leader-
ship during the Republican era. I n A ugust 1945, when China's claims to
Outer Mongolia were the subject of international interest, Chiang referred
to Dr.Sun's earlier policies, his words reflecting Sun's self-determinist
views: "Our people should realize that if weignore the aspirations of these
racial groups for freedomand restrain their urgefor independence and self-
government, it will not only becontrary to thespirit of our National Revo-
lution, but will also tend to increase friction between the racial groups:'12
Henoted that in 1924Dr.Sun had graciously receivedrepresentatives from
Mongolia and had treated themas members of afriendly neighboring coun-
try.A nd, as if in anticipation of the result of the coming plebiscite in
Mongolia, Chiang advocated China's recognition of the region as an inde-
pendent state. A sfor ether minority groups, hestated: "Weshould honestly
aid all racial groups which have given evidence of their capacity for self-
government and haveshown aspirit of independence.Weshould help them
14 NA710NAL MINORITY POUey
achievenational independence through self-determination.v'f
The suggested procedure for the groups that wanted this independence
was to makeknown their desires "inafriendlyspirit and through legal chan-
nels" so that the government could then determine whether they "have the
capacity for self-government and a strong determination to attain inde-
pendenceand are politically and economically ready for both."14 The cen-
tral government then would voluntarily help them to realize their freedom
and would hold no ill will against them if they chose to leave their mother
country.
Theintent of thespeechwas clear: the Chinesegovernment would accept
the independence of Mongolia, but in any other instance it would be the
central government that would determine whether a minority group was
ready for self-government, not the peoples themselves.While parts of the
speechsounded conciliatory, the basic premise of Chiang's policy remained
unchanged.By reservingfor itself alone the final decision as to the legality
or practicalityof minority aspirations, thegovernment affirmed its sovereign
rights over territories that, even as Chiang spoke, were in open revolt
against hisgovernment onjust thisissue.
Thisparticular speech must havebeen heardwithconsiderable consterna-
tion in border areas where representatives of the local peoples had been
tryingsincethe 1930sto get Chiang to givethem ahearing on the question
of possible future autonomy. Contingents from I nner Mongolia, for in-
stance, had tried to meet with Chiang or his representatives since the early
1930sto present their casefor autonomy.Theyweremet with "scorn, insult,
ignorance, and lack of interest" in the words of one source close to such
Mongol nationalists.
I 5
I nNovember and December 1946, Uighur represen-
tativesspoketo reporters of the Central NewsA gency, restating their hopes
that autonomy for minority nationalities would be included in China's new
constitution, then under discussion throughout the country.The Uighur
representative A bmet J an Kasimi evencited Sun's earlier programs in sup-
pon for hisrequest.
16
His pleas wereechoed by representatives of the Miao
peopleof Southwest China.
Despite thesepublic and private pleas to Chiang for autonomy, or at least
the promise of future autonomy, for border areas such as I nner Mongolia
andXinjiang, and despite thestatements inthe 1945speech cited above, the
1947Constitution adopted by the government inclUdedlittle mention of mi-
nority peoples and listedvirtually no concession to national minority cultur-
al sensibilities.
This constitution, which went into effect on December 25, 1947, briefly
re(err~to the larger national minorities in Chapter 13, Section 6, which
dealt with "Frontier Regions." The two articles in this section accorded
legal protection to minOritiesin these regions to insure their "status" and
NATIONALMlNOlU1YPOllCY 15
further pledged to give special assistance to them in carrying out their 10-
cal "self-government work.,,17
Neither the term "status" nor "special assistance" is explained, and either
statement could easily mean greater-cnot less-a-central government inter-
ference in local affairs. The term "self-government" referred specifically to
the type of local government then envisaged for all of China, under which
the local governments were empowered to pass laws and measures govern-
ing local affairs as long as such laws did not infringe on the powers of the
constitution.
Other specific "self-governing" powers were outlined in chapters 10 and
11, the latter including special provisions to protect the Mongolian units of
local government caned "learues" and "banners" and to honor the self-
government system of Tibet.! There were no specific provisions by which
these governments were supposed to operate, however, and there was no
mention of any type of autonomy or eventual self-determination for these or
any other national minority groups in China.
Chiang's intransigence on the matter of self-determination reflected the
bitterness of China's recent past. Weak Chinese governments had been un-
able to maintain control over Tibet or Mongolia, and powerful neighbors
had evinced their eagerness to annex further Chinese territory from the time
of the Chinese Revolution onward. Chiang's determination that no further
lands be lost was, in the circumstances, an understandable, even admirable
goal. But beyond this goal of maintaining Chinese sovereignty in all tradi-
tional Chinese territory, policy goals in the borderlands were vague, and na-
tional minority policy was for the most part a response to circumstances
rather than a case of government initiative for positive action.
Policy I mplementation
As mentioned previously, during the early years of the Republic. the border
areas continued to fall under the domination of warlords or local provincial
elites. Sun Y et-sen's policies of equality and self-determination for ethnic
minorities could not be implemented. Nonetheless, some government mao
chinery was set up to deal with minority affairs. The old Court of Colonial
A ffairs {L ifan Y uan),19 a holdover from the Qing government, was abol-
ished and replaced in 1912 by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau,
which, despite its name, also dealt with affairs of other minority groups in
China. The bureau was dissolved in 1914 and reorganized as the Mongolian-
Tibetan Ministry, under direct control of the president of the Republic.
Given the disturbances then affecting China, this ministry developed "no
plan of administration." A fter the Nationalist government was established
in Nanjing in 1928, the ministry was again the subject of reorganization and
16 NATIONAL MINOlUlY POUCY
was renamed the Mongolian and Tibetan A ffairs Commission. Despite the
new title it was considered to have ministerial status under the Executive
Y uan.
20
'
There has been little detailed study of the workings of this body, but there
is no doubt that its opportunities for action were severely limited by the
political and military situation that existed throughout China during the Re-
publican period. Thus it appears to have been primarily an advisory and
planning group. The lack of information and understanding of various
minorities and the shortage of bilingual personnel to deal directly with mi-
norny representatives doubtless further impaired its abilities.
Inpractice as well as in theory, central government policy under Chiang
Kai-shek was aimed at establishing Guommdang preeminence in the border
regions and irrevocably tying these areas to the Chinese state. Since the tra-
ditional means of using the military to assure control of tbe borderlands was
not an option available to Chiang, be used whatever means were available to
him. He became adept at using the shifting domestic and international
political and military alliances to extend Nationalist control in national mi-
nonty areas. Wherever possible, he entered into coalitions with local war-
lords and provincial elites to establish a semblance of central government
authority in areas that had slipped from its control. Up to the end of World
War I I , he had to be content with lip-service paid to the Nationalist cause by
such men as Ma Bufang in Qinghai and Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, who,
despite pledges of allegiance to the centra) government. continued to rule
their respective provinces independently. When Opportunity presented it-
self, however, Chiang moved to draw such men closer to the government
For instance, in 1944and 1945, he astutely took advantage of the rapid
changes that accompanied the last stages of World War II to remove Sheng
from Xinjiang and L ong Y un from Y unnan, replacing both men with ap-
pointees of his own chOOSing.2t
Chiang also successfully used internatiOnal means to further his pursuit of
Chinese control in the minority areas. I n Xinjiang, he sought to balance
Soviet presence with that of the United States and Britain by inviting these
two powen to open consular offices inUrumqi, where the USSR had been
officially represented for many years. Farther, he did not hesitate to ask for
the assistance of these governments' representatives in forestalling Soviet
moves in this particularly sensitive border area (see chapter 4).
A lthough Chiang enjoyed SOmesuccess in using diplomatic means to fur.
ther Nationalist COntrol in the border regions, the Nationalist record in
other aspects of policy vis-! vis minority areas was far less impressive. In
pan
i
cu1ar.the Chinese sought to foster a sense of national unity among na-
tional minorities through economic development programs, education, and
resettlement of refugees inthe borderlands. As shown below, little was ac-
tually accomplished inany of these areas.
NATIONAL MINOlUIY POllCY 17
Various government agencies periodically published reports on the pro.
posed reconstruction work to be carried out in border regions once peace
was restored.Oneof the subjects receivingthemost attention was economic
development. The government sponsored surveys, and the National Re-
sources Commission prepared reports on the underdeveloped borderlands,
indicating the existence of vast reserves of natural resources and drafting
plans for their future exploitation.Transport.communication, basic educa-
tion, and public hygienewerealso mentioned in suchreports asbasic neces-
sitiesfor improvingsocial welfareof theborderlands' inhabitants.
22
I n the area referred to as "frontier education:' the Nationalist govern-
ment itself admitted that it "did not follow any systematic trend until
1939.',23Subsequently, however, it established provincial departments of
Mongolian and TI betan education under the Ministry of Education.These
wereto provide all border districts with "modem education and citizenship
training, language, vocational, and hygienic training." Further, at the
secondary level, education was also to foster "aclear understanding of the
Chineseraceand nation."24
In 1945, the Ministry of Education adopted an "adaptation policy" for
frontier districts. Under this policy, the old practice of emphasizing the
teaching of the Chinese language was to be relaxedbecause, as one source
candidly put it, "this policy never produced satisfactory results...
25
The new
systemwas to allowstudents to have freechoice in the languageof instruc-
tion, and Chinese language classeswere no longer compulsory.Textbooks in
both local languages and Mandarin were to be prepared to enable this new
policyto be carried out.A s the government lackedboth the power and the
financesfor the proposed development of frontier education, however, little
was actually accomplished ineducation in theborder regions.
A further means of strengthening ties between the central government
and theoutlying regions was to be through the introduction of Han Chinese
settlers into minority areas.Such settlers were promised government aid,
andsmall groups weresent to areas likeXinjiang.TheNorthwest, inpartic-
ular, was considered ripe for such programs as it had been depopulated in
therebellions of the nineteenth century and hadsufferedfromperiodic dis-
turbances ever since.The introduction of these settlers was seen not only as
ameans to change the ethnic balance of the region but also asawayto en-
courage the ultimate assimilation or the non-Chinese population. The
limited attempt to resettle people in Xinjiang in 1944was unsuccessful,
however.Local opposition (discussedin chapter 3) plusageneral unwilling-
ness among refugees in China proper to move to remote border regions
weretwo major obstacles that thegovernment was unableto overcome.
The Nationalist government was unable to implement fully any of the
programs proposed above.Even if it had beenableto doso, there is serious
question as to whether these policies would havereceived much support
'1
18 NATIONALM/NORIlY POllCY
from the national minorities for whom they were intended.
Pronouncements on national minority regions under the Nationalist
government primarily reflected the major concern of the government with
regard to China's border areas: to prevent further disintegration of the
Chinese state.The Chinese chose to invest the limited resources available in
the one aspect of border policy that bad shown proven results. This was to
station Nationalist troops loyal to the central government in those regions
considered at risk from external or internal threat. As will beseen in the fol-
lowing chapters, in the case of Xinjiang this choice of policy did not neces-
sarily best serve Chinese interests in maintaining control of the borderlands.
CHA PTER 3
Geographical and Historical
Background to theRebellion
L ocated north of Tibet and west of Mongolia, Xinjiang is one of the most
isolated regions in the world.A t 1,500miles fromthe national capital of
Beijing, officials in Xinjiang's capital of Urumqi have responsibility for ad-
ministering a vast, distant land that includes within its boundaries massive
mountain ranges and thousands of miles of rocky, dry deserts. Called
"Chinese Turkestan" by such famous explorers as Sir A ueel Stein and Sven
Hedin, it is today known as the Xinjiang-Uighur A utonomous Region and
covers one-sixth of China's total territory, making it the largest administra-
tive unit in China.
Geographically, the region's 640,000 square miles are roughly divided into
the northern third, traditionally called Dzungaria, and the larger southern
two-thirds, which boasts the massive Takla Makao Desert and some of the
world's highest mountains. Between the two sectors lie the Tianshan
Mountains, which run from the eastern border with Gansu all the way across
the region to the Soviet Union, where this natural barrier of rock and ice
turns south-southwest toward A fghanistan, forming part of the Sino-Soviet
border from the IIivalley to the Pamirs, in the far southwestern corner of
the region.
Mountains also ring most of Xinjiang. I n the north and northeast the
A ltai Mountains straddle the border with the Mongolian People's Republic.
I n the northwest are the Tarbagatai Mountains, which form part of the
northern Xinjiang-Soviet border. I n the far southwest, the Tianshan merge
with the mountain ranges that form the southern border of the region with
Tibet: the Pamirs, the Karakorams, and "the Kunlun ranges, which in tum
march toward China proper. Completing the circle, in the east are the
Qilian Shan, which extend north and east from the Kunlun. These mountain
19
20 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
formations leave only a few natural corridors into Xinjiang, the most con-
venlenr of which is the Gansu corridor, which links Xinjiang to China
proper via the great Gobi Desert On the other side of the region, mountain
passes on the northwestern Sino-Soviet border offer much easier access to
the Soviet Central A sian Republics, a geographic fact that has influenced
development in the Northwest throughout the modem period.
There are two desert areas within the region. I n the north, mountains ring
the Dzungarian Plain, which itself contains several small desert areas. I n the
more arid south, mountains surround the 142,857square miles of the Takla
Makan Desert. Rivers flow out of the mountains and are lost in the sands of
this vast desert, but along the larger of the southern area's rivers are oasis
settlements that were once way-stations for traders on the Silk Road, two
branches of which once passed through Xinjiang, linking it with China and
the I slamic east. Today the oasis towns are the home of the region's
Uighurs, who have adapted to the harshness of the land over centuries, re-
sulting in a lifestyle that COUld,according to residents, be virtually paradisial.
Without its rivers and lakes, the region would be uninhabitable. Several
major rivers-the longest of which is the Tanm-cwater the oasis settlements
of the south while in the north smaller rivers flow down from towering
mountains to the Dzungarian Plain, making possible the abundant pasture
lands that are the basis of the northern nomad economy. A s long as the
region was not overpopulated, water resources made life in both oasis settle-
ments and pasture areas pleasant and, during some periods at relative peace,
even idyllic.
Natural Wealth
The rough beauty or Xinjiang disguises the immense natural wealth that lies
below the surface. The gold mines of the A ltai Mountains and the fine jade
of Khotan have been famous throughout China for centuries, and officials
dispatched to the tar northwest of China were known to return with plenti-
ful supplies of bothprecious COmmodities.1
Coal and oil were known to exist in both quattty and abundance. Local
residents talked of using oil from Wusu with no refining, and coal could be
had by taking a bUcket and shovel and COllecting a supply for personal use
without much effort.2
Other riches in Xinjiang were revealed in the course of twentieth-century
eXpl?ration, which uncovered deposits of tin, quicksilver (mercury),
uranium, lead, COpper.iron, and massive reserves of oil 3Because much of
the early exploration was undertaken by Soviet experts during the period of
Sheng Shicai's rule in Xinjiang, figures on the amounts of mineral wealth
mined up to 1949 are scarce. A ccording to one source, in 1942, oil wells at
Wusu were said to be producing 150 tons of crude oil daily, or 25,000 gal-
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 21
I onsof petrol a month." L ater research in the Karamai region revealedoil
depositsestimated at two billion metric tons, or 90percent of China'stotal
oil reserves.S
Other areas in northern Xinjiang were also producingminerals in the
19405,most of it going to the Soviet Union."Wolfram"-or tungsten-was
being mined near Fuwen (Koktcgai) in the A ltai Mountains, with one
sourceestimating that in 1946some 2,000tons ofwolfram.-bearingorewas
hauledto the USSR bytruck.A lso known to beintheA ltai areaaredeposits
of beryl and spodumene.The former isthe sourceof beryllium,whichforms
an alloy widely used in atomic reactors; the latter is also called lithium
aluminumsilicate and isused inthermonuclear explosives.
6
In addition to the oil and minerals found in the northern region, the IIi
valleyregion on the Sino-Soviet border boasted its ownstore of valuable
mineral wealth, including deposits of iron ore, molybdenum(aleadore),
tungsten, surface coal, petroleum, uranium, and gold.Copper deposits are
nearby?
Thus the three districts that were involved in the rebeI lion of 1944con-
tain Someof the largest, richest deposits of mineral wealth in Xinjiang.
Whilemost local inhabitants may not have known of the potential riches
these minerals represented-nor of their importance in production of
strategicarms-the Soviet Union recognized their valueandwas ableto ex-
ploit part of the cache of natural wealth in the 1930s.
8
Certainly Xinjiang'S
natural resources constitute one reason for continued Soviet interest in
China'sgreat Northwest.
DUringthe decade of the 1930sand into the early 19405,theamount of
tradein nonferrous metals from China to the Soviet Union varied.There
areno separate figures for the minerals extracted fromXinjiang.Table 1
givesthe known extent of Sino-Soviet trade.By 1943 muchof lhistradewas
viaXinjiang, with 2,786metric tons of tungsten are, 10.1metric ~ons.o~tin,
and1.5metric tons of quicksilver passing through customspostsI DXinJ I ang
enrouteto the USSR 9
.Prior to 1949, however, the most important tradeinnatural r~~rces was
10the sale of livestock and animal products.Trade between Xinjiangand
t~eUSSR in these important rawcommodities fell whenShengreor~ent~
himself toward the Nationalists. The extent of the resulting disrupuon m
~radeis clearly indicated in the Soviet statistics for the period.summanzed
10table 2.
A n A merican report of 1945 noted that the Soviet deficit inwool, cou?n,
leather, and meat would be largein the years 1945-1950, withwool require-
mentsfallingshort by 20000-80 (XXI metric tons and meat by some40,000
tonsannually.l0 Such shortages ~ould mean that the natural wealthof the
threedistricts would certainly invite attention fromthe USSR,wh~~
reSOurcesand ability to produce raw materials had been dramanca Y
a
22 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Table 1
Sino-Soviet Minerai Trade In 1938 and 1940
(metnc tons)
Mineral
1938tolal A mount 10
production USSR
%
1940total Amount to
production USSR
%
Tungsten 14,113 3,400 24 8,757 1,600 18
Antimony 11,616 5,950 51 7,528 1,315 17
Yin 13,282 1,060 8 17,278 1,550 9
QuicksHver 19.3 0 117.3 50 43
Sou.rc~: U,S. Office of Strategic Services, "Russo-Cbinese Relations and Potential Soviet
Contributions to China's Postwar Economic Development," R &A Repon No. 3331, A ugust 31,
1945, p. 13.
reduced during the war years.Under the influence of Sheng Shicai, Xinjiang
had contributed to the USSR war effort. Disruption of such supplies dou~t-
less refocused Soviet interest in this border region, whose residents had 10-
termutenny raisedtheflag of rebellion against their Chinese rulers.
Cultural and Historical Background
Thefollowingbrief surveyof the region's nationalities isbased on a number
of studies that detail thecultures and history of the peoples of Xinjiang.ll I n
the course of the survey, two basic points will become clear. First, th~
people of this area were not, as has been suggested in some recent work,1
dividedinto irreparably antagonistic groups.Despite ethnic divisions ~d
variations in lifestyle, the vast majority of the region's people were Turkic
Moslems, and this dominant majority was clearlydistinguishable as asingle
groupwho considered themselves to beseparate fromthe Han Chinese, not
onlybecauseof religiousdifferences but also on the basisof race.P
Second, theETR elitewerefar frombeingthesimple-minded country folk
that SOmeChinese and other sources would have one believe.In the 19405,
thereexisted among Xinjiang's Moslems aneducated, nationalistic elite that
wroteand spokewith conviction against Chinese policies in the Northv:est
and demanded Chinese recognition of Turkic nationalities' political aspira-
tions.They wrote on behalf of the region's Moslem population, which
sharedalong, often blOOdyhistoryof invasion, colonization, and rebellion.
TheMoslemgroups of modern Xinjiang are, in name at least, related to
histOric,nomadicgroups or nations that populated the vast reaches of Cen-
tral A sia during its ancient and mOdernperiods. The first group of these
nomads to settleand establish an empire were the Uighurs, whose first em-
~OOIl $. W
u U_"
~.g
~O
:;O nS
o F
13
- - - - - - - - - -
24 GElXJRAPH1CAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
plre was located on the Selenga River, in present-day northern Mongolia, in
the seventh and eighth centuries. In A D. 840, this empire was dest~oy~~
another nomadic group, the Kirghfz, namesakes of the modem Ki!ghlZ In
the USSR and Xinjiang. Remnants of the Uighur empire moved mto ~e
present-day area of Xinjiang, gradually establishing themselves in the casu
cities there, mixing with the local Persian, Turkic population.l"
The I slamization of the Turkic groups in Xinjiang began in the tenth
century. By the time of the Mongol invasion some three hundred years later,
Islamwas widespread throughout the region.
During the period of Mongol dominance in the Central A sian s~eppe,
small Uighur states continued to exist in Xinjiang, and educated U~ghUJ 5
from these oasis cities became influential in the Mongol court. The Ulghurs
are credited withteaching the illiterate Mongols to write using the Uigh~r
script, which the Uighurs themselves later abandoned in favor of the A rabic
script, the written form of the Koran and the basis of their new religion.
With the decline of Mongol control in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, the oasis states in Xinjiang briefly enjoyed an independent existence,
free of COntrol of either the powerful Turkic Khanates to the west or the
Chinese Ming dynasty to the east. RUled by the descendants of Mongols who
had become Turkicized and adopted I slam, the oasis people gradually be-
came a mix of Turkic and Mongol stock overlaying the previous I ndo-E~-
peen groups that, by this time, were totally SUbmerged in the new Turkic
CUltureof Xinjiang.
The Turkicized Mongol rulers gave way in tum to a new ruling class that
migrated to Xinjiang from the Khanates in the west The new elite were
Turkic religious leaders who gained political as well as religious control over
the oasis towns by the seventeenth century.I S By this time, however, China
was under the strong and aggressive Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, who
were determined to extend Manchu COntrol into Central A sia. In the eight-
eenth century they invaded Xinjiang, taking control of the cities on the once
famed Silk Route and imposing military rule over the region through the es-
tablishment of garrisons in major cities.
To rule this vast border land, the Qing used several classic Chinese poli-
cies.One was y; y; zhi yi, or USing the barbarian to fight the barbarian. In
o~~e~words, by pitting various groups against one another and thereby
dmdmg them, the Chinese could forestall the fonnation of large alliances or
co.~itions that COuldthreaten the Chinese state. The Qing also relied on
nuhtary presence, and the Manchu troops sent to the far northwest were en-
couraged to settle in the region with their families.
A series of rebellions against the Qing began almost immediately, increas-
ing in intensity and duration until a major revolt OCCUrrednear the end of
the nineteenth century. This revolt was put down only after a decade of ef-
fort by forces under General Zuo Zongtang. I n the face of General Zoo's
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 25
superior organization and leadership, the Turkic forces of Xinjiangand
neighboring Gansu province were defeated.In 1884, the northwestern re-
gionwas officially incorporated into the Chinese Empire as "Xinjiang," or
the"New Frontier."
Xinjiang Provincial Government
WhenXinjiang's status was raised to that of aprovincein 1884, it was ruled
under the same systemof organization as that of other Chinese provinces.
Officials wereappointed to the provincial bureaucracy for varyinglengthsof
timeby the imperial government in Beijing.A lthough Xinjiangoffered the
possibilityfor collection of great personal wealth, posts in thefar northwest
wereoften givenas punishment to waywardmembers of the Qing bureau-
cracy, and appointments to the border regions were generally considered
demotions within the ruling hierarchy,
The typical provincial government under the Qing included a governor
who often was able to exerciseconsiderable personal power.I n the case of
Xinjiang, because of the distance fromthe capital, the head of government
treated Xinjiang as his personal fiefdom, a process that culminated under
ShengShicai, whose pro-Soviet rule in Xinjiang wasvirtually independent
of thecentral government.
Underlying the traditional Chinese bureaucracy in Xinjiang were the na-
tiveleaders of the region, many of whomwere givenofficial status by the
Chinese and incorporated into the systemof administration.In Xinjiangun-
der the Qing there were six classes or ranks of "beg" or "bek" (the latter
beinglocal pronunciation inwhich <e
g
" becomes a"k" sound), rangingfrom
thehighest, "A kimbeg" or local governor, to the lowest, "Mirabu beg" or
superintendent of agriculture (seetable3).
Thebegs had considerable power among the oasis Turks.Theywere re-
sponsiblefor the collection of taxes, and a portion of local tax revenue in-
variablyadhered to their purses. Often they were wealthy local merchants
who used their official posts to ensure the most favorableenvironme.nt '? -
callyfor their business emerpnses.t" It should be noted that corrupuon m
Xinjiangwas thus not the prerogative of only the Chinese-c-it was accepted
practiceindealing with officialsof any nationality in Xinjiang, aselsewhere
in China.A mong the nomadic peoples, thetraditional tribal chieftainswere
held responsible for the actions of their people, but these menwere not
givenofficial Chinese rank.
A t the time of Xinjiang's formal incorporation into the Qingempire, the
hi area became the westernmost outpost of the Manchus.This region had
already been the object of bitter Sino-Russian rivalry in .thel~.OsPI n
recognition of the IIi area's particularly important strategic J lOSltlO~,.the
Qingappointed a special military governor based in the town of Smding,
- - - - - - - - - -
26 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Table 3
Local Administration of Xinjiang under the Qlng
Rank
Title
Pinyin
English
First
_,ct
Third
ro,""
Om,
Sixth
Akim Beg
Ishhan Beg
Shang Beg
Katsonatchi Beg
Hasun Beg
Mirabu Beg
Aqimu Bak.e
Yishenhan Bake
Shang Bake
Gezaneiqi Boke
Hazi Bake
Milabu Bake
Local governor
Assistant governor
Collector of revenues
Assistant collector
J udge
Superintendent of
agriculture
Souru: H. S.Brunnert and V.V.Hagelseom, Present Day Political OrganiUUirm o/Chioo, trans.
A . Beltcllenlco (I leijing, 1910), p. 440.
Notes: "Akim" refers to the Thrkish "hakim" or judge; "mirabu" may be derived from "memur"
or civil servant. The other titles, like "shang," appear to be of Chinese origin.
twenty five miles west of Y ining, to oversee this sensitive border region. The
military governor of lliwas assisted by two assistant military governors and
by ambans, officials who dealt with civil affairs stationed at Y ining and
Tacheng respectively.I 8Thus, the three districts that would form the East
Turkestan Republic in 1944were under Special military rule up to the end
of theQing. .
A fter the Chinese Revolution of 1911, there was initially little change I D
thesystemof administration in Xinjiang.The governor resigned, but ~re-
placement was a Olng-trained official named Y ang Cengxin who continued
to rule the region in much the same wayas his Qing predecessors. In fa.et,
rather than lessening provincial government control, Y ang moved to ~_
creaseit For instance, in 1915hedecided to make the region's local "dis-
triet elders" more directly accountable to himby declaring that they first tJ : e
elected and ~en recommend~d for their posts by the local ~nese maB-
strate, Y anghimself would ultimately confirmor reject theappoI DlJ !1ents..
Y ang kept closeCOntrolover Xinjiang until hisassassination in 1928.His
replacement, J in Shuren.was unable to maintain the control that marked
Y ang's rule.Delpite the fact that J in increased the number of secret police
and placedmembersofms familyin the highest posts of government, be~
unable to emulate Y ang's personal dOmination.Corruption and adete~?-
rating local economy J ed to a series of insurrections beginning in Haw I D
1931.
20
This patrem of insurrection quickly expanded, and in November
1933MOSlemforces in Kashgar declared the establishment of the first East
Turkestan Republic.
A t this timeinXinjiang several groups werecontending for leadership.I n
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL llACKGROUND Z1
southern Xinjiang, the Moslem religious leader Hoja Niyazclaimedawide
following,asdidanother religious leader, Sabit Damullah.I ntheHami area
and eastern Xinjiang, however, people looked toward members of the Ma
family,of Hui nationality, whichwas then aconsiderable forceinneighbor.
ingGansu and Qinghai provinces.I ntheTurfan areawas yet another leader,
Mahmud Muhidi.Of all these men, Hoja Niyazclaimed the largest follow.
ing.
21
There was conflict, however, between personalities and the different
goals of these various movements. These differences contributed to their
defeat and to the rise of ShengShicai.
Educated inJ apan, Sheng was ambitious and cleverenough to seetheop-
portunity inherent in a posting to Xinjiang.I n 1931 heleft Nanjing, where
hehadbeen an officer on Chiang Kai-shek's staff, and not longafter hisar-
rival in the far northwest succeeded in establishing himself as an up and
comingyoung military leader in the region.Upon hissuccessful dispersal of
therebel forces in Hami, Turfan, and southern Xinjiang, Sheng becamede
facto ruler of the province.I nitially, he led a reform-oriented administra-
tion, drawingheavilyon the Soviet model.I ndeed, Shengfosteredand devel-
oped close ties to the USSR and received extensive Soviet financial aid to
enablehimto begin modest reforms and reconstruction in thearea.Toward
theend of his rule, however, his government, likeits Chinese predecessors,
sufferedfromendemic corruption and frommilitary interference ingovern-
ment at all levels.L ike Y ang, hekept closepersonal control of themilitary,
andheexpanded the already extensivesecret policeforce.Bytheend of his
reign, both the military and the secret police servedas finelyhoned tools
that allowed Sheng to carry out a reign of terror that distinguished itself
evenin Xinjiang's bloody history.Estimates of people kiI I edunder Sheng
Sbicai run from80,000to 100,000.
22
Suchabuses ledto organized resistance throughout theprovince.Chinese
SOurcesrefer to assaults on settlements and militaryoutposts as"bandit at-
tacks." A lthough the object of some of these raids may havebeen booty,
theyalsoaimed at challenging Sheng's increasinglyoppressiveregime.
Theimportance with which Sheng himself viewed"bandit attacks" canbe
seen in his efforts to disarm the Kazaks in particular.A ccordingto both
Chinese and Kazak sources, Sheng successfully disarmed manycampsof
Kazaks throUghavariety of tactics.A common ploywas to capture aKazak
leader and hold him for ransom, payable in A ltai gold and weapons.~.I n
onecase, Sheng forced agroup of Kazaks to J eaveXinjiang by proI DJ SlD~
themhewould return the severed head of one of their reveredancestors I f
they would leave the A ltai.24Through such tactics, Sheng kept Kazak
resistancefromreaching full-scalerebellion duringhis yearsinXinjiang.
With the advent of World War I I , Sheng's support from the USSR
dwindledand hegradually began to tum toward theChinesecentral g~eC?-
ment.I nJ anuary 1943, he allowed the Guomindang to open a provincial
28 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
headquarters in Urumqi. On the sixteenth of the same month, Sheng was
named chairman of the Xinjiang branch of the Guomindang.
I n spring of the same year, at the invitation of the central government, the
United States opened a consulate in Urumqi. This was part of ~e ~~~m-
ment's attempt to draw international attention to the situation InXinjiang
and to by to balance Soviet official presence in the region, which included
fiveseparate Soviet consulates, three of which were inthe districts that were
to become the new ElR.
An even clearer sign of Sheng's new orientation was seen in ~y ~hen ~e
SOViet-Xinjiang Trading A gency began winding up its affairs. FmallY ',m
autumn 1943, Soviet troops stationed in Hami were withdrawn to the Soviet
Union. A t the end of 1943 a British intelligence report noted that the Rus-
sian (Soviet) presence in Xinjiang had virtually disappeared.2'i This did not
mean that Soviet interest in the region had lessened, nor did it mean that
the Soviets closed any of their five consular offices in the region. Nonethe-
less, the year 1943 did See the groUndwork laid for the reestablishment of
Nationalist COntrol in the Northwest Despite Sheng's continued ~nn:al
over the military and OVer his extensive secret police network, Nationalist
influence in Xinjiang was, at long last, on the increase. .
The major COncernof the central government had been what it cons~dered
to be the threat of Soviet takeover in Xinjiang. During Sheng'S penod of
COntrol in the province, however, the central government had made no offi-
cial complaint to the USSR over what the Chinese considered Soviet en.
croachment in the Northwest. With Sheng now turning away from.the
Soviets, the Nalionalist government chose to react to any real or I magined
Soviet provocation through official Channels. InMarch 1943, a series ofbor-
der incidents OCCurred on the SinO-Soviet border. the Chinese officially
. .
protested these on March 9, 1943, demanding that the Soviets end I nvasion
of Chi~ese air space and complaining of harassment of Chine.se bo~der
guards. A lthough there was no dear result to either the border mcursrons
or the official complaints, the Chinese were indicating quite clearly to the
USSR that they intended to limit the Soviet role in the Northwest and would
expose internationally any perceiVed encroachment in order to prevent
Soviet infringement oC Chinese territOrial integrity. .
A t the same time, Chiang Kai~shek continued economic discussions WIth
the USSR.These, too, were aimed at demonstrating Nationalist intentions
to expand their presence and influence in the border region. I n 1944, the
USSR agr~d to sell its aircraft plant in Urumqi to the Chinese for U:S.
S5OO,ooo m cash and $3,500,000 worth of sheep on the boof, 10 be deliV-
~red to the, ~ in the Tacheng area of Xinjiang.27Talks on the continua-
han of Soviet arrune service in tbe region COntinued during this period.
Both the talks on economic arrangements in Xinjiang and tbe official
complaints over Soviet border inCUlSions were part of Nationalist efforts to
GErx;RAPHlCAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 29
dislodgethe Soviets fromXinjiang.During the period under ShengShicai
theregion had been almost totally oriented toward the USSR,with Soviet
advisers, geographers, and even military units entering the regionby invita-
tion.
28
The Nationalist government now sought to reorient the region
towardChcngqing and to establish the area firmlywithin the Chinese, not
theSoviet, sphere of influence.
During the summer of 1944, Sheng became increasingly paranoid about
his enemies.Using this paranoia to their advantage, theNationalists offered
hima"safe" job in the Chinese capital, and inSeptember 1944 Shengfinally
accepted this position, leaving the province he had dominated for nearly a
decade.
But even as Sheng prepared to go, forces of rebellion were already mar-
shalied inthe more remote areas of theprovince.These forceswereinpart a
result of Sheng's regime, whichhad in its last years becomeincreasinglybru-
tal and repressive.This had resulted in pervasiveanti-Han Chinese senti-
ment throughout Xinjiang among both the Moslem majority and the
smaller non-Moslem groups in the province.This antipathy was also fueled
by another important force in the area-a growingsense of Turki nation-
alism.I n 1944 Xinjiang was already the scene of extensiveif uncoordinated
local efforts by organized, anti-Chinese resistance groups.Sheng's policy of
repressionof theseorganizations directlyaided in thedissemination of local
nationalist ideals and popularized the idea of an independent Turkestan,
thusleadingdirectly to the iiirebellion.
Xinjiang'S Nationalities
Because of Xinjiang's remoteness and the disturbed conditions intheregion
as well as in China proper during most of the twentieth century, demo-
graphicinformation on Xinjiang has, until recently, beenlimited.Most pop.
ulation figures for the province during the 19405 areno morethanestimates
because of the difficulties then involved in collecting such data.The most
accurate numbers available come fromthe 1945-46 provincial census, the
resultsof whichare givenin table4.k theoriginal government report itself
points out, the figures are not completely accurate because officialswereun-
able to verify census reports from the three districts of IIi, Tacheng, and
A shen.
Of the fourteen groups listed in the table, seven are M~sle~, including
theUighur, Kazak, Uzbek, Taranchi, Tatar, Tajik, and Kirghiz.!o~ther,
these people accounted for 92 percent of the region'S population m .t.h
e
1940s.In addition to their shared religious heritage, all except the TaJ l1es
Speakrelated Turkic dialects and all had once fought the sameenemy, the
Han Chinese. Thus the majority of the Xinjiang people inthemid-twentie~
centuryheld incommon ashared history of rebellion aswell asshared reli-
----------
30 GEOORAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Table 4
Xinjiang Population by Nationality, 1945
Nationality
Population
Uighur 2,988,528
Han Chinese 222,401
Hui 99,607
Kazak 438,575
Mongolian 59,686
RUssian 19,392
Uzbek 10,224
Taranchi 79,296
Tatar 5,614
Tajik 8,210
Kirghiz 69,923
Sibo 10.626
Solon 2,506
Manchu 762.
Total 4,015,350 (as given)
SouTct:: She I ..ingyuQ, "Economic Construction in Xinjiang as a Means to Secure Peace," TuuuhiJn
Y'Ugatl I (October 15, 1947): 21.
gious belief, and similar cultural and historical traditions.
I n the early twentieth century. the settled Turkic speakers of Xinjia~g
were known simply as Turks or Turkt in the writings of the day.29~
reflected both their mixed Turkic-MongOl heritage and their separation
from other Thekie peoples of the Russian steppe. The name "Uighur" was
reintroduced to Central A sia and Xinjiang in the 1920s after a hiatus of
nearly a thousand years. The modern use of the name Uighur began under
the influence of the newly established Soviet Union in 1921.A t a Tasbke~t
COnference of Ulghurs living inSoviet Turkestan, representatives of Turkic
peoples decided 10adopt the name Uighur for people who lived in.or were
Originally from, the settled oases of Xinjiang, although they themselves
pointed out that the modern Ufghurs should not be confused withthe an-
cient Uighur empire.30
The relation between this name and the Turkie peoples who lived in Xin-
jiang by the beginning of the twentieth century was remote. but the confer-
ence adopted the Damenonetneress, and some attempt was made within the
USSR to POpularize irs use. The name was not used in Xinjiang, however,
until the rise of pre-sevier Sheng Shicai in 1933.By Sheng's decree, the
name Uighur was to be used officially as the proper name of the settled
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 31
Turksof the region.For at least one foreign observer, however, the useof
thenamewas "ludicrous.,,3t
In fact, the introduction of the ideaof fourteen separate nationalities in
Xinjiangwas primarily the result of Sheng's efforts.To foster acceptanceof
thesefourteen names, Sheng encouraged theestablishment of cultural soci-
eties for each group and promoted the publication of "Uighur" language
newspapers.In the local press and in China proper itself thedescription of
Xinjiangas the home of fourteen separate nationalities gainedpopularity
duringSheng's rule.
32
A mong local people, however, pockets of resistance
to the"new" names rose.L ocal Turld intellectuals preferred to usetheterm
"Turkestan" to identify their homeland and used "Turk" or "Turki" as the
most appropriate name for the MoslemTurkic-speakingmajority.33
The introduction of the "new" names, then, was initially a political act
and only partially reflected the reality of the ethnic divisionsamong Xin-
jiang's peoples. The most important division was actually on the basis of
lifestyle; the population was generally divided into two broad groups.The
majoritywas composed of sedentary farmers and traders of theoasessettle-
ments, and a minority consisted of nomadic herdsmen. This difference
dividedthesedentary Uighur, Uzbek, Tatar, andTaranchi fromthenomadic
Kirghiz, Tajik, and Kazaks, the latter being by far the most numerous and
influential among Xinjiang's nomadic groups.
Differences in lifestyle led to variation in degree of religious orthodoxy
and educational level and also in the degree of response to increasing
Chinesepresence in Xinjiang.I solated fromthemosqueand medresse-the
religiousschools that were virtually the only formof education availablein
Xinjiangfor many years-the nomadic Turks tended to be lessorthodox in
religiousobservance.Women were not veiled in the usual I slamicstyle, al-
thoughTajik and Kirghiz women woredistinctive headdresses coveringthe
hair but leaving the face exposed. The seclusion of womenwas simply not
practical in a society in which women did much of the work around the
camps.Further, fewreligious rites were observed regularly, and although
teachersand religious leaders were respected-s-evenvenerated-among the
Kazak Turks and other groups, contact with such people was irregular at
best.The nomadic lifestylealso affected the educational level of theKazaks,
amongwhomthe illiteracy rate wasextremelyhigh. . .
Xinjiang's nomads.especially the Kazaks, developedamen~edrep~tatI on
aswarriors.Kazak traditional songs and poems emphasizethis warno~tra-
dition, whichwas especially strong among Kazaks of theGreater and~lddle
Hordewho populate Xinjiang's pasture lands.(Most of the Kazaks 10the
USSRare of the Greater Horde as are Kazaks of the IIivalley.) Fierce and
loyal fighters, the Kazaks were willing to go against seeminglyinsurmoun~.
ableodds when ledby one of their own -natar" or heroes.Kazak troops, I t
Will beseen, were thebackbone of the 1944antt-Clunese forces.
- - - - - - - - - - - - _a
32 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While the degree of religious orthodoxy and differences in lifestyle
divided the sedentary Turks from the nomads, both were inheritors of the
same linguistic traditions and of I slamic culture. I n the twentieth century,
withits stirrings of nationalism and open revolt against colonial and im-
perialist powers, both of these groups were influenced by the ideas of the
modern age, including Pan-Turantanjsm, Pan- Turkism, and Turkic national-
ism.SuchideasinOuencedthe educated elite of the towns and cities of Xin-
jiang and, to a lesser extent, the nomadic groups of the A ltai. L eaders from
among both Uighur and Kazak groups made the long and difficull journey
to Mecca on "haj," and they brought back new ideas as well as deeper
respect and understanding of their own I slamic culture.L eaders who carried
the title of "baj" were assured of high status upon their return from Mecca,
and their views and opinions, influenced by contacts outside the narrow pa-
rameters of Xinjiang, carried considerable weight
Change in Xinjiang on the basis of these ideas alone, however, would
probably have been a different, and POSSiblyslower, process had it not been
for the exploitative policies of the Chinese sent to administer the region in
the twentieth century. This and the concomitant weakening of the Chinese
government offered both common causeand opponunny for revolt to Xin-
jiang's increasingly anti-Chinese population.
NOlI-Moskm Peoples
The waves of invasion into Xinjiang over the centuries had also resulted in
the settlement of non-Moslem peoples in the area of Chinese Turkestan.
Most of the non-Moslem groups were relative newcomers. The Manchu
groups, for instance. dated from the period of Manchu rule in China proper.
Sent out assoldiers to man the new Manchu garrisons inXinjiang, and thus
isolated from mainstream Manchu culture and from the lure of Sinicization,
Xinjiang Manchu groups retained their Manchu language and customs.~
Today they are divided into three separate nationalities. on the basis of their
tribal origins in the former Manchurian homelands. These three are the
Sibo, the Solon, and the ManChus themselves.
As a result of proximity to expanding I mperial Russja, the region also bad
a sma.ll RUSSianpopulation. This group received a considerable boost after
the Bolshevik victory when many "white" Russians entered the region in the
1921l\ seeking refuge from the new Soviet regime. Some of these moved on
to Chinese roastaJ cities, but others remained and settled in the llivaney
region where they boUght farms or entered into business as traders.
Also present in Xinjiang as a result of bistory and proximity were the
Mongols. Often allies of the region's A ltai Kazaks, these people were as
much traditiOnal residents of Xinjiang as the Kazaks with whom they shared
pastures on occasion. A lthough the Mongols were L ama-Buddhists, the no-
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 33
madie lifestyle and shared economic concerns of the two groups led to close
relations and even to intermarriage. 35
The Hili, Chinese Moslems
Culturally between the Moslem peoples of the Northwest and the Chinese
cultural tradition of which they are also a part are the Hui or Chinese Mos-
lems.Traditionally, China's Moslems are said to descend from A rab traders
who entered China during the Tang dynasty and stayed, becoming Sinicized
in all but their religion. Today's Hui are hardly distinguishable from or-
dinary Han Chinese, yet they maintain their separateness by adhering to
their religion and, to as great an extent as possible, manying only other
Moslems.
The position of the Hui in the Northwest has periodically shifted from
pro- to anti-Han Chinese. In the nineteenth century, the Hui were definitely
allies of their Moslem coreligionists against the Han. Upon the defeat of
Moslem forces by General Zuo in 1877, fierce retribution was handed down
against them as traitors, while the Turkic rebels were treated much more
lightly, being mere barbarians.
I n the twentieth century, the Hui suffered along with their Moslem
brothers under Chinese administration. like other Xinjiang residents, they,
too, looked for reform in the 1930s and 19405, and, like all other groups,
they felt the sting of Sheng's reign of terror in the last years of his rule in
Xinjiang.
The largest and most influential group of non Moslems in Xinjiang were the
Han Chinese, numbering 222,401 according to the provincial census of
1946.
36
The largest concentration of Chinese was in the provincial capital,
~here they accounted for 55 percent of the population; most Chinese were
inthe provincial capital or Urumqi district, which together had 136,808 Han
Chinese residents, or 61.5 percent of all Chinese in the province.37The re-
mainder were scattered throughout the province, usually in larger towns or
cities where theywere part of the local bureaucracy or engaged in.trade.
Traditionally, Chinese did not willingly choose to leave thelT ancestral
homes in China proper for tbe "barbarous" border regions beyond ,,:u~eo,
the "J ade Gate" that marks the end of China's Great Walland oftradluonal
China.Only after 1884 when the region became a province was there asmall
migration of Han Chinese into the region. This was mainly due to.General
Z~'s pacification campaign in the Northwest, as a ~.~t. of which many
Chinese soldiers were introduced to the region's possibilines- The traders
"Who bad follOWedthe army to provision it ajso found Xinjiang a land of op-
- - - - - - - - - - - - _a
34 GEOGRAPHiCAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
portunity, and many of these, mainly Hunanese from General Zuo's home
province, elected to stay and trade in the province. Others entered th~local
Chinese bureaucracy.The men from Hunan became so entrenched mthe
region that it earned the epithet of "Hunan colony.,,38
In the twentieth century, most Han Chinese in Xinjiang were part of the
government, soldiers in the many garrisons throughout the province, or
traders.Fewwere involved in farming or herding, and therefore they were
not competing with the local population for the limited available land
resources.They did, however, require the stationing of mainly Han Chinese
troops, to protect both Chinese territorial rights and the trade in which they
wereinvolVed.Chinese troops were stationed in every district, but the
largest garrisons were in Urumqi, Kashgar, Y arkand, A ksu, and Y ining.
They represented Chinese authority in the Northwest, and they came to
dominate the towns in which they were stationed, both economically and
militarily-a situation that continued throughout the Republican period.
Ethnicity and Rebellion in Xinjiang
Conflict between the rUling Chinese minority and the region's Moslem ma-
jority had its roots in the Qing dynasty, when repeated rebellions against
Qing rule were sparked by colonialist policies in the area as well as by ex-
treme cultural differences between the Chinese and the indigenous Moslem
population. These differences were exacerbated by religious and linguistic
divisions but also by the presence of international powers engaged in "The
Great Game"-international rivalry over spheres of I nfluence in Central
A sia. While the political machinations of Russia and Great Britain did not
directly influence political affairs Within Xinjiang, the presence of these
states' representatives did serve as one conduit for political concepts from
the West to enter the region, specifically the idea of nationalism and the
right of self-determination for separate ethnic entities encompassed within
large nation-states. I n Xinjiang, this idea was given greater impetus by t.be
RUSSianRevolution and ultimately manifested itself in the growing desire
among Xinjiang's MOSlemelite (or control over the region's domestic affairs
and, eventually, (Or independence (or all of Turkestan.
A s mentioned previously, a first attempt to establish an independent
Turki State in 1933 had tailed, crushed by Chinese forces under Sheng with
assistance (rom the USSR.The second attempt had the benefit of this experi-
ence. This time, the leaders of the provisional Turkestan government care-
fully secured Soviet promises of noninterference with their plans to estab-
lish an independent state in Xinjiang (see chapter 7). Without Soviet
neutrality, no Such independence movement could survive; and without
benefit of this lesson of history, the Ilirebellion could not have SUcceeded.
Nor could it have SUcceeded wnhour the widespread and popular support
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 35
that the forces of rebellion enjoyed in the Moslem areas overrun in 1944-45.
The abuses perpetuated by successive Chinese regimes, which culminated in
the rule of Sheng Shicai, had prepared the population to accept yet another
attempt at self-rule. One measure of the extent of popular support for this
rebellion can be seen in the growth of resistance organizations, aimed, it
should be clearly understood, at ousting Han Chinese from Xinjiang.
I n the years prior to the rebellion at Vining, a committee was organized
that reportedly was responsible for planning the rebellion of November
1944.References are made to a Xinjiang Turkish People's L iberation Coun-
cil in both Chinese and A merican sources.e? The Soviet author Mingulov
also refers to such a group, as did Governor Zhang Zhizhong, who called
this planning body simply the "Y ining Committee, predecessor of the East
Turkestan Republic, established to throw off Chinese rule.'o4O
A ccording to Kazak accounts, an Organization for the Protection of the
Nation was established in the A ltai area of Xinjiang under the leadership of
Y unus Hakim during the late 19305.
41
Branches of this organization were
said to exist throughout the A ltai. Sheng's spies were able to gather in-
fannation on this organization, and in March 1940 he managed to capture
and arrest some 350 of its leaders. Not all the leadership was eliminated by
these arrests, and mobilization against the Chinese continued under such
menas Osman Batur and A li Beg Hakim (see chapters 6and 7).
By 1942 organizations among both the Uighur and Kazak Turks were
actively opposing Chinese rule; such groups were not only a cause of the
rebellion of 1944 but also served to propagate the extant ideas of Turki na-
tionalism in Xinjiang and encouraged Moslem zeal for an independent Mos-
lemstate.
Economic factors also influenced Xinjiang's flow toward rebellion in the
19405.With Sheng in control of Xinjiang, the province bad continued (0is-
sue its own currency, but, in addition, the local economic system used
Mexican silver dollars gold tae1s and Russian rubles. Reestablishment of

Nationalist control meant an inevitable increase in the amount of I nflation-
ridden Nationalist currency, certainly an unwelcome development for mer-
chants and local people alike. .
Further, the newly appointed Guomindang governor, Wu Zhongxtn: was
s~owto make any announcement on Nationalist plans for currency unifica-
tI Onin Xinjiang. J ust prior to his arrival in October he finally announced
that the province's financial system would continue as before.42By th~n,
however, the IIi rebellion had already begun in the far northwestern dI S
tricts.
The uncertain political situation in the summer of 1944~d already.led to
general economic decline in the region. The British consul 10Urumqi, Tur-
tal, kept a record of the gradual increase in the prices of stapl~p~oduets and
noted the growing scarcity of important items like flour and nee 10the sum-
- - - - - - - - - - - _a
36 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
mer of 1944. In J uly of that year, prices had risen 23 percent over J une.In
A ugust, prices zoomed to over 106percent in comparison to J uJ y.43When
Sheng's departure was finally announced at the end of A ugust, prices leveled
off, but doubtless the unstable situation added to tension in the region.
A nother economic factor affecting Xinjiang in the summer of 1944was
the fact that the border with the USSR had been dosed in 1942.A merican
Consul Ward, in Urumqi, Doted that this alone would have been cause
enough for the rebellion since the majority of the business enterprises in the
marea werestill oriented to the USSR,the major market for Xinji~raw
materials and the source of manufactured goods not made locally. The
central government in Chongqing was powerless to reopen the border
without Soviet agreement-and the economic hardship the dosed border
entailed for local businessmen and Kazak traders would certainly have of-
fered economic incentive to establish a local government that could then
open trade with the USSR.
The closing of the border certainly figured. in complaints against t~e
Chinese. Specific economic difficulties were enumerated ina pamphlet dis-
to'buted in the provincial capital in the summer of 1945.A ccording to point
nine of this listing of grievances, the friendly trading relations between the
people of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and the USSR had been disrupted by
the Chinese administration. A s the pamphlet detailed:
This cessauon of trade worked great hardship in our lives, checked me growtb
of peasant holdings in the villages, and broUght to a staodstill the trading intbe
bazaars; for each family tbe daily livelihood became difficult.Inevery locality
these who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find
employment, and wnose condition was altogether piteous, became more and
more numerous. Big merchants became small; thesmall became bankrupt; the
bankrupts became begg:m _..the number of people who have met this kindof
misfortune mounts up higher every day.I n the market there are no buyers for
cattle, for thevarious kinds of wool, skins or grains, or for the other products of
the small village holdings, nor for the production of the cattle raisers. Thepow -
erful S~ a large purchaser, MIenJ OWand aw ay from East Ttukestan as a
COlU~f{UDIc~of theinsUk-oul]JOliciu o/Sheng Tupan [Sheng SI ricai.].45
On top of the economic disruption of the cessation of Sino-Soviet trade
during these years, the pamphlet detailed further economic iUscaused by
Chinese authOrities: "The Chinese authorities also fOrcibly take all kinds of
taxes and exactions, for whichreason no one can spend for his own needs or
as he likes in a<:arefreeway."
Inanother such pamphlet, the government of Ali Han TOre also mentions
another Chinese economic abuse, that of dmrziuli mailiang-the practice of
making certain merchants resPOllSI 'blefor supplying a fixed amount of goods
to the local garrison, at p~ fixed by the garrison itself.46The A merican
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 37
consul reported that these prices were often "ruinously low." Such abuses
certainly constituted economic reasons for rebellion, just as cessation of
Soviet trade did.
A nother economic factor often cited by existing sources is the requisition
order for horses issued by General Sheng, officially to aid the Nationalist
army in its anti-J apanese war effort.47Such an order was published in the
Xinjiang Daily in Urumqi on March 16, 1944.A ccording to this order, each
qu or district in Xinjiang was to contribute a specific number of horses,
which altogether amounted to some 10,000, in lieu of Xinjiang being re-
quired to send men to fight at the front. The period of collection was to be
fromMarch 16to the end of May 1944.Specific instructions were published
in the article as to the size and type of horse that would be acceptable, and
on its care and feeding while awaiting delivery to the government. The order
stated that if a district did not have sufficient horses, then it could donate
Xn $700 in lieu of each horse; this money would then beused to buy horses
fromthose districts that were primary horsebreeding areas, in particular the
Kazak areas in the north of the province and the I li valley.
A ctually, there is good reason to suppose that this order was simply one
?f Sheng's many ploys to raise funds for his government or his own use.For
I flstance, according to reports in the Xinjiang Daily between March and J uly
1944, a total of Xn $1,655,860 was contributed (enough to "buy" 2,365
horses at the price of Xn $700 quoted in the original order}-but only 282
horses.By far the largest cash contributions came from settled, non-horse
breeding areas like Kashgar and Thrfan.
48
Furthermore, the cost of a horse
~n the open market in Xinjiang at this time was about Xn $350.
49
I f the N~-
uonattsr government had actually intended to pay Xn $700 for a horse, ~t
Wouldcertainly have been unprecedented beneficence on its part; For t~1S
~eason, it was generally assumed that the order was made on Shengs own m-
I tiativeand that its goal was not horses but rather the collection of yet more
money from the population of the major cities of the region.
50
When Sheng finally left Xinjiang, the quotas were ~nfilled and no furt~er
actionon this "requisition" was taken. Thus, while this order may be consid-
ered pan of Sheng's oppressive policies and therefore a contributing cause
~f the rebellion, it was not the immediate nor principal cause of th~forma-
tion of the East Turkestan Republic. Rather, the primary economic causes
were the unstable economic situation in the summer of 1944, the thn:al of a
changeover to the Nationalists' inflation-ridden currency, and, most unpor-
tant,ly, the cessation of trade with the region's foremost trading panner, tbe
SoVI etUnion.
Chinese Moslem Relations
Exacerbated by the excesses of the Sheng regime, Chinese-Moslem relations
had deteriorated in the period of 1940-1944 for several reasons, One cause
---------
38 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HlSTORleAL BACKGROUND
was certainly the rule of warlord Sheng, who made extensive use of his secret
police and the military to impose his rule on the province. Both these orga-
nizations were predominantly Han Chinese, which further emphasized the
COlonialist character of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.
The Chinese military were, in particular, a source of constant antagonism
between Moslems and Chinese. U.S. Consul Robert Ward graphically de-
scribed the negative impact as well as the general appearance and behavior
of the Chinese military in Xinjiang:
The individual soldiers are nearly all of them boys in their teens or earty
twenties, woo have had practically DO training, are without education, have
seen nOthing of tbe war, and have existed for years on the starvation rations left
to them after their officers have appropriated for personal uses most or all of
the money intended to clothe and feed the soldiers themselves. The uniforms
which these troops wear are of tbeCheapest and dirtiest COlton; their shoes ~
often of straw; their ideas of Wsc:iplinewould have shamed a Carthaginian ~n
the first of the Punic Wars. The result has been that the natives of areas In
wllich these troops have been garrisoned have suffered from every form of
depredation and abuse that bungry, ill-clad, undisciplined troops con-
temptuous of their commanders could put upon an alien people.... Wherever
these troops have been stationed, respect for China and the Chinese bas
reacnec a new low among the general population. This is not, however, the
worst of the story. When the places that tbese soldiers garrison is attacked, as
often as not-aceording to both Chinese and native reports--maoy of them
literally throw down their guns and run.St
A nother imPOrtant element in exacerbating poor Chinese-Moslem rela-
tions was the Xinjiang prison system. Ward attributed much local antipathy
to this system, perfected under Sheng Shicaj, He wrote;
In [the prisons) the Chinese governance of Sinldang [Xinjiang] bad bit upon a
IDeans byWhich it was able to manufacture wbilelJ ot opponents of Chinese rule
in wholesale J ots.. 1beformula was simple: arrest every outstanding individual,
every personality suspected of more than ordinary force or resource, herd
!bern an into prison, and SUbject them to the mcst vicious torture. The beauty
of !his system was its Universality: everyone of these people bad friends, sup-
porters, ad~devotees, not to speak: of loyal wives, brothers, and other ":1_
aUves.The hatred was only the deeper because it was foI "ced to subsist In
darkness andsilence.S2
Furthermore, inXinjiang rumor played an important part in stirring local
fears Of.~ive Han Chinese immigration into the region. Such rumors may
have ongmated withthe highe.<>t level of Chinese government A ccording to
A merican sources. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, curmg a trip to Gansu
in 1942, reportedly stressed the need to repopulate western Gansu with im-
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 39
migrants from China proper. Chinese officials generally agreed that this
would benecessary to provide an economic base for future Chinese military
control in the Northwest.
53
In 1943 a Daily Bulletin given to the U.S. Embassy announced that Xin-
jiang could accommodate at least one million refugees, and that some thirty
million dollars had already been appropriated for homesteading and land
reclamation projects in the Northwest The source for this information, Mr.
Uang Hanzhao, added that the province of Xinjiang would be desirable also
because it was relatively unaffected by rising commodity prices affecting
other areas of China.
54
The general resettlement program for the Northwest was also said to in-
clude the ~olicy of "converting nomads to semi-pastoral semi-agricultural
economy." 5I n fact.by A pril 27, 1944, seven thousand refugees had arrived
and settled in the area around Hami.
56
While this did not constitute an im-
mediate threat to the IIi area, it was no doubt seen as a precursor of future
settlement of Han Chinese in the region.
By 1944, Han Chinese-Moslem relations had been deeply affected by the
immediate history of ethnic strife under Sheng Shicai, and by the behavior
of the Chinese military stationed in the province and the economic burden
their presence imposed. Sheng's secret police and his prison system helped
foster resistance to Chinese rule among the local Moslems, and rumor of a
possible influx of new Han Chinese settlers to the region served to deepen
the existing animosities between Moslems and the ruling Chinese.
The USSR and the lliRebellion
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the IIi rebellion would not
have been possible without the acquiescence of the USSR.Furthermore. as
will be demonstrated, the USSR was undoubtedly the source of arms used by
the East Turkestan armies to fight the Chinese.
Certainly there can be no question of Soviet disinterest in Xinjiang af-
fairs. The region bordered the sensitive Central A sian Republics of the
Soviet Union, and disturbances in the Xinjiang area could possibly infect
the Soviet's own Central A sian minorities. I n addition to political geog-
raphy, however, there were further reasons for Soviet interest in Xinjiang.
I deologically. the Soviet policy toward national liberation movements was to
encourage those that were part of the international revolution of the ~rl~'s
peoples Who, like the USSR, were fighting what they viewed as the rwm evils
of imperialism and colonialism. To follow its own ideological precepts, the
USSR could not easily refuse its blessing to long-oppressed., long-suffering
groups on its own borders, who were requesting no more than that .the
Soviet Union refrain from opposing them or aiding the Cb~ese a~t
them. Soviet disenchantment with Chinese border policy and WI thSheng I D
4
-----------_ 1 1 1
40 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
panicular also served to influence the USSR to give its tacit consent to the
rebellion.
A lso, as mentioned previously, the IIi region was a particularly wealthy
area, rich in natural resources and in potential for supplying much needed
raw materials to the USSR.A n independent sector in this strategic area
could not have been greeted with displeasure in Moscow, especially given
theunstablesituation inChinaproper, where Chiang seemed first wannand
then cool to Soviet advice. Soviet ability to assure itself of iiiproducts, free
of interruption or interference by the Chinese government, doubtless also
had its appeal.
Regardless of how attractive the idea of a local rebellion in Xinjiang may
havebeen to the Moscowauthorities, such a rebellion did not serveSoviet
interests internationally. During this period, the USSR was counseling ~e
Chinesegovernment to pursue aunited front and join with the Communist
Chinese in concerted efforts against the J apanese.A s Stalin did not expect
the Communist Party in China to beable to dominate Chinese politics fora
long time to come, he also urged acceptance of a coalition government of
Guomindang and the Communist Party-a policy that the Soviets believed
Wouldservethegreater interests of proletarian revolution. Ifthe Soviets~_
cameOpenlyinvolVedin Supporting a rebel group in the Northwest, obvi-
ously thisWoulddamage their position with Chiang Kai-shek's government.
Theonly POSSibleinvolvement, if indeed there was to beany, would have10
bemost COvert Inaremote area likeXinjiang, acovert operation to aidthe
local population to rise inrebellion wascertainly feasible.
Thisdoes not, however, mean that the Soviets were the principal causeof
the IIi rebellion. Evidence of direct Soviet I nvolvement in the rebellion
remains circumstantial. and anti~Chinese activity and independence move-
ments already existed in Xinjiang by 1944.Convinced of Soviet instigation
of the rebellion, however, the Chinese based their policies in Xinjiang on
the premise that the disturbances in IIiwere a result of Soviet intrigue.As
the Chinese viewof the Soviet role is fundamental to an understanding of
Chinese policy in Xinjiang, the Chinese account of the causes of the rebel-
lionmust betaken into consideration.
TOday'sNationalist viewof the rebellion isclear and concise: namely, that
"On November 7, 1944, the USSR took steps to create the I ning [Y ining)
govemmenn-c? Pro~Nationalist authors today contend that the entire
episodewas simplydue to Soviet strategy, the aimof which was to separate
Xinjiangfromthe Republic of China.
58
The rebellion in the three districts is
seenasanextension of the longstruggle between China and Russia for con.
trot of Chinese Central A sia.I n the Chinese view.the Soviet Union was
~iItyof manipulating the local Turki peoples, causing them to rebel in the
mI Stakenideathat theUSSRwould allowthem to be independent.
Fromtheveryfirst daysof the rebellion, Nationalist reports on the events
GEOGRAPHICAL A.ND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 41
inIIi indicate an eagerness on the part of the military leaders involvedto
placetotal blame on the USSR,an eagerness reflected inthe Nationalist or,
flcialsin Urumqt who, before fully verifyinginitial incorrect accounts, an-
nouncedthat thjs wasan incident causedby theSoviet Union, inthepattern
of theearlier March 1944border incidents.I nrelatingthe newsof therebel-
lionasheheard it fromlocal government sources inUrumqi, BritishConsul
Turral reported that blame had already been ascribed to the Soviets, long
beforethere was any hard evidence.Hewrote that the Chinesebased their
accusation primarily on rumor and on two pieces of evidence: a Soviet
residencecertificate found on adead body, and thefact that theincident be-
ganon November 7, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution-
59
Further
evidencecited later by the Chinese included the claimthat the rebels had
manyhigh-quality weapons, and that Soviet adviserswere present with the
rebel forces.The means of identifyingtheseadvisersasSoviet was not given.
Chongqingaccepted such "proof," but it isinteresting to note that despite
thebelief in Soviet complicity in-or open instigation of-the rebellion, no
official complaint was lodged, then or later, with the Soviets.The situation
wasactually unclear in the three districts during the 1944-45 period, but
subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the forcesof rebellion were pre-
dominantly Turkic Moslems who were supported by the local population,
and that, as a result of the IIi rebellion. a Moslem-not socialist or com-
munist-state wasfounded inthe iiivalley.
-~---------
CHA PTER 4
TheEstablishment of the
East Turkestan Republic
Prior to the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic in the IIi~lley. a
series of incidents in the northern Xinjiang area foreshadowed the Vlol~nce
that was to erupt in 1944.In 1943, as Sheng Shicai's rule became ipcreas~g.
ly oppressive and unpredictable, and as the control imposed on the region
by his police and military forces tightened, rumors of impending troubl~
reached the A merican consul in Urumqt, who informed the U.S.secretary 0
state:
I I is reported vaguely that there exists political uneasiness among the Xinj~Dg
population, and it is stated somewhat more panieularly that a sort of gue~
warfare has been in progress in the A ltai region between the local populatlO1l
and the political authorities for over ayear.t
DUring 1943 and 1944 incidents increased in both number and intensity,
and by J uly 1944Kazak attacks on Chinese police posts and small garrisons
were endemic.Referred to as "bandit raids" by the Chinese, such attacks
were directed at both Chinese military and police and, inat least one case:
the Xinjiang Provincial Government itself: in early J uly Uighurs at J imanar
on the Sino~Soviet border took all the cattle and sheep belonging to the
provincial government and drove them across the Soviet border.
2
Before the disturbances of September 1944, which marked the ope~g of
hostilities between local Moslem forces and the Nationalist Chinese,
resistance groups had begun distributing leaflets that called on the regi~n's
non~Han Chinese nationalities to rise against their oppressors and begin a
MOSlemrevolution in Xinjiang.
3
Despite the warnings thus given to the Na-
tionalist troops in the IIiValley and elsewhere, the local commander of the
Y ining garrison was singularly unprepared for the fighting to come.
ESTABUSHMENT OF tns ETR 43
The IIiRebellion
OnSeptember 11, 1944, the day General Sheng was boarding a plane for
Chongqingand his newpost inthe central government, General DuDefu in
Y iningfound it necessary to send soldiers to quell disturbances in Gongha
County, some fiftymiles east, along the IIiRiver.
4
A companyofninety men
fromthe Public Security Cavalry, 4th Regiment, under the command of
Vice-Regimental Commander Xi arrived in the county on the 16th, but be-
cause the "rioters," as theywerecalled insubsequent Chinesereports, num-
beredover two hundred, the company was unable effectivelyto control the
area.
5
On September 23, after further incidents of rioting occurred in the same
areaand as the troops sent were still reporting their inability to handle the
situation, General Du wired Urumqt Military Headquarters to ask for rein-
forcementsbefore sending additional troops into GonghaCounty.6Support
was not forthcoming, however, as the government in Urumqi was in some
disorder after Sheng's departure. Doubtless encouraged by this tack of
response from the provincial capital, the disturbances grew in intensity
throughout the month of September.
Rumors of the increasing antigovernment movement in the IIiarea
reachedUrumqi in October.The British consul, Turral, reported that the IIi
valleysituation was "obscure," but that serious trouble was apparently brew-
ingin the Upper and L ower Bortala valleys, as wen as in the counties of
Qinghe and Gongha."
As aresult, the provincial government sent Commissioner of Civil A ffairs
DengXianghai to Y ining in October to investigate the situation.On his ar-
rival, the local police chief, Gao Y i, assured himthat there was no need for
any government alarm over the IIi area since all was peaceful and quiet
Dengpersonally visited the market areas, where hefound the atmosphere
calm. He reported to the government that the IIi situation seemed quite
normal.
8
As rumors of rebellion circulated through the provincethat autumn, the
first real battle against the Chinese had already been fought.On October 8,
1944,a force variously reported as being fromsix bundred to a thousand
menstrong stormed Nitka, the county seat of Gongha County, someseventy
miles east of Y ining. Soldiers at the garrison there were at first over-
Whelmedby the attack, but, rallied by the garrison commander, General Li,
they managed to fight for several days before being forced out of the town
onOctober 12,withdrawing to the nearby villageof Machaer on the road 10
Vining.The rebels thus gained control of their first county seat and ob-
tainedtheir first major victoryover ChineseNationalist fo~~.
.A ccordingto the Xinjiang Provincial Government's stausucs, thepopula-
tionof Gongha County in 1946was asfollows:
9
----------
44 ESTABUSHMENT OF me ETR
HanChinese 593
Hui 336
Uighur 2,164
Taranchi 3,638
Kazak 30,693
Mongol 4,188
WhiteRussian 491
Others 1,073
Total 43,176
As the vast majority, 70 percent, were Kazak, these figures add credence
to the belief that the motive force for the rebellion came from the Kazaks
who were angry over Sheng's heaVY -handed policies. A ccording to one
Kazak account, resistance to the Chinese actually dated fromJ une 1944
when the Kazaks themselves had finally killed a "particularly bad Chinese
soldier" and thus touched off aseries of revenge killings.to
General Du urged the Xinjiang military commander and acting governor,
Zhu Shaoliang, to send reinforcements 10Y ining, but arrangements to
strengthen the western garrisons were not completed for.some weeks, by
which time the movement against the Chinese had spread. I n government
reports, the many incidents in September and October were still described
as "bandit" raids, and POSSiblythe Urumqi military dismissed reports fr~m
Vining on more bandit activity as merely being further small-scale dis-
turbances.
I I
Presumably if Zhu had had a clearer idea of the situation, he
would have chosen a different COurseof action. A s it was, the significance of
the IIidisturbances was slow to penetrate, and the inaction of the provincial
government had disastrous resUlts for the Nationalist troops in the illvalI ey.
Having successfully established their control over Nilka, the anti-Chinese
forces' next target was the city of Vining. A s the largest town and center of
the 1Ii valley, Vining had been an importantlrading and cultural center for
years. A t the time of the rebellion in 1944, its population was around
1~9,OOO, the 92,CXXJ Uighurs far Outnumbering the 15,000 Han Cbines.e.n;.~
Citywas also home for 22,900 Kazak, 7,700 Hut, and 4,500 White RUSSians.
A ccording to military sources, Sheng had chosen to fortify Vining in the
1~, moving several battalions 10 the city over the years when he was in
power.A t the time of the rebellion, there were three battalions permanently
stationed there. These were the I st and 2d battalions of the 19th Regiment,
and the 3d Battalion of the 21st Regiment In addition, there was a unit of
replacement troops (reserves), but these were neither fully trained nor fully
armed. The City was also the base for a small air force unit with trainee
pilots who used vintage aircraft for training purposes. A t the nearby towns
of SUiding, HUOcheng, and Chaosu were additional troops, so that the total
of Nationalist troops inthe illarea was around ten thousand. of whom some
eight thousand were in Vining itself.
ESTABliSHMENT OF THE ErR 45
Despite the seeming strength of the garrison at the time, soldiers in
Y ining suffered from poor morale and had only outmoded and inadequate
equipment. I n September 1944 when General Du had first been sent to the
area, be had noted the deficiencies and had requested the Urumqi govern-
ment to upgrade the arms and equipment. But that was when the change in
government was taking place, and no immediate action was taken.On Octo-
ber 9, General Du himself flew to Urumqi to ask for assistance and also,
most probably, to appraise the changes then being made in the region's gov-
ernment and military.13 General zao Erling was subsequently sent to take
chargeof the Y ining garrison while Du remained in Urumqi, and it was Zao
whowas incharge when the attack on Y ining finally came.
A ccounts of the initial attack vary, but most agree that it began on the
morningof November 7, 1944, and that the attackers numbered only four or
fivehundred men, the majority of whom were Uighur, Kazak, and White
Russian.A ccording to an eyewitness report relayed to British Consul Turral
in Urumqt by Chinese sources, the signal for the attack came from the
Soviet Consulate, as did the first machine-gun fire of the battles, being
aimed at the Nationalist A ir Force Headquarters some sixty meters down
thestreet.U No other account, however, includes such explicit details of the
~rst fewhours of fighting, nor does any so directly implicate the USSR, cast-
109doubt on this official version.
DUringthe first three days of fighting, the attacking force managed to iso-
latethe Nationalist troops in three main strongholds of the city: the military
barracks at A irambek east of the city; the Guiwang Temple near the airport;
and the air force training field.The attackers thus felt the town sufficienlly
secure to declare the establishment of the Provisional Government of the
East Turkestan Republic. The new government was J ed by the region's most
prestigious religious leader and I slamic scholar, A li Han TOre, who an-
nOuncedthe founding of the republic on November 12, 1944: The.fact that
thegovernment was so quickly organized, even before all NatlonallS~troops
had been forced out of the city, points to considerable preparation be-
forehand by the nationalistic core of Turkic leaders. Certainly, the new gov
emment COmmittee must have had the acquiescence if not the total support
of ~he.I ocal population. Given the successes the revolutionary forces ~re .to
~nJ OYm the coming months, it appears most likely that the population did,
lD fact, support the new republic with considerable enthusiasm. .
.Theobjectives of the new ETR government were dearly stat~man emo-
tiOnal tract I ssued in the name of A li Han TOreand stamped WI th the seal of
theEast Turkestan Government:
The Turkestan Islam Government is organized: praise be to Allahfor.his
manifoldbiessin...,tA llah be praised! Theaid of A llah bas given us the neroem
C"". if have set
tooverthrowthegovernment of theoppressor Chinese. But even we
OUrselvesfree, can it be pleasinginthesight of our God if we only stand and
'"
---------
46 ESTABLiSHMENT OF ttts ETR
watch while you, our brethren in religion. _ .still bear the bloody grievance of
subjection to the black politics aT the oppressor Government of the savage
Chinese? Certainly our GOO would not be satisfied. We will not throw" down
our arms until we have made you free from the ffvebloody fingersof the
Chinese oppressors- power, nor until the very roots of the Chinese oppressors'
government have dried and died away from the face of the earth of East
Turkestan. whichwe have inherited as our native land from our fathers and
our grandfathers.. I S
I n another handbill circulated in the region in 1944-1945, a political plat-
form of fOurteen points was outlined. including the following (summarized)
objectives (for the full text of these nationalistic demands, see appendix E):
1.End Chinese rule.
2.Establish eqUality for all nationalities.
3.Organize a national
16
political alliance representing all people inEast
Turkestan in numbers proportionate 10their population.
4.Place local government in local hands.
5.Promote free cultural development in all groups and the use of local ian-
guages.
6.Reestablish kx:ally manned military units.
7. AbolishSheng Shicai's prison system.
8.Free all thosearrested under Sheng. .
9.Establish friendly relations with [he USSR and resume trade, especially
for cattle, wool, skins and grains.
10.Reduce talI a.tioo.
I L Establish religious freedom.
12.Oppose immigraliOl1ofHao Chinese into Xinjiang.
I 3.lncrease theamount of irrigated land.
14.End all forced I abor.17
No mention is made in these tracts of a desire for autonomy within China.
On the contrary, the rousing, emotional language in each case appears to~-
vite Specifically Moslem support for a Moslem government, free of all Chi-
nese rule. Certainly, as the fighting continued during the winter of 1944-45
and into the summer, Moslem zeal for eliminating all Han Chinese from the
soil of Xinjiang seemed clear to Chinese residents of the three districts.
The immediate response of the beleaguered illgarrison was to ask for relief
from.the Urumqi and other military units nearby. On November 9, Gene~
Z:a0 10Y mmg wired Urumqt asking for reinforcements, and he included m
hiS report the information that the Soviet Consulate was the base of the
whole Operation. Orders fer reinforcements were sent out on November 15,
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ErR 47
whenthegarrison at J inghe was ordered to send troops of the7th Division
andthe new45th Division under General Li Tiejun to assist General zao.
Bythe time General Li began the 175-milejourney to Y ining, resistancein
the region had spread. He would be forced back to J inghe without ever
reachinghisdestination.I S
I nUrumqi, the garrison commander, Zhu Shaoliang, ordered General Du
to flyback to his post in Y ining to take over from General Zao and to
report directly to himon the situation.A ccordingly, Du returned to Y ining
onNovember 22by air and wired his report to headquarters on thesame
day.Thesituation of the troops inY ining hadbecomedesperate, withheavy
casualtiessuffered.A t the GuiwangTemple onlysomeonehundreddefend-
erswereleft, according to Du's report 19The next day, November 23, Dure-
questedfurther support, askingspecificallythat the3dBattalion of the 19th
Regiment at J inghe besent to assist them.Thisunit was soordered, but, J ike
General L l's forces, it was not able to fight its waythrough the Moslem
forcesnear Hi to relieveY ining.
Despite heavy losses and increasing scarcity of food, the Nationalist
troopsheld onto their positions.In late December, asthesiegeof thethree
strongholdscontinued, Zhu himself flewover Y ining.but his planewas un-
ableto land due to heavy ground fire.A drop of muchneeded supplies was
made,but jUdgingfromDu's continued requests for aidit appears that these
suppliesdidnot reach their intended target.
On Christmas Day, the town of Hulyuan, near Y ining, fell to the Turki
forces, followed on J anuary 3, 1945, by the fall of the important town of
Suiding, west of Y ining on the road leading to J inghe (located three hun-
dredmileswest of Urumqi). In Y ining itself, fightingcontinued until J anu-
ary28, 1945, when General J iang, in command of the Nationalist forces in
theGuiwangTemple, was killed in an offensiveby the IIi forces.With tbis
major defeat, the Urumqi command finallygavethe order for the Nation-
alist troops to withdraw to J inghe onJ anuary 29.2:0Remnants of theNation-
a~t armywereattacked as they attempted to leavethe city, and manywere
killedin the fighting that followed.Of the nearly four thousand men who
had been defending the airfield, only eight hundred remained alive, and
most of these were killed as they evacuated their positions.
21
Despite the
strengthof the garrison, the entire Y ining areawas lost to the forcesof the
East Turkestan Republic in the first three months of fighting.
Despitethe bitter cold of the winter of 1945,withtemperatures as lowas
-35
0
F, fighting continued.
22
I n February the Chinese suffered a major
d~feat.Some nine hundred Chinese troops had been holding the pass ~t
Xinenai, but on February 17aforceof three thousand insurgents took thlS
fonine<!position, followed in rapid succession by victories over the Chinese
forcesat Sungshukou and Santai,23On February 20it was learned that two
to three thousand Chinese troops sent out from J inghe to bolster the
----------
48 ESTABliSHMENT OF THE ETR
Xinertai garrison bad been annihilated by the Turkestan! forces. By theend
of February, the major garrison town of J inghe, which had become tbe
Chinese headquarters for fighting the local insurgents, was under siege.
While the fighting continued, the central and provincial governments
both prepared to react politicaUy to the situation, which was rapidly damag-
ing Chinese prestige in the region and causing considerable concern in
Chongqing.
On February 5, 1945, General U Tiejun telegraphed an official report on
the situation to the central government, explaining in as full detail aswas
then available. The "rioters," he noted, had declared the establishment of an
"East Turkestan Republic" based in Y ining.A ltogether the newgovern-
ment controlled more than ten Counties with a total population of over
500.000, half ofwhom were Kazak.
General Listated that the entire incident had begun in the townof ~~a
A te, in the Kazakstan Republic of the USSR.He gaveno source for this10-
formation.Healso stated that regular army troops trained by the Kazakstan
government hadbeen involved in the fighting, and that theweapons used by
the rebel forces pointed directly to Soviet involvement since they w~re
primarily Russian and German models.He gaveas further proof of Sovi~t
involvement the fact that the tactics used bythe rebels wereclearly Soviet I D
originsincetheywere typical Commumsr taCiics.24
I naddition to the report submitted to the government by General U, a
further report was sent by General Hou Sheng, commander of the 29th
Corps in Xinjiang.His summary for the government on the reasons for th~
disastrous Nationalist losses inthe Hi areaattributed blame to Sheng Shicat
A CCOrdingto Hou, Sheng had known of plans for the rebellion and that it
would receive sUpport from the USSR.Hou also condemned Gao Vi, the
ViningPoliceChief, for misleading Deng Xianghai during hisvisit to Y i~ng
and declared that Gao had not informed the government of the coming
rebellion out of friendship and loyalty to Sheng-who would beblamedfor
theuprising.zs
The central government received another account of the Hi rising from
the new Governor Wu.On March 17, 1945, he made his official repor.t-
roundly condemning local county chiefs in the three districts who I ledthetr
posts dUringthe fighting, showing their cowardice. He concurred with Gen-
eral Li that the basic force behind the IIi rebellion was the USSR, and he
cautioned the central government that Xinjiang lacked the military strength
[0retake theVininggarrison area.26
The picture of the rebellion thus being conveyed to the provincial and
central governments by participants and observers was that of a Soviet-led,
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ETR 49
Soviet-inspired movement of insurgency involving wen-armed, well-led
troops, with Soviet training and perhaps with Soviet officers. Nonetheless,
the Chongqing government did not lodge an official protest with the Soviet
Union during the initial months of the campaign, despite the fact that the
three districts were being quickly overrun and some thirty thousand Chinese
troops had been killed in the fighting.
The general public was not informed of the defeats suffered on this far
northwestern front In Urumqi rumor flowed in and out, increased by the
lack of official news reports and further heightening the anxiety felt among
the local population. A s if oblivious to the IIi situation, the Xinjiang Daily
remained silent on the topic. I t did, however, continue to run stories on the
great family of the Chinese people, emphasizing that all the peoples of
China were brothers through blood and bone, all being the children of the
great emperor Huang Oi.
27
The concepts presented in such articles were viewed with concern by the
U.S.representative in Urumqi, Robert Ward, who pointed out in an official
report that Chinese policy in Xinjiang seemed to be based on several as-
sumptions: mainly the belief that Xinjiang people were part of the original
Chinese race; the assertion that Xinjiang had been a part of China for two
thousand years (which, Ward notes, "has never been and is not now true in a
racial, linguistic, or cultural sense"); and the contention that the "natives"
were meek, never revolting against their government unless instigated to do
~from the Outside.
28
A ll three points being untenable on the basis ofXin-
J iang's history, Ward contended that unless the Chinese adopted immediate,
radical changes in attitude and administration in Xinjiang, future revolts
were inevitable.
Ward, of course, was not alone in his Observations, and some members of
the Nationalist Government also seriously questioned the basis of Chinese
policy in Xinjiang. While some may have accepted without question the
story of Soviet manipulation and intrigue in Xinjiang, alternative views were
also being presented. L iu Zeying, commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign
~~irs in Urumqi, believed that, contrary to the picture being presented by
militarists, the USSR did not desire outright absorption of Xinjiang but
wanted, for its own security, to see a friendly regime installed in the prov-
~nce.Having experienced Sheng's turnabout and the resulting instabil-
iry, L iu felt that me only answer to Xinjiang's troubles was to implement the
many reforms long needed in the region.
29
As Chongqing sought an answer to the Y ining situation, the provincial
government in Xinjiang sought to use political countermeasures in a belated
attempt to win support among some factions of the local population. It
ordered the release of some of the many political prisoners still held in
Urumqj and appointed several of them to govemmeatposts- On J anuary 12,
1945, the newly released Kazak leader A I en wang-"was appointed vice-
- - - - - - - - - - _1
SO ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR
administrative superintendent of the A ltai District. A nother former
prisoner was the Mongol Prince Manjukjab, who was appointed to the same
post in Y enki. These men were sent on "pacification" missions to the
minorities of the nonhern A ltai areas. A len Wang personally-but un-
successfully-visited Osman Batur, the Kazak leader initially allied to the IIi
movement, in an attempt to persuade himto side with the central govern-
ment against the new insurgency movement. 31
DUring the same month, the governor also announced the new "Frontier
A reas A dministration Official Examination Order" passed by the cent~1
government, whichrequired that all government employees study thehis-
tory of the region to which they were sent and learn at least one of the local
native languages of their area.A s a result, ''Turki'' language classeswere
heldeveryeveningat Urumqi's Civil A ffairs Department offices.32
I nA pril 1945, it was rumored in Urumqi that Governor Wu had offe~ed
his resignation.Behind this rumor was the fact that General Zhu Shaolian
disapproved of Wu's handling of the iii affair. I n addition, the two were
known to differ over the best SOlutionto the province's long-standing prob-
lems.
33
Wuwas also havingdifficulty dealing with the growingpolitical te~-
sian, caused partly by the growingstrength of the antigovernment forcesIn
the three districts and partly by the increasing number of Nationalist troops
inUrumqi where their demands on the local economy had earned themthe
epithet "human-racer lOCUSts. ,,34
If Wu did indeed tender his resignation it was not accepted, for hecon-
tinued as governor for nearly one more year. I n a conciliatory gesture
toward the people of Xinjiang, heannounced that the Xinjiang government
would make some Xn $4 million available for "spring plowing" loans.
A ltogether, a total of Xn S60million was projected in financial assistance
for the rest of 1945 for the development of the province.The government
was also ableto resume supplying electricity to the capital, Urumqi, inJ un~
using equipment from what was formerly an aircraft parts factory.This
temporarily, at least, boosted morale inthe city.35
Further, in J une 1945 the names of the new representatives of the prov-
inceto the Provisional A dvisory A ssembly to beheld inChongqing werean-
nounced.Out of atotal of 42named, only 16wereChinese, indicating anew
awareness of the need for increased national minority participation in gov_
ernment The provincial government also announced the release of some
235men fromprison in Urumqi-a Short-livedvictory for the local people,
however, as the provincial government almost immediately arrested new
suspects as "Communist spies," a label that could result in harsh treatment
aswell asanindefinite stayinthe local jail.36
At the national level, the government had decided it would seek an inter-
national senlemem of the problem in the Uivalley.I t was rumored that the
rebeUionwould be brougjn up at the forthcoming international conference
ESTABliSHMENT OF THE ETR 51
of the Soviet Union and the United States in San Francisco that summer. It
followed that military activity be confined to a holding action. Certainly. no
moveagainst the rebel districts was made, despite the fact that the Chinese
military presence continued to increase. By A pril 1945 over 100,000Nation-
alist troops were in the province. but they remained in their fortifications,
taking no offensive action against the IIiforces.
Prior to the San Francisco talks, the Chinese government did make an ap-
proach to the Soviet Union. I n J une 1945, the Chinese quietly contacted the
Soviets through the Soviet consul in Urumqi, asking for Soviet good offices
to aid in the settlement of the IIiquestion. The consul deferred to Moscow,
however, and said that the matter should be left to Molotov and T.V.Soong
to discuss during the talks then being planned for the two in Moscow.
37
The Fighling Continues
With both Zhu Shaoliang and Chiang Kai-shek convinced that the only
solution to the problem in Xinjiang was through international channels, the
Nationalist forces in Xinjiang sat and waited behind their fortifications, suf-
fering record-breaking cold weather.
38
Doubtless encouraged by this failure
of the Nationalists to react, the rebel forces continued to expand the area of
their control unchecked. By the end of February 1945.they had arrived at
the garrison town of J inghe, from which reinforcements had unsuccessfully
tried to reach Vining some weeks earlier. A n important frontier post.J inghe
was then manned by some fifteen thousand Nationalist troops. including
units that had been forced to retreat from the IIivalley as well as fresh units
sent from Urumqi. Because the town was well fortified, the IIi forces chose
to bypass it. attacking outposts to the east of it first.and thereby hoping to
CUtthe town off from any possible outside support. By mid-J uly, IIi forces
had successfully cut the main road connecting the town of Tacbeng some
two hundred miles north of Y ining, and the town of Wusu, a major point on
the J inghe-Urumqi road By the end of J uly, most of Tachen\fistrict. in-
cluding the district capital of Tacbeng itself, was in rebel hands.
I n A ugust, the rebel troops. now proclaiming themselves to be the army
Of.the East Turkestan Republic, took Hefeng County (some one ~undred
miles east of Emin), forcing the Nationalist troops in the area to WI thdraw
south toward the town of Wusu. A lso in A ugust, Kazak troops of the ETR
under Osman Batur entered the district capital of A shan, effectively control-
lingthe city and outlying districts by mid-September.
40
With these victories under their belt. the ETR forces now converged on
the town of J inghe. By September, the town was cut off and surrounded by
ETR forces.and an all-out attack on the town was launched on september 3.
On September 7.after only four days of fighting, the city fell
That same week, other ETR units were preparing for an attack on Wusu,
52 ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR
another important garrison town on the J inghe-Urumqt road. Chinese
claims that Soviet planes were involved in the initial attack on Wusu, which
began on September 5, remain unconfirmed. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that there were planes available to the ETR forces, since they had
taken the airfield of the Nationalist air force in Y ining early in the fighting.
Ifthey had pilots among their own nationalities, it would have been possible
for aircraft that was not Soviet in origin to be involved in the Wusu fighting.
On September 6, the Nationalist forces in Wusu were in full retreat
toward the Manas River, itself a scant seventy miles from the provincial cap-
ital.A s news of the latest defeat reached Urumqi, hundreds of refugees be.
gan pouring out of that city on the road to Hami and toward the relative
safety of the next province. Wives of high government officials were
evacuated by air, and it appeared that the Nationalists were about to aban-
don the province. A t this point, the cost of a place on an ordinary bus out of
Urumqi rose to between Xn $50,000 and Xn S90,OOO; the permit to leave
COStan additional Xn $10,000.41
While the ETR forces forged their way almost unopposed toward the
provincial capital during the summer of 1945, the central government con.
tinued in its belief that only an international SOlution was feasible in Xin-
jiang. A s a result of Soong's summer talks with Molotov, aTreaty of Friend.
ship and A lliance between the Soviets and the Chinese was signed on
A ugust 14, 1945.I n the Exchange of Notes" appended to this document,
the Soviets Specifically disclaimed an interest in Xinjiang and recognized the
region as clearly within Chinese territory.42 The actual situation in Xinji~n.g
worsened during A ugust, however, and in early September it reached c-ss
proportions when the ETR forces reached the Manas River.
On September 7,1945, Chiang Kai shek informed U.S.A mbassador Hur-
ley of the gravity of the situation and was advised to take up the matter
through diplomatic channels. A ccordingly, Chiang summoned the Soviet
ambassador the same day and lodged an official protest over the attacks on
the towns of Wusu, J inghe, and Pull, the latter being a small town in the
Pamirs in the far south of Xinjiang, which reportedly had been bombed on
A ugust 22, 1945.
43
Having rhus begun the official Chinese protest, be n~t
summoned General Zhang Zhizbong on September 8, charging bim ~th
the task of flying to Urumqi to assess the situation and to report back to him
immediately.44
Before departing for Urumqi, Zhang first sought the advice of the Nation-
alists' Xinjiang representatives then living in the capital, namely, Mesut
Sa.b?, Mehmet Emin Bugra, and I sa Y usuf A lptekin. Mesut Sabri ~s
ongJ Dal1yfrom Y ining but had been educated in I stanbul, Turkey, as a medi-
ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR 53
cal doctor.Upon his return to Xinjiang, hehad been involvedinlocal edu-
cation as well as running his own medical practice there.He ran foul of
ShengShicai, however, and wasforced to flee.He madehiswayto Chong-
qingwhere, during World War I I , hebecameamember of theCentral Exec-
utiveCommittee of the Guomindang.Supported by the CC Clique, healso
becameamember of the National Political Council.
Mebmet Emin Bujra was a native of Hetian (Khotan}, wherehis father
had been the emir-a local prince or ruler.He had been involvedin the
short-lived East Turkestan Republic of 1933, but when the republic dis-
solvedhe, too, made his wayout of the province and ended up in Chong-
qtng,wherehewasmade a member of the National A ssembly, representing
Xinjiang.A long with I sa Y usuf A lptekin, hefounded apublishinghousein
Chongqingand wrote and edited magazines dedicatedto Xinjiang, including
AlIai, Tianshan, and Voice of Turkestan. Both heand I sa wereknown asar-
dent nationalists, appealing for autonomy for Xinjiangand demandingthat
the central government recognize Xinjiang's Turkic Moslems as one of
China'smajor nationalities, equal to theMongolsandTibetans.
Unliketheother two, I sa Y usuf A lptekin had beeneducated inChina-in
Beijingand Nanjing. A s early as 1932he had approached the Chinese
government on behalf of his native Xinjiang asking for change in the
government'spolicies toward that region andwarningof Russian incursions
intheprovince.
Thesethree exiles had explicit suggestions for General Zhang when he
visited them to seek their advice.A mong these was the request that the
government follow the program of autonomy for minority areas envisaged
by Dr.SunY at-sen and implement this policy in Xinjiang.Theyasked that
thecentral government ensure that the Turki languagebeused as the me-
diumof instruction in Xinjiang schools, and that personal freedomssuchas
freedomof speech, association, and publication be guaranteed,.and furth.er,
that religious freedom for aU be assured.A ccording to Mehmet's memoirs,
he, J sa, and Mesut were invited by General Zhang to return to Xinjiang.to
helpinresolving the Y ining situation. Given permission to return to Xin-
jiang, the three men finally arrived back in their homeprovincein October
1945.
45
Armed with this advice, General Zhang wasprepared to fly to theNO~-
west.From the beginning of his involvement with Xinjiang, Zhang.Zhi-
zhongshowed an ability to grasp principles that hadelud~other Chinese
Officialsin Chongqtng-c-namely, that immediate oonsideratl~n woul~ha:re
to be givento the case for reform. and that respect for national mtnonty
Wishesin various cultural areas would bea prerequisite for the success of
anyfutureNationalist policies inXinjiang. . . ..
The sensitivity with which he approached the problems I D Xinjiang
reneeter to agreat extent Zhang's background Hegraduated fromtheBao-

2
54 ESTABliSHMENT OF rm: ETR
ding Military A cademy and studied in Germany before beginning his mili-
tary career in China, where he was first a divisional commander and then
commander of the Fifth A rmy. I n 1937-1939, he was chairman of Hunan
province, but with the intensification of the war in China he was made head
of the Political Training Board of the National Military Council. Insuch a
post, Zhang had no personal military power base, but he did have access to
Chiang Kai-shek. Trusted by Chiang, Zhang had been involved in delicate
negotiations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party
prior to the "Y ining A ffair." With a reputation for honesty, forthrightness,
and congeniality, he was an excellent choice as a mediator, his appointment
to Xinjiang reflecting both the seriousness with which the central govern-
ment viewed the Xinjiang problem and the degree of trust Zhang enjoyed
with Chiang Kai-shek. A s will be seen in succeedfng pages, Zhang used ron-
siderable tact and patience in dealing with the representatives of the three
districts, earning him praise from observers and- participants. I n the end,
however, even his patience was exhausted.
On September 13, 1945, General Zhang arrived in Urumqi. On Septem-
ber 14 and 15 he made calls on the Soviet representative, A cting Consul
F.G.Evesoff. No record is available of what was said during these meetings,
but it was widely believed at the time that he suggested strongly to the
Soviets that unless there was a halt to hostilities the Chinese would make
the affair an international incident.
Regardless of what was said, it is known that Zhang departed from
Urumqi on September 16, and the next day in Chongqing, the Soviet ambaS-
sador informed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign A ffairs that the USSR
would be pleased to use Soviet good offices to mediate in ending the Xin-
jiang dispute. A t the same time, he also informed the Chinese that, in what
British Consul Turraj called an "amazing coincidence," the Soviets had just
received a direct request for Soviet assistance in mediating the dispute from
the representatives of the three districts. These representatives also wished
the Soviets to relay 10the Chinese the message that the people of the three
districts "had no desire to separate from China, that they desired autonomy
for the districts where the rebel regimes had been set up and that the reeson
for the revolt had been past oppression. ,>46
A nd so, aCCOrding to the information available at present, the Chin~
and the government of the three districts arranged an informal ceaseffre I D
the region, with a temporary ceasetlre line being drawn at the Manas Rive~.
When the fighting stopped so abruptly and so near to the important pnze
of the provincial capital. Urumqi, the immediate interpretation in some
quan~rs was that the Soviet Union had simply decided that it had gained a
suffiCiently large base for future operations and could therefore afford to
hal~the advance. keeping the richest districts of Xinjiang under its ~ntrol.
Chinese who blamed the Soviets for the entire affair shared this belief and
ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR ss
saw in the "amazing coincidence" of a near simultaneous Ilirequest for
Soviet mediation and Soviet offers Of"ood offices to end the affair proof of
Soviet complicity in the iiirebeUion.
4
I t is difficult, however, to accept this as a total explanation, for the fight-
ing force of the ETR was known to include many devout Moslems, anti-
Soviet in their political leanings and intent on establishing a Moslem state,
ledby their own distinguished Moslem leader, A li Han TOre.It was for A li
Han that the Kazaks, for instance, fought; to picture them fighting under the
leadership of a known Soviet Communist is inconsistent both with the situa-
tion that existed in 1944 and with later developments. But, if weaccept that
the USSR did not exercise military control over the E1R at this early stage,
howcan the events of mid-September 1945 be explained? Why did the army
of the ETR choose to stop on the virtual doorstep of Urumqi, the capture of
which would have given them such an imposing psychological aswell as mil-
itary victory? The answers to these questions are suggested in the following
discussion on the peace negotiations and are clarified in succeeding chapters
which more clearly demonstrate the objectives of the ETR leadership, the
aspirations of the region's Turkic majority, and the role of the Soviet Union
inXinjiang during this period.
The Peace Negotiations: Phase I
On October 12, 1945, three men appeared on horseback on the west bank of
the Manas River, the temporary ceasettre line of the Nationalist and ETR
forces.A fter making their crossing, they were met and escorted to Urumqi
by junior government officials the same day.A ll three wore the smart green
military uniform of the ETR amy. complete with the Moslem emblems of
thecrescent moon and star in gold.They identified themselves asRahim J an
SelimogJ u, A bmet J an Kasimi, and Ebulhayir TOre, representatives of the
ETR and members of its governing council, abody of seventeen members.
. Rahim was a Uighur Turk from the IIiarea in his forties. He was the son-
I~-la~ of Mesut Sabri, who, as previously mentioned, was also about to at-
nve 10the provincial capital
48
.
A hmet J an Kasimi was also a native of the llivalley and was thirty years
Ol~in 1945.Inhis short career in Xinjiang politics, he had already ~n tm-
p~oned in Urumqi by Sheng Shical for a number of years and had .nsen to
his POSition as minister of foreign affairs inthe ETR by virtue of thiS badge
of honor as well as by his very considerable natural abillty.49 L ike many
yo~ng men of his generation,. A hmet bad been educated in ~et Ce.ntral
A sia, and as a result be was fluent not only in his native Turti and Chinese
but also in Russian. I n the negotiations and inthe coalition gov~ent that
resulted. A bmet played a key role although Rahim J an was ted1nicaI ly the
leader of the three-man delegation.

2
56 ESTABUSHMENT OF 1HE ETR
The last member of the delegation was Ebulhayir TOre. He, too, was a
member of the council of the E1R but. unlike the other two, held no minis-
terial post-so
A s the principal Chinese negotiator, Zhang Zhizhong, had not yet ar-
rived, the three ill delegates made their first call on the Soviet representa-
tive, A cting Consul F.G.Evesoff, on October 13, 1945. It was Evesoff who
in tum presented the IIi delegates to the Chinese special commissioner of
the Ministry of Foreign A ffairs, Wu Zhixiong (Chaucer H.wu), who was
then stationed inUrumqi. I t was arranged that the three llidelegates would
meet withGeneral Zhang as soon as possible after the tatters arrival, slated
for October 14.
Unfortunately, the talks met a serious setback before they even began.
The three IIidelegates presented themselves as the representatives of the
East Turkestan Republic and wished to present their credentials as such to
General Zhang at the first meeting. Zhang was informed of this intention
before the first meeting and made clear to Consul Evesoff that he could not
meet with the delegates formally on that basis, since this would be
tantamount 10recognizing the ETR as a foreign government. Zhang later
wrote that he informed the Hi delegation that. as they themselves had al-
ready stated through the USSR's ambassador in Chongqing that they did not
desire independence from China but only autonomous status within the
Chinese state, it was not realistic to present themselves as anything but tb.e
representatives of a group of Chinese citizens who wished to discuss ther
grievances with a representative of their own country's government-the
central government of China.51
Zhang's stipulation put the IIi men in a quandary. They declared that as
their instructions had been to represent the new ETR government, they
could not accept Zhang's position without specific instructions from their
own government They would have to return to Y ining for further consulta-
tions.
Despite the fact that the question of credentials remained unresolved,
meetings between the two sides did take place informally, with General
Zhang and the Hi delegates both present. Zhang Dajun describes these
meetings as purely "courtesy affairs." However, they were not entirely a
matter of courtesy. A t one such meeting, Zhang addressed the delegates at
length on the SUbject of the government's policy toward the Northwest and
toward Xinjiang in particular. He explained that the recent A nti-J apanese
War bad made it impossible for the government to carry out its policies in
Xinjiang. The government was cona: med with the welfare of the people of
the Province, however, and with the war successfully concluded, it wished w
turn its attention toward reconstruction in China Itwould soon be assisting
the people of Xinjiang to build a modem province, on a democratic basis, as
provided by the 'Three Principles of the People...52
ESTABLISHMENT OF rns ETR 57
In the course of these "informal talks," Zhang also presented a program
of twelve points as the basis for a peace agreement with the people of the
three districts. Based in large part on the recommendations of the three
Xinjiang representatives who had been in Chongqing as advisers to the
government, the twelve points were as follows:
1.The government would assist the people of Xinjiang in political, eco-
nomic, and cultural development, according them treatment equal to tbat of
all Chinese citizens.
2. Freedom of religious belief and education would be guaranteed by the
government.
3.Each national minority's culture, customs, habits, and written and
spoken language would be respected.
4.The government would protect the rights of the person, property,
movement, residence, publication, and public meeting.
5.The government would put into practice a system of local autonomy in
the following way:
a.Within three months of the restoration of peace, elections would be
held at the village level, and within six months, elections would be held at
thecounty level for the County Council, which would then put into practice
thepeople's government
b.A fter county-level elections, laws would bepassed according to the will
of the local people.
c.Six months after establishment of the County Council, elections would
be held for the post of county head; two would beelected, and one of these
would be chosen by the government to serve as county head.
d.A vice-county head would be appointed by the government.
.e.The government would use local people to as great an extent as pes-
Siblewhen filling local government posts.
6.The government would give serious consideration to the reductio~of
farm and excise tax, would prohibit apportionment, assist in the expansion
of agriculture and industry, and raise the people'S standard of living.
7.There would be universal education at all levels, and the government
Would expand social education and work to raise the culturalleveJ .
Elementary schools would use the language of each local national minority
andwould include the study of their own literature.
S.A ll military activity in the three districts would stop within one month,
and alI illegal organizations would be disbanded. .
9.A ll organizations that participated in the movement would be~4
banded, and all members would return to their original homes and their
original jobs.
10.A ll who participated in the war would be guaranteed the right to live
peacefully after the end of hostilities.
----------f
58 ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR
11.Those under arrest would have their cases investigated.
12.Participants in the illegal organizations who returned to their original
homes and work would be separately investigated, and those who could
serve the nation would be employed by the govemmene.P
These were the twelve points the IIi delegates took with them when they
returned to Y ining on October 22for further consultations with the govern-
ment of the ETR.
The delegates returned to Urumqt November 12.There was no official
announcement on the question of credentials. British Consul Turral com-
mented, however, that the delegates now "understood the situation. ,,54The
use of the appellation "East Turkestan Republic" was, officially at least,
dropped. I nthe Chinese paper XlIIjiang Daily the three men fromIIiwere
referred to simply as the I I I delegates.
The iiimen brought with them counterproposals. These consisted of
eleven points which were presented to the Chinese representatives in the
original Turki inwhich they had been written. These points were asfollows:
1.Under a system of advanced autonomy in Xinjiang, local people would
hold government posts, and within two months elections would be held for
all government posts.
2.There Would be total religious freedom within the province. .
3. The language of the MOSlems would be used for all official and SOC131
affairs.
4.Elementary schools, middle and secondary schools, and the university
would all use the Moslem language. and national minority education would
be expanded.
5.There would be total artistic and cultural freedom.
6.The rights of publication, association, and written and spoken speech
would all be guaranteed.
7.Tax would be determined only according to each person's actual prop-
erty and livelihOOd.
8.Free trade with other countries would be assured.
9.A national minority army would be organized in each district, armed
and trained by thegovernment
10.Special MOSlem representatives would be inclUded in the government
as recognition of the Moslem majority in the region.
11.Within three days of the signing of this agreement, all freedom fight-
ers would be released from prison.55
Negotiations began using the original twelve points proposed by Zhang
and the new eleven Proposals of the I li group. I nitially the thorniest issues
of elections and reorganization of the military were skipped over. I nstead,
ESTABUSHMENT OF THE E1R 59
discussions began on cultural affairs, and agreement in this area was reached
with relative ease. The use of Turkic language and freedom of cultural de-
velopment were to be guaranteed, and the use of Turki in elementary
schools was agreed upon in the initial discussion. Both parties accepted as-
surances of personal freedom and of freedom of speech, publication, and re-
ligious belief.
These areas of agreement still left the larger issues unresolved. A s the
dayspassed, many observers were doubtful that there would be any positive
outcome to the talks. U.S.officials in China, for example, noted that any dis-
SOlutionof the negotiations would be blamed on the "central government's
failure to understand clearly Xinjiang's position and, by persistent effort, es-
pecially in Guomindang circles, to force handling of the problem on the
basisthat Xinjiang is 'no different from any other province.' ..56
It was also strongly rumored in Urumqi that the highest elected post the
Generalissimo himself would allow in Xinjiang was at the district level, and
there was a fear among many officials in the local government-and among
foreign observers-that Chiang's intransigence on this point alone would
destroy the ceasefire and the peace negotiations.
57
There is some basis fur this judgment, but the results of the talks show
that it was not wholly warranted. Via the not inconsiderable talents of Gen-
~ral Zhang and his negotiation team, a compromise was reached on the
~ue of elections. Zhang proposed that the province be ruled by a twenty-
five-member council, on which all ministry heads would also serve.The
Chinese, it was proposed, would appoint fifteen members of this council,
and these appointees would include the heads of three ministries. As many
as six or seven of the remaining posts would be reserved for local people,
chosen from among local Chinese or natives acceptable to the local
Guomindang. This offer, Zhang contended, was as much as could be ex-
pected in the way of a compromise on elections, and he was not, heclaimed,
empowered to go any further in subsequent negotiations.
58
The two sides also came to an understanding about the question of elect-
ing the head of the provincial government- I t was decided that this issue
Wouldbe left until after the National A ssembly had met and adopted a new
constitution, which would-or would not-accord power of election of the
prOVincial head to the people of the respective provinces .
.Finally, on the question of military reorganization, it was agr~ by both
Sl~esthat some type of reorganization was necessary, but the details of bow
this was to be done were left for later discuSSions.
With the new eleven-point compromise proposal in hand, th~IIi dele-
gates returned again to Y ining, this time ina Soviet plane.The C.hmese rep-
resentatives in Urumqi were expecting them to return forthWI th.but the
days dragged on without sign until December 25 when they finally reap-
peared in Urumqi to continue the negotiations. When they -erumed, they
,
- - - - - - - - - - - - _2
60 ESTABUSHMENT OF tm: ETR
brought new demands for the Chinese government. Despite the fact that
Zhang had thought agreement had basically been reached on the necessary
reforms, the IIi government now wished to add two further points. First, it
demanded that the numerous troops brought into Xinjiang to quell dis-
turbances be withdrawn. Second, it demanded that all Chinese special ser-
vice organizations (e.g., the hated secret police who were ~redOminantly
Han Chinese) be disbanded and withdrawn from the province. 9
A nxious to secure abasic agreement by the end of the year, Zhang urged
that these new questions be set aside and that discussion be limited to the
original eleven points presented by the iiigroup at the previous meeting.
The IIi delegates conceded this, and finally, on J anuary 3, 1946, announce-
ment was made that the IIi A ffair had been peacefully resolved.The~n.
nouncemem seemed premature, however, primarily because of the question
of annexes to the agreement. The first annex dealt with the distribution of
posts within the new government, and on this point both sides were in
agreement. However, there was also a second annex, dealing with the
reorganization of the military, and this annex was not accepted by the ill
delegates. Debate over its provisions was to rage for another six mont~.
Both sides saw this annex as crucial to the existence of the ElR separatist
movement. The central government wanted nothing less than the total dis-
banding of the ETR forces. The ETR wished to maintain their own armed
forces within the three districts under the leadership of their own Moslem
commanders, and, in addition, they proposed to share military control over
the remaining seven districts of Xinjiang. The iiigovernment also made t.h
e
further demand that new recruits to the provincial military forces be natl~e
Moslems and not Han Chinese. With these vital areas of disagreement still
Outstanding, the announcement of the restoration of peace seemed prema-
ture indeed.
Toward the end of 1945, Chiang Kat-shek urgently requested the presence
of Zhang Zhizhong in Chongqlng to aid in the Guomindang-Chinese Com-
munist negotiations which were then intermittently progressing. The some.
what premature announcement of peace in Xinjiang was partly a result of
this request. Unfortunately, this was to have repercussions in Xinjiang.
Once Zhang had gone, negotiations, which were supposed to continue on
the second annex, stalled and then collapsed.
The Peece Negotiations: Phase n
With Zhang's departure from Urumqi in early J anuary 1946, the provincial
government, still headed by Governor wu, established a committee to begin
planning for the organization and the financial basis of the new government
that was to be formed as SOOnas final agreement on the second annex was
reached. The announcement of the formation of this committee came OD
ESTABUSHMENT OF ms ETR 61
J anuary9, three days after Zhang's departure. On the following day, the IIi
delegatesreturned to their home base to report in person on the final agree-
ment and the slate of the discussions on the second annex.A ccording to the
terms of the agreement, hostilities were to cease within ten days of the
agreement's being signed, and elections were to take place within three
months.However, as the agreement was incomplete, no immediate plans
weremade for the holding of elections, and the ceasefire line remained at
theManas River, with troops of the ETR and the Nationalists facing each
otherinuneasy silence.
Thework of continuing the negotiations was left in the hands of Zhang's
colleagues, Peng Zhaoxian, L iu Mengchun, and Wang Cengshan, all of
whomhad been involved in the negotiations and were familiar with the
COurseof discussions, which had by this point occupied some thirty separate
formal and informal sesstons.w
It wassoon clear, however, that the IIi government did not wish to deal
withPeng, Zhang's successor. It informed the Chinese that it would wait for
Zhangto return himself, before continuing any discussions. On February 28,
as Zhanghad not returned, the ErR's council sent a telegram to the Chinese
government via the Soviet consul in Y ining to ask when General Zhang
wouldbe returning to resume talks.
61
They implied that unless Zhang him-
self returned there was a chance that the entire proposal for peace would be
abandoned.
Y ielding to this pressure to ensure peace in Xinjiang, the central govern-
m~~~decided in March to place Zhang at the head of the government in
XinJ iang, as he appeared to have gained the trust of the factions within that
troubledregion. A ccordingly, on March 29, the Chongqing government an-
nouncedhis appointment as provincial chairman.
62
This promotion made
Zhangamore authoritative figure, for he also was concurrently commander
Of. the.Northwest Field A rmy, responsible for the three provinces of Gansu,
~I ngna, and Xinjiang. On March 29, he left Chongqing for Urumqi, stop-
? lng first at his military headquarters in L anzhou before arriving in Xin-
J iang's capital on A pril 4.
ad.~g's ~etum was earnestly awaited because the intervening period ~f
.mnUSlratlOnunder old-style administrator Wu had shown all the tradi-
tional features of Chinese exploitation in border regions. Wu had become
bu unpopular figure not only because of his reputation for avariciousness,
~UI also because of his failure to release political prisoners as promised be-
~r: he had even arrived in the province. Corruption had also attained new
I ghtsunder his administration, and rumor strongly contended that Wu
~uld leav Xinl h .ed.63
e J iang considerably wealthier than when e amv .
Whatever the state of his personal fortune when he left, Wu did make
SOmeattempts to ameliorate east maladministration. He had tackled bead-
onthediffi rr- 1ft
cult matter of relations between soldiers and local popw...t10D.
,
I
- - - - - - - - - - - _1
62 ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR
On J anuary 28, it was announced that the soldiers of the 8th Army Corps in
Xinjiang, stationed mainly in Urumqi, had to obey strictly the government's
orders and to act in such a way as to alleviate the hardship their presence
was causing in the dty.64 The impact of this order may have been I im-
ited--eomplaints about the military continued throughout this period-but
the government did demonstrate its awareness of the problem. Ukewise,
Wu himself filed a personal report on the need for financial reform in the
province in J anuary 1946, emphasizing the need to prevent inflation and to
cut the number of government employees to reduce strain on the provincial
budget.
6S
During the same month, public mention of the building of a railwayin
Xinjiang was first made.On J anuary 26, the local newspaper announced that
a committee had been organized in Urumq! to petition the government to
build a rail link with L anzhou in neighboring.Gansu province, and dona-
tionsfromlocal citizens insupport of this measure weresolicited.Therewas
asyet no suggestion that donations weregoing to becompulsory astheyM.d
often been under Sheng.Nevertheless, no further mention wasmadeof this
committee in the media or government reports, and it appears that the
proposal layon the table to await the inauguration of the newgovernment
sometime that year.
Despite some positive governmental action under the governorship of
Wu Zhongxin, fewamong the local population regretted his departure.
Zhang's own popularity in Xinjiang, ingreat contrast, was obvious fromthe
warmreception accorded himupon his return to Urumqi.A t the airport.to
meet himwererepresentatives of the IIigovernment aswell aslocal officta~
and representatives of all the foreign governments stationed in urumq.l.
Within a week of his return, Zhang convened the first meeting of hls
government Their first task was to secure agreement on the crucial military
annexto thepeaceagreement, and theI irst indications wereauspicious.
In an atmosphere of optimism, Zhang declared that the mainObjectiveof
thenewgovernment would beto implement thegovernment's newpolie:t:of
autonomy in Xinjiang.Heemphasized the military importance of theregion
to thewholecountry and praised Urumqt asapolitical and economic ce~ter
for thenewdevelopments that would nowbegin to take place in the region.
Urumqi, hesaid, would become modernized inorder to serveasan example
for development throughout the region.He asked for thesupport of thelo-
cal population of all nationalities so that together they could look forward
to a future of peace and unity, under the guidance of the "Three Principles
of tbe People.66Problems with the second annex on military dispositions
persisted, however.Despite talks with the IIidelegates, no progress was an-
ncunced, Privately, Zhang certainly must have had reservations about the
chances for agreement on the annex.Inearly May it was announced that he
was unwell and that meetings to discuss the final formof the annexwouldbe
ESTABUSHMENT OF tnt: ETR 63
delayed.
67
Then, on May 8, evidently recovered fromhis bout of illness,
Zhangdelivered a speech in which he clearly expressed hisconcern about
thedelayon the second annex.He pointed out that whilethe government
badmademany concessions to the demands of the IIi delegates, aconclu-
sionbadnot yet been reached.This, heSlated, madehis heart uneasy,as he
sincerelywished to conclude the peace agreement. A fter six months of
patient work, he hoped that the delegates would nowaccept the govern-
ment'sgenerousoffers in order to securepeace.
6S
Theseoffers he proceeded to develop in greater detail than ever before,
producinga package covering religious, political, economic, andsocial af-
fairs. Theproposals were quite sweeping: the promise of autonomy would
be fulfilled; the rule of lawwould be enjoyed; all people's religious beliefs
~uld berespected; corrupt officials would be punished; Sino-Soviet rela-
hODSwouldbe improved.Economically, the government would undertake
toimprovetransportation, communication, andenvironmental sanitation.It
W~Uldalso encourage the expansion of farming, irrigation projects, and
animal husbandry, aswell as mining and industry.In short, the government
~hed to help Xinjiang modernize and advancewith the rest of Chinadur-
mgthenewperiod of reconstruction. This speechwas not onlyanappeal to
thepopulation of Urumqi, it was also an appeal to the 1li government to
~kepart inthe forthcoming discussions withaviewto matchingtheconces-
slO.n~made by the central govemment-e-concessicne which, in Zhang's
opuuon,wereconsiderable.
Formal negotiations began again on May 15.The IIidelegates used their
strength to widen the area of discussion. While the second annex was
?Stensiblythe main topic, the IIi delegates wanted government concessi~ns
mo~er areas.The central government had proposed Mehmet gmin Bugra
asVI ce-chairmanof the province. However, the IIi faction distrusted all
thr: of the former Xinjiang representatives, DOWback [romth.eirp~longed
s~y I nChongqing, despite their collective reputation for natI Onalism.The
~groupinstead proposed A hmet J an Kasimi, one of the IIi delegates, ~
Vlce-e.hainnan, and this.inthe end, was agreed.Theothervice-chairm~~hlp
was givento Burhan Shahidi, the Tatar who had:servedinprevious.XinJ lan
g
governments but who was not considered to be either pro-lit or pro-
Guo.mindangby the parties concemed'" . .
Nmedaysafter the final negotiations began, on May24, theSI Xa: u
cles
,of
thesecondannex on military reorganization wereinitialed.ThesesI X,whicb
had takenso long to agree upon but which nonetheless weresoonto cause
moredisagreement, wereas follows:
1.TheIIi forces in the three districts to be organiZedinto sixregiments,
threecavalryand three infantry.The total Dumberof menunder arms.to be
elevento twelvethousand..Two cavalry regiments andoneinfantryregunent
tobepart of the Nationalist A rmy inXinjiang.
- - - - - - - - - - - - _n
64 ESTAlJilSHMENT OF 11IE ETR
2 A Moslem nominated by the Vining representatives to command all six
of the above regiments and be responsible to the Xinjiang garrison com-
mander for the tbree Nationalist units and to the Xinjiang Peace Preser-
vation Corps {hereafter PPC] Commander for the other three.Thesame
Moslem commander to be the vice-commander or the Xinjiang PPC and 10
maintain aheadquarters.
3.The abovesix regiments to remain in the three districts and havesole
responsibility for the maintenance of peace in those districts. central gov-
ernment frontier defense troops to undertake defense of the national fron-
tiers, following methods and distribution of troops identical to those
prevailing prior to the IIiincident.
4.The A sku and Kashgar units of the PPC to be reorganized, usenative
recruits, and beorganized inoonsultation with the Moslem commander.
5.The supply, equipment. and treatment of the six regiments above to be
onapar with the top national army and PPC respectively.The three PPCto
be supplied fromthe PPC headquarters inXinjiang province.
6.The reorganization of the six regiments to be the responsibility of the
Moslemcommander.The garrisons of the troops in the three districts tobe
reported to and approved by the provincial authorities, and their numbers
andequipment to be reported to the provincial government.P 71
The formal signing of the second annex took place on J une 6.1946-
Zhang celebrated the momentous dayby seeking the approval of thecentral
government for a clutch of new economic policies.Particularly important
were pricestabilization measures.I nflation had continued to rise through.
out thewinter of 1946,and Zhang nowasked thegovernment to assist inim-
plementing several newmeasures.
To help COntrol the price of goods being brought into Xinjiang from
China proper, heasked that one hundred new trucks beadded to thoseof
the Public Highway Bureau of Xinjiang, and that a supply of gasoline a~d
spare parts be ensured to guarantee the steady supply of goods into Xin-
J iang.To fuel these vehicles, be requested that the government boost the
production at the Y umen oil fieldsand that the road between L anzhou and
Urumqi be maintained by the Northwest Highway Bureau, Further, he
~ked that the number and frequency of flightsand other forms of transport
Inand out of the region be I ncreased inorder to stabilize prices.Finally, he
petitioned the government to remit all taxes (or Xinjiang for the following
year to alleviate hardship, whichevents of the past year and ahalf hadgen
erated.72
Chairnu.mZhang Den tackled the problem of political prisone~ mal-
rer for Whichhedid Dot need central government approval.He publiclyor.
cered aU local officialsCOncernedimmediately to inform himo( the number
and location of all such prisoners with an almto expediting their release.73
Suchalist was drawn up naming 253persons being held in Urumqi and 135
ESTABliSHMENT OF ms ETR 65
heldelsewhere.A lthough their release was not immediate, Zhangmanaged
toarrangeageneral amnesty for all such prisoners by J une20,whenfriends
andrelativesgathered at Urumql's main prison to greet their relativesup-
ontheir release.P Upon release, each person wasgivenXn S2,OCKl to aid
themin resettlement
A lso inearly J une, the local paper carried a special announcement con-
cerning131 individuals accused of Communist sympathies (amongwhom
were22children).These people were to befreed and providedwith trans-
port to Y anan, according to the paper, andby the endof themonth theydid,
in fact,leavetheprovince.7
S
Zhang also proceeded to announce a new slogan for Xinjiang: yenwu
tiuw en, L iterally, this phrase meant "cease military activityand promote
civil affairs." The time for fighting, the Xinjiang Daily editorial ran, had
ended,andthe time to promote culture had come.Thelocal newspaperbe-
ganto feature many hopeful articles in the following weeks as Urumqi
preparedto host the inaugural ceremonies of thenewgovernment.'6
OnJ une20, 1946, the names of the newmembersof theXinjiangProvin-
cial Government were announced. Zhang's appointment aschairmanwas
confirmed,and the newheads of the various bureaus anddepartments were
dulylistedinthelocal newspaper (seechapter 5).
I nared-letter edition on J uly 1, 1946, theXmjiong Daily printed ames-
sagefromChairman Zhang to the people of Xinjianginwhichhespecitical-
I ~thankedthe Soviet consul general inUrumqi for hisassistanceduringthe
difficultnegotiations of the peace settlement. He praised the hardwork of
bothnegotiating teams and spoke of the hopes of all Xinjiangpeoplefor fu-
tur~peace. A nyopposition to national unity (the phraseused to encompass
un~tybetween national groups in China) or any attempt to destroys~cb
unJ tywouldnot betolerated hedeclared.A newworldhadcomeinto being
inXinjiang, and all the province's four million people must work to pro-
moteunityand peace." _
During the inaugural ceremony on J uly 1, 1946, each newofficial was
:ailed upon to swear his allegiance to the newgovernment.Eachoneswo~e
t? ~OI lowthe leadership of the central government, to protect the~ce In
XinJ iang,to support the unity of the Chinese state, realizedem~tlc gov-
crnmem, strengthen the unity of the nationalities, severely~uDlshcorrup-
tion,andprohibit opium and gambling.,,18The acceptedbaSI Sfor the gov-
ernment was to be Sun's Three Principles of the People, andall newmem-
bersof the government, including the IIi appointees, dUlysworeto all that
was required.
Whilemost of the new officials from the three districts werein atten-
~n~, it is noteworthy that several were not Moreover, several of .those
nUSSlngnever arrived in Urumqi to assume their newposts at ~- Ali Ha~
TOre,president of the ETR and Osman gatur, Kazak leader L Dthe A ltai,

-
-----------
66 ESTABUSHMENT OF THE ETR
were both ministers without portfolio in the new provincial government, but
neither arrived to assume his post. Nor did the new Kazak minister of
health, Delilhan Sukurbayoglu, who remained in A shen, leaving the deputy
head, Ma Shuqi, in charge.
Following Chairman Zhang's inaugural speech and the swearing in of new
officials, several other speeches were made. The speech of the newvice.
chairman, A bmet J an Kasimi, in particular was well received, and his taJ k
helped lauiiCh hiSreputatiOD in Urumqi as an accomplished and charismatic
speaker. His WOrds, printed in the Xmjiang Daily in a special black-bordered
box, called upon the new officials to work hard for the establishment of
democratic government inXinjiang and full implementation of local auton-
omy in the province.79
To both foreign and local residents, it must indeed haveseemed that a
new phase in Xinjiang's troubled history was about to begin.A difficult
compromise bad been reached, and in the struggle to achieve it, both sides
appeared to have given evidence of their good will and their intenti~n to
findaworkable solution that would bring peace to the region.The national
government of China had agreed to radical shifts in its position on minority
affairs, accepting that the local population would have to begivena much
larger degree of control, and that abusiveand corrupt policies wouldhaveto
end.Theseweresignificant concessions.
Furthermore, in theprocess the government bad becomesharply awareof
thevolatile situation in tbeNorthwest, Where,spurred by Soviet agitationor
not, the local population had become sufficiently enraged against the Han
Chinese to rise inrevolt A t thevel}' least, the urgent need for reformwas at
last recognized in Chongqing, and, in the person of Cbairman Zhang, it ap-
peared that there was nowachance for the Chinese to conunue to boldthe
region of Xinjiang asan integral part of thestate.
CHAPTERS
Xinjiang's 1946Coalition Government
Fromthe founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911 to the establishment of
!hep~esent People's Republic, coalition governments formed and dissolved
illChina according to the fortunes of war.These coalitions were temporary
alliances, born of the desire of military and political factions for power,
co~pledwith the inability of anyone group to e;tablishitself asw e sole
ruling power. Within these coalitions-which existed at both local and na-
tional levels-members sought to maximize their own positions. In typical
CO~litionfashion, these temporary arrangements dissolved when member-
ship no longer served the members' best interests or when one faction was
ablefinally to dominate the others.!
During the 1940s. China's central government was itself a coalition of
~uomindang factions, smaller political parties, and aprocessionof provi~.
~l warlords, allied to the Nationalists inorder to legitimize their own POSI -
~ons.A<> thecentral government's hold was tenuous in manyareasof China,
It ~asforced to accept regional power sharing in which Nationalist ap-
pomtees worked alongside local warlords or military factionsto give theI m-
pr~ion of acontinued, if limited, central government rolein theseareas.I t
~I~t~. this pattern of coalition governments that the Nationalists placed
heXinjiang Coalition Government in 1946-
Thepolyglot organization in Xinjiang called for in the peace agreement
of J anuary 1946was very mucha coalition intheabovesense, ~noneof the
~ons participating in it were satisfied with their new postuons. The.Na-
tton~lis~, unable to secure the territory militarily, fear~further lli~-
paJ I slomsminXinjiang, and this fear, coupled withtheChinese assu~ptI ~n
that the USSR was directly involved served as the impetus for Nationalist
a
ceepta~ceof the compromise government.However, a~er reasonwas
that, Whilealimited role ingovernment would haveto be givento represen-
- - - - - - - - - - - - .
68 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
latives of the local population, as called for in the peace agreement, the ac-
tual administrative COntrol of Xinjiang clearly was to remain in Chinese
hands by means of Han Chinese domination of the new ruling council and
other key posts at the provincial and lower levels of government.
I n addition, by imposing a peaceful hiatus on the region, the terms of the
agreement gave the central government the Opportunity to increase its milt-
tary strength in the region and to extend its own base of political support
among the anti-Soviet groups of Xinjiang.
The major goal of the new government was, officially at least, the imple-
mentation of the peace agreement and the new Government Political Pro-
gram (hereafter GPP) adopted durtng the first few weeks of coalition rule.
Whileneither the Nationalists nor the IIi faction wished to be seenas
deviating from the pursuit of popular democratic rule called for in the
agreement, as in any compromise situation both nonetheless sought to
mitigate implementation of those aspects of the agreement that they sawas
a possible threat to their Ownposition. The shifting and maneuvering for ad-
vantage within the government, typical of coalitions, was the undercurrent
that flowed through Xinjiang political affairs between 1946and 1947.
The focus of this Chapter is the Xinjiang coalition, partnership in which
was a cornerstone of Nationalist policy in the Northwest. Chinese continued
to dominate at all levels of government administration in the province. A 5
a result of this domination, the major problems of local government, which
were endemic elsewhere in China, also plagued the new government:
entrenched Chinese bureaucratism, corruption, poor relations between
undisciplined, underpaid Nationalist troops and the local non-Chinese vo.
P
-
ulation, military intervention in government policy, and various financial
problems. These difficulties escalated after J uly 1946despite the stated com-
mitment of the new government to COrrect past abuses and to implement
fully the peace agreement and the GPP.This chapter also demonstrates the
ramifications of the central government's belief that Xinjiang's problems
were the result of Soviet intrigue and manipulation in the area.
A lthough government representatives had visited the region and agreed
with Chairman Zhang that local grievances were in large part to blame for
tension in the area, and that these required immediate government att~n-
tion, the Nationalist government continued a wait-and-see policy with
regard to Xinjiang, predicated on the assumption that when the Sov~et
Union was forcer to withdraw from the province. the region's difficulties
would then be solved.
As the government's major concern in Xinjiang was to hold the region as
an integral part of China, the only action it directly encouraged, through
financial assistance to the province, was an increase in the central govern-
ment's troops, which served to exacerbate poor Chinese-national minority
relations. A lthough the Chinese had agreed to concessions when they signed
1946 COALfllON GOVERNMENT fD
thepeace agreement, they took little initiative in implementing those con-
cessions that threatened to curtail Nationalist power and influence in the
region.
Further, efforts at establishing trust between Zhang and the Turkic
people were damaged in the autumn of 1946with the disclosure made in
oneof Zhang's major speeches that he had been involved in talks with Os-
man Batur, who initially had been an ally of the IIigroup but who changed
sidessometime in 1946.Itwas rumored that Osman was fighting against the
IIi government with Nationalist military support, The fact that Zhang had
met with Osman aroused suspicions of Chinese insincerity and did little to
alleviatefears among local nationalists that the central government had no
intention of allowing a Turki-run government to operate in Xinjiang. The
possibility of the government's inducing Osman to fight the IIifaction also
implied a reversion to traditional Chinese border policy of "using the bar-
barian to fight the barbarian." By conducting negotiations with the Kazaks
inthe rumor-riddled and politically sensitive atmosphere of 1946--1947, the
Chineseran the danger of undermining the fragile peace in the region. Un-
rest and dissatisfaction grew among both the Han and other nationalities in
Xinjiang in 1946-1947. The problems referred to above, and the coalition's
attempts to deal with them were the factors that led, in tum, to the dissolu-
. ..
nonof the coalition in 1947.
Xinjiang'S NewGovernment: The Council
A ccording to the terms of the peace agreement between the central govern-
ment and the IIigroup, the new coalition government inaugurated on J uly I ,
1946,was to include ten central government appointees and fifteen mem-
ben drawn from the ten districts of Xinjiang, who would form the twenty-
five-man ruling council of the province. This tenlfifteen division gave the
I mpression of local national minority domination of the highest governmen-
tal organ in the region, but closer examination of the actual individua1s who
held t~ese twenty-five posts shows that in what were undoubt~y tense
negotI ations over each of the twenty-five positions, the Ch.Ulese h~d
managed to secure at least seventeen reliable votes on the council.The list
of ~embers' names and their political affiliation (table.5~only partially
clarifies this point. To understand the division of power I t lS necessary to
look more closely at the individuals concerned.
The eight Chinese members appointed by the Nationalists formed a
~hesive core group under the leadership of General Zhang Zhizhong and
InClUded Secretary-General L iu Mengchun, Finance Minister LuY ~n,
V-1Ce-~ister of Education Cai Zengxtan, Vice-Minister of ~~nstll!ctI O~
Gu J lanji. Minister of A dministration Wang Cengshan, Mimster withcu
POrtfolio Guan Zeliang. and Urumqi Mayor Chu Wu.
- - - - - - - - - - - .
70 1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT
Table 5
Xinjiang Provincial Government Council. 1946
Zhang Zhizhong (Han)
Burhan Shahidi (Tatar)
Ahmel J an Kasiml (Uighur)
Liu Mengchun (Han)
Abdul Karim Abbas (Uighur)
Salis (Kazak)
J elaleddin Wang Cengshan
(Hui)
Rahim J an Selimo(jlu (Uighur)
Lu 'ruwen (Han)
Ma Tingxian (Hui)
Seyfettin Azizi (Uighur)
Cai Zhongxian (Han)
Mehmel Emin Bugra (Uighur)
Gu J ianji (Han)
Zhao Qianfeng (Manchu)
Ardeni (Mongol)
DeWhan SugUrbayogiu
(Kazak)
Ma Shuqi
8
(Hui) ProvinCialappointee
ChuWu(Han) Guomindang
tsa Yusu!Alplekin (Uighur) Provincialappointee
GuanZeliang(Han) Guomindang
Abdul KarimResit(Uighur) Provincial appointee
Zhang Dihua (Manchu) Provincial appointee
Osman Batur (Kazak) IIi
Ali HanT6re.Hoja (Uighur) IIi
lzhak Han Mura, Hajl (Kirghiz) IIi
Sourc~: Zhang Dajun, Xinjiang'! Seventy l'ean of Turb .. lence (Taillei, 1980), 12:6880-81.
~Mawas not on the IWl: : nty-five-man council.
Title
Chairman
Vice
~~
Secretary-general
~~
Vice
Minister or
administration
~~
Minister of finance
~~
Minister of education
Vice
Minister Of reconstruction
~~
Minister of social affairs
~~
Minister of health
~~
Mayor of Urumqi
Ministers without portfolio
Name (Nationality)
Political affiliafion
Guomindang
Provincial appointee
Iii
Guomindang
IIi
Provincial appointee
Guomindang
iii
Guomindang
Provincial appointee
IIi
Guomindang
Provincial appointee
Guomindang
Guomindang
Provocer appointee
IIi
The Chinese side had Proposed Mehmet Emin Bugra as one of the rwo
vice-chairmen to work with Zhang.Since the Iligroup considered Mehmet
to be too pro-Chinese, they refused to sanction this but accepted himas
minister of the Reconstruction Bureau, which still made hima member of
the lWenty-five_man council.
2
I sa Y usuf A lptekfn, another former m~~ber
of the national government, was also appointed to the council as a mtntster
without portfolio.
Boththesemenwere known to beTurki nationalists, hoping for agreater
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 71
degreeof autonomous government for Xinjiang; however,both also saw
unionwithChina as the best course of action open to Xinjiangfor theim-
mediatefutureand were therefore committed to aChineserolein theprov-
ince.A s I sa said to an A merican in Urumqi in 1947,"I believetheChinese
side,for all its/faults, is better than the Russian and 1will continueto work
forautonomyunder Chinese rule.,,3
Of the fifteenposts allotted to representatives of Xinjiang'stendistricts,
sevenweregivento local national minorities who wereingeneral agreement
withthe sentiments of I sa Y usuf A lptekin.Whilesomeof themhoped for
eventual independence, they, too, feared Soviet power and preferredal-
liancewiththeweaker Republic of China.ThesemenincludedSecondVice-
ChairmanBurhan Shahidi (aformer member of Sheng'sgovernment); FI I St
Vice-Secretary-General Salis (a Kazak ally of A libegHakim and Osman
Baturwho later acted as a go-between for the Nationalist government and
theseKazak leaders); two Sinicized Manchus, Minister Without Portfolio
ZhongTihua and Minister of Social A ffairs Zhao Qianfeng; Vice-Minister
of Finance Ma Tingxian (Hut); Vice-Minister of Social A ffairs A rdeni
(Mongol);and Minister Without Portfolio A bdul KerimResit.Theseseven,
plusthe central government's ten appointees, gavethe Chineseeffective
control of thenewgovernment's highest organ.
Theother eight posts were filled by appointments that represented the
threeETR districts. These eight held concurrent posts in the provincial
government,but those with portfolios wereshadowedby aHan Chineseor
pro-Chinesecounterpart. A hmer J an gastmt, the IIi member holding the
hi~hestprovincial government rank, shared the position of vice-dtai~
WI thBurhan.The second highest post of secretary-general had twO vice-
se:cretaries,one of whomwas the ill appointee A bdul KerimA b~as.Other
I I I appointees were Rahim J an as vice-minister of admunstrauon under
~ang Cengshan; 5eyfeuin as minister of education, workingwithCal Zeng~
nan asvice-minister and Delilhan minister of health, pairedwithMa Shuqt
. " ..
~vrce-minfster.A further three IIirepresentatives weremademlDlS.~ers
WI thoutportfolio: A li Han TOre, Osman Batur, andI zhak HanM~HaJ I ".
As stated previously, several IIiappointees never took up the~po'Sts.m
Urumqf.A libeg and Osman were already in the processof splittingWith
their ETR allies.Unwilling to work.within the newcoalition, beth these
Kazakleaders elected to remain in their northern strongholds.I zbak Han
remainedat his post in the three districts' military organization.No replace-
mentswereappointed to the council. .
In addition.A li Han TOre, president of the ErR, disappeared mA ugust
1946in circumstances that still remain unclear. A s no one seem~sure
Whetherhewould return or not, his place on the Provincial Council ~
remained empty.This increased the Nationalist majorityto sev
entee
?m
COmparisonto the ill four.But, although the Nationalists werethus ma
----------
72 1946COALiTION GOVERNMENT
position to dominate the council, the record of its meetings indicates theef-
fans of Zhang to secure unanimous votes even on controversial proposi-
tions.For instance, when a motion was proposed in A ugust 1946to reduce
the number of government per: sonnel-ofwhom the vast majority were then
Han Chinese-it was unanimously passed." This was no accident Zhang
righteously and rightfully pointed out in 1947that he and other Chinese
members of the council had bent over backward to ensure that the decisions
of the new government were reached unanimously. He declared that the
need to compromise on many issues had been recognized by the Chinese
government from the beginning, and at no time had they used their power
on the council to force an affirmative VOleon an unpopular issue.5
This seeming unanimity was partly a function of the conciliatory policy
then being pursued by Zhang in his capacity as chairman. But it was as much
due to the fact that the provincial government lacked both the power and
the financial backing to act on many of its own resolutions. Itwas the central
government that had ultimate authority over decisions on national defense,
so that provincial resolutions in such matters were only advisory. A nd,
provincial decisions relied heavily on central government subsidies. Provin-
cial programs for education expansion and public health work, for instance,
required approval from the Nanjing authorities, and this gave the ce.ntral
government ultimate control over most areas of development in the region.
A further means of maintaining Chinese predominance in the pr~~ce
was by the appointment of Chinese and pro-Chinese officials at provincial,
district, and COUDtylevels. By early 1947, county officials were appointed by
elected county assemblies, but other posts throughout the province ~re
filled by appointees. There was pressure for the Chairmanship of the PrOV1~-
ciaI Council to be made elective, but the response continued to be that this
must wait for a national-level decision at the coming National A ssembly.
Xinjiang's I nspectors-General
A nother institution aVailable to the central government was the system of
inspectors-general which existed at provincial, district, and county levels.As
these appointed officials had great supervisory powers, it is worth looking at
them in greater detail.
A t the provincial level, the inspector-general reponed directly to the.ce?-
traI government and was thus the head of an independent hierarchy WI thin
the Province. A t all levels, the post of inspector-general was parallel to that
of county, district, and Provincial chairmen and was usually I Dled by a highly
educated, locally respected appointee whose duties included serving ~
watChdog over the workings of the civil government, with speciaj responsi-
bility for checking on civil adminuaration, financial affairs, reconstruction,
and education.6 InXinjiang, the inspector-general at the provincial level
1946C0AlJI10N GOVERNMENT 73
was also to serve as an adviser on the election process, an especially impor-
tant role in light of the fact that these were Xinjiang's first elections.
Xinjiang's first inspector-general was Mesut Sabri. a member of the
Guomindang as well as an associate of the CC Clique, one of the most im-
portant political factions within the Guomindang. By securing lhis appoint-
ment for one of their associates, the CC Clique strengthened their position
in the province-a position already strong by virtue of the fact that they
counted several members of the twenty-five-man governing council among
their followers. These included L iu Mengchun (secretary-general), Wang
Cengshan (minister of administration). Zhao Qianfeng (minister of social
affairs), and Gu J ianji (vice-minister of reconstruction).' This clique had
earned a reputation for being an arch-conservative force in government,
quick to use force or brutality to ensure a predominant position for itself
Theclout exercised by this clique was probably a main reason why Mesut
and his fellow-travelers in Xinjiang politics, I sa Y usuf and Mehmet Entin
Bugra, were allowed to return to the region in 1945.
Between May and September 1946, inspectors-general at the district and
county level were appointed in the seven districts under Chinese control. A t
the district level, four of the appointees were Han Chinese, two were
Uighurs, and one was a Sinicized Kazak. Of the thirty-nine county-level in-
specters, twenty-nine were Han Chinese, a fact of importance to the local
Citizens.Names and nationalities are given in table 6for the district-level
posts, with a summary of the county appointments by nationality. With Han
~ese dominance in this post, a potentially important means of maintain-
mgcloser central control in the region was kept firmly in Chinese hands.
. I n early 1947, the provincial government increased the power of t~e
~peetors-general, the reason being that government organization was sull
~nneed of development in the vast territory of Xinjiang. District-level
I DSpectors-general were charged with carrying out the peace agreement ~d
theGPp as their principal duty, The inspectors were also given the s~c
power,to formulate and promulgate I ocal laws.These lawswere not to inter-
ferewnh the people's rights to personal freedom and were t~bereported W
the government, but the power that this right of law-making represented
was, on paper at least, formidable.
Chinese Dominance in L ocal Police Upits
~other important institution that remained under Chinese conlrO~, at I ~t
mthe provincial capital, was the local police ..As mentioned: prevlOusly, .m
the last years of Sheng Shicai's rule. both the ordinary p~lice and speetal
secret police units had aided the Tupan in carrying out a reign of te.rro
r
.By
1944, the police were both hated and feared in Urumqi- As the police were
predominantly Han Chinese, the antipathy took on racial overtones,
-----------
74 1946COALrTJON GOVERNMENT
Table 6
Appointed Inspectors-General, 1946
Inspector
Date of
District
(Nationality)
appointment
Urumqi
Hatije (Kazak)
J uly 4, 1946
Kashgar
Abdul Karim Han
J une 3D, 1946
Masim (Uighur)
A ksu
Abdul J sazu Mesul
AuguSl27, 1946
(Uighur).
Hetian
Hac Oengpang
May 31, 1946
(KhOlan)
(Han)
Yenki
luo Shuping (Han)
September 20, 1946
Hami Li Liangxing (Han)
Yarkand Chou Fanggan
(Han)
May 11,1946
No dale given
Source: Zhang DaJ un, Seventy liars, 12:7032_38.
County-J evel inspectors
12counties:
10Han;2 national minorities
8counties
(5 reporting): 4 Han; 1 unclear
9counties
(6 reporting), 4 H.an;
2 national mlnontle5
6counties
(4 reporting): 4 Han
7 counties, 1 bureau .
(7 reporting): 4 Han, 3 natiOnal
minorities
3 counties, 1 bureau
(3 reporting): 3 Han
5counties
(2 reporting): 2 national
minorities
No official statistics are available on the ethnic composition of thepolice
after the 1946coalition government cameinto being, but according to anar-
ticlewritten byProvincial Vice-Chairman A bmet J an Kasfmt, 81 percent of
the police officers and 89 percent of the lower ranks in Urumqi were Han
Cbtnese.f The chief of the Provincial Police was L iu Handong, also Han
Chinese.Quite naturally, the Turki element in the newgovernment sought
to havethe number of policeof various nationalities made proportionate to
theOVerallnumbers of nationalities inthe province, but, despite this be~m-
ingaspecific policy objective of the newgovernment, Han police remained
overwhelminglydominant in 1947.
The New Coalition Government and Passage
or the Government Political Program
The newgovernment got oft to an inauspicious start.On J uly 11 it held its
first meeting, and that very evening Moslem mobs attacked the houses of
Han Chinese who were married to Moslemwomen.The result was a full-
scale riot in the provincial capital. The mob abducted the Moslem wives,
and inSOmecases the unfortunate womenwere forced (0marry old Moslem
men.SomeChinesewere killedin the fighting that night, although no num-
ber of casualties was given in sUbsequent press reports.A n 11 P.M.curfew
was immediately imposed in Urumqi in an effort to restore order and fore-
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 75
stall revenge attacks. The new government then ordered an investigation
into the incident; the results, as in other cases, were never officially
released.?
Onedirect result of this incident was an increase intheunease felt by Han
Chinesein the capital; they feared that under the current conciliatory policy
they were not adequately protected, and that such incidents might become
commonplace should the government fail to take decisive action.A :i no ac-
tionwas taken against any Moslems after this incident, it remained as one of
theunavenged grievances that undoubtedly contributed to the violence of
thefollowing February.
Nevertheless, meetings of the new government proceeded, and after a
series of initial sessions the government council officially adopted the
Government Political Program on J uly 18, 1946.
10
This lengthy document
together with the peace agreement itself were intended to form the basis of
lawin Xinjiang and to serve as a guide for the administration of the new
government.It attempted to cover all important aspects of political, social,
economic, and cultural life in the region. It was also aplan of action for the
futureeconomic development of the area, and one that required consider-
ablecentral government assistance to make implementation feasible.
I t was Dot only wide-ranging and broad in scope, but also democratic in
tone.I ndeed, it began with the major statement that power was to be ex-
ercisedby the people. I ts ambitious nature, however, was also its shortcom-
ing.I n covering a wide range of objectives for the new government, it
pro~ised the peoR
le
a democratic "paradise," in the words of Vi~-
Chairman A bmet; 1 but as noted by the A merican observer Barnett, I t
promised agreat deal without reference to the means by which its promises
Wouldbe fulfilled.12 I ts economic provisions were so broad that to realize
evenasmall portion of the stated goals would have required capital invest-
ment far beyond what was available to Xinjiang at the time or in thenear~-
rure.A nd, as the new government had witnessed on its first day of official
operation, the personal freedoms guaranteed in the GPP woul~have ~obe
SUSpendedat times simply to keep the peace, even inthe provincial e3:
P1tal
The first section of the opp was aguarantee of the people's legal nghts as
caned for originally in the peace agreement It also repeated th~assurance
that Chinese and Turki languages would be used on an equal basts.The sec-
Ondpoint, however tempered any concession to local legal custom by out-
lawingthe use of corporal punishment under customary or religio~law;
funhermore, it provided that in the case of conflict between the civil law
COdeand local religious law the central government would be called upon
tor~lve the dispute. A n additional departure fromreligious lawW3Scalled
f~r mthe third point, which included legal equality for women and protec-
tionof their legal rights.
Inthe first section the government also reserved the right (Qtrain all new-
----------
76 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
I y elected officials, a clause that potentially enabled the government to as-
sess not only the new officials' abilities but also their political stance.
Section Bof the GPP was devoted to the guarantee of equality and respect
for all nationalities in the province, again repeating the terms of the peace
agreement A dded to this was the declaration that stirring up bad feeling or
destroying national unity would Dot be permitted, although no provision
suggests ways to prevent incidents of either kind, nor is punishment for
those guilty of such activity mentioned.
The next section, C, concerning "Foreign Relations," dealt exclusively
with the "friendly relations" between the USSR and China and called for
economic cooperation as well as cultural and artistic exchanges with the
USSR's Central A sian republics. Clearly inclUded as a sign of Soviet support
for the new government, it could be seen to benefit both the I li and the cen-
tral government factions. For IIi, it meant central government acknowledg-
ment of the USSR's importance to Xinjiang and the necessity of reopening
trade, which had been interrupted since before the beginning of the re~l-
lion.
13
To the Chinese, this section reaffirmed Soviet recognition of Xin-
jiang as an integral part of China-an affirmation just recently secured by
the Chongqing government with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship and A lliance on A ugust 14, 1945.
The most ambitious section of the GPP was Section D, on economic de-
velopment. Plans were outlined in nineteen provisions that called for creat-
ing an industrial and agricultural base in Xinjiang. However well-inten-
tioned the Proposals, the carrying out of point 13alone would have tak~n
more funds and technological skill than were then available in the enure
province: it called for establishment of basic industries in cement, electricity,
steel, and the production of machine pans. The financial and technological
constraints also applied to the other provisions in this section, which recom-
mended the development of communications, public health, culture, and ed-
ucation, all of which required considerable financial investment. .
The means by which these programs would be financed was discussed I D
Section E. I n addition to revenue from local taxes, point 5 called for the
COntinuation of central SUbsidies to Xinjiang. As the coalition had little ~eft
in the treasury by A ugust 1946, and by the end of 1946was some six billI on
dollars in debt, central funds were vital. This financial dependence was ex-
pected to COntinue.Of the fifty-billion-dollar budget proposed for fiscal year
1947, only twenty-two billion was expected as income from local taxes.I 4-
Because considerable sums would have to come from the central govern-
ment, and as lax regulations in general were decided by the national, Dot
provincial, government, the provision on taxes in the GPP included few
details. It did stipulate, however. that collection of taxes in the province
must not "damage the people's livelihOOd."
On the senSitive issue of locaUy issUed currency, point 3 simply stated that
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 77
thecurrency of Xinjiang would be united with that of the rest of the nation,
butthai this would be done only after further appropriate discussion and re-
search.While this treatment avoided a potentially divisive discussion, it also
leftan important economic question unresolved, contributing to a sense of
financialinsecurity in the province.
Point 6of the finance section called for reduction in provincial govern-
meet expenditures and in the number of government employees. Regula-
tionsdealing with this point were later passed to ensure agreater number of
representatives of national minorities in local government.
An important financial matter that was not touched upon in the GPP and
laterwas to cause difficulties was the uniting of the currency of the three dis-
tricts with that of the rest of Xinjiang. A ccording to U.S.sources, the
provincial government had agreed to exchange, for Xinjiang dollars, the
largeamount of money printed by the IIi government to finance its mili-
tal}' action in 1944-1945.
15
This was in addition to "relief' funds issued to
thecity government of Vining by the provincial government in the summer
of 1946of some Xn $40 million.
16
A s both relief money and funds for
buyingthe IIi currency affected the province's financial situation, they were
important omissions. Their exclusion was presumably to avoid open dis-
agreement or stalemate among the new coalition's members at this early
stage.
A ccording to Zhang's statement on the GPP, printed in the local U.rumqi
paperon J uly 20, 1946, every word in the GPP had been carefully conslder~
andthen passed by the council. The resulting document, he said, was unam-
mO~lysupported by all government members.l" A voiding the more co~-
tenhous issues in the area of finance was certainly one way to ensure this
unanimity. .
~e search for unanimity doubtless accounts for.the program's ~eneral.I I y,
forI tsambitious optimism and for its failure to diSCUSSthe quesnon of I m-
plementation.While the app did provide a wide-ranging set of goals be~t-
tinga modernizing and democratic government, the ways and means of.I ts
implementation were uncertain. One major limitation was that the runding
was Subject to central government approval. For this and other reasons the
coalitionSOOnfound itself struggling to realize even asmall part of the pro-
gram'sambitious provisions. P was one of
The I mplementation of the peace agreen,tent a~d the ~~ in the
many problems facing the coalition. These difficulties are was
fOllOWing sections. A good example of the complenty of th~problems
tbe~rience of trying to implement the provisions for elecllons.
EIeaions
Inad .. t and theselection of the
dI tion to the reorganization of the governm
en
unry level within
COunci~the peace agreement called for eleCtions at the 00
- - - - - - - - - - ..
78 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
three months. Each County A ssembly was to be elected first.These wereto
elect the assembly chairman and vice-chairman. One of the first tasks of
these assemblies was to choose the county magistrate and his assistant, as
well as acounty secretary-general. The names of all those chosen were to be
reported to the provincial government.
A fter an initial delay in which the Provincial Council was set up and the
method of election decided, the regulations for the coming elections were
finally announced on September 1, 1946, following the decision of the coun-
cil on A ugust 27, at its eighth session.
18
Two of the most important provi-
sions covering the elections were for universal suffrage for both menand
womenand the useof the secret ballot.
The qualifications for county assemblymen included in the published elec-
tion regulations were very general, allowing nonlocal residents to run for
posts that were supposed to represent the particular interests of the county.
The eight qualifications simply stated that candidates could be of any na-
tionality, of any religion, and residents of any county; they could be male or
female but had to support the Republic of China, be literate in one lan-
guage, SUpport the peace agreement and the OPP, and, finally, be over
twenty-five and under forty-five years of age.19
One of the most important functions of the County A ssembly was to be
the election of a representative to the Provincial A ssembly. The Provincial
A ssembly, attended by indirectly elected representatives, would therefore
supposedly reflect the various nationalities in the region in proportion to
population. A ll of the elective offices were to be held for two-year terms.
Representatives could not be reelected, and they were not paid.
The first step in the election process was the appointment of Election Su-
pervisory Committees at the district and county levels. A t the district l~el,
the committees were headed by Han Chinese or by national minontl~
fluent in Chinese and with previous experience in government. The ethnic
composition of the district and county committees is given in tables 7and 8.
A lthough national minority members dominated at bothlevels, the com-
mittees inclUded many individuals who had traditionally allied themselves to
the Chinese as well at least one Han Chinese on most committees.
The supervisory work of the COmmittees began in September. The actual
county elections themselves were spread over a three-month period due to
problems of organization, logistics, and, in several cases, violent encounters
between election personnel and local nationalities distrustful of any repre-
sentative of the government in Urumqi. .
Criticism of the election procedures was quick to surface. People in the IIi
area objected to the need to submit a name list to the provincial government
as a prereqUisite to holding the formal elections. The Revouaionary East
Turkestan Daily editorialized: "We are certainly not opposed to the elec-
tions! On the contrary, we ardently welcome them, but we want to be able to
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 79
Table 7
DI strict-L evel E l ection Supervisory ccmmntees
District
""
members
National minority
members Chairman (Nationality)
Urumqi
Vining
Kashgar
A ""
Tacheng
""''" Henan (Khotan)
Yenki
Hami
Yarkand
T._
Sollrce: Xinjilmg Daily. September 17. 1946. p- 3.
Burhan Shahidi (Tatar)
Liu Mengchun (Han)
Abdul Kerim Erbana (Uighur)
Unclear
Zhen Luhua (Sibo)
J animhan (Kazak)
LiuXiaohan (Han)
Ardeni (Mongoi)
Liu(unclear) (Han)
Liu Qingxiu (Han)
3
4
5
4
5
5
5
3
4
3
22
60
2
1
1
1
2
11
Tallie 8
County-L evel E l ection Supervisory Committees
Number of
National
counties
""
minority
District
District
reported members
members
total
Urumqi
10of 12 23
25
48
YlOing
1 of 11 0
5
5
K . . . . ~
5ot 9 3
22
25
A " " 50110 1
23
24
Hetian(Khotan)
2 of 7 1
9
10
Yenki
4018 2
t3
15
Hami
2 of 2 2
,
10
Yarkand
4ot 4 0
20
20
T"",
33 0163 32
125
157
Soruc
e
: lfuUitulg Daily. November 2, 1946, p. 3.
electaUf supporters, without aname list to limit us.,,
20
.
I naddition to such criticism several violent incidents occurred mthe
processof organizing the electio~. The most serious of th.esea.lle?edlyoc-
CUrredin southern Xinjiang.On an unspecified date, asenous medent oc-
curredin thecity of Kuche.Turn allegations, later supported by A hmet J an
2
80 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
Kastmt, were that Chinese troops surrounded the field in which elections
were being held and twiceopened fire with rifles and machine guns, k a
result, four people were killed and seven or eight wounded.The incident
was quoted to British Consul Graham as the supreme example of Chinese
interference in the elections and was presented as conclusive proof of the
necessity of removing the Chinese from Xinjiang.Chinese leaders, when
asked about the allegations, refused either to confirm or to deny them.J ead-
iog to speculation that there may well have been some truth to the charges.
A nother serious incident occurred in the north on October 16, 1946,
when the Ernin County election committee chairman, Tuyuze, and his as-
sistant were shot and killed.L ater press coverage of the incident revealed
that the same area had been the site of earlier killings. Some thirty Han
Chinese refugees who were returning to Xinjiang from refuge in the USSR
had also reportedly died in the same locale in the late summer.U
The government appointed a committee to investigate, but no results
were ever announced publicly. One explanation of what happened was that
the election committee was known to be pro-Chinese; and when it reached
the Emin area an A ltai group, who were presumably Kazak, had demanded
that it be searched for weapons. When the chairman refused, he and his as-
sistant were killed in the ensuing fight.22
Election supervisors sent by Urumqi to other areas also encountered dif-
ficulties. In November, the supervisors in Y enki requested that they be ~-
lowed to return to the capital because they were unable to complete their
work due to "poor communication" in the area. They asked that the gover~
mem a~point a new supervisory staff as they wished to be relieved of (herr
duties.
Tacheng District was also the site of trouble. The committee sent there
also requested permission to return, since in their area not even a draft list
of coun~representatives had been drawn up, and it was by then al~eady De-
cember. Prior to their request, Salis, the Kazak who was serving as ~.
sistant secretary-general in the provincial government, made a personal visn
to check on the election process there. In November, local authorities had
had to put him into protective CUStodyfor a period of time.
25
Officials who
had accompanied him were not molested, however.
During the winter of 1946-1947, Mehmet Emin Bugra visited the south-
ern part of Xinjiang and subsequently reported that the military had not
permitted elections in one district, and that five other duly elected
magistrates had been prevented from assuming their offices by Han Chinese
civil and military officials who were aided by "reactionary" Moslems. A t
Henan (Khotam he reported that the Chinese military had killed civilians.
A s a result of such problems, elections were never completed in some
areas of the province. The incomplete results, given in table 9, show that
ethnic minorities were elected at a ratio of3:1 at the county level
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ~l f l I '
1946 COAL mON GOVERNMENT 81
Table 9
XInjiang Province 1946 Election Results
District
Number
counties
reported
Assembly Chair
and Viee-Chair
Han Min.
County
Magistrate
Han Min.
County
Representative
to Province
Han Min.
County
Assemblymen
Han Min.
Urumqi
Ylning
Kashgar
A k w
Tacheng
""'" Khotan
Yenki
Hami
Yarkand
''''''
4
10
7
o
5
10
10
20
8
o
87
140
14
o
12of 12
10of 11
Oaf 9
30110
6016
o ot7
0017
4018 0 38 6
3013 8 17 3
1014 2
390177 68 324 15 58 10
SoiIrce: )(jnjiang Daily, November 21, December 17and 18, 1946, p.3.
:es: Elections were reponedly held in Kashgar and Khotan, but no re5UI I Sare available. Zhang
!J Uncontends that no elections were ever held in the district of Ashan due to the interference of
~_ Batur.No election results for that district were reported in the press. See Zhang Dajun,
_,."uy l'ffirs, 12:7170-71, on election problems.
59
o
5
12
12
30
1
o
1
o
6 o 6
o
3
2
1
26
2
o
9
3
1
1
26
It is d.ifficult to draw conclusions as to how representative of the local
pop~!atlon those elected were. Certainly. some were part of the local
nobility, traditionally allied to the Chinese.Thecountyheadsin Urumqi and
Ham d .
. I rstrtcts, for example, were "native" but were known (0be pro-
Chinese, andmost wereof noble birth.
26
.V~ting,whichwas supposed to beby secret ballot, hadbeendoneinsome
dI Strictsat public meetings, votes beingcast by showof hands.This offered
~heopportunity for Chinese to ensure the election of pro-Chineseofficials
ill.t~esevendistricts, according to one observer.
v
Moreover, insouthern
Xin)l3.Dg, provincial Vice-Chairman A hmet and Minister of Reconstruction
MebmetEmin Bugraaccused local militaryand policeunits of havinginter-
~eredinthe elections by beatings, breaking upof meetings, and imprisoning
eachersand students. At the same time, however, A hmet agreed that the
holdingof elections was one positive result of thecoalitiongovernt?ent.He
wrote that there had been "serious struggle" at thetimeof theelectiOns,but
thepeoplehadchosen those theywanted asleaders.
28
O~hermembers of the government also expressed satisfaction with the
elections.I nan interview, Wang Cengsban, minister of administration, said
82 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
hewas proud that "backward" Xinjiang was the first place in Chinawhere
popular self-government wasdeveloping.29
Considering the uniqueness of the situation and the newness of the
government at this point, the elections appeared to havegone off quitewell.
Not only did they result in the appearance of some new faces inofficial
posts, but theyalso served to raise the general political consciousnessof the
region's population, since publicity on the elections and their objectives
reached even remote areas of Xinjiang.The elections also served to famil-
iarize many Moslems with the newTurki leaders in the provincial govern-
ment, as the IIirepresentatives Seyfettin and A bmet, in particular, made
numerous public appearances during the monthS 0-(election.
Zhang Zhizhong's A dministration:
Major Problems, A ttempted Solutions
Head of the Coalition Provincial Government fromJ uly 1946to May1947,
Zhang Zhizhong needed diplomatic skills as hesought to lead the coalition
in awayacceptable to both the central government and local factions.An
astute diplomat and keen observer, Zhang clearly identified the areas of
greatest tension and potential disagreement in the province and spokecon-
vincinglyto thecentral government of the need for immediate reform.Some
members of the central government were byno means in agreement onthe
necessity for aprolonged conciliatory policy in the Northwest, and Zhang's
presence undoubtedly served as a brake on them and on certain ambitious
militarists in Nanjing and Xinjiang who did not share hisviews on the need
for greater participation ingovernment bythe national minorities.
I n Xinjiang I tselt, Zhang had the further difficult task of soothing oft~n
ruffled relations between the Han and local Moslems.Pursuing the policy
"unity of nationalities," Zhang was not alwayssuccessful in the realmof ~a-
tional minority relations, but his efforts did earn hima personal reputation
inthe region for forthrightness and sincerity.3D .
In addition to acting as conciliator, Zhang had to deal with other major
political and administrative problems.The eight areas of concern heidenn-
fied demonstrate the enormity of the problems confronting not only the
government but also the J ivesof the people of the province.These problems
were finances, unemployment, corruption, military discipline, appointment
of delegates to the National A ssembly, A shan members of the government,
implementation of the peace a5';eement and the GPP, and the question.of
the "East Turkestan Republic." 1 A ll of these problems represented major
threats to the continuation of the fragile coalition. In the background was
alwaysZhang's attempt to establish "unity of nationalities." I t will behel~-
ful to look first at Zhang's visit to the DivalleyinA ugust 1946,asweJ l ashis
efforts to easetension between Han and Moslems in thecapital city.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~? I I
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 83
TItt Iii JTISiJ
In theinitial, hopeful atmosphere that permeated the capital during the first
fewmonths of coalition rule, Zhang made repeated calls for unity within the
newprovincial government and for the support of all nationalities for its
policies.He was joined in this call by various local Moslem leaders, includ-
ingmembers of the IIi faction, who spoke publicly of the need for united
support for this newest attempt to bring real "people's government" to Xin-
jiang.
A s indicated previously, however, there were obstacles to such unity in-
herent in the coalition system itself. Distrust, fear of eventual military domi-
nation by the other factions, and general unrest caused by the economic
situation and political reorganization were problems particularly resistant to
solution.Further, the three Ilidistricts remained cut off from the rest of the
province, withtransport and communication remaining at astandstill during
thesecond half of 1946.
In an effort to demonstrate to the people of the province that unity was
possible, the government announced plans to resume normal traffic to
Y ~ningfrom Urumqi. First, the partially destroyed bridge over the Manas
R~v~rhad to be re~aired; then road construction on the main route to
Y iningwas to begin. 2
Plans were also made in J uly 1946for a series of visits to the Ui valley by
various officials. A lthough Zhang himself was personally anxious to
demonstrate renewal of open communications with the three districts, he
was not the first member of the new government to visit the region. Rather,
thefirst to make the journey was Mesut Sabri, the new inspector-general of
theprovince, who was given permission to visit his home town ofY ~~ ~e
left thecapital on J uly 23, the purpose of his visit ostensibly being to vtsrt his
son, Who, like his father, was a medical doctor.
33
It is probable that Mesut
also went to prepare the way for Zhang's visit, to assure the provincial au-
thortties that Zhang would be civilly if not cordially welcomed. He was a~
daub.tless collecting information for the provincial govemment, ~",:g
theSituation and its possible future implications for the Chinese during his
stay,which, in the end, was extended to several months.
In Urumqt, Mesut's visit was not accorded a great deal of publicity; nor
were the visits to IIi in A ugust by the Soviet consul general statio~ed in
Urumqf When Zhang finally visited Y ining himself, however, a sen~of
reports in the Jellljitlng Daily gave details of the visit, and pictures of hI S ~r-
= ~1 Y ining's A irambek A irport were later published in the TUlIISIum Pic-
A ccompanied by provincial Secretary-General L iu Mengchun and a party
of twenty, including central government representatives ~d n~pa~r
repOrters, Zhang left Urumqi on A ugust 28, flying in the Smo-Sov:iet au-
a
84 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
line's plane that had previously carried the IIi delegates to thepeace
negotiations. A mong those greeting him at the airport in Y ining were local
government representatives and Soviet Consul-General Tubashenyev. A fter
what was described by the press as a "rousing welcome," Zhang went into
the city and later attended several meetings. The first of these, at 7P.M.,was
with Tubashenyev and Y ining's most important military leaders. L ater he
met with other local city officials and county heads who had gathered inthe
city to meet him.
35
There is no available official record of these private meetings, but on sep-
tember 2, Zhang addressed a crowd in Y infng's West Park, details of which
were reported in theXmjial1g Daily. Zhang again appealed for unity, asking
for the support of all the people in carrying out the terms of thepeace
agreement and the GPp.36He reiterated the four aims of the new govern-
ment as being continued friendship between China and the Soviet Union,
preservation of the unity of the nation, realization of democracy, and
strengthening the solidarity of various races in Xinjiang. He was careful to
point out, too, that he and A hmet J an Kasimi had worked together "like
brothers" to forge a new government He-also emphasized the need for con-
tinued closeSino-Soviet friendship, cultural exchanges, and trade---especial-
lywith the peoples of Soviet Central A sia.37
On September 3, he inspected the two towns of Xinertai and Xuerxuesi
where, aCCOrdingto news reports, he was warmly welcomed. On the 4th he
returned to Urumqi carrying with him pledges of support for the new
government from the Hi people.38
I n the eyes of some local Moslems, the implications of Zhang's visit were
that the Chinese-dominated provincial government would now reassert it-
self in the three districts; the J uly declaration that the road would be opened
had caused much concern-so much so that A bmet was called upon to
SOOthesuch fears. I n a September 1946 speech in Y ining to the Uzbek Sum-
mer Club, he said:
Itis clear from your qcesuons that you are uneasy because we have opened the
road, and demobilized our troops while on the other sidethere is an ever
greater number of troops, defenses are not demolished, oldofficials remainat
their posts, Chinesefamiliesare migratingto Urumqi, andso on; andyou feat
that they have deceived us and may stan an offensive. I n my opinion, you bave
no grounds for such conclusions. Y ou can live in peace since we, your repre-
sentatives, are members of theprovincial govemment.39
A lthough the speech is critical in tone, A hmet was at least clear in offer-
ing his personal opinion that the Opening of the road should not constitute ~
threat. Reaction to his remarks in Y ining may have been temporarily ~J -
rive, but traffic on the route between the three districts and the rest of Xin-
jiang remained restricted until early 1947, and even at that time the traffic

-------------~ ..fII
1946 COALlIJON GOVERNMENT 85
was primarily one-way and consisted of White Russians anxious to escape
thethree districts (see chapter 7).I n fact, because of distrust-s-and because
of fears of Chinese resurgence in the three districts-full communications
andfree travel with the IIi area were never restored, despite Zhang's efforts
inY ining in September 1946.
A nother visitor also reached Y ining that fall.Walter Graham, the British
consul stationed in Urumqi, had applied to visit the area. A fter an initial
refusal by Chinese authorities, he was given permission in early September
to take the overland route to Y ining. L eaving the capital on September 3, he
drovevia the town of Manas, which remained the unofficial border between
the three districts and the rest of Xinjiang. He arrived in Y ining later than
anticipated, on the evening of the 13th, because of mechanical difficulties
withhis vehicle. During his week-long visit, Graham had an opportunity to
wander through the town, noting that life seemed quiet and ordinary, with
markets busy as usual. He saw no sign of overt Soviet occupation in the city,
anda number of Chinese appeared on the streets, dispelling claims that all
Chinesein the area had been killed the previous winter.
40
Graham's opinion that the Soviets were involved in some way in the IIi
rebellion remained unchanged, but he could not establish one way or the
other the presence of Soviet Russians in the government, or of Soviet troops
Outsidethe Hi valley.
Thevisits mentioned above were certainly pan of Zhang's efforts to show
the people of Xinjiang-and of China proper-that "unity" had indeed
returned to Xinjiang. These officially sanctioned visits, however, did not
represent a resumption of "normal" traffic to the area by any means, and the
fictionof normalized relations was obvious to nearly all observers by the end
orthe year.
DUringthe new government's initial six months in power, Zhang and other
members of his new government spoke publicly of the need for unity and
COOperation.A ssurances were offered in turn to Han Chinese, to local Mos-
lems, and to residents of the I li area in an attempt to foster aspirit of unity
amongall local inhabitants
InJ Uly, four major contributions to this theme were made, all of.whic~
referred repeatedly to the need for unity and cooperation among natl~nali-
tl~.On J uly 16, Y ice-Chairman Burhan spoke for two hours to the Uighur
L iterary Society in Urumqi. A ddressing an audience of some one thousand
people, he appealed to local Uighurs to support their new govemmen~and
extOlledthe virtues of the GPP which if fully implemented, would bring a
Dew life to the troubled region.4t Two'daY S later, when Xinjiang'S new ~fef
of staff, General Song Xilian, took up his post, heechoed Burhan's call.

86 1946COALnION GOVERNMENT
Less than a week later, another speech was delivered to the Urumqi City
Council by Moslem representative Niyaz Haji. Niyaz was the name of alead-
ing princely family in Xinjiang, members of which had been involved in the
1933 East Turkestan Republic; a plea from a member of this family for na-
tional unity was probably expected to attract greater support from the local
Moslem population.P
The day after the Niyaz speech appeared in the local press, Urumqt Gar-
rison Commander Chen Defa, Mayor Chu wu, and Police Chief L iu Han-
dong, jointly signed an article in the Xinjiang Daily that blamed current
problems on "past errors" in Xinjiang's history and on general contradic-
tions in society.44A s in the speeches, the three asked for the support of the
general population and for unity among aU of Xinjiang's nationalities. But
they also referred to a"small minority" who had taken "mistaken actions,"
and they declared that in the future such acts were to be prohibited. They
named specifically the formation of gangs, causing chaos, and destroying
others' freedomor legal rights asprohibited acts.
In A ugust 1946, no less a personage than Y u Y ouren, president of the
Control Y uan, was quoted in two articles in theXinjiang Daily on thesaDl.e
theme,45and in the same month another important speech by Zhang Zhi-
zhongwas published.A imed mainly at the Han Chinese, Zhang's speechad-
monished the local Chinese for their criticismof his policies.He toldthem
that ''To givewayis not to surrender; patience is not shameful.'046Hemade
a plea that SOundedrather like a Chinese version of the White Man's Bur-
den, declaring that the Han must remember their role as "older brother" to
their "younger brothers" inXinjiang.47
The call for unity was not confined to official channels in Urumqt.I n
Y ining, too, the cause of unity was expounded and publicized.The speech
that Zhang madein Y ining on September 2was reported locally, aswas the
speech by Vice-Chairman A hmet J an Kasimi, which had received th.e
audience's enthusiastic applause. Especially long applause had greeted hI S
description of the armed struggle of I li valley residents "for the rights of our
people." I nveiled references to anticoallnon forces in the region, A nmet
declared that "traitors in our midst" should be ousted, and that all people
should rally to support the new government.Hestated that the iiiarea had
rebelled only to secure its Lawful rights guaranteed under the Chinese con-
stitution-and because "the sevententh-century conditions" in Xinjiang
were no longer tolerable. I n the new era opening to the people o~the
region, heasked for support and unity, echoing the rhetoric of the Chl~ese
members of government, albeit spiced with references to the accomplish-
ments of theTurkic people in forcing the government to implement revolu-
tionary changes in the province.48
A s attention turned to the election process in September and October
1946, fewer speeches calling for unity were made, but fromlate October
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 87
through November, government personalities continued to address the
samememe,"? The provincial daily frequently editorialized on this topic,
and periodically speeches by well-known minority personalities were fea-
tured.
50
It is noteworthy, however, that pleas for unity now accompanied ar-
tides on disorder or on new government regulations aimed at maintaining
lawand order in the capital. The November 11 report in the XinjiiJng Daily
on tbe Emin murders carried such a plea, as did a November 19 article on
guarantees for the free movement of people within the province.
51
By December, when it was clear that the elections would not be com-
pleted for some time and that disturbances caused by anticoalition forces
wereintensifying rather than decreasing, such references all but stopped in
tbe local press. The wording of government directives took on a harsher
tone, declaring that the law would be obeyed and that any persons acting il-
legallycould expect severe punishment. Government hopes of promoting
somekind of unity within the province to support the new government did
not die, but in the winter of 1946-1947 the harder line of men like Song
Xilianwas finding a larger and larger audience, not only among disaffected
Han but also among those local Turks who feared a resurgence of Soviet
power and influence in Xinjiang due to Zhang's conciliatory line.
While preoccupation with a theme is not necessarily an indication of sin-
cerity or even of dedication to such an ideal, in this instance Zhang and
other members of the new coalition government knew the necessity of
"unity" for the continuation of their still fragile coalition. Without astrong
measure of unity-meaning popular, unified support for the new govem-
ment a?d its policies-the people of the region faced further bloodshed a.n~
would inevitably fall even further behind in economic development. Politi-
cally,all factions in Xinjiang stood to gain, in the short run at least, from.the
arrangement that offered a much needed period of stability for the region.
Thus the "unity" called for by Chinese and local leaders was more than a
political slogan. A hrnet had stated that the rights his people were deter-
mined to secure were those now guiiiilteed in the peace agr~m~nt:md the
GPP, tacitly agreeing that Xinjiang was part of China. The I mpli~uon was
that, for the time being at least, the area of Xinjiang ~ Chmese,. and
through political unity the population would secure baste human nghts
caned for in the Chinese constitution.
DUring the initial months of the coalition government, the collective
~embership appears to have been sincere in its belief that the coalition was,
In the short term at least a workable alternative to past jorms of govern-
m:nt in the region. In November 1946 foreign observers remarked on the
evident good will and sincerity apparent among Moslem and non-MOSle~
me~~rs of the government who were to attend the National A sse~bly I D
Nan]lDgin December 1946.52 Nonetheless, it was also clear tha~different
factions had quite different expectations for the implementatI on of the
a
88 1946COALrrJON GOYERNMENT
agreement. The Chinese, having yielded for the first time to suchwide-
ranging reforms in a minority area, expected good will and cooperation from
the new minority members of the provincial government. But it became
clear that reforms would not take place overnight, and national minority ex-
pectations of rapid change were quickly disappointed. For instance, it was
expected that Chinese officials would be replaced with local Moslemsin
many government posts and in the police, but change in these areas was slow
to come, and proportional representation never reached the level envisaged
by the Moslem members of government. A s Zhang was well aware, even if
he had been able to find qualified local people to replace Han Chinese offi-
cials, he would be left with a large Dumber of unemployed Han, further ex-
acerbating poor relations between local Chinese and Moslems.Eventhe
provisions for education in local languages were difficult to fulfill, given the
limited number of qualified local people to fill positions in educational in-
stitutions.
Calls for unity could not mask the enormity of the problems of implemen-
tation of the peace agreement and the GPP.High expectations coupled with
the reality of Xinjiang's poor economic situation and lack of educated,
qualified native personnel to step into government posts were inevitable
causes of friction in both government and society as a whole. Furthermore,
the local non-Han population was well aware of the extent of the loss of face
the concessions by the Chinese entailed; buoyed by a new spirit of victory
over traditional foes, a new sense of Turkic power made itself felt in Xin-
jiang in the summer and autumn of 1946.
A New Sense of" 'Turkic Pow er"
I n what for many Turks was a heady atmosphere of new political op-
portuniry, the first few months of the coalition also saw the emergence of a
new Turkic sense of power within their traditional homeland. Excited over
what was perceived as a victory over the Chinese, local Turks set out to
make resident Han Chinese aware of their minority status in the region. Be-
ginning with the anti-Chinese riots on the first day of the new government's
official business, small outbursts of anti-Han sentiment exploded periodical-
ly during the first months of coalition government. The unavenged murders
of the first day of coalition rule were still in the minds of HanChinese when,
on J uly 29, a Chinese airline official. J in Xuedong, was murdered.
53
When
two Turkic suspects in the murder were finally arrested on October 21, a
mob gathered at the prison demanding their release. A fter the crowd guar-
anteed to produce the two later for trial. they were set free on bail.
54
Outside the capital itself, Han Chinese were also suffering from the new
Tutkic sense of power. Early A ugust saw anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet riots
in Kashgar, where police were called out to disperse rioters. L ater that
1946 COALnION GOVERNMENT 89
monthinTurfan, south of the provincial capital, disturbancesoccurredthat
werecalmedonlyafter apersonal visit fromVice-ChairmanBurhan.
55
Suchevents, coupled with Zhang's policy'of compromiseandconciliation
towardnational minorities, caused increasingconcern amongChineseinthe
capitalandelsewhere.Han Chinese sawtheir dominant roleinXinjiangaf-
fairsbeing threatened and began pressing the Chinese members of the
governmentto look after their interests inthe region.
HanChilw seU1Ut!SI
~theearlymonths passed and the incidents involvingHan Chineseandlo-
cal Moslemsincreased rather than diminished, Han resistance to Zhang's
conciliatorypolicies built and gradually came to focus on two issues: the
planfor redistribution of jobs in the government to i.ncludeprogressively
morenational minorities in government employment; and the lossof au-
thorityby Han Chinese and by China itself through constant concessionsto
national minority demands.
Withregard to the first issue, the coalition government hadactedquickly
to includemorenational minorities ingovernment Inonlyamonth, 30per-
centof Haninprovincial-level posts had reportedly beenreplaced, ashad40
percentof Han officials at the district and county levels.
56
Manyof thecis-
placedofficialswereprobably assignedother duties, but Zhangwas awareof
what hecalled unemployment among the Han, aproblem hediscussedat
lengthinhisOctober speech. ..
Inaddition to the Chinese officials displacedby national nuncnues, Han
refugeesfromthe three districts also crowdedinto Urumqt, BetweenA ugust
a~dDecember 1946, some thirteen thousand refugeesarrived inthep~~
CiaJ .capita1.57Considerable financial aidwas givento thesepeople, but their
presenceadded to tensions inthe city.58 . .
Ute in A ugust the provincial government issuedasix-point direcu~e.to
thoseHanChinesewho remained intheir posts.A ll government andmilita-
ry officialsin the area were required to dedicate themselvesto the.govern-
mempolicy of reconciliation. Certain long-standing abuses against t~e
peoplewereto end.For example, military disciplinewas to beimprove<!m
aneffort to curtail some of the most serious abuses, suchastheconflSC3~on
of property and supplies from local merchants without payment Punish-
mentfor anysuchabuses was to besevere, accordingto thedirective.
59
Further important measures dealingwithgovernment empl~ werean-
nouncedin a directive on November 25.
60
This time the intenUonwas to
ensureproportionate national minority representation in~l government.
The policy was to tate effect on J anuary I , 1947.Themost unportant ~pect
of this directive was that it called for a fixed ratio of Han to national
minOritiesingovernment of 50-50within sixmonthsandaratio of 70:30,the
- - - - - - - - - - - - u
90 1946COALlTJON GOVERNMENT
new minority being the Han, thereafter. A ll nationalities would be included
inthis ratio system, but Han technicians and other specialists were excluded.
The Chinese authorities thus preserved the option of bringing in numerous
Han "experts" under this clause.This directive was also an attempt to im-
prove the quality of government officials. A test would be given to existing
officials to weed out those who were incapable; the latter would be replaced
by locally born people. Training for all officials from county level down
would be compulsory, and after training the officials could be sent elsewhere
inChina to work if no positions were available in Xinjiang itself.
There is DO record of the number of Han who lost their government poslS
as aresult of the new system.The intended ratio of 70:30 was never realized,
however, mainly because a relatively small number of qualified local Mos-
lems existed at the time. A ll the same, the threat implicit in the new regu-
lations upset resentful local Han who were suddenly faced with reverse
discrimination after years of domination.
The loss of Chinese prestige in Xinjiang was a second source of Han un-
rest. Many Chinese attributed the numerous incidents of Turki-Han con.
frontation throughout the region to Zhang's "soft policy" toward the local
population. A lthough as long as Zhang was in the region most Chinese offi-
cials professed support for him and his line, as soon as he left on a visit to
the national capital, demonstrations exploded in Urumqi, illustrating the ex-
tent of Han resentment against COntinued concessions to minorities.
The chief spokesman for the anticoncillatory faction within Xinjiang was
General Song Xilian. Only a month after the new government was orga-
nized, he confided to the British consul in Kashgar that although any
"unlawful interference" by Chinese with the native population would be
severely punished, the government was not prepared to go beyond the con-
cessions already given to the people of Xinjiang and would "rigorously s~p-
press any further disorder or sedition. tt61 It was while Song was the ranking
official in Xinjiang and dUring Zhang's absence that the February 1947riots
OCCUrredin Urumqi. Song was finally transferred from the region in 1948,
reportedly because of his hard-line views.62
Zhang Zhizhong's A ssessment
of Xinjiang's Problems
Inaddition to dealing with Han and Turkic discontent, Zhang Zhizhong had
to face other problems in the region. I n late October 1948, he addressed a
Special meeting in Urumqi attended by over a thousand representatives of
Xinjiang's nationalities. His speech concerned eight major problem areas
facing Xinjiang, which he identified as finances, unemployment, military dis-
cipline, representation at the upcoming National A ssembly, the A sban
members of government, implementation of the peace agreement, and the
......
.------------~
1946 COALITiON GOVERNMENT 91
question of the East Turkestan Republic.
63
As these eight problems repre-
sentedthe major challenges to the coalition as well as to the continuation of
theChinese role in Xinjiang, it is worth dealing with the speech insome
detail.First, Zhang's comments on each point are briefly summarized, fol-
lowedby anattempt to place theminperspective and to clarify the issues in-
volved.
A fter noting that the rising prices in the region were affecting everyone's
lives, Zhang told his audience that they were partly responsible for their
own plight due to their unreasonable opposition to the issuanceof more
provincial currency. especially in new large denominations of Xn $200 and
Xn $500 bills. A s a result of local objections, the proposed Xn $500 bill
wouldnot be printed, but the Xn $200 bill would haveto be issued.He
~ked the people how, if no money was printed, the government would pay
I ts many bills.He reminded them that one reason there was little money in
theprovincial treasury was that taxes for half of 1946had been remitted by
thecentral government at his request.
Zhang also sought to reply to local objections to the government's ship-
ment of 500,000 ounces of gold and 50,000 ounces of silver back to Nanjing
asa "reserve" for the Xinjiang dollar. This reserve, said Zhang, was neces-
saryif trade was to continue between Xinjiang, which had its own indepen-
dent currency, and the rest of China. Without it, he asked, bow could the
government exchange Cn S5 for Xn S1? Furtbennore, he stated, the entire
provincial budget was being subsidized by the central government, and.the
total value of financial support far exceeded the value of the gold and silver
that had been sent to the capital
With the resurgence of Nationalist presence in 1944, inflation had be-
COmeamajor problem in the region, with prices steadily climbing.Examples
of the increasing price of staples are seen in table 10.By 1948 the govern-
ment fixed.prices in an effort at stabilization.
A lthough there were certainly local objections to printing more Xinjiang
dollars, in the view of the general population a more difficult problem was
thefixed rate of exchange enforced by the central government, apari~of en
$5 to Xn S1.The Nationalists officially maintained this rate unuI 1949,
despite the incredible inflation being experienced in China proper. ~. the
Nationalist currency decreased in value, it took more and more Xinjiang
dollars to buy goods imported from China.
One serious consequence was felt by the milita!Y , who wer~supposed to
beSUpplied by local traders and herdsmen. As these traDS3~ons m~lved
payment in CnS, local food suppliers increasingly resisted sel~ng.their pro-
duce to the army. Sometimes this caused shortages of supplI es m the gar-
.1
I
91 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
Table 10
Food Price Inflation, 1946-1948
April 1945
October 1946
November 1946
J anuary 1947
December 1948
Flour price per [ln, in ens
1.000
24,000
38,000
50-55,000
120,000
Wheat price per charack (20Ib), in Xn$
J uly 1947 3,000
September 1947 6,000
November 1947 8,000
J anuary 1948 16,000
A pril 1948 40,000
November 1948 Almost impossible to buy
Source: lOR UP&SII2I2405 file 12, 62, Graham, Urumqi, December4, 1946, andJ anuary 4, 1947.
risons; as a result, local Turki merchants were forced to sell at a loss to the
military, leading to further ill will and deteriorating Han- Turki relations in
garrison towns. Furthermore, the effects of sending increasing numbers of
Chinese troops to the region were to heighten inflation and also to frighten
the local POpulation into believing that there would SOOnbe food shortages
in Xinjiang. The local people considered the two phenomena-inflation and
military presence-to be closely relaled.
64
Zhang did not mention either the
relationship between these factors or the people's fears of food shortag~.
Nor did he relate the need to print more of the Xinjiang currency to the mil-
itary presence. A s the local population believed that this additional issue of
provincial currency WOuld benefit the Chinese more than the Turki, they
naturally objected to increased money production.
One group that did benefit from the financial situation was the merchan~
who were selling Xinjiang native products to China proper. A s they paid
Only Co $5for Xn .$1of goods, their profits increased with infL ation.65
Zhang also neglected to mention the sensitive issue of the Xinjiang Na-
tive Products Co. This organization had been set up by Sheng Shicai as a
quasi~government trading company handling local products such as wool,
skins, and animal hair and also running a number of government-owned h:-
tones. It had become the monopoly of the government officials who ran It
basically for their own and Sheng's benefit A s a result, Zhang dissolved the
company, but winding up its affairs took several months. It was replaced by
the Chi Y e Trading Company in the autumn of 1946, but as this ''n~
entity was run by virtually the same officials who had run its predecessor, I t
1946 COALlTION GOVERNMENT 93
suffered (rom the same problems and was criticized by local Moslems as
beingtoo exploitative.
66
This company was in turn replaced by anew Native
Products Trading Company, with Zhang on the board of directors. This was
no guarantee of correct management, however, and by 1948 this company,
too, was involved in a corruption scandal.
67
Zhang did mention heavy central government subsidies to the province,
whichwere in (act sizable. Nearly half of this money, however, went to sup-
~nthe local military and police establishments. A ccording to the provin-
cial budget (or 1945, the two largest items of expenditure were the security
police, which received Xn $657million, and the provision of "public food-
stuffs" (meaning subsidized imports of food (or government employees and
themilitary), which consumed Xn 51,102million. Together these two items
accounted for 47percent of the Xn $3.7billion provincial budget in 1945.
68
I n the circumstance, it is not surprising that the local people felt they
derived little benefit (rom the central government's financial support to the
province.
~ceording to Zhang's speech, there was unemployment among all of Xin-
J iang's nationalities. He stated that this was an area in which the govern-
ment intended to help. I nitial steps included the previously mentioned plan
to divide government jobs among Han and other national minorities, grad-
~allyreaching a ratio of 70:30 in favor of local nationalities. As the GPP was
I mplemented, Zhang assured his audience, more and more opportunities
would become available within the region so that no talented person would
~without a job. There would be, he claimed, opportunity for all to help
with the development of the "new" Xinjiang.
As it was primarily Han Chinese who were being threatened with unem-
ployment due to the new proposed ratio system, Zhang's comments in this
~ion were aimed chiefly at them. Not only was he trying to reassure Han
to government posts that they would have a future in the province; he was
also addressing the Han refugees who had entered the capital in search of
security and government supporL . .
Together, both groups of Han were pressing Zhang to look after their I n-
terests, and his conciliatory approach was bringing criticism from bu:ea
u
-
crats afraid of losing lucrative government posts and from Han Chinese
hoping for government jobs or government assistance to compensate (or
their losses in the period of rebellion. Zhang was attempting to reply to the
aggrieved.Han without backing down from promises to inuoduce the pro-
portionate employment of all nationalities in government. But Han unrest
continued to build in the provincial capital, so that by the time th~J anuary
1,1947, deadline (or the first changes bad passed, the employment I SSuehad
94 194<1COAlJI'10N GOVERNMENT
been added to the Chinese list of grievances and contributed to the rioting
that took place in February 1947(see chapter 6).
Qmuplion
Zhang reminded his aUdience that he had asked for and received central
government authOrity to use martial law to deal with corruption as, in his
opinion, the local civil COurts were unable to handle the work load of cases.
He urged the public to report all cases of corruption to the government,
which would act to put an end to all government and military corruption in
the region. He mentioned some of the cases with which the government had
summarily dealt; all involved Han Chinese, and in all cases the officials had
been executed for their crimes.
Corruption had been an intrinsic part of the operation of government in
the region, bribery being the fastest and simplest way of ensuring action or,
depending on the case, inaction from government officials. Since his ap-
pointment as chairman of the province in A pril 1946, Zhang had been
seriously working on the problem of corruption. A lthough he did not men-
tion his spring crusade against it in his speech, Zhang had moved against a
major cause of corruption in the region in May and J une 1946.I n J une and
J Uly he had opium and other drugs burned publicly in front of governm~nt
offices, and strict regulations were passed against all government officials
who COntinUed to use the drug.
69
A s drug traffic had been a pan of the cor-
rupt practices of many government officials, Zhang's attack on the trade as
well as on its addicts was a public demonstration of his intention to fight
corruption seriously.
InJ uly 1946, Zhang had indeed requested permission to use martial law.
I n his original request, he Slated that corruption in Xinjiang occurred at
high and low levels of government, and that the majority of the offenders
were Han Chinese. This situation he wrote touched off conflict between
the nationalities. The thousands ~f cases that he knew existed had, in his
opinion, to be dealt with immediately. A s the local judicial system was slow
and many officials under investigation continued to work at their posts, pub-
lic confidence in the government was being undermined. Therefore, he
asked for and was granted permission to use martial J aw.70
Despite what certainly seemed to be sincere efforts by Zhang to stamp out
corruption, it remained a major problem. I t was so much a part of bu.s~~
and government that it defied any real SOlution. A good example of th.iSI S
seen in the way military supplies were purchased for local military garrisons.
The local magistrate (xiangbao zhang or xiangzhang) was in theory supposed
to handle the purchasing of supplies, as a go-between for the militaJ y and lo-
cal merchants_ However, he reportedly often was able to pocket the money
given him for the SUpplies.telling the military later that the goods had been
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 95
lost,stolen, or just "disappeared." A s Zhang himself knew, the opportunity
to makemoney in this and other ways was so great that the local magistrate
~uallY paid Xn $20,000-30,000 for the privilege of hOldinJ i the post, know-
mgthat hewould recover his costs in two or three months.
A nother form of corruption related to this abuse of power occurred when
thegarrisons ran short of food and new supplies were not forthcoming.
Soldierswould go personally to demand goods from local merchants, telling
themthat payment would be made later, or in installments, but such pay-
mentsrarely materialized.
In December 1946, the provincial government issued specific orders to
end such abuses. The military was officially prohibited from purchasing
goods directly from merchants. I nstead, all goods were to be purchased
through pr~r channels, and underpaying and buying on credit were both
prohibited. The government hoped that such measures would also end the
increasingly frequent attacks on military supply lines within the province, a
phenomenon thai increased with colder winter weather and higher food
prices.'3 However, neither Zhang's assault on corruption nor the new taws
on military purchasing ended abuses; both problems remained a nagging
I hornin the government's side.
Han Chinese were not the only ones involved in corrupt practices. Many
local "begs"-nobility tracing hereditary nues back many centuries-had
~ongbeen used to representing the Chinese and were accustomed to collect-
mglocal taxes and otherwise administering local government, all of which
offered opportunities to collect money for themselves. For instance, in
Kashgar, when food was purchased for the local garrison, four times the
quantity was forcibly purchased at one-tenth the market price.The extra
'bree-rcurnu was set aside for the local beg and the military authority 000-
cemed; although a certain amount of graft was expected, this was "a margin
of profit considered excessive by local producers:,74 .
County-level corruption included the common practice of destroymg tax
recordsSOthat the county taxcollector could oollect tax twiceor more tn the
same district. The county head and other officials expected big birthday
celebrations, and the county head often considered money set aside for ~he
coun~bUdget as being for his personal use.7
5
Ticket sellers and officials
WhoI SSuedgovernment travel permits continued to collect extra fees, and
s~ori~about rapacious Chinese officials circulated throughout tbe seven
dlSlnctsstill under Nationalist control
76
Whil~stories of bribery and corruption could not be p~:en, many.loatl
people I I I Xinjiang believed them to betrue, and, by assocI ation? all .Chm~
I n government were tainted. Zhang himself, however, maI 8taI ne~his
reputation as a reformer. Even after he was transferred from the p.rovmee.
~thminority members of his government and the general population con-
Suleredhimto have been an honest official.
-----------
96 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
It should be kept in mind that abuses associated with corruption were
long standing, and a degree of "squeeze" was expected-and accepted-by
the local POpulation.Complaints against corrupt officials did not, for in-
stance, figure prominently in demands for government reform.Giventhe
rate of pay accorded to most officials, squeeze was perhaps a necessary sup-
plement to lowwages.When the corruption involved the military-a Han
Chinese institution_it took on racial overtones, however, with theag.
grieved party adding this abuse of power to the existing sins of the "infidel"
army.
Zhang stated that many people had complained to himabout the problem
of military discipline, and therefore he was well aware that the soldiers of
the Nationalist army had on occasion harassed the local people.Heasked
people to remember, however, that the army was trying to keep peace ina
large area, and that their task was extremely difficult. When cases of abuse
were officially reported, he promised that action would be taken. He men-
tioned Specifically one case of a Han commander who had killed a Uighur
soldier; this commander, he said, had been tried, convicted, and executed.
This demonstrated that the government would not tolerate such breeches of
military discipline.
Complaints against the military included not only corruption, indiscrimi-
Dateconfiscation of supplies, and other forms of harassment of local people.
but, more seriously, accusations that in many areas the local military COI D-
menders, not the duly elected officials, often represented the ultimate au-
thority. Vice-Chairman A hmet noted in A pril 1947that people did Dot obey
SOmelocal Moslem county heads but rather followed the instructions of the
Chinese county garrison commanders.
17
This military interference in civil-
ian government was most apparent outside of the provincial capital. A lways
deferred to because they held ultimate power within local districts, the gar_
rison commanders were seen by many people as a threat to the new "demo-
cratic" rule inXinjiang, as was the increase in Chinese troop strength, espe-
cially inSouthern Xinjiang.78
I t will be recalled that local people opposed the military presence because
of its impact on prices and availability of goods. When Zhang visited the
south of the province in the spring of 1947, he was besieged with demands
that Chinese troops be withdrawn-for economic as well as political rea-
SODS.
79
A lthough the provincial government declared that the number of
troops had been reduced, the number had actually increased insome areas.
partlcutarty in the south, where the government anticipated further
trouble.80
Problems concerning military discipline COntinued to escalate, despite
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 97
government attempts to impose control over garrison commanders and indi-
vidual soldiers. This contributed to the pressures on the coalition govern-
meat and was a principal cause of tension in the area.
I nhis speech, Zhang began by asserting that the representatives to the
National A ssembly were not supposed to represent the views of individuals
or groups, but rather were to represent the ideas of all peoples and all na-
tionalities in the province. A ccording to him, thousands of names bad been
proposed, and under A bmet J an Kastmi's direction the final list of represen-
tatives had been drawn up and approved by the provincial government
Thosechosen represented all nationalities, not only their own, and since
most of them were government officials, Zhang called them "the logical rep-
resentatives" of Xinjiang. Opposing them was opposing the government
. As for the challenges made against some of those chosen, Zhang said that
It was no longer a question of whether so and so should be arepresentative,
but rather aquestion of the provincial government's authority. He ended his
comments on this question by saying that he did not want anyone to bring
up this matter again-an admonition to both Han and national minority
critics.
The provincial government's final choices had pleased few, and Zhang
SOU~t.to defend the appointed delegates. Those delegates were .A hm~t J an
~~ml (Uighur, provincial vice-chairman); I sa Y usuf A lptekin (Uighur,
numster without portfolio); A bdul Kerim A bbas (Uighur, deputy secretary-
ge~eral); Zhao Qianfeng (Manchu, minister of social affairs); yvu.M:n
er
(UI ghur); Hatije [Hatewan] (Kazak, inspector-general for Urumqt ~J Stn~);
ZhaD~Fengjiu (Han); Madame Bek (probably Uighur); Ma Guoyt ~UI );
Mu~lDga (Sibo from I nlng): Nasir, Uighur (deputy mayor ofUru~qt); and
Hamid SUltan, Kazak. The vocational representatives to the Natlo~a~As-
sem.b1ywere A bdul Kenm Maksun (Uighur businessman fro~Y ining):
~~ Haji (Uighur); Dr.A rtughrul Sabnoglu (Mai Huanxin] (UI ghur fr~m
Y ~nlDg);Ziya (Kazak, deputy chief of police, Urumqt); A m~nah H.a~tDl,
Uighur (wife of Mehmet Emin Bugra); and Mesut A hong (UI ghur reltgtous
leader from Tunan).81 Of these dele~tes, three represented the ni taction,
I nclUding the provincial vice-chairman, A hmet J an Kasimi. I sa Y usuf
A 1p~ekinrepresented the outspoken Turkic nationalists who ~vo~ed coop-
crationwith the Chinese as an alternative to the increase ot Sovtet mfluence
1Dthe Northwest,
. Prior to the departure of the delegates for Nanjing, delegate Hatije was
I nterviewed.and the Xinjiang press quoted her as saying, "We absOlutely
sUPPOrtnational unity ...a: 2 Ina story released after the delegates' ~parture,
lsa was also quoted, saying that "A utonomy is not independence. The 10-
- - - - - - - - - - - .
98 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
cal Xinjiang papers also gave publicity to the departure of the delegates on
November 11, 1946; according to press reports, the group included wivesof
the delegates and some unofficial members such as Mesut Sabri, the region's
inspector-general. They were later joined by Chairman Zhang, who went to
discuss the general Xinjiang situation and also to participate inthe
GuOmindang-Cbinese Communist Party talks to be held early in 1947.
Han Chinese objected that the delegates chosen included too manyna-
tional minority members and were led by an iiifaction member, A hmet J an
Kasimi. Turki Objections included the fact that several of the delegates were
known to be pro-Cbinese and their views, it was felt, did DOt represent the
overall majority of the province.
H it was the Chinese-dominated Provincial Council's intention to pack
the delegation with ciphers, this was only a partial success. Inearly Decem-
ber, A hmet and I sa attended a session on the draft constitution that in-
cluded national minority delegates from Xinjiang, Xigang (then a part of
Tibet), and the Miao areas of the Southwest AU of these minority groups
were demanding autonomy for their respective nationalities and sought to
have the new constitution guarantee this autonomy. .
Both A hmet and I sa spoke to the session on behalf of Xinjiang's Turki
majority, and both put forward the demand for autonomy expressed in the
original peace negotiations with Zhang Zhizhong. Particularly outspoken
was I sa, who "in astirring speech ... declared that unless and until the pres-
ent government policy toward racial minorities in Xinjiang is radically
changed, blood feuds between them and the Chinese will continue." He fur-
ther stated that the Xinjiang people were not agitating for secession or inde-
pendence, but for freedom, equality, and autonomy, adding that "Xinjiang
natives will not be satisfied with half and lukewarm measures. ,084I sa called
on the Nationalist government to follow Dr.SUD Y et-sen's original propos-
als with regard to the self-determination of Chinese national minorities, and
to amend the constitution to assure the border areas of this right
These outspoken remarks and demands for autonomy were not reported
locally in Xinjiang. Infact, little mention was made of the delegates after ~e
publicity that bad accompanied their departure, except a notice of their
return in J anuary 1947.One reason for this must have been the speeches of
A hmet and Isa, but also important was the fact that A bmet, in particular,
returned "lukewarm" on Nanjing and was privately pessimistic about the
possibility that the central government would listen to the demands for
autonomy emanating from the border regions.85
1h<
khonM
embenofGtmmmenJ
A s to the problem of the Ashan members of government. Zhang saidhe had
been asked why he thought it necessary to meet with men from A shan (spe-

1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 99

cificallywith Osman Batur, the Kazak leader of the A ltai region), what had
been discussed with them, and what the results of the discussions were. He
indicated that he had invited "Mr. Osman" because he was a provincial
government official and held the post of A shan vice-chairman and
inspector-general. There was, Zhang claimed, no way he could not welcome
himto Urumqi for talks.
Further, Zhang told his audience that he had met with Osman once be-
fore, on which occasion Vice-Chairman Burhan was also present. A t that
timehe had told Osman that A shan would be included as part of the three
districts during government discussions. If Osman wished this to change,
thenZhang would bring this up with the two vice-chairmen and abide by
theirdecision.Declaring his attitude toward Osman to be"straightforward,"
hedenied that Osman's people were being bribed or used as mercenaries.
Heknew that his meeting with Osman had upset many people, but he
believed his attitude to becorrect in the circumstances.
The unspoken problem here was that the A ltai area remained tense,
primarilydue to the activities of Osman and A li Beg Hakim against the ill
group, which they had formerly supported. Varying reports put the date of
Osman's break from IIi sometime in the summer of 1946; Osman himself
r~ponedly said it was in A pril 1946.
86
Whatever the exact date, the IIicoali-
tionwas split by the time of Zhang's speech, and already the Nationalists
badmovedquickly to take advantage of the situation.
Rumors quickly grew that the Chinese military was arming Osman and
encouraging him to oppose the Ili faction militarily. Zhang did not specifi-
cally mention this charge. But the fact that he himself had met with Osman's
representatives on two different occasions was now no longer rumor. The
Nationalists were playing both sides: On the one hand, they were involved in
thecoalition and publicly espoused the concepts of "unity" and peace. On
theother hand, the provincial chairman himself admitted that contact had
been established with Osman's Kazaks. I n a region like Xinjiang where
rumor preceded public acknowledgment of fact, and where replies ~o deli-
cate,questi~ns were cautiously advanced, Zhang's answers rega~g ~-
~an s meeungs with him would hardly have assuaged fears of Nauonahst
mtentions to dominate the region through whatever means available.
'J ?eseventh problem was the implementation of the peace agreement, espe-
~Ilythe accusation that the government was dragging its heels.Zhang used
this opportunity to reiterate the government's efforts to implement the
trea fu be i .ted and
ty lI y.Government noncompliance was just a slogan, mse ,
hePOinted to the various aspects of the agreement that had already been
carriedout; the elections were in progress; there was freedOmof speech, as-
2
1{}() 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
sembly, and publication; and the new government itself, as caned for in the
treaty, was in operation. He admitted some shortcomings but pointed out
that implementation was the mutual responsibility of A hmet and himself.If
he had not fulfilled the treaty, then neither had A bmet, as both were jointly
responsible.
A lthough some aspects of the agreement had of course been carried out,
as Zhang outlined, the powerlessness of the new coalition to make any im-
mediate or dramatic changes in the region was apparent in the first few
months of its existence. The three districts remained cut off from the rest of
Xinjiang, for neither side had followed the military arrangements called for
in the peace agreement. Elections had been completed insome districts, but
the validity of the results was questioned, and there was still no elected
Provincial A ssembly as called for in the agreement. Distrust-the ever-
present flaw in coalitions-kept both sides from unilaterally deciding to ful-
fill the terms of the peace agreement, and as rumors of Nationalist military
aid to Osman grew and Osman's opposition to IIi became an established
fact, the distrust deepened. This distrust, which all factions within the
government felt, also helped to keep alive the idea of an independent Xin-
jiang. This was the final point that Zhang chose to discuss.
The Qumion ojlhe East Turkman &public
On the question of the Em's existence, Zhang pointed out that in Xinjiang
there was a mistaken idea that was "anti-homeland, anti-Han and anti-
Three Principles of the People."S7 This idea was that "East Turkestan"
could be the name of a country whereas in reality it was only a geographic
term and could not be the basis of an independent state. Ev~n_A hmet bad
agreed with this, Zhang said, referring to an A ugust speech by the former.
How was it possible, he asked, that provincial government representatives
were asking for independence for Xinjiang? This was an issue that could Dot
be discussed until Xinjiang bad established true freedom and equality and
had built up its society economically, socially, and politicaUy. He again put
forward the idea that the Han Chinese were elder brothers 10the people of
Xinjiang. How, he asked, could an elder brother push his inexperienced
younger brother out to face the world when he was not ready?
Zhang ended his comments by saying that there were three roads ope~to
the people of Xinjiang. The first road was union with the Republic of China
and local autonomy. The second was total independence, and the third was
union with the USSR.A s for the latter, he quickly pointed out that the USSR
had already claimed to be disinterested in China's internal affairs and would
not be willing to accept Xinjiang. As to total independence, the region ~
not yet ready, and, while it might one day be capable of independence, tblS
was "absolutely" not possible in the immediate future.

j....------------~IIII!I. ~
1946 COALITION GOVERNMENT 101
Zhang's lengthy rebuttal of the independent East Turkestan thesis em-
phasizesthe vitality of the independence movement in Xinjiang at the time.
Growingnumbers of Turkic intellectuals and masses ot young Turki people
hadbecome committed to the idea of eventual independence for their
homelands.Continuing abuses by Chinese officials and the Nationalist army
servedto strengthen these feelings; despite the new government's good in-
tentions, no great reduction in tension had occurred, and incidents of
violencebetween national minorities and Han Chinese continued.
1\vo other factors were strengthening Turki nationalist sentiment in the
region:one was the existence of the lli government, which continued to ex-
cludeChinese from the three districts; the other was the opportunity for
Turkimembersof the newgovernment-both IIiand independent national-
ist factions-to reach larger audiences withtheir messageof nationalism.
Becausethe IIigovernment at first represented another manifestationof
theTurkicdreamof independence, many local groups ralliedto the move-
ment.10thesevendistricts outside its control, it wasconsideredto bea10-
eally run, locally inspired government. Many Moslems, initially at least,
~ked to I I I as a model for the future independence of the wholeof Xin-
J iang.
A n important factor in I I i's prestige was the influenceof A li Han Tore,
therespectedMoslem leader who served as the ErR'S first president.His
leadershipwas especially important in bringing the Kazaks into the move-
ment,accordingto recent Kazak sources.
88
Through such personalities, the
variousTurkicgroups were united inanationalist effort at creatingthebasis
foraTurkicMoslemstate in the region.A s longas the territorial integrity
of thethreedistricts was maintained, it continued to claimsupporters from
theothersevendistricts.
A further factor contributing to the increase in Turki nationalism
throughout the province at this time was the expandinginfluenceof the
Tur~i ~embers of the coalition. A s previously mentioned~~met J an
Kaslmlemerged as a popular and charismatic speaker, recervmga.warm
r~ptioo whenever he addressed mainly Turkic audiences.A ccor~mgto
~ous Observers,fromthe time of his first publicspeechinUrum.ql-dur-
mgtheinaugural ceremonies for the newgovernment-I Ds reception from
theassembledcrowds was far wanner and more enthusiastic then that ac-
cordedto anyoneelse, including Chairman ZhanghimseI L
89
. .. .
~other active IIi appointee in the coalition was Seyfetun~ [~-
~], who in the autumn of 1946traveled to the south of thepro
vmcc
I D
his capacityasan election supervisor.In the southern city of Kasbgarat the
sametimewere Burhan Sbahidi, the second provincial viee-c~rman, and
MehrnetEmin Bugra,-the independent Turn nationalist.Offioally, all three
~. ~~~. t~~~
.mthesouth on government business sinceSeyterunwas ~
electionsin Kasbgar, Burhan in Y arkand, and Mehmet 1DHeuaa (Khotan).
&
102 1946COALITION GOVERNMENT
But first the three men spent some fiveweeks in Kashgar, during which time
they held public meetings and made "boldly nationalistic" speeches.S' The
three also traveled to other cities. A t the same time, the British consul in
Kashgar noted the walls of many of these towns sprouting new posters bear-
ing "popular nationalist slogans.,,91
A lthough the Turki members of the coalition were of different factions.
they agreed in their desire for a "free democratic Xinjiang" and for eventual
independence from China. This nationalistic message was being carried to a
greater number of Turkic people than before, with the prestige of the newly
won concessions to bolster itscredibility.
Neither the peace agreement nor Turki participation in the provincial
government had resulted in a lessening of tensions in the region, and, as
Zhang was well aware, dreams of a greater East Turkestan including all of
Xinjiang province continued. It was to counter such dreams that he added
his remarks on the "three roads" to his speech. The irony of a Han Chinese,
heir to an imperialist and bloody past in Xinjiang, warning the Tutti people
of the dangers of the USSR, however Obliquely, would not have been lost on
some members of the audience, and many of his listeners may have found
this tactic just another ploy to avoid the greater question of Turki demands
for control in their own homeland
Zhang also used this opportunity to assure the local people that they
would have government support, including financial aid, to help in the de-
velopment of their region. But, as much as Xinjiang needed financial as-
sistance, the local people also knew that greater government assistance
could well mean greater central government interference in the administra-
tion of the region and more Chinese "experts" to develop the local econo-
my.Since the goal of the Turki nationalist movement was less, not more,
central control, these assurances were more appealing to Han than to
Turkic ears.
A s many observers noted toward the end of 1946, Chairman Zhang had
genuinely attempted to understand the complex situation in Xinjiang and to
correct the worst political and economic abuses in the region. A lthough the
military provisions of the peace agreement had not been implemented, there
was still hope that the Chinese would gradually, under Zhang's conciliatory
policies, improve the situation in Xinjiang.
The main purposes of Zhang's October speech were to calm Han Chinese
fears about the changes in the Xinjiang government, and at the same time to
reassure the Turkic population that the new coalition understood the
region's special needs and was doing its best to deal with them. The
defensive tone hewas forced 10 take, however. demonstrates that after only
three months of coalition rule, things were not going welL
The important problem was that the peace agreement had not been fully
implemented. By the end of 1946, eachside bad begun publicly to blame the
I ! I & --------------~: .
1946 COALmON GOVERNMENT 103
otherfor noncompliance with the agreement.
92
On the IIiside, they had yet
(0supplymilitary information to the provincial government regarding the
numbersand disposition of soldiers, and they continued to exclude Chinese
fromthe three districts.
93
The central government, for its part, had been in-
creasingthe Dumber of Nationalist troops in the region, giving the impres-
sionthat an assault on the IIiregion was being considered. Furthermore, as
theIiifaction knew by October, Osman had turned against his former llial-
lies.Inhis speech, Zhang let it be known publicly that he had mel with Os-
manmore than once. The implications of this were enormous as it pointed
directly to secret Chinese-Kazak negotiations. The trust that Zhang and
other Chinese leaders in the coalition had worked to establish was seriously
threatenedby this admission.
As the central government was also doubtless aware, full implementation
ofthepeace agreement would have encouraged local nationalism to an even
greater extent and therefore, from the Chinese viewpoint, implementation
of theagreement was not in their best interests. Further, the Chinese side
hadaccepted the agreement in the first instance thinking that they were
dealingstrictly with the USSR.
94
Having signed the agreement, the govern
~enl had fully expected an end to minor agitation. When tension continued
10thearea, the government continued to blame the USSR and became even
moreentrenched in its view that greater freedoms in the region would only
leadto further undermining of the Chinese position inthe province.
2
CHAPTER 6
The Xinjiang Coalition,
J anuary to J uly 1947
By early 1947, the weaknesses inherent in a coalition became moreand
more apparent in the Xinjiang Provincial Coalition Government. The
mutual, murmured accusations of ncnlmplementation grew louder after the
return of the region's delegates from the Nanjing National A ssembly.The
impassioned speeches of [saand A hmet left little doubt that border area
peoples would resist government attempts to reestablish traditional Chin~
military rule in the borderlands, and that a measure of local participation I D
the provincial government would be the minimum requirement of the in-
creasingly nationalistic minority groups.Y et no assurances of equal or pro-
portionate minority roles in local government were forthcoming at the
A ssembly, and acertain degree of disillusionment accompanied the IIi rep-
resentatives. in particular, upon their return.
With General Zhang Zhizhong absent from Xinjiang for the first few
months of 1947, the Chinese militarists gained considerable ground in the
region vis-a.-vis what may be termed Zhang's conciliation faction. Led.by
General Song Xilian, a hard-line military man, the militarist faction in Xin-
jiang was supported by many of the Han Chinese in the region who were, as
noted, worried over the "soft" approach of Chairman Zhang.
A lthough the militarists continued to participate in the coalition govern-
ment, at the same time they encouraged such anti-Soviet and anti-I ll forces
as Osman's Kazaks and continued their attempts to expand the influenc:e of
pro-Chinese factions, thus ensuring that local national minorities remained
divided.
This chapter examines the militarist attempt to strengthen the Han
Chinese position in Xinjiang during Zhang's absence from the region, and
Zhang's attempts upon his return to restore unity to the provincial govem~
1("
.. &------------~....
XINJIANG COALITION, 1947 105
ment.The major political events discussed include new economic measures,
theFebruary riots in Urumqi and their effects, Zhang's tour of the southern
areaof the province, and his replacement by Mesut Sabri inMay 1947.
Inearlysummer of 1947, Xinjang was also the site of the "Beidashan AI-
fair"-a border incident touched off by Osman Bator involving China, the
MFR,and the USSR.A lthough its significance was blown out of proportion
by theNationalists, the "affair" did confirm Nationalist Chinese support of
Osman,thus substantiating 1li accusations of Chinese military activity
againstthe three districts. Discussion of the incident is thus included in this
chapteras further evidence of the influence of the military line in Xinjiang
politicsduring the last months of the coalition.
TheCoalition Cracks
Theyear 1947began quietly in Xinjiang. I n mid-J anuary theXinjiangdele-
gatesof the National A ssembly returned to Urumqi, but theymaintaineda
very lowprofile, making no immediate comment on their experiencesinthe
capi~l and, evidently, awaiting the return of Zhang, who had remained in
Nan]tngforconsultations.'
A lthoughZhang and other members of the coalition hadbeenaway,the
Provincial government, under theleadership of A ctingChairmanRahimJ an
Sabri,hadcontinued to work on the region's financial problems.OnJ anuary
12,1947,theyannounced the newtax rates for the province, someof which
weresubstantiallydecreased fromthe previous year.For instance, thebusi-
nesslax was reduced from3percent to 1.5percent; thetax on livestockwas
reducedfrom6percent to 2percent.The salt tax, however,amalnstayof the
central government's revenues was increased fromone to threedollars per
jin; andthesensitiveissueof tax on agricultural landwas left to besettledat
afuturedate.2
A nother important economic measure was announcedinFebruary.flour
Wasrationedfor the first time.To ensure adequate supplies of this staple,
theprovincial government committee on prices announced that .~erchants
~re obligedto sell flour to poor and needy persons at the.ong
maJ
base
rnce (not givenin the report); all purchasers werealsO requI Tedto usera-
I On cards, and merchants were told that if the person was not aformer
CUStomer they were not allowed to sell himany flour (to stop profiteers
frombUyingup flour at the original price).3 This anDounce~ent a~so
revealed that there were only enough flour supplies in theprovincial capital
to last until the end of March a fact that doubtless contributed to fears
aboutthefuture '
. A. moreimportant source of tension in somequarters, was the in~-
~~gspeculationover whether or not ~irman Zhangwouldreturn to ~
liang.I t was probably to calmsuch fears that an interviewwithZhang, s

- - - - - - - - - - - - - .
]{)(j XINJIANG COAUTION. 1947
inNanjing, was pUblished in the Xinjiang Daily in mid-J anuary. Y ";en asked
why he remained in Nanjing, Zhang replied that he was there to try to solve
Xinjiang's financial problems by securing much needed central government
financial aid; specifically, he was asking for ZOOmillion dollars for construc-
tion and development in the northwestern province. Upon beingasked
when he would return to Xinjiang, he told the reporter that he did not know
the exact date, but that he would return after he finished official business
and after making avisit to the graves or his ancestors."
Despite what seemed to be an assurance of Zhang's return in the report
of this interview, rumors said that his outspoken opposition to central
government policy in Xinjiang dUring his stay in Nanjing made his removal
inevitable.
s
A lthough outwardly the provincial capital remained calm in J anuary,
posters and handbills criticizing the provincial government began appearing
that month in Urumqi. One such handbill, entitled "Struggle for the
Motherland," urged the Turki people to oust the "Chinese oppressor" who
"came two hundred years ago to enslave us, making our land a colony and
dishonoring our holy religion."6 The flurry of leaflets caused A cting
Chairman Rahim J an and Secretary General L iu to issue a joint statement
in the Xinjiang Daily. They declared that these handbills were written to
create disturbances, to break down the unity of the various nationalities in
Xinjiang, and to bring down the provincial government itself.7
I n February 1947a committee was set up to discuss implementation of
the peace agreement, for it was from this sole issue that tensions now ap-
peared to derive. The COmmittee included four representatives of the IIifac-
tion and four representatives of the central government. Chairing the meet-
ings was General Song Xilian. His presence on the committee demonstrat~
both his official status as commander in the region and his attempt ~n
Zhang's absence to inaugurate a more hard-line approach to problems I D
Xinjiang.
A t the time this committee was formed, the position of the Nationalis~
was that nonimplementation was solely the result of delay tactics of t~e HI
faction. I n the Nationalist view, the major instances of IIi nonco~pha~ce
were that no election lists had ever been prepared in the three districts (WI th
the result that no elections were held there), and normal communications
between the three mdistricts and the other seven had not been restored-
When the Nationalists had begun reconstructing the bridge on the Manas
that had been destroyed during the fighting of 1945, IIi forces had stopped
them, and SUbsequent winter floods had made it impossible to carry on
work.
8
L ittle progress had been made on the issue of uniting the IIi currency,
I ssued during 1945~1946, withthat of the rest of Xinjiang. The em..:aese
government had agreed to redeem the currency, but, according to Nauon-

.-------------~
XINllANG COAllTION, 1947 lU7
alist sources, the IIi government kept changing the amount of money it
claimedto have issued; it had grown from an initial amount of 200 million
to300 million and, most recently, to 430 million. This made adjustments
"vel)' difficult.,,9
Disagreement also continued over the implementation of the military
provisionsof the agreement. No Nationalist troops had been allowed to en-
terthethree districts to patrol the Sino-Soviet border, as required inA rticle
3of theSecond A nnex to the peace agreement.l'' The Chinese had not
forced the issue by amassing troops at the Manas River for entrance into the
ihreedistricts.The lightly patrolled ceasefire line between IIiand the rest of
Xinjiangattests to the fact that the Chinese intended to enter only after as-
suranceshad been given.I I A s the Chinese privately held the Soviet Union
responsiblefor the situation, presumably such assurances would have had to
come fromthe USSR as well as from the IIi representatives in the provincial
government before Nationalist troops entered the three districts.
TheChinese claimed that the Hi group had not reorganized their troops
~required by the agreement, nor had they reported the numbers and loca-
tionsof their troops as stipulated. The IIi forces also continued to wear the
green ETR uniform and its Moslem insignia.
12
In reply to these accusations, the commander of the E1R military forces,
lzhak Han Mura, had at first reported that he had, in fact, complied with the
order to reorganize in November 1946, but that compilation of a list of
troops and their deployment had been delayed due to his own almost con-
stant travel Furthermore, he said that the constant increase in the numbers
of new recruits made it difficult for him to give final figures.
13
.~other reason for difficulty in reorganization of the IIimilitary was
gI Ve~mFebruary 1947.This was that the provincial government had no~~t
earned out the reorganization of the Public Security Forces (Baoan DUI ) In
A ksuand Kashgar. Until such reorganization was carried out, the IIiforces
Would.continue to remain segregated from the National.ist army..A t ~e
sameume, they accused the Nationalists of showing bad faith and vtofatmg
thespirit of the agreement by building up their military strength ~Xi.Djiang.
~fa~General Song confided to Graham in Urumqi ~t at this ~lDt ~a-
~t troop strength was ninety thousand, and supplies were being sat~-
~eto~liy built up. He said he could fight "Kulja" (the IIi government) if
OUtsiders" did not interfere.
14
a ~e Natio~alists' Teply to the IIi position ,:,as simply tba~they were
waiting the IIireorganization before making their own changes inthe A ksu
and.Kashgar areas, leaving the question of military unification stalemated.
Wi ~e COmmit~eethus had plenty to discuss, but it was ove~en by ~en~.
. thin days of I tS first meeting serious rioting broke out 10Urumqt, This
IItvolved both Han and nationai minorities, and (he provincial government
was at Once drawn in.

------------
108 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
The troubles began just prior to the formation of the committee.A
memorial service was held in Urumqi in memory of the Han Chinese who
had been killed 98 February 16of the previous year in Tacheng. Some four
hundred Chinese relatives of those killed gathered to honor their dead at a
public ceremony attended by over a thousand people.I S Within days, a
"liberty massmeeting" was held at the Uighur Club in Urumqi, at which the
first of what would be several petitions to the government was drawn up.16
This petition was presented to the provincial government on February 21.
The 21st was a Friday, the day of worship for Moslems. This particular
Friday, a crowd of over five hundred Turkis gathered after services to parade
through Urumqt streets to the government offices to present their petition
demanding full implementation of the peace agreement Many local people
had come to believe that if the agreement were enforced, the region could
beassured of peace, and thus the main concern of this first petition was for
full, immediate implementation of theagreement.
Thecrowd was unruly as it marched, and some members shouted menac-
ingly.A t one point, some even sought to storm the Central Bank17but by
6:00 P.M.the majority were in front of the government headquarters
demanding action on 55separate points in the petition. A bmet addressed
the petitioners and invited them to return the following day to discussthe
points of the petition; acceding to Ahmers request, the crowddispersed.
I naddition to askingfor full and immediate implementation of thepeace
agreement, the first petition also listed the following demands: withdrawal
of Nationalist government troops from Xinjiang; establishment of a l~
people's militia in A ksu and Kashgar; an end to army interference 10
government and oppression of the people; implementation of the 70:30
ratio ot hiring in government; new elections in areas where "oppression"
had occurred; elimination of the present tax bureau and all secret policeac-
tivity; and the removal of Hatije [Hatewan] and Salis, both Kazak, from
their government posts.I S A CCOrdingto one source, a further demand was
for the punishment of Osman Batur, a point which is not included in the
Chinesesources.I ?
On February 22,.the crowds reappeared to hear A hmet's reply to the
petition and, according to at least one source, to present afurther sevent~,D
points for government attention. These included the deposition of Hamt S
Y olbars Khan (the Uighur "Prince" of Hami) and the provincial minister of
finance, J animhan.
20
Exchanges occurred between A hmer and the crowd.
and A hmet, again asking the crowd for more time to prepare his replies, reo
quested that the people return once again on the followingday.The crowd
didso, and theFebruary 23meeting passed without incident. .
On that same day, the Xinjiang Daily ran an editorial also askingthe
government to implement fully the peace agreement It also took the op-
portunity to remind local people of how much the government bad already
XINJIANG COAL fTlON, 1947 109
donefor them, and it pointedly claimed that in the three districts the people
werestill not being assured their basic freedoms. It asked the government,
therefore, to be sure to implement the peace agreement in all ten of the
region's districts.
21
On February 24, Urumqi's Chinese population organized a counter-
demonstration, which also included Hui and Kazak supporrers.P I nthe now
emotionally charged atmosphere, central government troops were posted
throughout the town, and guards were placed on all consulates. During this
demonstration, some five thousand people paraded in the streets in support
of the central government and its policies, finally presenting a thirteen-point
petition to the government which included demands that it oppose all those
ttying to oppose peace; that it control Uighur demonstrations; that the GPP
be supported so that all national minorities would be given equal treatment;
and, in reply to demands for the removal of Salis and others, that Ahmer
resign.In particular, Kazaks in the procession voiced their support of Salls,
Hatije, and Osman, saying that if the government did not support them,
then the Urumqi Kazaks themselves would look after them in the future.
23
To deal with the situation, an emergency meeting of the provincial gov-
ernment was called on the 24th to discuss its next move.As the day drew to
aclose, the tension in the capital grew in the absence of a firm government
response to the situation.
On the evening of that same day, some "rotten apples," to use the title
given them by the local paper, dressed in Urumqi City police uniforms,
P~hed their way into local Turki homes on the rretext of looki~g for .,rm-
bhng dens, frightening and threatening the residents as they did so. To
make matters worse, after a night of disturbances, on the 25th, a further
demonstration organized by the "Urumqi City Peace and Unity of the
Masses Organization" took place, with Han Chinese as the majority, joined
by pro-Chinese Uighur, Kazak, and Hui. I nitially numbering six to seven
hundred, this group made its way toward the government offices shouting
slogans of unity and drawing additional supporters so that some one thou-
sand people reportedly gathered at the government gates.2.5
Both provincial vice-chairmen, A hmet and Burhan:Ui cam~out to a~dr~
the crowd. DUring these exchanges, a shot rang out, setung off a not m
whicheight people were killed~7 The Urumqi garrison commander was
called upon to restore order and the following day martial lawwas declared
inthe capital, 28 '
Taking advantage of the opponunity presented by martial law, on the
night of February 26, General Song Xilian ordered all n~ighborbood leade~
(bMjia zhang) to inspect local households within the ctty, From the~until
maniallaw was lifted in Marchthere was a series of searches by police and
military, ostensibly for the safety of the public and (0 seize any unI a~
held arms.
29
Sure of his ability to impose military control on the capital,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - _1
110 XINJIANG COALrrJON, 1947
Song's "inspections" demonstrated his hard-line approach to Xinjiang's
problems and reflected the Chinese militarist's traditional solution in bor-
der areas-the use of military strength to intimidate the local population.
The activities of both the military and the Urumqi police bad already
been criticized publicly, by both Moslems and the Chinese-run, conservative
Xinjiang Daily. On February 25, the government had announced via the
news media that all police must carry identification and should beac-
companied by the local neighborhood chief and possess avalid warrant
when searching aprivate house.
30
The implication was that local people had
already complained about arbitrary arrests and searches.The inclusionof
detailed directions on what an individual should do if illegally searched
would indicate that this was not an uncommon occurrence.
With the imposition of martial law.these rights, so recently detailed in
the press, were set aside.The house-to-house searches that took place under
martial law between February 26and March 5were later to become a cause
celebre, referred to in the press of the three districts as further proof of
Chinese oppression.
A s Zhang Dajun, a former military intelligence officer in Xinjiang,
points out in his discussion of the powers of the military under martial law,
the army had the right tQ inspect both private property and individuals for
arms and ammunition; it also had the right to detain any suspect or to COD-
rlscate any unlawful items.
31
A full list of military powers under martial law
was given in the Xinjiang Daily on March 2, and repeated on the 3d, 4th, and
5th.
With the military in control, the city returned to an uneasy calm.Busi-
ness resumed as soldiers remained in evidence on the streets. The Chinese
in particular seemed confident enough of the military's ability to control
events for the Xinjiang provincial Guomindang to hold its scheduled as-
sembly in Urumqi on March 4, under the chairmanship of Chen Xlhao, a
Guomindang member of the CC Clique.32
On March 5.it was announced that martial law would be lifted the fol-
lowing day.The local press appealed to the people of the capital to rem~in
caIrn and law abiding. It appeared that the crisis had passed and thai the CIty
was returning to normal.That night. however. the local military units and
the Urumqt City Police, most of whom were Han Chinese, used the last op-
portunity they would have under martial law for a house-to-bouse search.~f
the Turki areas of the city.33 Under martial law regulations, police and mili-
tary were both required to present identification upon entrance to any
house, and they were also required to give receipts for any items they took
away. A s had occurred before during such searches, however, there were
many incidents of arbitrary seizure and of Han who entered Turki hom~
and, in the later words of Vice-Chairman A hmet, harassed the local Turk!
population. 34
XINJIANG COALlTION, 1947111
A bmet himself was later to refer to the February and March incidents
with great anger, even calling them a turning point in Xinjiang affairs.Y et
therewas no immediate aftennath in Urumqi; no further violent incidents
occurred.This was partly because of tight military control in the city, but
also because many of the minority factions were waiting to see what moves
thegovernment would make next and, especially, what would be the reac-
tionof Chairman Zhang.
Zhang reacted immediately. He left Nanjing, arriving in L anzhou on
March 8, where he was delayed by bad weather until March 16, when he
finallyflewto Urumqi. He immediately summoned General Song and Secre-
tary General L iu Mengchun and violently upbraided both for their handling
of what was now being termed the "2.25 A ffair."3S He then met with A hmet,
Burhan, and other minority leaders and ordered a complete investigation
into the deaths.
36
A full provincial government meeting was arranged for
March20, and at the same time, Zhang also announced that he intended to
convenethe Provincial A ssembly on May 5,1947.
While the above measures made it appear that Zhang was once again in
COntrol of the province, his position in both the province itself and the
central government's eyes had deteriorated in the first months of 1947.I n
Nanjing,he had been unable to secure the funds that hesaw asvital for Xin-
jiang's COntinued existence as part of the Chinese state.
37
This failure was,
no doubt, in part due to the displeasure of Chiang Kai-shek and other cen-
tral militarist leaders with Zhang's criticism of Guomindang policy in the
Northwest and elsewhere in China.
~urthennore, General Song had established himself as a major power
dunng Zhang's absence, by virtue of his control of the military and.th~sup-
port of the local Han Chinese population. Zhang had no autbonty to
remove him and his continuation in command did little to restore local
M~lem confidence in Zhang's ability to control the hard-line Chinese mili-
tanst element in the province. . .
Zhang attempted to undo some of the damage to Han-national m.m~nty
relations from the February incidents, but his effectiveness was no~limited,
for ~e riots had served to polarize the anti. and pro-Chines:e factions. For
:" his conciliatory words and gestures, Zhang was ~ev. ed Withless res~t
Ddconfidence than before. His speeches after hiS return from ~anJ ~ng
re~ the real decline in his status in Xinjiang aswell as his~wnr~lizatlon
of ~h.1Sfact.I ncreasingly, his public addresses became impatle~t ~t~local
PI Dlon,Wherebefore they had always tried to show acertain objectI VI tyand
respect for the Moslem nationalities .
.mthe ten days between his return to Urumqi and the issuance of the f~t
major government statement on the "2~25 A ffair," Zhang met privately WIth
~ority and Han Chinese leaders to work out some kind of nccommoda-
11On. In a March 22conversation with A merican Consul J ohn Hall paxton,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - _n
112 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
Zhang said that a settlement had been reached "in principle," and that with
goodwill on both sides there would be no further such incidents.38
Signed by eighteen members of the Provincial Council, the first public
statement on the "2-25 A ffair" appeared in the local paper on March 26,
1947.
39
The announcement sought both to address the 2~25incident and to
set it in the context of the progress made during the previous half year.I t
declared that neither the government nor the army was responsible for the
incident, and that none of the surrounding events had been the govern-
ment's doing. (I t was suspected that the CC Clique had been at least partly
responsible. Many people believed that it had been a plot by both military
leaders and Guomindang leaders such as Chen to cause trouble in the
region-sand possibly to weaken Zhang's reputation and prestige inthe area
during his absence. The government directly denied these euegauons.)
Further, with regard to the Nationalist army, the statement reminded the
petitioners who were demanding the removal of Nationalist troops that the
military forces were in Xinjiang as part of the nation's national defense sys-
tem, and that, therefore, the people should not regard them with hostility.
On the other hand, other passages showed that Zhang's anger over the mili-
tary's handling of the affair had not dissipated. The statement added that the
military, for its part, was not to interfere with the freedom granted to the
people in the peace agreement and GPP, and that any unreasonable action
by the military would be quickly and severely dealt with.40
The following day, the paper published new measures designed to ensure
public order. A lthough martial law was not to be reimposed, special orders
were promulgated to end terrorism in the province. A mong the new mea-
sures was corporal punishment for any person "breaking the peace" by as-
sassination, rape, violent threats to life, causing chaos among or quarrels be-
tween national minorities, or encroaching on peoples' private property or
personal liberties. 41
While these measures could be read as protecting the local people fr?m
further harassment by the military or police, the vagueness of the word~ng
about breaking the peace (after all, political speeches by almost any factI On
could be said to cause chaos if the provision were liberally interpreted) gave
the predominantly Han police more power than ever before if they chose to
exercise it.Basically, this series of new measures and several of the gove~-
ment statements that were to follow indicate that although Zhang was trying
once again to achieve compromise in the coalition govemment-and the~-
by 10 give the impression that the provincial government was ag~lD
United-the police and the Chinese-dominated military had secured consid-
erably more power as a result of the 2-25 Incident,
Insupport of Zhang's efforts at compromise, in (he A pril 4edition o~the
Xmjiang Daily an excerpt from Youth Monthly was included that emphas.~
that only a small minority-"rotten apples"-were involved in such mel-
XINJIANG COAL rTION, 1947 113
dentsas had occurred in the capital. These bad elements used the excuse
thai the opp and the peace agreement bad not yet been fully implemented
to cause trouble. The article urged that, rather than listening to such
troublemakers, people should work together to overcome the region's prob-
I ems.
42
I n the closest thing yet to an apology over the February riots and the
Marchsearches, the same article referred to these incidents as illegal acts
muchregretted by the government. But increasingly, the Xinjiang Daily and
other publications were openly accusing a small minority, which they said
was responsible for all the troubles that had plagued the capital. Dominated
by conservative Guomindang officials, the Xinjiang Daily was adding to the
political divisions in the region by its thinly veiled accusation that tbe IIifac-
tionwas responsible for the uneasy situation. To say the least, the newspa-
per turned a blind eye to other troubles. For instance, it must have known
that unrest in the A shan district was, in great part, due to the Chinese
armingof Osman Batur's Kazaks. Nonetheless, the Xinjiang Daily continued
10blame I li for these disturbances (see the later discussion in this chapter
onA shen during these months). As will be seen, the n~ media became
J !:3" of the "divide and rule" tactics being employed by the Chinese milita-
I lSIfactio!l in Xinjiang.
. Further evidence of the increasing influence of the militaristic Chinese
~ewsin government were the new regulations on travel announced in Xin-
J l3ngthat spring. On A pril 10, it was required that any person doing bust-
~withChina proper had to show proof of membership ina business asso-
ctat~on;a travel pass issued by the local police chief would be required of
bus.messmenintending to travel; and officials and businessmen, as well as
thelTfamilies, had to have the business association to which they belonged
~tampor seal a formal letter of identification, which must also indicate the
~dividuaI 's destination. 43That these limitations directly contravened the
libertyguaranteed in the peace agreement indicates that the newregulations
were primarily the work of the police, who issued them; they may even have
doneso without consulting the government. Certainly, the city government
orUrumqiwas concerned about protecting what it called persotw! Uberty,.as
well asabout the increasing crime rate in the capital, and mee~gs to dI S-
~ both of these matters were held in mid-A pril. The Han ~ese may
vewelcomed the new police regulations and the new' emphasI S on lawand
order, but the minorities increasingly viewed such police action as contrary
to thespirit of both the peace agreement and the GPP.
By ellowtng greater powers to accrue to the poliee-which. it mus~bere-
I lletnbered,was virtually a Han organization-and by not implementmg ~
~0:30ratio for hiring Moslems in government jobs, suspicions and tension
mo~gthe non-Han grew. Despite Zbans's return, and despite the re~
mllCilia. 6 racncn
tory tone of the government announcements, day~to-day I nte
- - - - - - - - - - - - .
114 XINJIANG COALfl'ION, 1947
between Han and national minorities involved lower-level Han officials who
hadlittle usefor conciliation and compromtse.s''
A t this point even the chairman himself began to falter.I nmid-A pril,
Zhang decided to make a long-delayed inspection mission to the southof
the region. A crompanied by Mesut Sabri, A bmet J an Kasimi, Wang Ceng-
shan.and I sa Y usuf A lptekin as well as other officials, Zhang headedsouth
on A pril 16.
Demands began at the first stop.Zhang, speaking to a largemeetingof
local people in A ksu, mentioned the progress made in the region under the
coalition government. The local people responded by complaining that
there was not one singlerepresentative of southern Xinjiang on theProvin-
cial Council, although the majority of the region's population J ived south of
the Tianshan. They also put forward a set of local demands: strict prohibi-
tion of intermarriage between Han and Moslem; serious punishment for
those (e.g., members of the Han Chinese police or the military) who broke
the peace or robbed others; establishment of more hospitals; and provision
of science education in the schools. These last demands were mentioned in
the first Xinjiang Daily report of the incident, but the composition of th~
Provincial Council was a senstnve matter and was not mentioned until
later.
45
The party next went to Kashgar, where a public meeting was held ~n
A pril 22at which the crowd put forward demands similar to those made m
the February petitions in Urumqi. These demands were not reported in me
Xinjiang Daily, but other sources say that they included demands for an end
to military interference in people's freedom and an end to military arrests;
prohibition against new settlers entering Xinjiang; a change in the Dame~
the province to East Turkestan; an end to taxation, especially the land tax;
prohibition ofTurki-Han marriage; and the immediate punishment of all in-
dividual soldiers who mistreated the people.f? This criticism evidently un-
settled Zhang. who held no further public meetings until May 5when he
told a group of mostly government officials that the government was not
planning to send any immigrants to Xinjiang and asked :;ain for their sup-
port and assistance inSOlvingXinjiang's many problems.
Unsatisfied with the J ack of government response to their demands,
crowds gathered again on May 6in Kashgar to ask more questions of the
provincial chairman and to put forward even more demands. The situation
grew tense as the crowds stood waiting, and Zhang had to call for Ahmet to
come out and address them. A t the same time he called for the local gar-
rison commander. fearing that another 2-25 incident might occur. A hmet's
address calmed the assembly, however, which dissipated before any vio!en.cc
occurred.
49
This dangerous situation was not reported in the provincial
news media
Shaken and angered by his experience in Kashgar, Zhang flew baCk to
XINJIANG COALITION, 1947115
thecapital on May 8.Within days he called for a special three-day meeting
of highgovernment officials in Urumqi. I n a speech to the assembled offi-
cials, hetook a much harder line than "ever before, complaining that despite
greatefforts and many concessions on the part of the government, nonethe-
less, manypeople continued to hold "mistaken" ideas.
Zhang's speech indicates that his perception of the political situation in
Xinjianghad undergone radical revision. It made clear the irreconcilability
of theChinese government's intentions and the wishes of substantial num-
bers of the local population. For the first time, Zhang openly acknowledged
therefractoriness of the IIifaction. He accused it of taking its revolution un-
dergroundand fomenting antigovernment activity. He blamed A bmet per-
sonallyfor participating in such activity.
Zhangalso referred to what he called contradictions in Xinjiang society
(translated as "inconsistencies" in the English version of this speech in the
J ?um~1Pacific Affairs), the most important of which he called "contradic-
tionsIn political leadership." He admitted that in the past tbe region had
~nruled by Chinese, who only comprised 5percent of the total popula-
uon, andhe accepted that this was the policy of an imperialist nation toward
I ts COlony.He contended, however, that this old attitude was in the process
of ~ing superseded, and that progress was being held up by the IIi faction,
whichWouldnot reach agreement on many important issues.Zhang went as
faras to saythat the IIifaction was even taking a different road..50
ZhangCOntrasted the III faction's "obscure" views with the clarity of the
gover:nment's role and policies. I n addition to carrying out elections as
Promised and making every effort at compromise, the government had made
several Proposals to improve the life of the people of the province, but these
proposals had all been rejected by either the IIi faction or other local
groups.He specified five such instances: establishment of a National
l!anshan University, to replace the lower-level Xinjiang College; unifica-
non of currency in all ten districts and with China proper; a railroad to
speed industrial development and communication; new elections for "spe-
cal commissioners" (a proposal directly opposed by A hmet, he noted); and
:r~njzati~n of the military (which had been delayed because the three
tricts contmued to "go their own path,,).51
These complaints were further evidence of the change in Zhang, for
thesegovernment proposals were all aimed ultimately at regaining con~~1
of theentire province. A s such they were elements in the struggle for pcliu-
~l COntrol, a Struggle which 'increasingly intensified during the .spring of
~7,narroWing down to one between the Nationalist Han Chinese ~d
their I....... ' - widemng
se ..w.ubona~minority supporters, on the one hand, and an ever-. _
gment of nauonallsuc Turkis whose ultimate goal was eventuallDdepen
~fu . .
r Xinjiang, on the other. Zhang knew very well what the obJ ~ns
wereto . I bi cellon to
virtually every one of the proposals. For examp e.0 J
------------
116 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
elevating Xinjiang College to university status was based on the fact that, as
a national institution, it would be another progovernment institution domi-
nated by Han Chinese, and therefore undesirable on that basis alone.Cur-
rency unification, as previously discussed. was vehemently opposed because
the inflation-ridden Nationalist currency promised no benefits to the local
economy and. furthermore. was another tie to the rest of China. The rail-
road was objected to on similar grounds, plus the fact thai it would open the
region to more Han settlers. A s to the objection to the elections, A hmer
probably feared another Han-dominated and Han-run election. Delaying
them indefinitely-or at least until after a Provincial A ssembly bad been
convened-was to the advantage of the minority factions as it gavemore
time for the propagation of the basic tenets of Turki nationalisminthe
region, and thus awider base of support in any election.
As to the military organization, deep distrust continued among military
leaders on both sides. General Song was certainly involved in negotiations
with Osman Batur and other Kazaks, and he was even supplying them in
return for their allegiance. Continued stalemate on the military organization
clause was inevitable while the Chinese military were convinced that ~he
Soviet Union remained the dominant force behind the iiifaction, allowing
the IIimembers of government to take what many Chinese considered an ar-
rogant, uncooperative stance.
Xinjiang's "Newspaper Wa....
With Zhang Zhizhong's denunciation of the IIi group, the factions in
government polarized. The intensification of distrust between the factions
had developed apace in the preceding few weeks, illustrated in the "news-
paper war" that occurred in the spring of 1947.In the course of it, Zhang's
interpretation of events in Xinjiang was supported, up to a point, since the
"war" revealed the efforts of A bmet J an Kasimi to establish himself as
spokesman for all the people of the province, and not merely for the IIitac-
tion alone.
As mentioned previously, tbeXinjiang Daily was dominated by conserva-
tive elements. of the Guomindang. It was a pan of Guomindang machinery
for the dissemination of the government and party line, and while I ts
editorials had initially fully supported the coalition, beginning in 1947mese
editorials repeatedly referred to the responsibility of a "small minority" of
"bad elements" for the tension and violence in the provincial capital an~
elsewhere in the region. By spring, it was clear that what was meant by this
"small minority" was, infact., the IIifaction. .
The first newspaper to challenge the official line of th~Xtn]" :" K ~
was the Vining paper, Minzhu ban (Democratic daily), published mY J I lI og
in five languages, including Chinese. I nitially this paper tried to appeal for
XINJIANG COALITION, 1947117
calm and continued cooperation. A s late as A pril, it carried articles by Han
Chinese living in the three districts who called for patience and toleration in
solvingXinjiang's problems. One such article even claimed that the Febru-
ary and March incidents were the work of mobsters and did not represent
themajority of Han Chinese.
52
Rather than offering more accusations
against the Chinese or the government, it appeared to express hopes in the
threedistricts that there would still bea peaceful settlement of the problems
inXinjiang.
I n May, however, articles by Ahmet J an Kasimi, the provincial vice-
chairman, began appearing in the Minzhu bao under the general title "Who
Is Unwilling for Peace?" This series covered a number of topics in detail,
most of which were presented as examples of how the Chinese showed their
insincerity in Xinjiang-a-for example, how they continued to dominate the
police forces, how they were supporting Osman, and how corruption con-
tinuedto operate throughout the province.
53
Sucharticles also began appearing in Urumqi's Xinjiang gezeti, in Turki.
This paper was supposed to be the local-language equivalent of the Xmjian.g
Daily, but by the spring of 1947it was pursuing a quite different editorial
linefrom the Chinese version. On May 12, the Xin.jiang Daily published a
letter, purportedly from a Uighur reader, denouncing theXllljiang gezeti for
?avingabad influence on society because of its policy of "continually print-
mgonlylies."54
. I ncomparison to SUcceeding letters, this first one, with its direct a~-
ucn against the Gezeti, was tame. A second letter, published in the Xm}llJ1lg
Daily and signed by a Kazak named Tosun, reported that the people in the
three districts were oppressed by their government to such an extent that
manywere now fleeing; the IIiarea was said to be like all Xinjiang had been
under Sheng Shicai.5S .
The following day, the editor of the Xinjiang Daily ident~fi~d the I ii
group as being the reactionary force opposed to peace in XinJ lan~The
three ~istricts, he proclaimed, were opposed to Sino-Sovie~frie?~hlp and
to nauonat unity and were destroying the unity between naticnalines by use
of sucn slogans as "Our fatherland East Turkestan."56
.A t first, both the Minzhu bao and the Xinjiang Daily used simita: tech-
mques, Each featured letters by members of the "opposite" nationality, for
example, Uighur letters (in Chinese) in the Chinese paper, and Chinese let-
ters (in.Turki) in the Turki papers. As the battle grew more heated, how-
ever,this particular ploy was dropped by bothsides. .' e
Itappears that the IIifaction used the Min.zhu bao beCause I ts Views wer
not .gettingadequate coverage in the Chinese press in Urumqi. ~tially, th:
factionmade its observations in a calm and reasonable way; for lI I Sta?ct; .
May1 article called only for the peace agreement to beput intO pracuce; I t
urgedthe people aU to work hard for peace and not to believe rumors. As
- - - - - - - - - - - ..
118 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
the Chinese press in Urumqi intensified its criticism of the IIifaction, how-
ever. the tone of the Minzhu baa hardened. On May 19 it accused the Chi-
nese of directly contravening the peace agreement by aiding Osman Batur 10
fight against the three districts. I t also asked for the dismissal of three Kazak
leaders in the provincial government--salis, Hetfje, and J animhan-as well
as other members of the government who were said to be in direct radio
contact with Osman.S? A ccusations like this were not printed in Urumqi's
Chinese-language press; the llirepresentatives in government were probably
right in their assumption that the Chinese media would never fullyconvey
their views to the general public.
A t this time, important new elements entered the political situation. It
became known that Zhang Zhizhong was to be removed from his post as
chairman of the province, and that Mesut Sabri would replace him.This fur-
ther fueled the "newspaper war," which continued during the summer of
1947, by this time giving expression to a direct confrontation of the Chinese
authorities with the IIifaction.
The "newspaper war" of spring and summer 1947demonstrated that the
Hi group had lost none of its nationalistic fervor. Their participation in the
provincial coalition bad not lessened their commitment to a Moslem-domi-
nated local government for Xinjiang, and, in fact, the increasingly nati~n-
alistic articles appearing in the IIi press during this period point to an in-
tensification of local nationalism in that region.
This verbal war also served to refine the IIi faction's political stance,
which was expanded upon and expounded in numerous articles that not only
denounced Han Chinese policies in Moslem "Turkestan" but also called for
Moslem control over the entire region's domestic affairs. A s author of much
of the most outspoken criticism, A hmet J an's personal reputation as a
spokesman for the region's Moslem population grew; the provincewide ex-
posure he received during the period of the "war" also brought him lo.the
forefront of the Moslem-Chinese confrontation, which escalated rapidly
with the appointment of Mesut as provincial chairman in May 1947. .
The Chinese response to the fervent nationalism expounded in the Tu:ki
press of the three districts was to maintain the view of Xinjiang as an J D*
tegrat part of China. Evidence was supplied almost daily to the Chinese au-
thorities by the active local press of the need for Chinese recognition of lo-
cal political aspirations. But the government continued in its belief ~at,
first, Xinjiang was and would be treated as an ordinary Chinese province,
and, second, once a settlement with the Soviet Union had been reached, the
difficulties inXinjiang would simply disappear.
Zhang'sR .......
The central gcvemmenr had never intended to appoint General Zhan~10a
term of any length in Xinjiang. He had originally been sent to the region as
XINJIANG COAL ITION, 1947 1I9
anegotiator, a trusted representative of President Chiang, who expected
Zhangto visit the region, to reach an accord with the local "rebels," and,
havingrestored peace and assured continued Chinese sovereignty in the
province, to return to the nation's capital and his role in the ongoing
negotiations between the Guomindang and the CCP.
Thedecision to remove Zhang was made prior to his return to Xinjiang
inMarch1947; Zhang himself was probably aware of his impending transfer.
Hehinted at such a change in a speech he made in Urumqi on March 31
whenhedeclared that he would not be Xinjiang's chairman forever.
58
None-
theless, his removal took the province by surprise.
59
On May 19, 1947, the
ExecutiveY uan in Nanjing announced that Mesut Sabri, a Uighur from the
Iiiarea and a long-standing member of the Guomindang, would replace
Zhang.The news was officially announced in theXinjiang Daily on May 21.
Speculation on the reasons for Zhang's removal varied. Some con-
temporary observers felt that perhaps he had been too soft in his approach
10Xinjiang's problems to satisfy the central government While his evident
sincerityand his belief in the need for reform in Xinjiang had earned him
therespect of local Moslems, his outspoken criticism of Chinese politics in
theNorthwest had not endeared him to the central government.
Zhang himself, however, offered a different view.On the day of the an-
no~cement in Urumqi, an article by Zhang was published in the Xinji~g
~iJy.In the course of this lengthy article, he appealed to the people of Xin-
J I lI Dgto work together to overcome contradictions in the region's complex
SOCiety. He referred to the opposition that was already building to Mesut's
appointment Why, he asked, would anyone want to oppose Mesut? "I have
gOOdrelations with both Mesut and A hmet, and this is a good thing....
Whyshould we oppose Mesut? How could I oppose one and support the
other? We three are all g00<l1'o6OI n other words, Zhang was urging the local
POPUlationto accept another Chinese government appointment to thepost
of regional chairman. his major argument being that this ~ewappointee
WOuldgovern in much the same way as he himself would have illth~future.
OPPOSition to the new appointment began almost as soon as I t ~ an-
nounced.Zhang's May 21 speech noted this but did not in any way rndtcate
theSOurces or the extent. I n fact, the same day as this speech appeared,
handbills also appeared on Urumqi streets attacking Mesut and the ~t~
g<Nerrunent.Other leaflets attacked A hmet and the Hi faction. The nft I I I
MOSlem-Chineserelations expanded almost overnight into a.gapi?g abyss.
Sou~ of opposition to Mesut certainly included the IIi~on. But ~
cal Turki nationalists also opposed Mesut, as did some of the higher-ranking
Chinese officials who felt that the change had come at a bad time.The rea-
so~for Opposing Mesut, Who, according to one source, had "high repute
forI ntegrity and justice:061 varied but the primary reason among local Mos-
1emswas that he was consideredto be the tool of the Guomindang, and,
- - - - - - - - - -
120 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
more specifically, the Cc Clique, which had nurtured him during his long
career in Chinese government and which had been responsible for placing
him in high government posts. That he commanded respect among older,
wealthy Uighur merchants may have been true,62 but Mesut had been away
from the province for too long to have major political support among the
wider population. A s chairman of the province, he would be responsible 10
the Chinese who appointed him, and who would be backing him with Han
Chinese Nationalist troops. I n the view of all but the Han faction in govern.
rnent, this meant that Chinese interests would be placed before those of the
local population while Mesut was in office.
The official reason for Mesur's appointment was given in a second article
by Zhang Zhizhong. published in the Xinjiang Daily the day following the
announcement He wrote that the central government wanted the Xinjiang
government to be headed by a local individual,. and that the appointme~t of
Mesur had been made out of respect for the Turki people of Xinjiang. GI Ven
Mesut's reputation for honesty and his wide experience in government, he
was, in Zhang's view, an ideal choice for chairman.63
Unfortunately, it was precisely his experience in Chinese government,
and his many years away from his own people, that were the main causes of
concern among the Turki nationalists in Xinjiang. Furthermore, as pointed
out in several quarters (none of them Chinese), Mesut was already in poor
health at age Sixty. The IIi faction was worried that Mesut, "frail and
tired,'>64 would be easily manipulated by the local Chinese militarists, be-
COming no more than a figurehead. With power delegated to the generals,
and increasing reliance on the military to solve Xinjiang's internal problems,
the prospects for democratic government in Xinjiang would be bleak.
A lthough Mesut was an experienced administrator and probably sincere
in wanting to aid his home region's development toward democracy and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, his appointment constituted another attempt ~the
central government to COntrol the region more closely through military
power and political manipulatjonrc In deciding to make the announcement
of Mesur's appointment before the Provincial A ssembly was convened, the
central government was hoping that Mesut would be given a vote of ~n-
fidence by that body, furthering Nationalist Chinese efforts at asserung
Guomindang influence in Xinjiang and uniting the various minorities be-
hind a native-born, Guomindang_trained head of government. I nstead, the
appointment set off new waves of opposition toward Chinese policy among
the various non-Chinese factions inthe region and led directly to an open
split in the government coalition.
Disorder in the Xinjiang ProY incial A ssembly
Representatives to Xinjiang'S first Provincial A ssembly had been elected
during the autumn elections of 1946. No assembly had been called,
XINJIANG COALITION, 1947121
however-the official reason being that the elections in some districts were
incomplete.I n March 1947, Zhang nonetheless decided to convene the first
Provincial A ssembly, possibly in part to conciliate the local population in
theaftermath of the 2~25A ffair. By May, when Zhang returned from Kash-
gar, hecould hardly have been very optimistic over the possible effects of
theforthcoming meeting. The announcement had already been made, how-
ever,and preparations (or it continued. The arrival of some delegates was
delayedby travel difficulties, but by mid-May most had reached Urumqi.
66
From the very beginning there were problems. A rguments erupted im-
mediatelyover the number of delegates for some districts, and even over the
identities and qualifications of some of those who arrived.
67
A ccording to
later reports, one of the main problems was that the IIi and Tacheng dis-
triers,which were entitled to fourteen and six representatives respectively,
hadsent eighteen and eight instead. Furthermore, five of those sent by
Tachengwere not on the original list of those elected. The IIi District also
sent an extra two representatives, on behalf of the Sibo, Solon, and Manchu
populations of IIi, which was quite outside the original regulations. The
KashgarDistrict was entitled to send twenty elected representatives and had
doneso, but seven of these had names differing from those on the original
I ~stof elected delegates submitted, and these men's identities were ques-
tionedby the delegates from other districts.
68
A nother problem was that the IIi District representatives had decided
they wanted the matter of electing government, army, and police officers
broUghtup at the A ssembly-a matter that the Chinese felt was lnappropn-
atefor discussion at the first Provincial A ssembly.69
Inan attempt to overcome these problems, Zhang, upon his return from
Kashgaron May 8, invited all parties concerned to discussions, but no.head-
waywasmade and the opening of the A ssembly was delayed In the midst of
theseevents, the appointment of Mesut Sabri was announced, adding yet an-
other point of contention to an already tense situation.
. POSSiblyin the hopes that a quick inauguration, coupled with the open-
In~.Ofa new "democratic" assembly, would defuse the gathering politi~
cnse, Mesut was sworn in on May 28 1947and on the same day the Provtn-
cia!A ssembly was declared formally open.70
. ~aCCOuntof what transpired at the first Xinjiang Provincial ~mbly
I S~iffieult to piece together from existing sources. Given thecheouc state of
ChlDeseparliamentary proceeding; at the nationallevel,71 it was hardly to
be expected that the Provincial A ssembly would be run any more success~l~
!y.A ccording to the Hami delegate, Mr. A bdul grturk, at the first sessl~D
theProceeding; were immediately bogged down over all the unresolved 15-
~ues.A rgument concerned not only matters of representation, but also the
:ue of Mesut's appointment, the reorganization of the military, an~even
hetber the A ssembly had the right to debate such matters as the J mple-
-----------
122 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
mentation of the peace agreement and the GPP.7Z The arguments wereso
chaotic that no formal sessions took place, the proceedings remaining in.
formal for the duration of the entire assembly.
Whatever the status of the meetings, the Vining newspapers reported
that on J une 4, the Provincial A ssembly met and a major resolution was
passed whereby sixty-two out of ninety delegates voted against Mesurs
chairmansbip--whether they were empowered to do so or not being quite
beyond the question.P It seemed that all the dissension in the province was
projected into and given new form by the proceedings of the A ssembly.
DUring the month of J une, the dissension outside the A ssembly itself by
no means diminished. L ocal newspapers, in published articles and in letters
to the editor, COntributed to the growing unrest. The Vining publications
were solid in proclaiming that the three districts' struggle had been justified
and their attitude toward the peace agreement correct.
I n Urumqi, law and order declined to such a point that the police chief
had to be given Special powers against "untrue rumors" and antigovernment
pro~ag~nda, and to deal with quarrels among the nationalities, i1I eg~l
deprfvanon of liberty, and the issuing of inflammatory leaflets and posters.
I n short, it began to appear that Xinjiang's political problems were in-
tractable,
The Beidashan I ncident
A t the same time as the central authorities were showing a certain disregard
for local susceptibilities in Xinjiang, an incident occurred on the Sino-
Mongolian border that showed clearly the Chinese government's vi~that
the solutions to the province's problems lay either in the internatlon~1
sphere or inthe realm of standard pacificatory measures. To understand this
it is n~ry to look first at the sequence of events unraveling innorthern
and northeastern Xinjiang early in 1947.
Osman Batur, an important leader of the Kerei Kazaks, had origina~y
allied himself with the ETR, but as early as the summer of 1946he was 10
contact with the Chinese government, from which he hoped to receive arms
inorder to continue what he called his fight against communism.
Given the legend and myth that now surround Osman, it isdifficult to es-
tablish his true motives in shifting allegiance from the ETR t~the
GUOmindang-whether it was Soviet interference in the ETR, as he claim~
or the fact that he may simply have been an independent agent, invol~ed Ul
the A ltai fighting for whatever advantage it would bring him and his fol-
lowers. What is known is that Osman was one of several Kazak leaders who
in 1946--47began activities against the ErR in the three districts, and who
received military and other aid from the Nationalist Chinese.
Chinese sources claim that Osman wrote to General Song Xilian inJ uly
XINJIANG COALfTION, 1947123
1946offering to join the Nationalists in fighting communism. Upon hearing
of hisappointment as a "government official" on A ugust 15, 1946, he was
overcomewith emotion and from that time on was committed to the Na-
tionalist cause.
7S
There is no indication that Nationalist military aid was given to Osman
at this time, nor did he undertake any military action against IIi. He re-
mainedin the A ltai District capital of Chenghua until November 1946.
76
In J uly 1946another important Kazak leader, A li Beg Hakim, had sent
hisrepresentative to Urumqi to see J animhan and Salis, the two Kazak
membersof the newly formed coalition government. The representative told
theNationalist government that A li Beg Hakim and his people would resist
IIiand cooperate with the Nationalists. A s part of his resistance movement
against IIi, A li Beg wrote literature for distribution among A ltai Kazaks and
elsewherein Xinjiang, and he may have been the source of handbills that ap-
pearedinUrumqi in the winter of 1946-47.'7
Mer leaving Chenghua in November 1946, Osman's forces took part in
at least one battle with the IIi forces on March 27, 1947,78and again on
A pril 7, 1947, after which they withdrew from Gexiubao (Kurte) to Beida-
shanon the border between Xinjiang and Mongolia.79
Complaints against Osman by the local people quickly surfaced.Burhan,
thesecond vice-chairman of the province at the time, was sent on an inspec-
tionmission to the A ltai in A pril 1947, accompanied by an IIifaction repre-
sentative, Rahim J an. A t a meeting with people'S representatives in th.e
A ltai on A pril 4, 1947, Osman was accused of stealing sheep and other ani-
mals, and demands were made for his arrest and punishment. Burhan
reported on Osman directly to Chairman Zhang, but no action was taken,
becauseno one could go against General Song.
so
Osman was joined at Beidashan by more Kazaks, so that by J une and
J ulyhewas leading some 1,200 families. Osman had not been able to bring
a~uate supplies witb him, and it was reported that the Chinese were sup-
plyinghimwith sheep and flour.
81
... ee :
I n May.the Mongolian government reported that a dI VI SI ono.f the
hundred Han and Kalak troops had illegally entered Mongolian rermory at
Baytak Bogda, the Turki name for Beidashan, and had arrested and taken
~waySOmeMongol soldiers.82 The border in this area bas been called
'unclear."83 Nonetheless there were border posts in the area held by the
N' .' allh nh the ac-
atJ onalists on one side and Mongols on the other, so that, ougn
I nal border line itself was unclear the soldiers inthe area were a-wareof the
apprOXimateextent-if not the exact perimeter-of their own territory. .
When Osman withdrew into this area from central A ltai, hewas camping
on lands that traditionally had been summer grazing .r.r;tures used by both
Kazaks from Xinjiang and Mongols from the MPH. asman's ~p (~C;
COrdingto most of the accounts cited below) was near that of Nauonalis
124 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
border guards stationed inthe Beidashan area.
When the Xinjiang provincial government did not reply to Mongol de.
mamnes that the arrested soldiers be returned (it was, after all, a timeof
crisis for the coalition, due to Mesut's appointment), the Mongoliansissued
an ultimatum.A fter forty-eight hours had expired, theysent four planeson
J une 5 to bomb the Chinese border guard's post at Beidashan.Bombing
COntinuedon J une 6, 7, and 8; two Chinese were reportedly killed inthe
raids.
86
I nexplaining the attack on the border post, the Chinese heldthat thein-
cident initially began as an attack on Osman, who had angered the Soviet
Union and its MPR allyby rejecting the ETR and choosing to fight against it
Some Turki SOurcessupport this, as they record that Osman had beenap-
proached by representatives of both the USSR and the Emduring the
winter of 1946-47.Osman, having twicerebuffed overtures fromtheSoviets,
then becamethe object of attacks by Ollonel L eskin, aSoviet-trained officer
servingwith the ETR army.A ccording to Kazak accounts, L eskin hadfol-
lowedOsman fromA ltai to Beidashan, Wherehefinallyorchestrated theat-
tack that ledto the I ncident, 87
First reactions to the border clashes were guarded. The U.S.consul
noted thedelay in the Chinese announcement of theborder violation.It was
onJ une 11, 1947, that the Chinese I nformation Officefirst toldforeigncor-
respondents of the incidents, and they then simply said that Soviet planes
hadbombed Beidashan.Theydeclined to givefurther details.
88
I ndeed, the Chinese themselves at first seemed unsure of theactual loca-
tion of Beidashan.One government report placed it 117miles northeast of
the town of Qitai, putting it right on the Sino-Mongolian border, but ano~-
er report said the Mongolians had penetrated two hundred miles into Xin-
jiang to attack Beidashan.89
On J une 10, the Chinese lodged an official protest with both the Soviet
Union and the MPR government, demanding immediate withdrawal of
Mongolian troops from Chinese territory. The protest declared t~at
Beidashan was garrisoned by loyal Han and Kazak troops, and that Soviet
action had been aimed at intimidating the Kazaks into becoming pro-
Soviet, 90
The official Mongolian statement, issued on J une 15, declared that on
J Une5Chinese troops had entered the MPR and proceeded 15kilometers to
Baytak Bogda (Beidashanj, Where they camped and then assa~Hed
Mongolian border guards.In reply, the MPR troops had driven the Chinese
our-s-after the Chinese had refused a Mongolian officers request for them
to leavepeacefully. A ttacked with the aidof planes of theMPR air force,.the
Chinese had been driven back across the border, which was at no time
CTOSSed by the Mongolians.No mention of any Kazaks is made in the MPR
repon.?' Thereafter the incident petered out into an exchangeof mutual ac-
XINJIANG COAUT10N, 1947125
cusationsof border infringement by both theChineseandtheMongols.
Regardlessof what actually happened at Betdashan that J une, the inc-
dentclearlyestablished, first, that Chineseauthorities wereindirect contact
withOsman and were supplying himwith food and other materials.They
werethus aiding agroup that wasin direct conflict with theIIi forceswhile
at the same time participating with those same forces in the coalition
government,whichaimedat peaceandstabilityinXinjiang.
Second, the incident showed the basicconvictionof theChinesegovern-
ment that its problems in Xinjiang laywith the government of the USSR,
andthegovernment's willingness to capitalizeonanyincident that might at-
tract international support to the Nationalist cause in its differences with
theUSSR and the MPR. Ithad the additional advantageof drawingattention
away fromtheincreasingly chaotic economic and political situation inChina
proper.
92
Onceagain, the Chinese interpretation of Xinjiang's troubles officially
placedthe blame on Soviet intrigue, the Chineseversion of the Beidashan
incident reflecting a basic political stand.Even before the Chinesethem-
selveshad been able to verify the details of the "attack"-or evento estab-
lishwhere the incident took place-the Chinese government bad blamed
the USSR and its MPR ally.Once the incident had been milked of all
propagandavalue, it was dropped fromthe news.
93
The Final CoUapse of the Coalition
Whilethe Beidashan incident was the temporary focusof attention outside
Xinjiang,the people of the provincial capital-who read nothingabout any
s~Chincident in their local papers-remained in astate of uneasyanticipa-
tion, unsure of what new developments Mesut's appointment would
precipitate.
A s noted previously, the police, under Police Chief L iuHandong, had
beengivennew powers to keep order in the capital ear?, in J une.As .the
~Onthprogressed, the accusations fromthe IIi group egatnst Handomtn~.
ti~?of and discrimination in the policegrew. MohmmedTashen, Urumqr s
~d District police chief and one of the fewlocal Moslemsto holds~ch.a
high POSt.described the major problems that confronted n~n.H:mservingI D
thepolice.Unlike their Han Chinese counterparts, Turki policemen were
not issuedweapons; orders issued by Moslemsuperiors werenot obey~by
lower-ranking Han; some police business was kept secret fromTur~of-
ficers; and even routine matters were sometimes restricted to Han Chinese
ears.
94
L ater in the month these accusations wererepeated, but therewas now
~ddedto the list of gri~ces thedenunciation of thesecret po~ce..A cco~
I Dgto the seventeen Moslem policemen who wrote to theMinzhu boo
- - - - - - - - - - - ..
126 XINJIANG COALrTION, 1947
Y mlng, the secret police remained active in the provincial capital and else-
where. These policemen also complained of the interference of the armyin
police matters. The military was said to be the real power in the region, and
to dominate matters that were properly the sole concern of the police.95
A ccusations of continued military interference in the government ap-
peared in succeeding issues of the Y ining papers. Despite theelections,
wrote A hmet J an Kasimi, the real power at the county level remained the
county company commander, who was invariably Han Chinese.96Sincethis
was the case, he queried, what was the point of having elections?
Ina move to limit the impact of such articles, no Turki-I anguage papers
from Urumqi were allowed to circulate in the area south of the Tianshan.Hi
papers, according to Deputy Secretary General A bbas, were destroyed at the
Manas River (the unofficial boundary between the three districts and the
remaining seven) and the carriers J mpnsonec."?
The issue of Han domination through the military and police was an im-
portant one. Since these two institutions remained primarily Han, theywere
a constant and obvious reminder of the Chinese position in Xinjiang. Rela-
tions among the nationalities took a turn for the worse.
On J une 30, 1947, some 1,500 people gathered at the Uighur L iterary
Club in Urumqi to watch a Russian film.
98
SUddenly, there was the sound of
a gunshot, and armed men appeared at the club's windows. Han Chinese en-
tered the hall, shouting that they were looking for a certain official of the
club. When he could not be found, they reportedly beat up the club's
musicians before leaving.
99
Observers placed blame for this, and.ot~er
minor incidents during the month of J une, on the CC Clique's inmguing
but local Moslems COnsidered all Han Chinese to be responsible for such
events.
The general feeling of unrest, fed by rumored stories of such evc:n~,
erupted into open revolt by early J uly. Serious rials, described in detail ~
the next chapter, OCCurred in the towns of Turfan, Shanahan, Toksun, an
Bai.A il of these were quickly suppressed by the Nationalist military.tOOAl-
though Kashgar saw no open violence, the military there deemed it prudent
to impose a curfew and to arrest potential agitators. The number arrested
was variously estimated asbetween seventy and three hundred. lOt
Unlike the seven districts under Chinese military control, the govern-
ment in Y ining could boast of general law and order. The local government
officials declared their intention to adhere to the terms of the peace agree-
ment, and in the local papers they urged the Chinese to do the same.On
J uly 1, an important mass meeting was held in Y ining's West Park, reported-
ly attended by some twenty thousand people. It was addressed by.fi~local
government officials, among others. lot The meeting resulted inajoint dec-
laration signed by leaders of religious and business organizati?DS ~.the
three districts and by each national minority cultural association mY UlI 1lg,
XINJIANG COAIJTION, 1947117
includingthat of the Han Chinese.The declaration stated that thepeopleof
thethree districts had worked sincerely for peace, but that the "reaction-
aries"hadnot been sincere.As instances of thislack of goodfaith, thedec-
larationmentioned the February riots, the appointment of Mesut, thecon-
tinuationofthe policy to print more moneyto offset Xinjiang'sdebt,103and
theincreasingtaxation and inflation in the province.The declaration then
put forth seven demands: immediate implementation of the peace agree-
ment and the OPP; Mesut's removal and also the removal of J animhan,
Salis, Hatije, and others; establishment of atrulydemocratic government in
Xinjiang;anend to rumors; an end to the practiceof printing moremoney;
thegovernment to stop terrorism; and, finally, the improvement of Sino-
Soviettrade.
104
Failureto implement the peaceagreement wasaconstant themeinthese
articles.If only the peace agreement were implemented, then the entire
province would have peace. Blame for nonimplementatlon was placed
squarelyon the reactionaries in the provincial government who opposed
Zhang'spolicy of conciliation and on the militarists in theprovince, ledby
General SongXilian.
Zhang himself retorted in theXinjiang Daily that the Ili area itself was
thereal reason that the peace agreement had not been implemented, anac-
cusationlater rebutted in an open letter to Chairman Zhang intheMjnzhu
baa, whichwent on to declare that therewasno truedemocracyinXinjiang,
sincethe government and judiciary remained under Chinese military influ-
ence.If the central government did not intend to pay anyattention to the
Provincial A ssembly, whybother evento conveneone, sinceit obviou.slywas
powerless.t05
The author of the letter, religious leader Osman Damullab, further
claimedthat it was IIithat had reorganized, and thusimplemented thepeace
agreement as required; yet the government had not carried out its pan of
theagreement with asimilar reorganization. Heasked that aspecial panel
be set up to investigate the entire question of nonimplementation.Finally,
heconcludedwith apleato Zhang to carryout thetermsof thepeaceagree-
ment sinceit was his responsibility, as the representative of the ~ple. I n
additionto carrying Osman Damullab's name, the letter borethesignatures
of sixtyother IIiresidents.
Theaccusations and counteraccusations becamehealedduringJ uneand
J uly; after violence finally erupted in towns near the provincial capital in
~r1Y J Uly,the newgovernment under Mesut decidedit was necessaryto ad-
joum the Provincial A ssembly, and an announcement to that effect was
madeon J uly 9.106A standing committee was organized to arrange for an-
other sessionof the A ssembly, at anunspecifieddateinreefuture. .
Havingno further official business in thecapital, delegates left tjrumqr
after the announcement. Some chose to go to ill for avisit, asaresult of an
-----------
118 XINJIANG COALITION, 1947
open invitation extended to them by Abmet and other members of the IIi
faction. A lmost immediately. delegates from Urumqt who had not taken up
the invitation wrote to A hmet, demanding an explanation for the action of
delegates who had chosen to visit IIi. A hmet's reply was simply that Hi was
not "a foreign country," and that the delegates, being free to travel any-
where in the province, were now most welcome to visit Hi. He denied that
any had been coerced to make the journey.tO?
On J Uly 29, 1947, some IIi representatives who had remained in Urumqi
decided there was nothing more to gain by staying on in the capital and
returned to Vining. A hmet himself chose to remain for some days longer,
but by A ugust the coalition was in complete disarray. A s he did not wishto
work withthe new chairman, A hmet finally left the capital in A ugust, bring-
ing to end the period of coalition government in Xinjiang.
A lthough the coalition had ostensibly dissolved in a stalemate over
Mesut's appointment, the principal reasons for its dissolution lay elsewhere.
During the first months of the coalition, the personal prestige and character
of Zhang Zhizhong had been instrumental inmaking it work.His departure
from Xinjiang inJ anuary 1947, however, had left the militarists with a free
hand. Despite Zhang's return to the region SOOnafter the February riots, ~
position in Xinjiang was no longer the same. By then, the military domi-
nated Xinjiang's political and governmental affairs through the garrison
commanders, and General Song, more certain than ever that concessions
were no longer of any value, had increased his own influence at the expense
of Zhang's. Rumors of Zhang's probable removal as chairman did nothing
to help the latter's prestige among the Turki people or his credibility among
the Han Chinese in the province.
Zhang's trip to the south, which was supposed to boost public support
for the government, had nearly the opposite effect. When near riots oc-
curred in Kashgar, Zhang was forced to call on the Nationalist A rmy for
protection and to preserve public law and order. A ngry and defensive, he
returned to the capital and took a much firmer line with the national
minorities in his government
Not only had Zhang's ability to influence or partially control the milital)'
decreased, but also his Own confidence in his ability to influence events was
shaken. Ifat this point he had received full endorsement of his policies from
the central government, this might have renewed his confidence and
prestige, so that his opposition to the militarist line would have been effec-
tive.But Zhang had already made his views on Xinjiang quite clear to .th:
government: he believed that a degree of autonomy was the only feasibl
policy for the government to pursue in Xinjiang at the time, and he fully
Supported the idea of more national minority participation in govern-
ment
lOB
This was not in line with the view then held by the highest echelo~
of the Guomindang and the Nationalist government. No endorsement 0
XINJIANG COAL lTlON, 1947129
Zhang and his policies was forthcoming. With Zhang's removal, a basic in-
gredient of any coalition disappeared: the will to govern in a spirit of com-
promise and concession vanished from the ruling faction in Xinjiang's
government.
An equally important factor in the collapse of the coalition was the role
of the military.The handling of the incidents during the winter of 1946-1947
was not forgotten by either the Han or the Turki population. To the Chi-
nese, such occurrences were proof of the need for greater, not less, military
control and fed their desire to see stronger Chinese military control in Xin-
jiang.To the local Turki population, the increasing military role simply sup-
ported suspicions that the Chinese would never allow home-rule in the
region.
Rumors of Nationalist aid to Osman Batur-another policy favored by
the military-indicated to many Moslems that their urge to mistrust
Chinese intentions in Xinjiang was correct. By directly supplying the iiifac-
tion's enemy, the Nationalist government undermined its own position and
affirmed the continuation of its "divide and rule" policy in this border
region.
Mesut's appointment was in some ways the proverbial straw and no
more.His appointment was asymbolic gesture, but it was heavy-handed as it
demonstrated that a local individual might be appointed to aleadership post
in Xinjiang but would have to fit the proper mold and be a loyal
Guomindang supporter, sharing Nanjing's political goal of maintaining Xin-
jiang as an intrinsic pan of China for the foreseeable future. Being thus a
symbol of continued Chinese domination, Mesut was totally unacceptable to
apeople Who, by 1947, were fully embarked on the journey toward acollec-
tivenational consciousness.
- - - - - - - - - -
CHA PTER 7
Xinjiang A fter the Collapse
ofthe Coalition, 1947-1949
A fter the coalition disintegrated in the summer of 1947, Chinese militarists
dominated Nationalist policy in Xinjiang. Under the direction of General
Song, covert military action against the three districts began through the
Nationalist's Kazak allies led by Osman Batur. A t the same time, Zhang
Zhizhong pursued the possibility of another diplomatic settlement with the
estranged llidelegates through an exchange of letters which began in Sep-
tember 1947.A lthough Zhang was DOlonger chairman of the province, he
was still COmmander of the Northwest Military Region and continued to
take an active interest in Xinjiang, attempting to use his influence withihe
illfaction to bring it back into the coalition. A s long as military action con-
tinued, however, there was no possibility of his being successful, as the let-
ters from IIi,sent in reply to Zhang, indicate.
The political paradox of these two divergent courses typifies the ad hOC
nature of the policies to which the Nanjing government was reduced by the
late 1940s in the border areas. Desperate to maintain control over as much
of China's traditional territory as possible, the central government fell back
upon the only courses available.
Neither route led to conclusive results. The IIi government maintained
independent control of the three districts throughout the remaining years of
the Republican period, while Nationalist rule in the rest of the province be-
came increasingly reliant on Chinese military garrisons to maintain Chinese
supremacy. Kept at full strength, the military continued to antagonize the
local population, fanning racial animosity and exacerbating inflation in me
region.
This chapter discusses three major areas of political development in me
last period of Nationalist involvement in Xinjiang, between 1947and 1949.
130
COLLAPSE OF THE COALIJ" ION, 1947-1949 131
First, there were the attempts to reform the coalition. The Soviet Union
sought to mediate by bringing the I I i group and the Chinese to the negotiat-
ingtable. When these efforts failed, Zhang Zhizhong entered into an ex-
change of letters with the I li government, which also ultimately ended in
failure.
The second area of interest is the course of events in the A shan district,
where anti-I I i Kazaks under Osman tried to regain control of what they con-
sidered to be their homelands, and to continue their avowed right against
"Communist intervention" in Xinjiang's affairs.
Finally, a comparison is made of the two parallel administrations that
developed in the region between 1947and 1949---that of the IIigovernment
in the three districts, and that of the Chinese government in the remaining
seven.
TheSoviet A ttempt at Mediation
In March 1947, the Soviet Union once again involved itself openly in local
Xinjiang politics. Following the February and March incidents in Urumqi,
the Soviet consul there notified L iu Zeying, special commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign A ffairs in Xinjiang, that the USSR was very concerned
over recent events, particularly the police and military searches of private
residences, arbitrary arrests, and confiscation of property and llterature.! I n
the Soviet view, these actions contravened the peace agreement The consul
formally requested the Chinese government to look into the situation.
2
On March 24, 1947, the Soviets sent a second protest to Commissioner
till, asking that the Chinese fully implement the peace agreement which the
Soviets had worked so hard tobring about in 1946.
3
I n the summer of 1947 as the situation in Urumqi deteriorated, the
Soviets once again contacted the Chinese government through their.~~ul
at Urumqi. A Soviet memorandum of A ugust 11, 1947, strongly criticized
the appointment of Mesut, saying it was unacceptable to the local.people,
and condemned police and military attitudes toward Moslems as betng con-
trary to the spirit of the peace agreement
4
. . ..
The Soviets' last attempt to influence the course of events ~Xinjiang
through official channels came in November 1947when the SoViet consul
again wrote to the Chinese government The communication was adm:
essed
to Zhang, however, and not to the new provincial chairman, who was, m.the
Soviet view the cause of such trouble in the region.Specifically, the Soviets
COmplained that Zhang himself seemed to be trying to protect police who
were responsible for the deaths of some two thousand people in the TU~
area alone, where riots caused by Mesut's ap~intment ~d brought un;
mediate, vengeful retaliation from the Han-dommated .police ron:e.As f~
their own role, the Soviets emphasized that they only WI Shedto bnng pea
132 COllAPSE OF mE COAL fT10N, 1947-1949
to the region; they expressed the fear that with the Chinese military con.
stenuy interfering and slirring up bad feelings, and with constant harass-
ment of the population by both the police and the military, a return to peace
was becoming impossible.5
These formal attempts by the Soviets to bring about a change in Chinese
policy received no formal response, but informally they provoked indigna-
tion. L iu considered them to be unwarranted interference in China's
domestic affairs. This view is shared by Chinese authors Sun Fulrun and
Zhang Dajun-both of whom assert that it was the Chinese who wereat this
time trying to preserve peace while the IIi forces secretly plotted to destroy
all prospect of peace for the region." I n the circumstances, the effect of
Soviet eCforts at mediation made local Chinese officials in Xinjiang morein-
transigenl_
Exchange or Notes Between the lli
Faction and Zhang Zhizhong
While the Soviets were thus making their opinions known, sporadic commu-
nication was established between the IIi government and Zhang Zhizhong.
A s the I li faction did not accept Mesut's appointment, they were willing only
to communicate with Zhang, whose return to the chairmanship they con-
tinued to favor.
A fter the last Ili delegates had refurned to IIi in A ugust 1947, Zhang
wrote to the IIigroup to defend Nationalist policy in Xinjiang and to accuse
the IIi faction of having caused the dissolution of the coalition. He charged
thai the lli faction had refused to adhere to the terms of the peace agree-
ment because they had not implemented its military provisions; that they
bad refused to normalize relations between the three IJ i districts and the re:s
t
of Xinjiang; that they had been instrumental in the massacre of Chinese m
1946dUring the elections and in the February 1947demonstrations; and that
they continued secret efforts to expand their political influence and control
into the remaining seven districts of the province,"
Zhang's outline of the alleged violations of the peace agreement by the
illside was hardly conciliatory in tone. Similar points were made in Zhang's
September report to the central government, 8indicating that Zhang's inten-
tions in the letter to Ui may have been to defend his own role. Clearly, heat-
tempted to place responsiblhty for reopening talks on the illgroup. .
The IIi reply, dated October 16, 1947, and delivered to the Chinese VIa
the Soviet Consul in Vining, offered a succinct rebuttal of Zhang's letter.
First, it listed six major Chinese violations of the Peace A greemene" f
1.The Chinese had not fulfilled their promise to reduce the number.o
central government troops in the province but, on the con~, had m-
creased the numbers from 20,000-25,000 in 1944 to 90,000 in 1947. 0
COlL APSE OF THE COAL lTION, 1947-1949 133
2.No P~ce ~reservation Corps hadbeenformedinKashgaror Aksu.
3.Turki troops were not being treated the same as the Nationalist
troops,asstipulated in the agreement; theTurki forceshadreceivedneither
foodnor ammunition.
4.Thecommander of the central government troops inXinjiangincited
andaidedOsman Batur to attack theA ltai area; anddespiteOsman'sillegal
actions, he and his supporters in the provincial government continued to
holdtheir posts.
_ 5.The Chinese army, the police, and the SanMin Zhu Y i Y outh Corps
I nterferedwith elected officials, and arrests, beatings, imprisonments, and
other oppressions carried out against the people on a largescalehad be-
comecommon.
6.Promises to abolish thesecret policeand to reorganizethelocal police
sothat themajority wereTurki hadnot beenfulfilled.
Theletter also stated that obstruction to communications withthethree
districtswasprimarily fromthe Chineseside.For their part, the IIipartydid
concedethat they refused to allownon-Turki-speaking officialsto servein
thepostal, telegraph, and customs serviceinthethreedistricts.Thiswas be-
causeChinese officials sent fromNanjing and Shanghai not onlycouldnot
speaklocal dialects but also demanded "squeeze."
I nreplyto Zhang's accusations of I I i-initiatedincidentsof violence, pub-
licdemonstrations, and murder, the IIi party cited"large-scalemassacresin
Mustag, Turfan, Manas, Urumqi, and other places" perpetrated by the
Chinese.They further accused the Chineseof followingapolicy of dividing
thepeople of the region bydisregarding local viewson theappointment of
Mesut and other government officials, and bystirring up enmity between
racesthrough "antagonistic and provocativeposters."
Finally, they offered four conditions that would haveto bemet before
theIIigroup would return to the negotiating table.Thesewere: (1) Endthe
oppressionand torture of progressiveelements inXinjiang; (2) freeall Mos-
lemprisoners injail and punish thosewhojailedthem; (3) removeMesut as
chairman; (4) immediately implement theJ une 1946peaceagreeme.nt.
ll
Zhang did not reply until December 9, 1947.He refuted the DI char~
andclaimed that Nationalist troops in the region had been reduced I D
number.He further claimed that the Chinesewerenot aidingOsman.In ad-
~itionto this defense of government policy inXinjiang,heset ~pfiveco~~i-
~o~for the resumption of talks, namely, that iiieliminat~anyI rregulanues
In its territory; that the Chinese flagbeflown and theChineselanguage be
USed;that I I i's military preparations and mobiliZationbe ended; that the
"East Turkestan Movement" and anti-Chioese propaganda end; and that
~mmunications with the rest of the provincebe restored.rzPlainly,neither
SideWouldgiveway. .. The
I n his letter, Zhang certainly exceeded the bounds of credibility.
-----------
134 COLLAPSE OF ruz COALrrION, 1947-1949
number of Nationalist troops had, in fact, increased. The general public
believed the Chinese to beaiding Osman and, as of 1947, the Kazak leader
A li Beg Hakim, to enable them to fight the I li government; suchaidwas in
fact admitted in official circles.U
Zhang's claims and demands had little impact on the IIi faction, which
took ten weeks to reply and then, on February 17, 1948, restated the IIiposi-
tion, repeating the main points made in the first letter.They againaccused
General Song of aiding Osman and demanded that Osman be handedover
to the A shan government for trial. They also protested the arrests of pro-
gressive elements throughout the province and especially in Urumqi, Hami,
and the Nanjiang area (southern Xinjiang) Where, the note said, thepeople
were simply reacting against police brutality and oppression. Ui denied any
connection with the revolts in Turfan, Shanshan, and Toksun whichhad
broken out the preceding summer. Finally, they demanded that Mesut be
removed so that the peace agreement COuld,at last, be implemented asin-
teoded.
14
A fter conferring with colleagues at L anzhou, the former chairman
replied to the IIiJ etter on A pril 1, 1948, curtly asking whythe IIigroupha~
not replied to the fiveconditions set out in his December note.If the UI
forceswere serious about entering into discussions and were ready to fulfill
these requirements, Zhang wrote, then they should reply directly inorder to
showtheir good intentions.15
I t was not until along summer had passed that the IIigovernment wrote
once again to Zhang Zhizhong. Unlike previous letters, this one didnot
come through SOViet channels. A nd, unlike the others, tbe note was
reportedly conciliatory in tone.16
A lthough this letter offered some hope of an end to the stalemate be-
tween the iii faction and the Chinese, no further letters were to beex-
changed. By this time, the situation in Xinjiang was being inf]uen~by
events in China proper, Wherethe Nationalist military position was quickly
deteriorating. This forced the Chinese authorities to make conciliatory
movesinXinjiang, but the IIigovernment madeno further reply.
The net result of the Zhang-hi exchanges was to confirmeachsideinits
original position and demonstrate that Zhang himself had moved into the
militarist camp.The polarization of Han Chinese and IIi nationalists ap-
peared complete.
The Kazak Card
A major stumbling block to I ii-Nationalist Chinese relations continued W
be Chinese aid to Osman Batur.The interrelations of these Kazaks and the
Chinese are not only highly relevant to the course of events in 1947-1949,
but also aninherently interesting part of developments during theseyears.
COlL APSE OF THE COAL ITION, 1947~1949135
I n J une 1947, Osman and his forces had figured prominently in the
"Beidashan I ncident," but by the end of that month, the border clashes had
ended. Osman remained with the Chinese Nationalist troops in the
Beidashan area, but in September he and his men were moving north toward
A shan district.
A ccording to Zhang Dajun, a former Chinese military intelligence of-
ficer who is well informed on Osman's movements at this time, Osman at-
tacked the little town of Fuyun on september IO. Osman claimed that he
successfully fought off troops led by a Soviet commander, Stalinov, on Sep-
tember 13, and proceeded on the 16th to Chenghua, the capital of A shan
district, with forces from the IIi area under General Delilhan fleeing before
hi 17 tm,
I n reporting this fighting to the U.S.consul, General Song noted that the
Kazaks' main motivation to go back north was to join their families who had
been unable to accompany the fighting force when it moved south.
I 8
An
A merican official at Beidashan observed, however, that some 250 families
had arrived with Osman and more of his followers soon joined him,
eventually totaling 1,200 yurts.
19
Song also claimed that Osman's forces were not under his direct control,
and that Osman and his men were acting without his and the Nationalist
g~ernment's approval.P I n November 1948, however, U.S.intelligence in-
~I cated that the provincial head~uarters of the military had finally stopped
I tssupply of arms to the Kazaks.
2
Thus there is little doubt that the autumn
1947foray of Osman and company into the Ashan district was done with the
knowledge and support of General Song and the central government.
That September, Osman regained control of Chengnua, the capital of
A shan district. His victory, however, was Short-lived. A ccording to Osman,
who was in radio contact with the Chinese at the time, in October some one
hundred trucks carrying two thousand troops and supported by six tanks en-
tered Xinjiang at J imunai, a town on the Sino-Soviet border. These troo~
Proceeded to Chenghua, via Burqun.
22
By early November, ~man and ~lS
forces were being driven out of the Chenghua area. A coordmg to eyewtt-
nesses-cwho, it must be pointed out, were brought to the U.S.Consulate to
give their stories by anti-I ll members of the provincial govemment-the
Soviet Red A rmy had assisted in the drive against Osman. One wi~ess ac-
c~ed Depsbaytov, the acting Soviet consul in Caenghua at the tl~e, of
being involved in this particular operation, which had been headed iD (he
field by General Bolinov (a member of the E1R government) and Colonel
"Madjoroff ."23 Osman did oat succeed again in taking any part ~f A sb~
He retreated to the Tianshan Mountains where he sheltered until jeavmg
for Berkel in 1949.
..Because of his long involvement io anti-Chinese, anti_government ac-
tMties in Xinjiang, Osman's reputation bas grown somewhat out of propor-
----------
136 COllAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
tion to the influence he actually had among Xinjiang Kazaks during this pe_
riod. Other leaders actually commanded much lar~r followings. I n 1947,for
instance, A li Beg Hakim ledsome 20,(0) people, incomparison withOs-
man's following of 1,200 yurts or 5,000-7.000 people.Further, out of an
estimated total Kazak population in Xinjiang of 450,000, 210,000 lived in
the IIi district alone in 1944.
25
I t seems the majority of Xinjiang's Kazaks
did not choose to oppose the ElR actively.
One reason behind support of the bulk of the three districts' population
for the Ern was that their government was abenevolent one.L ifeonadaily
basis in the IIiarea was more comfortable and agood deal more secure than
in theother sevendistricts, which remained under Chinese control.
Xinjiang's Two Parallel A dministrations
Despite the year of coalition rule in 1946--1947, the three I I i-led districts
were not integrated into the province until 195D-1951. I n effect, two admin-
istrations existed in Xinjiang throUghout the period 1944-1950.
From its founding on November 12, 1944, until the entrance of the PL A into
the three districts sometime in 1950, the ElR government maintained itself
as an independent Moslem state. Covering roughly 20 percent of the prov-
ince, the ElR inclUded some of the region's most valuable natural resources
within its borders (see ch~ter 2).The ETR was home to 16-20 percent of
the province's population. The ethnic breakdown within the three districts
was estimated as being 53 percent Kazak, 23 percent Uighur, and 24 percent
smaller nationalilies. I ncluding Mongols. White Russians. Manchus, Uz-
belts, and Tatars.2:1
As noted in chapter 2, the three westernmost districts of Xinjiang had
been the Object of foreign interest in the previous century, with the result
that these three partiCUlar districts had been ruled by Special military rom-
menders prior to their incorporation into the province as ordinary districts
under Governor Y ang. From the 1920s onward, the three had been part of
the usual Chinese provincial system. A s the largest administrative units.un-
der the provincial government, the districts in tum were broken down mOO
counties (rian). In the urban areas. the old Chinese baojia system con~ued
to operate, with one neighborhOOd leader responsible for the beha:no~of
ten families. These traditional forms of Chinese government orgamzanon
were retained by the ETR.
L ike the Xinjiang Provincial Government of 1946, the Ern~also .a
type of coalition. I rs members were representative of all nanonatines resi-
dent in the three districts, except for the Chinese. A mong these men were
COLL4PSE OF mz COALITION, 1947-1949 137
also varying political views, as will be discussed below.A t the top of the ETR
governmental hierarchy was a governing council of seventeen members, led
by the chairman (called the "president" in Turki sources) and two vice-
chairmen. Of the ten ministry heads, only four served on the council (see
table 11).
In addition to this council, the government included an advisory council
of seven religious leaders. The exact functions of this council were not
stated, but its presence attests to the respect paid to I slam by the new
government.
The majority of leaders in the ETR were Uighur-Turks who, despite dif-
ferences in education and in degree of admiration for tbe USSR, gave their
allegiance to the Em's first chairman, A li Han TOre, and his idea of an in-
dependent East Turkestan. A li Han's involvement "inthe organization and
establishment of the Em drew both Uighurs and Kazaks into the new
movement. A ccording to most Turkic sources, A li's prestige as a religious
scholar and leader and his well-known stance as a Turki nationalist were
fundamental to the movement in the early stages.
28
With A li Han's disappearance in A ugust 1946-an incident not yet ade-
quately accounted for29-his first vice-chairman, A slm Bey, another revered
religious leader from a princely family of the IIivalley, became the head of
government.30A ssisting him was the Turkish-educated, anti-Soviet A nwar
Musa Bey.31 These two remained at the head of the ElR until its union with
the PRe in 1950.When A bmet J an Kasimt returned to IIi in A ugust 1947,
however, he assumed a leading position in government affairs in the three
districts. I t was A hmet who carried on correspondence with Zhang Zhi-
zhong on behalf of the Em, for instance. Such duties would also have been
part of his portfolio as minister of foreign affairs, the post he assumed upon
his return to Y ining in 1947. But his eminence derived also from his in-
timate knowledge of the Chinese, his travels to the cities of China proper,
and his close working relationship with Zhang, established during his
montns in Urumqi.
Other members of the E1R government reflected the varying opinions
and policies of the people of the three districts at this time. Some clearly
favored a period of autonomy under Chinese rule while preparing for the
region's eventual independence. Others were undoubtedly pro-Sovi~t.
seeing in the USSR a modernizing state that could benefit the people of Xin
jiang. But whatever the political views of individual leaders may have been,
all were aware of the need to maintain good relations with the U~R. on one
hand, and to maintain the ErR as a Moslem state, on the other, morder to
ensure popular support for the movement. The top government posts the~e-
fore remained in the hands of weD-known religious leaders such as ~un
Bey and A nwar Musa Bey, chairman and vice-chairman respectively from
1947to 1950.
32
- - - - - - - - - -
138 COlLAPSE OF THE COALrrION, 1947-1949
Table 11
The Government of the East TUrkestan Republic
Chairman Ali Han Tore, Uzbek"
Vice-chairman Bolinov, White Russian
Vice-chairman A~m Bey Hoja, Uighur
Secretary General Mahsum
Members of the Governing Council
A$im Bey Hoja, Uighur
Abdul Buti, Uighur
Ali Hal;te, Uighur
Abdullah Ebu Maksum, Uighur
Kerim Hajl
Bolinov, White Russian
Mansur
Ahmet J an Kasimi, Uighur
lznak Han Mum Haji, Kirghiz
Rahim J an SelimoQlu. Uighur
SalihJ an Bey
J uma Ahong
Anwar Musa Bey, Uighur
Fujia
Ebulhayir lore, Uighur
Mosk%ff, White Russian
Huseyin Teyji
Sou.ru: Zhang Dajun, An Account ofFony Years Tu.rmoi{in Xinjiang (faibei, 1954), p.82; abo from
infonnation supplied by former Di residents.
"'The I I lI tionality of these officials is given where known.
The Soviet Role in the ETR
Some mention must be made of the interesting question of Soviet advisers
and militaty personnel in the three districts during the period of ETR ~n-
trot The picture presented by Turkic sources is of particular interest smce
they offer what seems a highly plausible account of the general courseof
events and of the Soviet role.
These sources say that the Original organizers of the E1R had r~ived
assurances fromthe Soviet Union that it wouldnot interfere in IIiaffairs but
would support I li's fight for self-determination and for the establishment of
a democratic government in Xinjiang.However.once the EI R wasestab-
lished and arms had been purchased from the USSR, the latter insistedon
sending advisers into the area.Not only weremilitary adviserssent, b.u~also
advisersarrived to aidingovernment administration. I nother words.I t I Sas-
serted that the Soviets sought to extend their influence in the threedistr!cts
by building a pro-Sovrer, or at least Soviet-oriented, government orgamza-
lionin the three districts.
COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949 139
Table 11 (conl'dj
Ministry heads
Internal Affairs: Moskolov, White Russian
Finance: Anwar Musa Bey, Uighur
Law: Muhammed J an
Fore1g~Affairs: Ahmet J an Kasimi, Uighur
Education: Seyletlin (Saifudinj, Uighur
Vice-minister: Hamdi
A9~cullure: Ali J an Bey
Religious Affairs: SalihJ an Bey
Information (propaganda): Minaigen Hoja
Banking: Gansip Hoja
Health: Muhellin Kanat. M.D., Uighur
Military Affairs
Commander of the ETA forces: Bolinov, White Russian
~cle.e-eammander.ofthe ETR forces: Izhak Han Mura Haji," Kirghiz
hlef of staff: Latif J an Kanat, Uighur
Religious Affairs Council
lemur (T1enna~Ahong
Lukman Ahong
Kansup Ahong
Sasar Ahong
Ma Sandaren
Ma Uangpao
Special posts
Vining Police Chief: Yebi J an
~nmg District Specel Commissioner: A!,limTaj
ce-conmeeoner: Abdullah Han
Commissioner of Military Law: Aini
UBy 1947lzhak Ran was the military commander for all ETR forces.
Civilian advisers who are reported to have arrived from the USSR to aid
t~e ETR in carrying out its operations allegedly included the following indi-
viduals: Muhsm (USSR Turk), counselor to A li Han TOre; GorI d Mihalovic
(Russian), finance adviser; carer Karl (USSR Turk), religious adviser; A b-
dullayeff (USSR Turk), education adviser; Ali (unidentified), interior affairs;
and Vladimir I stepanovic (Russian), overall political adviser.
33
Chinese military intelligence had its own list of Soviet military advisers
and commanders in the ETR military: I zbak Han Mora Haji, commander,
ETR forces; Hasanlokov military adviser: Zolun Tahir, vice-commander;
De
I ilhan, vice-commander; Mevlanov, chief military adviser; and Bolinov,
commander, IIipeople's militia.34
. Part of the difficulty inascertaining who 'WaS and was not a ''Soviet'' ad-
VI Ser-in either the military or inthe govemment-is due w the pr~nce of
~ny locally born Russians and White Russian tmigrts who were mvolved
Inboth the ETR's government and military establisbments. Such individuals
]40 COLLAPSE OF me COALITION, 1947-1949
and their families had relations with the USSR that were, by necessity, prag-
matic. When in early 1946the USSR decreed that it would extend the dead-
line (to J Uly 1946) for readmission to Soviet citizenship for any citizens of
the former Russian empire or persons who lost their citizenship and were
living in Xinjiang,35 many White Russians took advantage of the offer.A c-
cording to the British Consulate in Urumqi, two-thirds of the White Rus-
sian community there and an estimated 90percent of the White Russians in
the IIiarea accepted Soviet papers.36
Undoubtedly the motivation for the Whites was fear of Soviet reprisal if
and when the Soviet Union again achieved a position of dominance in Xin-
jiang. Moreover, although many people took out Soviet papers, at the same
time those who had Chinese citizenship retained it as well.However, by
spring of 1947, most White Russians from the IIiregion had sold their farms
and businesses and were making the long journey to the Chinese coast or
Hong Kong and the chance of emigration to safer climes.
3
? Whatever com.
pelled Xinjiang's Russians to take out Soviet papers, it does not appear to
have been admiration for Communism or for the Soviet Union in general.
The holding of Soviet papers thus cannot be taken automatically to indi-
cate pro-Soviet or pro-Communist political beliefs. The same may be said
for a Soviet education, with regard to which several factors should be kept in
mind.
First, for a Xinjiang Turkic language speaker, the choices of schooling,
especially at the secondary level and beyond, were extremely limited. Other
than the local Xinjiang College, described by observer Barnett as "rather a
joke,,,38 the province offered no education beyond middle school. Virtua~y
the only relatively nearby place offering higher education using the Turkic
language as the medium of instruction and boasting comparatively modem
methods was the Soviet Union. I t is therefore hardly surprising to find that
many able young men were sent into Soviet Central A sian republics to get
an education. Under Sheng's rule, in particular, a sizable number were sent,
with the Object that when they returned they would be the vanguard of a
modernizing, pro-Soviet elite in the region.
While education abroad does sometimes foster a love of the host coun-
try, its people, and its policies, this does not occur automatically and cons~-
tently in every case. I n the final analysis, neither the "facts" of a ~et
education or of Soviet citizenship offer adequate basis to label any particu-
lar individual in the ETR government a Soviet agent, . . .
The individual who is usually so labeled is A hmet J an Kasimi, vjce-
chairman of the coalition provincial government and the ETR's minisle~of
foreign affairs.
39
This accusation is based on the biographical informanou
that A bmet was Soviet educated, spoke Russian fluently, and had even
taught school in the USSR-all of which information is correct. A hmet ~
nor, however, involved in any of the planning of the Hi rebelhon. He was 1I l
COLL1PSE OF THE COALrrION, 1947-1949 141
prison in Urumqi from 1937to 1944.
40
His political views expressed in both
speeches and later writings are those of a Turki nationalist, intent on estab-
lishinga democratic, Moslem-majority government in Xinjiang. L acking any
more substantial evidence of his connection to the USSR as an agent, the
only safe statement to be made about A hmet's political beliefs is that hewas
able to speak forcefully, eloquently, and with evident sincerity for the Turki
people; as to any other motivation behind his words, this must await more
than purely circumstantial proof.
41
A ccusations in Chinese sources of Soviet connections also focus on four
individuals in the E1R military. These four are General I zhak Han, General
Bolinov, Colonel L eskin, and Colonel Mevlanov. I nformation on all of these
individuals is fragmentary, but the following summaries of the available in-
formation shed a little light on just who they were.
The first man, I zhak Han (also spelled I zhart, I shajqan), was forty-one at
the time of the IIi rebellion; originally from Kashgar, he was of Kirghiz na-
tionality.42 L ike A bmet, he was Soviet educated. While A merican sources
state that he was originally sent into Xinjiang by the USSR to aid Sheng
Shicai,43it is equally plausible that he returned to his own homeland to aid
in the struggle against the Chinese for his own nationalistic reasons. The
available evidence does not confirm either view.
More important in the IIi hierarchy was the White Russian General
Bolinov. The fact that he was one of two vice-chairmen may reflect the key
role that White Russians had among the fighting force of the E1R. L ike
other members of the ETR government, he, too, had been in prison under
Sheng Shicai. Upon his release, he reportedly went to the USSR in 1940,
remaining until 1944.Chinese sources claim.that it was during this period
that he was trained by the Soviets to play an important role in the I I i rebel-
lion.
44
Similar accusations of Soviet connections are made about Colonel L es-
kin, another I I i-born White Russian. Variously reported to bean engineer
and expert in motor transport, 45L eskin was only involved with military op-
erations, Dot with the civi1 government. L ike Bolinov, he is an example of
thecontribution made by the White Russians to the ErR cause. .
The fourth name, Mevtanov, is the one for which there is the least m-
formation. The fact that so little about him is recorded might indicate that,
Unlikethe other three men, he was not locally born, and that hemay actually
havebeen a Soviet adviser. as suggested by Turki sources.
46
.
The existing evidence is insufficient to substantiate t~e.accusa~oD of
"Soviet agent" against any of these individuals. However, I t I S clear tn ~e
cases of the Xinjiang-born leaders that they were Dot perceived as anything
hut Turki nationalists by their friends and fellow nationa~ists .inthe~.
A side from the difficult question of individual mottvanon th~re I S the
larger issue of whether there were Soviet military units involved In the es-
, .
I,
I
- - - - - - - - - - - -
142 COLUPSE OF tne COALITION, 1947-1949
tablishment of the ETR and in maintaining the independent status of tbe
three districts. The Nationalist Chinese sources and many of the Turki
sources already cited claim repeatedly that Soviet troops fought alongside
the ETR military, and that at various times Soviet troops crossed the border
to assist the ElR against the Chlnese.s?
The two most neutral sources of information for this study disagreeon
this important and sensitive point. During Graham's visit to Y ining in sep-
tember 1946, hesaw no Soviet troops at any time during the courseof his
motor journey from Urumqi to Y ining; nor did he see Soviet troops in
Y ining, the capital of the ETR. His reports were corroborated by the inde-
pendent A merican traveler and author, Barbara Stephens, who visited theIIi
areain 1947and reported no activeSoviet influence in theE1R.48
Incontrast to this, a U.S. representative reponed seeing small numbers
of Soviet personnel in the Hi area during his visit to the region, and being
told by Vining residents that some five hundred Soviet troops bad left the
city before his arrival.49
I n view of this conflict in opinions, it is difficult to resolve the question
on the basis of the information now available. I t must be pointed out, how-
ever, that the question of identification of an individual as either a Soviet
Central A sian or a Xinjiang Turki would be a difficult matter simply from
observation alone, since the two are racially indistinguishable. Moreove~,
the E1R forces wore a Soviet-style uniform, further complicating the I denu-
fication of troops as being from either the USSR or the ETR. If this contu-
sion was intended, it was successful. There is little alternative but to treat all
reported sightings of "Soviet" troops in the ETR with caution. .
While clear identification of Soviet military units in Xinjiang remains
problematical, another question of equal importance can now be answered
with some certainty. This is the matter of whether the border between the
ETR and the USSR was open during this period.
TheStatus of the EmUSSR Border
On the question of the status of the EI R-USSR border during the existence
of the ETR.again the two principal neutral sources disagree, The infcrma-
lion presented here, however, based on British, Turkic, Russian, and
Chinese sources, indicates that close commercial ties between the IIiarea
and the USSR resumed. and that in all likelihood this trade included the
transfer of strategic materials.
There is no question of the strong economic lies that had previously ex-
isted between the three districts and the USSR.The Soviet Union was the
natural trading partner of the region, absorbing vast quantities o~local
animals and animal products and making life in the I li valley, in particular,
profitable and comfortable for those trading with the USSR in the 1930S.
_--------I I I I I I I !
COIL J.PSE OF TIlE COAL lTJON, 1947-1949 143
Further, the USSR offered the fastest and most convenient overland link
t~theoutside world for Xinjiang residents. From 1930 onward, the comple-
tionof the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Turk-Siberian Railway made the
trip10 Beijing via the USSR the easiest and fastest land route to China and,
intheopposite direction, to Europe.SO
By the end of the 1930s, IIi area trade with the USSR had made Vining
dependent on the Soviet Union for various commodities.
51
Unfortunately,
thereare no specific figures for I I i-USSR trade, but according to local resi-
dentsthe USSR was both the major market for the three districts' raw
materials and the major supplier of manufactured goods to Y ining, Chinese
goods often being of poorer quality and prohibitively expensivedue to
transportation costs.
52
Whether cessation of this trade would have constituted extreme econom-
ic hardshi
p
53 is difficult to assess without more data, but certainly having
thismarket interfered with by the Chinese authorities would have displeased
IIi merchants and brought about a severe shortage of manufactured goods
forlocal consumers.
U.S.Consul Ward was convinced that the border between the USSR and
the ETR had been deliberately closed by the Soviet Union in 1943 when
Sheng Shicai had turned away from his Soviet ally.This border closure,
Ward believed, had led to such economic difficulties in the three districts
that open rebellion ensued in 1944.By keeping the border closed, tension in
the province would continue to rise, creating a more favorable climate for
~ture Soviet action in Xinjiang--eitber in the course of Soviet involvement
In the IIi region itself or in the event of future negotiations between the
USSR and the Chinese government over economic concessions in Xinjiang
~r elsewhere.54 N. proof of the continued closed status of the border, A me~-
lean reports stated that the goods famine in IIi was more severe t~an m
Urumqi, and that many commodities were more expensive in lli than mthe
provincial capital.
55
.This information is directly contradicted by British sources a~d local
residents. Graham reported, after his September 1946visit to the IIi valley,
that staples like meat and lard (the latter not used by Moslems, of course)
were half the price charged in Urumqi. Flour, which sold at ~.S2oo a
pound in Urumqi, sold for only Xn $45 a pound inY ining.~As Y mmg had
the province's only 110ur mill, one would expect flour pna:s. to ~much
l?We~there than in Urumqi, and such indeed was the ~ ~nt1Sh mfann.a-
ucn I Scorroborated by former IIiresidents who say that life lD the three dis-
triers between 1946 and 1949 continued to be "nOrmaJ ."51 Russian trade
goods also continued to reach Urumqi during this period to rep~nish m~r-
ch~nts' shelves, indicating that some commercial trade eonrtnued With
Cbma via the three districts.
58
. .
Turkish, Chinese, and even Soviet authors oorrobOrate the coaunuancn
144 COLLAPSE OF me COAliTION, 1947-1949
of commercial trade, and most agree with the British reports that the En
also received its arms from the USSR.59While Soviet sources make no men.
tion of the fact that the USSR was the source of arms for the ElR, British
reports state that the E1R purchased its weapons from the USSR, paying for
them in flour and live antmats.w A rthur SabriogI u, son of Mesut Sabri, con-
fided to an A merican consular official that the IIigovernment received sup-
plies from the Soviets on a barter basis in exchange for cotton, wheat, and
hides, adding that it could get more if necessery.s! By 1948, rumors through-
out the province claimed that the war materials used by the ETR were
bought from the USSR using ordinary commercial agreements that called for
payment in local goods.
62
In the face of agreement among such disparate
sources, it seems certain that the border was open, that trade resumed, and
that the USSR was the ETR's supplier of war materials.
Since the USSR was the supplier, it seems highly possible that Soviet ad-
visers accompanied the military equipment and that, in addition, civilian ad.
visers were also assigned to the ETR government as suggested by some
sources.
TheETR Government's Policies
The earliest statement of the aims of the "Three Districts Revolution" were
first made public in thc'''Kulja Declaration." I ssued at the fourth meeting of
the ElR government on J anuary 5, 1945, it included nine articles. The first
stated explicitly that the goal of the movement was to destroy forever
Chinese despotism in the territory of the East Turkestan Republic_
63
The
list of political goals and a basic political program were outlined in one of
the nationalistic pamphlets distributed in the provincial capital in the su~
mer of 1945, and I ncluded the call not only for an end to Chinese rule In
Turkestan, but also total local control over the military and all cultural af-
fairs.
64
A lthough the call to oust the Chinese from Turkestan supplied the ~i-
tial impetus to the rebellion, by the time the peace negotiations began In
September 1945, the political realities of the situation had asserted them-
selves. I n order to exist, the ElR had to come to terms with both its power
ful neighbors, the Chinese and the USSR It did this through the sign~g .of
the J anuary 1946 Peace A greement and participation in the ~rovmc131
Coalition Government Formally, at least, this ended the secession of the
three districts from the Chinese state.
By 1947, however, it was apparent that the EI R continued its de fa~O~;
I stence, administering the three districts without reference to the prOVI DCl3
f
government in Urumqi. A fter the summer of 1947, it was the SOle.authOr ~
policy for the area under its control. The three districts were, indeed, I I I
General Zhang's words, "going their own road:>65
--------------,.
COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-]949 145
I nthe following sections, six aspects of the program and policies pursued
in the ETR are examined. These are the I slamic nature of the government,
the military, economic affairs, agriculture and industry, social welfare, and
political organizations.
The Islamic Nature of tne ETR Government
Islam provided the basis for unity within the ETR, where over three-fourths
of the population were Moslems. A s many of the pamphlets and circulars al-
readycited indicate, the desire to secure freedomof worship and official
recognition for the status of I slam was one motivation behind the formation
of the ETR, and the establishment of religious freedom was a basic tenet of
the E1R government. During the peace negotiations, the Hi delegates had
~n intent on securing complete religious freedom, whichwasultimately
listed as one of the eleven points in the final peace agreement. Clearly, any
government that sought to establish itself on the basis of popular support in
~njiang would have to include protection of religious freedom and, in par-
ticular, respect for the I slamic religion.
The fundamental importance of I slam in the ETR is seen in both the
leadership and the governmental organization. First, the two leaders of the
E'I R, A li Han TOre and A sim Bey Hoja, were both I slamic scholars, known
throughout the three districts for their scholarship and their dedication to
I slam.Second, the majority of members in the new government were also
Moslems and included several men who carried the title of Hoja (teacher),
Haji (pilgrim), or A bong (religious leader).66
I n terms of government organization, the importance of I slam is seen in
the formation of the Religious Council. On this council were five A hongs
and two Chinese Moslems. A lthough the actual function of this council
r~mains unclear, the respect being shown to I slam through itscreation is ob-
ViOUS
.~unher, the ETR included a special Ministry of Religious A ffairs. The
munster, Salih J an Bey, was one of only four ministers who atso served on
theseventeen-man council.
The importance of I slam can also be seen in the symbols of government:
the flagof the new republic incorporated the Moslem crescent .and star.The
people of the area demonstrated their solidarity with the I slamic-led govern-
ment by wearing badges bearing the same I slamic symbol,67and gold and sil-
ver badges bearing the star and crescent were given as tokens of honor and
friendship among the various allies of the ETR.especially in the first year.
liS
The M"ditary
A s mentioned earlier in this chapter the ETR army was, for most of its exis-
tence, led by the Moslem command~r I zhak Han Mura Haji, who was also
I
- - - - - - - - - - - ..
146 COUAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947~1949
on the ElR Council. A ssisting him were vice-commanders Bolinov and L es-
kin, both of whom were ethnic Russians, probably trained in Russian-style
military methods and organization. I n addition to these men, there werealso
Soviet advisers present with the military, although the extent of their control
after 1945 was probably limited since the USSR's position by September
1945 was to discourage further military action by the ETR.
Military tactics adopted by the leaders of thearmy included guerrilla-
type attacks on Chinese units, the avoidance of largegarrison towns like
Qingho in favor of smaller, easier targets, and the practice of cuttingoff
supply and reinforcement routes. It is not surprising, therefore, to readin
one Chinese source that "Communist" tactics were used during the I li rebel-
lion.
69
These tactics, however, were also traditionally favored by the Kazak
groups who initially formed the bulk of the ETR fighting force, and they
were the tactics best suited to the situation in Xinjiang. They proved to be
extremely effective as well, for Chinese resistance fell away before the E1R
onslaught in 1944-1945.
I n terms of military organization, the ETR army appears to have f~l-
lowed Soviet forms. However, the ETR placed considerable reliance on I ts
Kazak cavalry units: six out of the ten known regiments-were Kazak groups,
and these retained their own forms of internal organization.
Discipline among the ETR forces was apparently good. Soldiers observed
in the three districts were said to be well behaved,7lJ and soldiers of the ETR
in the provincial capital serving as bodyguards to the IIi members of govern-
ment were also of good conduct 71 The contrast in behavior between the
ETR and Chinese troops was yet another source of positive propaganda for
the ETR government.
Soviet influence can most clearly be seen in the ETR uniforms aD~
equipment. The soldiers of at least some units sported a Sovie.t~~I e UDl;
form, with the buttons clearly marked "VfR"-the cyrillic I nitials fo
ETR.
72
Equipment used by the ETR varied It included Chinese weapons
captured from the garrisons overrun by the ETR in 1944--1945 as well as
Russian- and German-made guns bought [rom the USSR by the Turkestan
government, Other SOurces mention the presence of machine gun and mor-
tar companies.
73
For transport, the ETR had horses and R.~ian:ma~e
trucks, as well as the airplanes that had been captured at the Y imng airfieI ,
although there is no evidence that these planes were ever used to fight the
Chinese. .t
Neither the uniforms nor the equipment used by the ETR prove ~et
instigation of the rebellion, but they do demonstrate the extent of ScJ vje
material aid to the EI R during its crucial first year.
Estimates of the ETR's total military forces have varied Up to ~o~
thousand men may have been involved at the height of the fighting Within
the three districts in 1944--1945.
74
A fter the coalition government was
-------------
COL L APSE OF mE COAL ITiON, 1947-1949 147
formed, the ElR continued to maintain some ten to twelve thousand troops
in the three districts,75 facing some ninety thousand Nationalist Chinese
troops in the other seven districts.
The odds would seem to have been much in favor of the Chinese, but in
thecircumstances this was not actually the case.First, the Chinese had to
maintaina large number of troops in the southern part of theprovince,
Which,they feared, could erupt into open revolt, following the IIiexample.A
sizablenumber also were retained in the provincial capital, so that the num-
ber of troops that could have been mustered for an attack on the IIiregion
was strictly limited. Furthermore, the Chinese belief that the Soviet Union
remained behind the ElR led the Chinese to maintain a strictly defensive
stance, using only proxy troops like those of Osman Bator to engage in open
conflict withthe IIiarea.
Second, the IIi forces enjoyed several advantages. They knew the terrain
well and enjoyed the advantage of mobility, as many of its units were fuUy
mounted.The IIi men were also high in morale and committed to a cause
that combined powerful nationalistic and religious feelings. I n contrast, the
Chinesetroops suffered from chronic low morale: they were rarely paid, and
many, having been brought from China proper, were unaccustomed to the
extremes ofthe Xinjiang climate and the local f(X)(1.
Well-disciplined, highly motivated, and generally supported by the local
population, the ETR standing force of ten to twelve thousand men would
havebeen an adequate army after 1946.A dditional units of Soviet troops
appear to have been unnecessary, in the circumstances.
Economic Affairs
Financial affairs were the province of Minister of Finance ~ .MusaBey
~ndMinister for Banking Management Gansip Haji. I n recogmuon of the
lll1portance of finance Minister A nwar Bey was also a member of the coun-
~l, a distinction not shared by the minister for banking. There was no spe-
CI alministry for trade and commerce, so presumably these matters were also
handled.by these two ministries. .
The Di region was a particularly wealthy area. a source of great mlDe~
wealth, particularly gold. From 1945, the government contro~led the A ltaI
gold mines, which would have afforded it a considerable national reserve.
The government printed its own money,76 which was doubtless ~cked by
tbe gold from its own mines, but it also allowed the tree circulatlOD ~f t~
RUSSianruble and the provincial currency. In fact, the amount of provm~
CUrrency in the three districts was considerable. U.S. Consul "':a~~m
Urumqi had been informed by Mr. Lo Zhimai, manager of the XinJ 130g
COmmercial Bank, that just prior to the IIi incident he had sent Xn
$7.000,000"in new notes" to their branch bank inY ining.
71
- - - - - - - - - - - .
148 COLlAPSE OF THE COALrrION, 1947-1949
Table 12
Comparison of Price Increases in Vining and Urumql, 1941-1947
(All prices In Xinjiang dollars)
Year
Flour per 100jin
Sheep per jin
Vining UrumQi
Vining Urumqi
1941
180
20--30
1942
200
20~30
1943
240
80
1944
250
110
1945
2, 400
190
1946
Oct
3,500
20,000
180 800
Nov.
24,000
Doc.
43,000
1947
J an.
3.000
50,000
350
1948
May
40,000
Doc.
12,000,000
Sources: Vining figures are from Chen Li, An AcCQWU ofrhe Yining Incident (faibei, 1977), pp. 11-
I Z.Urumqi figures are from Zhang Dajun, Seventy l?ars, 12:7079, and from PRO Fl5627and PRO
F3236, citing Graham's September 24, 1946, report. Figures for 1948 for Urumqi are taken from
Xinjiang Daily, May 15, 1948, p. 3, and December 13, 1948, p. 3.
*This price was 20,000 per 100 pounds.
Further, the Em also for a time enjoyed a financial subsidy from the
provincial government A fter the signing of the peace agreement, the three
di22striclS were once again counted as an ordinary part of the region; .as
such, they were entitled to district bUdgets provided by the provincial
government.This subsidywas givento thegovernments of the threedistricts
un~l J uly 1947when the Mesut government voted to st~funds to thethree
until theyconformed to provincial lawsand regulations.
With regard to taxation, firsthand sources declare that the ETR leviedD.O
tax on the inhabitants. This, they have explained, was because taxatio~I S
contrary to I slamic law.
79
Ifso, government income derived fromtheprint-
ingof its own money, from the takeover of the local mining industry, and
fromtheprovincial government itself between 1945and 1947. .
A 5previously staled.the ETR suffered little fromtheeffects of mrlauon,
prices in the area remaining stable and muchbelow thoseof the other seven
districts. A ccording to Soviet sources, prices were fiveto twelvetimeslow~r
in Y ining than in Urumqi.
80
This is confirmed (unintentionally).'>Y a Chi-
nese source, which, in seeking to record inflation's course in I ll, demon-
COlL APSE OF me COAL mON, 1947-1949 149
urates that the Soviet statement is basically accurate.
The prices listed in table 12indicate inflation's inDuence, aswould be ex-
pected in an area affected by military disturbances and interruption of usual
trade.But the rate of inflation as revealed in these figures appears small in
comparison with the I nflation then being suffered by Urumqt residents and
elsewhere in the seven districts. This comparison of prices, based on Chen
Li's figures for Y ining and on figures from Chinese and British sources for
Urumqi, supports the Soviet statement on inDation in the three districts.
Banking in the ETR was carried on by local banks, which also handled
theagricultural loans made by the ElR government to farmers throughout
the three districts.
81
Y ining also had a branch of the Soviet State Bank,
"Gossbank," to facilitate trade and financial relations between the ETR and
theUSSR.
82
L ocal residents attest to the normalcy of life during the period in ques-
tion.I mportantly, there was no economic panic, as was the case elsewhere in
Xinjiang in 1948--49. Generally, the economic situation in the three districts
was an excellent source of propaganda for the new government. A popular
view of the IIiposition is given in the following description:
Themost effectivepropaganda for therebelswas, rosever, thepictureof their
economicposition as it was gradually coming to beviewed t, the"maninthe
street" inTihwa [Urumqi]. I n thiscity, for instance, 100carries of flourcost Xn
$5,000 (or Cn $25,000); in I ning [Y iningj so it was saidinTihwa, thesame
amount of much superior I ning flour could be bought for Xn $1,000 (Cn
$5,000). Other types of food 'Wererumored to beequallycheap; tradewas
brisk, work was easy to procure, andpeople who werehungrycoukl a~ ~it
were necessary, liveon the numerous wildberries andfruitsof theoa5J S, which
theycouldalso sen on thelocal markets.Theinsurrectionist "government"was
apopular one, and amodus operandi was asserted to have been set up under
Whichexports to and imports from the neighboringA lma Ata District of the
Kazak SSR were possible.
83
With regard to the development of trade, acrording to a Soviet source,
one of the first acts of the new government in Y ining had been to resume
trade relations with the USSR.
84
Undoubtedly, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, trade was carried on with the USSR during this period, although the
exact extent and nature of it remain unknown. I n Y ining in 1946it was pos.
sibleto buy white Soviet sugar for Xn S700 a kilo; in comparison, Urumqf's
POP~lation paid Xn S1.600 a pound for "dirty ~lI o.w s~~r." Many.oth:r
Soviet goods unavailable in Urumqi were plentilul I n Y lm~g, ~uesung 0
the COntinuation of commercial trade between the three dismcts and the
USSR.85
.. A certain amount of trade also continued with the seven districts o~~
J iang.Small amounts of I lcur arrived in the provincial capital ~m ~lfilDg,
mostly for use by government officials. The fewvisitors to the Di region 00-
150 COlL 4PSE OF THE COAL ITION, 1947-1949
tween 1944and 1949also noted the movement of trucks carryinganimal
skins and some Russian-made luxury goods.A ccording to former Urumqi
residents, Russian textiles continued to reach Urumqi via Viningduringthe
1946-1947period, as did a limited amount of Russian manufactured
gOOds.
86
Agriculture and Industry
The ETR government sought to promote development in both agriculture
andindustry.Contrary to what mayhavebeenexpected insomequartersun-
der agovernment with Soviet advisers, thegovernment didnot carryout any
Sovietization or collectfvization.S? indeed, confiscated property, seized by
the Chinese during Sheng Shicai's rule, was returned to individual ownersby
theETR.88
To aid agricultural development, the government reportedly gavegov-
ernment loans and seed to farmers.
89
I t also encouraged land reclamation
and irrigation projects.Soviet author Mingulov asserts that the areaunder
cultivation rose from251,000 hectares in 1941 to 375,000 hectares in 1948;
and that theJ rain harvest rose from 212,000 tons to 295,000 tons inthe
sameperiod.
Various industrial enterprises COntinuedto operate throughout thepe~_
ad.Vining's tannery, flour mill, and brewery operated normally.TheCl:l"
had electricity and telephone service for at least parts of the day.
Reportedly under the direction of Soviet engineers, the gold mines of.the
northern A ltai also continued to produce.
92
Reports of mining operations
continuing at the important tungsten mines at Fuwen and Wenquan also ex-
ist.93A s there was no local means of refining or processing any of thisraw
ore, it all had to continue to findamarket in the USSR,whichhadbeenthe
consumer of such natural resources prior to the I li rebellion.Coal mining
doubtless continued in the region as well, as it was an easily availablefuel
and necessary asasource of heating in the bitterly coldwinters.
Social Welfare
Government-supported schools operated at all levels upthrough seco?daI 'y,
with classes taught in the various local national languages.
94
A ccording ;~
one source.classes were able to resume normally by ~tember 1,.1945.
The E1R government also encouraged a literacy drive, thus adopting one
of thecharacteristic progressive policies for theperiod. .
For much of 1946-1949, the three districts boasted n~pape~ In f7
languages-- Turkish, Russian, Manchu, Mongolian, and Chmese. WI Dde
thequality of the newsin these maynot havebeen of international staQ(1a~,
the mainY ining paper,A zad Shor/d Turkestan, did receiveTA SS reports.
COlL APSE OF THE COAL fTI0N, 1947-1949 151
Two hospitals served the people of the I li area, and Soviet sources write
that a medical school, dispensaries, and maternity homes were established
under the ElR.I n the area of public health, "the incidence of typhus was ar-
restec,"?? Homes for the old and the homeless were reportedly established,
and aid to families of military personnel was given.
too
A lthough some for-
mer IIi residents expressed opposition to what they considered to be Soviet
interference in the districts, this interference certainly did not cause any
deterioration in their standard of living, and it appears that life in the ETR
was probably a good deal more comfortable than life in the rest of Xinjiang.
Political Organizations
The main Turki political organization in the three districts was the Y asblar
Tashknati, variously translated in English-language sources as the Y oung
Turki Party, the East Turkestan Y outh Party, or the Turki Y outh Party.This
organization was also active throughout the province on behalf of the ETR.
A t the height of its strength, it claimed a membership of some 300,000
~roughout Xinjiang. This was a highly nationalistic organization, definitely
m favor of establishing an independent Turki homeland in Xinjiang. The
rules of organization comprised fifty-four articles which were presented to
the government in Urumqi in an attempt to get the proposed organization
registered. It is noteworthy that this request was never formally dealt with.
Evidently the nationalistic character of the group was too strong for the
provincial officials, who, however, could hardly sayso when the party was al-
readyoperating ina large way in m.
10l
This organization saw the IIi rebellion as much more than a rebellion
against unjust rule; it viewed the accomplishment of the ETR as nothing J ess
~n a revolution, referring to the uprising as the "November Revolution"
tn the party's articles filed in Urumqi. It sought to democratize Turki youth,
to consolidate the gains of the revolution, and to continue to work for the
total withdrawal of Han Chinese from East Turkestan.
102
It represented a
~litical challenge to the Guomindang. which itself had only.been operating
to Xinjiang since 1943..A: > an indigenous Turki movement.lt ..threatened to
undermine the entire base of Guomindang activity within Xinjiang.
I n the Summer of 1948 the Y ashlar Tasbkilati was superseded by a larger
organization, the name of which is evocative of the 1941))' atmoSphere-~e
Union for the Defense of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang. referred to m
this WOrkas the Democratic Union. The mission of this organization was, to
qUOtefrom its own statement, published in Y iniog on A ugust I , 1948: "To
advance freedom and peace among the people, to carry out the Pea~Pact
[peace agreement] concluded on J une 6, 1946, to investigate and pumsh th~
adventurers who violated the Peace Pact, and to coordinate the work of al
those Whowork for the public good and love peace."l03
152 COL L APSE OF rne COAL rrlON, 1947-1949
The original members of this organization, representatives of religious
circles, cultural associations, and youth groups, also put forward twelve
demands which amounted to a basic political program, incorporating the
rights promised to Xinjiang's people in the peace agreement and theGPP.
A lthough this organization was nationalistic, its aimssignaledasubstan-
tial shift inattitude on the part of the leadership of the three districts.While
calling for the implementation of the peace agreement (now aconstant
theme inall Y ining's official statements), it also declared that it wouldfully
assist and sup~n the central government "in all its truly progressive
undertakings." 04The Democratic Union may thus have been a partial
response of the IIi leadership to the quiet overtures beingmadeby theGuo-
mindang in the summer of 1948
105
-aresponse that was cautious recogni-
tion of both the changing fortunes of the Nationalist A rmy in Chinaproper
and the need for the three districts 10come to terms with the Chinese.I ts
broader base also was designed to appeal to awider spectrum of Xinjiang's
MoslemPopulation, and thereby to bring the ETR greater popular support.
This wasalso in harmony with the mediating influence of Soviet advisers
in the ETR government. The Soviets were involved at this timein trade
negotiations with the Chinese concerning mineral rights in Xinjiangaswell
as the continuation of the Sino.Sovi.et A irline A greement, whichwas dueto
be renewed.
106
During these negotiations, it would havebeen in Soviet in-
terests to encourage the development of alessopenly nationalistic organiza-
tion to replace the Y ashlar Tashkilati.Whether with Soviet blessingsor not,
the overwhelmingly nationalistic and religious Y ashlar Tashkilari was sub-
merged in this newer organization based on awider visionof democracyand
on a call for all races-including Chinese-to work together in buildinga
newXinjiang.
I n the sixareas of government activity described above, the ETR appar-
ently enjoyed considerable success. lI S I slamic character appears in the
choice of leadership. in the structure of government, and in thesymbols of
government, whichwereall clearly inthe Moslemtradition.
I n I ts military organization, the ETR army was successful on several
counts.It hadsecured I ts main, immediate Object of forcing the Chineseout
or the three districts and preventing a Chinese counteroffensive. I I success-
fullyrallied support fromamong the local population as it swept towa~~e
provincial capital. Further, during the years of coalition rule and untJ lI !S
dissolution in 1950, there were no complaints recorded against the ETR mil-
itary for poor discipline or conduct-completely in contrast with the
Chinese forces.Despite Soviet influence, the credit for their militarysuccess
accrues to therebels themselves.
Financially, the region contained enough natural wealth to term tbe
basis of an independent economy and (0pay for all needed imports.In~m'
partson with the other seven districts, the ETR successfully controlled jnOa-
COUAPSE OF mE COAL TTION,1'Hl-1949 153
tion, keeping it to a level that made it among tbe I owest in China at the
time.
I n trade, the ETR achieved a major goal of local Turks in reopening
commercial relations with the USSR.thereby ending any hardship caused by
cessation of trade. In agriculture and I ndustry, there was some development,
although the exact extent remains unclear. I n the area of social welfare, es-
peciallyin education, there was some advance.
I n terms of political organizations and activity, a slight mellowing of the
ETR'spolitical sland-probably a result of Soviet influeooc-<:an beseen in
tbe formation of the Democratic Union in Y ining in 1948. 11should be
n~ted, however, that although this union professed itself willing to 'NOrk
Withthe Chinese central govemment, it also reiterated the TR'S detenni-
n~tion to carry out the peace agreement and to punish those who bid
violated it. Since Zhang Zhizhong had already reaffirmed the Chincsc
~mment position that the Iligovernment was at fault for not implement-
mgthe peace agreement, the stalemate on this issue oontinued.
. I ntbese six areas, the ETR could rightly L akepride in achievemenlS that
unproved the lives of its citizens and gained the new government a positive
reputation among much of the Moslem population of Xinjiang.Between the
autumn of 1945, when fighting between ETR forces and the Otinese ceased,
an~the spring of 1950, when the area was joined to the people's Republic of
Chma, the far northwestern districts of Xinjiang maintained an independent
government that, by most accounts, offered its Moslem inhabitants a
benevolent rule. free of the corruption, inDation. and political unrest that
Characterized life in tbe remainder of Xinjiang province.
There is no doubt about tbe presence of Soviet advisers in the ETR.
However, while such advisers evidently counseled the government and tbe
military on many aspects of policy and organization, policy i~p~mentalio.n
does not indicate exaggerated Soviet influence in tbe three dJ S~What 1$
clearly indicated is lhal wilh respect to enemat policy, Soviet ~~ were
most likely a conservative force.advising restraint in ETR dealingsWltbtbe
Chinese. Manifestly, it was in the Soviet interest to oontinut to act as a~n.
~rvative force as it had done in September 1945 when it ~nse1ed ~lOt~.
UOnrather than armed conflict with the QlineSe. L ater, 11wa$ a150 10thtir
int~rest to encourage thedevelopment of the less n.a~~~tic~mocratic
Union and to urge the leaders of the ETR to use pohucal ed~uon to Q.
pand the influence of the ETR while awaiting botb furtber aune::I C coPCCS-
sicns and greater popular support for the ETR obje~ives in the more
POpulous southern ballof the province. With the baCking of the ~rful
~I Union, the leadership of the ETR found iuelfal ~aa:a
ntage
lD cka1.
I1lgs with the Chinese so that despite their '"riding tht uger, tbey were able
. ." _ I in tbe wee
to bOng to an end the influence of me NatioI UJ 1i:S1 govemrne
n
districts.This was indeed tbe goal
Ii

f
154 COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
The written statements of the leaders of the ETR evince a sincere desire
for democratic local control over provincial affairs and for both government
reformand modernization. Under the leadership of A li Han and~imBeg
Hoja, the ElR was a symbol of the Turkic dream of an independent I slamic
state that might one day cover the whole of Xinjiang and unite its Turkic
people under one democratic government. Whether or not the leadersand
the ETR itself came under the domination of Soviet advisers in the later
period of its existence, the Emnonetheless represented the political aspira-
tions of an increasing number of Turkic people in Xinjiang.As suchasym-
bol, its existence fueled the growth of Turki nationalism elsewhere in the
province and undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties the Chinese experi-
enced in maintaining control in the other seven districts. As will be seen in
the following pages, many of these difficulties stemmed from acontinuation
of past Chinese policy and political abuses which, coupled with a deteriorat-
ing economic situation, led to continued unrest and disturbances between
1947and 1949.
Dr. Mesut Baykozu Sabriogfu 107was sworn in as the first native-bor~
chairman of Xinjiang province on May 28, 1947. From the first days of his
chairmanship, the administration was marked by bitter opposition to hisap-
pointment, led by the IIifaction and its supporters both in Urumqi itself a.n~
in other districts throughout the province. This opposition was met by mili-
tary force. For example, the J uly 1947riots in the Turfan area were put
down with considerable bloodshed. This crackdown, carried out by the
predominantly Han Chinese military and police, served to provoke further
opposition and exacerbated existing tensions so that use of the military be-
came the only means to maintain law and order during the months of
Mesut's administration.
Mesut's appointment was intended to reconcile national minorities to
central government control in Xinjiang, but the effect was virtually the ~p-
posite. law and order deteriorated; corruption flourished as never before; in-
flation soared; and splits developed among the national minority members
of the new government in the face of Mesut's inability to solve any of the
region's major problems or to forestall ever greater Han domination in t~e
government in Urumqi and, through the still fully deployed Nauonahst
A rmy, throughout the province. f
Mesut had a reputation in the nation's capital as a "leading advocate 0
Turki autonomy:'108 I n the course of his administration, his.cultural
policies indicated this. However, the government he led was dommated by
Han Chinese, many of whom had long served in Xinjiang and who therefore
had established themselves in positions of considerable power. Added to
--------------SJI
COllAPSE OF mE COAL rrJON, 1947-1949 155
this existing hierarchy of Han Chinese, new Chinese appointees were sent
out by the central government to bolster the overall Han role in Xinjiang's
government and to tie the region's government organization more closely to
that of Chinaproper.
Itis clear that Mesut became a figurehead for his predominantly Han ad-
ministration. General Song Xilian (who remained as the commander of the
Chinese Nationalist troops in Xinjiang), L iu Mengchun, and the Guomtn-
dang party head, Chen Xlhao, increased their influence and power within
the highest echelons of government, their names dominating in newspaper
accounts of provincial news and of meetings of the Provincial Government
Council. The central government also increased itsown direct influence un-
der the Mesut administration through itsown appointees, who regularly at-
tended the meetings of the Provincial Government Council. I nevitably this
Han domination led to the new government attempting to fit Xinjiang into
the mold of an ordinary Chinese province, closely bound to the central
government.
With the increase of Han domination in the provincial government, the
military's power and prestige grew.Policies favored by the military-c-includ-
ingthe ruthless and immediate suppression of any opposition to the govern-
ment in the seven districts-were pursued more openly.
Under Mesut, the GPP and the peace agreement were dead letters. With-
out an adequate financial base, few programs called for in the GPP could be
implemented. The IIi faction continued to regard the peace agreement as
the proper basis for peace; but neither the ETR government nor any other
faction thought there was much hope for its full implementation. By the
summer of 1947an atmosphere of acute mistrust precluded either side's
moving any closer to fulfilling their part of the agreement.
This section examines the new Han-dominated provincial government
under the titular leadership of the ailing Mesut, and the policies pursued by
his government. It also notes the major problems of his administra-
tion-maintenance of law and order, deterioration of the local economy, an
increasing inflation rate, corruption, and, in the last months, scandals that
rocked the government and led in part to Mesut's replacement by Burhan
Shahidi in J anuary 1949.
TheNew Mesul Government
During Mesufs administration, there were several important changes made
in the provincial government, both in personnel and in overall governmen-
tal organization. These changes are particularly interesting because they
demonstrate the realization by the central government of the need for at
least token national minority participation in local ~rnmen~ At the~e
time, these changes also show the general consensus I D NanJ lDg that Xin-
156 COUJU>SEOF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
jiang must be more closely bound te the central government through what-
ever means available. These means included, first, concentrating key provin-
cial government posts in experienced and trusted Chinese hands and,
second, continuing to station large numbers of Nationalist Chinese troops
in the region.
L ocal Moslems who had served in high posts in Zhang's government
were retained under Mesut. These included the I I I members of government
who, despite their refusal to serve under the new chairman and their return
to I I I in the summer of 1947, technically remained in their posts.(See table
13, which includes the absent IIimembers of government.)
The five new national minority members of government demonstrate un-
spoken central government criteria for such office holders. First, the new
appointees were locally born, educated individuals who were devout Mos-
lems if not Moslem religious leaders; second, they were known to the local
Moslem community and were, at least formerly, of high standing. I n
response to demands from people in southern Xinjiang for representation
for the South in the highest levels of provincial government, at least one
individual was chosen on the basis of geography. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the new appointees all had long-standing associations with the
Guomindang and the Chinese authorities.
Finding individuals to satisfy all or most of these criteria reduced the
field of candidates considerably. The central government ultimately had
little choice but to select men who were known as Turki nationalists but
who nonetheless satisfied most Chinese requirements. The first such ap-
pointee was a new vice-chairman, named at the end of J uly 1947.He was
A bdul Kenm Han Maksum, a Uighur (rom Kashgar, a city which had not
been represented at the provincial level of government previously. A ~ul
was a businessman and former Chinese-appointed district officer, so, like
Mesut, he had appropriate experience working with Chinese officialdom.
Second, I sa Y usuf A lptekin, Mesut's colleague from Chongqing days,
was appointed the new secretary general, replacing the powerful L iu Meng-
chun. The third Turki nationalist with a long-standing connection wit.h ~e
central government, Mehmet Emin Bugra, was appointed to the provincial
government as minister of reconstruction. The other key ministerial ~ts,of
administration, finance, health, and education already in national mlDon~
hands were unchanged and continued to be under the direction of J elaleddin
Wang Cengshan, J animhan, Delilhan, and Seyfettin respectively.l09
I n early A ugust 1947, an eighty-year-old Moslem religious leader, ~
L iangjun, a Hui from Urumqi, was appointed to the post of rontro~lDg
inspector, the highest provincial post in the Control Y uan.
110
This appomt+
menr appears to have been made as a gesture of good will toward l~ M~-
lems. Ma did not attend government meetings and was rarely menuoned m
the press after the initial announcement ofhis appointment.
COLLAPSE OF tns COAlJfION, 1947-1949 157
Table 13
Mesut Sabri's Administration
Chairman-Mesut Sabri, Uighur
Vice-cI1airman (Sr.)-Ahmet J an Kasimi, Uighur
'Vice-chairman (J r.)-Abdul Kerim Han Maksum, Uighur
"Secretary eenera-asa Yusuf Alptekin, Uighur
Vice-Abdul Kerim Abbas, Uighur
Vice-Salis, Kazak
Minister of Administration-J elaleddin Wang Cengshan, Hui
Vice-Rahim J an Sabri, Uighur
Minister of Finance-J animhan Tilevbayoglu, Kazak
'Vice-Bai Wenyu
Minister of Education-Seyfettin Azizi. Uighur
"Viee-----ChenFangbo, Han Chinese
'Minister of Reconstrudion-Mehmet Emin Bugra, Uighur
Vice-Gu J ianji, Han Chinese
"Minister of Social Affairs-Liu Xiaoli, Han Chinese
Vice-Ardeni, Mongol
Minister of Health-Delilhan Sugurbayoglu, Kazak
VK: e-Ma Shuqi, Hui
Ministers withoul Portfolio
LiuYongyang, Han Chinese
Guan Zeliang, Han Chinese
Abdui Kerim Aesit, Uighur
Zhong Tihua, Han Chinese
Osman Batur, Kazak
Ali Han Tore, Uighur
Izhak Han Mura, Kirghiz
"Minister of Information-Uu Mengchun, Han Chinese
"Comptroller-Gui Xixi, Han Chinese
"Special central Government Replesentatives to Xinjiang
UuZeying, Han Chinese, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
J ia Shanju, Han Chinese, representing the Control Yuan
Head 01 Xinjiang Province Guomindang-Chen xnao.Han Chinese
Commander, Xinjiang Garrison Command Headquarters-Song Xllian
Vice-commander -Tang Bigang
Commander, SouthXinjiang Garrison-Zhao Xihuang
"Inspector-General, Xinjang Province-Ma Uangjun
Mayor of Urumqi-Chu"Wu
Chief of Police, Urumqi-Uu Handong
A new government appointee andIOI" a new post in !be provinciaI 8O"emI J :lelI l:.
158 COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
The newnational minority appointees were an important pan of govern-
ment policy designed to show Chinese awareness of Moslemdemandsfor
greater local participation in government. However, while minorities were
placed in highly visible government posts, at the same time the provincial
government was made broader based and more comprehensive initsorgani-
zation by the addition of new government posts, nearly all of whichwere
firmlyin Chinese hands.
The only Han Chinese appointed to an existing ministerial post was L iu
Xiaoli, who became the newminister of social affairs, replacing theManchu,
Zhao Qienfeng.I nthe position of vice-minister there were two changes:the
newvice-minister of finance was Bai Wenyu, Han Chinese, replacingaHui,
and ineducation the newvice-minister was Chen Fanbo, aHan Chinesewho
was replacing another. One new Chinese minister without portfolio was
added to the existing list, Mr.L iu Y ongyang, who took an activepart in the
newgovernment's day-to-day business.
Of greater consequence were the new government organizations added
in the early months of Mesur's administration. A newGovernment I nforma-
tion Office (Xuanchuan Weiyuan Hui) was established in September 1947,
with former Secretary General L iu Mengchun aschairman.This brought ~e
influencial L iu back onto the Provincial Council, where hewas to remam
until 1949.The provincial government also added the office of thecomp-
troller, the head of which was new Han Chinese appointee Guo Xixi.~d
during the winter the government created a third newentity, the newXin-
jiang Construction Commission.
The first of these, the Government I nformation Office, was set upinpart
to investigate rumors and public accusations. Brief reports emanating tram
this body occasionally appeared in the press, mainly in connection withthe
riots that occurred during the summer of 1947and other incidents of
antigovernment activity. Members of this committee were drawn tram
among government employees, many of whom, like the chairman, L in, had
servedin the previous administration.HI
The second new post, that of comptroller, was necessitated by two fac-
tors. First, J animhan, the Kazak who had replaced the coalition gove~-
ment's first finance minister (L u Y uwen) in A ugust 1946, was illitera~e.1D
Chinese, a handicap that understandably led to problems within that muns-
try.112Rather than remove this popular Kazak leader, anewChinesecomp-
troller was appointed-a prerequisite for improved financial policy.~nd,
in 1947the economic situation was already experiencing diffi~l~ as.a
result of the division of the province and the economic detenoranon ~
China proper. It was no doubt felt that an individual more experienced I P
financial affairs was required if any control over the local economywas to be
exerted.The newcomptroller, like the new head of the I nformation Office,
L iu Mengchun, regularly attended meetings of the provincial government.
COlL APSE OF rne COAL ITION, 1947-1949 159
Thethird neworganization was the XinjiangConstruction Commission,
whosemembers were drawn fromthose people holding other government
postsor previous government employees.A t theDecember 1, 1947,meeting
of this group, some 160people gathered to hear the chairman, Mesut, and
thegarrison commander, Song, speak on the needfor unityamongall Xin-
jiang's nationalities in order to ensure the rapiddevelopment of thewhole
province.U'' The chairman of this new group was Chen Fangbo, who also
servedasSeyfettin's vice-minister of education.Reports on the functionsof
thisgroup tend to beprimarily rhetorical, repeating the call for unity and
other political slogans.No concrete plan of action wasannounced, other
than to petition the central government for increased economic aid to the
Northwest
A nother group that had previously existed but was reorganized under
Mesut's administration was the Commodity Prices Control Commission
(referred to hereafter as the PriceCommission).Byearly 1948, inresponse
to the deteriorating economic situation, this body beganto meet regularly.
Theprincipal members were Secretary General I saand nine Han Chinese
drawnfromthe police and the govemmenr.U" The chairman of this group
also was the still-powerful L iu Mengchun; under his direction the Price
Commissionattempted to exert somecontrol over what increasinglybecame
achaotic economic situation.I tswork reports are referred to indetail inthe
fOllowingpages.
A U of thesenewbodies weredominated by HanChinese.No pretenseof
proportionate representation of minorities-or even of token Turki pres-
ence-was made in any of these ministries or commissions; all of them
remainedHan-dominated groups throughout theMesut administration.
By broadening the structure of the provincial government, the central
authorities gavewider scope for Han participation in government posts at
the top of the scale in Xinjiang.The presence of more traditionalist ad-
ministrators in the provincial government generally and on the Provincial
Council inparticular servedto increaseHanauthority inthegovernment.
I n addition to the important changes mentioned above, the central
government decided to send its own representatives to participate in the
day-to-day governing of the region.Two special appointees weresent to
Xinjiang in the summer of 1947.L iu Zeying (whO had served in Xinjiang
previously) represented the Ministry of Foreign A ffairs; J ia Shanchen, also
Han Chinese, represented the Control Y uan.Both men had the title of
"special commissioner," and both attended virtually everymeeting of the
Mesut government, their names receiving special mention in the regular
newspaper accounts of the provincial government sessions.
Further, the Guomindang itself was nowdirectlyrepresented at ~rn-
ment sessionsby the local provincial beadof theGuomindang, ~en ~hao.
Themilitary also sent adirect representative to attend thesemeeungsmthe
160 COLlAPSE OF ms COALITION, 1947-1949
person of Vice-Commander of the Garrison Command Tang Bigang.Final-
ly, the mayor of Urumqi, Chu Wu, a central government appointee, was also
in regular attendance
The expansion of membership by those mentioned above, plus the new
ministers, vice-ministers, and "special commissioners" of the central govern-
ment, meant that Han Chinese dominated the provincial government. Fur-
ther, the IIi faction did not return, and its continued absence left only tbe
China-leaning Turki nationalists to oppose the more traditional and milita-
ristic moves of the new provincial government. This Han domination J ed to
disaffection even in some of Mesut's staunchest supporters, who ultimately
deserted him because of his inability to bring democratic and representative
government to the region.
Elections for District Inspectors-General
A nother facet of central government policy at this time was to continue the
pretense of democratically elected government. A utumn 1947saw another
flurry of election activity in the province. This time, the post of district
inspector.general was to befilled by election rather than appointment.
I n charge of these elections was the minister of administration, Wang
Cengshan, who traveled throughout the seven districts during Septem-
ber-Qctober 1947supervising election activities. Only partial results of
these elections were published. A ccording to Wang's subsequent reports,
there were difficulties in the election process in some areas due (0com~u-
nication and transponation problems, so possibly some of these elections
were never completed. The available results are given in table 14.
The net result of the elections that were completed was to put pro-
Guomindang men and women into these posts. Hatfje and Y olbars were
both considered totally within the Guomindang pocket; in the one instane:e
where a Moslem Hoja was elected, his two assistants were both Han ~-
nese. InY enki, the victory of a Han Chinese was surprising, as this was avtr-
tualI y 100 percent Moslem city; the election of two Uighurs as his assistants
was less so.
There is a clear pattern in the available election results of apparent con-
cern for achieving an ethnically balanced slate of officials. I n almost every
instance either a Han Chinese was combined with two Moslem assistants or
vice versa.This may indicate Chinese concern over local susceptibilities, bU~
it gives a certain artificiality to the election results that tends to support 0,
charges of untoward Chinese interference in local elections. A t best, the
most that can be said for the elections is that they were held and therefore
show some awareness on the part of the government for the need fO~a
democratic_type structure in local government However, the results potnt
out clearly that Han dominance was the goal of the central government.
COIL -tPSE OF THE COMmON, 1947-1949 161
Table 14
Partial Election Results: District Inspectors-General, t947
District Person
Yenki Zuo Shuping, Han"
Nadir J an, Uighur
Hatil Rasid, Uighur
Sayit Mehmel Hoja, Uighur
(Ul'ldear), Han
(Unclear), Han
Yolbars Khan, Uighur
Chen Shoupiog (Undear),? Han
Ali Beg, Uighur
Hatije Kadvan Hanim,
[Hatewan] Kazak'
Dun {unclear), Han
L ee(ul'ldear), Han
Election comrretees were only organized in OCtober.
No election results announced.
Inspector-General
Assistants
lnspectcr-Generel
Assistants
Hami
Inspeclor-General
Assistants
Urumqi
Inspector-General
Assistants
Sources: I nformatiOll on theY enki and Aksu elections is frornXilljiong DtUIy. October 5, 1'1; Hami
and, Ururnqi elections from Xinjiang DtUly, December 3, 1947, p. I ; Kashgar noI ice from XilljiaJIg
D<lIly, December 17. 1947, p.3.
"Chinese-appointed incumbent.
Kmjiang's New Delegates to the National Assembly
The force of Turki nationalism had grown in Xinjiang by 1948, the year of
the second National A ssembly in China. Despite government attempts to
ensure that pro-China and pro-Guomindang individuals were given govern-
ment posts, pro-autonomy Turki nationalists sprang up in the most un-
expected places. The most important instance of this phenomenon was
among the delegates chosen to attend the 1948 A ssembly. The fifty-five
delegates included thirty-six Uighurs and only nine Han Chinese, with tbe
remainder drawn from among the region's other smaller national minori-
ties; alternates included twenty-nine Uighurs and sixteen Han (table 15).Of
the one hundred chosen, fifty-three were serving government officials, and
nineteen were former government employees. Of the others, some repre-
sented the Guomindang while others were school and education officials,
representative'> of various cultural associations, and journalists.
In addition to these official delegate'>, there were also representatives
from various professions. A mong these were representatives of the Kazak
allies of the Nationalist Chinese, including Osman Bater's son Seniman as
well as the pro-Chinese Kazak leaders Hamza Ucar ComusbayogI u, Kosse-
gan KaripogI u, and Delilban J an A ltay.t15
-----------_1
162 COlLAPSE OF THE COALrrlON, 1947~1949
Table 15
XinJ iang's 1948 Delegates to the National Assembly
(percentages do not equal 100due to rounding)
Nationality
Number
%
Alternates
%
Uighur
36
65
29 52
""
9
16
16 29
Kazak
1
1
1 1
Hui
4
7
5 9
Tajik
1
1
1 1
Kirghiz
2
3
2 3
Mongol
1
1
1 1
"m e '
1
1
0 0
To",
55
95
55 96
Souru: Xinjiang Doily, A pril 12-23, 1948, p.
3.
Despite what was probably careful vetting of these representatives, the
views expressed by Some of the delegates at the National A ssembly were
critical of Chinese action in Xinjiang. The predominant view among the~
was that Xinjiang people did not want separation from China, but they did
want a return to the liberalization begun under General Zhang Zhizhong.
A ccording to one delegate, Xinjiang had progressed more in two y~rs
under Zhang than in the past ten.
116
I ndeed, the chief delegate, I brahim
Mittin, declared in an interview that Zhang's policy of patience and under-
standing was the main reason for Xinjiang's loyalty to China.
1l7
A lthough
this delegation was less outspoken than the 1946delegation led by A hmel
J an Kasimi, they nonetheless echoed demands for democratic liberalization
made by the previous representatives.
TheIncreased Military Role
Inaddition to strengthening Han Chinese dominance through the exp~ion
of the provincial government, Mesut's administration also saw a distinct
strengthening of the Han-dominated police and military. A lthough Zhang
Zhizhong contended in his letters to Ui that the Chinese milital}' presen~
in Xinjiang had been reduced since Sheng's time, the number of Nauonafist
trooras remained at around ninety thousand in the province during this.pen-
od.! 8 The military abuses referred to previously expanded and continued
under Mesut, and by 1948 the revitalized arrogance of the Chinese in thel!
dealings with the local population caused some observers to despair?f the
future prospects of the region ifit remained under Chinese control. Shipton,
COlLAPSE OF THE COAliTION, 1947-1949 163
British consul in Kashgar in 1948, reported that elected officials were not
given opportunity to exercise power, which continued to emanate from local
Chinese military garrisons to the exclusion of local officials. He lamented
that the Chinese were "failing tragically to make use of a rare opportunity to
establish peace and contentment."lt9 The role of local military commanders
had become dominant in most garrison towns, and, with more hard-line men
in positions of power in Urumqi, the military was able to increase even fur-
ther its influence under Mesut.
The military was given opportunity to display its newly extended military
power in J uly 1947when the army was called upon to quell anti-Mesut riots
in Turfan and neighboring counties. The severity of the military action in
this instance caused a reaction even among the Turki nationalists in the
Mesut government.P'' Secretary General I sa Y usuf A lptekin became an
outspoken critic of the Mesut administration as a result, and the assertions
of the IIi faction that Mesut would be dominated by the Chinese appeared
already to have come true.
Under Mesut there was a clear reversion to the traditional Chinese
means of maintaining order-the use of military force.This was done at the
cost of further disaffecting local Moslems as well as members of Mesut's
own government. I ronically, it was under the first native-led administration
that the military again emerged as the predominant power in Xinjiang.
Major Problems o/the Mesut Administration
One of the immediate problems for the new chairman and his government
was the reestablishment of law and order, which bad seriously deteriorated
from the first announcement of Mesut's appointment in May 1947. To
counter increasing unrest, the Urumqi police chief, L iu, proclaimed on J une
10 that under special powers given him by the central government in their
recent proclamation on "Temporary Measures to Safeguard Public Order,"
he was empowered to arrest anyone creating rumors or plotting distur-
bances. L iu particularly condemned the pamphlets that were being cir~-
tatoo in Urumqi denouncing members of the provincial government. ThI S
infI amatory type of writing was not to be tolerated, and the persons involved
I
ced . I th I ,,121
a arrest and punishment "wi out orgrven~. . . .
The above proclamation was not only an instance of racreasmg police
powers. The new orders were also an example of the province'S being re-
quired to conform to national standards. Despite the difficult and unusual
situation faced by the Chinese in the region, the central government was
determined to treat Xinjiang as an ordinary Chinese province.
I n view of the increasing tension in the provincial capit~l, anoth~r
proclamation was issued inUrumqi on J uly 20 to preserve peace ~~heca.pl-
tal The police announced new, harsher penalitles for anyone disrurtnng
164 COlLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
the peace:' This now included anyone participating inariot, or anyonewho
had knowledge of a riot and did not act to stop it.Newregulations gave
citizens the right of arrest and the obligation to inform the government of
any suspicious activity. They also outlawed distribution of reactionary
propaganda, thespreading of rumors, and the useof terrorist methods.l22In
Kashgar the local government went so far as to declare that capital punish-
ment awaited anyone revolting against thegovemmem.W
Proclamations were of no use, however; despite the breadth of thenew
powers, in several counties near Urumqi serious rioting beganin J uly.I n
Toksun on J uly 10rioters attacked a police station. This wasfoHowedin
Turfan with an attack on the Chinese military garrison on J uly 13.Thedis-
turbances soon spread through nearby towns in Toksun and Y enki counties.
I n its report on these riots, the Xinjiang Garrison Command emphasizeda
connection between the "rioters" and the ElR, sayingthat the participants
carried East Turkestan flags.It named Thrfan County Magistrate A bdul
Rahman and Uighur A ssociation leader Naman Han as leaders of theriots,
whichwerenot quelled until the end of J uly.l24
A fter Chairman Mesut made apersonal visit to the riot-torn areassome
months later, hereported that flfty-one local people had died, eighty-seven
"rioters" had been killed, and thirty-six had been arrested.There hadbeen
considerable damage to local homes and crops, and many animals, mainly
horses, had been killed.A n unknown number of people had fled thearea,
including the leaders of the three counties in question; their flight ap~ed
to confirm, to Mesut and others, their guilt inplanning thedisturbances.l~
This immediate and vengeful military crackdown in J uly 1947was dif-
ficult for the Turki nationalists in the new government. Mesut, areform-
minded individual who was much concerned with aiding his nativeland,
could not curtail Chinese military action in J uly or inlater incidents.An .in-
dlcation of the pressure this placed on himand the other Turki nationalists
in his government appeared inan interview between U.S.and Britishrepre-
sentatives in Urumqt and I sa, Mesut's secretary general and old frien~; In
mid-November 1947, I sa arranged to meet withboth men to discussthe o~
pression of Xinjiang natives:' A ccording to J sa, the main instances of this
oppression were the imprisoning of innocent Turks and the useof forceand
intimidation so that only pro-Chinese wereelected to government p?sts.He
also expressed anger that no effort had been made to end I ntermarriage be-
tween Han men and Moslem women and he added that the name "Xin-
jiang" was abhorrent to the local people as a symbol of Han domination;
and that the name "Turkestan" was the only acceptable title for the Turks
homeland.t26
I sa also made two proposals to the British and U.S.consuls that refl~
the extent of his disenchantment with the Chinese at this point, He aske
I irsr that the USSR be prevented from taking over Xinjiang, afear perhaps
COIL4PSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949 165
mademore real by recent Nationalist Chinese losseson the battlefields in
Chinaproper.Second, herequested that the consulsask their governments
to persuade the Chinese to givethe nativepeople"real self-government and
facilitiesfor development and to stopoppressingthem."
lsa also declared that the majority of Xinjiang people "wouldbewilling
to sacrificetheir lifeand possessions for a fair measureof self-government
andfreedom." He clearlybelieved that thegovernment under Mesut didnot
represent anyimprovement for the lot of thelocal population; ifanything.it
was astep backward, awayfromthe self_government promised by the Chi-
neseinthe newconstitution. Rather than leadingthe regiontowarddemoc-
racy and majority Moslem rule, the province was more than ever being
dominated by the Han Chinese, and reform was nowat atotal standstill.
I sa'sappeal to foreign governments to aidincurtailing Chineseabsusesand
persuading them to allow true self-government iscertainly a measureof
both I sa's concern for his native land and his disillusion, at this early date,
withthenewadministration.
I ntermarriage was a perennial problem in Xinjiang.I nsouthern Xin-
jiang, someattempt wasmadeto deal withthechronic difficultyit caused.I n
september 1947, Kashgar Military Headquarters announced that soldiers
who were not Moslemwere not to marry Moslemwomen.tV I na further
conciliatory move.,local commander General Zhao Xihuangattended cere-
monies to celebrate the birth of Mohammed and madeaspeech urginghis
mento respect all people.He also admonished his mento respect andobey
their superiors, whether theywereHanor Turti 128
The question of intermarriage remained explosive, however.A s Shipton
pointed out, with ninety thousand soldiers and almost no Chinesewomen
available, it was expecting rather much that these men remain celibatefor
periods that reached, in some cases, more than ten years.
l29
Nonetheless,
fewcasesof violence were actually reported in the press.I nOCtoberor No-
vember 1948,aHan Chinese was murdered inUrumqi for marryingaMos-
lemgirl.130As such cases generated discussioninthepress, it wouldappear
that actual murder as a solution to end such marriages was rare in the
provincial capital at least, since this one incident was the onlyone given
suchpublicityinthe Urumqi papers.
Cullural Policies
Whilelawand order policywas basicallyamatter for theChinesepoliceand
military units, policy with regard to cultural development wasentrUSt~as
far aspossibleto supporters of Mesut, I sa, andMehmet'sbrandofTurki na-
tionalism.A ccording to I sa's memoirs, oneof the first movesof thenewad-
ministration was to remove all RussianS and all leftists fromgovemment
posts, replacing themwith democratically oriented Moslemswherever pas-
166 COllAPSE OF THE COALrrION, 1947-1949
sible. For example, I sa notes that the Uighur version of the Xinjiang D<Jily
had been in "reactionary hands" but was now returned to the hands of the
former editor, Polat Turfani Bey.Pclat was advised to use the term. "I urke.
stan" to refer to Xinjiang, so that for the first time in history, according to
I sa, the proper name of the region was publicly used.131
I n schools, lessons in Turki history were introduced. In publications,
people were encouraged to print new magazines and papers and to write
about Turki history, culture, and language to educate the local people in
their own cultural tradition. Further, Mesut encouraged I he establishment
of libraries. Teachers from all schools were invited to Urumqi so that Mesut
and other Turki nationalists could lecture them on Turki history and the
need for unity among the Turks. They emphasized the commonality of all
Xinjiang Moslem Turks, playing down the divisions caused by variance in
life-style.
132
A ccording 10 I sa's record, these activities incurred Chinese
wrath. He writes in particular of the impact of this cultural activity on Gen-
eral Song Xilian, Who, with J sa, attended a conference in Urumqi in the
winter of 1947.A t this conference, I sa heard Song say: "A t first, wedid not
notice. Now, it is understood that this nationalism is more dangerous than
the leftist group (the Russian). For instance, the leftists do not belong to a
religion or a nation. All they want is to take power. But the nationalists are
taking over on all fronts (i.e., literature, language, history) from the very
roots; they are trying to poison the people.,,133 In the circumstances that
pertained in Xinjiang in 1947-1948, Mesut could only work in cultural
spheres and, in a limited way, in political organization; but even these ef-
forts led 10negative reaction on the part of Chinese leaders.
Political Souggle
The deadlock between I he IIi faction and the Chinese continued under
Mesut, but political struggle intensified in Xinjiang between the Guomin-
dang and the Turk! nationalist organizations. Given the strength of the
Chinese military, and (he clear evidence of its willingness and ability qui~Y
to crush any armed resistance to the new provincial government, ann-
Chinese sentiment found its major outlet in Turki political organizations.
A s noted in an editorial in the Xinjiang Daily, the Guomindang had only
been organized in Xinjiang since 1942. and the "Three Principles of t~
.....n;.."'rl iD
People Y outh Corps," under the leadership of I sa, was only or~ .
1946.Neither organization had long experience or extensive membership in
the region, but in 1947the Guomindang attempted to increase ~tsinfluence
and that of its youth branch. Guomindang Provincial Party Chamnan Chen
Xfhao became more visible; his name became more prominent in the.I ~
Chinese press, and he regularly attended aU meetings of the prO~lDCI a
government in 1947-48, a change from Zhang Zhizhong's administranon.
COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949 167
A t a well-publicized meeting in Urumqt during September 1947, the
Guomindang and its youth branch called on the young of Xinjiang to sup-
port and aid society, to unite all national minorities, to aid in construction
of anew society, and to support national defense. As the Xinjiang Daily ob-
served, however, few people really understood the meaning of the "Three
Principles of the People"-they knew only of the slogans, not the work, of
theGuomindang.U"
Despite Guomtndang efforts, its membership and that of its youth
branch were never large in Xinjiang; although local people did join other
quasi-governmental organizations (such as the cultural groups that original-
ly formed under Sheng Shicai and emerged as a base for Turki nationalism
inthe 1940s), interest in the Guomindang remained low.The reasons for
this were partly local distrust of what was basically a Han Chinese organiza-
tion, despite the presence of I sa and other representatives of national
minorities.But also the Guomindang had a major competitor in the thriving
Y ashlar Tashkilati of the TR.
I n COntrast to the relatively recently founded Guomindang, there was a
history of Turki nationalistic organizations in Xinjiang, dating fromthe time
of Sheng's rule.The Y ashlar Tashkilati was only the latest expression of this
phenomenon. A s mentioned eartier in this chapter, this organization had
a~plied for registration as a political organization; despite the lack of offi-
Cl3.1recognition, which was never forthcoming, the party grew throughout
the province. A ccording to Chinese military intelligence, the financial basis
for this expansion was provided by monies given to the three districts asrlrt
of their share of provincial funds, as called for in the peace agreement.
I
This and other nationalistic Turki organizations were viewed asaserious
threat in Urumqi. To counter their growing influence, the Guomindan~
began a drive to gather members for its youth organization, but the Turki
organizations were clearly of greater attraction. For example, General Song
expressed his growing concern over the agitation for government reform of a
"small number" of youth in the autumn of 1947and ~lsOmentioned that
SOmelocal youths bad chosen to leave for the ETR, making clear the power-
CuI lure of the independent region. Song implied in his sp~_h ~t these
young people had left because they were involved in illegal acuvuy ~Urum-
qi~pecifically by interfering in people'S democratic rights and ro.rcmgthem
to J ain their organization. 1~But it is clear from Song's expressI On of .((lR-
~rn that by autumn of 1947, the political struggle between the T~rki na-
tionalists and the Guomindang over Xinjiang's younger geD~ratJ on was
deepening, and clearly the struggle was going againSt the Han Chinese.
The Economy: June 1947-December 1948
As elsewhere in China the deteriorating economic situation strongly inA '
n
.' of anuP.mment poliCY .
ueaced I mplementation, and local acceptance, 6~ -
168 COlLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
major handicap in dealing with provincial finances had been the minister of
finance, J anlmhan, who was eminently unqualified for his position. It was
necessary for the government to appoint aqualified assistant, which theydid
in the person of the new vice-minister, Bai Wenyu, and a comptroller, Xin-
jiang's first.With provincial financial matters being handled by these two in-
dividuals, the minister himself increasingly devoted his attentions to the
Xinjiang Native Products Company. A lthOUgh J animhan did attend govern.
mental meetings regularly, the province's budget for 1948 was ~esented to
the government (and probably prepared) by Vi::e-Minister Bai.1
In the autumn of 1947the major economic problems facing the govern-
ment were the thriving black market and the shortage of grain due to prob-
lems of transportation and hoarding in the grain-producing south. With
regard to the first problem, the Urumqi Mayor Chu Wu cautioned the
government against prohibiting the black market. A ny such action, he
declared, would lead to the total disappearance of many goods from the lo-
cal market;t38 his advice was followed, thus enabling the affluent of Urumqi,
mainly Chinese officials, to continue to buy such luxury items as Russian
sugar and cloth and Chinese tea.
The government was also much concerned with continuing the rice sup-
ply to Urumqt I n October 1947it allotted 500 million dollars to buy rice in
order to ensure an adequate supply for the capital during the com~ng
winter.
139
Further, J animhan proposed that the use of grain for making
wine be strictly prohibited to help ensure adequate grain supplies. Mes~t
concurred, urging Xinjiang people to support the government in this
measure.
l40
Despite such measures, by December 1947inflation had increased- A n
editorial in the Xinjiang Daily noted that everyone in the province now suf-
fered from the increase in prices: within only one month, November 1947,
prices had doubled. Hardest hit were low-level government employees and
teachers who continued to receive preinffatlon salaries. The local ~~r
caUed upon the government to ensure adequate livelihoods for such indI Vld-
uals.
141
A s prices doubted, hoarding became a major problem. The gove~ent
passed new regulations to prevent hoarding from totally dlsrupnng ~he
availability of food supplies in J anuary 1948.A ccording to the new dir:ctJ VC.
each household would be allowed to retain a certain amount of supplies on
a monthly basis. A nyone holding supplies in excess of government-
established limits would have to sell the excess to the government at 80 per-
cent of its market value. Police were given the right to inspect houses to
carry out this order.
142
,
Further, the government decided that it was necessary to limit the charge
for transport of grain from the south; it announced that the price of trans-
port would now be fixed and declared that with transport problems over-
COIL -tPSE OF tns COAL fTJON, 1947-1949 1(1}
come, there would be an adequate supply of grain for everyone. They ad-
mitted that there were shortages of many goods in the capital and in many
other areas of Xinjiang, but this was blamed on shopkeepers who refused to
sell goods due to general unrest.
l43
There were other factors, however, in the refusal of many shopkeepers to
sell their goods. For instance, in early 1948 the government prohibited
transporting, buying, or selling gold.
l44
This was an attempt not only to con-
trol prices but also to limit the use of Soviet gold coins, a popular currency
throughout the province. The new regulation did not have the desired effect
of stabilization but increased reluctance to accept Nationalist currency. I n
the spring of 1948, troops stationed in Kashgar received six months' worth
of back pay, further driving up prices in the south and increasing local
resistance to accepting Nationalist currency.145
The currency exchange rate was another factor in the refusal by locals to
sell their goods. Despite the terrible inflation rate being experienced in
China proper, rendering the fabi a currency of dubious value, the exchange
rate between Xinjiang dollars and the fabi had remained at Xn Sl to Cn $5.
As a result, remittances between Xinjiang and the rest of China came to a
standstill in early 1948.
146
Despite repeated requests for a resumption of
remittances from local merchants, trade with the rest of China ground to a
halt, except for the black market, which continued to thrive.
I n A pril prices temporarily stabilized, but by this time the price of
staples had soared, as indicated in the case of wheat, whose price per charak
(20 pounds) rose from Xn $3,000 in J uly 1941 to $8,000 in November,
$16,00:>in J anuary 1948, and as high as $4O,OOJ in A priL 147 .
I n public, the government increasingly followed the line that a maJ ~r
cause of the region's economic problems lay in the people's hearts: th~lr
own fears were causing many of the province's difficulL ies, announced Price
Commission Chairman L iu. He urged people not to believe rum~rs and to
~assured that government economic support, in the form~f s~nn~glow,
mg loans and coal subsidies, would soon help to resolve theSltuatlO~.
I n A ugust 1948 the central government announced that the enure coun-
trywould change over to the gold yuan note.The new exchange rate for the
Xinjiang dollar was set at Xn S3,OOO to two gold yuan.149A t this announ~-
mem, the availability of goods immediately dropped, and the local economic
Situation suffered yet another setback. By October, ~e ~rovincial ~vem-
menr found it necessary to ration available food supplies Inthe capital. ~-
cording to new regulations each person was entitled to buy a total of thirtY
.. '150 . r I ugar andcloth
J ID of flour or six sheng of ricea month. Supplies 0 ea, s ,
we
ghbo g Gansu to offset snort-
re to be sent into the province from net no
ages.
151
people lbat the sbort-
A lthough the government attempted to reassure y-.. A s
ageswere not critical,lSZ unrest over price controls and rauonlng grew. a
-----------
170 COLLAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
result, by November the government yielded to public pressure to lift price
controls on many items, but the rationing of grain, coal, and meat continued
as the economy declined. By December, the price of flour reached an
astronomical Xn $12,000,000 per one hundred jin, and the government
decreed that it would begin to handle the saleof flour itself to ensure
availability of supplies at this new price.153
By the end of 1948, any remaining confidence in Mesut and the Chinese
Nationalists had ebbed. Mesut's removal in December 1948 was,probably an
attempt to place responsibility for the area's economic woes onhis
shoulders. Certainly, in the ever shifting circumstances that pertained in
China, Mesut was hardly accountable for the region's economic difficulties,
but as he was chairman dUring the period of the worst economic decline me
region had ever known, his removal was a political necessity.
Corruption and Internal Dissent
A ccusations of blatant corruption continued 10surface throughout Mesut's
administration. Corruption associated with military purchasing, a persistent
problem discussed in previous chapters, expanded in scope as hoarding and
refusal to sell intensified.
Under Mesut, accusations of corruption were made against officials.at
the highest level.Both General Song Xilian and L in Mengchun were p~bliC-
I y accused of getting rich off the purchase of military supplies. One UI ghur
newspaper in the capital labeled this type of corruption an obvious example
of army oppression.
154
Denials of such activity did not stem the flow of
rumor, which found enough basis in reality to warrant belief among many of
the local people. .
I nstances of corruption on a lesser scale were commonplace. For .m-
stance, the British COnsul noted that poorly paid customs officials were.usmg
the stiff penalty (or opium smUggling to their advantage. Ifa traveler didnot
pay the necessary bribe to border officials, opium was likely to be planted ~~
the unsuspecting traveler--and the penalty for such smuggling was death.
A s a result, few neglected to pay the necessary bribe. .
Both Turk! and Chinese government officials were engaged in ~ous
corrupt practices that increased in scope under Mesurs administration. In
the summer of 1948, Shipton, in Kashgar, noted that in Xinjiang."whe~
honesty has never existed, dishonesty is hardly a vice," corrupnoe ba.
reached new heights. The Turki officials were as guilty as the Chinese, bU~I[
was the Chinese whom the Moslem population invariably blamed. I n t e
opinion of the British consul, the Chinese had been offered a "golden op-
pcrtunity" in Xinjiang in 1947to reestablish Chinese control, b~t.througb~
resurgence in the incidence of corruption, they had lost their chance
1948.[56
COJL.Y>SE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949 171
Not only corruption, but also open political dissension hit the Mesut
government. I sa's outspoken criticism of the Mesut administration was ini-
Hally reserved for foreign ears. A s the year 1948 progressed, however, the
split between him and Mesut became open knowledge. A ccording to British
reports, the two men gave subordinates conflicting orders. A ntagonism in
government, says the report, "has produced so many interpretations of
government policy and legislation that it isawonder to many how the every-
day administration of the province continues.,,157
In October 1948 a major corruption scandal broke. This time it involved
Minister of Finance J animhan. He was accused of selling property belonging
to the Xinjiang Native Products Company to his friends and relatives, who
then sold the goods to members of other nationalities at great financial
benefit to themselves. I SS Mesut was reportedly angry over this incident in
particular, but the damage was firmly associated with him, personally.
despite the fact that J animhan had been appointed by the coalition govern-
ment of Zhang Zhizhong and not by MesuL
With the corruption and splits among national minority members of his
government public knowledge, and with accusations of corrupt practices
being leveled at top officials in Xinjiang. the Mesut administration was dis-
credited and without direction by the end of 1948.Mesut's replacement was
openly discussed in the region, and Burban Shahidi, the great survivor of
Xinjiang politics, was tipped as the next head of government.
A s Mesut struggled through the increasingly difficult months of his ad-
ministration, there were signs that the ever weakening Nationalist govern-
ment was contemplating further concessions in Xinjiang. During the year
there were several indications of central government willingness to meet IIi
demands. I n J anuary 1948, the central government announced plans for
compensation to victims of Sheng Shicai's policy of confiscating the proper-
ty of anyone imprisoned by his regime.
1S9
That spring, contentious General
Song Xiliau, the hard-line militarist who dominated much of government
policy under Mesut, suffered a broken arm and was sent to China proper to
recuperate.tw He never returned, and his removal was seen in some
quarters as a peace overture to the IIifaction.
16t
Mesut's presence as chairman was a more important obstacle to the
resumption of I I i-Chinese relations. Rumors circulated that if Mesut could
be removed, then possibly the I I i members of government would return and
participate once again in a new provincial government These developments,
coupled with the deteriorating economy and the scandals witbin the Mesut
government, made his removal a necessity by the end of 1948.
TheBreak-up o{tM Mesul Adminislrotion.
Mesut's government certainly had begun under dark douds. He inberited
both the problems of the coalition and the even graver difficulties of the Na-
172 COLUPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
tionalist Chinese predicament, which was nearing the end of its tortuous
route to Taiwan.Economic difficulties, military interference, andcorruption
were three facets of government in Xinjiang that were beyondanyattempt
at local solution, since they were inextricably bound to central government
policies.But even in those areas of administration more amenable to local
reform or solution-such as local education, cultural development, Han-
Moslem relations, and local unity among nationalities--Mesul's govern-
ment accomplished little. The region neither moved closer to unitywith
China proper, the major goal of Chinese policy, nor moved toward unity
among nationalities within the province itself.Xinjiang's cultural andpoliti-
cal divisions remained.and Mesut ultimately succumbed to theoverwhelm-
ingproblems that hadexisted fromthe outset of his administration.
The Burhan Administration:
January 10-September 25,1949
Burhan Shahidi, Tatar.was born in Russia on October 3, 1894; his family
was originally fromXinjiang, and it was to Xinjiang that theyreturnedwhen
Burhan was still a young man.
162
Being froma wealthy merchant family,
Burhan had the opportunity to study in Europe; heattended theUniversity
of Berlin, graduating with adegree in economics.When hereturned to Xin-
jiang, heserved under successiveChinese governments in the province,sur-
viving them all to become the last Nationalist appointed governor in the
Northwest.
Burhan had been awayfromXinjiang during muchof Mesut's termof of-
fice.He had left on Se~tember 29.1947, to servein Nanjing as amemberof
the party's Presidium. 63 I n May 1948, as Burhan himself has written, he
wished to return to Xinjiang to visit his mother who was illHearrivedba~k
in Xinjiang in J une 1948, having stopped first to visit Zhang Zhizhong I D
L anzhou.
Burhan was not particularly welcomed by the chairman, who didnot of-
fer hima government post.I nstead, hebecame the head of Xinjiang Col-
lege, apost heheld until his appointment aschairman inJ anuary 1949: f
A rticle 113 (2) of the Chinese Constitution calls for the etecuoa a
provincial governors, but Burhan was nonetheless appointed by the central
government as a replacement for the discredited and ill Mesut.Burhanwas
thus the second national minority personality to be made head o~gov~m~
ment in Xinjiang.A ssisting himas vice-chairman was Mebmet Entin Bugra,
L iu Mengchun once again became secretary general. Both I saand Mesut
wererecalled to Nanjing.
The former finance minister.J emmhan, initially remained apart of BU~-
han's government. In May, however.hequietly moved away fromU:um
qL
Although Burhan sent Vice-Minister Bai to bring him back, J ammhan
COLUPSE OF ms COALTTION. 1947-1949 173
refused to return, thus ending his career as the province's first Kazak minis-
ter of finance.
l64
Other Nationalist officers in the government also began to
leave in the summer of 1949, moving first to the southern city of Kashgar.
Many then went on to make the difficult journey over the Himalayas into
neighboring Pakistan and I ndia. From there, most eventually moved to
Taiwan.
16S
Financial Affairs
A s Burhan rightly points out in his memoirs, the economic situation he in-
herited from Mesut was totally chaotic. Shops had closed in the provincial
capital, and available goods could only behad at astronomical prices.A box
of matches, for example, sold for one million fabi. I n consultation with
Zhang Zhizhong, Burhan decided that Xinjiang must return to using itsown
currency as it had done before. The use of the gold certificate was suspended
in Xinjiang, and Burhan reported sending back to Nanjing planes specifical-
lydispatched to Xinjiang with millions in now virtually valueless gold yuan
notes.
l66
By the summer of 1949, the local Xinjiang currency had stablized
so that trade on a modest scale was able to resume. I n A ugust, however, offi-
cials and traders fleeing L anzhou arrived in Xinjiang, bringing with them
vast amounts of gold yuan. Burhan himself privately supported a movement
among local traders to refuse these gold certificates, use of which spurred
panic buying in Urumqi during that month. A ccording to Burhan, the move-
ment to refuse to use the Nationalist currency spread, with local people
using the Xinjiang currency or Russian coins in preference to the now total-
lydiscredited Nationalist yuan.
L ocal Political Developments
DUring the months of Burhan's administration, underground Turki nation-
alist organizations proliferated while existing groups such as the Xinjian~
Democratic Union expanded their influence. A mong the many new orgam-
zations was the Pioneer A ssociation, which asked for and received financial
assistance from Burhan personally. Pioneer and other groups were busy
printing and circulating Turki nationalist literature of all kinds during 1949;
altogether, Burban notes some thirty kinds of handouts that were prepared
by these Nationalistic groups.167
I n addition to giving financial aid, Burban appointed various members of
sucb groups to government posts. I n particular, be appointed one under-
ground leader as the new police chief for Urumqi, and be made anot.ber.na~
tionalist leader Usur Musa, his assistant, A leader of another orgamzauoe,
168
Democratic Y outh was made head of the Government Personnel Office.
Despite tension generated by the existence of such organizations,
174 COIL4PSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
Urumql was relatively quiet in the summer of 1949.One incident did occur
at a movie theater in J une, resulting in the death of a young Chinese stu-
dent.
l69
A lthough there was outrage in the press over this incident, it did
not trigger further incidents or reprisals.
SiJw ..Soviet Trade Negotiotions Under Burhan
In 1949, Xinjiang once again became the focus of international attention,
not for Kazaks or currency problems but because it had become a factor in
ongoing Sino-Soviet trade negotiations. The USSR's interest was, in fact,
both economic and political
The Soviet interest in the natural wealth of Xinjiang had become clear
during the years of Sheng's rule in the region, when the latter made a private
arrangement for Soviet exploitation of various natural resources in ex.
change for Soviet loans and military assistance.
Inthe period after World War I I , Soviet need for Xinjiang's raw materi-
als had grown. The U.S.government estimated that between 1945 and 1950
the Soviet supplies of important foods and consumer items would besub-
stantially below requirements; shortages were predicted especially in wool,
cotton, leather, and meal, all items that Xinjiang had previously traded to
the USSR for manufactured gOOdsPO
Further, Soviet interest in Xinjiang's mineral wealth was of long dura-
tion, and Xinjiang's known deposits of gold, coal, uranium, molybedum, and
tungsten ore had reportedly been exploited in secret by the USSR for some
years.
Politically, the Soviet Union could not afford to be a disinterested neigh-
bor. A nti-Soviet sentiment in Xinjiang could easily affect the USSR'S own
restive Moslem nationalities, and it could even offer a base for anti-Soviet
resistance movements. A t the very least, the Soviet UniOD would want to see
a friendly regime in control of the immediate border districts; the ElR, d~.
pendent on the USSR for arms and for future economic assistance, had m
many ways been the ideal buffer, as long as its leaders maintained a rro-
Soviet stance. It was, nonetheless, very much in Soviet interests to conM.u.e
some kind of dialogue with the Nationalist Chinese, as they remained a mili-
tary power in Xinjiang.
DUring the period 1944--1949, the USSR had kept the Chinese govem-
ment in doubt of its intentions, first vowing to follow a policy of non-
intervention in Xinjiang (in the A ugust 14, 1945, treaty with China), ~ut
then in 1946--1947becoming openly critical of Chinese policy in the regI On
to a point of officially protesting Chinese action in their own province.
The Chinese. on the other hand, openly vowed their friendship for the
Soviet Union, incorporating calls for close relations into political speecheS
at every opportunity. A t the same time, the Chinese privately held the USSR
COlL 4PSE OF 11/E COAL moN, 1947-1949 175
responsible for the IIiaffair, the Beidashan incident, and the general unrest
throughout Xinjiang.
Despite the well-established distrust between the two powers, economic
talks concerning Xinjiang's development had continued sporadically since
1944.There were constant rumors of ever-increasing demands from the
Soviets for more and more concessions in Xinjiang, but no concrete results
of economic discussions emerged.
I n 1949, a new surge of rumors began, predicting tbat a November 1944
draft economic agreement between the USSR and China was now to be
revived.This agreement was said to include Sino-Soviet co-exploitation of
all mineral resources in Xinjiang, freedom of trade between Xinjiang mer-
chants and the USSR, and the free access-c-wtthout customs duty or in-
spection-of the Soviet Union's traders to the Xinjiang market. Rumor of
such an agreement was so strong that it provoked I sa once again to ap-
proach the A mericans, asking that the United States block this trade accord,
asit would virtually hand over Xinjiang "as chattel" to the USSR.
17l
In J une 1949, the existing Sino-Soviet air agreement was extended for
fiveyears, and no further announcements of plans for mineral or other natu-
ral resource exploitation were forthcoming. Mehmet wrote later tbat an or-
der reached the negotiators in Urumqi on J uly 10, 1949, that told them to
suspend all discussions.
I 72
Time had run out; the Nationalists were no
longer in any position to make decisions about the economic future of the
Northwest
Denouement
In A ugust 1949, Burhan received a telegram from General Zhang Zhizhong
in Beijing, a new ally of the Communist government. I n this tel:gr~m,
Zhang suggested to Burban that be invite delegates from the three dtstncts
to COmeto Urumqi for talks. Burban did so, and sUbsequ~nt.lyameeting was
arranged between a representative of the Xinjiang P.rovu.tClal,?ovemment,
Chen Fangbo, and delegates from Iii. During the bnef discu~I Ons held on
the banks of the Manas River which remained the unofficial border be-
tween the ETR and the rest of the province, the twO sides agreed t~at nei-
ther would use force against the other, and that peace should prevail at the
border dividing the two administrative areasof Xinjiang.
l73
Burhan was also in touch with A hmer J an gaslmi, who wrote on A ugust
16, just prior to his departure from Vining for A lma A ta in the Soviet
Union. from where he and several other members of tbe ETR ~ernm~nt
were to fly to Beijing. On A ugust 28, Burhan writes that bewas pnvately tn-
formed by the USSR consul general in Urumqi that the plane from A lma
Ala had crashed killing all on board.
174
The dead included Abme~J an,
A bbas, Delilhan, 'I zhak Han, and a Chinese official, L o Zu.No public an-
176 COLlAPSE OF THE COALITION, 1947-1949
nouneement was made of these deaths until some months later.115 A ccord.
ing to Burhan, the Soviet consul general cautioned him not to make any
public announcement as it could possibly cause a disturbance. He further
advised that Seyfettin had already been despatched to Beijing to represent
the three districts in talks with the new Chinese government.
Speculation on the cause of the deaths of the ElR leaders has continued
ever since the crash was announced.Us Whatever the true story, it is clear
that this incident removed the most effective and most charismatic leaders
of the ETR from any post-L iberation discussions on the future of the Torti
homelands.
A ccording to Burhan's memoirs, on September 19, 1949, he personally
telegraphed Mao Zedong about the determination of the people of Xinjiang
to sever all connection with the "reactionary" Guomindang.l"? Four days
later he received a reply from Mao, asking that the PL A be assisted when it
entered the region. Official telegrams followed on September 25 from Bur.
han and the Xinjiang garrison commander, Tao Zhiyue, to Beijing, officially
severing ties with the Nationalist Chinese and declaring the allegiance of the
Xinjiang people to the new government inBeijing.118
Representatives of the PL A began their march into Xinjiang on October
12,1949, entering Urumqi eight days later.
119
I n the months that folI OW~
the PL A consolidated control over the entire region, including the three dI S-
triers. Xinjiang, China's nortbwesternmost province of mountains and
deserts, and proud Turki people, once again came under Chinese control.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
The IIi rebellion of 1944 and the resultant East Turkestan Republic directly
challenged Chinese sovereignty not only in the three districts themselves,
but throughout all of Xinjiang province. Therefore, the immediate goal of
th~central government was to restore Chinese authority inXinjiang, and to
reintegrate the province into the Chinese state. From the first days of the
rebellion, however, the Chinese response to this challenge was complicated
by both international and domestic factors that limited the government's
choice of alternatives indealing with the "Xinjiang question."
.~use of theregion's locationoninternational borderswiththeUSSR,
Brttlsh I ndia and Pakistan, A fghanistan, and, after 1945, the Mongolian
P~ple's Republic, it was politically and militarily sensitive.I t was sig-
~ficant not only to the Chinese government, which considered theregion an
integral part of the Chinese state, but also to international powers whose in-
ter~~ltsin A sia were part of greater stratagems involving the future of A sia.
Chinese efforts to restore Xinjiang to the fold were, therefore, of concern to
powerful Outside interests .
.~tthe same time, the central government was sensitive to the fact that
Xinjtang had never been under its control, and the region had nearly been
~t to China. In the years leading up to and following the Chinese Revolu-
lion, the region had repeatedly been the Object of foreign.eDcroachme~L
l.a~ds long claimed by the Chinese were incorporated I Ota t~e ~~et
UnI On, and territory on the border withI ndia was a matter of con~nu.lDg10-
te~ational dispute. The Chinese fear of further encroachment In.light of
theI r own lack of control in this remote and rugged land was certainly not
without foundation. .
Inaddition to the international complexity of the situation, ~e Cb~ese
government bad inherited a region that by 1944 had become mcreasmgJ y
177
- - - - - - - - - - - -
178 CONCLUSION
hostile (0 Chinese rule. A ssassination, rebenton, and repeated confrontation
between Chinese and local Moslems marked the twentieth-century history
of Xinjiang under Chinese warlord rule, and the ROC inherited this bloody
legacy.Despite the fact that the Nationalist government had never oontrol~
led Xinjiang, to the local population the new Guomindang government of
1944simply represented a continuation of the oppressive Chinese ruleim-
posed on the province by Sheng Shicai and his predecessors. The central
government was thus heir to problems and attitudes that werelargelynot of
its own making.
The IIi rebellion occurred at a time when the central government was
singularly ill-prepared to respond militarily. The long war of resistance
against the J apanese had already decimated Chinese troops, and many army
units were both demoralized and overextended. A military solution to the
problem in IIiwas not an immediate possibility.
A further factor limiting Chinese policy alternatives was the Chinese
government's interpretation of the genesis of the rebellion itself. From the
beginning, the Chinese government believed the USSR was responsible for
the instigation and support of the independence movement in lli. When the
gravity of the situation became clear to the government early in 1945, its
response was based on the assumption that in this instance China was nOI
facing a local Moslem rebellion, but the Soviets in the guise of Moslem
Turki rebels. A s has been seen, from the very first reports on the situation,
Chinese military leaders constantly referred to the USSR as asource of ~lh
men and war materials, ultimately blaming the entire affair on the Soviet
Union. The success of the central government's appeal in September 194.5
for Soviet good offices in ending the fighting confirmed the Chinese in thea
belief that the USSR was in fact: behind the formation of the ETR. Chinese
militarists as well as most members of the central government came to ac-
cept this view without question.
Certainly this interpretation of events was not without basis in recent
history in China's border lands. The Chinese knew the Soviet Union was
deeply involVed in the independence movement in Mongolia; in 1944 the
area known as Tanna Tuva, west of Mongolia and directly to the north of
Xinjiang, had been quietly incorporated into the USSR.In light of these
events, it was not unreasonable for the Chinese government to assume
Soviet involvement in Xinjiang's llirebelJ ion. .
A s the preceding chapters relate. the USSR did, in fact.playa role ~the
rebellion. There is little doubt that the ETR government purchased mJ lit~
supplies from the USSR in 1944-1945. Further, as would beconsistent ~th
Soviet policy, Soviet military and civilian advisers probably accompanied
these military supplies. . . . . of
Material presented here does not, however, suggest Soviet msugauon
the rebellion. A s demonstrated above, historic and economic factors,
CONCLUSION 179
coupled with the new, capable, nationalistic leadership that formed in the Ili
region, account for the rebellion itself, and for the widespread popular sup-
port accorded the ETR movement in 1944-1945 by the people of the three
districts.The Chinese central government nonetheless became firmly dedi-
cated to the theory of Soviet instigation, and policy moves with regard to
Xinjiang during this period were deeply affected asa result.
Given the major limitations and complications outlined above, the first
option the Chinese chose to exercise was the use of international diplomacy
to seek a settlement of the rebellion. As Chiang Kai-shek. assumed the
Soviet Union to be directing events, an approach was first made to the
Soviet government, which chose to defer discussion of this question until
thesummer of 1945.By then, under the influence of his allies, Chiang found
himself forced to make important concessions to the USSR.But at the same
time, Chiang was able to use the opportunity thus presented to secure con-
cessions of his own. One of these was to ask for Soviet assurance of non-
intervention in Xinjiang. which was given as part of the Sino-Soviet Treaty
of 1945.With its signing, Chiang believed that an international solution to
theXinjiang problem had been found. .
The unrest in Xinjiang and the general dissatisfaction with Chinese gov-
ernance among the local population was not, however, something that could
be resolved so simply. Fundamental problems remained in Xinjiang.
Throughout the period of Nationalist rule in the region, Chinese-Moslem
r~lations deteriorated, despite the avowed Chinese policy of "unuy of na-
honalities." Military interference in government at all levels grew con-
conutantty with the ever-increasing number of Nationalist Chinese troops,
making implementation of any real government reform impossible. Further,
the economy during this period deteriorated steadily, reaching what was
probably its lowest ebb in history by 1948-1949. At the same ~e, the .ETR
continued to exist as a de facto government, serving to fao I ncreasingly
defiant Turki nationalism throughout the region. ThUS,while I nternational
mediation had secured a ceasefire for the Chinese and had brought control
of seven of the region's ten districts back to the central ~~ment, the
problems within the province itself remained dauntn;tg.Nauonausr attempts
to deal with these pressing concerns were largely a failure.
NationaUst Failure inXinjiang
In part, this failure was influenced by external. tacto.rs ~nd ~= 1: ;
troL But a large measure of the Nationalist failure InXinjiang ID
stemmed from two important sources bOth within Nationalist power t?
h '-~ , to national-level poll-
c.ange: Chinese insistence on Xinjiang ooworm~g .uaJ milita-
cU: saDdbeha lik .. d: ...,..auoesepTQViIK: e,andcontm .
vmg ean or J' ftheregJ On.
ry interference incivil government andin the local politI CS 0
180 CONCLUSION
Chinese insistence on Xinjiang's conformity to national policieswas part
of an overall Chinese policy aimed at making Xinjiang an integral part of
the Chinese state.A fter all, if the region did not followcentral government
directives or conform to national policy, it could take a path leadingaway
fromunion with China, as Zhang had accused the ETR of doing.Thus, be-
ginning in 1944 and continuing through the decade, Xinjiang's provincial
government was required 10followpatterns established in other provinces,
despite the obvious cultural, religious, and socioeconomic differences that
dividedit fromChina proper.
For example, under the coalition, the Xinjiang government didinclude
national minority representatives at the provincial level, asstipulated inthe
peace agreement and its supplements. A s this study demonstrates, however,
the provincial government of Xinjiang remained firmly in the hands of
Chinese-appointed bureaucrats, as did provincial governments elsewherein
China. The resolution passed by the coalition in 1946calling for a70:30
ratio of national minorities to Han Chinese in the government was never
implemented. Chinese domination continued at most levelsof government,
despite theelections of 1946.A s wehaveseen, aflerl947, Chinese represen-
tation in the direct rule of the provincial government increased, withcentral
government appointees joining the ranks of local officials.
Nationally promuigared measures that called for tougher action by the
policeand military to maintain order in China werealso carried out inXin-
jiang, especially as lawand order deteriorated in the region after Mesurs
appointment. By national decree, the already powerful policewerestrength-
ened in Xinjiang, thereby encouraging the militarist line among Han Chi-
nese who believed only light control could bring stability to the regiO~.
Whilea predominantly Chinese police forcewould havebeen acceptable1.0
China proper, in Xinjiang such a forcewas increasingly viewed asa tool of
Chinese domination, and police action against the Turks was bound to ta~e
on racial and religious overtones.The February and March 1947inciden.ts1.0
Urumqi are dramatic illustration of how the police were drawn into direct
confrontation with the local Turkis, as a result of which the incidents rook
on wider dimensions, adding fuel to ethnic rivalries.
Other unfortunate aspects of "ordinary" Chinese-style provincial gov-
ernment also asserted themselves in Xinjiang as Guomindang influenceand
control expanded.The nationwide pattern of corruption among government
and military officials continued unchecked in Xinjiang, with abuses of
privilege a common occurrence. The nation's economic woes also began to
affect Xinjiang, which, prior to the period of coalition gove~men~~d
maintained aseparate and relatively strong economy.The rise of i.n!1ahonI D
the late 19405was yet another offshoot of beingan"ordinary" provmce. r
By forcing Xinjiang to conform to the central government's concept a
what a province should be, the Guomindang lost its opportunity for reform
- - - - - - - - - - - ~.
CONCLUSION 181
in Xinjiang. I nstead of a new era of reformed government, as promised in
the peace agreement and the GPP, the Guomindang brought to Xinjiang
many of the evils then plaguing provinces under Nationalist control
throughout China.
A second major failing of the Guomindang with regard to Xinjiang was
the continuation and growth of military interference in civilian government
andlocal politics. Such interference was common elsewhere in China, but as
Nationalist military strength in Xinjiang had not beengreat prior to the
1940s, there was an opportunity for the provincial government in Xinjiang
to remain predominantly in the hands of civilians when Governor Wu was
appointed in 1944.As Nationalist troop strength grew, however, military I n-
terference grew apace.
From 1944 onward, the power of the military commanders in small and
large towns steadily strengthened, prompting Vice-Chairman A hmer to
comment that elections were useless since the local commanders beld all 10-
~Iauthority. As the number of troops grew, so grew the attendant econom-
tCabuses and corruption. A s abuses multiplied, demands increased for the
removal of the troops, and the Chinese military thus became a focus of
Turki resentment. The increasingly angry opposition to the military was un-
doubtedly an important factor in the expansion of Turki nationalism in the
region, particularly in the south where the Nationalist troop presence was
deemed especially oppressive.
A t the provincial level, a major impetus behind military interference was
General Song Xilian. A s a military man, be clearly believed that military
~Ominance was the only means to secure Chinese control of Xinjiang. His
I nfluence on local politics was first demonstrated in his handling of me Feb-
ruary riots in Urumqi, when his iron-fisted response to the demonstrations
gravely affected the reputation of the coalition and undid much of Gene~l
Zhang's efforts at building good relations with leaders of me local Turk~c
COmmunities the previous year. Song's use of force to put d~ me.an~-
Mesut demonstrations in J uly 1947was a further indicator of his belief I D
the efficacy of the military answer to Xinjiang's problems. .
More important than these overt signs, however, was Songs ~rt .I D-
volvement with the Kazak leader Osman Bator and his followers.Begmmng
in 1946, Song was in contact with Osman through pro-Guomindang I Uza,k
members of the provincial government; newspaper stories ~well as Song s
comments to foreign consular officials-and later Turkish language ac-
COuntsof Osman's career-point (0 a close conn~ion terween the h~of
the Nationalist Chinese forces in Xinjiang and this Kazak leader.Certat~
~ng was aware of Osman's plan to enter and at~k ETR-eoo~U~ :~
tn~in.the autumn of 1947.In doing so,.Soog ~ directly und~~~
Provincial government and working against policy ~vocated ked Ii
POlicy of unity, conciliation, and compromise. Wbtle Zhang wor or
- - - - - - - - - -
182 CONCLUSION
peace, Sung was actively sowing discord.
Both the Chinese insistence on Xinjiang's conformity with national
policy and the increased interference of the military in the region's govern-
ment were major reasons for Nationalist Chinese failure to deal effectively
with the region's peoples. Both these factors were also potent sources of dis-
content with Chinese dominance in the region and so contributed to the
growth of Turki nationalism. By offering the local population acommonfoe
to unite against, the Chinese gave the forces of Turki nationalism perhaps
its greatest impetus: By not carrying out reforms as promised and by allow-
ingmilitary interference in civil matters, the Chinese directly fed the forces
of nationalistic rebellion, which, by the 1940s, had penetrated even the more
remote comers of this vast borderland.
The Growth orTurki Nationalism
Xinjiang in the 19405 was a geographically remote and isolated area, sepa-
rated by great distances from the major centers of world civilization.A s a
result, its population was relatively unsophisticated, with illiteracywide-
spread and the level of education even in urban areas relatively low.How-
ever, Xinjiang was Dot by any means apolitical and cultural vacuum, andthe
IIi rebellion did not OCCUr in total isolation fromoutside influences.In the
region's towns and cities, an educated elite was awareof the manychanges
taking place in the wider world beyond the oases and deserts of Xinjiang.
A lthough the immediate impact of the Russian and Chinese revolutions had
been limited, Pan Turkic and Pan-Turantan ideals had infiltrated theregion
in the 19205 and found suppon among the region's religious and cultural
elite.
A nother influence that made itself felt in Xinjiang was the modernizing,
secular government of Turkey.Sons of wealthy families like that of Mesur
Sabri were sent to I stanbul or A nkara for an education.UJ XJ ntheir return,
the respect generally accorded such returned scholars was considerable, and
their influence was often far greater than their relatively smaU numbers
might indicate. Further COntacts between the Middle East and Xinjia~g
weremadeby the Kazak and Uighur Turks who made thelongandoften dif-
ficult journey to Mecca on "haj" and returned to Xinjiang via Turkey.~uch
men brought back to their native land new notions formed in the relatively
modern atmosphere of the Middle East,
From the time of the Russian Revolution onward, Xinjiang's people
were also aware of the modernizing efforts of the Soviet govemmen~in the
Central A sian RepUblics oontiguous to Xinjiang.New ideas regaf(h~g the
role of government and of alternatives to the Chinese systemwere mrro-
duced to northwestern China by traders and by students who weresent to
school in the Soviet Union and returned imbued with the desire to see
CONCLUSION 18J
changes intheir native towns and cities.
While such ideas of reform and change in the region were initially the
province of a small educated elite, the idea of resistance to the Han Chinese
was not.Relatively unsophisticated groups of uneducated but determined
men were part of the underground resistance movement in Xinjiang from
the time of the first governor of the Republican period, Y ang Cengxin.Such
movements were often based solely on shared antipathy toward the Chinese,
but other elements were also present. The force of I slam, which separated
local Moslems from Chinese, was an important bond among such groups, as
was the shared Turkic language and culture of the majority of the in-
digenous population. The dream of an independent Turkestan-a dream
which can be traced back to the days ofY akub Begand earlier----wasalso an
important element in some of the resistance movements.
I n 1933, anti-Chinese sentiment and the dream of the Turkic state re-
sulted in the abortive attempt to form the first East Turkestan government.
A lthough this disunited and faction-tom government was crushed by Sheng
Shicai with Soviet assistance, former members of its government remained
in Xinjiang and continued to give life to the idea of an independent Turkic
state. This idea gained a wider audience in the thirties, and despite the
COllapseof the first East Turkestan Republic, the concept it embodied
remained.
Under Sheng, widespread resentment of his increasingly oppressive rule
aroused greater antipathy toward the Chinese in general and gave further
impetus to the desire for an independent I slamic state in Xinjiang.T~d
the end of Sheng's rule, nationalistic Turki handbills began to appear I~
both the provincial capital and the three districts, revealing that the.an~-
Chinese movement now incorporated an appeal to all Moslems to umte m
sUPport of freedom and the establishment of an independent Moslem state.
A lthough such tracts-c-examples of which appear in appendices E and
F--d.o not reveal a sophisticated political platform, their appeal was clearly
based on the fundamentals of nationalism: shared culture and language.
shared religious belief, shared economic concerns, and a clearly defined ter-
ritorial base, the province of Xinjiang. These shared elements, all com-
ponents of modem nationalism made it possible for the ETR movement to
bi . " '" tb "!n CU and eventually
mo illze Widespread popular support ID the ree UJ : t
among the greater population of the province. f To ki
The ElR itself was in great part a manifestation of the growth0 r,
nationalism in Xinjiang. A vailable information indicates t.ba~the ~ s
leaders were nationalistic Moslems who sought to bring maJ o~ty ~os::-
rule to "I urkestanv-c-an envisaged I slamic state that would ultirnat ly
. di " that such a govem~
compass all of Xinjiang. The EI R was also anm cation" tnitan
mem could in fact, exist and successfully govern an I stannc XinJ g. uJ d
b government co
UDder the Moslem leadership of the El'R, t e new
184 CONCLUSION
boast of major successes in itsdealings with both the USSR andtheChinese.
Fromthe Soviets, the ETR had secured military supplies to enable therebel-
lion to succeed and had then reestablished the important commercial J inks
with the Soviet Union.In dealings with the Chinese, the leaders of theE1R
bad gleaned major successes in forcing the government to enter into an
agreement with them to institute democratic: government basedonpopular
elections throughout Xinjiang.
Further, elections had actually been held in Xinjiang for thefirst time,a
major result of the peace agreement During the course of the elections, as
we haveseen, the representatives of the ETR were able to travel throughout
the province, bringing their nationalistic message to even the remoter
comers of the region.The ETR's political organization, the Y ashlar Tash-
kilati, was able to grow and expand its activities throughout the province.
A nd, as the newspaper war of 1947demonstrated, thespirit of therebellion
had not been diminished by I ll participation in the coalition government.
When Chinese military power grew in 1947, it only served to intensify
defiance among Turks throughout the region, and by the time of Zhang's
visit to Kashgar, a newmilitant spirit was evident evenin the southern part
of theprovince, whichhad not participated inthe IIirebellion.
Thus the fruits of the 'Three Districts Revolution" were many, and
among themwas a heightened sense of Turki nationalism that increasingly
made itself felt throughout the province.Chinese control in the sevendis-
tricts was constantly challenged during this period of growing national con-
sciousness, so that the Chinese-<lominated provincial government cameto
rely almost solely on local military garrisons as the basis of its continued
control inthe region.
In 1944the nationalism long nascent in Xinjiang province foundexpres-
sion in the Ui rebellion and in the formation of the E1R During the peace
process of 1945-1946and under the newcoalition government that formed
asaresult, Xinjiang's Moslempopulation was involvedinpolitical processes
on aprovincewide basis so that anewsense ofTurki strength emerged, com-
biningelements of I slamand Turkic culture with the more modempoliti~
concepts of representative government and political rights.Nationalism m
Xinjiang had thus grown to become, in the words of U.S.Consul Ro~rt
Ward. "Quite a vital thing" in Xinjiang in the 1940s.The Nationalist
Chinese failure to deal effectively with tbis newlyawakened nationalismor,
indeed, to recognize the nature of this challenge to the central govemro~nt
authority in itself constituted amajor threat to Chinese sovereignty in Xin-
jiang between 1944and 1949.
A!'PENDIXA
The Peace A greement of J anuary 2, 1946
This if a m: mlaJion of the eleven.-point peace agreement signed on lQllllOJ ')l ~1946, by
rtpres~ntatives of the three districts com[#'ising the East TutlresllUl Republic and rtpn-
sentatives of the Chinese central government.
~e Representatives of the central Government and the Representatives of the three
dI Sturbed districts agree to the following provisionS as a means of peacefully resolving
thearmed conflict:
1.The government hereby gives the people of Xinjiang the rigbt 10vote 50that
~stwonhy local individuals may be elected to serve as goeemment officials.To put
this ~r into practice, thefollowingmeasureswiD apply:
Within tbree months of this resotuuca, the people of eachcounty will elect county
assemblymen and establish a County Assembly; the County Assembly will elect the
county magistrate (xianzhang)_ The vice-eounty magetrate and omer county-k:vel
government officials will be appointed by the county magistrale.
. DUring the period prior to the hoklirI g of electiooS, withiII the uiree disturbed dis-
tricts and counties the present officials will continue inoffice..
The district government supervisory officialS snau be recommended for appoint-
meD~by the kx: al people, and the names of suchofficials shall be submiUed to the
~l government for approval . .
SpeCI al government officials and other staff will be hired by ~
. After the rormauoc of tbe County As5f;mblieS, each ~mbly will eleCt represen
reuves to the Provincial A ssembly so that a provinCial A s5embl)' may be oonvened-
Representmg thewill of people, they will oversee and assist the ~ government..
Poor to the promulgation of the constitution and before the eJ e(:liOilSare ~ the
?t'ga~tion of me prO\'incial govemmem will be according[Qthe ~ supulated
mA rticle 9 of this agreement. .. .
2.The government win punishdiscriJ ninatioo on the baSis of religtOD. andgrvel the
people complete freedom of religious belief.
3.For state organizations' and private organizations' documents, individUalsare
" s
----------
186 APPENDIX A
authorized to use their native written language.
4. Elementary and middle schools will use the language of the I ocaJ nalionafily,
but in middle schools, Chinese language will be a required course. A t the university
level, Chinese or Moslem I anguage(s) will be used, according 10the course needs.
5.The government resolves that nationalities' cultures and arts will expand freely.
6.The government resolves that there will be freedom of publication, assembly,
and speech.
7.The government will prescribe tax rates in accordance with the people's real
productivity and (earning) power.
8. The government gives businessmen freedom in domestic and foreign trade;
however, foreign trade must be in accord with the government's commercia] treaties
withforeign states.
9.The central government agrees to the expansion of the Xinjiang Provincial
Government to inClUdea council of twenty-five persons. Of these twenty-five people,
ten will be appointed by the Cenrrar Government directly, and the remaining fifteen
will be chosen from among those recommended by the peoples of each district,
A mong the ten individuals directly appointed by the centra] govemment will be the
provincial chairman, the secretary general, tbe minister of civil affairs, the minister of
finance, the head of the bureau of social welfare, the vice-minister of education, the
vice-minister of reconstruction, assistant head of the bureau of public health, and two
ministers witbout portfolio.
A mong the fifteen individuals recommended for appointment by the people of the
various districts will be two prOVincial vce-chamnen, two assistant secretaries generat,
the minister of education, the minister of reconstruction, the head of the public heallh
bureau, the vice-minister of cMI affairs, the vice-minister of finance, the assistant head
of the social welfare bureau, and five ministers without portfolio.
Refer to Supplement number 1.
I O.Permit the organization of people's militia (minzu jundui). Replacement troo~
will be assigned in accordance with the principle of using Moslem soldiers; thepeople s
militia will include troops involved in the recent inciclent and will be reorganized ac-
cording 10 National A rmy organization. The numbers and tbe placement of these
troops will be discussed and will follow- the terms set out in the second supplement to
this agreement.
Inthe training and orders for these military units, the language of the Uigburs and
Kazaks will be used
The officers of these units will be preserved as in their original form, but at specific
times will receive military officers' training and further education.
'These military units will be assisted and instructed by training officials sen! by the
government
Xinjiang's central government military units wi~not ~~tioned in ~e sa:
places as the people's militia; moreover, they will establish special friendly relauons a
will not act inaspirit of mutual hostility.
Refer to supplement number 2.
I i. Prisoners detained during the COurse of the incident will be released by bOl.h
sides within ten days of passage of Ihis agreement; no record will be kept of those ar-
rested and there will beno discrimination agamsr them.
Signed by: Zhang Zhizhong, representing the central government; Rahim J an
tus PEACE AGREEMENT 187
Mura Haji, Ebulhayir Tore, and A hmet J an Kasimi, representing tbe people.Dated;
J anuary 2, 1946.
Supplement 1
I. Of the fifteen posts to be filled by recommendations from the people, six will
come from the three districts (EiR).
2.These six posts will include the following:
Onevice-chairman of the province
Onevice-secretary general
Minister of education or of reconstruction
Vice-minister of civil affairs
Head of the public health bureau or assistant head of the bureau of social welfare
One minister without portfolio
. 3.The remaining nine posts will be given 10appointees from tbe other seven dis-
tncts of the province anc1will include one vice-chairman of the province; others will
boldposts not in the above list, at the level of assistant heads of bureaus, vice-secretary
general, vice-ministers, and ministers without portfolio.
Signed on J anuary 2, 1946.
Supplement 2
1.The IIi forces in the three districts will be reorganized into six regiments, three
cavalryand three infantry.The total number of men under arms will be from 11,000 to
12,?OO.Two cavalry regiments and one infantry regiment will bepart of the Nat.iooaI ist
Chinese Army in Xinjiang.
2.A Moslem nominated by the IIidelegates will command aU sixof theabove regi-
~en~and will be responsible to the Xinjiang garrison commander for the three Na-
tionalist Army units and to the Xinjiang Peace preservation Corps (bereafter PPC),
commander for the other three. The same Moslem commander will be the vee-
commander oftbe Xinjiang ppe and will maintain his own beadqcerters-
3.The six above regiments will remain in the three districts and will nave sole
~ponsjbility for the maintenance ofpeaee in mose dislrictS.Central government fron-
tier defense troops will undertake defense of the national frontiers, fol/OWingmethods
anddistribution of troops identical to that prevailing prior to the lliincident. .
4..TI le A ksu and Kasbgar units of the PPC will be reorganized and will use nanve
recruits; they will be organized in consultation withtbe MCfilemcommencer.
5_.The supply, equipment, and treatment of the six regiments a~ will be ot.t a
par withthe top National A rmy and PPC respectively. The three PPC WI llbe supplied
from the PPC headquarters inXinjiang province. . .'
6.The reorganization of the six regiments will be the respooSlbilityof the MC6I em
commander. The garrisons of the troops inthe three disUic1S are to be.reported to,
and aPProved by, the provincial authorities, and their numbers and equI pment to be
reponed to the provincial government.
Signed on J une 6, 1946.
So~ces: Zhang Dajun, Seventy Yean of Turbulence in Xinj~g (Tai~i, l~),
12:6847_50.Supplements pp.6850-51, 6875-76. OriginalS bcld m the Nauonal His-
tory I nstitute A rchives, Tarbet, Taiwan.
-----------
A!'PENDIXB
Government Political Program
This is a translation of the " Government Political Program" (GPP), w hich w as paJud
by the Xuzjiang ProYincial Government at its second meeting on July 15, 1946..
A Political Section
1.The people \\oillexercise political power.
2 The law will protect and guard the following freedoms: thought, written expres-
sion, pUblishing, meeting, association, residence, movement, person, and property. Ar-
rest or detention of people by illegal institutions will nor be tolerated, and corporal
punishment by religious law will not be permitted. ,
3.Under government administration, women's equality is guaranteed, as are tbetr
economic, legal, educatiOnal, and social rights.
4.I n the event of conflict between civil law and religious law, in each case, the cen-
tral government will be asked to resolve the dispute. 10carrying out the law, locally
trained individuals will be used as far as possible. .
5.L ocal elections will be based on universal SUffrage and the secret ballot; ejecuon
manipulation or bribery are absolutely prohibited
6.Within three months of the government reorganization, eleclions will be beld for
representative bodies belooN county level, for officials in the self-governing baojia sys-
tem and for the post of county head, according to tbe election regulations 10be stipu-
lated by tne provincial government.
7.Representative bodies of each level of government shall nave the right to super-
vise and assist I be government officials at their respective levels.
8.Government officials of each administrative level shall be ctrosen from among
talented individuals of eecn nationality; every county bead and all self-governing offi-
cials will be sent [or training at tbe provincial or district level at regular intervals. _
9.I n government and legal matters, Chinese and the Moolem language (Hwwen)
will be used equally, with individuals free 10use their native tongue.
to.Corruption and actsagainst the welfare of the people are prohibited.
188
GOVERNMENT POLfI'lCAL PROGRAM 189
11.Gambling, hashish, and opium are all forbidden.
B.Nationalities Section
1.I n government, economy, law, and education all nationalities are equal.
2.Mutual respect and consideration are to be observed and unity amoog aU nation-
alitiespromoted.
3.Use and expand national minority languages, literature, arts, and other areas of
cultural endeavor.
4.Religious beliefs of each national minority will berespected.
5.Stirring up ill feeling, damaging the unity of nationalities, and endangering mutual
respect between nationalities will not be permitted.
6.A ny person who violates national minority customs, religious belief, and so on, es-
peciallyamong the smaller minority groups, will be severely punished.
C.Foreign Relations Section
1.Expand Sino-Soviet friendly relations.
2Promote Sino-Soviet economic cooperation.
3.Expand Sino-Soviet artistic and cultural relations.
4.Expand each nation's trade, friendship, and academic relations.
5.Strive to improve relations among all Moslem nationS (including the Soviet Cen-
tral A sian Republics] on the basis of commonly shared religious belief and culture.
D. Eoonomic Section
.1.Protect the rights of the peasant and the right to lease land; opposethe cooceotra-
lion of land ina fewhands inorder to reach the goal of "lieI ds to the tuer,'
2Promote labor laws, reform labor regulations, and protect women workers.
3.Solve the unemployment problem.
4.I ncrease the standard ofliving of the peasant andnomad peopies.
5.Prohibit high interest rates and usury, and cut all exorbitant rent. ..,
6. Aid the region's agricultural development, and stress the importance of 1lTIgaUOO
construction projects; plan for future developmeJ 1t. .
7.Expand the amount of arable land, improve the peasants' agricultural skilJ s, and
the agricultural system; prevent joccss anddisasters..
8.I ncrease the production of cotton, hemp, andother agricultural products.
9.Encournge afforestation.
10.Expand and encourage cattle breeding. .
11.A ssist in establ.ishing the jocal manufacture of leather and wool products and arti-
cles for daily use.
12.Encournge cottage industries., especially for the production of silk, W()lI I eDcloth,
and special regional products. .
13.Plan for the establishment of basic industries in the provm<%. e.g, cement, eiec-
tricity, steel, and machine parts.
14.Develop the mining industry. .
15.I nsure absolute freedom for an mterear trade. f.xCCPl for the mspectlOOof goods;
- - - - - - - - - - -
I9() APPENDIX B
the government will nOI interfere, and will not levy any unreasonable tax on goods.
Government and public officials may not engage in any commercial enterprise.
16.I n accordance with the treaties of the central government, foreign trade will be
conducted freely.
17.Promote cooperative effons in the areas of manufacturing, consumption, and
transponation.
18.Make use of tbe central and provincial money system to facilitate loans to agricul-
tural and animal husbandry enterprises.
19. Except for government enterprises, allow no kind of monopoly.
E. Government Finance Section
1.Expand the economy, raise production, and become fmancially self-sufficient.
2.I n coI lecling lax, adhere to central government instructions and avoid damaging
the people's livelihood or the principle of expanding the economy.
3.Unite the currency within a specified period of time by stopping the issuance of
provincial notes.A ll currencies will be redeemed ar existing rates.
4.Reorganize the Xinjiang Commercial Bank into a provincial bank and, according
to the terms of the law, allow individuals (renmin) to operate banks for agricultural,
animal husbandry, or industrial enterprises.
5.Before the province becomes self-sufficiem, the province may apply 10 the
central government to continue financial assistance, accorcmg to the needs of eachen.
terprise.
6.The provincial government will reduce expenditure and reduce the number of of-
ficials.
7.Prohibit all types of illegal apportionment of funds and irregular taxation prac-
uces.
F.Communications Section
1.Develop communications within the province to enhance economic and cultural
developmem.
2Request the central government 10extend the L unghai Railroad line into the pro-
vince, and plan a network of provincial railroad links.
3.A1k: the central government to build a system of standard roads quickly and ron-
street state highways.
4.Expand and promote airline facilities and plan for a provincial airline system.
5.Expand the use of river transport.
6.Complete the ceveiopmem of postal, telegraphic, and broadcasting networkS.
7.Train large numbers of managerial personnel in communication technology.
G.Education
J .Promote the concept of the stale, national consciousness, and good order amceg
the naUon's citizens. . . f
2 rmpemenr rompulsory education, universalizing it within a specified period 0
time.
GOVERNMENT POur/CAL PROGRAM 19/
3. Train advanced personnel for provincial development by establishing aprovincial
universityinTihua (Urumqi), as well as schools of agriculture, animal husbandry, com-
mercial and business studies, communications, and teacher training.
4.A ccording to provincial needs, establish junior colleges and vocational schools 10
trainmid- and basic-level personnel.
S.Regulate and improve mid-level and other schools within individual districts
withinaspecified period of time.
6.Establish teacher training institutes to cultivate youths of all nationa1ities; improve
teachingmaterials and establish schools for short-term teacher training; at regular pe-
riods convene meetings for primary school teachers and giveregular trainingcourses.
7.Universally establish national schools, middle, primary schools, and prescbools
(kindergartens).
8.Promote adult education and end illiteracy withinaspecified periodof time.
9.I n all primary and middle schools, students will be educated in their 0\lII1 native
languages; in middle schools, Chinese (guowen) will be used in all compulsOryclasses.
At the university level, according to the needs of the SUbject,Chinese (guowm) or the
Moslemlanguage (Huiwen) will beused equally for instruction.
10.A ll private schools must follow proper standards and be managed by qualified
personnel .
.11.Within aspecified period of time, establish institutions for mass ee:!ucat~, librar-
IeS, public physical education grounds. erc., inorder to promote social educauco. .
12.For certain periods of time, students may choose local education or ee:!ucalloo
abroad.
ItCulture Section
LGuarantee freedom of cultural studies and scientific research.
?- ~elop all nationalities' cultures, and promote local literature, music, dance, and
pamnng as well as all of the arts,
3.Promote this province's culture and the culture of the hinterlands.and the inter-
flow between the nationalities' cultures. .
4.Establish guidelines for publication and promote the publication in. each na~-
alities' own written language of otcuonarres, thesaurus, grammar, te~clllng ::a15,
and works on all natural sciences, and social sciences, as well as I llerary by
famous authors,
S.Bleb district will establish a museum to display artifaC!Sin order 10encourage un-
del'3tanding and promote research. . of musicand
6.Establish centers for the artsof each nationality and for the teacbiDg
cance.
7.Expand the news services and thelocal filmindustry.
L Public Health Section
1
. ....staJ 1(Iatd of the cil~ns'
'.Strengthen measures for physical education and rmse."''-
ph)'sicaJ .health, paying special attention to the raisingofchi
ldre
.
n
. medicine to prevent
?-- Strictly emphasize public health, strengthen pre"lCllta
llVC
epidemics and infectious diseases-
- - - - - - - - - - - -
191 APPENDlX B
3.Thoroughly implement (measures for) asystem of public hospitals, complerefyes,
tablishing medical care at all levels.
4.Complete the creation of medical facilities and equipment.
5.Rapidly develop the number of medical personnel.
6.Train midwives and establish midwifery centers.
7.Establish pubuc sanatoriums and recuperative centers.and developlocal hot
springs.
8.Encourage private individuals 10build local hospitals throughout the province.
9.PrOhibit early marriage.
10.Set standards for practitioners of I raditiooal medicine.
Source: Xinjiang Daily, J uly 20, 1946.A lso published in Zhang Dejun, Seventy Yean of
Turbulence in Xinjiang (Taibei, 1980), 12:6958--61.
APPENDIXC
Chinese Transliteration of Turkic Names
F: centuries, the history of Central A sia bas been recorded by Chinese scnoiers, so
t I t~ay, Chinese language materials on central A siaexceedall othersin bOth
: m~ltyand qu.ality.A major problem in using Cbtoese sources, nowever, has been
dl~culty of I dentifying individuals and groups referred to, because of unsystematic
transliteration of "foreign" names into Chinese. Use of different characters for the
~me ~me and attempts to sinicize the names of foreign individualS are but reo such
1l1COnSistencies.
This problem has persisted into present -day materials on Central A sia.I n myre-
~Ch all Xinjiang's modern history and politics,I have beenableto oomplement
ese-language sources with materials in other languages, but in many ways West-
ern la~guage sources complicate the problems by adding misleadingformsof
romaruzation, often based on originally incorrect Chinese sources.ThuS the original
P~lem <transliterating foreign names into Ctucese coolinues to make t: be idcntifi-
C3tJ orlO[unportant individuals in Xinjiang's modem bistcxy difficult.
f T~e1a.rify just who is who in Xinjiang during the period under the disCUssion, the
allowingI S ashort discussion of traditional Turkic names and uues, foUoWed byanex-
Planation of common forms of Chinese uaoslitel3tion and agIosSaJ 'Y CTCfiS rdercncirJ g
~m Turkish forms of Xinjiang names to their common English variationS, and
their commonest Ctu I
inese onn.
Tlirldc NllI D.esand Tilles
Traditionally, tbeTurkic people of both Turk.ey and Xinjiang used onlype~1
names su h . .. p<rsonal names I S
, C as Ah, Muhammed, or Ahmet. ThIS emphasIS- on
::rved in Turk.ey today,where the usual mode of verbal addreSS is to use.~-
s personal name followed by "Bey" meaning "Mister.""!bus, A bffie1 SelimOglu
WOuldbeaddressed as Ahmet Bey rather than as SelimOgtuBey, and so 01'1.
I n J une 1934, A laturll: decreed that all Turts must take a surname A 5 a resu~,
mooern Turldsb names include both a personal and familY name Tbefamily name I S
193
.,
- - - - - - - - - -
194 APPENDIX C
often just the name of a common object or a reference to the profession of the individ.
ual, according to the whim of the village registrar incharge of carrying out thenewlaw.
Some Turks chose to follow a patronymic system dating back before the decree, in
which "o&lu," meaning "son of," was appended to the father's name.Meso! SOI l of
Selim, for instance, would become Mesur Selimoglu.
In Xinjiang, the use of oglu was occasionally followed by a few of the educated
Uighur and Kazak Turks. This was especially true for those who had been 10Turkey
or Mecca on pilgrimage, and who thus imponed the new system into Chinese territory.
Most Xinjiang names, however, reflect the interesting admixture of culturesin tbe
region, inCluding elements of Turkish, Russian, and Chinese naming practices.For in-
stance, in the IIiarea close to the Russian border, russification of names sometimes oc,
curred, with "ov"or "off" appended to what would otherwise be a commonTurki8h
name. Selim, for example, would become SeJ imov, and so 00.Such russification some-
times reflected a connection with the Soviet Union through trade or business contacts;
it could also indicate that a member of the family received higher education in Soviet
Central A sian schools, a common OCCUrrencesince higher education in Chinese Xin-
jiang was extremely limited.
MCll:commonly, a person was identified by his town or village or by his profe$iOO.
A s there were many A hmets, Muhammeds, and A lis, Specific titles or town of birth or
other ideOlifying words would be used to distinguish one A hmet from another. But
just as often asingle name stood alone, adding to the difficulties of identification when
such persons were referred to in Chinese records without furtber explanation.
Common Turkish names for males used in Xinjiang include Mehmet, Izb~
Y usuf, Kasim, and A bbas. Turkic names indigenous to Xinjiang and not commoe c
Turkey include Tckti, Zahrel, A del, and Talip, The man common titles added.10
names in both Turkey and Xinjiang are "Bey" meaning "Mister"; "Hoja" mem:nn
g
"teacber"'; and "Haji" meaning one who has made the pilgrimage 10Mecca.Such uues
follow theWholename of the person, except inspoken address. , '
I n Xinjiang, the use of these titles is tbe same as in Turkey, but the sound of' ~
or ''Bay'' becomes "Belt." Chinese transliteration of the term recognizes this by USlDg
characters with a "k" sound, as indicated in table 14.In addition to varying from~e
Turkish "Bey" insound, the term also carries greater social and political signifi~ID
Xinjiang than in Turkey. The title "Bek'' or "Beg" became part of the official cues
conferred on local Turki officials by the Qing government (see listing in chapter .3).
Turki Begs often wielded considerable power in Xinjiang, and thus the title carried
much prestige and power even in the twentieth century.
A s will be seen below, Chinese transliteration practices tend to merge all these
Thrkic titles with individuals' names.
Problems inChineseTransliteration ofTuridc Names
InXinjiang stUdies, the main transliteration problems are the use of different ~
characters to represent the same name or title; .the u~of ~aractttS ~ souad-
seems remote from thesound intended; the mergmg of I I tles WI thnames, and the
ditioo of final characters to russify a name or the limitation of a long and complel
nameto only two or three cbaracters tosinictze it, .
lbere are various examples of the first: problem, that of using different cmnese
TRANSLITERATION OF TVRKJC NAMES 195
characters for the same name or title.Thecommon Turkish name"A li" has beenwrit-
ten"Ali"(J ~}l)and "Ali"(~1...);as the sound of both forms isvinually thesame, it is
pc&iblethat this was first done to distinguish two different people.I n aeotber case,
bowever, the characters "Hali" (~.1J ) have been used to indicatea man named A li
Beg Hakim or, in Chinese transliteration "Halibalke." The appearance of this "H" as
the initial sound led various Western observers to call the man variously Halibet,
Halibank, or even Kalibank, none of which bear much resemblance to the man's actual
name.
This last example also demonstrates the problem of the use of differing ChineSe
characters for the same title.Historically, "Beg" was written "Boke" (181l.); ~,
ill modem sources it issometimes written "Bayi" (~-r<..), whichis closer to theTurkish
Conn "Bey." But, for tbe name of Ali Beg Hakim, another form, "Baikc" (t-l L), is
used, whichevidently ledseveral authors to treat the titleas a part of hisname.
Ali Beg Hakim did not help clarify matters I limself: likeotbet men in positionS of
leadership, he changed his name with a change inhis social status.Originally, hewas
Ali Beg Rahimbegoglu, or Mr. A li son of Mr. Rahim. His original name was thus a
mixture of modern Turkish naming practices and jocal titI es.His new name, using
Hakimor "judge," suited his new status as leader of alarger group ofKazab. (see tbe
~unt in Hasan Oraltay, Kaznk Turlderi, p. 85.) Hakim was part of the title of the
blghest Chinese rank conferred on Xinjiang's Turkic officials.
OCcasionally a Chinese author chooses to use a character that seems somewhat
remote from the sound intended. A n important example of thisis the nameRahimjan
SelimogluHoja InChinese sources he appears as "L aiximujiang" (..,,~.+' ,-).Once
the reader knows to whom this name refers, the problem issolved, as this formap-
pears consistently. However, it isonly through context that an association canbe made
bel\\.ttn this name and the individual concerned.
The third problem, that of merging titles with names, issometimeS afunction of l0-
cal naming practices as seen in the case of A li Beg Haldm.But it also stems rrom the
Chinese misunderst~ing of names and titles in the Turkic languages.The na~of
~military commander of the m forces isa good case inpoint.Inmodem Turkish be
IS I zOOt: Han Mura Haji, "Haji" being the title given to.s.om~.newhO nas~n t~
Mecca on pilgrimage. InOlinese, his name appears as "Y isibakeJ l8ogMU~haJ l)'Cfu.
Here"Hajj" is treated as the last part of his name, whichhas etscbce.
n
ruMiftedby tbe
addition of the suffix "vefu ..equivalent to the Russian " 0'1." This brings us 10t~WI
} , .' __ ..... russificatiOD or
~m mdealing with Chinese transliteration of Turkic nall~
sUlicimtionof Xinjiang Turkic names and titles. confroo 'm
A s so much of Xinjiang's modem history invOlveS conflict and tatoo Vt~
the.USSR, Chinese sources often take the view ~t reeson in the N~: ~~
V3riab~aresult of Soviet manipulation inthe region, One way ~fprovmg ks of Zhang
to russify local names in Chinese sources, This can be seen I I I tbe war I - .
Dajun, Sun Fukun and other pro-Guomindang authOrS cited in thi:I work. [~~-
hie' . names themsel~ as a
that insome cases, these individuals may have russified tbe~ . B t former
r:s.ultof prolonged contact with, or education in, the ~et Un~n. ;!besame
~nts of the m area do not usually use tbe ~.~ ~re=~ usage is a
~uals wh<r.e names are russilied by tbe annese. I lldiCatlDg
political r.atber than cultural coosideration. . . .-cittl".nt of lhe East
One Important example of this practice I SJ D the nameof the }'"----
-----------
196 APPENDIX C
Turkestan Republic. I n modem Turkish his name is A li Han TOre Raja, tbe WI word
being the tille of "teacher." A s in the case of I zhak Han Mura Haji, this man's tilleof
Hoja has been russified in Chinese-language SOurces, leading some Western-language
sources to use the name "Ali Khan Ture Hojaeff." A s Ali Han was decidedly anti-
Soviet as well as anli-Communist, it is unlikely that he himself ever chose to russifyhis
name.
Ina few cases, lengthy Turkic: names have been made to conform to the Chinese
traditional name form consisting of a oee-cterace- surname and one or two charac-
ters for the personal name. Examples are Burhan Shadidi, or "Baa Erhan" (-eo ;ri ,")ill
Chinese, and SeyfeUirl A mi, Who is "Sai Fudmg'' (: f-.f;A ).(The final "i"in this
name-and otbers, like Kasimi-is a Xinjiang variation on traditional Turldsb names.
This final "i"does DOl appear in Turkish names today.)
Inan attempt to lessen confusion over some of the Turkic names that has resulted
from Chinese transJ iteration, the fOllowing glossary of names offers a list of important
names from Xinjiang's modem history in modem Turkish form, followed by common
Englishvariations, the Chinese characters used to represent the name, and the pinyin
form of the characters. It is hoped that future research on Xinjiang's modem political
and historical affairs will be less confUsing as a resun of lhis partial guide, which forms
a basis for understanding "Who's Who" in Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949.
Turkish A lpbabet Pronunciation Guide
There isOllly one way to pronounce a given letter inthe Turkish alphabet and, as the
following guide indicates, most of theletters are pronounced as in English.
a
asinother, come
u
b
asinliuy, Qay

"
asin[elfy, J oe ,
d
asmdoll -
y
e
asinred
z
f
asinfine, foul
g t
asing()Q(
"
h
asinhelp
t g
asinI his, wanted
asinth!n.p!n -
J
asinplea~ure
k
asinkite
I
asinI Ow
m
asin!!!ine
n
asin!!.O
0
asin~t
6
asinI heFrench D~
P asineie
r
asinred
s
asinsee
s asinshorr
,
asin truth
asinput
asintheFrench t.!!.s:!!r
asina:!.ay
asinyear
as ingero
asia Church
asinweigh; thai is, usuallysilent
Common English
Chinese
Chinese
Modem Turkish Variations
Characters
Pinyin
A bdulkerim A bbas A bbas,
I'!...ot..t..
A basufu
A bbasoff
A budou
A bdulkerim Han A bdul Kerim.

Mansur Makhsun
~.~
Kelimujiang
__J i.-~
Maihesumu
A hmet J an Kasimi A chmedjan Kastmov
f1f". a><-
A hemaitijiang
A li Beg Hakim
A hkmedJ an Kasim
Halibaike
Kalibank. Halibek,
~joJl,'"
A li Han Tore Hoja
Hakimbek
A ilihan Tiaore
A li HanToere.
-;;...,;<t
A li Khan Ture Sakhir "
~
A shimBeg Haji
Hojaeff
:::.-:t.,.
A ishenmu
Hakim Beg-haji .fl. ... ""....
Baikehejia
Burhan Shahidi
Burhan
...... ;1-
BaoErhan
J animhan Tilev-
BaoErhan J ianimuhan
J animhan
'-,'I t""""
Bayoglu Haji
Dalilihan
Del~lhanJ an A ltay Delilhan
ll....7H"
Dalilihan
Oehlhan SugurbayogluDelilhan.
...... J> >t-
Talilhan Sukurbayeff
.llJ l'!.o:."'-
Sukeerbayefu
~
TRANSLITERATION OF TIJRKJCNAMES 197
A ppendixTable 1
lurkic Titles, Turkic Names, and Chinese Tl"llosliteration
TurkicTI tles
Modem Chinese Chinese
English
Turkish
Characters
Pinyin
Variations
Meaning
Banr
Z.LI1-': -
Batuer
Batur
hero.brave
Bay
,"'-
Bayi
B,g
M,
B,y
,.'"
Boke
B,k
"'"
Baike
J " o~ J iang lo"
aperson; the
namevfohn"
Haji
,,~~ Haji
Haj
pilgrim
r'l ~
Haji
judge
Hakim
~f;'M";!:.-
Hachimu
Hakim
learned manor
sage
""
, f
H"
Khan
sovereign or king
Hoja 1-; b~ Hejia
Hodja
reacher
Khodja
Turko Names and Chinese Transliteration
HatijeKadvan Hanim Hatewan
KaliWang
Hussein,
Husain
A isa
A isabek
I zhak Han Mura Haji I zhartJ an Muna,
Hojaeff,
I zaakbeg,
I shakjan Monhakiyev
Masud Sabri,
Mahksud
MohammedJ an
Mohammed I min,
Mohammed I -Min
KhojaNeyaze,
Khodja Niaze
Osman BaturorBator '~l~.
RachimKhanHoja, -"l*-?"-v...
Rahmjan Sabri Hod-
jaeff
Sablt Mullah,
Sabit Damolla
Salis
Saifudin,
Seyfullaev,
Saipidin,
Seypidin
ShalifKhan
Y olbars Khan,
General Y ol Bars
Zolun Tahir Tsunengrayev .....'*"-"" Tzunongtayefu
198 APPENDIX C
EbulhayirTore
Huseyin Teyc!'
I saY usuf A lplekin
Mesut Baykozu
Sabrioglu
Muhammed J an
Mehmet Emin Bugra
NiyazHoja
Osman Banr
Rahimjan Selimoglu
Hoja
Sabut DamulJ ah
Salis Ennekoglu
Seyfettin A zizi
ShalifHan
Y olbars
MrA bdul
u ...
A budouhayier
Ture
Hadewan
Husaiyin
A ishaBoke
Y ichihakejiang
Muna Hajiyefu
Maisiwude
Muhanmodejiang
Muhanmode
Y imin
Niyasun Hejia
Wusiman Batuer
L aiximujiang
Shabiti Damaola
Salishi
Saifuding
Shalifuhan
Y aoleboshi
I "Teyci" isaKazak title for a leader of asub-tribe group of 1000-3000yuns.
- - - - - - - - - - -
A !'PENDI XD
L ist oflnterviews
I grntefully acknowledge the contribution of all the following individualSwho assisted
m~rthering my understanding of the compleX political and ethnic situation in Xinjiang
du~g the 19408.While I deeply appreciate their help, I aiso wish to stale clearly that
the interpretation placed on the information they sharedwithme is mine alone, and
theconclusions I reach are not necessarily shared by any of the individualS listed here.
I also wish to thank Dr.Tang Y i for his assistance inacting as translator (rurtish
10English), for Dr. Kanal, Mr. Erturk, and Mr.Tosun. The other interviewS were con-
ducted inChinese or English by myself.
NlUl1eand nationality
Prof.Frank Bessac, A merican
Mr. Delilhan J an A ltay, Kazak:
:. Zhang Dejun, Han Chinese
M . Anthony A Deng, Han Chinese-Russian
f. A bdUllah Emiroglu, Uighur
Mr. A bdullah Erturk, Uighur
Mr. Walter Graham, British
: A bdul Kerim Kanat, Uighur
M .A rbunsainKunggur,Sibo
t-Ma Shuqi, Hui
Mr.I brahimM"""''' H
h_ .....,...r, Ul
'"I I .NaSylUh, Manchu
Mr. vtocem Shui Han ChineSe
Mr. Ars1an T05U~Kazak
:. MakbuleWa~gShuli Hui
~.:"- MUhammed Wang, Hui
J I Y aqub Y clbers, Uighur
- - - - - - - - - -
A!'PENDIXE
''Why A reWeFighting?"
(Early Rebel Pamphlet)
Note: This pamphlet is reproduced here as in. the original translation made for the US.
Consulate in utumqi, notes included.
Our fathers and OUf father's fathers called the place where we are living"East
Turkestan,"
From ancient time there have lived in this place Utghurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Uz-
beks, and Tatars; at the present time also it isthe place of their habitation. .
Inthis territory there are counted to be four millionpeople; more than threemil-
lion of them are of these nations (that we have named); for tbal reasonthe
area-- Turkestan-was called the hearth of the Turkish nations, Our Dearestbloodre-
lations are Kazaks, Kirghiz, UZbeks, and Tatars. Inthe Soviet Union each of tbese
races bas organized its own Government and us members are living free andjoyful
lives.let us listen to the while bearded old men among us while they tell us, as they
alone can, what was the beginning of the history of our East Turkestan nations, and
bow it began.
Who are we? Who and where are OUf near and far relations? Where are the burial
grounds-so dear to I J S---()f our beloved and renowned ancestors?
Inanswer to thesequestions, any man who seeksthe truth and whoseheart isrighf
cannot fail to say that the root of our nation and soul is not in China. but in Central
A sia. in Kazakstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, and Tatarstan Our native place is East
Turkestan; we are the eastern branch and pan of that race-bound to us by blood
relationship-the other parts of which lie within the Soviet Union; we are the part that
isfighting.
Two hundred years ago fromA sl:rak.han and the borders of the Caspian Sea there
came to our East Turkestan several Kalmuk families and from that time forward they
lived among us as friends and without friction. Thus we see that their roots also were
not in China but sprang from the Russian Kalmuks. If they are asked they rnemsebes
will oonfinn ttus.
The (White) Russians now resident in East Turkestan can also make tbe same
statement about themselves [le., that they came 00[ fromChina but from Russia].
zoo
''WHY ARE ~ FIGHTING?" 201
Of the fourteen nations living in East Turkestan, the ten nations accounted the
most numerous have had no national, racial, or cultural relatioMhip nor any com-
munityof blood with the Chinese, nor did aD}'ever exist.
But through tbe sands oftbe desert from remote China therecameChinese 10our
Best Turkestan. With the help of sabres and whips and takingadvantageof our 10ve of
peace, the whiteness of our hearts, and our trustfulness, tbey took inlO their bands !be
control of the whole government; they exacted from us heavy tases and many I cinds of
contributions; they oppressed us until we had no more rights mae animals. And tbey
wereat that time the least enlightened people in the world; they could not give to us
brighter lives, they could not increase our knowledge or culture, they could not im-
~ theordinary livingconditions of the people; instead they robbed us of light,held
us u: ' slavery, kept us illiterate and plunged us in darkness.From that timeforwardour
territory was called "West China" or "Sinlciang" and it was forbidden 10pronounce the
name''East Turkestan" which the land had borne for years witbout end throughOUt
history. .
.Our fathers aod grandfathers were for hundreds of years oppressed by the sava~
~. To understand the nature of that oppression, weneed onlyregard theway 10
whichour people are being oppressed by the Chinese at the present time.
Many times inthe past our people have been unable further to endure thisoppres-
~ their patience exhausted, they have turned on their savageoppressors andfought
WIthgreat heroism. These battles are known to history.The beloved names of our
heroic grandfathers who died in these struggles snould serve us as banners callingus
forward to do battle against the Chinese who enslave us! .
~the years 26 and 27t the savage policies of ShengTupan began to be put 10 oe-
erauon, at the same time that fascism started.
Inthe same wa:y tbat fascism counts as its enemies all people whO klY e ~ and
freedom, thus did Sheng Tupan and the savage Chinese whO su~~ himcount
us, !henative people of East Turk.estan, as their enemies and as an infenor race.They
Dppressed us with every kind of cruelty. I n 26and 11 and the su!:l5equentyears SheDg
Tupan arrested Ha J eeneeyas, Sherif J an,2 and over four thousand others of the
vanguard, of these who were D105lliked, of those who IaJ e'N the cos, of ecse whO
were most Clever, of those who were outstanding for J eadenbip.can we forget them?
~er hebad arrested them, Sheng Tupan put them intorture ce~bearthe~
til their bones were broken strangled them and poisoned them.unlil they were .
Their crime inthe eyesof the Tupan was that heaccounted tbem our repre:sentaliY eS,
wOO sought for our people freedom andgood fortune. .' few are
Very fewof these men who were arrested at tbat time are still aliVe. '1lJ OSe
Indark. . . ortures at the hands oUbe
T prisons waiting for the coming of death to end thelf t . . ds ould DOl
epee's executioners. Their condition is so pitiful
lhat
th~lf beSt frien :00at tbC
~ themif they saw them, and their mothers, wives, or dtlldren 'WOUld go
Sightof the
These m. . Kaz3b Kirgbiz, Uz-
be helpless,unfortunate people are Uighurs, T~ ~ to wbicb we
beb, and Tarars. But they are more man representatlV
es
of thehers and our rela-
~g: they are our fathers, our elder brOlhers, our younger brOl
Hail, people! L et all men k.D<J W well: . Tu draWing
'I bat these helpless, unfortunate people in the prisODS of Sheng pan,
-
202 APPENDIX E
their last breaths or life before dying, tum upon us the eyes of their souls and in their
moaning say to us: "For the suffering-which we have endured at the hands of the
savage Chinese, you must avenge us.We are pouring forth our blood and yieldingup
our souls for OUf people: for this also you must avenge US."
A t the present lime, in OUf territory of East Turkestan, all of the ruling power is in
the hands of the Chinese alone.We are a people who have los! all human rights. I t
should be known by every man aCknowledge that when the rule is in the hands orlbe
Chinese, there is no equality and no justice. Only when the throats of the Chinesej~-
cis! oppressors have been cut and they have bled to death will we come again into the
lifeofligbC- - __
Cliliiese administrators plan to move from far-away China a million Chinese and
Chinese bandits
3
into our territory. Some of them, in the guise of soldiersandof
refugees, havealready rome to lihwa [UrumqiJ ; they are beingdispersed amongthe
several districts ancll1sien [: tian]. Itis the aim of the Chinese 10drive us out thereafter
from our native Turkestan and to remove us by force to the east. This thing which the
Chinese seek to do to us is for us the same lhing as the most horrible death: everyone
Should understand this. Our bones will rot unburied on either side of the long road
across the Chinese steppe to far away China; Chinese and Chinese bandits will live in
our houses, take over our goods, enjoy our riches, be masters in our stead; by force
they will go into our wives and our daughters. Because of our fear and our docility and
our trustfulness they will mock us with contemptuous laughter.
The Progressive, forward looking people among us, who give tbought to our future
welfare and fortune, have in every place organized illegal groups in order to figllt
againstlhe savage Chinese, because the Chinese are dragging us toward a bottomless
well, into which they mean to fling us.
Our fighters for the people'S freedom will unite our forces in friendship and under
right leadership to rise against the Chinese inorder to destroy their savage mastery and
power; therefore there have been fonned in every locality tbe illegal "National Free-
dam Groups."
Our aim in forming the "National Freedom Groups" is to free our people from
enslavement 10the savage Chinese and thereafter 10make it so that these people, whO
have been oppressed by the Chinese, strangled by them, crushed down by them, may
ariseagain as national races in possession of freedom, equality before the law, wealth,
culture, and afortunate life.
Our National Freedom Groups and au the members of every group have taken ~
oath in the name of the One God, before the souls of our heroic grandfathers and III
the presence of aU the people, to achieve, throUgh enthusiasm and heroism, by legal
and illegal means, by words and by force of arms, by night and by day andwithout rest-
ing the objectives set forth below.
1.We are fighting to do away with Chinese rule in all our East Turkestan
[SinkiangJ and to de'ltroy for aU limes theroots of Chinese tyranny inour territory.
East Turkestan belongs to the real masters of I he territory, the Uigburs, the
Taranchis, tbe Kazaks, the Kirghjz, rbe Teters, the Uzbeks, together with all tbose ~
live among them in peace and friendship and who alike suffer Chinese ~,
such as the Mongols and other non-Chinese nations. There is no place m East
Turkestan for Ctanese colonial government or Chinese coJ onists.. .
2 The National Freedom Groups and all of their members are fighting to establish
" WHY ARE WE FIGHTING?" 203
inEast Turkestan areal equality of rights between an races one with the other.
3.We are fighting for the organization of a National Political A lliance, that is, a
cngress composed of elected representatives of the people living in East Turkestan;
therepresentatives comprising this National Political A lliance should be elected in
numbersproportionate to the total numbers of their respective races. We should our-
selvesbe the real masters of this National Political A lliance and not the Chinese.
Thereafter the Chinese will have no way to deride and in treat us: we win make our
IJ \\'O lives and our own happiness according to our own desires and not according to
tbcse of the Chinese.
From among the elected representatives to the National Political Alliance we will
selectthemoot intelligent, the most just, and those who most J ovethe people, and with
themwe win organize our own new government.
4.The National Freedom. Groups and their members are fighting in the interests
of the people of an races except the Chinese so that inthe future the district, town, vil-
lageand small village administrations and organizations win be composed of trusted,
energetic, capable, just members elected according to the popular will by the locally
resident people themselves.
S.The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting for the cultural
~1opment of every racial nation {inSinkiang) and for the establishment of joeer and
middleschools in tbeir respective languages for tile children of every nation, these
scbooIs to be supported by the government.
6.The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to reestablish the
separate national contingents of troops, such as those comprised respectively by
Uighura, Kazeks, Mongols, and members of other national races, which were dis-
banded by Sheng Tupan because of his fear that they might oppose his political
-
7. Sheng Tupan, running wild, took: aU military and civil rule into hi<;0IVll ~;
throughout the entire East Turkestan all rule became military; in the cities martial jaw
was declared, and as SOOIl as it became evening all movement in tbe streets was ab-
~lutely forbidden; it was impossible to leave the city without permission. A fter
mghtfall)'Oll were prevented not only from visiting your friends.but you could not go
to seeyour closest relatives on the most urgent business, because tlte moment you
stepped out of your door a Chinese would seize you and begin; "Where are you
gomg?" "For what reason?" "What have you said?" and [be would ask you) many
~berquestions. Each person was obliged to spy on evefYOllC else and irlf~the po-
~ A t the present time East Turkestan {SinkiangJ bas tecome one vast PfI SOn; the
MtkJ J s are captives in it and the Chinese are tlte executioners. 1beoaeeee them-
selvesaccount the situation tobe one of happiness and afortunate lifefor the nativeS!
. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to overttnuw ~
PFI son system set up by the oppressor, Sheng Tupan; to wrest the mili~.and civil
powersfromthe rule of one man, and to free unoffending peop1e frOm c:aptMty.
to 8.The Natiooal Freedom Groups and their members are fi~~g to ~ freedOm
~ch among the number of those natives who (beCause of thelf llI terest mthe we.
1
-
aliYe of the'people) were arrested and inprisoned by Sheng Tcpan as may yet be still
and stili serrenng from Chinese oppression; these persons arethe most trusted of
our people, possess naturally the m<J 5[ authority, are Ute foremo;t among us and the
IlQl dear to us.
204 APPENDIX E
9.There ~ously-existl;:fl frieruuy ~g_~I !lJ ions_be,~f Easl:
Tur~ rS~gJ J !I ld the-Soviet-Govemment; this relationship was disruj)i'OO"6y
th ChineSe administration; this cessation of trade worked great hardship in our lives,
checked the growth of peasant holdings in the villages, and brought to a standstill tile
trading in the bazaars; for each family the daily livelihOOd became difficult I n every
locality those who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find
employment, and whose condition was altogether piteous, became more and more
numerous. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; the bankrupt be-
came beggars. For skilled workers also there are no jobs because there is no one who
needs to employ them. A s a result they too have fallen into dire poverty. The number
of people who have met this kind of misfortune mounts up higher every day.Inthe
market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of wool, skins, or grains, or
for the other products of the small village holdings, nor for the production of the cattle
raisers. The powerful Sovsintorg, a large purchaser, went out and away from East
Turkestan [Sinkiang) asa consequence of the inside-out political policies of Sheng
Tupan. The prices of the food supplies and other products of the village holdings and
of carne and sheep husbandry are too cheap: the husbandman cannot buy any of the
things he needs for his family's livelibood with the money he realizes from the sale of
his products. From this money the Chinese authorities also forcibly take all kinds of
taxes and exactions, for which reason no one can spend for his own needs or as be likes
ina carefree way the money be receives. The lifeof the peasant, of the cattle and sheep
herder, of the whole generality of the population, thus becomes progressively more dif.
ficult day by day.The people of East Turkestan [SinkiangJ are like an orphaned child,
without father or mother or anyone to heed its cries.The savage Chinese have torn the
child from the mother that bore it (the Soviet Government) and seek to give it to a
foster mother (the Three People's Principles) for the latter to trample it under foot.
For the people of East Turkestan the severance of their mutually friendly relations
with the Soviet Union and their subjection to the discipline of the Three People's Prin-
ciples by the savage Chinese is the same thing as death by torture.
The National Freedom Groups must fight to free eu people from the claws of
death by hunger, to establish anew- strong and truly sincere relations of friendship ~tb
our great, freedom-loving friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union, and to develop wide
and full trading relations between all our trading men and the sovsmrorg. We ~re
fighting to do away with the fIXed market prices set by the Chinese by proclamation
and to destroy the other systems of regulations harmful to thepeople.
10.The National Freedom Groups must fight to procure the abatement and
lightening of the unbearable load of taxes and exactions imposed upon tbe people.by
the Chinese. We demand of the Chinese that they decrease the endless and grcwmg
number of police and soldiers.
11.The National Freedom Groups must fight to secure freedom of religion and
will oppose all restraints placed upon religious pracnces,"
12 The National Freedom Groups must offer strong and merciless opposition .to
the policy of moving Chinese and Chinese bandits into our East Turkestan and of driv
ing us, the people of the place, by force from our native soil to the East.
Even if the Otinese, with false and sweet words., attempt to receive us, we will not
move anywhere at all from our own soil, nor shall the Cbinese enter into our land, be-
cause we know very well that for us these things would be the same as death.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
--
''M/Y ARE WE FfGHTING?" 205
13.The National Freedom Groups must fight to procure the increase and expan-
sionof irrigated lands, rivers, and (artificial) waterways and must direct theattention of
our new government to such useful projects and assist (intheir realization).
. 14.The National Freedom Groups must oppose all of the many kinds of heavy and
difficult forced labor imposed on the native peoples by the QtineSe (such as the dig-
gingof completely useless trenches and so forth) because tnese things are of no benefit
to the people and are necessary to no one.
The oppression of the savage Chinese bas turned into Fascist: rapacity; for this it is
not possible to sit with quiet and patience, only watcbing. Everyone must Ir;Do\V that the
timehas come when he must choose one of two lives: to livearealty happy lifein free-
dom, or to becrushed in slavery beneath the boot of tbe savage Chinese.
. The National Freedom Groups and their members give to all people tbiswarning:
~because of our fear we improvidently let this moment pass, the QrineSe will bring
I DtOOUfland millions of Chinese bandits and they will be settled among us.Then we
shall be strangled, robbed of all our belongings, and humiliated; then we sean be
powerless to liberate ourselves from the claws of the Chinese Facsists-
The National Freedom Groups clearly understand this situation and we have
sworn an oath not to permit a single moment to pass unused from this time forward,
but rather to start now to fight against the rule of the savage (]rioe:Se oppressors, for
the sake of a bright life for the people, their freedom, their fortune, and their wen-
being.
We call upon every man whO takes thought for the happineSS of his own family and
of his people, upon all men of learning, of justice and of courage, upon our he~and
all our youth, upon our brave soldiers, each and everyone of them, not to let aslOgle
moment pass, but to stand in our ranks as one of us to resist with us the oppressor
Cbi~. There is no single person whO could possibly doubt that the help of the Ooe
God I Son our side and His kindneSS iswith us.
Brothers! Each of WI must rise with heroic braVery against the QlineSe!Tunc coes
DOt 'Nail. Our lives and our bapp~ are for this moment illourOWO hands: if we aI!.i
afraid we will jose them both.
Enroll yourself as a member of the National Freedom Grouf6l Organize in every
separate place a local National Freedom Group! L et all people arise and resist tbe
savage Chinese! 1betime of our triumph wincertainly come!
The National Freedom Group
~e: U.S.Dept.of Stale, Office of Strategic Semces Hie XL 32642.''Rebel Objet-
twes in Sinkiang." september 25, 1945, enctosute DO- 1 to dcSP8
tdt
no.23, frOln the
American Consulate in Urumqi..
N. . . .
1.Of the Chinese Republic, te., 1937and 1938- . R' J an-
2 The leader of ..._ A ltai Kazab. whO knew well the OJ jnc5e and U5I WI
...... . . . ..... --.ol fabill stature
gua~and was ahandsome. graciouS manof gJ ganuc~ue. r....-..o
and hI S physical courage. He baS beC:OfDe alegend
---------
106 APPENDIX E
3. Hung hu tsu, by which the Chinese mean simply "bandit" and the Turkish mean
"Chinese bandit."
4.Here the propagandist doubUess refers, among other constraining regulations,
to those which in effect forbid the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca, which used to be made
by many Sinkiang Muslims.
APPENDIXF
"Struggle for the Motherland"
(L ater Rebel Pamphlet)
Thir pamphlet appean here as in the original translation modefiOl' the u.s. ConsukJJt in
U" " '" "
Originally Eastern Turkestan, our Mrnberland, was the real territory of the Turkish
Race.We consist of seven million people.This land is our birthright left by our brave
ancestors and it is our duty and responsibility to guard this heritage.The Chinese op-
press.orsand usurpers came to this land two hundred years ago, likesavagesand
bandits, seizing our territory, enslaving us, malting our land a colony and disbooOring
our holy religion. In brief, we became like men who have eyes but are blind, ears but
are deaf, tongues but are dumb, and legs but are lame.Such treachery and barbarous
m:ato~ent.How can they be endured? Ponder over these things.Which oftbem can be
gatn'lald? Ifyou are Dot a spy or a quisling; if you are born OfY OUfmother; iI tbe blood
from your umbilical cord wet this soil; if our father owns you as his legitimate SOD
thenyou cannot cny the truth 0 wHat has just been said!
You must Dot forget how our country flourished of old under the leadership of
such heroes of our race as Sultan Sokushbora Khan, Harum Khan, A bdul Raschid
Khan, Mohamet Khan, Sudduk Khan, and Osman Khan.During the times of these
great men we were masters of our territory and maintained the luster of our culture
~.l to any others. Within the last two hundred years we have loSt our birth-right and
live likeanimals under I he cruel sway of me Chinese wOOare filthyand tarterccs,
Why did the iiiuprising occur? It was because we have the right to rise up against
oppression for the sake of our liberty, the happiness and prosperity of our sons, and
the rennaissance of our religion. We also believe that A llah has said to us, '1shall
pumsh all oppressors,'' We atso are fully convinced that tbe power of the masses is the
power.of A llah. I n this faith we fought and over-throwing the treacherous Qlinese
~relgnty in the three districts! established a free Muslim Eastern Turkeslan State.
A llhe same time we raised tbeflag that was handed down fromour jorefatbers,
Ho, fellow countrymen, Men of the Faith and members of the same b/OOd.. Fear
oot.Strengthen your hearts and courage and consciences..
A fter an abundance of bloodshed we won a compromise peacewhich consisted of
- - - - - - - - -
208 APPENDIX F
eleven articles of agreement. Inorder to preserve this agreement infull, thepeopk:
must be willing to sacrifice everything.
The crafty fOlCes, with their swinish snouts, seeking to obtain what is not theirs, the
shameless and Oppressive Chinese, using these eleven articles all a blind, are seeking
again to trap us in their net The cunning Chinese serve us with awooden plate(which
can be used once only and then must be thrown away). "May A llah protect us from
falling once more into the Chinese hands....Ifwe do so again the people know how they
will be treated. People, you must remember the past.The land is ours and tbe invaders
have no Claimto it
NoW, the mili~ry beads of theseoppressors at Urumcbi are trying to prolong their
already exhausted life.
2
Their aim is to reestablish their old barbarous methods. To-
gether with them are a few running dogs, conscienceless fools and sycophants, playing
a quisring role withthe Chinese. The eleven articles of the agreement will not alJ owthe
oppressors any road to regain their former suzerainty if lI S terms are fulfilled
Ho, shameless beasts and devils. Y ou must know"that you are already caughr in
Hell.We, people of the same blood, must not let youqu~gs danceto Cbinesem~.
The present isan era of democracy, justice, and liberty-no I orI ger orabsotete dic-
tatorship. This isno more a time for slumber but a brightening period oflbe Twentieth
Century.] We must SlruggJ e unceasingly withour belts still tightened.
L et tnese OPPressors depan qUicJ cly from our Eastern Turkestan.
L et these spies, traitors and puppets also leave at once.
L et I .bese running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.
L ong live free Eastern Turkestan.
L ong live our Muslim RepUblican Government.
L ong live the great, the heroic warriors.
L ong live the crescent calling for our thirty days ofboly fast.
L ong live the star calling for OUrfive daily prayers. .
A way with, away with, away witb these oppressors, these spies, these pro-Chinese.
Ifyou do DOt depan there is no room for you here above the ground.
The BUbbling Spring
Source: us, Depanmellt of State, Division of Chinese A ffairs, "Signs of Unrest in
Tibwa," A merican Consul J . Hall Paxton to tbe Secretary of State, Urumqi, J anuary
13, 1947, enclosure no.2.
No ...
1.The three northwest dist.rk::ts:A ltai, Cbuguchek, and Kuldja.
2.This is said to refer to a recent speech of General Song's in which he urged that
the01inese bold their ground and cease yielding. . .
3.Strange but apparently true, a strongly Moslem declaration using the Ctmsuen
dnoooI ogy.
NOTES
CHA PTER 2
1.J une Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions (london, 1976), p. 33-38.
2I bid., pp.18-22.
3.Sun Vat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (faibel, 1953), p, 181.
4.I bid., p.182.
5.I bid.
6.Sun Y et-sen, Fundamentals ofNationalReconst1UCtUm (Taibei, 1953), p.265.
7.Sechin J agchid, "The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The I nner
Mongolian Case:' in Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, ed.McCagg and Silver (New Y ork,
1979).A ccording to ttns source (pp. 235-36), the use of zJlOl1gzu was vehemently
denounced by various national minority representatives,
8.The China Yearbook (Shanghai, 1934), p. 466.
9.Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (faibei, 1953), p.6.
10.Dr.Sun himself bad evidently at one time envisaged atype of federal organization
for China Members of Sun's Revive China Society founded in 1895 reportedly were
asked to swear an oaththat called for an end to Manchu rule and the establishment of
afederal republic in China. See I mmanuel C.Y .Hsu, The Rise of Modem Chinn (Ox-
ford, 1983), p. 451.
11.ChveQ L attimore,Pivot of Asia (Boston, 1950), p.115.
12.Chiang Kai-shek, Selected Speeches and Messages: 1937-1945 (faibei, 1953),
p.265.
13.~bid..p.266. The possibility of greater autonomy for Mongolia and Tibet had
been mcluded in I he platform of the Sixth National Guomindang Congress of May 18,
1945, but other frontier areas were to be essssec in economic and cultural develop-
ment tosreac, with no mention of possible autonomy. see Milton J .T.Shieh, TI re
Kuonuntang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969 (New Y ork, 1970).
14.Chiang Kai-shek, Selected Speeches, p.266.
I
210 NOTES TO C1fAJ>TERS2AND 3
15.Frank Bessac, "Revolution and Government in I nner Mongolia 1945-1950,"
Papers of the MichiganAcademy a/Science Arts and Letters (Michigan, 1965), p. 422.
16."Border Districts Delegates Demand A utonomy for Racial Minorities," English
L anguage Service of the Central News A gency, December 3, 1946, cited in lOR
UP&S/l2/2360. "Chinese Turkestan I nternal Situation."
17.W.Y .Tsao, The Constitutional Structure of Modern China (Melbourne, 1947),
pp.291-92.
18.I bid., pp.286--87.
19.This office isdiscussed inHsu, The Risea/Modem China, p. 53.
20.Tsao Wen-yen, ed., The Chinese Year Book 1944--45 (Shanghai, 1946), p.271.
21.On Sheng's removal see chapter 3. On L ung Y un's removal, see the account in
J .C.S.Hall, The YU1t11OnProvincial Faction 1927-1937 (Canberra, 1976).
22.See C.C.Ku, "Economic Development of China's Northwest," China Quarterly
(Shanghai) 4 (1938-39): 294.
23. China Handbook 1937-43 (New Y ork, 1943), p. 403.
24.China Handbook 1937-45 (New Y ork, 1947), p.341.
25.Tsao, ed., The Chinese Year Book 1944--45, p. 787.
CI I A PI 'ERJ
1.C. C. Ku, "Economic Development of China's Northwest," Chino. Quorterfy
(Shanghai) 4 (1938-39): 264.No figures are available for the amount of gold being
taken out of the A ltai gold mines, but some fifty thousand workers were said to VI OI 'k:
in the gOld mines there. Shipments of gold by plane from L anzhou to the Chinese
coast were "COnsiderable." This gold, according to Ku, was "mostly mining ~ty by
high officials" and valued at one-twentieth of the total A ltai output.
2 I nterview with Walter Graham, Uckfield, England, A ugust 1984.
3.Xinjiang's bituminous coal reserves were estimated at 31,980 million tons, or the
third largest reserves in China in 1946. Oil reserves were estimated at 120million
metric tons, or 58 percent of China's total reserves; iron, 42,888,000 metric tons, and
tungsten ore, 8,600 metric tons were also considered important reserves. ChinD Hand.
book 1937-45 (New Y ork. 1947), p. 391.
4.U.S. National A rchives, Washington, D.C., Office of Strategic Services (OS~),
"Developments of the Week in China: Chungking Challenges Russian I nfluence m
Sinkiang." Research and Analysis Report no.340, A ugust 25, 1942, p.1.
5.HoKu-jen,/3SUe3 and Studies 4(1968): 25.
6. U.S. National A rchives, Washington, D.C., Office of I ntelligence R~rcb,
"Recent Events in Sinkiang," 00.4461, J une 11, 1947, p.9, citing Chinese milit.aJ Y
sources, Wolfram ore yields tungsten, which is used in tungsten steel and in electrical
filaments.
7.Herman, An Historical Atlas of China (Chicago, 1%6), p.60.
S.The importance of molybdenum was recognized by the Chinese government, ~t
Xinjiang's deposits were apparently unknown; no mention of the existence of thiS
mineral inXinjiang is made in the China Handbook. 1937-45. . ,
9.ass, "Russo-Chinese Relations and Potential Soviet Contributions to Ctuna S
Postwar Economic development," R &A Report 00.3331, A ugust 31, 1945, P.13.
10.I bid.
NOTES TO cHAPTER 3 211
11.Se~L awrence Krader, Peoples of Central Asia (BlOOmington, 19(3); J ack.
Dabbs, HIStory of the Discovery and Exploration of Chinese Turkestan (Nether1a.nds,
1%3); Geoffrey Wheeler, The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia (L ondon, 19(6); and
J une Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions (L ondon, 1976).
12..L awrence Franklin, "The Chinese Response to British and Russian zecroece-
ment L O Northwest China," Ph.D. dissertation, St.J ohn's University, 1978.
..13.People from the IIiarea, inparticular, identify only three separate groups [n Xin-
J ~g:Moslems, non-Moslems (e.g., Manchus, Mongols), and Han Chinese.I nterview
WithAnth? ny A 1exievitch Deng, Taibei, Taiwan, November 1984.
14'.Vanous Turkic groups lived inCentral A sia during this period and inlermarried.
Turkic peoples included the Besmil, the Qarluq, and the Turlcic peoples of the
Karakanik, Ghaznavid, and succeeding Turkic empires, many of whichwere formed
through alliances ofTurkic groups more powerful tban the Uighur.
15.L attimore, Pivot of Asia (Boston, 1950), pp.15-16.
16.I bid., pp.45-69.
17.For a detailed account see I mmanuel C.Y .Hsu, The Iii Crisis: A studyof5.ino-
Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881 (L ondon, 1965).
~8. H. S. Brunnert and V. V.Hagestrom, Present Day poUJical 0rganiziJ ti0tt of
China, trans.A Beltchenko (Beijing, 1910), p. 440.
19.L attimore, Pivot of Asia, pp.52-64.
20.seedescription inibid., pp- 66-67.
.21.I nterview with A bdullah Erturk, Taibei, Taiwan, November 1982A lsO see L at-
umore, Pivot of Asia, pp.(j6.....67. ...
22 M. Kullukoff "The Democratic Movement of the People of SoUthXioJ J aI 1g
(Kashgaria) 1945-47:" SCientific w orks ond Inf()TtrliJtion,Book I, A cade'o/ 0: ~~,
Uzbek SSR, Department of Social Sciences (fasbkeot, 1960), p. 111,citing XinJ J aI 1g
Gaaett," May 3,1951; L attimore, Pivot ofAsW, p. 67. .
23.Kazak resistance under Sheng is recorded in HasanOraltay, KiJzJJ: - ~~
(I stanbul, 1961), pp.6J --67. Other Sheng taetics included kidD3pPng, false IJ lV1tatiOl'lS
~ talks, and promiseS to reieese pnsooers inachaDg
e
for ee di.';arfDiIlg of the
b.
24.I nterview with ArsIan 'rosen 'tanet, Taivw'3I l, October 1981.A cCOfding10Mr.
Tosun, the group of KazakS ofwhiciJ heWa1 amember was prounsed lhal ~~ of
their revered leader zuta HaJ ; would be relurned to tbett1 fI X"proper bUriallf lbey
." _ .......... icl'rl do so and under
would end their resistance 10Sheng's government..lbeY l"vu---
I O
, ,
their leader Sultan Sherif they moved to the BarkOl area where they ooped to.1iVe
peecercuy; however, due to continued goverllI 1lent harrassme~t they moved I ota
neighboring Qinghai inJ uly 1937.They returned to Xinjiang somet
une
tn 1948;.,,'-;,,1
25.I ndia Office Records (lOR), L oodOO, I .J P&SI I 2/Z359, DO_1224 (4). "l"'~-
Survey of I ntelligence on Xinjiang lC)4.3."
26.China Handbook (faibei, 1951).p.365. "Uru .
ZT. lOR L /P&S/12/2405. 00. 12, File 62, "Chinese Turt.es
180
, Tunal, m<p,
J une 2, 1944.
28.SeeA llen Whiling, SUrJcjong: Pawn or Pivot (M~gan, 1958). I S '9I bo
.29.As. lale as tile 19405, the ter01 "Tum" was belDgused ~ in~iang.
VI SI tedthe region and representatiY eSof forcign goveJ 1(lJ 1Cflts sta . tI J Uru .
30.fOR UP&S/l2/2359. 110.1224 (4), letter DO- 601J Hf6/S-P'f, Gille, mqt,
---------- .
212 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
March 1, 1944.He in tum cites a Soviet grammar of Uighur published in 1939 as the
source of his information.
31.I bid.
32.See A itchen K. Wu, ''The Fourteen Peoples of ChineseTurkestan," JoumaI of
the West China Border Research Society 15, seriesA (1944): 88-93.
33.An example can be seen in Mehmet Emin Bugra, "Xinjiang Compatriots Are
Turkish," Altai 1, 1 (A pril 25, 1945): 8-10.
34.Today Manchus continue to use their own language in Xinjiang.InTafbei,a
Manchu A ssociation fosters continued interest in Manchu language and culture
among a small bUI enthusiastic group of Manchus from Xinjiang as well as from the
northeast of China.
35.I nterviews with A rbunsain Kunggur, Taibei, Taiwan, 1984-1985. Mr.Kungguris
a Sibo originally from the OJ valley.
36.Urumqi's population was 69,275; Han accounted for 38,557, or 55 percent I f
the city's 15,978 Chinese Moslems or Hui are added, Chinese speakers accounted for
78 percent of the city's population in 1946.Based on figures given by She Ungyun in
Tianshan yuegan, Oct. 15,1947: 9-21.
37.I bid.
38.I ...attimore, Pivot 0/ Asia, p. 140.
39.Zhang Dajun, Forty Yean a/Turbulence in Xinjiang (Hong Kong, 1956), p.175;
O.Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Grear Game (L ondon, 1971), p.175.
40.N.N.Mingulov, "The National liberation Movement in Xinjiang as Part of the
Chinese Revolution, 1944-49," Central Asian Review 11 (1963): 184; Tianshan
huabao (J une 1947): 1, citing Zhang Zhizhong. Uncorroborated information from the
youngest son of Sabit DamulJ ah (an official in the government of the first Ea~t
Turkestan RepUblic) states that the initial meetings of this committee took place a! his
father's house io Vining in the year prior to the rebellion. I nterview with Dr. A bdul
Kasim Kanat, Taibe~Taiwan,J anuary 1982.
41.SeeHasan Oraltay,Kizzak Turlderi, p.63.
42.Zhang Dajun, Xmjiang's Seventy Yean of Turbulence (Taibei, 1980), 11:6147.
43.lOR l./P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turral, Urumqi, september 6, 1944.He
added that the general cost of living for a laborer was up 86percent in A ugust 1944
over the preceding lllOI lth, mainly the result of the cost of food.
44. lOR L /P&S!12/2360, no. 12, File 64, G. A weuinger, Nanjing, December 3,
1946.
45.OSS, File XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," september 25, 1945, en-
closure no. I , pp.6-7_
46.I bid., citing enclosure no.2, p.L
47.See George Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The IIi KaZJ1kh Autono.
mous Chou (Harvard, 1966); J ack Chen, The SinJdang Story (london, 1977), p.210;
Burhan, Fifty Yean in Xmjiang (Beijing, 1983), p.276.
48.Kasbgar's quota had been to supply 1,500 horses, but it "donated" a total of Xn
$1,050,000 and 70 horses.Xinjiang Daily, J une 30, 1944, p.3.Turfan contributed Xn
$113,400 and no horses-Xinjiang Daily, J une 25, 1944, p.3_
49.Chen, The Sinkiang Srory, p.209.
SO. A lso, getting horses away from the Kazaks woukl have been a major challenge!
51.OSS, Hie XI.. 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," September 25, 1945, P.9.
-
NOTES TO CHAPTERS 3 AND 4 213
52 I bid.A mong those held in Sheng's prisons were A hmet J an Kasimi (1937-1944)
and Burhan Shahidi (1938-1944). see Burhan, Fifty Yean, pp.269-81.
53.This report also indicated that as local oases in the area between L anzhou and
Urumqi did not produce any surplus foodstuffs, the passage of troops into t.his area
would constitute "economicdisruption and suffering." ass, vue36225, DO.1176,
"Movement of National Government Troops into Sinkiang," OJ ongqing, May 12,
1943, citing U.S.Consul Clubb, Urumqi, A pril 22, 1943.
54.ass, Flle 35656, no. 1076, "Subject Transmitting Report Contained in China
I nformation Committee Daily Bulletin on Sinkiang Province," Cbongqing, A pril 14,
1943, citingDaily Bulletin, 00.613 (undated).
55.lOR UP&S/1212359, no. 1224 (4), "Confidential Report on Sino-So'I iet Rela-
tions Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia Frontier I ncidents," Turrnl, Urumqi, A pril 7, 1944.
56.I bid., A pril 27, 1944.
57. ChiJul Handbook (faibei, 1951), p. 359.
58.See especially the works of Zhang Dajun and Sun Fukun,
59.lOR 1)P&S/1212405,1lO. 12, Flle 62, Turral, Urumqi, December I , 1944.
CHA PTER.
1.U.S.State Department, Document 45492, citing report of U.s. Consul O.Ed-
mund QUbb, entitled "Sinkiang-USSR Relations," Urumqi, J uly 3, 1943, p. 3.
2 I bid.
3.One leaflet is cited in Zhang Dajun, Xinjiang's Seventy Yean of Turbuknu
(Taibei, 1980), 11:6259, which in tum cites the Xinjiang Proviocial Public security De-
partment, IIiDistrict, Gongha County Bandit Suppression Report, 00. I , 1944.
4.I bid.
5.A ccording to the account by J ack Chen the unit was ambushed and wiped out,
but this is not supported by Chinese sources. see J ack eben, The Sinkiong Slay
(london, '977), p. 209.
6.Zhang, Sn.>entyYean, 11:6'1fJ 7.
7.lOR l.J P&s/12/2405, Turral, I jrumqi, November 2, 1944.
8.Zhang, SevenJy Yean, 11: 6'1fJ7. Zhang implies that Deng was purposely misled
during hi<;wit by Y ining officials sliD loyal to Sheng who were trying to assure that
Sheng would DOl be blamed for thecoming troubles. .
9.Xinjiang PrOY incial Government, "Population steusocs for 1946," UrumqJ , J uly
S, 1946, held at theBureau of I nvestigation, Xindian, Taibei, Taiwan.
10.Hasan Oraltay,KDZJ J k Turlderi (l5tanbu~1961),p. 79. . .
I I . The term "bandit" is .still used by Ounese speakers both 10deoote a bandit m
the usual Englishsense of theword and to identify antigovernment groups.
12Xinjiang Provincial Government, "Population Statistics for 1946."
13.Zhang, Seventy Years, 11:6260.
14.lOR UP&s/2405, 00.12, FlI e 62, Turral, Urumq~December 1, 194o!'
15.ass XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," report by Amencao Consul
Raben Ward, Urumqi, September 25, 1945, ercoscre 2, p. 3. . ..
16."Nauoear' here refers to thearea of Chinese Turtestao--XinJ I 8Dg.
17.ass XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives inSinkiang," encloSUre I , pp. 4-8..
18.Zhang, Seventy Yean, 11:6271.
214 NOTES TO CllAPTER. 4
19.I bid
20.I bid, 11:6276. A U.S.SOurce gives different dates. A ccording to tne U.S.cocscr
in Urumqi, SUiding feli on December 30.General Xie reached Y ining about J anuary
18, 1945, with five thousand troops and engaged the "insurgents" for a five-day period
that ended withthe defeat of the Chinese. Xie retreated withremnants of the defend.
ers of the airfield on J anuary 31.ass File 117975, no.7, citing "I ning Uprising: The
Fall of the Defense A rea; the I nsurgent Government," U.S. Consul Ward, Urumql,
February7,1945.
21.Various SOurces agree on this fact, but there are no official figures available 00
casualties at Y ining.
22.ass HI e 117975, no.7, 'lI ning Uprising," p.2
23. OSS File 137188, 00.9, "Xinjiang Revolt: I ts Progress from the First Week in
February to the Middle of May; Rumored Efforts to Seek a Settlement," U.S.Consul
Ward, Urumqi, May 25, 1945.
24. Zhang,Sf!Venty Yean, 11: 6277.
25.I bid., 11:6278-79.
26."Xinjiang: The IiiA ffair," Document no. 100/1 13.5/1, March 17, 1945, National
History I nstitute, Xindian, Taibei.
27.Zhao Xiguang, "Toward a Correct Understanding of the Northwest," JUnjiang
Daily, J anuary 21, 1945.
28. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic
Papers 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1969), 7:991, citing Ward's report of J anuary I S,
1945.
29.I bid., 7:994. A lso see references to the fact that T.V.Soong disagreed with the
Soviet instigation theory, p.1004.
30. His name also appears as A ilun Chun Wang, or Prince Wang. He was the
reportedly henpecked husband of Hatije Kadvan Hanim [Hatewan], later the first fe-
male Kazak to hold the post of inspector general for Urumqi, and the first female to
hold SUcha high-ranking post inXinjiang.
31.Zhang, Seventy Yean, 1I :6349-50. .
32.lOR UP&S/1112405, Tunal, Urumqi, February 5, 1945.Also inXinjiangJ)(Jily,
J anuary 12, 1945, p.3.
33.Zhang, Seventy Yean, 11:6349-50.
34. Mesut Sabri, "Concerning Politics in the Northwest," Altai [Chinese-language
magazineJ , Chongqing, A pril 25, 1945.
35.lOR UP&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Terral, Urumqi, J uly 7,1945.
36.I bid.
37.FRUS, 1945,7:1002
38.Even if Zhu ShaoUang had decided to launch an offensive, it seems bighly pr0b-
able that despite greater numbers of Nationalist troops they may wen have been more
than matched by iocar forces. A ccording to eyewitness accounts, the Natiooalist ~
were ill-prepared for OOlJ ditions in Xinjiang, lacking adequate dothing and alI J ]pI a~g
bitterly about the unsuitable food. I nterviews with A rbusain Kunggur and I brahim
Mansur, Taibei, Taiwan.
39. White Russian commander Bolinov is credned witb leading the attacks on
Tacheng and Emin.See Zhang, SevenJy Yean, 11:6336.
40.A mali Karahoca, Dogu Turkistan (I stanbul, 1961), p.440.
Nons TOCHAPTER 4 215
41.FRUS, 1945,7:1020.
42 The note from Molotov to Wang Shijie, China's new minister of foreign affairs
who replaced T.V.Soong before the treaty was signed, stated that with regard to
rect:
nt
developments in Xinjiang, the Soviet Union "has no intention of inlerfering in
theunemar affairs of China." The Chinese Yearbook. 1944-45, p.513.
..43.Sun Fukun, A Record of the Soviet Union's Aggression and Exp/oiJaJion in Xin-
JIang (Hong Kong, 1952), p.9.
44.Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:6803.
45.Mehmet Emin Bugra, Dogu TurldstDn (I stanbul, 1952), p.58.
46.lOR L /P&S1l2/2405, no.12, Hie 62, Turral, Urumqi, October 3,1945.
47.Zhu Shaoliang and L uo J iaJ un (special commissioner for Xinjiang, under tbe
Control Y uan) blamed lhe Soviet Union for inspiring and aiding the IIi forces. See
FRUS, 1945,7:992, 1001-1002.
48.A lthoUgh the two men were related, this marriage bad caused a split inthe fam-
ily.There was no indication of any specific sympatlJ y between the two and no record
that they met, although both were in Urumqi at the same time.
49.There isan interesting story concerning A hmet's rise to power in the ElR, which
isrecorded in more than one source. In the years just prior to tbe IIi rebellion A hmel
was in prison in Urumqi. Released after the rebellioo began, he made his way back to
Vining and offered his services to the new government. He was asked to help out in
the kitchen, his first contribution to the three districts revolution thus being as cook.
When it was discovered that he could read Russian, he was called upon [0translate in-
formation from that language into Turkl, From thi<; rather humble beginning be rose
to the post of minister of foreign affairs by autumn of 1945.See Burhan Shahidi, Fifty
Years, p.293.
50. Ebulhayir has remained a shadowy figure. FoI J owing his participation in the
peace negotiations, and after the coalition government look: over inJ uly 1946, little is
heard of him.
51.Zhang, Seventy Year:r, 12:6808, citing Zhang Zhizbong's report 10the central
government of March 1947.see also assXL 48391, ciring "Negotiations Between
Chang Chih-chung inTI hwa [Urumqi]," Ward, Urumqi, J anuary 29, 1946, p.2
52 I bid.
53.Zhang. Seventy Years, 12:6810-14.
54.lOR I .J P&SI 12/2405, TUrra1, Urumqi, November 1, 1945.
55.Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:6822-24.
56.FRUS, 1945,7:1024.
57.I bid., 7:1023. A lso, Zhang Dajun writes that the government had determined
~t no advanced autonomy would be given to Xinjiang, aed that absolutely 00 eke-
tlOQ of provincial-Ievel officiaJ s woukf be allOwed. see ZhaOg, Sevody YeD7.J,12:6825.
58.Ibid.
59.ass File XL em48391 "Negotiations between OJ 3ng OJ ib-dlung and the
Delegates of the lning Regime,': J anuary 28, 1946, p- 4.Zhang Dajun writes that the
delegates also demanded that the wbole provincial police force be MQ\lem, that .the
centra] government assist in the organization of people's militias, and that all soldiers
brought into Xinjiang to quell tbe rebellion be removed. Zhang, Sewllly Yean,
12:6842
60.I bid, 12:6847.
216 NOTES TO CllAPTERs 4 AND S
61.I bid., 12:6861.
62.I bid, 12:6865.
63.On previous appointments in border areas, he had gained a reputation for en",
riching himself at the local people's expense---especially in Tibet and I nner Mongolia.
See L attimore, Piviot of Asia, pp.85-86.Rumors said he left with Xn S20 millioo in
gold A popular story Claimed that "He arrived with a bedding roll and small suitcase
and left with 600 kilos of luggage and 9 lorry loads of goods," Two of his aides were
said to have collected over Xn S4 million in bribes for passports and export visas-tbe
passport feeunder Sheng being a mere Xn S150,000 but under Wu in 1946Xn S2mil.
lion. These stories were all collected by the British consul and recorded in I RQ
l.J P&s1I 2/2402, Ext.Document 7595, 1946.
64. Xmjiang Daily, J anuary 28, 1946, p.3.
65.Wu Zhongxin, "Xinjiang Province Monetary Question," Doc. no.02.2/10, J anu-
my 1946, National History I nstitute, Xindian, Taibei.
66. Xinjiang Daily, A pril 26, 1946, p.3.
67.I bid., May 4, 1946, p.3.
68.I bid., May 8, 1946, p.3.
69.Zhang, Sew nty Yean, 12:6874.
70.The text of the second annex asupplementary agreement is in FRUS, 1946,
10:1208; also in the original Chinese inZhang, Seventy Years, 12:6875-76.
71. XinjiangDaily,June 7, 1946, p.3.
72 I bid., J une 6, 1946, p.3.The central government had already decided that no
1945-46 land taxes would be collected in the provinces occupied by J apan during the
war. I n 1946 it was declared that all provinces would receive this exemption, ~
Zhang was therefore probably certain his request would be granted. On the tax reme-
son, see L loyd E.Eastman, SeedJ Of Destruction (Stanford, 1984), p.73.
73.Xiangjiang Daily,J une 6, 1946, p.3.
74.I bid., J une 21, 1946, p, 3.
75.I bid., J une 8, 1946, p.3.
76.I bid.
n. I bid., J uly I , 1946, p.3.
78.I bid., J uly 2, 1946, p, 3.
79.I bid
CllAPTERs
1.On Guomiodang tcvobemem in coenuocs, see Paul Sib, NaJirJnn1UI ChimJ Dar-
ing the Sino-JoptUfese War 1937-1945 (Hicbville, N.Y ., 1977). On warlords and
provincial factions seeJ .C.S. Hall, The YlUVUuIProviJu:iaJ Faction: 1927-1937 (Can.
berra, 1976); M.R Hunsberger,"Ma PU-fang in Cbingbai Province: 1931-49" ~h.D.
dissertation, Temple University, 1978); Robert A Kapp, Szechuan and the Chirlue
Repib/k 1911-1938 (Y ale, J 973); and A Doak Barnett, China on the Eve ofCmn.
mwUsJTakeovu(L orldon, 1963).
2 iiiopposition to Emin's appointment w noted in Zllang Dajun, SevmJy Yean,
12:6874.
3.Barnett, China Ott the Evr of CommunisJ Takeover, P.273. .
4. XinjiDng Daily, A ugust J 5, 1946, P.3.See aJ so reports in the Xinjiang Doily 00
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 217
meet~gs of the Provincial Council between J uly and December 1946, whicb recoer
unammous decisions on virtually all issues, cootentious or Olberwise.
5.Zhang Zhizhong's May 13, 1947, speech was published in tbe XUrjiaJ'lgDaily,
A ugust 14, 1947; also translated inPar.~ Affain 20, 1-4 (December 19(7): 422-29.
6.Zhang, Seventy Year.r, 12: 6847.
7.L attimore, Pivot of Asia, p.91.
8.A hmet J an Kasimi, "Who I s Unwilling for Peace," MinzIw boo (Y lOing) J une
18,1947, p.4.
9.lOR 1..IP&s1l2/2405, no.12, File 62, Graham, Urumqi, A ugust 3, 1946.
10.XlfIjiang Daily, J uly 19, 1946, p.3.A oomplete tramlatioo of this document ap-
pears inappendix B.
IL Xinjiang Daily, A ugust 4, 1946, p.3.
12.Barnett, China 011 tk Eve of Communi.st TaJaover, p.2SO.
.13.See especially Chairman Zhang's remarks in his October 26, 1946, spcecb
pnnted inXinjiang Daily, NO\I ember2S, 1946, p. 2.
14.FRUS, 1946, p.1219.
I S.I bid., p.1216, citing Robert Ward, Urumqi, November 20, 1946-
16.J OR UP&S/l2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, J uly 29, 1946.
17.XUrjiang Daily, J uly 20,1946, p.3.
I B..I bid., September I , 1946, p.3.
19.1bid.
20.Zhang, SevenJyYean, 12:7148, citing the Eosf TurkatQII Revo1uJiontIfJNtMIJ,
September 16, 1946.
21.Xinjiang Daily, November I I , 1946, P.3,and NO'Y ember21,1946, P.3.
22.lOR l./P&SI l2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, J anuary I , 1947.Aoothcr source 13)'$
that the election committee was actually investigating tbe refugee murders when the
chairman aDd his assistant were killed.See FRUS, 1946, p. 1217, atfngAmerican Con-
sul Robert Ward, Urumqi, November 30, 1946.This seems uolitel)' as lbc committee
was in sensitfve Kalak: territory and tberel'ore ina precarious enough poI ition withoUt
altempting such an investigatioo. PRO F05030, Qraham, Urumqi, February TT, 1947.
A nother reference to this incident plaCeS it in Februafy 1947.See ass. R.t A Report
no.4461, "Recent Events inSinkiang," J uly I I , 1947, p.5.
23.XinjiangDaily, December 14, 1946, P.3.
24 I bid ...........
. ..December 17, 1946, p.3.
25.lOR l./P&S/121236O, Graham, Urumqi, Dccemb8, 1946.
26.I bid., J anuary 18, 1947.
'D.I bid. The use of the sbow-of-baPds method may IJ a'Ie been necessary In aome
districts due to high illiteracy.
28.A bmet J an KaWri, "On the People's J oint [)cdaration," Mwlw boo (Y tttinJ ).
I Uly3, 1947, p. 2; Mehmet'svie'Mare mOSS, R ok A ReportQO. 4461, p.5.
29.lOR lJ P&S/I 2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, NOY CI 11ber 21, 1946. .
30.I n particular the U.s. and BrimhaJ I J SlI ls inUrumqi saw Zbang's rok: pMJ taI ,.
and their reports t~tbcir re: speetn.oc govell1lI lClllS praise Zhans'l etrou durinl
l946
and 1947.See I RO 1..I P&5I l2J Z36(}, 2384, 2350, 236J fur British canmettlJ on Zbang:
FRUS, 1946aod 1947vols. lOaod 7rc:spcctivtly.
31.Xinjiang Doily, November 25,1946, P.2. A lso portiooI ofthis speeeb appear U1
Zhang, Sevmty Yean, 12: 6900-16.
- - - - - - - - -
218 NOlES TO CHAPrER 5
32 I bid., J uly 24, 1946, p.3.
33.Mesut's SOlI ,Dr. A rthur Sabri (A rtughrul SabriogJ u), was trained in medicine31
Western China Union University in Chengdu and had worked for UNRRA before
returning to Y ining. OI R Report 4451, J une 30, 1947.
34. TUl/I shan hua boo I (J anuary 1947). Zhang's visit isrecorded inXinjiang Doily,
A ugust 29, September 1, 4, and 5, 1946.Other comments are to be found in the Brit-
ish consular reports for this period as previously cited.
35. Xmjiang Daily, September 1, 1946, p.3.
36.I bid.
37.I bid., September 4, 1946, p.3.
38.I bid.
39.lOR I .I P&S/11/236O, citing Rt!VOhJJionary East Turkestan (yming), September
15,1946.
40.lOR l)P&s/1112402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
4I.XmjiangDaily, J uly 17, 1946, p.3.
42 I bid., J uly 18, 1946, p.3.
43.I bld., J uly 26, 1946, p.3.
44. Xinjiang Daily, J uly zt, 1946, p.3.
45.I bid., A ugustS and 31,1946, P.3
46.I bid., A ugust 26, 1946, p.1.
47.Xmjiang Daily, September 1, 1946,p.4. ..
48.lOR 1./P&s/1Z/2360, no. 12.File 24, Graham, Urumqi, October 2, 1946, Clung
Revolutionary East Turkestan September 15and 16, 1946.
49. Xinjiang Doily, November 25, 1946, p.3.
SO.For instance, in early November I he paper featured remarks by the inspector.
general for Urumqi District, Hatije [HatewanJ , who spoke "wholeheartedly" insup-
port of unity and urged her Xinjiang compatriots to do the same. I bid., November 3,
1946,p.3.
51.I bid., November 11, and 19, 1946, p.3.
52 FRUS, 1946, p.1217.
53.No immediate report appeared inthe local press OIl this incident, but refe~ces
were later made to it in Xuifilll7.g Daily, November 22, 1946, p.3.Other detalls.as:
from Zhang, Seventy Yean, 12:7067, Who writes that J in W<L 'S murdered for "dabbling'
with a Uighur girl
54.I qR 1..J P&.s/l2l236O, Graham, Urumqi,November 1, 1946.
55.I bid.; lOR 1..J P&S/I 2/2360, Etheringtoo-8mith, Kashgar, A ugust 24, 1946.
56.XinjiangDaily,August25, 1946, p. 3.
57.lOR l.I P&S/I 2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, J anuary 5, 1947. .
58.A refugee association w as established in Urumqi for displaced Han ~,
each of whom received Xn $2,500 inaid from thegovernment through this assocauce.
On this association and tbe tension created in the capital by the presence of the
refugees, see especially Zhang, Seveltl)' Yean, 12:7049-50.
59. Xinjiang Daily, A ugust 27, 1946, p. 3.
60.I bid., November 25, 1946, P.3.
61. lOR l./P&S/I 2/2384, no.12/24/(2), Coli. 11/24, Etherington-8mith, Kasbgar,
A ugust 9, 1946. big
62.A ccording to 7bang Dajun, Song cursed Zhang Zhizhoog as "little man,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 219
ideas" and felt the only way to solve the region's difficullies was to put down all
"mobsters" inIIiand Urumqi by military force.see Zhang Dajun, Sishi llian dongluan
Xinjiang (Hong Kong, 1956), pp. 223, 227.
63.A ll the summaries in this chapter are based on the text of Qlainnan Zhang's
speech that appeared in theXinjinng Daily, November 25, 1946. While Uris speechis
~~otedextensively by Zhang Dajun, the order of theitems is slightJ y changed, as he in-
itially omits discussion of the sixth point concerning Guomindang contact with Kalak
leader Osman Batur. See Zhang, Seventy Yean, 12:6900-16.
64.InJ anuary 1946, Governor Wu Lbongxin had submitted areport on inflationin
~e region and on the currency question, advising thai the province switchto the Na-
ucoatst currency within two years.He noted that militaryspending inXinjiang, as else-
where, bad an inflationary impact, and therefore he recommended that salaries for
troops stationed there not be increased. Further, be felt a smatlnumber of soldiers
withgood equipment and transport would be as effective and jess difficult to aupport
and supply. That this and other advice to mecentral government was distegarded
~ that other considerations prevailed in Nanjing.Wu's report, "Xinjiang Prcsin-
Cial Monetary Question," J anuary 1946, Document 02.2110, National History Ar-
Chives, Xindian, Tarbet.
65.1besame conclusion is reached byA llen Whiting, Sinkiang: Pawn or PiVOl (East
Lansing, Michigan, 1958), p.100.
66.lOR 1./P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, September 1946.
67.See chapter 7for further details on the scandal this caused for Olairman MC5Ut
Sabri.
68.Xinjiang Provincial Government Y ear 34 (1945) Bpeoditures, Document 2-
10.024/65, National History A rchives, Xindian, Taibei,
69.Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7041. Forty thousand ounces of opium alone were
reponedly burned 00 J une 3, 1946.
7~."Sinkiang PrcMnce Corruption eases UDder MartiaJ L aw," Document 02./49,
NatlOOal History A rchives, Xindian, Taibei (telegram).
71.Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7045.
72.Xinjiang Daily, December 17, 1946, p.3.
73.Such attacks are referred to inXinjimtg Daily, December 13, 1946, p.3.
74.lOR lJ P&S/I 2/2361, con.12/24, Etheringtoo-Smilb, Kashgar,J une 21, 1~.
75.Zhang Dajuo mentions all these types of conuption see znang, Sn'CIlY tan,
12:7045-46.These and other kinds are also referred to inHasan OraI tay, KiJzJJk Turk-
kri,P 86.
76.Hrst-band experience of corruption was repocted by AJ : nericaIJ Consul Robert
Ward.SeeFRUS, 1945, p. 1020. ..
rt. Muulw boo (Y tning) J une 29, 1947, p.4, wItictl coruaus an article by A hmet
lan Kasiori dated A pril 28 1947entitled "Who I sUnwillingfor peace?"
78.lOR lJ P&S/l2123sO, Graham. Urumqi,J anuary 18,1947.
79.I bid., eoll12l2OA ,Shipton, Kasbgar, May 1, 1947.
SO.Increases in Natiooalist army srreugth are noted inthe lOR fileS on a monlbly
basis between J uly and December 1946. . .
.~1.Xinjinng Daily, November 15, 1946, p. 3, lists the dele.gates but not their~-
a1ities or government posittons, which are based 00informatlOlJ from other $OU
82.Xinjiang Daily, November 3, 1946, p.3.
-
220 NOlEs TO CHAPTERs 5AND 6
83. I bid., December 5, 1946, p. 3.
84. lOR L I P&SI l2/2360, Stevenson, Nanjing, December 6, 1946, citing Eng1isJ :l
L anguage Service of the Central News A gency of December 3, 1946.
85.lOR 1..I P&SI l2l236o, Graham, Urumqi, May 24,1947.
86. See Barnett, China 011 the Eve of Communist Takeover, p.276.
87. Xmjiang Daily, November 25,1946, p.3.
88. The Kazak writer Halife A ltay identifies A li Han TOre and Osman Batur ashav.
ing the same aims-the independence of the entire region. See his An.ayurtlGll
Anadoluya (I stanbul, 1977), p, 441.A nother Kazak points out that this was the reason
why A li Han disappeared in A ugust 1946.SeeHasan Oraney, Kazak Turkkri, p.102.
89.See frequent COmment to this effecr in Zhang, Seven.ty Yean, and lOR files, es-
pecially Graham's reports for J uly 1946to March 1947.
90. lOR lI P&S/12l236o, Shipton, Kashgar, J anuary 1, 1947.
91. I bid.
92. lOR 1..I P&SI l2/2360, Graham, Urumqr, November 15, 1946.
93. I bid. IIi Commander I Zhak Han Mura's reason was that he had aClually
reorganized his Units, but the J ist-and otller information were not ready as he had been
traveling so much and because so many new recruits had joined his forces.
94.Zhang, Seventy Yean, 12:6847, noting I hat after thirty meetings agreement had
been reached, but that it was really the USSR they were dealing with and really the
USSR I hat had finally agreed.
CHA PTER.
1.Stories on the returning delegates appeared in the Xinjiang Daily on J anuary ~4,
15, 17, 1947, and included I he information that A bmet J an Kasimi had mel With
Chiang Kai-shet, Who then Presented the Xinjiang delegation with a flag. None of tile
mfaction delegates--nor the OUtspoken lsa---is quoted in mesestones.
2. Xinjiang Daily, J anuary 12, 1947, p. 1.
3.!bid., February,s, 1947, p.2. Furthermore, the right to buy flour and rice ~~con.
trolled prices had been withdrawn from all employees who were 001 Chinesectzens,
A ny person holding Soviet papers was therefore ineligible to buy flour at the controlled
price of Xn $470 per jin, as OPposed to the open-market price at I bis lime of Xu
SSO,OOOajio.PRo F'3236, DO.2, Graham, Urumqi, J anuary 6, 1947.
4. Xinjiang Daily, J anuary 13, 1947, p. 4.
5. FRUS, 1947, p. 548, citing U.S.A mbassador Stuart, J anuary 30, 1947.
6.lOR L/P&Si
I
21236O, no. 18, Graham, Urumqi, J anuary 31, 1947, ciling a band.
bill entitled "Struggle for the Motherland." A li Beg Hakim was responsible for much
of tbis handout literature, aCCOrding to Kazak sources. See Hasan Oraltay, KazaIc
Turkleri, pp. 105, 1M.
7.Xinjiang Daily, J anuary 9, 1947, p.3.
8.lOR l./P&S1I 2I 236o, Graham, Urumqi, November I S, 1946.
9.I bid.
10.U.S:.Department of Stale , Report no.4461,J uly 11, 1947.
I I . Reports from visitors to the I I i area in September 1946andJ anuary 1947attest
to thepresence of only a few border guards on either side. lOR UP&sII2/2350, leiter
no. 737~H/51L-47, Shiplon, Kashgar, May I , 1947. Abo see PRO F0506t, 110.28,
NOTES TO CHAPlER 6 221
Graham, Urumqi, February 22, 1947.
12lOR UP&S/l2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 15, 1946.
13.I bid.
14.lOR UP&S/l2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 18, 1947.
15.XlI1jiangDaily, February 17, 1947,p. 3.
16.The dale of I bis first "liberty mass meeting" was February 19, aa:ording to
Barnett, China on theEve of Communist TakeoYeT, p. 251; the date of February 20 is
giveo by Zhang Dajun, &venty Yean, 12:7326. Zhang writes tbat the meeting was
mainly a youth meeting et whicb slogans like "Strike down !be Han," "Drtve out
Zhang (Zhizhong)," and "Corrupt Han running dogs" were snccteo.He states that
Uighur youth were seeking revenge for a Uighur who had been bUed by a Han on tDe
bighway-but this is not corroborated by any other source. 2'1lang's dates are not al-
ways accurate. For instance, be says A bmet returned to Urumqi at the start of tile riots
on February 21; actually A hmet had been in Urumqi since J anuary 14, according 10
!beXinjiang Daily of that date; also A bmet was interviewed inJ anuary, in Urumqi, by
the British consul. See lOR L /P&S/12/2360, J anuary 1947despatches; also PRO
F5030, Graham, Urumqi, J anuary 28, 1947.
17.lOR UP&SJ I 2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 27, 1947.
18.These points are cited in both Barnett and Zllaog Dajun. See Barnett, ChiJuJ
on 1MEve of Communist Takeover, p.251, and Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7326.
19.Zllang does not mentiorl Osman, bur Barnett does (p. 251).
20.Zhang,SevenJ y Yean, 12:7328.
21.XinjiangDai1y, February 23,1947, p.3.
22.lOR UP&S/I 2/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February V, 1947.A ccording 10Bur-
Dan Shabidi's memoirs, some three LbOuSand Hui demonstrated 00.the 24th, in sup-
pori of the government and against the three districts. Burban writes that this
demonstration was really simply arranged by General Song Xi/ian, who W35 taking ed-
vantage of Zhang's continued absence. See Durban, Fifty Y ftU:J ,P. 307.
23.Zhang, ~nty Yean, 12:7329.
24.XinjiangDai1y, FebruaI y25, 1947, p.a.
25.Both Zhang Dajun and Duman Sbabidi gm !he figure of 1O,lXX) for this mass
cemccscauon. See:l1lang, Seventy Yean, 12:7329, and Durban, Fifty Year.J,p.308.
26.Zhang's uocorrobOrated eccocnt of bow the first shot was fired is as follows.
A bmet talked with the demonstrators until noon, around whicb time an old person
tried to get uno Burhan's car.1bechauffeur broke a 'I l,indOW of the car in trying to
slop him aDd then bit the old man. When an angry crowd gathered, an official drew a
handgun to ward them orr, He accidentally fired, tilling a Han Chioese and two other
people. Zhang DajUD, SevenJy Y ftU:J , 12:7330. A similar story about a government
driver getting imoI ved in a quarrel and then shooting soceoee in anger appeared in
XinjUmgDWly,F<b<uNy1. 1947,p.3.
Z7.The number killed and wounded vanes from 50UttC to source. Xinjiong Daily,
February 26, 1947, claims that five were killed and three badly wounded. Bameu. in
ChiM on the Ew ofCommunist T~(p. 251), writes that ~r ~ and four
Uigbur were killed. The Britisb consul, Walter Grabam, did nor Wl.tneu tbe
demonstration but beard later that four Turki and two Chinese were kitled. lOR
l.I P&SI t2/2360, FebruaryTl,I 947. .'
28.A leiter from aHan ChineSe.printed inthe Y ming paper MinzhU boo on April
I
I
I
----------
222 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
22, 1947, p. 4, states that half of the crowd present on the day of the demonstratioo
were soldiers. When A hmel came out, the cries of "Kill him" came from the soldiers,
not the crowd, which did not take up the cry.The leiter implies that the entire incident
was actually arranged: MQ;lems and Kazaks had been ordered to go first; on tbe25th
Han were told 10go, and student group; were to follow on the 26th, with businessmen
on the 27th. It was all a matter of government manipUlation according to this J etter,
Which, tantalizing as it is, is uncorroborated by any other sources. Buchan's0Wll
memoirs add liUle to existing accounts, except that he and the other officials were
forced [0take refuge in the government bufldlngs, emerging only in theeveningwhen
A hmet went 10address the Uighur I J terary Club in Urumqt, where he succeeded in
calming down the assembled members. Buchan, Fifty Year: r,pp.309-10.
29.XUfjiong Daily, March6,1947, p, 3.
30.I bid., February 25,1947, p.3.
31.Zhang,SevenJy Yean, 12: 7331.
32XUljiang Daily, March I , 1947, p. 3.
33.I bid, March 5,1947, p.3.
34.A hmet J an Kasimi, "Who I s Unwilling for Peace?" MinzJw boo (Y ining), May
24,1947.
35.Zhang, SevenJy Yean, 12: 7337.
36. No report was ever published, References were made in the local press about
the "unfortunate accident" that sparked the riots and government regret over theaf.
fair, but no further explanation was offered, nor was blame ever ascribed to any one in.
dividual.
37.Zhang's lack of success in securing government funds is lK)(ed inFRUS, 1947,
p.548; the report is dated J anuary 30, 1947.
38.I bid., p.551.
39.The members signing the announcement were eight Han Chinese, including
Zhang, and ten national minOrity councillors, inClUdingiiifaction leader A hmet J ~
Kasim~A bbas, and Rahim, as well as the Turld nationalists Isa and Mehmet Emm
Bugra.SeeXmjiang Daily, March 26, 1947, p. 3.
40.I bid.
41.J oid., March 27,1947, p. 3.
42 I bid, ApriJ 5,1947, p. 3.
43.I bid, ApriJ 10, 1947, p. 3. .
44. Many officials remained from the days of Sheng Shicai. See oommeolS. m
Barnetl, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover, p. 256, who notes that local police
rcrces and courts retained I 1lO8tof the sameofficials who bad \mCked under Sheng.
45.Xmjiang Daily, ApriJ 27, 1947, p. 3, and May 13, 1947, p. 3.
46.Zhang had announced that the government Would repeal the taxes for
J une-December 1946.I bid., A pril 11, 1947, p.3.
47.Zhang, Seventy Yt'lD: l', 12: 7376.
48.Zhang's May 5 speech to the Kasbgar representatives was published intbeXin-
jiDngDaily of May21, 1947,pp.2-3. .
49.lOR UP&Stl212350, Con, 12/20A , Shipton, Kasbgar, J une I , 1947.Acrordmg
to Shipton, only A hmet's intervention prevented a full-scale riot.
50.A partial English translation appears in Pacific Affairs 20, 1-4 (Deoem~
1947). A Chinese versiorl, whichappears to be complete, appeared in the A ugust I ,
NOIES TO CH.APTER 6 223
1947, issue of Xinjiang Daily. Parts of the speecb-or possibly the original, as it is a
good deal longer than the XiJljiang Daily versoe.-eppeer in Zhang Zhizong's repcet
to the central government, dated september II 1947cited in Zhang Sevt'nty Yean
12:7383-7406. ""
. 51.I n the longest version of the speech, cited in Zhang Dajun, A hmet is aisc
drrectly blamed for delayS in the investigation into the murders at Emin in 1946.See
Zhang, SevenJy Y ear.r, 12:7395.
52Minzhu. boo (yining), A pril 22, 1947, p. 4.
53.I bid., A pril 22, 1947, p. 4.
54.XlnjiangDaily, May 12, 1947, P.3.
55.I bid., May 16, 1947, p.3.
56.I bid., May 17, 1947, p.3.
57.Minzlw . boo, May 19, 1947.
58.Thang, Seventy Ytar.r, 12:7366.
59. FRUS, 1947, p.554, citing U.S.Consul Paxton's report of May 24,1947, whic.l: t
DOtesthat General Song told Paxton on May 13 that Zhang'MlUld be rt:plaCed that
month.
60.Zhang Zhizhong, "Everyooe Wants to Eliminate Contradictions in Society,"
Xinjiang Daily, May21, 1947,p.3.
61. FRUS, 1947, p.557, citing A mbassador Stuart.
62 L attimore asserts tbat Mesut had the support of wealthy Uighur cusses, See
L attimore, Pivot of kin, p.97.
63.XiJljitJngDaily, May 22, 1947,p. 3.
64.10R UP&SII2/2350, Colll2/20A , Shipton, Kashgar, A ugust 2, 1947.
..65.Mesut's appointment was certainly greeted witll approval by General Song
Xilian, A report by American Consul Pulon states that "Uu {?.eying}feels appoint-
ment perhaps somewhat premature but General Song is much peesed" fRUS, 1947,
p.557, citing Paxton's report of J une I , 1947.
66.XinjiangDaily,JuIy21, 1947, p.3.
67.A ccording to me Hami delegate to the A ssembly, Mr.A bdul &turk, argument
centered on thirteen delegates--four from KlW1gar, five from lli,three fran Tacheng,
and one from A ltai 1beaccusation was that rneee men were not the real delegatcs but
repecemems for men who were ill or bad died Itwas actually admitted tbat that \WS
~e case, so the other delegates wanted mese "imposters" denied seats.A bdul &turk
lOterview-,J anuary 1982, Taibei, Taiwan.
68.XinjiangDaily, J uly 21, 1947, Po 3.
69.I bid.
.. 70.I bid, May 29,1947, p.3.A ccOfding to an article published in Taiwan, the Xin-
J lCl.Dg Provincial A :i.sembly convened on J une 22andelected as chairmall Sahid ~&
a religious leader from.A ksu and as vice-chainnaI l, Ma Uangjun, another religI OUS
leader.See the interesting bu; unc.orrotxnted eccccm in Li Y utang, ..Y tzhaDj xuanju
rengbao: Sbaok bosbi seesuweu," Vwngwai zmJ J i (BeyOOd Qlina magazine) (J une
1968,98-
71.See the account in K. W.Rea, ed., The FmgoltCIAm1Jo.nOdor: 1M RrpuU of
J .L Stuart, 1946-49 (Cokx1J do, 1981), pp.40, 191.
72 A bdul Erturk interview.
73.Minzlw . baa (Y"ming), J une 19, 1947, p.3.
224 NOTES TO CHAPTER. 6
74.XUljiangDaily, J une 10, 1947, p. 3.
75.The title he was given w asguanshi, meaning simply government official.Zhang,
Seventy Yean, 12:7306. A ccording to Zhang, Osman made five points in his letter to
the Chinese military: He 'WOulduphold the Three Principles of the People inthe A shan
district; protect lives of all the people; strike and drive out any Mongols in the
Beidashan area; and defend the country; finally, he requested that the government
supply him with ammunition. A s a source for this information, Zhang cites "Xinjiang
Garrison Command Classified I nformation on IIi Military Developments, Report No.
91," J uly 20, 1946. Zhang also cites a letter from Osman to Chairman Zhang in a
similar military report dated J uly 25, 1946, 00.95, inwhich Osman claims that heand
his people were cheated into joining the IIiforces and asks that thegovernment extend
its protection to him and his people. seeZhang, Seventy Yean, 12:7306-7307.
76.Hasan Oraltay, Knzak TurIderi, p.102
77.I bid. U.S.sources (which refer to Ali Beg Hakim as "f!alibek") say be became
pro-Cbinese inearly 1947.FRUS, 1947, p.580.
78. I bid.No specific date is given.
79.FRUS,I947,p.568.
80.Burhan, Fifty Yean, p.316.Ac;a member of the CCP and representative ofthe
government that had Osman executed in 1951, it could be expected that Burhan would
include criticism of Osman in his memoirs. However as noted previously, there were
many regular complaints about the man and his fol~rs whenever they shifted their
center of operations.
81. FRUS, 1947, p.568.This information is the result of the personal visit of atr.s.
consular official to the Beidashan area inJ une 1947.
82. The number of soldiers taken varies from source to source. Zhang Dajun says
two. See Zhang Dajun, Sishi Nan dongluan Xinjiang (Hong Kong: Y azhou chebanse,
1956), p.219.An A merican source says eight. SeeFRUS, 1947, p.557.
83.L attimore, Pivot of Asia, p.101.
84.I bid., p. 100.Curiously, L attimore makes little comment on the BeidasbaO af-
fair, saying only that the whole business (wbich he does not describe) was sensational-
ized by the press.
85.Song said that he had, in fact, sent an order to release the Mongol.prsoeers,
but it bad not arrived in time.FRUS, 1947, p.557.
86.I bid, p.557.
87_ See especially Halife A ltay, Anayw ttan Anadolu)oa (A nkara: Modern Matbaa,
1981), p.448. J ack Chen claims that Osman was attacked by I zhak Han, woo bad
driven him to Beidashan. J ack Chen, Sinkiang Story (L ondon: Collier MacmilJ aD,
'977).p. 261.
88.FRUS, 1947,p.559.
89.I bid., P. 565_
90.I bid., p- 561. ..
91.I bid., p.566, citing aXinhua news agency report of J une 17, 1947, inturn Clung
T~, whichbroadcast an announcement on Beklashan made by the Ministry of For-
eignA ffairs of the MPR,J uoe 15, 1947. . .' 7
92. A merican Foreign service officer J ohn Melby wrote in his diary 10J une 1~
00 the "Mongol: inY asion of Sinltiang": "The Ministry of I nformation admiU~to me
that the hoopla is designed to help force a loan from us and to distract auentlOll eoei
NOTES TO CHAFTERS 6AND 7 225
the dlsas~ers in Manchuria which are real disasters, The gentleman in question did not
even smile when he said it." J ohn Melby, The Mandate of Heavert (L ondon: Ctauo
and Wmdus, 1969), p.210.
93.~ost sources on Xinjiang during this period mention the Beidasban affair, but
the Soviet authors Mingulov and Kutlukov do not.L attimore makes L ittlemention of
it The XlJljiang Daily issilent on the entire episode.
94.Minzhu. boo (yining), J une 18, 1947, p.4.
95.I bid., J une 24,1947, p.4.
96.I bid., J une 29,1947.
97.FRUS, 1947,pp.57G-71.
98.Cullural clubs like this one existed for eachnatiooa1ity and were often the flXUS
of political work.
99. Minzhu. boo (yining), J uly 7, 1947.
100.seedetailed disCuSSionin the next chapter. A lsO, see comment inBarnell, China
on ~ Eve of Communist Takeover, p.252; and in British Consul ShiptOO'Sreports,
lOR 1./P&S/12/2361, coa.12/24.
101.lOR UP&SJI2/2361, Con.12(24, letter no.29/H/5/I A 8, Shiptoo, Kashgar, A pril
5, 1948.Shipton adds that later some fifty of these were sentenced to twO years in
prison, forty-five were released, and sawere reportedly executed.
102.Minzhu. boo (yining), J uly 3, 1941.
103.I bid. I n a special report on the Xinjiang budget, dated May 1941, the central
government decided that Xinjiang would nave 10continue to print its own money to
offset the provincial deficit of 6.9 billioo dollars, as the central government was unable
to subsidize the region. I n light of this, Guomindang claims of government'S maMivt
support for Xinjiang are clearly incorrect. See DocumenI Z,
lO
.
02
4/65, National His-
tory A rchives, Xindian, Taibei, Taiwan.
104. Minzhu. baa (Y rning), J uly 3, 1947.
lOS.Xinjiang Daily, J une 10, 1947, p.3.
101i lbid,J uly 10, 1947, p. 3.
101. I bid., J uly 8, 1947, p.3. .
108.Zhang's disagreement withthe prevailing NationaliSt vieW i5 indiCaledmseveral
sources, but see especiall}' FRUS, 1947, pp.554 and 572, whicb 00ie5 that the A mer-
icans had beard that Zllang was recommending the granting of fun autoDOl11Yto Xin-
jiang by the central goemmecr-
CHA PTER'
1.Turkic sources make me same acccsauce- bUt add torture of IoC3l MaY emS,
e.g., the nailing of bands to bOards, burning, and mock banging. A cCOrding to one
source, many Turlci prisoners went mad as result of such treatment. See Hasan i I
Oraltay, Kazak Turkleri, pp. 130-32. . . .' (Hon """
2.Sun Fukun, A Record of Soviet Union'S A ggrtmOl'l Ul sitt/ciDng g g,
1952), p.25.
3.I bid.
4.I bid.
5.I bid., p.26; Soviet sources, whicll include the aUI ~rita~~ KutlukaV, do not
mention thepeace feelerS put out by the seMel eoosut dunng thiS nee.
-'
_-I." ., ....
226 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
6.See Sun Fukun, Saviet Union's Aggression; Zhang Dajun, Seventy Years, vol. 12.
7.These are given in Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover, p.253,
and Zhang Dajun (1956), p.223.
8.This speech was delivered September 11, 1947; published in Zhang, Seventy
Years, 12:7384.
9.PRO F0371169624, doc. no.61770. The Ui letter to Zhang was published in the
Y ining newspaper Wake Up and was translated by the British Consulate, Urumqi. Itis
submitted by "The Members of the Provincial Government Who Signed the 1946
A greement" and signed by A bmet J an Kasimi and Rahim J an Sabri Haji (spelled
A hmed Kasyme and Rahim J an Sabir Haji respectively in the original translation).
10.The iiigroup said there were 20,000--25,000 Nationalist forces in 1944.How-
ever, Chinese sources say that in 1944 there were 50,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in
the province. See Zhang Dajun, Seventy Years, 12:6163. By 1947, the number of
troops was 90,000 according to Song Xilian. See lOR L /P&S/12/2360, Graham,
Urumqi, February 18, 1947.
1L PRO F0371/69642, doc.no.61770.
12 Cited in Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover, p.254.See also
PRO FO 1778, citing an extract from Central News A gency, J anuary 14, 1948, giving
Zhang's reply to the "I ning Tribe's" letter of OCtober 16, 1947.
13.General Song told the U.S.consul in Urumqi that the Nationalists had aided Os-
man but, he claimed, no Chinese troops were with Osman and that, actually, the
Chinese disapproved of Osman's action in the A ltai. FRUS, 1947, p.573. Song later
said he knew that A li Beg Hakim (spelled Halibek in the report) was attacking lli
forces around the town of Wusu but again claimed it was "against Chinese advice."
I bid., p.580.
14.I bid., 1948, p.732
15.I bid.
16.This last note may have been collected by Foreign Affairs Special commissioner
L iu Zeying, WhCR plane stopped in Y ining en route from Alma Ala to Urumqi ar
about this time. See ibid., p. 751.For comment on the note itself-the exact content of
which remains unknown--see ibid., p.749.
17.Zhang Dajun (1956), p.226.A lso inXUljiang Daily, October 15, 1947, p.3.
18. FRUS, 1947, p.572, ina report dated September 23,1947.
19.I bid., p.568, in a report dated J uly 2, 1947.This firsthand information was 001-
leered by U.S.consular official Dougtas Macltiernan.
ZO.I bid., 1948, p. 751. .
21.I bid. L iu Mengchun also declared pUbl.ictythat not one Chinese soldier was.~tb
Osman, and that the Chinese were not preparing to enter the A ltai region. XUljUUlg
Daily, October 5,1947, p3.
22.FRUS,I947,p.573. .
23."Madjorotr' may have been Mevlanov, an adviser to the E1R government, said
to be a Soviet citizen and agent.
24. FRUS, 1947, p.580. The allegiance of A li Beg Hakim remainS u~. He
certainly appears to have received representatives from both the lliand Chinese fac-
tions.
25. Barnett, China on theEve of Communist Tahover, p.'1>7. . . .
26.Acoording to the Shanghai Xinw en 000, the population of the three distnCtS m
NOTES TO CHAFTER 7 zrr
1~was 650,000. Using the figure of 4,015,350 for the total provincial population,
ibis comes to 16percent. Cited inPRO F0371 75800, fileno.11126, F.2042, British
Embassy, Nanjing, J anuary 25,1949.
27.Barnett, China on theEve of Comnw nist TtJkeover, p. 267.
.28.Turkic sources differ on many points of interpretation as well as on details in
their aceou?~of the EI R. However, virtually all attest to A li Han Tore's repute as a
scholar, religious leader, nationalist, and anti-So\!iet force in the three districts. See
Mehmet Emin Bujre, Dogu Turldston, pp.56-57; Karahoca, Dogu Turkistan, p.22;
I sa Y usuf A 1pteltin, Dogu Turkistan Davasi, p.181; Hassan Oraltay, KozJ J 1c Turkkri,
~' 80and I ll, citing Kazaks who said they fought for A li andthat they recognized no
difference between Uighur and Kazak, saying "We are all Turkestan's Turkish
people."
29.Turkish sources claimthat Ali Han TOreBegwas kidnapped by the Russians in
A ugust 1946because of hisopflCNtioo to the peace agreement.SuchviewS areshared
by Hasan Oraltay in Kazak Turkleri, p.101; I sa Y usuf A 1ptekin, Dogu TurJdstlUl
Davasi, p.186; and AI1UUS Karaboca, Dogu TurkUttm, p.22.However, another theOry
is that A li Han TOre, at this time aged sixty-two, voluntarily went to the USSR for
medical treatment, leaving his government in the bands of an equally nationalistic
Moslem, A sim Bey.This theory issupported by Graham who, during hisvisit to the IIi
area, was told that the peace agreement came "as a great disappointment 10 many
people in Kulja [Y ining] ... who had established an independent republic and had DO
wishto return to Chinese control." He CQl]tinues,"A liban Ture, the Uzbeg who J ed
the revolt, is said to have wept at the conclusion of the agreement ... and on thescore
of illhealth ... bas disappeared none k: Do\J IS whither." PRO FI 55S0/.324/1
0
, Graham,
Urumqi, October, 26, 1946.
30.Burban,Fifiy Yean, p.282;OSS, OI R DO.4451, J une 30, 1947, p. 6.
31.I n September 1946during Graham's visit, A nw3t was the "deputy adminstra-
livesupervisor" under "Hakim Beg Hoja" (~Beg Hop). A nwar reportedly spoke
very good Russian, unlike A sim, who spoke no Russian but had "fair cmnese." PRO
F15627, October 1946.
32.MuheUin and L atif Kanar, sons of sabit Damullah, whO served as the premier
of the earlier ETR, were among the Moslem nationalists hOpingfor an indepe~nt
Moslem state in Xinjiang. Both men served in the ETR government-~Uhellm as
minister of health and L atif as chief of staff.Dr. A bdul KasimKanat, internew, FebrU-
ary 12, 1981, Taibe~Taiwan.
33.Mehmet Emin Bugm, p.57.1bis\isl of names is not C()I TOborarwby all}'other
source, and Mehmet does not indicate hissource ofinforma
tion
.
34.Zhang Dajun, Sishi nilJn dongtuanXlfljimlg, p. 94, ~SevelItY Y M1'3', 12:6897.
J ack Chenwrites that a mankOOWI 1 as"ffilSSOOCIY" was I zhak sdeputy comman<kr, ~
identifies "PolinOY " as a Wbite Russian cavalry commander and Zolun Taharr,
Uighur, as deputy(X)fI lmander. Chen, ~Sin/ciang StorY, pp- 228--231. ..
35.lOR I J P&S/12fl362, DO.12(5), Hie 24.Doc.ext 2064, MarchI I , 1946, cmng
Joumol of Supreme Soviet of the USSR, March 3, 1946.
36.I bid., Ext. Doc.no.819516, September 24, 1946. .. 1
37.I bid.Much of this fileconcerns White Russians, on whOm the Bri: : : :
was particularly wellinformed sinCe he spoke R~ ~counted among
inUrumqi many members of the White RUS5iaDcomm
Ul1I
ty.
228 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
38.Barnett, China on theEve ofComnw nist Takeover, p. 260.
39.Not only Chinese sources like Zhang make this accusation; Turki sources also
accuse A bmet of being an agent. However, Soviet citizenship and education can be in-
terpreted either way. One informant declared that the possession of Soviet papers
proved that one individual was pro-Soviet, and later used the fact of a Soviet education
to show that another individual knew the Soviets too well ever to trust them. A bdul
Kerim Kanat interview.
40.lOR report no.4451, J une 30, 1947, based on Chinese sources. It also states
that A bmet was born in Tashkent and graduated from the Soviet Technical College
there, information which iscorroborated by Burhan and Zhang Dajun.
41. The problem of establishing the truth about A hmet's political views is ex-
emplified in a reference to A hmet contained in a British Embassy report. When Ab-
met attended the National A ssembly in Nanjing in December 1946, be had a meeting
witb the Turkish ambassador, Tugay, who commented after first meeting him and
others from Xinjiang that tbey were fundamentally anti-Soviet and "Ce sont des 'I ures,
vraiment." A fter later meetings, however, Tugay described A bmet as "a very
dangerous man and a pro-Stalinist," This was because A hmet based his case for Xin-
jiang autonomy on religious rather than political grounds, which Tugay took to be the
Soviet party line.For the first report mentioning tbis exchange see PRO FO F507, DO.
1674 (116/101/46) citing tbe British Embassy report ofG. V. Kitson, Nanjing, Decem-
ber 30, 1946.The second report is from PRO F2112, Gillett, Kashgar, J anuary 23,
1947.
42.Zhang (1956), p.290.
43. FRUS, 1946, p.553.
44.I bid.
45.Zhang Dajun writes that be was an engineer. Zhang (1956), p.281; J ack Chen
suggests be was an expert in motor transport. Chen, The SinkimIg Story, p. 229.
46.Mehmet Emin Bugra, Dogu Turkistan, p.57_
47.See Zhang Dajun, Seve1lJy Years, 11:6355-56, for the Chinese view. See Hasen
Oraltay, Knzak TurkJeri, p.79, and Mehmet Emin Bugra,.Dogu TurlWttJn, pp.57-58,
for theTurkic view.
48.lOR 1..JP&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946; lOR L /P&Sf1'Z1
2350, Col.\.12, Shipton, Kashgar, and PRO F5061, no.28, Graham, Urumqi, FebfU8:FY
22,1947. Shipton considered Ms. Stephens to be biased against the Nation~llSt
Chinese; be cited her pro-CCP views in order to criticize her abilities of ottservaUOl1
'Ibis is in contrast with theopinion of Walter Graham who remembered her asotser-
vant and generally wen-informed. Unfortunately, she died in an airplane crash e~route
from Urumqi to Beijing and never filed her stories with life and Tune, or ~ththe
French news agency for which she worked. The report of her death is noted InJ ohn
Melby, Mandate of Heaven (london, 1969), p. 229.
49.OI R report no..4461, dated J uly 11, 1947, p. 10_
SO.For an interesting account of this trip, see A itcben Wu's Turkistan rUf1llJll
(Hong Kong, 1984). all
51: One ~' I brahim Mansur, remembered the lossof manufactured mat~ of
of whichwere importee from tbe USSR. When shipments were cut I D the wmtef
1944-1945, people bad to light fires with flints.This was, however, the on1Y sI J Ort3&C
thaI figured in his memories. I brahim Mansur interview Taibei November 1984
, ,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 229
. 5~.I bid. See also the figures for Soviet exports to Xinjiang from 1942to 1949
gwen 10table 2.
53.See "rebel"leafiets, appendices E and F, which claimthat the closed border did
bring economic hardship to local residents.
54.OSS fileXI , 32642, containing the report of Robert Ward, Urumqi, september
25,1945,p.4. .
55. lOR L /P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, March 12, 1946, which recounts
Graham's interview with Robert Ward.
56.lOR I )P&SI l2/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
57.From interviews with former IIiresidents.
58.From interviews with former IIiresidents and also British Consul Graham.
59.For the Turkish view, see Hasan Oraltay and Mehmet Emin Bugra. Burhan
Shahidi states that the ETR received extensive Soviet aid.Burhan, Fifty Y ear:r,p.282
Kunukcv writes that trade was resumed immediately with the ETR to alleviate
hardship in the IIi area. Kutlusov, The National Liberation MovtrMllt in XiIljilJng
1944-49w a Pan ofw Chinae People's Revolution (fashkent, 1958).pp.261-69. He
makes no mention of the sale of any arms or war materials as aid to the ETR-
60.lOR I )P&S1l2l2402. Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
61. Melby, Mandate of Heaven, p. 102.Melby atsc writes tbat the younger Dr.
Sabri clearly identified with the Y ining government as he continually referred 10them
using "we."
62 lOR I )P&S/I 212408, Shipton. Kashgat,J une2l, 1948-
63.KutlukOY , National L iberatiml Movonmt, p.258.
64.See earner discussion inchapter 4 and the funlist of demands inappendix E.
65.Zhang, Seventy Y ear:r, 12:7403.
66.See appendix C for discussion ofTurkic names and litles.
67.Graham said that such badges were so rommon lhat "the absence of amedal is
something of a distinction." Even the driver of a truck he passed 00 his way 10Y lI ling
in 1946had two of them pinned to his dungarees. PRO Fl5627, Graham, Urumqi,
October 18, 1946.
68.Hasan Orattey, KiJZJJk Turkkri, p.101.Drawings ofseven typd of badges, pius
the ETR flag, can be found in Q1en,A Record of theIning Affair (faibei.1977), P.25.
69.Zhang, Seventy Y ear:r, 12:6277.
70. PRO FO 5061, Graham, urcmqt, February 27, 1947, citing Ms.:BarblU'a
Stephens.
71.PRO FO 371/63336, Graham, Urumqi, pecemter 4,1946.
12.lOR I)P&S/12f24O'2, Graham, Urumqi, September 24.1946.
73. FRUS, 1945. p.992, and Chen, "I'M Sinkiang Story, p.228. Chen abo writes
that the ETR bad weapoes of J apanese. British, German. and A,merican make$, and
that the ETR had anti-aitaafi guns, but his information I s n<1 corroborated by lUI)'
other sources,
74.L attimore giveS thefigure of 40,000.L attimore, Pivot of A sia, p.ff7.(ben giw: s
the number of 30,000. Chen, Th~ SinJciangStory, p.236. I n 1947.General SOnI
estimated ETR strength as "over 69,000"; FRUS, 1947.p.571. .
75.A c.cording to Cbinese military intelligence, mese units \1ICte as fOI I Ol1I S: ReS!"
ment of Mixed Nattooalities 3 ()(lO: Kazak Guerrilla Regiment, 800; Ant I nfantry
Regiment (mixed), 1,600; Se~I ~fantry Regiment (mixed), 1,500; lbird I nfantry
-
230 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
Regiment and Fourth Cavalry Regiment, 1,000; Hui Fifth Regiment,500; Kazak SixI b
Regiment, 700; Kazak Seventh Regiment, 500; Mongol Eighlh Regiment, 500; Mixed
Nationality Ninth Regiment, 500; Hui Tenth Regiment, 700; I ndependent Sibo
Mounted Regiment, 200; total, 11,500. Zhang Dajun (1956), pp.179-80.
76.1bis money was of such poor quality that it ''will soon all have disintegrated
entirely," PRO doc.F 15550, Graham, Urumqi, OCtober 25, 1946.
77.assFile 137188, no.9, "Xinjiang Revolt: I ts Progress from.the First Week in
February to I he Middle of May: Rumored Efforts to Seek a settlement," U.S.Consul
Robert Ward, Urumqi, February 7, 1945.
78.XUljiongDaily, J uly 27, 1947, p.3.
79.Mansur and Kanat interviews.
BO. Kutlukov, NOJionalliberati.on Movement, p.261.
81.I bid.
82. PRO FI 5627, Graham, Urumqi, October 28,1946.
83. ass File 137188, no. 9, citing U.S. Consul Robert Ward, Urumqi, May 25,
1945, pp.7--8.
84.Kutlukov,NOJ ional Liberation Movement, p.261.
85.PRO F15627, October 28, 1946, citing Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
86.I bid.
87.Barnett, China on theEve of Communist Takeover, p.269.
88.Kutluk.ov, NaJionalliberaJion Movement, p.260, citingA zad Shorki Turkestan
(Free East Turkestan), December 5, 1944.
89.I bid., p.260, citingA zad Sharki Turkestan, A pril 19, 1945, J uly 16, 1945, and
A ugust 28, 1945.The same information is cited inN.N.Mingulov, "The Uprising in
Northwestern Xinjiang, 1944-45," CAR 11,2 (1963):186-89.
90.MingulO'V, "Uprising," p.189.He cites no source.
91.lOR UP&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
92.Osman personally claimed to have opposed Russian exploitation of the A ltai
mines. He recounts challenging a group of Russians, demanding that they show him an
authorization by A li Han TOre himself, or he would drive them out. Hasan Ora1tay,
Ka7Ak TurkJeri, p. 102.
93.A merican observer Barnell wrote of persistent rumors that the Russians con-
tinued to mine in the A ltai, as per an agreement with the ETR. Not only gold was
taken, but also the tungsten mines at Fuwen and Weoquan were said to operate for
tbe benefit of I he USSR.Barnett, China on theEve ofCommunillt Takeover, p.270.
94.Mingulov, "Uprising," p. 186.This was corroborated in an lnterview with Dr.
Kanat, who was a high scboot student in Y ining between 1945 and 1949.
95.Dr.A bdul Kerim Kanat interview.
96.MinguloY , "Upnang," p.186.
97.PRO L ondon, FI 5627.
98. Ibid.
99.Mingulov, "Uprising," p.189.
100.KullukoY , NaJiorw lLiberalion MovemmJ, p. 260.
101.Zhang, Seventy Yean, 12:7061. The head of tbis organization was aman named
Sayerdule (Seyfullaev), not Seyfeuin and nOI A bmet J an Kasimi as is erT'OGeousiY
stated invarious sources.
102.PRO F3116. Originally tbis information was inQian jin boo, A ugust I , 1948,
NOTES TO CHAFTER 7 131
PUblis~ed in ~ining. It was reproduced in Dagong baa, (Shanghai) November 29,
1948, In an article entitled "New Developments in Xinjiang as Revealed in a L ocal
Document," by linY en.
103.I bid.
104.I bid.
105.see discussion later in this chapter.
106.see discussion on the aviation agreement later in the chapter,
107. This is the formal Turkisb name of the chairman. He is more commonly
referred to as Mesut Sabri, or Mesut, in keeping with Turkish forms of address.sec
appendix C for further discussion of this point.
108.Melby, Man.dare of Heaven, p. 102.
109. Seyfettin is listed as among those attending a meeting of the provincial
government on September 18, 1947.Xinjiang Daily, september 22, 1947,p.3.
110.I bid., A ugust 11, 1947.The uue of this post in Chinese is "J iancha Shi." Ma
L iangjun was one of the men released by Governor Wu in 1945 aloog withtbe Kazalt
leader A ilin Wang. see Zhang, Seventy YelU3', 12;6175.A ootber source claims that Ma
was elected vice-chairman of the Provincial ~mbly in J une 1947, on the recom-
mendation of no less a personage tban Y ang Deliang, then oommander of military
forces at Kasbgar. Y ang, a Chinese Moslem, reportedly made aspeciallrip 10Urumqi
to endorse Ma in aspeech delivered after religious services inan Urumqi mosque.see
L i Y utang, "Y izhang xuanju fengbo: Sbaoleboshi (sansbiwu)," Zhongwai zazhi
(Taibei) (J une 1986): 98.
111.Xmjiangllily, september 16, 1947, p.3.
112. Some reports claim J animhan was totally illiterate, but as he did have a
mecreese education, it seems more probable thai bewas at I eaSI semiliterate.
113.Xinjiang Daily, December 2, 1947, p.3.
114.I bid., A pril 21, 1948, p.3.
115_ Halife Altay,Anayw 1tanAnodoluya (I stanbul, 1971), p.448.
116.I RO W&S/11J 2361, Coli. 11/24, J une-December 1948. From an undated
article in the consular fileS by Gary Wang entitled "Sinkiang, Baclt Door to China, Is
the L and of Opportunity for the Y oung." .
117. I brahim Mittin, a Kazak, was also elected 10 the National A ssembly
Presidium. I RO l.IP&SII2/2361.
118. PRO F5061, DO.28, Graham, Urumqi, February 22, 1947.
119.I RO l.I P&S/l2/2361, CoI L 12/24, L etter no.47-H/5J l,-48, Shipton, Kasbgar,
J une 21, 1948_
120.See details on !be J uly riots inthe followingsection.
121.Xinjiang Daily, J une 10, 1947, p.3.
122.I bid.,J uly20,1947,p.3. 7 ..
123. lOR l)P&S/12,12350, CoU.I 2/20A , Shipton, Kasbgar, J uly 30, 194 , atrn8
KJw iq lshJiki, a Uighur-language daily inKashgar.
124.XinjiangDaily,July24,1947,p.4. S hiAi OY er
125.I bid., November 17, 1947, p.3.However, acrording to B.urhan 00........ .
three thousand were killed and many fled the three counties.seeking refuge 10 the Ili-
controlled three districts. seeBurban, Fifty YelU3', p. 322.. . and
126..When the two represenrenves asked lsa for:men:=e::sign
abuse by the Chinese, Isa replied tbat people were to

232 NOTES TOCHAnER 7

anything for fear of reprisal. See lOR I .)P&S/12/2361, Coil. 12/24, Shipton, Kashgar,
November 19, 1947.
127.I bid., letter no.29/H/5/IAB, Kashgar, A pril 5, 1948.
128.I bid.
129.I bid.
130.XinjiangDaily, December 5 and 27, 1947.
131. I sa Y usuf A lptekiu, Dogu Turkistan Davasi; pp. 197-98. There could have
been very few Russians in the government; presumably, he means people with USSR
papers.
132 I bid.
133.I bid., p.202.
134.Xinjiang Daily, September 17, 1947, p.3.
135.Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7058.
136. Xmjiang Daily, September 17, 1947, p.3.The further development and ac-
tivity of Turki nationalist organizations is discussed later in this Chapter.
137.The budget was presented by Bai and approved in October. Xmjiang Daily,
October 19, 1947, p.3.
138.I bid., October 14, 1947, p.3.
139.I bid.
140.XinjiangDaily, October 14, 1947, p.3.
141. I bid., December 5, 1947, p.2.This was a common problem throughout
China. Poorly paid officials were often reduced to corruption just to stay alive.see
Chou Shun-hsin, The Chinese Inflation 1937-49 (New Y ork, 1963), p.244.
142. Xinjiang Daily, J anuary 4, 1948, p.1.
143.I bid., March 17, 1948.
144.I bid., J anuary 18, 1948, p.l.
145.lOR I .)P&SI 12/2361, CoI l.12/24, Shipton, Kashgar, A prilS, 1948.
146.Xmjiang Daily, March 17, 1948, p.3.
147.lOR l,J P&s/2361, Coli. 12/24, Shipton, Kasbgar, A pril 5, 1948.
148. Xinjiang Daily, A pril 21, 1948. See also Mesut's promises of specia.l ~dto
drought-stricken areas {ibid., A pril 27, 1948, p.3) and wheat loans of 5,000 milllOO to
be allotted threughour the seven districts according to local need (ibid., A pril 29, 1948,
p.3).
149.lOR l.J P&S/I 2/2361.
150. Xinjiang Daily, October 23 and 29, 1948, p.3.
151.I bid., October 24,1948, p.3.
152 I bid., October 30, p.1,editorial.
153.I bid., December 13, 1948, p.3. .
154.I bid., October 30, 1948, p. 4, citing accusations in Shuguang ribao (UruJ Dql),
September 29, 1948.
155.lOR l.J P&SI 1212361, Shipton, Kashgar, A prilS, 1948.
156. I OR/lJ P&SlI 2/2361, Coli. 12/24, letter no.47-H/5/L -48, Shipton, Kasbgar,
J une 21, 1948.
157.lOR I lP&s/I 2/2408, no.889 (46110/1040/48), despatch no.106, Fm-Holfl]eS,
Urumqi, October 8, 1948.
158.I bid
159.L attimore, Pivot of Asia, p.98
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 2J j
160.lOR I .J P&S/l2/236I , Shipton, Kashgar, ApriJ 5, 1948-
.161. See the account in H. Boorman, ed, Biographic Dictionary of Republican
~ (L ondon, 1970),3:3. I n his memoirs, Burban writes lhat Zhang ll1i: zhoog bad
realized that Song's presence was an obStacle to normalization of I I i Urumqi relations
and had asked Chiang Kal-shek to recauhim. Burhan, Fifty Years, p. 322.
162 Burhan, Fifty Yean, p.I.
163.I bid., p.320. Burhan writes that be had left Xinjiang at the $lJ ggeslion of
Zhang Zbizhong, who advised him that since Mesu! was unacceptable, he would be
eventually replaced; if Burban distanced himselffrom the Mesut gocercment, heoould
then be called at the appropriate time to serve as the next chairman,
164.Burhan, Fifty Yean, p. 349.
165.Some published sources mention this erodes in the summer and autumn or
1?4
9
, but this information was more grapbically conveyed to the author during jnter-
VIews with members of these officials' families who now live inTaiwan aDdthe Middle
""'c
166.Burhan, Fifty YearS', p.344.
167.I bid., p.346.
168.I bid.InChinese, thepolice chiefs name isgiven 8lI Niufuli.
169. Xinjiang Daily, J une 15, 1949, P. 3.
170.assR&A,no.3331, "R~ Relations anc Potential Soviet Contri-
bution to China's Postwar Economic Deveklpment.," Washington, D.c.. A ugu51 31,
1945, p.29.
171. FRUS, 1949, pp.1044, 1049.
172Mehmet Emin Bugra,Dogu Turkistan, pp.63-64.
173.Burhan, Fifty Yean, p.358.
174.I bid. However, Burban's message to the new government in Beijing, wriueo
in September 1949, also induded a request that IIimembers of the provincial govern-
ment return to Urumqi to aid in tbe coming change in governmenl, a curiouS request
inlight of the claim inhis memoirs that he already bleW oHbe men's demise inA ugust
194-9.
175. I bid. Burhan writes (p. 372) that be made the announcement at a pub6c
meeting inUrumqi on November I , 1949.Thedate of tile aasbisgiveD asA ugu5l V,
1949.A year later, theXUljiDng Daily (A ugust 28, 1949, p.t) repated memorial ser-
vices for the fallen heroes, with A hmet's photograph prominently displayed. A
memorial service was held earlier inY"tning, atteoded by 300,000 people.POI l5iblythis
was when the announcement of these deat~was made in the uiree districts. I bid.,
A pril 21, 1950,p.1.
176.The Burnan accoenr is partly (X)lTOborated by that of Mebmel Emin Bugra,.
who heard in september 1949 that the iii k;aders had gone 10A lma Ala and from
there had departed for Beijing. No jurtner news was heard of the men, bUt ~
months later four burned lXX'J l5d were broUght to IIiandburied mere..Metunet ~
Bugm, Dogu. Turkiston, pp.66-67. A recent ~rs.ioo oftbe fate ofUle lli\e3defS daiJ DS
that there was no airplane crash at all. Rather, according to tbe former deputy
cbainnan of Xinjiang Uighur A ut~ {)istril: t,!be ~ were aU ~ed upon
their arrival in Beijing, and A hmet J ao Kasimi died in pnson tbere I n 1962.~
Roostrnm Sadri, "The I slamic Republic of Eastern TurkeStaD: A commemorauve
Review," JoomallfUtiJuU of Mwlim MIlfCriJyAffain 5, 2(J uly 1984): 313.
,..- - - - - - - - - - - - -
234 NOTES TO CHAnER 7
I n. Burhan, Fifty YeaTS, p.359.
178.I bid.AIsoSurveyo/ChinnMainland Press, no.775, October 29,1965, p. 30.
179. Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 775, October 29, 1965, p. 30.Peng
Dehuai reported, however, that the PI A entered Hami on November 12, 1949.It is
possible that he is referring to the main body of PL A troops and that the troops that
entered Urumqi in OCtober were an advance party that was met, according to Burban,
by himself on October 20, 1949.For the Peng account see his article, "Report on the
Work Situatioo inthe Northwest," Xinhua yuebao (Beijing) 204 (February 15, 1950):
873-76. For Burban's account, see Burhan's memoirs. which include a photograph of
him greeting PIA troops, dated October 20, 1949.
GL OSSA RY
Hanyu
Chinese
Wade- Gil es
Engl ish and/or
pinyin
characters
system
al tematives
Aertai
~., illii J .\l,-
A h-erh-t'ai
A ltai
A kesu
fL .,
~OJ ~}
Ah-k'o-su
A ksu
A qimuBoke ~-rilI-tfafL
Ah-cn'r-mu
Hakim Beg
Po-k'o
A s ha n
pOl .....
Ah-sban
Bai Wenyu
S;;t..L
Pai Wen-yii
Baoan Dui
1~#~
Pao-an Tui
baojia
1~'I'
pao-chia
baojia zhang
1J f.'I'R
pao-chta chang
Beidashan .::U:::. j;~llJ
pet-ta-shan
Baytag gogdo
g
Bole
t~*
Po-le
Pol o
zss
- - - - - - - - - - -
236
GLOSSARY
B ol inov
~.&: j[t~
Po-I i-nuo.m
Pol inoff
B uergen
;Ip jIjlJ -*k Pu-erh-ken
Burqun
B uerxin
-fii.*'t Pu- erh- hsin
Cai Zengxian
?;j.W rfx..
Ts' ai Tseng-hsten
,~~
Chaosu
87] ~J-
Chao- su Q " ,,*,
Chen Fangho f-f j; is
Ch' en Fang_po
Chen Xihao
~~i: .
Ch'en Hsl-hao
Chenghua
'>1".. -ft: ,
Ch'eng-hua
Sharsumbey, Ashan
danzhal
J "~it'l'l -fit
tan- chai- mai- l iang
compul sory
mail iang
sal e of suppl ies
to mil itary
Deng Xianghai 1tI'J ij ;tij-
Teng Hsiang- hai
Dihua (Urumqi) ~ 1'1:.
Ti- hua
Tihwa
DuDefu fJ .,Iii rl'
Tu Te- fu
'~7
Emin
<ti'i
~.t.
O- min
fabi
~*
'\~
fa- pi
National ist Chinese
currency
Fuhai
~
-.-<=
Fu-hai 'Ai}-
'f

Fuyun
.." Fu- yfin .....
~
t1f.
GaoYi
-
KanI
r.]
Gezanaqi Boke
Ketsan-na-ch'j
Katsonatchl B eg
~*,,~~elL
Po- k' o
Gongha
rR.
D.c-.
Kung- ha
Kungha, Nitka 1t-
0
Gu Jianji
.!ijli "f
Ku Chien- chi
g
GLOSSARY 237
Guan Zeliang
'E;liZ.. Kuan Tse-Hang
Gui Xixi f~J ilj, ~,~
Kuei Hsi-hsi
Guomindang
~j'(,*'
Kuomintang
~,
Rami
l],e,.. ~
Ha-mi
Komul
" ""'
Hazi Boke
'13' J:Z 18R....
Ha-tzu Po-k'o Hazi Beg
Hefeng ;f'~
Ho-feng
.e,
Henan
to
'A '
Ho-t'ien
Khotan
Hou Sheng
1~~r\,o
~-jt
HoSbeng
Huijiao
@~Z
Hui-cbiao
I slam
Huiyuan
!l!. ,,"
Hwei-yuan
"''/.U ~
Huocheng
'it
rA , Huo-ch'eng
J ia Shanju
, AA- .
Chia Shan-ehu
J iancha shi
tt'~1i.-
Chien-ch'a shih
Controlling inspector
J imunai
-,1-
~J }
Chi-mu-nai
"
jin
fr
chin
unit of measure
J inShuren
~;J tt-1'-"-
Chin Shu-jen
J inXuedong
1t ~th
Chin Hsueh-tong
J inghe
~~"J
Ching-ho
Keshen $it-
K'o-shen
Kashgar
Kuche
J f
if
K'u-cbe
Kucha
KuerJ e
.J lf-~;1;
g'u-erh-le
Karla
LiTiejuu
tm': f
uTieb-ebiin
-----------
238 GLOSSARY
L in Handong ~J 51-... --*- L in Han-tung
L in Mengchun jC!.it- ,~If... L in Meng--ch'un
L in Qingxiu
~J i'" 15
L in Ch'ing-hsiu
: iii ..,;z:.. ~
L in Xlaohan
~'l~;l.
L in Hsiao-han
L in XiaoI i
"1'1 _. l;'
L in Hsiao-I i
1(..c...~
L iu Y ongyang ~J
~<t-f L in Y ung~yang
"" .,
"''''-
L in Zeying
il1 -,
'; f.:
L iu Tse-ying
L uY uwen
41ip
Z L u Y u-wen
L uo Zhi
~fri
-= -r
L oChih
.:;,~
.!if,
..l!:. ~~
MaBufang
jI ..7.f
Ma Pu-fang
MaGuoyt .,~
~i{,
MaKuo-i
Ma Liangjun
,,~
ft....~
Ma L iang<hiin
MaShuqi
.~jl~ ~
Ma Shu-ch'I
~' - Ma Tingxian
.." J <..."-1l. MaTing-hsien
Ma Zhongying ..!iJ 10/ .,(
Ma Chong-ying
Machaer
)~;fLjffi'
Ma-cha-er
Maigaiti
}.J( t~
Mai-kai-t'I
Manasi
J ;!iJ .tir"J M
Ma-na.ssu
Mazar
Merker
Manas
Milabu Boke ~tj.: /iJ 1s >'L Mi-I a-pu Po-k'o
minzu J t ~ min-tzu
minzu jundui K~~~min-tzu chnn-mj people's militia
Peng Dehuai i~1~>tT:<.... P'eng Te-huai
Mirabu Beg
GLOSSARY 239
PengZhaoxian ji1 erg If~
P'eng Chao-hsien
Qingbaishe
t
6
*;t.
Ch'ing-pai she
CCOique
Qinghe
1
':Qj Ch'ing-ho
Qingzhensi
1-1(.-"'-
Ch'ing-chen-ssu
mosque
}j " q
Qitai
-tr
L .>.
Ch'j-l'ai
Kitai
C>
QuWu
~
~
Ch'u Wu
Sanral
~s-:
San-t'ai
~
'"
~L
if-
Shache
~... v Sha-ch'e
,
Shang Bcke
jffi -18 3t... Shang Po-k'o
Shang Beg
sheng
+r
sheng
unit of measure
sheng
: {j sheng
province
ehengcan yiyuan
sheng-ts'an
Provincial
-11-"-"-'4 ~
i~yuan
A ssembly
.-: : : -p: .n,.
representative
'"
Sheng Shicai
~ 1!t-1"
Sheng Shih~ts'ai
Shufu
iiF',-, j?ii
Shu-fu
Kashgar
Song Xlllan
':t':oip ~Ar
Sung Hsi-I ien
Songshukon
f1.-1M a
Sung-shn-k'Ou
SUiding
,,-'" ~
Sui-ling
.,j<-
Tacheng
.t~: t: ~
Ta-<:heng
Tarbagatai, gavan,
or Chugachak
Tang Bigang
: t.'<j" ~'j
Tang Pi-kaog
Tao Zhiyue
n.J ...t~
Tao Chih-yueh
- - - - - - - - - - -
240 GLOSSARy
Tianshan ;"R.... u..,
Toukesun 1'C.s:.,t,0;
Tuwufan
Ulumuqi
Wenquan %&r. .,W<...
Wu Zhongxin ~ .... tit
Wusu
xian
.~1;.'0_
xianzhang !: f/r- ;;Z
Xtnertaf $jf .x: ~
Xingzheng ducha
chuanyuan ~
1HZ"'J ~~i'i
Xinjiang .f1f 1j:
Xuanchuan W1'~~~
Weiyuan Hui
Xuerxuesi .; ilIijfj) JUr
Y ang Cengxin ~ "IN J f
Y anqi :'S 1
Y anwo xiuwen 1~f(11-z
Yili
T'ou-ke-SUD
Toksun
Tu-wu-fan Turfan, Turpan
Wang TS'eng-shan
Wu-lu-mu-ch't Urumqi
Wen -ch'uan
Wu Chung-hsin
Wu-su
hsien
hsien-ts'an-i-hui
hsien-chang
Hsin-erh-t'ai
Hslng-cheng
tu-ch'a
cb'uanyuan
Hsin-kiang
Hsuan-ch'uan
Wei-yuan Hui
Hsu-erh-hsueh-ssu
Y ang Tseng-hsin
Y en-chi
Y en-wu hsiu-wen
I -I i
county
County A ssembly
County magistrate
I nspector-
general (or
district officer)
Sinkiang
Government
Information Office
Yenki
Cease conflict;
promote culture
ill
GLOSSARY Ul
Yingjisha
I ning, Kul dja
Ying- chi- sha Yangi Hssar
Yining
f-ning
Y lshenhan Hoke l-shen-han Po-k'o
i1'"it- 'fsft...
Y iyizhiyi ~)..~ 1f;'jk l-i-chih-i
Yishenshan Beg
Use the barbarian to
fight the barbarian
Yu Youren
T jp1-f.- Yii Yu-jen
Yumen
r~ J '~
YO- men
Zao Erl ing
f
8B Tsao Erh-ling
ZhangFengjiu 3-k.~~ Chang Feng- chiu
..,i)
Zhang Zhizhong ~ ;f; tf Chang Chih-cbung
Zhao Qianfeng ~: f: -j '$- Chao Chlen-I eng
ZhongTihua
'J t.iA -/1t l
Chong Ti- hua
zhongzu
rt %$(
chung-rzu
race; tribe
Zhu Shaol iang --* t.:."{ j ~ Chu Shao- I iang
Zuo Chuping .J.;... l .-l tf Tso Chu- p' ing
.J .i- r-o .1'
Tso Tsungtang Zuo Zongtang ./j... ~
1- - - - - - - - - _
SELECfED BIBLIOGRAPHY
WORKS I N ENGUSH
AbuAlGh . B
To ea, ahadur. A History of the Turks, Moguls, and Tatan, Vulgarly calkd
a:r
ars
Together w ith a Description of the Countries They Inhabit. 2 vola, London:
.Privately printed, 1730.
A kiner, Shirin.Islamic Peodes Of me Soviet Union L ondon' KeganPaul I nternational
1983. '/'.... , ~ .' '
A1~rt.h. E~rd, ed.Central Asia: A CenturYof Russian R1Je. NewYork: Columbia
mvemry Press, 1967.
__ ."!he Nationality I dea inCzarist Central A sia."InEtJuric M'uw rities ilr /he Saviet
A I UnlO~.Edited by Erich Goldhagen. L ondon: Frederick A Praeger, 1968.
p, T~km. The Turkish and Pan- Turkish Ideal. LondOl1: Admiralty War Staff, In-
Amtel.hgence Division (translation). 1917.
encan Ethnological Society. Essays on lite problem of Tribe. Proceedilfg1 of the
B 1967Annual Spring Meeting. Seattle: University of WashingtOll Press, 1968.
aeon, Elizabeth. Central Asians Under Russian Rule. I thaca, New Y or!c cornell Uni-
.versny Press, 1966.
:l1ey, L l-Col.F. M.Missioff 10 Tashkent. L ondon: J onathan cape, I ~. .
marc, F. M. J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture. cambndge: cambridge
University Press, 1969.
Barnett, A. Doac. China on the Eve of communist TaJaovtT L ondOn: FrederiCk:
A. Praeger, 1963.
Barthold, W.Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. L oodOt1: LIJ 13C and cc, .1958.
Bawden, C.R. 'I 1J Modem History of Mongolia. L ondOO: Weidenfekl and NlCOlSOO.
1968.
Betemtsky, A leksandr. Central Asia. Translated byJ ames Hogartl1.L ondon: The oe-
set Press 1969.
Beloff, M~ Soviet Policy ill the Far ElL5t 1944-/951. londOn: Oxford UniY ersity
Press, 1953.
UJ
244 SE1..ECTED BIBLIOORAPHY
Bennigsen, A lexandre. "The Bolshevik Conquest of the Moslem Borderlands." I nThe
Anatomy of ContnuJnist Takeovers. Ediled by Thomas Hammond. L ondon: Y ale
University Press, 1975. . .
Bennigsen, A lexandre, and Chama/ L emercier-Quelquejay.lslmn in the SovIet UnIOf!.
Translated by G.Wheeler and H.Evans. L ondon: Pall MaJ I Press, 1967. . .
-. The E,olulion of the MU'[;m Nalionalili" of /he USSR and Theu Lin," ,,~
Problems. L ondon: Central A sian Research Centre, in association WI
St.A nthony's College, Oxford, Soviet Affairs Study Group, 1961. .
Bennigsen, A lexandre, and Marie Broxup. The Islamic Threat to the SOM StlIte.
L ondon: 00000 Helm, 1983. .
Bessae, Frank. "Culture Types of Northern and Western China" Pb.D. dissertation,
Un""";,, of WOCOnsin, 1963. '"
-. "Revolution and Government in I nner Mongolia: 1945-50." Papers oft
MichiganACademy o/&knce, Arts and L etten 1 (1965); 415-29.
Badele, Derk. "Chinese Muslims in Occupied A reas." Far Eastem Survey 20, 21 (Octo-
ber 1946): 330--33.
Boorman, Howard. L , and Richard C.Howard. eds, /JiographicaJ Dictionary of Ire.
publkan China. 2vots.New Y ork; Columbia University Press, 1967-69. .
"The Borderlands of Soviet Central A <;ia; Sinkiang." CentraJAsian Review 5, 2(1957):
144--57; 6, 1 (1958): 76-88; lO,3 (1962); 271-76. .
Borisove, 0. B., and B.T.KoiOSkov.Soviet Chinese Relauons 1945--70. L ondon: Indi-
ana University Press, 1975.
BroomhaJ l, Marshall. Islam in China. L ondon, 1910; reprinted New Y ork; Paragon
Book Reprint Corp., 1966.
urccm, Michael. "The Etfecr of the USSR's I ..anguage Policy on the Nation~l L an-
guages of its Turkic POPUlation:' I n The USSR and the Muslim World. Edited by
Y aacoe Ro'i.l.ondon; George A llen and Unwin, 1984.
Brugger, Bill China.'l...iberaJion. and T,ansformation 1942-62. L ondon: Croom Helm,
1981.
Brunnert, H. S., and V. V.Hagelslrom. Pnwu Day PolitU: aJ Organizntion of Chintl.
Trn_,,,, by A Belt""'nko and E.E.Mornn. Pekin. (Beij;ng), N.p., 1910. .
Carrere d'Encausse, Helene. "tsem in the USSR." CmtraJ Asian Revinv 9,4 (1961). 335-38.
Chan, F. Gilbert. "Sinkiang Under Sheng Shib.ts'ai" Master's I hesis, University of
Hoog Kong, 1965.
-, ed.China at 1M C1'O.J Srood.r: NaJionaIisu and Commw u.us, 1927-1949. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1980.
Chaog, Cbib-ehung (Zhang Zhizhong) "Dilemma in Sinkiang." Pocijic Affairs 20
(1947): 422-29.
Chang, Cbih-yi. "L and Utilization and Settlement POS&ibiliUcsin Sinkiang....The Geo-
graphU:aJ R~ 39, J (J anuary 1949); 68-74.
Chen, J aet.1k sinlcimtg Story. London: Collier Macmillan, 1m.
OJ 'en, Y uan. W~ and CeIUTaJ Asimu in China U1Jdu tk Mongolr. Trans!ated by
Cb'ien Hsing-hai and LCarrington Goodrich. L os A ngeles; Monumenl2 Serica,
UniY ersiry Of California P~ 1966.
Chesoeaux, J ean, ed.POpu/a, Movemau and Se~l Societs in China 1840-1950.
SlanfOl'd; Stanford Universiry Press, 1972.
SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY 145
ChiangKai~ek. Soviet Russia in China. New Y ork: Farrar, Straus &L udaby, 1957.
_. ~sldenJ Chiang Kai-shek's Selected Speeches and Messages 1937-1945.Taibei:
China CulturaJ Service, n.d..
-1ChiJuJ's Destiny. Translated by Wang Chung-hui, Taibei: China Cultural5ervK%:,
953.
Onna Handbook EditoriaJ Board. China Handbook 1951.Taibei: China Publishing
Co., 1951.
Chinese Ministry of I nformation. China Handbook 1937-43. New Y ork: Macmillan,
1943.
Chou, Nailene J osephine. "Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier A drninisl:rationin
~te Ch'ing China.The case ofSinkiang 1759--1911." Ph.D.dislertation, Univer
slty ofwashington, 1976.
Chu, Chi-bsien. ''The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Turtistan." Master's theSis, NortbeaSt
Missouri Stale University, Kirksville, MissOUri, 1979.
Chu, Wen.cJ jang. The Moslem Rebellion in NW China 1862-1878. The Hague:
Mouton, 1966.
Clark, L eonard. The Marching Wmd. L ondOn: Hutchinsoll, 1955.
QUbb, O. Edmund. China and Russia: The " Great (J ame." L ondon: Cotumbia Uni-
versity Press, 197L
_. "Economic Modernization in Sinkiang." Far Etutern Survq zt, 2(1958): 17-23.
Conquest, Robert. Soviet NationtJ}itieJ PoIiq in Practice. New Y ork: Praeger,1~7.
_. TheNation Ki11ers (The Soviet DeportaJionofNotionJditin). L ondon: Maemrnan,
1970.
Corban, A lfred. The Nation State and National Sel/.detemtifuJlion. I ,ondol1: Cotlin,
1969.
Cressey, George S.Asia's lAnd and Peoples. New Y ork: McQraw HiJ ~1951.
Caapncka, M.A The Turlc ofCenrraIAsia. I ..oodoo: eurz:on PresS, 1918-
Dabh';, J ack A. H" lStory of th Disccw ery ami Explct'oticIl of CJUnoe ruritDliJn. 1bc
Hague: Mouton, 1963.
Dallin, David. The Rise of IWssia inAsia. [.ondorI: HolGs and Carter, 1950.
Deutsch, Karl W.NaJionalismmul ItrAltemoJillU- NewY ork: Knopf, 1969.
Dreyer,J une Teufel. ChinJJ's Forty Mi/JionS L oodoo: HaJ 'V3td UntverStY Pres&, 1976-
Dupree, louis.Afghanistan_ PrinCeton: PJ 'jnc: etOl1 uJ livelSitY PresS, 1973-. .
Eagleton, wnnam.J r. The KJJrdj.sh RejNhJjc of 1946.L oodOO: Oxford uniCfSdY rre-.
1963. .ed
Eastman, Uoyd E."The Kuomintang in tile 193OL "lD The l.itniU of(;hongt Edil
by Charlotte Furth. I ..oodoo:" Harvard UniveTSityPress. 1976-
_. ~eds of IX.rtruction_ Stanford: Stanford u~J 'rd5, 1~ u~01
Ekvall, ROberL Cultuml &1iJJions Oft the J(onsU- TIbdan IJotrkr ClJ i'2F
Chicago Press, 1939. . BfO'i1l,
Enloe, Cynthia R E.tltnk ConfIkt and Political ~- I k*OO: L ittI C.
1m.
~henon, P.T.ln theHemtofAsla- I ..ooda1= ~ 1925; 71(19:59>:171-78.
'The Ethoograpby of smtiang and"TI bet." QIIITtIl AJ UIII RelII1tI'
Fleming, Peter. T~1.f inTartJl1Y.I..oDdoD= J (Dlllbad ~ I ~WtM'" ~' New
Foster, Charles R. Narions W" JlhouI SIilID: i}rIfic A/iIttJ tf*d ur
Y ork: Praeger, 19811
246 SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY
Franklin, L awrence. "The Chinese Response to British and Russian Encroachment in
Northwest China." Ph.D. dissertation, St.J ohn's University, 1978.
Furth, Charlotte, ed.The Limits of Change. L ondon: Harvard University Press, 1976.
Geertz, Clifford, Islam Observed. New Haven: Y ale University Press, 1968.
Gillin, Donald. Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shonsi Province, 1911--49. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1967.
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. Ethnicity: Theory and Experi-
ence. L ondon: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Gokalp, Ziya. The Principles ofTurkism. Translated by Robert Devereux. leiden: E.
J .Brill, 1968.
Gupta, Bhabeni sen. The Fulcnun of Asia. New Y ork: Western Publishing Co., 1970.
Hall, 1.C.S.The Yunnan Provincial Faction 1927-1937. Canberra: The A ustralian
National University, 1976.
Hammond, Thomas T. "The Communist Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model for
Eastern Europe?" I n The Anatomy of Communist Takeover.;. Edited by Thomas
T.Hammond. L ondon: Y ale University Press, 1975.
--, ed. The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers. L ondon: Y ale University Press,
1975.
Hasiotis, A rthur C, J r. "A Study of Soviet Political, Economic, and Military I nvolve-
ment in Sinkiang from 1928-1949." Ph.D. dissertation, New Y ork University,
1978.
Hayit, Bayrrurza.Soviet Russian Colonialism and Imperialism in Turkestan as an Ex-
ample of the Soviet Type of Colonialism of an Is/ivnic People in Asia. Koln: N.p.,
1965.
Hedin, Sven. The Flight of Big Horse, Translated by F.H. L yon. New Y ork;
E.P.Dutton, 1936.
Heyd, Uriel. Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teochings of Ziya
Go/aJIp. L ondon: L u7A C,1950.
HOldsworth, Mary. Turkestan in the 19th Century. L ondon; Central A sian Research
Centre, in association with St.A nthony's College, Oxford, Soviet A ffairs Study
Group, 1959.
Hook, Brian, ed.The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China. L ondon: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1982
Hopkirk, Peter. Setting the East Ablau: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia. L ondon:
lohn Murray, 1984.
Hostjer, Cbanes Warren. Turkism and the Soviets. L ondon: George A llen and Unwin,
1951_
Hsu, I mmanuel C.Y .The Iii Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-
1881. L ondon: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965.
-. The Rise of Modem China. 3d ec.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
HUnsberger,M. R. "Ma Pe-fang inChinghai Province 1931-1949." Ph.D. dissertation,
Temple University, 1978.
I smail, Mohammed Sa'id, and Mohammed Am I smail.Moslems in the Soviet Union
and China. Translated by U.s. Government, J oint Pcbnceuons Service. Tehran,
I ran: Privately printed pamphlet, published as vot 1, 1960 (Hejira 1380); transla-
tion printed inWashingtoo: lPRS 3936, september 19, 1960.
I sraeli, Raphael. "Chinese versus Muslims: A Study of Cultural Confrontation."
SELECTED BlBUOGRAPHY 247
Pb.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1974.
J ackson, W. A Douglas. Russo-Chinne Borderlands. New Y ork; D.Van Nostrand,
1962
J affe, ~bilip.New Frontir.r inAsia--A Chi1lJenge to the West. NewY ork: Knopf, 1945.
J agchld, Secbin. "The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The I nner
Mongolian Case." I n Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers. Edited by WilliamO.McCagg
and Brian D.Silver. New Y ork: Pergamon Press, 1979.
Kapp, Robert A Szechuan 0Ild the Chinese RePJblic, 1911-1938. New Haven: Y ale
University Press, 1973.
Kedourie, Elie.Nationalism. L ondon: Hurchteson University L ibrary, 1960.
--, ed.NaJionaIism in Asia OIldAfrica.londoo: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.
Kirk, George. The Middle East 1945-1950. L ondon; OXfordUniversity Press, 1954.
Klein, Donald W., and A nne B. Clark. Biogrophic Dictionary ofChinese Communism
1921-1965.Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1971.
Krader, L awrence. Peoples of Central Asia. Bloomington: I ndiana University Press,
1963.
Ku, C.C."Economic Development of China's Northwest." China Qua1terly (SMng-
bai) 4(1938--39): 287-97.
Kuropatkin, A N.KDshgaria; Historical and Ge%gical Sketch ofw Country, lu Mili-
tary Strength, Industries and Trade. Translated by Major W.E.Gowan.Calcutta:
Thacker, Spink., 1882.
Kwanten, L uc.Imperial Nomads. Pbiladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979.
L amb, A 1astaiL A sian Frontim. L ondon: Pall Mall Press, 1968.
L ammens, Rlskun.: Beliefs and lnstimJions. L ondon: Praak Cass, 1929.
Lattimore, Eleanor. "Report on Sinmng." Far Eastern Survey 14(1945): 77-79.
--. "The Sinkiang I ncident." Far Eastern Survey 13(1944): 77-81.
L attimore, Owen. Pivot of Asia. Boston; L ittle, Brown, 1950. .'
-. Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. New Y ork: OXfordUnJ 'lel"SltyPress,
1955.
-. Studies in Frontier H" utory. L ondon: Oxford University Press, 1962. .
L attimore, Owen and Eleanor. "Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet" In The Stau of Mia.
Edited by L awrence Rosiager.New Y ork: Knopf, 1951.
L e Coq, A lben von.Buried Treasures ofCIrinne Turkntan. Translated by A nna Bar-
wen.london: George A llen &Unwin, 1~. N Y ork:
L enczowski, George. Russia and wWest In lran 1918-1949. I thaca, ew
Cornen University Press, 1949.
L i.Chang."TheSeMel Grip onSinkiang." Fam!!"Aff~ 32(1~4): 491-503.The In-
I tang, Chin-tung."The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Fnendship and A I I ian<X: of 1945
j
Edited
side Story." I n NationaIi.st China During tM Silu:rJapanese War, /937-194 .
by Paul Sib.Hicksville, N.Y ..: Exposition Press, 1977.
L ias, Godfrey. Kozak Exodus. London:~v;WB~ I~. Ethnic Frontim. New
McCagg, William 0., and Brian D.Silver, ecs, Soviet Asian
Y ork; Pergamon Press. 1979.
Mclea.D, fitzroy.EastemAfJ?OllChes. I.oodon: J ooa~cape.1949.377...!&6
Mclean N L D "Sinkiang Today." [ntemtJtionaIAffmn 24(1948): ,"0" ""I
,. . ca berra' centre 0 neD....
Macl::erras, Colin. The Uighur Empire (744--840). n .
Studies, the A ustralian National UniverSity, 1968.
248 SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY
McMillen, Donald H."Chinese Communist Power and Policy inSinkiang 1949-1973."
Ph.D.dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1976.
Marshall, Richard R., J r.Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917-1967. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1971.
Massell, Gergory J .The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolmionary
Strategies in Soviet Cemral Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
Medlin, William K., William M. Cave, and Finley Carpenter. Education and De-
velopment in Central Asia: A Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan. L eideo:
E.J .Brill, 1971.
Melby, J ohn F. The Mandate of Heaven. london: Chatto and Windus, 1969.
Menon, K.. P.S.Delhi-Chungking: A Travel Diary. london: University of OXfordPress,
1947.
Morrison, lao."Some Notes on the Kazakhs of Sinkiang." Joumai of the Ruyal Central
Asian Society 36(1948--49): 67-71.
Moseley, George. A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The lli-Kazakh Autonomous
Chou.. Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1966.
Myrdal, J an.The Silk Road. L ondon: Victor Gollancz, 1980.
Norins, Mania. "The New Sinkiang: China's link with the Middle East." Pacific Af-
fairs 15,4 (1942): 457-62.
Nyman, L ars-Erik. Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in
Sinkiong, 1919-1934. Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1977.
Peissel, Michel. Cavaliers of Khan: The Secret War in Tibet. L ondon: William
Heineman, 1972
"The Peoples of Sinkiang." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 17(1930):
231-35.
Pierce, Richard H.Russian CentralAsia 1867-1917. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1960.
Price, M.Phillip."The Great Kazakh Epic." Journal of the Royal CenlTalAsian Society
41 (1954): 249-52.
Prouty, LFletcher. The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the UniJed
Stllles and the World. Englewood Cliffs, NJ .: Prentice Hall, 1973.
Pye, L ucien W.Ww lord Politics. L ondon: Praeger, 1971.
Quested, R.K.. I.Sino-lW.ssian Relations: A Short History. london: George A llen &
Unwin, 1984.
'Rakowska-Hannstone, Teresa. lW.ssia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of
Tadzhikistan. Baltimore: J ohns Hopkins Press, 1970.
Rauch, Georg von.A History of Soviet Russia. Translated by A nnette J acobson
L ondon: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
Rea, Kenneth W.and J ohn C.Brewer, cds. The FotgottenAnrbanadOf': The Reports of
John uighIon Stuart, 1946-49. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
Rice, Tamara Talbot.Ancient Am of Central Asia. L ondon: Thames and Hudson,
1965.
Riker, William H.The Theory of Poli~al Coalitions. L ondon: Y ale Ulliversity Press,
1962-
Ro'~Y aacov, ed.The USSR and tireMuslim World. London: George A llen &Unwin,
1984.
Rcsinger, Uwrence K. TheSUue ofAsia. New Y ert: Knopf, 1951.
SELECTED BlBUOGRAPHY 249
Roosabi, Morris. Chinn and Inner Asia. 100000: Thames and Hudson, 1975.
Rupen, Robert A "The Absorption of Tuva." I n The Anatomy of Communist
Takeovers. Edited by Thomas T.Hammond. L ondon: Y ale University Press, 1975.
-. ?:e 1o!ongolian People's Republic. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.
__ . Peking and the National Minorities." I n C(JI7II7UUIist China 1949-Q); A Tw tnty
Year AppraisaL Edited by Frank Trager. New Y ork: New Y ork University Press,
1970.
Sadri, Rcostram. "The I slamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan: A Commemorative
Review." Joumallnstitute of MuslimMinorityAffain 5, 2(1984): 194-320.
samoun, William. East Turkestan 10 the Tw elfth CenJUry. L ondon: Mouton, 1964.
Saunders, J .J .The History aftlre Mongol Conquests. L ondon: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1971.
Schomberg, R. C.F.Peaks and Plains of Central Aria. L ondon; Martin Hopkinson,
1933.
_. "A Fourth J ourney in the Tien Shan." The Geographical Jounw l79. 5 (1932):
368-74.
Setoo-Watson, HUgh.NaJions and Stales. L ondon: Methuen, 1977.
Sharar A l-zaman Tahir Marvazi.On Chitta, The TurkJ and India. Translated by
V. Minorsky. Original A rabic text dated 1120.L ondon: Royal A siatic Society,
1942-
Sheridan, J ames E.China in Disinlegrotion: The Replblican Era in Chineu lfiStOry,
1912-1949. L ondon: The Free Press, Collier Macmillan Publi.shers, 1975.
Shieh, Milton J .T.The KuominJang; Seld K/Starical [)ocumellU 1894-1969. New
Y ork:: St.J ohn's University Press under the auspices of the Center of A sian
Studies, 1970.
S~iplon, Diana. The Antique L and. L ondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1950. .
Sib,Paul K T.Nationalist Chitta [Juring the Sino-J~ War, 1937-1945.Hict.wille,
N.Y.: Exposition Press. 1977. '
Skrine, Francis Henry and EdWard Denison Ross.The HuJT1 of Asia: A lflSlc.y of
Russian Turkestan:uw . the Centro/.Asimt J(}wna1a. London: Methuen, 1899.
Smith, A nthony D.S.NoJiono/ism inthe '[wenIinh (; mJUrj. Qxford: Martin Robert-
son, 1979.
Smith, D.Howard. Chinese Religiotu. [.oodon: Weldenfeld &, Nkolson, 1.968..
Smith, Wilfred cantwell Islam inModem If/StOfY I ..oodOO: OXford Unl'lerSlty Press,
1957.
SlI 1OCk,David R The Politics of PI uruJ imt. New Y ork: fi';eVicf.PresS, 1975..
Stalin, J oseph. Marxism and the NoJional tIlU1 C%niill QrJ mW1I .I ...ondon. tawrenee
and Wishart, 1936. . and~-
Stein, M. A.Archaeological ExpIoraIinn in~ Turkaf01I . I ..oodoD. Eyre "'ro'
tiswoode, 1901.
_. OnAncient CenJralAsUm Traclcr. r..oooon:~' l.m
ew
ISeJ Vict firSt
Sun Y et-sen. Memoin of a C/tineH~. Taibet anna tura '
printing 1918, second printing inTaibei, 1953. W Price Taibei: QI iDa OJ I -
_. The Prim:iple of NatinNJ/ism. Translated by Frank .
tural Service n.d. _..""''''' by 0Jiang
_. ThE _: Principia of"" P<op/e>'" rwo~w~'
Koi.sheJc.. Taibei: China PubI :ishiD8Co., n-d
250 SELECTED BmUOGRAPHY
Swartz, Marc J ., Victor W. Turner, and A rthur Tuden. Political Anthro-
fXJIogy. Chicago: A ldine, 1966.
Tang, Peter S.H.Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 1959.
Tang, Tscu.America's Failure in China 1941-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1963.
Tashjean, J ohn E. Where China Meets Russia: An Analysis of Dr. Starlinger's
Theory. Washington, D.C.: central A sian Collectanea, no.2, 1959.
Teichman, Sir Eric.J ourney to Turkistan.l.ondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936.
~-. "Chinese Turkestan." JoumaJ of the Royal Central Asian Sm:iety 23, 4 (1936):
561-78.
Tinker, HUgh.Ballot Box and Bayonet. L ondon: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Tong, Hollington K, ed.China Handbook 1937-45w ith 1946SupplemenJ. Compiled
by Chinese Ministry of I nformation. New Y ark: Macmillan, 1947.
Tritton, A S.Islam: Belief and Practices. L ondon: Hutchinson University L ibrary
Press, 1951.
Tsaa, Wen-yen, eo.The Chinese Yearbook 1944-45.Compiled by the Council of I nter-
national A ffairs, Chungking. Shanghai: China Daily Tribune Publishing Co., 1946.
Tsao, W.Y . The Constitutional Structure of Modem China. Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1947.
Tuzmuhamedov, R.How the Nationol Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia (A
Reply to Falsifiers). Translated by David Fidloo. Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1973.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic
Papers. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1956.
--. Foreign Relations of the United States DiplomoJic Papers, vol 7(1945), vallO
(1946), vol. 7(1947), vol.9 (1948), vol.9 (1949). Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1969.
USSR A cademy of Sciences, I nstitute of Oriental Studies. L enin and NaJional Libera.
tion in the East. Translated by Galina Sdobnikova. Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1978.
VI adimirov, P.P.China's Special Area. Bombay: A llied Publishers, 1974.
Wallace, Henry A The Price of VISion: The Diary of Henry A. Wa11ace 1942-1946.
Boston: Haughton Mifflin, 1973.
Watson, Francis. The FronJim a/China. London: Chatta and windus, 1966.
Weigert, Hans W. Generals and Geographen: The Tw ilight of Geopolitics. L ondon:
Oxford University Press, 1942.
Wheeler, Geoffrey. The Peoples of Soviet Cerural Asia. London: Bodley Head, 1966.
--. Rm:iol Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia. L ondon: Oxford University Press, 1962.
--. "Nationalism vs.Communism in A sia.." AsionAffain 64 (1977): 3S-47.
--. "The Muslims of central A sia." Problems of Communism 16,5 (1967): 72-81.
Whiting, A llen S.Sinkiang; Paw n or Pivot. East L ansing: Michigan Slate University
Press, 1958.
Whitson, William W.The Chinese High COmmand. New Y ork; Praeger, 1973.
Wiens., Harold J ."The Di Valley as a Geographic Region of Hsin-chiaog." Current
Sune 7,15 (1969); 1-19.
--. ""The Historical and Geographical Role of Urumcbi, Capital of Olinese central
,
SELECTED nWLIOGRAPHY 251
W" A sia." Annab a/the Association o! American Geographers 53, 4(1963): 441-64.
unbU~h, S. Enders, and Ronald wixman. "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in
W Soviet Central A sia." Canadian Slavonic Papers 17(1975): 320-41.
mne!, Thomas G.The Oral Art and Literature of the Kozakhs of Russian Centra]
Asra. Durham: Duke University Press 1958.
W . '
mnmgton, A lan. Tibet, Record of a Journey. New Y ork: I nternational Publishers
1957. '
Woodhead, H.G.W.The China Year Book 1934.Shanghai: North-China DailyNews
and Herald, 1934.
Woodman, Dorothy. Himalayan Frontiers. L ondon: Banie and Rockliff, Cresser Press,
1969.
Wu, A ncben K. Turkistan Tumult. L ondon: Methuen, 1940; reprinted Hong Koog:
Oxford University Press, 1984.
__ .'The Fourteen Peoples of ChineseTurkestan." J(}lJlTIIJ1 a/the West China Bor-
der Research Saviety 15, series A (1944): 90-98.
Y oung, Crawford. The Politics of CubuTal PhlTOlism. Madison: University of WJ SOOO-
sin Press, 1976.
Zenkovsky, serge A Pan-Turkism and Islam in /WSSia. cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity press, 1967.
WORKS I N CHI NESE
A hemaitijiang (A hmet J an Kasiml)."Shui buyuanyi beping?" Minzhu boo (Yining).
May 1, 1947, p.4; May 19, p.3; May 24, p. 1; J une 18,p. 4; J une 24, p. 4; J une 29,
p.4; J uly 9, p.4; J uly 13, p.4; J uly 16, p.4. ...
__ ."Women uti minzu wenti zhong de yixiecuowu." Xvrhuo yuebao (BetJ lng) 2, 4
(February 15, 1950): 883--85.
An Nmg (Zhang Dajun). XUljiangneimu. Singapore: Chuangken ch~~he, 1952
Baoerhan [Burhan Shahldij. Xinjiang w ushi Nan. Beijing: Wenshi zlliao chuba/lsbe,
1984.
"Cankao zillao: Xinjiang sheng zuzheng gangling." lIanlw i chao (Urumql) 1, 1(J anu-
ary 1947): 25-26.
Ceng Xiaolu. "Xinjiang wenti." Bianduo yuegan 2, 1 (1948): ~ .
Chen U. Yming Shibian ji!ue. Taibei: wennat chubanshe yrnman g~g5l, 19T!'
Cheng Deshou, ed.Bianjiang shew ai 8'uuai.Taibel: Meng-Zang wet yuanhUI , 1962
Deng Xianghai. "Tumshan huiyi," I n nine parts.Zllllyi )U8uou. VolS.65-73: .
"Dui Xinjiang ying you kaiming zhengee." Tw nshan Jwob(J() 1 (J une 1947).2; photo-
graphs on pp.10, 12, 18. ..' .Ni . nmin
Gansu Sheng Minzu Y eojiusuo, ed.yui/an liao au ZJwnggUD. Gansu mgxJ 3re
" chuba~she, 1982. . .., " . min), J uly 3,
Ge renmm tuand dUl dangqJ aI l shi J U lianhe xuanyan. MinzhU bDO (Vi g
1947, p.2 .. .. Edi cd by ZhOOggL ln
Guang L u.E di qin1ue Xtnjiang zhe yiMW. I nXJnJum~~1U...t n\J I o"U
bianjiang lishi yuwen l[lleyuan. Taibei: Zhongguo bianJ w.ngliSmyuwe eyuan,
1964.. .. . . .,. " '7"' han u"Pcrut I (Qclober 15, 1947):
_~.."Xinjiang de guochu, lI J anZ81,wei at. w ns J-O-_
>-4.
Hong Cunyuan.Xinjiang. Taibei: Taishan chubanshe, 1961.

252 SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY

HOI lgDichen. Xinjiang shidi da gang. Nanjing: Chengzhong shuju, 1935.
L i Dongfang. "Xinjiang sheng tongbao shi Tujuezu rna?" Aertai (A ltai) 1,2 (A pril 25,
1945): 8--9.
--. "zai I un Xinjiang sheng tongbao bu yingcheng wei Tujue minzu Xinjiang sheng
bu ying cheng wei Tujuesidan." Aertai (A ltai) 1, 2(A pril 25, 1945): 9.-.-10.
L i linw ei.Xmjiangfengyun. Hong Kong: Haiwai shudian, 1947.
L i linwei and Shui liantong, eds.Xinjiang w enn, Hong Kong: Haiwai shudian, 1947.
L in Danjiu. "Xinjiang de minzujiefang doujeng." Xinluulyuebao 1,2(1950): 361-62.
Meng-Zang Weiyuan Hui, Bianjiang zhengce yanjiu. Taibei: Meng-Zang weiyuan hui,
1957.
Min feng zhoubao (Drumqtj. September 7, 1947.
Muhanmode Y imin (Mehmet Emin Bugra]. "Xinjiang sheng tongbao shi Tujuezu."
Aertai (A ltai), 1,2 (A pril 25, 1945): 10-14.
--. "Zai lun Xinjiang sneng tongbao shi Tujue zu." Aertai (A ltai) 1,2 (A pril 25,
1945): 18--21.
Peng Dehuai. "Guanyu Xibei gongzuo qingkuang de beogao." Xmhua yuegan 1, 4
(February 15, 1950): 873-75.
She lingyun. "Y i jingqi qianshe jiu Xinjiang yongjiu heping." Tianshan yuegan (OCto-
ber 15, 1947): 9.-.-21.
Sun Fukuu. Sulian luedua Xinjiangjishi. Hong Kong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1952.
Sun Haicheng. "Wuchuanshan shang Zhu Shaoliang." Xurw en tiandi (Shanghai) 12
(A pril 1946), 20-21-
Sun Runsheng. "Minzu Tuanjie yo heping qianshe." Hanhaicluw 1, 1 (J anuary 1947):
12-14.
Sun Zuobin. "Dui xiaoshu minzu gongzuo de yijian." Xinhua yuebao 2, 4 (February
15, 1950): 376.
Ttu:heng minsheng boa (Tacbengj.A pri13O, 1947.
Wang Cengshan (Celaleddin Wang Oengshan). " Xmjiangyu Tuerqi:" Aertai (A ltai) I , 1
(J anuary 15, 1944): 29-30.
Wang Hualung. Zhongguoquyu diligangyao. Taibei: by the author, 1967.
XUifiangribao (Urumqi), March I , 1944-May 31, 1949; miscellaneous wues between
1949 and 1951.
Xu Bode. Su e dui Xinjiang 1M qinlue. I n Xinjiang yanjiu.. Edited by Zhongguo bian-
jiang I ishi yuwen xueyuan..Taibei: Zhongguo bianjiang lishi yuwen xueyuan, 1964.
Zhang Dajun. Xurjiang jin sishi nian bianluan ji/ue. Taibei: Zhongyang wen wu
gongyingllhe, 1954.
--. Xinjiang minzz.I bian qianji xian chuang. Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe,
1954.
-. Sishi niiln dongfuanXUifiang. Hong Kong: Y arnou chubanshe, 1956.
--. Xinjiang fengbao qishinian. 12voI s.Taibei: lanxi chubanshe you xian gongsi.
1980.
Zhang Qiyun, cdZJw nghua minguo diJu ji: Zhong.Ya dalu bimljian& Xizang difang
Xinjimlg sheng Menggu difang. Taibei: Guofang yanjiu yuan yinxing yu Zhongguo
dime yanjiu suo hezuo, 1960.
Zhang Xinglang. Bianjiang zhengzhi. Taibei: Meng-Zang Wei yuan hui, 1962.
Zbongguo bianjiang I isbi yuwen xueyuan. Xinjiang yanjiu.. Taibei: Zhongguo bianjiang
lMi yuweo xueyuan, 1964.
SELECTED BIBliOGRAPHY 253
Zhongyang xuanchuan bu."Xinjiang zai qianshe zhong." Government pamphlet dated
October 25, 1944.
Zhu L uosheng. "Zl:!ouxin guo renmin sixiangsbangde chongda miuwu." }{in XllIjiong
3,5 (March 15, 1945): 13-18.
WORKS I N RUSSI A N
Bruk, .S.I ."Ethnic Composition and Distribution of the Population inthe Xinjiang-
Uighur A utonomous Region of the People's Republic of China," Sovetskaya 1-
nograftya 2(March-A pril 1950): 89-94.Translated inlPRS 16,030, 1-12
__ ."The Distribution of National Minorities inthe Chinese People's Republic,"
Sovetskaya Elnografiya (1958). Translated inCtntrolAsian Revitw 7:1 (1959):
84-96_
Kotov, K. F. Autonomy of L ocal NationnJities in the CJUnestPtop!e'J RefWlic. MOI l-
caw: State Pub\i.shing House of J udicial literature, 1956.Translated inlPRS 3547.
Kutlukov, M.The National Liberation Movement of 1944-49 in Xinjiang as Pan of the
Demomctic Revolution in China. Unpublished translation by M. Paulin.
Ph.D. dissertation abstract, published by the A cademy of Science, Uzbek SSR, In-
stitute of Eastern Science in Memory of A buray Han glruni, Tashkent, 1963.
__ ."The Democratic Movement of the people of Southern Xinjiang (Kashgaria)
Between 1945-47." Unpublished translation by M. Paulin.Scientific WorkS and
I nformation Book I , A cademy of Science, Uzbek SSR, Department of Social
Sciences.Tashkent (1960): 103-14.
___ ."The National L iberation Movement in Xinjiang 1944-49 as a Part of ee
Chinese People's Revolution." Unpublished translation by M.Paulin.Collected
Works of the Graduate SchOOl of Social Science, A cademy of seeoce, Uzbck SSR
Book n. Tashkent (1958): 255-71.
Mingulov, N.N."The Uprising in NorthweSt Xinjiang 1944--49."Translated by Cen-
tral A sian Review. A lma A ta: Voprosy I SlOrii KazakhStana I Vostocbnogo
Turkestana, 1962. A bridged translation in Central Asian Review 11:2(1963):
181-95.
Murzayev, E.M. Nature of XUljimtgand Fomw tWn oflhe [Jesuts of
CenJnJ1As
ia.. Ma&-
caw: Nauka, 1966.Translate<! in J PRS 40, 299.
Shevel, I. B."National ccostrucuon in tbe Xinjiang-Uighur A ut()l]OlDOU5 Region of
the People'S Republic of China." SovtukJJya mograjiya (1956): 95-105. Trans-
lated inlPRS 16,030, 11-29.
SladkCMkii, M.I .15toriiJJT~hnkilch aurosJtenii s.s.s.R. s KiJMm MOl--
caw: Nauka, 1977
_. Ocherki. tkonomicheshkh otno5hmii s.S.S.R. s lata. M{COW: Nauka, ~7
Taipov, Zunin. The FighJ for F~edom. Unpoblisbed tran5la
tion
by M. Paulin. MOl-
cow: Main Editorial Offces ofWesterD [jterature, 1949. . ...
Y akotev, A G."The Question of the National L iberatjon.M~nt 10Xiopang
1944--49." Unpublished tranSlation by M- Paulin.TM ScienJi.fi NoW r: f 1M in-
stitute of Orimtol studies (A cademie oCScieJ 1CC, USSR) 2(1~5): 155-88: .
__ ."The Role of the People's Uberation A trt1Y inEcor1OOllC ~cuon J D the
Outlying Distrlets of the Qljnese Peopk:'~RePUb\iCin 1950-55. Tramlated by
254 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Central Asian Review . Moscow: Kratkuye Sobshcheniya I nstituta Vostokevedeniya
21, 1959.Translation and comment in CentrolAsian Review 5:2(1957).
WORKS I N TURKI SH
Translations of all the following works were made by M.S.L Wang, for the author's
personal use.
A 1ptekin, I sa Y usuf. Dogu Turkistan Davasi. I stanbul: mag Matbaasi, 1975.
A ltay, Halife.Anayw 1tanAnadoh(ya. A nkara: Modem Matbaa, 1981.
Bugra, Mehmet Emin. Dogu Turkistan. I stanbul: N.p., 1952
Gayrelulla, Hizir Bek.Altaylanla Knnli Gunler. I stanbul: A bmet Salt Mattaasi, 1977.
xaranoca, A mac.Dogu Tuekutan, I stanbul: N.p., 1960.
Oraltay, Hasan. Kozak Turkkri. I stanbul: N.p., 1961.
UNPUBUSHED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
The names and dates of specific documents in the U.S.National A rchives and in the
National History I nstitute archives in Taiwan are listed individually. I n the case of the
Bdlish archival material, however, only the main file reference numbers and the dates
covered by each file are cited here, since each file contains innumerable individual
items, many of which have already been identified in the notes by author, place, and
date, aswell asby their main filereference number.
Great Britain
I ndia Office Records. Political (External) HI es and Collections 1931-50.
l}P&S/I 2/2350 Coll12I 20A 1945-48
2355 con, 12/23 1929-37
2359Co1I . 12I 24(4) 1939-46
2360 Coil 12124(4) 1946-48
2361 Coli.12124(4) 1948-49
2362 CoIl. 12/24(5) 1944-47
2363 Coli.12/25 1934-35
2367Coll 12/29 1934-46
2369 con.12/30 1935-41
1377CollI 2/37(2) 1941-42
2378 CoI L 12/38 1936-44
2384 CoD.12/43(2) 1942-46
2385 CoI l.12/44 1936-37
2386CoI l.12/45 1935-43
2387 Coli.12/46 1937-41
2388 cea.12/46(2) 1941-43
2392 CoIl. 12/49 1934-43
2399 CoI L 12/561943-46
2404 CoI 112/61 1943-45
2405 CoI l 12/62 1944-47
,
SELECTED BIBUQGRAPHY 255
2407CoI l.12/64 1944-46
2408 Coli. 12/66 1948-49
Public Record Office.Files of the British Foreign Office
FO 371-46187(1945) .
FO 371-53665 (1946)
FO 371-53666 (1946)
FO 371-63336 (1947)
FO 371-63337(1947)
FO 371-69624 (1948)
FO 371-7580.1(1949)
Repllblic o/China
Bureau of I nvestigation. Diao Cna J u.X"lJljiang Sheng sanshiwu niml du qumrsheng
renkou tongjice. Urumqi,J uly 5,1947.
National History I nstitute. Guo Shi Guan.
Doc.no. 100/113.5/1 Xinjiang Y ili shibian, March 17, 1945.
Doc.no. 100/114.52.35/2 Xinjiang sneng shizhi gangling.J uly 20, 1946.
Doc. no. I 12.10/0 Xinjiang sheng canyibui dian qing cong 51ljiejue Y ining shi
bian.A pri11946.
Doc. no. 12.1/15 Xinjiang Hetian renmm qing fahai I I leishou caichan.September
1946_
Doc. no.121/20 Shisi ci jiangjie hoi yi. september 1947.
Doc. no.02.2110 Xinjiang sheng qin rong wenti jielue.J anuary 1946.
Doc.no.05(38 Xinjiang sheng juan shui, A ugust 1946.
Doc. no. 02/49 Xinjiang sheng tanwu an [ian zhao reeg zai junta jiguan sben-
pan.J uly 1946.
Doc. no.2_10.02.4/65 Xinjiang sheogjingfei May 1947.
Doc. no.03.10/30 Xinjiang shengxingjeng chu hua.A ugust 1946.
Ref. 3-050.14/6 Xinjiang sheng jengfu qmg shell gai sbengxuan cnuan ..... ei yuan hui
niqi zuzhi guicheng. september 9, 1948.
United StoJes of America
u.s. Department of State. National ArchiVeS- Records of the Officeof Strategic Ser-
vices, 1942--48.
1942Report 26051 "NortlJ weSI Road to China." October 8,1942 . M
1943 Report 35656Untitled report 011 settlement of Chineserefugees 10XinJ lllll&
April 14, 1943. . .. ..M
Report 36225 "Movement of Nationalist oovernment Troop> 1010Sjnkjang, ay
12, 1943.
Report 40382 "Extension of the Central aovemment's A uthOrity intO the North-
west," J une 24, 1943. . . . .
Report 43256 "A Few Highlights on tbe political and EconomI C SltuattOO m
Sinkiang," A ugust 10, 1943.
Report 45670 "Kuomintang..communist Situation," A Ugust 17.1943-
Report 48871 SinO-Russian RelationS 00 SinkiaOg." september 16, 1943.
-
256 SELECTEDBIBUOGRAPHY
Report 66569 "Political Developments in Sinkiang 1942-43," November 1, 1943.
Report 66570 "Political Disturbances inSinkiang," November I , 1943.
Report 48049 "Political and Military Situation in Sinkiang and Ninghsia Prov-
mces," November Z. 1943.
Report 66568 "Works of Defense Commissioner Sheng Shi-tsai," November 4,
1943. ,
Report 66571 "USSR..sinkiang Relationships," December 3, 1943.
1944 Report 57386 "Stability of Government; the Muslims in Northwest China,"
J anuary 24, 1944.
Report 69604 "A lleged Bombings by Soviet Planes of Sinkiang Provincial Troops,"
A prilS, 1944.
Report 70438 "USSR..sinkiang Relations," May 8, 1944.
Report 940&1 ''Two Despatches on Developments inSinkiang," A ugust 17, 1944.
Report 103722 "Kazakh A ctivities in Sinkiang," OCtober 9,1944.
Report 105147"The Far East and I slam," November 6, 1944.
1945 Report 110296 "Chinese War L osses," J anuary 1, 1945.
Report 117975 "Ining Uprising," February 7, 1945.
Report 127079 "Communist Views in Regard to Sinkiang," March 16, 1945.
Report 137188 "Sinkiang Revolt," May 25, 1945.
Report XL 15895 "Sinkiang Revolt: From the Middle of May to the Middle of
J uly: The Characterofthe I mpasse," J uly 16, 1945.
Report XL 32642 "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," september 25, 1945.
Report 113663 "Basic Factors in the Sinkiang Situation," December 15, 1945.
Report X 35384 "Relations Between Y enan Communist Government and the Re-
public of Outer Mongolia," December 29, 1945.
1946Report XL 48301 "Negotiations Between General Chang Ctnn-chong and
the Delegates of the Ioing Regime inTihwa,' J anuary 28, 1946.
Report X 43572 "China-Russian I ssues in Mancburia," February 12, 1946.
Report XL 44804''Soviet Far Eastern A ims," February 23, 1946.
Report 47545 "Eastern Mongolian A utonomous Movement," March 16, 1946.
Report 893/12-546 "The Current Situation in Sinkiang," December 5, 1946.
Report 893/12-946 Telegram. December 9, 1946.
1947Report 893/1-1347"Signs of Unrest inTihwa," J anuary 11, 1947.
Report 893/1-647"Drift ofSinkiang A way from China," J une 6, 1947.
1948 Report 114848 "Disturbances in Sinkiang," J anuary 25, 1948.
Report 45492 "Smkiang-Russian Relations in Sinkiang," A ugust 9, 1948-
U.S.Department of State. Records of the Office of Strategic services, Research and
A nalysis Branch.
R &A Report 340 "Developments ot tbe Week.in Sinkiang," A ugust 25,1942.
R &A Report 751 "Survey of Sinkiang," J UDe25, 1942; second edition, septem-
ber 27,1943.
R &A Report 1223 "Russian WithdrawaJ .from Sinkiang," December 28, 1943.
R &A Repon 2911S "Revolt inChinese Turkestan," February 16, 1945.
R &A Report 1921 "Peoples and Politics of China's Northwest," J uly 1, 1945.
R &A Report 3331 "Busso-Oaneee Relations and Potential Soviet Ccntributiocs
toOnna's PostwarEoonomic Development," A ugust 31,1945.
R &A Report 3248 "I mplications of the Sino-So'I I iet A greements for the I nternal
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 257
Politics of China," september 7, 1945.
R & A Report 3247 "Chinese Reactions to the A greements with the Soviet
Union," september 7, 1945.
U.S.Department of State, Officeof I ntelligence Research.
Report No.4451 "Biographies of SinkiangOftk:ers," J une 30, 1947.
Report No.4461 "Recent Events inSinkiang," J uly I I , 1947.
-
I NDEX
A bbas, A bdul Kerim, 71, 97, 126, 176
AlxIullalyoff, 139
A f g ha n~t a n, 19, 177
agriculture, 150
A 1en Wang, 50
A li,139
A li Beg Hakim, 35, 71, 99,123,134,136
A li Han TOre, 36, 45, 55,66, tOl, 139,
154; disappearance of, 71,137; as
I slamic leader, 145; as president of
ETR, 137
A lptekin, I sa Y usuf, 73,97,104,163,
165; appointment to coalition, 70,
71; biographical information, 53; in-
terview with foreign consuls,
164-65; at National A <iSemb)y, 98;
recalled, 172-73
A ltai Mountains, 20
A ltay, DelilhanJ an, 161
A meenah Hanim, 97
A nkara, 182
A nwar Musa Bey, 137, 147
Arabic script, 24
A shan members of government, 98--99
~im Bey Haja, 137, 145, 154
assimilation, 11, 12-13, 17
A zerbaijan, 8
Azizi, Seyfettin, 71, 82, 101, 156, 159
Hai Wenyu, 158, 168, 173
banking, 147, 149.gee also currency
Barko\, 135
Barnett, A Doak, 140
Baytak Bogda. See Beidashan I ncident
Begs, 25
Beidashan I ncident, 123-25, 175
beryl,21
beryllium,21
black market, 168
Bolinov, General A , 135, 139
British consuls. See Graham, Walter,
Shipton, Brie; 'turret, G.R.
Bujra, Mehmet Ermn,63, 73, 165, 175;
appointment under Mesut, 156,
172; biographical infonna
tion
, 53; at
National A ssembly, '11; in 1946
coalition,70; in 1946eleetiOOs, 80,
81; travels of, 101
cai Zengxian, 69, 71
e.c.Clique, 73, 110, 112, 120, 126
Chen Fanbo, 158, 159, 175
Cnen u, 149
Chen Xittao, 110, 112, 155, 160, 167
Qri Y e Trading eompany, 92
Chiang Kai-shek, 5, 7, 9, V, 28,40,51,
54,59,60, 111,119; millority policy,
12-15; Xinjiang poliCY ,38-39, 179
Qrine'le COlI I murtist party, 13
Chinese I nronnation Office, 124
260 INDEX
Chu Wu, 69, 86, 160, 168
coat, 20, 21, 150, 174
coalitions, 67, 68, 69
Colonial A ffairs, Court of, 15
Commodity Price Control Commission,
159
ComuSbayoglu, Hamza Ucar, 161
Constitutions, 13, 14-15
oorruption: at county level, 95; govern-
ment moves against, 9S; under J in
Shuren, 26; among local Begs, 9S;
among magistrates, 95-96; in Mesut
government, 170-72; in military gar-
risons, 36, 37, 94-95; in Qing period,
25,26; under Sheng Shicai, 37;
Zhang Zhizhong's speech on, 94
currency: central government redemp,
tion of, 94,147; exchange rates, 91,
169; opposition to Nationalist, 116,
169; plans for unification of, 77;
prinling of Xinjiang dollar, 91, 127;
SUspending of gold yuan, 173; use of
Russian, 169
danzhoi moiJUurg, 36
Democratic Union, lSI , 152
DengJ GangDW, 43, 48
DepshaytOV, 135
Disease control, 151
Du Detu, General, 43.44, 45, 47
Dzungarian plain, 20
East Turkestan, 100, 101
East Turkestan Republic (1933), 26-27,
34, 183
East Turkestan Republic (1944): agri-
culture: and industry in, 150; early
goals of, 45-46; economic policies,
147-50; establishment of,42--48;
general goals, I S3-54; history of,
136; Islamic nature of, 145; KUlja
Dcdaration, 144; military, 145-47;
military :supplies for, 144; negotia-
tions with Chinese.55-64; ofIiciafs,
138; """" P"'I"""!s of, 58; _,
L
organization, 151-52; "question of,"
82,91,100--1; social welfare in,
150-S1; status of border with
USSR, 142-44; and Zhang Zhi-
Zhong, 132-34. See also A li Han
TOre; Kasimi, A hmet J an; Mura
Haji, I mak J an; senmogru, Rahim
J an
Ebulhayir TOre, 55
education, 17, 140,150
elections, 77--81, ffl
Erturk, A bdul, 121
Evesoff, F.G., 54, 56
frontier regions, 14-15
Gansip Haji, 147
Gansu, 19,20.25,38,62
Gao Yi. 43, 48
gold, 20, 91,147,150,169, 174
Gongha county, 43
Gossbank,149
Government I nformation Office, 158
Government Political Program (1946),
75-77, lI 2, 113, 122, 152, 155, 181
Graham, Walter, SO,85,107, 142, 143
Great Britain, 7,16,34
Gu J ianji, 69, 73
Guan Zetiang, 69
Guo Xixi, 158
Guomindang: in Mesul government,
159-60; minority policy, 7, 10; opens
provincial headquarters, 28; negotia-
tions witb IIidelegates, 5~
provinciallJ 'lttting, 110; view of IIi
rebellion, 4l}-.41; in Xinjiang, 166,
167
Hami,26
Han Olinese: dominance or provincial
government, 180; asminority,
33-34; pecpcsed ratio in govern-
ment posts, 89-90;relations with
Moslems, 4, 5,37-39,88, 179; un-
rest, 89, 93
Han Naman, 164
RasanlokoY , 139
Hatewan.See Hauje, Kadvan Hanim
Hatije, Kadvan Hanim, 97,108,109,
118,127,160
Hedin, Sven, 19
horses, 37
haipitals,151
Hou Sheng, General, 48
Hu~27, 33, 44,109
Hurley, Patrick.J ay, 52
I ii area,40
I l~faction, 118, 119, 134
IIi~ebellion,34--41, 42-55,177-79
I ndta,277
industry, 150
mnauon, 91, 92, 148-49, 168-70
inspectors-general, 72, 73, 160
intermarriage, 114, 164, 165
I ran, 8
I raq, 8
iron,20
I slam, 22-25, 29-32, 34--35, 46, 145.See
also Moslems; Turldc peoples
I stanbul, 182
tsepanovc, Vladimir, 139
jade, 20
J animhan, 118, 127, 156, 158, 168, 171,
173
J ia Shanchen, 159
J in Shuren, 26
J in Xuedong, 88
Karakorum Mountains, 19
Kari, Cafer, 139
Karim Haji,97
KaripogI u, KoJ csegan, 161
Kasimi, A hmet J an, 66, 79,82, 84, <fl,
100,103,115,116,119,126,162;
accusations against, 141; appoint
mem to coalition, 71; articles by,
117; biograpbical information, 55;
calls for resignation of, 109; com-
INDEX 2f5J
ments on GPP, 75; dealhof, 176;
departure to IIi, 128; education, 140;
on garrison commanders, 96; letter
10Burhaa, 175; on mission I OlOOth,
114; at National A ssembly, 98; on
national unity, 86; on 1946electionS,
81; popularity, 101; repJ rt 00
Urumqi police, 74; during rioCs,
lQS.-l1; role inETR, 137
Kazab, 29, 33, 113; delegales 10Na-
tionalA ssembly, 162; inETR, 136,
146; in Gongba county and Vining,
44; illiteracy among, 31; reY OI ulion-
ary organizationS of, 35; inriots,
109; Sheng Shicai's policy toWl!rd,
T1, 35; warrior tradition of, 31.Su
also Turkic pcopIes
Kirgtliz, 24, 29, 31
Kulja, 107
Kulja Declaration, 144
Kunlun Mountains, 19
Kurdish, 8
L ama Buddhivn, 32
L attimore, Owen, 13
load, 20
Lessin, ColOfleI , 141, 146
UTlejun,47,48
Liang HanzhaO, 39
ueHandoog, 74, 86, 125, 163 .
Uu Mengchun, 73, 106, 170; appooll-
menl under Buman. 172; as
dJ airtn<U1 of eommoditY PriceS
Control eommi.1$iOD, 159; as
cbairJ J 'Nll1 of GOVernment lnronna
tiOll OlI ice, 158; inMesot adminis-
lI'alion. 155; in 1945oe~
61; in 1946coalition.69; 00prk:c:s.
169;'OiSit to lli, 83
UuXiaOli,I 58
LiuYcopg, 158
tiu Zcying, 49,131,159
to Z,himai, 176
L ong Y en, 16
LuY uwen, (f}
262 INDEX
Ma Bufang, 6, 16
Ma GUoyJ ,97
Ma Liangjun, 156--57
MaSbuqi,71
Ma Tingxian, 71
Madjoroff, Colonel, 135
magistrates, 94
Mai Huarorin. See SabriogJ u, A rtughral
Maksun, A bdul Kerim, 97
Manchus, I I , 12, 136, 158; nationality,
32; rule inXinjiang, 25-26; troops,
24
Mandarin, 17
Manjukjab, Prince, 50, 52
Mao Zedong, 13, 14, 176
Martial law, 109-10, 112
Mecca, 32
Mesut A bong, 97
Mesut Sabri. See Sabrioglu, Mesut
Mevianav, 139, 141
Miao,14
Mihalovic, Gorki, 139
mineral wealth, 21
Mingulov, N.N., 150
Minzhu boo, 116--17
MiUin,lbrabim, 162
Molotov, V.M, 51
molybedum, 174
Mongolia, 10, 18, 19; banners of, 15;
Beidashan I ncident and, 122-25;
border incidents involving, 122;
plebiscite in, 13
Mongolian and TI betan A ffairs, Bureau
of, 15; Commission of, 15
Mongolian People's Republic, 19, 177
Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry, 15
MOI lgols, 4, 11, 136; history of, 24; as
Kazak allies, 32; plea for autonomy,
14; religion of, 32; writing system of,
24
Moslems, 22-25, 30--32, 33, 74, 165,
166. See also Hatije, Kadvan
Hanim; Hui; I slam; Turkic peoples;
Xinjiang nationalities
Mura Haji, IzhakJ an, 71,139,141,
145-46, 176
MUsa, {J sur, 174
Mushin, 139
Nasir, 97
National A ssembly, 97,105,161,162
national liberation, 8, 39
nationalism,S, 22, 29,101,154,166,167
Nationalist Chinese military, 18, 152,
179; calls for withdrawal of, 96, 108,
112, 114; description of, 38; dis-
cipline among, 96--97; interference
in provincial government by, 126,
181; reorganization of, 107;
response to iiiRebeUion, 46-48,
51-52; suppression of riots, 126, 164
Nationalist Party. See Guomindang
nationality question, 8-9
Native Products Trading Company, 93
newspaper war, 116--18
newspapers in ElR, 150-51
Nilka,43,44
Niyaz Ho]a, 86
nomads,39
nonferrous metals, 21
Northwest Military Region, 130
oiI ,20-21
opium, 94
Osman Batur, 35, 50, 51, 66, 69, 7l,
103,105,108,109,113,116,129,
130,133,147,162, 181; advance
into Ashen area, 134-35; in
Beidashan I ncident, 122-25; IIitee-
nco anger over, 117-18; rumors
concerning, 98-99
Osman Damullah, 127
Pakistan, 177
Pamir Mountains, 19
Pan-Turanianism,32, 182
Pan-Turtisrn,32, 182
Paxton, J ohn Hall, 111
Peitashan. See Beidashan I ncident
Peng Zhaoxian, 61
People's liberation A rmy, 176
petroleum, 20-21
Polat, Turfani Bey, 166
police, 73-74, 109-10, 125-26, 154
political prisoners, 64-65, 133
prices, 148, 149, 168-70, 173.See also
Commodity Price Control Commis-
sion; inflation
Qing dynasty, 15,24,25,26
Rahman, A bdul, 164
railroad, 62, 115-16, 143
rationing, 105
refugees, 89.See also White Russians
Religious A ffairs, Ministry of, 145
Religious Council, 145
Resit, A bdul Kerim, 71
Riots (1947),108-109,112-13,126,164
"rotten apples," 109, 112
Russian Revolution, 34
Russians, 32, 166.See also White Rus-
sians
Sabit Damullah,27
Sabrioglu, Dr.Mugbral, 97, 144
Sabrioglu, Mesut, 98,105,180,182;
biographical information, 53;
demands for removal of, 134; econ-
omy under, 168-70; government of,
157; as inspector-general. 73; mis-
sion to south, 114; opposition to,
120,121,122, 131; provincial
chairman, 119, 154-72; on unity,
159; visit to IIi, 83; visit to riot areas,
164
Saifudin. See Azizi, Seyfettin
Salenga River, 24
self-determination, 13, 14-15
Salih, J an Bey, 145
selimoglu, Rahim J an, 55, 71, 106
Serziman, 161
Seyfettirl.See A zizi, Seyfettin
Shahidi, Burtian, 99, 109, I ll, 155; ad-
ministration of, 172-75; appoint-
INDEX 163
rnent to coalition, 63, 71; biographi-
cal infonnation on, 172; J uly 1946
speech, 85; inTurfan, 89; in
Y arkand, 102
Sheng Shicai, 6, 16,22, 35, 43, 73, 117,
150,171,174,178,183; Chinese-
Moslem relations under, 37-39; ear-
lycareer of, 27; ethnic policy, 30, 31;
norse requisition policy, 37; mineral
exploration under, 20; shift teward
Guonnndang, 28, 29; inWorld War
n,27
Shipton, Eric, 162--63, 165
SibO,32, 121
Silk Road, 20, 24
Sino-Soviet border: description of,
19-20; incidents, 28, 42, 135; statuS
of,l38
Sino-Soviet relations, 63, 117.See also
USSR
smo-scaet trade, 21-22, 174-75
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
A lliance (1945), 76, 174, 179.See
also USSR
Solon, 32, 121
Song Xilian, 159, 170; accusations
against, 134; anticonciliation views
of, 90; appointed to Xinjiang, 85-86;
domination of, 130, 155; on fighting
the ElR, 107; leadership inXin-
jiang, 104, 106; I eaVtSXinjiang, 171;
negotiationS with Kazan.116, 181;
opposition to zhang, 127, 181; and
Osman Bator, 123, 135; inriots,
109, I ll; on Tum nationalist in-
fluence,l67
Soong, T.V., 51
Soviet Central hia, 39, 140, 142, 182
Soviet:.Xinjiang Trading A gency, 28
spodumene, 21
Stalin, J oseph.40
Stein, Sir Auret, 19
Stephens, B;irbaJ 'a, 142
subsidies, 76, 93
SukUrooyogJ U,Delilhan, 71, 139,
- - - - - - - - - - -
264 INDEX
156,176
Sultan Hamid, 97
Suo Fukun, 132
sun-rorre Manifesto, 12
Sun vat-sen, 10-12
Tahir, Zolun, 139
Tajik, 29
Takla Makao Desert, 19,20
Tang Bigaog, 160
Tanna Tuva, 178
Tao Zhiyue, 176
Taranchi, 29, 31
Tarbagatai Mountains. 19
Tarim River. 20
Tashen, Mohammed, 125
Tashkeot,30
Tatar, 11,29,31,136
taxation. 114, 148
Three Districts' Revolution. See East
Turkestan Republic
Tianahan Mountains, 19
Tibet, 5, 11,13, 15, 17, 19
lin, 21
Tosun, 117
trade,21-22, 149-50, 174-75
Tubashenyev, 84
tungsten, 21,174
Turk. See Turkic peoples
Turkestan, 19,31,34,118,164
Turkey, 182
Tum, 30
Turkic Khanates, 24
Turkic peoples, 6, 30, 55, 69; description
of, 29--32; history of, 165-66; na.
uceet leaders of, 22, 53, 70-71,120,
141; nationalism among, 5,22,29,
101, 154, 182-84; nationalist organi-
zationsof,35, 151-52, 166-67
173---74,183; senseof powera~og,
88-89. Seealto East Turkestan Re-
publiC; Kazaks; Mosk:ms; Uighurs
Turral, G.R, 35,41, 43,45,54, 58
Tuyuze,BO
Uighur HI m Cub, 126
Uighurs, 22-24, 29, 31, 44, 45, 85, 87,
136, 137.See also Turkic peoples
unemployment, 93
Union for the Defense of Peace and
Democracy inXinjiang, 151, 152
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), 5, 28, 34,116,122, 177;
advisers to ETR, 138-39, 153;
blamed for instigating rebellion,
40-41,67, 178; disclosure of plane
crash, 176; interest inXinjiang, 7,
39-40,177-79; local fears of, 165;
mediation by, 52-55,131-32;
mineral exploration in Xinjiang, 20,
174; Moslem nationalities of, 174;
representatives inXinjiang, 16,28;
role in ETR, 138-42; sale of aircraft
plant.28; State Bank, 149; support
for Democratic Union, 152; support
for Sbeng Shic:U, 1:7; trade with
ElR, 149; troops inHami, 28;
While Russian policy, 140
United States Consulate, 28
uranium, 20, 174
Uzbek, 29, 31, 136
Wang cengscan (J elaleddin), 61.69, 71,
73,81-82, 156, 160
Ward, Robert, 36-37, 38, 49,143,147,
184
White Russians, 32, 44, 136, 139-40
wolfram, 21
Wu Maier, 97
Wu Zhixiang (Chaucer H.), 56
Wu Zhongxtn, 6,35, 48, 50, 60, 61, 62,
181
Xinjiang: administration under Qing,
22-25; Otiang Kai-shek's views on,
6; College of, 140, 172; Commercial
Bank of, 147; Construction Com.
mission, 158, 159; cultural and his.
toricaJ background, 22-29;
demography or, 29-30; education in,
140; failure of Chinese policies in,
179-80; geography of, 19--21; na-
uonauues, 29--34; Native Products
Company,92, 168, 171; provincial
budget, 93; representatives to Na-
tional A ssemtsy, 97-98; requests for
financial aid, 76; Revolution of 1911
in, 26; settlers sent to, 17,38-39;
Turkish People's L iberation Coun-
cil,35
XmjianggeUti,l17
Xinjiang Provincia! A ssembjy, I ll,
120--22, 127
Yakub Beg, 183
Y ang Cengda, 26,136,183
Y ashlar Tashkilati, 151, 167, 184.See
also Turkic peoples, nationalist or-
ganizations of
Y olbars Khan, 108, 160
Y oung Turki Party.See Y ashlar Tash-
kilati
Y u Y ouren, 86
ZaoErling, 45, 47
Zhang Dajun, 56, 110, 132
Zhang Fengjiu, 97
INDEX 265
Zhang Tthua, 71
Zhang 2'llizbong, 52, 53, 68, 104, 105,
130; biographical information on,
54,56; calls for unity, 85-87; as
chairman of Xinjiang provincial gov-
ernment, 69; convenes Provincial
A ssembly, 121; cultural pluralism of,
13; on GPP, n; and I ii faction,
115-16,132-34; inspection mission
to south, 114-15; leaves Xinjiang.
128; negotiations with iiidelegates,
56-66; on problems of coalition gov-
ernment, 82;OI l problems of Xtn-
jiang, 91-103; on Pl'O"I incialCouncil,
71-12; reaction to riots, I ll, lIZ;
removed as provinciaJ chairman,
118-20; resistance to coociJ iatory
policies of, 89; support for Mesut,
120; telegram to Burhan, 175; visit
to iii,83--84
Zhao Qianfeng, 71, 73, 97,158
Zhao Xihuang. 165
Zhu SbaoI iang, 44, 47, SO,:S1
Ziya, 91
Zuo zongrang General, 25, 33, 34
A graduate of Northern State College in South Dakota, L I NDA K.
BENSON received her Ph.D.in politics fromthe Universityof L eeds.She
has been an associate professor in the Graduate School of Political Science
at National Chengchi University in MuchaTaipei, Taiwan.Her researchex-
perience includes posts in Hong Kong, the People's Republic of China, the
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Presently,
sheisA ssistant Professor at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan.