SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA

THE CARRERA REVOLT

RALPH LEE WOODWARD,
JR.
j-7(j
MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TULANE UNIVERSITY
NEW ORLEANS
1971
PUBLISHED WITH THE AID OF A GRANT FROM
THE FORD FOUNDATION
MARGARET A. L. HARRISON
ROBERT WAUCHOPE
Editors
Publication 23
APPLIED ENLIGHTENMENT: 19TH CENTURY LIBERALISM
Number 3
SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA
THE CARRERA REVOLT
RALPH LEE WOODWARD,
JR.
Issued in 1971
Coleccion Luis Lujan Munoz
Universidad Francisco Marroquin
www.ufm.edu
-
Guatemala
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Universidad Francisco Marroquin
http://www.archive.org/details/socialrevOOIeewguat
C PARED A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPEN-
dence, Central Americans engaged in
heated debate and bloody strife throughout
the early years of the 19th century over a
variety of other issues. They came to blows
over church-state relations, fiscal policies, of-
ficeholding, economic planning, trade policy,
and general philosophy of government, but
few issues arose after independence that had
not already been raised during the turbulent
years from 1808 to 1823.
1
In fact, the Central
American political struggle after 1823 may be
viewed as an extension of Spanish politics
from 1808 to 1826. The Conservatives pleaded
for moderation, order and stability of tradi-
tional, familiar institutions. The Liberals
argued for continuation of the Enlightenment
reforms already begun under the Spanish
Bourbons. The latter sought to make Central
America a modern, progressive state, casting
off the burden of Iberian heritage, and to ab-
sorb eagerly innovative republican ideas from
France, England, and the United States.
These Liberals gained the upper hand,
adopted a Constitution in 1824 and elected a
government in 1825. Their victory was by the
barest of margins, yet they embarked on a
bold revolutionary program that terrified their
opponents and led to civil war within a year.
Only after a destructive, three-year blood-
letting did the Liberals once more gain con-
trol of the governments of the State of Gua-
temala and the Federation.
Following their victory in 1829, the Lib-
erals dealt vindictively with the vanquished.
Principal Conservative leaders they impris-
oned or exiled, and the Guatemalan legisla-
ture granted the government extraordinary
powers to deal with those who opposed the
I. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.,
"Economic and
Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties (1773-
1823)," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV
(Nov., 1965), 556-66.
government.
2
In the years following, Fed-
eral President Francisco Morazan used the
full powers of his officeand moreto at-
tain order and stability in the Republic. In
this he was generally a failure, as disturb-
ances and anarchy continued in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua, while Costa Rica
virtually ignored the federal establishment.
In Guatemala, however, Governor Mariano
Galvez approached the problem with more
success through conciliation. His provisional
predecessors in the executive office, Pedro
Molina (1829-30) and Antonio Rivera Ca-
bezas (1830-31), had dealt harshly with the
hated serviles, but Galvez restored some mea-
sure of harmony to Guatemalan society.
3
While he launched a program of radical
economic and social reform, Galvez at the
same time courted certain conservative groups
in the capital, gaining him a broader base of
support.
4
An ambitious program to increase
2. Lorenzo Montufar, Resena historica de Centro-
America, 7 vols. (Guatemala, 1878-87), I, 153-60.
3. Ibid., 126-249; Alejandro Marure, Efemerides de
los hechos notables acaecidos en la Republica de
Centro-America desde el ano de 1821 hasta el de
1842, 2d ed. (Guatemala, 1895), pp.
50-84; Miguel
Garcia Granados, Memorias del General Miguel Gar-
cia Granados, 2 vols. (Guatemala, 1893), II, 95-114;
Hubert Howe Bancroft, History
of
Central America,
3 vols. (San Francisco, 1883-87), III, 97-117; Mary
P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp.
104-5;
Adam Szaszdi, Nicolas Raoul y la Republica Federal
de Centro-America (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid,
Seminario de Estudios Americanistas, 1958), pp.
153-54.
4. Archivo General de Centro-America, Guatemala
(hereinafter cited as AGCA), leg. 191, exp. 4137;
leg. 3479, exp. 79472, fol. 4; Szaszdi, Raoul,
pp.
141-
42; Holleran, Church and State, pp.
100-02; Robert
Sidney Smith, "Financing the Central American Fed-
eration, 1821-1838," Hispanic American Historical
Review, XLIII (Nov., 1963), 490-507; Robert A.
Naylor, "British Commercial Relations with Central
America,
1821-1851" (unpublished doctoral disser-
tation, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1958), p.
85, 154; Pedro Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, 2d ed.
(Guatemala: Biblioteca de Cultura Popular, vol. 30,
Ministerio de Education Publica, 1959), p. 48.
45
46
Social Revolution in Guatemala
production, expand transportation, and col-
onize the lowland areas of the Caribbean
coast, for example, promised tangible benefits
to the merchant class.
5
Although political
passions still ran high, relative peace in the
state and mild prosperity resulting from the
expanding cochineal production contributed
to a lessening of political tensions. In the
well-to-do classesthe only ones who had par-
ticipated in politics
by
1834 there was once
more social intercourse among those of dif-
ferent political persuasions. Miguel Garcia
Granados noted that at a grand ball given by
the governor on Independence Day of that
year, "for the first time since before 1829,
all those belonging to 'the aristocracy' came
together." An impartial observer, Garcia Gra-
nados added, would have noticed the har-
mony that reigned among the notables at the
governor's house that night, and would have
believed that a period of peace and prosperity
lay ahead for the state. He would have held
no suspicion that "we were on a volcano, and
on the eve of entering a terrible crisis of im-
mense consequence for our future."
In retrospect, Galvez' first administration
does appear as a calm before the storm. While
the so-called "aristocrats" to which Garcia
Granados referred might have reached a de-
gree of concord, their congeniality did not
reflect the society as a whole, and Guatemala
was soon to be bathed once more in blood.
Governing most aspects of Guatemalan life
were the Europeanized residents of the ca-
pital, a city of no more than 40,000 by 1835.
7
5. See, for example, AGCA, leg. 160, exp. 3375, fols.
17-19; leg. 168, exp. 3545, fols. 11-13; leg. 176, exp.
3765; leg. 177, exp. 3788, fol. 3; leg. 178, exp. 3790,
fol. 11, and exp. 3809; leg. 182, exps. 3972, 3974;
leg. 183, exp. 3989, fol. 15; leg. 1167, exps. 27731-
43; leg. 4126, exp. 92812; Boletin Oficial (Guate-
mala), segunda parte, no. 34 (May 26, 1833), p. 375.
6. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 180.
7. Estimates of the Guatemalan population vary
rather considerably for this period. For Guatemala
as a whole, Juan Galindo's figures, quoted by
Ephraim G. Squier in his Notes on Central America;
Particularly the States
of
Honduras and San Salvador:
Their Geography, Topography, Climate, Population,
Resources, Production, etc., etc., and the proposed
Honduras Inter-oceanic Railway (New York, 1855),
p. 52, would appear to be reasonable, although
Squier believed the number of whites to be less than
Since the late 18th century, the extended fam-
ily of the House of Aycinena had dominated
the society. Creoles for the most part, it in-
cluded a few Spaniards, among whom the
most notable had been the first Marques de
Aycinena. They had come to be known in
the 19th century variously as "the nobles,"
"the aristocracy," or simply as "the family,"
although by strict European definitions the
terms were inaccurate.
8
The political and
economic disturbances that began during the
administration of Captain-General Jose de
Bustamante (1811-18), the decline of indigo
exports, and the disintegration of the old
Kingdom of Guatemala following indepen-
dence all contributed to an erosion of the
collective importance of this white elite. Con-
trary to popular opinion, they were not united
politically, leaders of both parties coming
from their ranksalthough it is true that by
the 1830s most were Conservatives.
Less wealthy than these "aristocrats," but
still part of the creole ruling class, was a
larger group of people who, since the reforms
inaugurated by the Cortes of Cadiz, had
played an important role in the country's
politics and economy. It was from this "mid-
dle sector" (another inaccurate term, for they
were really near the top) that many of the
leaders of the Liberal Party and the Galvez
administration came.
The production and commerce of the state
was in the hands of these two groups, and al-
though there was considerable political gain
to be made by branding individuals as "aris-
tocrats" between 1821 and 1839, in all prob-
ability the line between these classes was
never clearly defined and became blurred
with the political differences between Liberal
and Conservative. Changing circumstances
had reduced the favorable economic position
that the Aycinena "family" had held at the
Galindo indicated: 450,000 Indians, 100,000 whites,
and 150,000 ladinos (mestizos).
8. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp.
545-46.
An excellent investigation of the Guatemalan elite
in the Federation period is the work of Susan Emily
Strobeck, "The Political Activities of Some Members
of the Aristocratic Families of Guatemala, 1821-
1839" (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane Univer-
sity, New Orleans, 1958).
Social Revolution in Guatemala
47
close of the reign of Carlos IV, but this elite
was still the most durable element of the
Guatemalan upper class in the transition from
colony to republic. A comparison of the ma-
triculas of the merchant guild, comprised of
the leading merchants and landholders of
Guatemala, for the years 1799, 1823, and 1839,
reveals 168 different family names, but only
twelve of the names are common to all three
lists.
9
This startling statistic suggests that ec-
onomic survival during the forty years was
difficult. Among the twelve families were im-
portant participants on both the Liberal and
Conservative sides, as well as several who
took no active part in the political activity,
but all were major houses. On the other
hand, the high rate of attrition among other
merchants and landholders illustrates that the
period witnessed considerable dislocation.
Many of the Spaniards left the country at the
time of independence. There is a notable de-
crease in the number of Basque names on
the 1823 list. The civil disorders and wars of
the 1820s and 1830s further disrupted the
economy. Meanwhile, there was a small flow
of newcomers to enlarge the European
resident class in the capital.
10
9. Arrivillaga, Asturias, Aycinena, Barrundia, Batres,
Cambronero, Najera, Pavon, Pinol, Tejada, Urruela,
and Valdez. Six others namesBenitez, Gorris, Roma,
Rubio, Taboada, and Vidaurre-appear on the 1799
and 1839 lists, but not on the 1823 list. Eighty-six
individuals, representing 70 different family names,
appeared on the 1799 list; 115 individuals, represent-
ing 79 family names, appeared on the 1823 list; and
119 individuals, representing 81 family names, ap-
peared on the 1839 list. Twenty-one of the family
names appear on both the 1799 and 1823 lists, and
36 on both the 1829 and 1839 lists. There are 44
different family names that appear only on the 1799
lists; 34 appear only on the 1823 list; and 42 appear
only on the 1839 list. AGCA, Lista de Comerciantes
y
Hacendados de esta Capital, June 12, 1799, leg. 6,
exp. 110, fols. 8-9; Lista de los Yndividuos Comer-
ciantes
y
Hazendados que componen el gremio con-
sular, Dec. 22, 1823, leg. 1391, exp. 32111; Lista de
los comerciantes
y hacendados que a juicio de los
que suscriben pueden ser nombrados por el Supremo
Gobierno para efectuar la reorganization del Con-
sulado Mercantil, Aug. 25, 1839, leg. 214, exp. 4941,
fols. 200-06.
10. Robert Glasgow Dunlop, Travels in Central
America, being a Journal
of
nearly Three Years' Resi-
dence in the Country, together with a Sketch
of
the
History
of
the Republic, and an Account
of
its Cli-
mate, Production, Commerce, etc. (London, 1847).
pp. 317, 334-35.
This class of Europeans, born on either side
of the Atlantic, dominated in the capital the
politics of the era. The majority of the popula-
tion had little voice. Although there was some
class mobility, largely along
economic-cul-
tural lines, the remainder of the population
in the 1830s can be divided into racial classes:
first, the mestizos, or ladinos as they arc
called in Guatemala, and second, the Indians.
There were also some Negroes, mulattos, and
zambos on the north coast and in the Amati-
tlan region, but they were not a significant
percentage of the total.
The ladinos were the most volatile group
in the society. As they were denied deep
roots in either the European or Indian com-
munities, their fortunes depended to a greater
extent on their own initiative and abilities and
they therefore often acted more aggressively
than the class above or below them. Most
numerous in the major towns and in the east-
ern mountain region, they had been severely
hurt by the economic disruption since in-
dependence. The line between the more suc-
cessful of this class and the lower echelons
of the European community was not clearly
drawn, and the ladino class was certainly one
source of newcomers into the Creole class.
11
The Indians, the majority of the population,
were more isolated and generally less in-
volved with the European community than
were the ladinos. Many did not speak Span-
ish. They continued in their traditional way
of life, little aware of or interested in the pos-
sibilities of modern economic and social ad-
11. Detailed information on this middle class for this
period is scanty, but some useful descriptions and
observations are found in: ibid.,
pp.
335-37; Ramon
A. Salazar, Historia de veintiun anos (Guatemala:
Tipografia Nacional, 1928); Henry Dunn, Guatimala,
or, the Republic
of
Central America, in 1827-8; being
Sketches and Memorandum made during a Twelve
Months' Residence (London, 1829), pp. 219-20;
Frederick Crowe, The Gosjiel in Central America;
Containing a Sketch
of
the Country, Physical and
GeographicalHistorical and PoliticalMoral and Re-
ligious: A History
of
the Baptist Mission in British
Honduras and
of
the Introduction
of the Bible into
the Spanish American Republic
of
Guatemala (Lon-
don, 1850), pp.
252-53; see also Jacques Lambert,
Latin America: Social Structures and Political Insti-
tutions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), p. 81.
48
Social Revolution in Guatemala
vance. Providing the labor force for rural
Guatemala since before the Spanish Conquest,
the Indians of Guatemala have still not been
brought into the life of the nation, and, as
a recent participant in the Guatemalan guer-
rilla warfare has put it, "Barriers of distrust
confront any proposal for change."
12
For the
Indians and probably for many of the rural
ladinos, Jacques Lambert's recent statement
that "most Spaniards lived in the cities during
the colonial period, while most of the Indians
and mestizos lived in isolation in the country-
side," would seem to apply to Guatemala as
independence began. "Instead of being sub-
jected to the authority of Spanish adminis-
trators," Lambert continued, "they were con-
trolled by their Creole masters or, in some
cases, by their Indian chiefs."
13
The Galvez administration looked optimis-
tically at its progress and the restoration of
order in the state. The indigo decline that
had begun around 1800 because of foreign
competition had continued, but that was more
of a problem for El Salvador than for Gua-
temala, although the Guatemalan merchants
were involved. Meanwhile, production of
cochineal had grown steadily since its rein-
troduction into the country in 1811.
14
The
12. Eduardo Galeano, Guatemala, Occupied Coun-
try, trans, by Cedric Belfrage (New York and Lon-
don: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 45. Anthro-
pologists have dealt with various Indian communi-
ties in Guatemala and with some aspects of the In-
dian throughout the country, but there is a remark-
able lack of writing on the Indians as a social class
or force. Perhaps this is because of the difficulty
in ascertaining that they played any role at all. Some
interesting observations on the problems that the
Galvez government faced in trying to westernize the
Indians are presented by Miriam Williford, Las
Luces y La Civilization: The Social Reforms of
Mari-
ano Galvez (New Orleans: Middle American Re-
search Institute, Tulane University, 1969), pp.
35-
40.
13. Lambert, Latin America, p. 131.
14. Shirley Lucas McAfee, "A Study of Agricultural
Labor in Guatemala, 1821-1871" (unpublished
master's thesis, Tulane University, New Orleans,
1955), pp.
5-7, 23-24, 41, 55; Dunn, Guatimala,
p. 212; Woodward, "Economic and Social," p. 559;
Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.,
Class Privilege and Eco-
nomic Development: The Consulado de Comercio
of
Guatemala, 1793-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp.
39-44; Gazeta
de Guatemala, XV, no. 218 (May 16, 1811), 209-10.
The report of the Real Consulado de Comercio
very depressed state of the economy in the
1820s
15
had been mitigated by peace and
growing trade, largely owing to the British
promotion of Belize as the major entrepot for
Central American exports of indigo, cochineal,
and mahogany.
10
To protect the native textile
industry higher tariffs had been adopted,
17
and although this had not restored prosper-
ity to the weavers, it was a positive step in
that direction. A serious debt, shortage of
currency, and accompanying high interest
rates still plagued the economy,
18
but there
were signs of improvement.
10
Most signif-
icantly, cochineal production and exports rose
dramatically in the 1830's, providing a real
sense of prosperity among producers in Ama-
titlan, Antigua, and the Verapaz, as well as
among merchants of the capital.
20
The Carrera revolt of 1837 shattered this
delicate atmosphere of conciliation, prosper-
ity, and calm. Unlike earlier civil wars, this
one arose not from differences among the
Creoles, but erupted among the peasants of
the eastern mountains, the region in Guate-
mala known as la montana. It was not an-
other quarrel between Liberals and Conserva-
tives for control of the government, but rather
a popular rebellion engendered by a growing
list of grievances against the Galvez govern-
of Guatemala of Apr. 15, 1817, AGCA, leg. 51, exp.
1273, fols. 3-7, provides a detailed description of
the causes of the decline of indigo and of the prob-
lems facing the Guatemalan economy on the eve of
independence. The best description of cochineal pro-
duction is in Dunlop, Travels, pp.
123-35.
15. Rafael Heliodoro Valle, La anexion de Centro
America a Mexico, 6 vols. (Mexico, 1924-36), II,
198; Valentin Solorzano Fernandez, Historia de la
evolution economica de Guatemala (Mexico, 1947),
pp.
220-30.
16. Naylor, "British Commercial."
17. Smith, "Financing," pp. 506-07.
18. Miguel Garcia Granados noted that as of about
1832, although there was much poverty in Guate-
mala, the cost of living was relatively low, and that
the only thing expensive was money, interest on
which ranged from 2 per cent to 3 per cent monthly
with good collateral. Memorias, II, 55.
19. Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure
of
Union: Cen-
tral America, 1824-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 62.
20. Chester Lloyd Jones, Guatemala, Past and Pres-
ent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1940), p. 385; Semanario de Guatemala, no. 3 (May
Social Revolution in Guatemala
49
ment and triggered by a catastrophic epid-
emic of cholera.
At the heart of the difficulty lay the Gal-
vez reform program, the rational extension of
changes inspired by Enlightenment philoso-
phers, initiated by Bourbon ministers, ac-
celerated by liberal Spaniards in Napoleonic
times, and continued by Creoles after inde-
pendence. The last group added a new di-
mension, however, in their conscious effort
to imitate the rapidly advancing English-
speaking world. Direct contact with English
and North American merchants and diplomats
in Central America accounted for part of this,
but probably more important were the read-
ings and travels of Central Americans. Both
Morazan and Galvez believed that Central
America could become a modern, progressive
republic through enlightened legislation. Con-
vinced that Spanish colonialism was respons-
ible for their nation's underdevelopment, they
sought to destroy Hispanic institutions and
to construct new institutions and laws based
on the successful experience of Great Britain
and the United States.
21
In practice, however,
although Galvez made substantial headway in
gaining acceptance of his program from the
elite, he found the changes unwelcome among
the lower classes of the country. From Gal-
vez' point of view, he promoted a carefully
planned program to improve the country's ec-
onomy, its judicial system, bureaucracy, edu-
cational opportunities, communications, and
general welfare. But the Liberals displayed
exceptional ineptitude in attracting the popu-
lace to their program. In spite of all their
stated good intentions, as a Conservative
21, 1836), p. 14; Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar, His-
toria y tradiciones de la Ciudad de Amatitldn (Guate-
mala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cultura Popular,
vol. 47, Ministerio de Education Publica, 1961), p.
80.
21. Galvez said in 1830 that "Our civilization and
prosperity depend on our drawing closer to the At-
lantic." William
J.
Griffith, Empires in the Wilder-
ness; Foreign Colonization and Development in Gua-
temala, 1834-1844 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 8-9, citing Mariano Gal-
vez, Informe que presento al Congreso Federal, el
Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Hacienda,
al dar cuenta del negocio relativo a la apertura del
canal de Nicaragua en la sesion publica ordinaria del
sdbado 24 de fulio de 1830 ([Guatemala], n.d.), p. 5.
Guatemalan historian has put it, "neither the
Liberals, nor the aristocrats, nor the high
clergy succeeded in interesting the people in
the enterprise of their emancipation. The
people were not," he added, "discontent un-
der the Spanish regime, which was very pa-
ternal, very benevolent."
22
Although Galvez' program claimed to pro-
mote a prosperous economy, many remained
understandably unconvinced. The dislocation
occasioned by the shift to cochineal produc-
tion could not easily be absorbed. Galvez'
tariff policy was more favorable to native
weavers, but heavy imports of British textiles
had already substantially ruined them and
they continued to be apprehensive of the
Liberals' talk of economic freedom. Galvez'
tariff adjustment was too little, too late.
23
More directly responsible for popular re-
action was the establishment of a direct head
tax, reminiscent of the tribute collected by
the Spaniards and abolished immediately
after independence. Wealthy citizens had
been forced to supply loans to the new gov-
ernment after 1829, but this was insufficient
to provide for the ambitious program of the
government.
24
Galvez established the tax at
two pesos per capita, an amount sufficient
to harass the Guatemalan peasant of the
1830s.
25
In El Salvador such a tax resulted
in widespread popular rebellion, forcing sus-
pension of the levy there, but Galvez main-
tained the tax in Guatemala.
26
The Galvez plans for an extensive network
of roads and ports resulted in heavy demands
for peasant labor. The government frequent-
ly reminded local officials of the obligation
of all residents to work on the roads three
days out of every month. One could evade
22. Manuel Cobos Batres, Carrera (Guatemala,
n.d.), p. 81.
23. Naylor, "British Commercial," p. 154; Smith,
"Financing," pp.
506-07; Tobar Cruz, Los mon-
taneses, p. 48.
24. Strobeck, "Political Activities," pp.
85-86.
25. Clemente Marroquin Bojas, Francisco Morazan
y Rafael Carrera (Guatemala, 1965), p. 116; Ignacio
Solis, ed., Memorias del General Carrera, 1837 a
1840 (Guatemala, 1906), pp. 15, 24.
26. Marure, Efemerides, pp.
73-74; Garcia Grana-
dos, Memorias, II, 93-95.
50 Social Revolution in Guatemala
this labor by payment of the low daily wage,
but for the masses it meant forced labor,
which could not have been welcomed. The
practice was not new with Galvez, but it was
now enforced more rigorously than earlier.
27
Another aspect of the Liberal economic
program contributing to rural unrest was the
land policy of the government, which since
1825 had promoted private acquisition of pub-
He land as a means of increasing production.
After 1829 these efforts were accelerated. It
seems likely that the real result of this re-
form was to allow those with some capital to
acquire Indian communal lands and to in-
crease, rather than decrease, latifundism. In-
dividual ownership did not have great appeal
for the Indians. Galvez apparently believed
it should be encouraged as a civilizing force,
and in the end lands which were formerly
used in common by local inhabitants may
have passed into the hands of latifundistas.
Also, a number of large grants to foreigners
caused considerable unrest in eastern Guate-
mala.
28
An integral part of Galvez' vision of a
prosperous state was his program of foreign
colonization in the more sparsely inhabited
reaches as a means of bringing about their
development and attracting a more indus-
trious type of citizen into the state. Such
plans date back to the 18th century, but
the Galvez emphasis on northern European
immigration was new. The growing com-
mercial activity of the British from their set-
tlement at Belize had intensified the tradi-
tional suspicion of foreigners by many resi-
dents. Spanish colonial administration had
dealt harshly with foreign interlopers, but
since independence the Liberal policy had
27. For example, see AGCA, leg. 1191, exps. 28983,
28991.
28. Robert A. Naylor, "Guatemala: Indian Attitudes
toward Land Tenure," Journal
of
Inter-American
Studies, IX (Oct., 1967), 626-29, 634; Manuel Pi-
neda de Mont, comp., Recopilacion de las leues de
Guatemala, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1869-72), I, 658-
86; William
J.
Griffith, "Juan Galindo, Central
American Chauvinist," Hispanic American Historical
Review, XL (Feb., 1960), 28-31; Ignacio Solis, "La
Casa de Moneda" (unpublished manuscript in the
Biblioteca de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de
Guatemala), p. 70.
welcomed them, and this caused apprehen-
sion among those who believed themselves
to be the victims of foreign competition. For-
eign influence was evident in many aspects
of the Galvez program, but the concessions
made to mahogany loggers and the projects
to colonize the northern and eastern portions
of the country with Englishmen particularly
aroused the residents of those regions. They
came to regard the Galvez government as
more favorable to foreign than to national in-
terests. In their eyes, Galvez was giving away
what they believed to be their own resources.
As the British hold on Belize, the Mosquito
Coast, and the Bay Islands tightened, and as
Anglo-American colonizers in Texas threw off
Mexican rule, the wisdom of Galvez' coloni-
zation plan became increasingly dubious to
these people.
29
Between March and August,
1834, the Guatemalan government ceded
nearly all its public land to foreign coloniza-
tion companies, an area equal to nearly three-
fourths of the total area of the state.
30
The Galvez government ignored or sup-
pressed petitions against these contracts from
residents of the region and the anti-foreign
resentment spread. Galvez and his reformers
considered ridiculous the idea that they were
betraying their country to Europeans and
they attributed entirely to the self-interest of
native woodcutters the opposition from Chi-
quimula and other eastern towns. A revolt
29. The most complete work on the Liberals' en-
couragement of foreign colonization is Griffith, Em-
pires. See also David Vela, Barrundia ante el espejo
de su tiempo, 2 vols. (Guatemala: Editorial Uni-
versitaria, 1956-57), I, 229; Naylor, "British Com-
mercial," pp.
4-7, 13-15, 25, 90-96, 159-61, 183;
Robert A. Naylor, "The British Role in Central
America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of
1850," Hispanic American Historical Review, XL
(Aug., 1960), 364-67; John A. Burdon, ed., Archives
of
British Honduras, 3 vols. (London, 1931-35), II.
150, 179-80, 184-88, 209-14, 224, 239, 255, 259,
266-75, 282; Wayne M. Clegern, British Honduras,
Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900 (Baton Rouge: Lou-
isiana State University Press, 1967), pp.
7-9, 167-
68; Virgilio Rodriguez Beteta, La politico inglesa en
Centroamerica durante el sigh XIX (Guatemala: Cen-
tro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra," Ministerio dc
Education Publica, 1963), pp.
15-18, 22, 48; George
Alexander Thompson, Narrative of
an Official Visit
to Guatemala from Mexico (London, 1829), pp.
71-
72, 419-21; Szaszdi, Raoul, p. 54.
30. Griffith, Empires,
pp.
32-52.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
51
in Chiquimula in the fall of 1835, possibly
linked to the uprising in El Salvador against
Morazan's federal government, focused on the
foreign issue, as anti-English propaganda in-
flamed the residents of the eastern region.
Government troops suppressed this rebellion,
but the practice of imposing levies on the
towns that had revolted to pay for the mili-
tary's expenses could only have increased the
resentment.
31
Concern over the popular re-
action against the contracts caused the fed-
eral government to pressure Galvez into issu-
ing a conciliatory decree guaranteeing Guate-
malan citizens full rights, but this failed to
pacify the inhabitants.
32
The arrival of a
shipload of British colonists in mid-1836 ag-
gravated the resentment, which must be con-
sidered a major factor in inflaming the popu-
lace against the Galvez government.
33
Central to the Liberal program was the
removal of the clergy from its traditional role
in politics, economy, and education. As with
other issues, the roots of this are in the Bour-
bon reforms of the 18th century, but after
independence the attack on clerical privilege
accelerated. Anti-clericalism ran particularly
high after the Church backed the Conserva-
tive regime in 1826-29. Liberal victory in
1829 brought swift retaliation, as earlier re-
forms were not implemented. Far from sepa-
rating Church and State, the government in-
stituted close control over the Church. The
federal government, with President Morazan
taking the lead, began a systematic removal
of anti-Liberal clergymen, including the arch-
bishop.
34
Following suppression of monastic
orders, the exile of conservative leaders in
the clergy, and establishment of religious lib-
erty in the Republic, the federal government
prevailed on state governments to continue
the assault on clerical privilege. From 1829
to 1831 the Guatemalan government censored
ecclesiastical correspondence, seized Church
funds, and confiscated monastic property.
35
Governor Galvez went further. The govern-
ment suppressed collection of the tithe in
1832, ended many religious holidays, confis-
cated more Church property, decreed the
right of the clergy to write their wills as they
wished, and legitimized the inheritance of
parents' property by children of the clergy.
In 1837 the Guatemalan legislature author-
ized civil marriage and legalized divorce.
36
Many priests did not take lightly such chal-
lenges to the traditional authority of the
Church, especially in the countryside, where
their parishioners were already disenchanted
with the Galvez government on other grounds.
In the Indian and ladino villages, the priests
were more than just spiritual leaders. As en-
voy from the United States, John Lloyd
Stephens described a typical representative
of the rural clergy in 1839
:
37
Besides officiating in all the services of the
church, visiting the sick, and burying the
dead, my worthy host was looked up to by
every Indian in the village as a counselor,
friend, and father. The door of the convent
was always open, and Indians were constant-
ly resorting to him: A man who had quar-
reled with his neighbor; a wife who had been
badly treated by her husband; a father whose
son had been carried off as a soldier; a young
girl deserted by her lover

all who were in
trouble or affliction came to him for advice
and consolation, and none went away with-
out it. And, besides this he was principal di-
rector of all the public business of the town,
the right hand of the alcalde.
Given this position, village curates could in-
flame their parishioners against a government
that attacked their sacred institution, brought
Protestant foreigners into the country, and
threatened the very bases of society. These
village priests were in the vanguard of the up-
risings that rocked Guatemala in 1837.
38
31. Ibid., pp.
84-113. Belize merchant Marshall
Bennett was most active in pursuing concessions to
the extent of curtailing the rights and opportunities
of Guatemalan citizens.
32. Ibid.,
pp.
114-19; AGCA, leg. 164, exp. 3428,
fol. 6; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 822-23.
33. Griffith, Empires, pp.
138-50.
34. Holleran, Church and State,
pp.
74-96, 102.
35. Ibid., pp.
101-20; Mamie, Efemerides, pp.
60-
64, 70.
36. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 71, 80, 93; Boletin
Oficial, no. 105 (Oct. 10, 1837), pp.
437-52.
37. Incidents
of
Travel in Central America, Chiapas,
and Yucatan, edited with an introduction and notes
by Richard L. Predmore, 2 vols. (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1949), I, 134.
38. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 154-61, 177;
Dunlop, Travels, pp.
185-86; Holleran, Church and
State, pp.
121-27; Solis, Carrera, p. 16; Arlene Eisen,
Social Revolution in Guatemala
None of Galvez' reforms were closer to him
than his plan to remove education from the
traditionalist hands of the Church and to re-
place it with secular schools open to all Gua-
temalans. An ambitious program called for es-
tablishment of public schools throughout the
country, and a broad range of cultural promo-
tions attempted to westernize the Guatemalan
Indian. Trying to change long-established
customs and prejudices naturally exposed the
Galvez administration to bigoted criticism
from the illiterate masses.
39
Probably no part of the Galvez program
proved quite so objectionable to so many as
his effort to revise the judicial system of the
country. Thoroughly convinced that the Span-
ish system of private fueros and multiple
courts was unjust and out of step with en-
lightened, 19th-century progress, the Lib-
erals

owing chiefly to the endeavors of Jose
Francisco Barrundia

adopted the Livingston
Codes, which went into effect January 1, 1837.
Written by Edward Livingston for the State
of Louisiana in 1824, but never adopted, this
Anglo-Saxon code suggested to Liberal Gua-
temalans a modern replacement for the sys-
tem they had been abolishing piecemeal. As
the central feature of the new system was trial
by jury, Barrundia praised it on the day it
went into effect in these terms : "The justice of
a nation is no longer abandoned solely to the
discretion of a salaried judge and to the
obscure labyrinth of cruel and bloody laws."
40
Almost immediately, however, problems arose
in the countryside. In a country where il-
literacy Was general and a class system was
well established, trial by jury proved imprac-
ticable, and anecdotes quickly circulated
"The Indians in Colonial Spanish America," in Ma-
gali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in
America (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies,
University of California, 1966), p. 104.
39. Galvez' educational program is explained in Mi-
riam Williford, "The Educational Reforms of Dr. Ma-
riano Galvez," Journal
of Inter-American Studies, X
(July, 1968), 461-73. See also her Las Luces,
pp.
35-40; Marure, Efemerides,
pp. 62, 65-66, 72-73,
87; and Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses,
pp.
4344.
40. Speech of
J.
F. Barrundia, Guatemala, January
1, 1837, in the Biblioteca Nacional de Guatemala,
Collection of Hojas Sueltas, cited in Mario Rodriguez,
The Livingston Codes in the Guatemalan Crisis
of
1837-1838 (New Orleans: Middle American Research
Institute, Tulane University,
1955), p. 14.
ridiculing the decisions of Indian juries. The
requirements of Livingston's penal code
proved to be equally impracticable, as jails
with separate cells for prisoners did not exist,
and their construction with forced labor added
to the resentment of the population, who
identified the Codes much more with cen-
tralized rule from Guatemala City, with for-
eign influence, and with anti-clericalism, than
with social justice.
41
Measures of enforcement took place that
seemed to belie the Liberals' rhetoric about
liberty and freedom. Reforms were intro-
duced with brutality, with harshness, and in
a totalitarian manner. Such tactics had been
escalating in Guatemalan government ever
since the strong-armed rule of Captain-Gen-
eral Bustamante,
42
and the Liberals who came
back into power in 1829 were vengeful against
the Conservatives who had preceded them.
Such methods, however, did little to ingratiate
the Galvez government with the people. In
October, 1832, Galvez divided the state into
four comandancias, with a general in com-
mand of each.
43
Thereafter, military govern-
ment was a characteristic. Both the Morazan
and Galvez governments were insensitive in
their efforts to regulate the morality of the
inhabitants, in suppressing criticism of their
own policies, and in persecuting their enemies
through exile and confiscation of property.
One of the first acts of the Guatemalan leg-
islature in 1829 was a decree ordering the re-
payment of all salaries paid to public officials
from October, 1826, through April, 1829, en-
forced by confiscatory measures. The con-
duct of government troops often inflamed the
people in the country. The educational pro-
gram, designed to insure education to all,
41. Many writers have dealt with the effect of the
codes, nearly all agreeing that they were a major
cause in turning the rural population against the Gal-
vez government. Rodriguez' work (ibid.) offers the
most perceptive account.
42. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp.
557-60.
43. la-Departamento de Guatemala, General Carlos
Salazar: 2a-Departamentos de Sacatepequez y
Solola,
General Juan Prem; 3a-Departamentos de Chiquimu-
la y
Verapaz, General Juan Jose Gorriz; 4-Departa-
mento de Quezaltenango y
Totonicapan, General
Agustin Guzman. These military governments con-
tinued until their suppression October 23, 1838, fol-
lowing Galvez' resignation. Marure, Efemerides, p.
74.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
53
provided that uneducated children might be
taken from their parents and assigned to "Pro-
tectors" who would provide for their educa-
tion. In practice this often provided inex-
pensive personal service for the elite, and the
poorer classes viewed it unfavorably. The
government also maintained an active pro-
paganda campaign designed not only to pro-
mote its own program, but to discredit the
opposition.
44
The Liberals' good intentions,
evidenced by adoption of the Livingston
Codes, must have exceeded actual practice
greatly, for Conservatives denounced those
who claimed to be "partisans of progress and
civilization" as guilty of "cruel inhumanity."
45
44. Bancroft, Central America, III, p. 102; Williford,
Las Luces, pp.
35-39; Garcia Granados, Memorias,
II, 92-93; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, p. 161; Grif-
fith, Empires, p. 97.
45. A letter published in El Tiempo (Guatemala),
no. 23 (Aug. 11, 1939), pp.
91-92; read: "Un movi-
miento de horror, a que no puedo resistir, me obli-
ga a suplicar a UU. se sirvan insertar en su periodico
lo que he visto con mis ojos en el siglo 19, y
en
Guatemala cuando los que se dicen partidarios del
progreso
y de la civilization manejaban los negocios.
Quiero denunciar el publico un rasgo de inhumanidad
cruel. Y para aumentar el escandalo dire, que sus
autores son los que ahora en sus escritos furibundos
nos llaman retrogrados y obscurantistas. Pero que
se comparen los hechos.
"Hace pocos dias, que por curiosidad fui al Con-
vento de Santo-Domingo. Los vestijios de destruc-
cion y de ruina que presenta aquel edificio, no ex-
citaron mi atencion por que asi estan todos los es-
tablecimientos publicos,
y
ya me lo figuraba. Mi de-
seo era conocer las carceles que se preparaban se-
gun el sistema de Livingston; y creia ver realizadas
las hermosas descripciones que habia leido de las pe-
nitenciarias de Filadelfia
y otros lugares de Norte
America. Pero mi sorpresa fue indecible, cuando me
vi en un cementerio. Si, aquellos calabozos son se-
pulcros de vivos, donde los desventurados que hu-
biesen entrado, debian morir entre la desesperacion,
la hambre, y la dificultad de respirar. Entre en va-
rios de aquellos horrorosos calabozos; y
medi su largo
que era como de dos varas y media: su ancho era
de una vara larga; y a la altura de tres o cuatro varas,
una ventanita redonda como de tres pulgadas de dia-
metro que servia para comunicar una muy escasa luz,
que venia de un callejon largo y obscuro. Estaban fa-
bricadas sobre cincuenta; y delineadas mas de ciento.
El que crea que falto a la verdad, que vaya al mo-
menta a satisfacerse por si mismo, antes que las aca-
ben de deshacer.
"Esto hacen los que se han apropiado, como un
titulo esclusivo, los dictados de filantropicos, ilustra-
dos, filosofos
y
progresistas. Uno de los mas entu-
siastas [Pedro Molina] recorriendo aauella horrible
masmorra, se mostraba muy complacido
y
daba se-
nates inequfvocas de su aprobacion. Yo quiero se
me diga, si habrian hecho mas los tiranuelos de los
tiempos feudales; o los inquisidores mas sanguinarios.
Que mediten los pueblos sobre esos monumentos que
Into this atmosphere of bitterness came
the terrible scourge of cholera. The epidemic
that hit Guatemala in 1837 was not unanti-
cipated by the government. As early as De-
cember, 1831, a Guatemalan newspaper had
noted the severe cholera epidemic that was
causing "terror" throughout Europe.
46
In 1833
it struck Mexico, and Galvez warned of the
danger to his state as he established sanitary
cordons, opened up new water supplies and
sewage facilities, and prohibited burials in-
side of churches.
47
In 1836 the danger became
imminent, and, despite increased precautions,
cholera penetrated the cordons late that year
or early in 1837, probably via Belize.
48
In
March and April, 1837, the government began
to quarantine infected areas and to tighten the
sanitary cordons.
49
These measures were un-
doubtedly justified, but they were poorly un-
derstood and they did not succeed. The mas-
ses, already alienated from the Galvez govern-
ment, feared the vaccines, and they believed
priests who told them that the medicine that
the government's health officers put into the
water was poison. Panic resulted and violence
broke out, particularly in the hard-hit eastern
region.
50
Irate over the government's reforms and
with cholera settling over the land like a
divine retribution (which the priests said it
was!), uprisings of peasants occurred in
nos han dejado los libres de nuestro pais y de nues-
tros dias.
"Dispensen, sefiores Editores, lo mal escrito de mi
comunicado: no aspiro a ser tenido por gran escritor;
pero si por un hombre sensible
y
amante de la hu-
manidad.Un Curioso."
46. El Siglo de Lafayette (Guatemala), no. 9 (Dec.
15, 1831), p. 34.
47. Williford, Las Luces, p. 37; Tobar Cruz, Los
montaneses, p. 54.
48. Griffith, Empires,
pp.
153-54; Tobar Cruz, Los
montaneses, pp.
56-57.
49. Boletin Oficial, no. 88 (Mar. 29, 1837), pp.
231-32: Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 9 (Apr.
25, 1837), pp.
107-08; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte,
no. 11 (Mar. 19, 1837), p. 42; no. 12 (Mar. 31,
1837), pp.
45-46; no. 13 (Apr. 4, 1837), pp.
47-48;
no. 14 (Apr. 26, 1837), pp.
49-50; no. 15 (Apr.
29, 1837), pp.
51-52.
50. Mariano Galvez, "Mensaje del Gefe de Estado
de Guatemala, Dr. Mariano Galvez, al abrir sus se-
siones ordinarias la Asamblea Lejislativa en 1837,"
in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, Latin American Li-
brary, Tulane University, New Orleans (hereinafter
cited as L.A.L.
),
p. 4; Montiifar, Besena historica,
II, 348-54; Solis, Carrera, p. 16.
54 Social Revolution in Guatemala
various places beginning in March, 1837. The
greatest trouble was in the eastern montana
zone, more ladino than Indian, and tradi-
tionally more restless while at the same time
more generally under the domination of par-
ish priests. The first major insurgency took
place at San Juan
Ostuncalco, where natives
rose up against officials charged with effecting
the Livingston Codes.
51
Other uprisings fol-
lowed and from the village of Mataquescuin-
tla there arose a natural leader, Jose
Rafael
Carrera. Born in the run-down Candelaria
section of Guatemala City in 1814, Carrera
was twenty-two when the revolt reached Ma-
taquescuintla. His biographers have differed
over his racial stock, but he seems to have
been of mixed Indian, Negro, and European
blood, and was not purely an "Indian" as he
was called by his enemies. His early life may
have been fairly representative of lower-class
51. Marure, Efemerides, pp.
91-92; Dunlop, Travels,
pp.
192-93, recounts what happened there: "On the
6th of March, a serious disturbance took place in the
town of San Juan Ostuncalo [sic], the people, who
were nearly all aborigines, being provoked at being
compelled to work at the construction of prisons, and
excited against the new laws, rose en masse, to
attack the circuit judges, at that time holding their
first court of justice in the town. They and the of-
ficers accompanying them were compelled to save
themselves from the popular indignation by a pre-
cipitate flight. The magistrate of the district, es-
corted by a troop of dragoons, proceeded to re-
monstrate with the Indians; but he had no sooner
begun to speak than they directed against him a
shower of stones. An engagement then took place
between the mob and the dragoons, when the former
was dispersed with considerable loss after killing
twenty-four of the dragoons. The Indians left behind
them an idol and a jar filled with stones collected
from the bed of a neighbouring river. It appears
that they had been made to believe that the jar,
if broken at the moment of the attack, would throw
lightning upon the enemy, and by enchantment, a
number of venomous snakes would rush out from a
neighbouring wood and bite the soldiers;an event
which was to be brought about by the assistance of
ladinos of the period. Receiving no formal
education, he drifted about working at various
jobs. By the time he was fourteen he was
a drummer boy in the Guatemalan army and
fought on the losing side against the forces
of Morazan. After the civil war he worked in
Amatitlan for a while, but by 1834 he was
driving hogs in the district of Mita and his
fortunes began to improve. A favorable re-
lationship with the village priest of Mataques-
cuintla opened the door to marriage with Pe-
trona Garcia Alvarez, the daughter of a fam-
ily of modest means. Frequently wounded in
battle, Carrera was a man of exceptional physi-
cal courage and undaunted determination. He
was capable of violent outbursts of passion
and may have been intemperate in his per-
sonal life but, through native intelligence
and common sense, in 1837 he became revered
or feared as a guerrilla leader.
52
the old gods of the country, which, though nominally
discarded by the Indians, are always recurred to in
times of necessity, as the Romish superstition is by
those in Europe professing a purer creed. The idol
was a monstrous figure of a man seated cross-legged,
with the head reclining upon the back, and the arms,
encompassing an enormous belly, hanging down from
the throat, being doubtless one of the old idols which
had been concealed from the careful search of the
inquisition."
52. Max Leon Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera of Gua-
temala: His Life and Times," (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1942),
pp. iv-v, 9-16, 45-46; Cobos Batres, Carrera,
pp.
7-43, 48; Antonio Batres Jauregui
;
La America Cen-
tral ante la historia, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1916-49),
III, 162-83; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp.
63-64;
Soils, Carrera, pp. 17-19, 27; Stephens, Incidents.
I, 177, 195-98; Bancroft, Central America, III, 125-
26; Dunlop, Travels,
pp.
88-89, 195; Thomas Young,
Narrative of a Residence on the Mosquito Shore,
durinti the Years 1839. 1840, and 1841, ivith an Ac-
count
of
Truxillo and the Adjacent Islands
of
Bonacca
and Roatan (London, 1842), p. 144; Boletin Extra-
ordinario (Guatemala), August 17, 1857, in AGCA,
leg. 1109, exp. 24621, fol. 33; Garcia Granados.
Memorias, II, 246.
rpHE WAR OF LA MONTANA is one
*
more bloody chapter in Central American
history. Popular uprisings against the Liberal
reforms stretched from El Salvador to Quezal-
tenango during the first half of 1837, but it
was in the district of Mita where Rafael Ca-
rrera was first involved and where the nucleus
of the Revolution developed. On May 6 some
2000 peasants rioted against the district gov-
ernor, Francisco Aqueche, who was trying to
isolate the area in accordance with the gov-
ernment's health regulations. Aqueche took
refuge in the convent, where Carrera's friend
of the same name, probably a relative of the
governor, lived. The mob demanded that the
governor be turned out of the convent so that
they could kill him, but the priest sent young
Rafael Carrera instead to talk to them. With
difficulty, he succeeded in persuading them
to disperse. The young swineherd dominated
the village from this moment on. Soon after,
a new health officer appointed Carrera to
command a platoon of troops enforcing the
health cordons denying passage into the dis-
trict. Carrera accepted the position reluctant-
ly. Meanwhile, two residents of nearby Santa
Rosa, Jose Maria Zapeta and Teodoro Mejia,
were going from village to village in the
region preaching resistance to the govern-
ment and plotting rebellion. When a detach-
ment of government troops approached Santa
Rosa to suppress this movement on June 8,
the Santarrosenos sent word to Mataques-
cuintla, calling for aid. Carrera led a small
band and headed for the neighboring town,
where he arrived late the next evening, find-
ing not a fighting force but a mob of men, wo-
men, and children expecting to meet the sixty
government dragoons assembled on the plain
of Ambelis. The battle went badly for the
rebels at first, but then Carrera took the initi-
ative from Mejia and with a daring charge
put the government forces to rout. Mejia con-
tinued to coordinate and propagandize the
rebellion thereafter, but from that day
forward there were few who did not know
that Rafael Carrera was in command, and his
peasant followers were soon calling him
"Angel," "Son of God," and the "Lord."
53
Similar uprisings occurred in several towns
and villages in El Salvador and they may not
have been unrelated to events in eastern Gua-
temala. To meet the threat there, on May 27
Morazan decreed martial law in the depart-
ments of Cuscatlan and San Vicente, as well
as in San Salvador where there were also
disorders.
54
In Guatemala, Galvez responded
to the violence with two decrees on June 12.
He acknowledged that "many villages of the
District of Mita have been incited to rebellion
and that they are spreading terror and
violence," and "that similar disorders have ap-
peared in other districts, which have been
made to believe that the pestilence which
devastates the peoples is a poison in the wa-
ter and in the medicines." Thus, to prevent
the further spread of cholera and to restore
order, Galvez decreed that all those parti-
cipating in any Way in the uprisings would be
tried by military courts as traitors, punishable
by death. To enforce this, his second decree
provided for immediate reorganization of re-
serve militia forces.
55
Three days later, gov-
ernment troops launched a vindictive attack
on Santa Rosa and Mataquescuintla. Pri-
soners taken at Mataquescuintla implicated
Father Aqueche, Rafael Carrera, and others.
The troops killed several peasants and de-
stroyed much property. The rebels fled to the
surrounding hills, from whence began a long
53. Marroquin Rojas, Morazan, pp.
112-19; Tobar
Cruz, Los montaneses, pp.
62-65; Solis, Carrera, pp.
21-29; Marure, Efemerides, pp.
95-96; Young, Nar-
rative, p. 144.
54. Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 10 (June 26,
1837), pp.
120-22.
55. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 17 (June 12, 1837), pp.
55-58.
55
56 Social Revolution in Guatemala
campaign of raiding and harassing govern-
ment forces.
56
A special sesion of the Gua-
temalan legislature convened on June 13 and
began a stormy debate, as Liberal opposition
rose up against the growing arbitrariness of
Galvez.
57
There was genuine fear in both
parties of the popular uprisings, and on June
18 the legislature authorized Galvez to raise
the armed forces to whatever size necessary
to suppress the revolt. Galvez signed the de-
cree on the 20th and proceeded to use his
dictatorial powers in an effort to restore
peace.
58
While Galvez employed repressive mea-
sures, he also offered pardon to those who
would lay down their arms, first on June 22,
excepting only those who had actually killed
government forces, and then on August 24, to
all the rebels.
59
He did not have forces suf-
ficient to deal a fatal blow to the guerrillas.
Short of volunteers and funds and unable to
secure sufficient recruits through conscrip-
tions, on July 17 he authorized arming of pri-
soners, offering to commute the sentences, ex-
cepting only robbers and assassins, of those
who took up arms against the insurgents.
60
The high incidence of cholera in the jails of
the capital provided further incentive for pri-
soners to volunteer.
61
The disease was now
serious in the capital, where the death toll
had reached 819 by mid-July.
62
As the epidemic spread, the panic of the
natives increased. This, combined with rising
apprehension over foreign influence, seems to
have been of greatest concern to the peasants
of the eastern zone. Carrera's guerrillas in-
creased in numbers and effectiveness, and he
56. Ibid., no. 19 (June 19, 1837), pp.
61-62; Ma-
rure, Efemerides, p. 97; Montufar, Reseha historica,
II, 355-61; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp.
55-57;
Solis, Carrera, pp.
30-38.
57. Manure, Efemerides, p. 97.
58. Boletin Oficial, no. 98 (June 21, 1837), pp.
393-
95.
59. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 20 (June 23, 1837), pp.
63-64; no. 24 (July 27, 1837), p. 73; no. 25 (Aug.
24, 1837), pp.
75-76.
60. Boletin Oficial, no. 100 (July 17, 1837), pp.
403-04.
61. El Editor: Periodico de los Tribunales (Guate-
mala), no. 15 (July 13, 1837), p. 62.
62. Ibid., Alcance al no. 15, July 20, 1837. The
epidemic had also spread into the highlands of the
west by this date. Quezaltenango recorded 161 deaths
from the disease between April and July. No sta-
tistics are available for the state as a whole.
announced a program for the revolution in
late June which included six points :
(
1
)
abolition of the Livingston Codes;
(2)
protec-
tion of life and property;
(3)
return of the
archbishop and reestablishment of the reli-
gious orders;
(4)
abolition of the head tax;
(5)
amnesty for all persons exiled in 1829;
and
(6)
respect for Carrera's orders as law
under pain of death to violators.
63
The pace
of fighting picked up and peasant distrust of
the government grew as ill-paid and poorly
supplied government troops looted and pil-
laged as they searched out guerrillas. Among
the atrocities committed was an attack on
Carrera's wife by government soldiers. Roused
to fury, Carrera vowed never to lay down his
arms while an officer of Morazan remained
in the state, and he took his vengeance on
judges and government officials. Often de-
feated, he evaded capture, always finding re-
fuge among the peasants of the mountainous
country where his legendary image grew
daily.
64
In the face of popular rebellion, the Liberals
in the capital fell to bickering among them-
selves as to what course to follow. In a
misguided search for unity, Galvez became
more conciliatory toward the Conservatives,
which alienated the more extreme of the Lib-
erals headed by Barrundia and Pedro Molina.
With increasing invective the Barrundia fac-
tion criticized the government in the press and
in the legislature, accusing Galvez of suppres-
sing freedom throughout the Republic in
order to quell a local rebellion. In December,
Galvez appointed two moderates, Juan Jose
Aycinena and Marcial Zebadua, to his key
ministerial posts, temporarily gaining some
conservative support but antagonizing even
further the Barrundia forces. Confronted by
a spreading peasant revolt and with growing
dissension within the government in Guate-
63. Solis, Carrera, p.
24.
64. Stephens, Incidents, I, 178; Tobar Cruz, Los
montaneses, pp.
67-73. Examples of the type of
actions in which Carrera engaged during this period
are in the- reports of government officers in the
AGCA, leg. 2522: Copala, Aug. 11, 1837, exp. 57100;
Cuajinalpa, Oct. 19, 1837, exp. 5104; Atiquizaya,
Oct. 28, 1837, exp. 57056; Las Flores, Nov. 9, 1837,
exp. 57059; and Santa Rosa, Nov. 14, 1837, exp.
57035.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
57
mala City, Morazan began to have grave
doubts about Galvez, and he failed to send
the kind of assistance that might have saved
the Guatemalan governor.
65
In response to criticism of his dictatorial
manner, Galvez signed on September 11 the
"Declaration of Rights and Guarantees per-
taining to all Citizens and Inhabitants of the
State of Guatemala," which the legislature
had passed on August 18.
66
In the meantime,
however, Galvez continued his campaign of
repression against Carrera in the countryside
and waged a relentless, but futile, propaganda
war against Barrundia, accusing him both of
being against the interests of property and
civilization and of being the ally, or dupe, of
Carrera.
67
65. There is considerable literature on the split
among the Liberals in late 1837 and early 1838, but
this subject will not be discussed here. Among the
most useful works on the political intrigues in Gua-
temala in the face of Carrera's revolt is Vela, Ba-
rrundia, see especially, I, 210-51. See also Antonio
Batres Jauregui, El Dr. Mariano Galvez y su epoca,
2d ed. (Guatemala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cul-
tura Popular, vol. 15, Editorial del Ministerio de Edu-
cation Publica, 1957), pp.
75-76; Tobar Cruz, Los
montaneses,
pp.
73-87; Garcia Granados, Memorias,
II, 183-89; Alberto Herrarte, La union de Centro-
america (tragedia
y
esperanza); ensayo politico-social
sobre la realidad de Centro America, 2d ed. (Gua-
temala: Centro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra" del
Ministerio de Education Publica, 1964), pp.
125-26;
Charles DeWitt to John Forsyth, Guatemala City,
Jan. 13, 1838, Doc. #793, William R. Manning, ed.,
Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States, In-
ter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, Volume Ill-Cen-
tral America, 1831-1850 (Washington: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1933), pp. 145-46,
148; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 97-99; Rodriguez, Li-
vingston Codes,
pp. 3, 8, 20-22.
66. Boletin Oficial, no. 103 (Sept. 11, 1837), pp.
417-23.
67. A good example of this propaganda was a broad-
side addressed to "Guafemaltecos" on Oct. 28, 1837.
It read: "Mariana pretende la nueva aristocracia triun-
far del pueblo, enganandolo
y desacreditando a sus
defensores; pero no triunfara sino el pueblo sobe-
rano.
"Alerta propietarios, comerciantes
y hacendados,
porque si los revolucionarios
y su candillo Barrundia
consiguen sus miras, pronto tendrein aqui a su pro-
tejido Carrera aliviandoos de la carga de vuestros
intereses
y dinero como sucedio al patriota C. Juan
de Dios Mayorga. [Dios Mayorga was killed by un-
known assassins in September, 1837.]
"Alerta artesanos, no os dejeis enganar de los que
nunca se han acordado de vosotros,
y vierten las mas
atroces injurias contra vuestros compafieros Abarca
y
Alvaro, porque estan colocados en los destinos de
election popular, donde no sufren verlos.
"Alerta. militares defensores de la patria, con los
Ayerdia, los Valenzuelas, los Arevalos
y otros muchos
de estos mismos revolucionarios que han representado
Meanwhile, as the war raged on and went
badly for the government, Galvez' reforms
were one by one sacrificed for lack of funds

that had to be spent for the military. The
state's budget put into effect on September
4,
1837, revealed that of a total of just under
300,000 pesos, 110,00 were appropriated for
the Department of War, 57,000 for the De-
partment of Justice, and only 12,000 for public
education.
68
Having placed too much faith in
advanced laws and too little in the sentiments
of the people, Galvez was paying the price.
With too few troops to occupy the entire
country, Galvez sought to defeat and capture
the caudillo, but the raiding and looting con-
tinued and the war was becoming a race war,
with Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and zambos
joining together against the whites.
69
The
state of the country was revealed in the ap-
peal to the rural inhabitants made by Galvez'
new ministers on December 16. Aycinena and
Zebadua made an impassioned plea for the
peasants to end the widespread violence and
to stop following the caudillo, in order to end
the bloodshed of their loved ones and to re-
store the peace and tranquility of former
times.
70
The countryside had become com-
al gobierno, para que en premio de vuestros sacrifi-
cios y de vuestra sangre derramada por la Patria,
salgais manana fuera de la ciudad, privandoos de
esta manera del derecho electoral que os dan las le-
yes fundamentales de la Republica y del Estado,
para quedarse ellos solos en los cantones, cuando
en los peligros corren a los tabancos y salinas, y voso-
tros poneis vuestros pechos al frente de las balas.
"Hacendados, comerciantes, artesanos
y
militares,
concurrid manana a sufragar por las personas de to-
da vuestra confianza, pues que estos son los deseos
de los Verdaderos Patriotas." Collection of Hojas
Sueltas, L.A.L.
68. Boletin Oficial, no. 107 (Oct. 30, 1837), pp.
457-66.
69. A United States racist later observed that race
was at the root of the problem. Ephraim G. Squier
(Notes on Central America, p. 58) believed "that
the only hope of Central America consists in ad-
verting the numerical decline of its white population,
and increasing that element in the composition of its
people. If not brought about by a iudicious en-
couragement of emigration or an intelligent system
of colonization, the geographical position and re-
sources of the country indicate that the end will
be attained by those more violent means, which
among men, as in the material world, often an-
ticipate the slower operations of natural laws."
70. Marcial Zebadua and
J. J.
de Avcinena, "Los
Secretarios del Gefe de Estado a los habitantes del
campo," Guatemala, Dec. 16, 1837, in Collection of
Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.
58 Social Revolution in Guatemala
pletely unsafe because of the guerrilla activity.
Commerce and communication were at a
standstill. In January, U. S. charge d'affaires,
Charles DeWitt, informed his Secretary of
State that "the roads leading from this capital
have for the last six weeks been so infested
by armed bands of highwaymen, that no
prudent traveller, and least of all a foreigner,
will venture to set out for any distant point."
DeWitt said they were "under the chieftain-
ship of an abandoned outlaw named Carrera,
whose war cry is 'down with the Livingston
Code and trial by jury!' and who scruples not
in the pursuit of his nefarious designs to com-
mit the most atrocious crimes .... So au-
dacious has he of late grown and so good an
understanding has he continued to cultivate
with the Guatemalan troops," DeWitt con-
tinued, "that a band of his most daring fol-
lowers penetrated into the very environs of
the City."
71
Galvez' days in office were now numbered.
Barrundia determined to form an alliance with
Carrera as a means of ousting Galvez, con-
fident that he could dominate the supposedly
illiterate guerrilla leader. In late 1837 a del-
egation headed by Barrundia sought to nego-
tiate with the rebels, but the hatred of the
priests advising Carrera precluded agreement.
On January 16, 1838, the Barrundia faction
set up an opposition government in Antigua
and several departments soon recognized it.
Aycinena and Zebadua resigned on the 17th.
Morazan failed to come to the aid of Galvez
and he was left alone. The municipal govern-
ment dissolved itself and anarchy reigned in
the capital.
72
Yet he refused to surrender. On January 20
he called for the raising of an army of 2000,
including 500 cavalry, within six weeks, and
decreed a forced loan on the propertyholders
of the capital to pay the cost until the leg-
islature convened.
73
On the following day he
bravely announced that government forces
would attack all rebel troops within eight
leagues of the capital.
74
It was a futile gesture,
and there was general dissatisfaction with the
government even within the capital.
75
Ba-
rrundia traveled to San Salvador where he
gained Morazan's permission to treat with Ca-
rrera. In the meantime, the commander of
Barrundia's Antigua forces, Manuel Carras-
cosa, anticipated him by negotiating with Fa-
ther Mariano Duran, a close adviser to Ca-
rrera. Significantly, Carrascosa agreed to
terms that would have been unacceptable to
Barrundia. Specifically, in return for Ca-
rrera's military alliance, he agreed to aboli-
tion of the Livingston Codes, to relaxation of
the anti-clericalism, and, most dangerous of
all, to acceptance of Carrera as commander of
all the insurgent forces. The accord suc-
ceeded in bringing down Galvez, but it spelled
eventual disaster for Barrundia's cause.
76
In the face of this unholy alliance, Galvez
sent two envoys (the Vice-President of the
Republic, Jose Gregorio Salazar, and the Sec-
retary of Foreign Relations, Miguel Alvarez)
to negotiate with Carrascosa, and they agreed
to the Convention of Guarda Vieja on the
afternoon of January 28. It was a compro-
mise among the Liberals, hoping to avert a
Carrera take-over. Galvez agreed to resign,
his remaining forces pledging their allegiance
to President Morazan. The capital would be
occupied by Carrascosa's forces from Sacate-
pequez, which would guarantee the lives and
property of all.
77
Carrera would have nothing
to do with this, however, and Carrascosa's
force could not contest his horde, which on
January 31 poured into the capital. Estimates
of the size of the caudillo's ragtag army range
as high as 12,000. John Lloyd Stephens re-
lated the scene
78
as told him by a gentle-
man who saw them "from the roof of his
house, and who was familiar with all the
71. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala, Jan. 13, 1838,
Doc. #793, Manning, Central America,
pp.
144-45.
72. Marure, Efemerides, p. 100; Tobar Cruz, Los
montaneses,
pp. 88-92; Batres Jauregui, America
Central, III, 138-40.
73. Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 34 (Jan. 20,
1838), pp. 106-07.
74. Ibid., no. 36 (Jan. 15 [sic, 25], 1838), p. 108.
75. On Jan. 26 the important Concordia Battalion in
the capital pronounced against Galvez, demanding
restoration of the Aycinena-Zebadua ministry. Ma-
rure, Efemerides, pp.
100-01; Garcia Granados, Me-
morias, II. 204-05.
76. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera." p. 27; Sob's, Ca-
rrera, p. 54; Montufar, Resena historica, II, 572-73;
Garcia Granados, Memorias II, 192-93.
77. Bancroft, Central America, III, 128-29.
78. Stephens, Incidents, I, 183.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
scenes of terror which had taken place in that
unhappy city":
Choking up the streets, all with green
bushes in their hats, they seemed to him at
a distance like a moving forest. They were
armed with rusty muskets, old pistols, fowl-
ing pieces, some with locks and some with-
out; they carried sticks formed into the shape
of muskets, with tin-plate locks, and clubs,
machetes, and knives tied to the ends of long
poles. And swelling the multitude were two
or three thousand women, with sacks and al-
forjas for carrying away the plunder. Many,
who had never left their villages before,
looked wild at the sight of the houses and
churches, and the magnificence of the city.
They entered the plaza vociferating Viva la
religion,
y
muerte a los estrangeros! Carrera,
himself, amazed at the immense ball he had
set in motion, was so embarrassed that he
could not guide his horse. He afterward said
that he was frightened at the difficulty of
controlling this huge and disorderly mass.
The traitor Barrundia, the leader of the op-
position, the Catiline of this rebellion, rode
by his side on this entry into the plaza.
The U.S. charge d'affaires reported the anti-
foreign sentiment of the rural forces: "The
shouts of vengeance raised in the streets by
Carrera's Indians were mostly directed against
what are here called English foreigners."
Among the conditions for peace, DeWitt
noted, was "that English foreigners be de-
stroyed, Spaniards excepted!"
79
In spite of
some inevitable brutality and vengeance by
the peasant force, order was quickly restored
and Carrera gained the praise of Barrundia
and others for his conduct. His forces gen-
erally respected property and the principal
commercial houses. Carrera himself was obe-
dient to the new government and maintained
his troops under command, evacuating most
of them within a few days. He had succeeded
in toppling the government, he had been as-
sured that the Liberals' excesses would be
discontinued, he could return to la montana
with victory
80
and, according to some sources,
with an $11,000 bribe for himself and his
men.
81
The Barrundia-Molina faction appeared to
have triumphed. Galvez had resigned in favor
of his lieutenant governor, Pedro Valenzuela,
more acceptable to Barrundia. Carrera, com-
missioned a lieutenant colonel and given mil-
itary command of his home district of Mita,
was out of the capital with his dreaded
peasant army. Pedro Molina was chosen as
president of the legislature.
82
The real si-
tuation was otherwise, however, for it was
a delicate coalition that sustained the govern-
ment, and all feared a return of the guerrilla
caudillo. Although Galvez was out, he still
had supporters in the legislature, and in ad-
dition to the Barrundia faction, the Conser-
vative-Clerical party now made an important
resurgence, having gained first from their al-
liance with Galvez and now from the pro-
clerical attitude of Carrera. In the mean-
time, the departments of Los Altos took ad-
vantage of the situation and seceded from
the state, declaring allegiance to Morazan,
and weakening the position of Guatemala.
83
A series of actions by the Guatemalan gov-
ernment reflect Carrera's presence and the
government's desire to appease him. By Feb-
ruary 20, the government was addressing Ca-
rrera as "General" and processing with kid
gloves complaints of hacendados regarding
Carrera's peasants on their lands.
84
Pedro Mo-
lina resigned as president of the legislature,
which now restored the Church to its former
position, removed the military governments,
and called for a return to constitutional rule.
Under the threat of a new mobilization by
79. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, Feb. 10,
1838, Doc. #794, Manning, Central America, p. 148.
For other accounts of Carrera's occupation of the
capital, see Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp.
27-29;
Solis, Carrera,
pp.
54-58; Tobar Cruz, Los monta-
neses,
pp.
94-99; and Bancroft, Central America, III,
130-32.
80. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 219-21.
81. Stephens, Incidents, I, 185. Bancroft {Central
America, III, 132) cites Stephens, but also says, "The
facts appear in the records of the asamblea." Pedro
Valenzuela later claimed (AGCA, leg. 3600, exp.
82810, fol. 2) that Carrera demanded 500 pesos from
him, the money to be divided among his troops.
82. Secretaria de la Asamblea del Estado de Guate-
mala al Secretario del Gobierno, Guatemala, Feb. 4,
1838, Boletin Oficial, no. 110 (Feb. 30, 1838), pp.
470-71.
83. The departments of Quezaltenango, Solola, and
Totonicapan, although never particularly friendly to
the Liberal cause, had resented domination by Gua-
temala and accepted Morazan now as a means of
gaining sovereignty in Quezaltenango. Montufar, Re-
sena historica, III, 9-23; Marure, Efemerides, p.
101.
84. AGCA, leg. 1962, exp. 45282.
60 Social Revolution in Guatemala
Carrera, the body repealed the Livingston
Codes in March. These decrees reflected the
popular will, as voiced by the guerrilla leader.
The preamble of a decree of March 12, which
terminated all nonelective officeholders, il-
lustrated the attention the legislature gave
to this will when it acknowledged that "a
great majority of the populations of the State
have armed themselves to resist the admin-
istration that violated their guarantees and
the fundamental pact," and justified the re-
volution against Galvez, "directed to reestab-
lishing law and liberty . . . and demanded by
self-preservation against tyranny, [as] not only
legitimate but consecrated by reason and
justice."
85
The liberal language of this decree
probably reflected the continuing influence of
Barrundia, but the repeal of the Livingston
Codes soon after revealed the shifting power.
The decree suppressing these codes gave as
the principal reason "the opinion of the peo-
ple, unprepared for so important an enter-
prise."
86
New demands for funds brought dis-
satisfaction with the Valenzuela government
and enabled the Conservatives to consolidate
support, inevitably drawing them closer to
Carrera.
87
Barrundia failed to recognize the growing
Conservative strength and doubted the ability
of Carrera to bring sufficient force against a
united government. Carrera, on the other
hand, dissatisfied with the government's pro-
gress toward his demands, prodded by grow-
ing antigovemment sentiment from rural pro-
pertyholders, and convinced by the priests
that he was being used by the Liberals, re-
newed his campaign of guerrilla warfare. Va-
lenzuela, urged on by Barrundia, responded
with repression.
88
The election of a new Re-
presentative Council, clearly reflecting the
Conservative gains in public opinion and
headed by Conservative Mariano Rivera
Paz,
89
put Barrundia in an untenable position.
Although he retained considerable influence
in the legislature for some time longer, Con-
servative strength was rising and was drifting
into a natural alliance with the masses. In
the end, Barrundia had to fall back on his
liberal ally, Francisco Morazan, and the re-
entry of the federal president with 1000 Sal-
vadoran troops into the state in mid-March
marked a new phase of the struggle.
85. Boletin Oficial, no. Ill (Mar. 17, 1838), pp.
474-77.
86. Ibid., no. 114 (Mar. 30, 1838), pp.
486-91.
87. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 236-37; Bole-
tin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp.
112-14.
88. Vela, Barrundia, I, 231; Moorhead, "Rafael Ca-
rrera," pp.
31-32; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no.
38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp. 112-14; no. 39 (Mar. 10,
1838), pp.
115-16; no. 40 (Mar. 15, 1838), pp.
117-19.
89. Boletin Oficial, no. 113 (Mar. 23, 1838), pp.
482-83.
A S EARLY AS February 9, 1838, the Gua-
*"-temalan government had cautioned Mora-
zan not to march into the state, as he would
upset the recent understanding with Carrera,
who had returned to Mita in peace.
90
Yet the
resumption of warfare by Carrera in March
forced the state to look to the federal govern-
ment for help. After negotiators rejected
Carrera's demands, Morazan launched a major
campaign to crush the rebellion.
91
The guer-
rillas responded with a new ferocity, parti-
cularly, although not exclusively, against for-
eign-owned properties. Often losing skirm-
ishes but never decisively defeated, the guer-
rillas harried the government in an ever-ex-
tending area, stretching finally from the Ca-
ribbean to the Pacific and westward into the
Verapaz and Sacatepequez. Morazan in-
creased his control over the machinery of the
state government and, as Galvez had done be-
fore, escalated the repression.
92
In the course
of the war, Carrera's father-in-law was cap-
tured and shot, a severity which in the opin-
ion of one of Morazan's officers was "im-
politic, serving only further to bathe the re-
volution in blood."
93
With Morazan in control of the capital, the
Liberals reinstituted some of their program
which had been sacrificed earlier to appease
Carrera.
94
In the meantime, however, the
90. AGCA, leg. 166, exp. 3470.
91. Solis, Carrera, p. 39; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera,"
pp.
32-33; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses,
pp.
108-10;
Montufar, Resena historica, III, 105-09.
92. George Washington Montgomery, Narrative
of a
Journey to Guatemala, in Central America, in 1838
(New York, 1839), p. 33, 148, 174; Garcia Grana-
dos, Memorias, II, 249, 262-63, Griffith, Empires,
pp. 152, 163; Marure, Efemerides, p. 103; Stephens,
Incidents, I, 191; Manning, Central America, p. 151;
Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses,
pp.
111-12; Boletin
Oficial, no. 116 (Apr. 23, 1838), pp. 495-96; no.
117 (Apr. 24, 1838), pp.
500-02; AGCA, leg. 1405,
exp. 32888; leg. 3600, exp. 82790; leg. 3618, exp.
84635.
93. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 246.
94. See, for example, Montufar, Resena historica, III,
federation over which he presided was be-
coming a fiction, and on May 30 the Federal
Congress, in San Salvador, allowed the states
to go their separate ways.
95
When, on
July
7, Congress went even further and declared
the states to be "sovereign, free and inde-
pendent political bodies," Morazan decided it
was time to return to San Salvador and put
his government in order. He believed, in-
correctly, that he had greatly weakened the
Carrera revolt in Guatemala. He would be
equally ineffective in restoring the now shat-
tered Central American union.
96
Following
Morazan's departure, a growing liaison be-
tween Conservatives and Carrera developed.
Within a month the Conservatives had gained
control of the government, supported by pop-
ular demonstrations calling for action to fore-
stall a new invasion of the capital from la
montafia. On July 22 Valenzuela turned over
the executive power to Rivera Paz.
97
The
U.S. charge d'affaires reported the marked
increase of popular support for Carrera: "Ow-
ing to the nature of the country, the numeri-
cal strength of the insurgents, and the en-
couragement they receive from one of the
political parties in this city, it has become as
difficult to subdue them as the Seminoles in
Florida. Besides," he wrote to Forsyth, "the
Ladino farmers from fear or inclination are
generally speaking in favour of Carrera, so
that, except in the cities and large towns,
Gen. Morazan is master of no more ground
than he can cover with his troops."
98
On July 25 the legislature decreed a gen-
eral amnesty for all political acts in the state
95. Boletin Oficial, no. 123 (July 16, 1838), pp.
533-34.
96. MoOrhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp.
36-37, citing
Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 69.
97. Boletin Oficial, no. 124 (July 16, 1838), pp.
535-38; no. 125 (July 26, 1838), p. 544; Stephens,
Incidents, I, 191; Marure, Efemerides, pp.
105-06;
Montufar, Resena historica, HI, 181-91.
98. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, July 24,
1838, Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p. 153.
61
Social Revolution in Guatemala
since 1821, welcomed back exiles and de-
clared all civil rights and guarantees reestab-
lished." There followed a stream of legisla-
tion dismantling the Liberal program and be-
ginning the restoration of the institutions of
the colonial era. In rapid succession the leg-
islature provided for State support of the
Church,
100
formally declared State sovereign-
ty,
101
reduced by half the direct head tax,
102
repealed civil marriage and divorce,
103
re-
voked Galvez's municipal organization sys-
tem,
104
and decreed other measures to reverse
the direction of Guatemala's government. At
the same time, the Rivera Paz government
continued its military efforts to suppress the
guerrillas, but with Morazan's troops gone
Carrera made notable gains and by early
September he had occupied Antigua and once
more threatened the capital.
105
A sudden
counter-offensive by the Liberal general, Car-
los Salazar, however, dealt Carrera a stun-
ning defeat at Villa Nueva on September 11,
although Carrera escaped into the hills once
more. In November, Morazan joined the
chase. Although Carrera's situation was des-
perate, he managed to continue the resist-
ance.
100
Carrera bought time to reorganize
his haggard forces, when, on December 23,
1838, he signed with General Agustin Guz-
man, of the State of Los Altos, a treaty agree-
ing to lay down his arms and recognize the
government of Guatemala in return for his
restoration as military commander of the Dis-
trict of Mita. Rivera Paz and Morazan both
agreed, and the country enjoyed a breath of
peace.
107
The respite was short, however, for, en-
99. Boletin Oficial, no. 125 (July 26, 1838), pp.
539-41; Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p.
153.
100. Ibid., pp.
542-43.
101. Ibid., no. 126 (July 28, 1838), pp.
547-50.
102. Ibid., p. 551.
103. Ibid., pp.
554-55.
104. Ibid., pp.
552-53; no. 127 (Aug. 5, 1838),
pp.
559-60.
105. Montufar, Reseiia historica, III, 204; AGCA,
leg. 1413, exp. 33009, fol. 2; leg. 3607, exp. 83853;
leg. 3652, exp. 86106; Marure, Efemerides, pp.
107.
106. Bancroft, Central America, III, 135-37.
107. AGCA, leg. 1413, exp. 33009; leg. 153, exp.
3260, fol. 14; Solis, Carrera,
pp.
86-87; Marure,
Efemerides, p. Ill; Pedro Zamora Castellanos, Vida
militar de Centro America (Guatemala, 1924), p.
167.
couraged by the apparent collapse of the Ca-
rrera movement, the Liberals attempted to
recoup their position. On January 30, 1839,
Morazan deposed Rivera Paz with General
Salazar, the hero of Villa Nueva.
108
Mean-
while, Conservatives gained power in Hon-
duras and Nicaragua and joined forces
against Liberals in El Salvador. Carrera was
in league with those Conservative leaders as
well as with those in Guatemala, and the new
Liberal thrust by Morazan convinced him
that there could be no peace until Morazan
was defeated once and for all.
109
Morazan's
term as President of the Federation expired
on February
1, and his opponents now
claimed that he was the true rebel, for he
was in office illegally after that date. No suc-
cessor had been elected.
110
The cause of the
Conservatives and of Carrera had now be-
come one: the elimination of Morazan. On
March 24 Carrera issued a manifesto from
Mataquescuintla. Defending his own action in
taking up arms once more on the grounds of
defense of his country, he accused Morazan
of cruelty toward the clergy and others, of
destroying commerce, of confiscating private
property, and of spreading terror throughout
Guatemala. Swearing before God Almighty,
he promised to restore Rivera Paz and to join
with the Conservatives of Honduras and Nica-
ragua in ousting Morazan.
111
.
Three weeks later, on April 13, he entered
the capital unopposed at the head of a large
and orderly army. Carrera rode directly to
the house of Mariano Rivera Paz and restored
his authority. The Conservatives had re-
gained control almost to the day a decade
108. AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. ^51825; Victor Jerez,
"General Don Carlos Salazar," San Salvador
y
sus
hombres (San Salvador: Ministerio de Educacion,
1967), p. 98. . __
109. Robert S. Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan,
Champion
of
Central American Federation (Coral
Gables: University of Miami Press, 1950), p. 37;
Tobar Cruz, Los montafieses, p. 125; Franklin D.
Parker, The Central American Republics (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 184.
110. Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 37. Morazan also
assumed the office of Governor of El Salvador, the
only state remaining in the Federation.
111. Rafael Carrera, Pronunciamiento del General
Rafael Carrera
y del ejercito de la Constitucion del
Estado de Guatemala (Mataquescuintla. March 24,
1839), in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
63
after they had lost it to Morazan.
112
Carrera
spent the remainder of the year mopping up
Liberal resistance in Guatemala and support-
ing Conservative forces in neighboring El Sal-
vador and Honduras.
113
In January, 1840, he
moved swiftly into Los Altos and crushed the
Liberal stronghold in Quezaltenango, an
event evidently welcomed by the majority
there.
114
In a "Farewell Address" to the in-
habitants there, he assured them of his con-
tinued protection now that he had put that
province back on the road to progress. Tangi-
ble benefits were provided immediately.
"Compatriots," he declared, "I leave you free
of the head tax
(
contribution
)
; and although
you will pay the sales taxes (alcabalas) and
other taxes to which you are accustomed, no
longer will there be those that they have been
collecting here, nor those that were collected
in the time of Galvez in Guatemala: Those
now established are more moderate on peo-
ples who obey the government."
115
A showdown between Morazan and Carre-
ra became inevitable as each continued to
intervene in the other's state. Morazan, re-
fusing to abandon the federation idea, even
though since the fall of Los Altos he had
only El Salvador, took the initiative and in-
vaded Guatemala in mid-March. Success-
fully outmaneuvering Carrera's forces, Mora-
zan took the Guatemalan capital with little
resistance on March 18. On the following
day, however, Carrera's troops stormed into
the city, completely routing the Liberal forces
and ending Morazan's rule.
110
Morazan and
112. Montufar, Resena historica, III, 299-305; El
Tiempo, no. 10 (June 12, 1839), p. 40; AGCA, leg.
2437, exp. 51825; "Disposition de Rafael Carrera,
Comandante de los Pueblos de Mita, 13 de Abril de
1839," in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L.
113. A running account of his activities and pro-
clamations is given in El Tiempo, nos. 7-70 (May
14, 1839-Jan. 22, 1840), pp.
27-279. Extensive re-
ports on his military operations are available in the
AGCA, particularly in legs. 1141 and 2437.
114. El Tiempo, nos. 70-79 (Jan. 22-Feb. 25, 1840),
pp.
279-313.
115. "Rafael Carrera a los pueblos de los departa-
mentos de Los Altos," Quezaltenango. Feb. 9, 1840,
El Tiempo, no. 79 (Feb. 25. 1840), p. 311. On
Feb. 26 Los Altos was formally reincorporated into
the State of Guatemala. El Tiempo, no. 81 (Mar.
4, 1840), p. 332.
116. A number of publications in the Collection of
Hojas Sueltas in the Hemeroteca of the AGCA pro-
vide detail on the events of March 17-19: "El
a few of his officers escaped to Panama.
117
Two years later he returned to Central Amer-
ica for the last time, briefly usurping power
in Costa Rica. Another popular uprising cut
short his aspirations of reunification, and he
died before a firing squad in San Jose on
September 15, 1842.
118
Much of Carrera's time in the years follow-
ing Morazan's defeat was spent consolidating
Conservative rule in Guatemala and its neigh-
bors. The Conservatives soon found, how-
ever, that they could not control the caudillo,
and the years from 1840 to 1844 were a peri-
od of political adjustment to caudillismo.
Although conservative in tone, it was unlike
earlier elite governments, for Carrera's will
Coronel V. Cruz a los Guatemaltecos," Guatemala,
Mar. 17, 1840; "Lista de los individuos actuados,
que estaban presentes el 17 de marzo en estas car-
celes, y fueron sacados por la tropa de Morazan,"
[Guatemala, Mar. 17, 1840]; Juaquin Duran, Se-
cretario del Despacho de Gobernacion, "Parte Ofi-
cial," Guatemala, Mar. 19, 1840; Rafael Carrera,
"Parte circunstanciado de la accion de los dias 18
y
19 de marzo, que ha sido dirigido al Gobierno por
el General en Gefe del Estado," Guatemala, Mar.
23, 1840; "Coleccion de algunos de los interesantes
documentos que se encontraron en los equipajes to-
rnados en la accion de los dias 18 y 19 de marzo,"
(Guatemala, n.d.). See also Solis, Carrera,
pp.
88-90; Montufar, Resena historica. III, 455-71;
Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 40; Stephens, Incidents,
II, 89-95; Rancroft, Central America, III, 141-42;
Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp.
137-39.
117. Marure, Efemerides, p. 124; Montufar, Resena
historica, III, 600-01; Morazan to Esteban Travieso,
David, N.G., Aug. 14, 1840, Doc. #54(29), Mora-
zan Papers, L.A.L.
118. Marure, Efemerides, pp.
132-33; Arturo Hum-
berto Montes, Morazan y
la federacion centroameri-
cana (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1958), pp.
281-
324; Arturo Mejia Nieto, Morazan, Presidente de la
desaparecida Republica Centroamericana (Ruenos Ai-
res: Editorial Nova, 1947), pp.
167-89; Rodrigo Fa-
cio, Traijectoria y
crisis de la federacion centroameri-
cana, con tin acdpite sohre el proceso de la separa-
cion de Costa Rica de la Republica Federal
y de su
constitucion como republica soberana, libre e indepen-
diente (San Jose de Costa Rica: Imprenta Nacional,
1949), p. 84; Marroquin Rojas, Morazan,
pp.
228-40;
see also, in the Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the He-
meroteca of the AGCA, the proclamation of General
Antonio Pinto on Morazan's execution, San Jose, Sept.
16, 1842, and of Mariano Rivera Paz, congratulating
the inhabitants of Costa Rica on the act, Guatemala,
Oct. 21, 1842, and a separate proclamation of Rivera
Paz of the same date to the people of Guatemala, in
which he thanked Divine Providence for coming to
their defense. "Morazan," he said, "el enemigo obse-
cada del orden, de la propiedad y de la libertad de
los pueblos, ya no existe: termino su carrera de un
modo desastroso en Costa-Rica, en la Ciudad de San
Jose el 15 de Septiembre, aniversario glorioso de
nuestra independencia."
64 Social Revolution in Guatemala
was law, and he insisted from time to time
on the priority of peasant interests. At the
same time, his own interests gradually
shifted to the more traditional conservatism
of the oligarchy. The growth of his own
estate probably contributed to this. Begin-
ning with his wife's property, his holdings in-
creased with his military fortunes, and by the
time he became President in 1844 he and
his family had amassed a considerable
amount.
119
There is at least one good example of the
relation between Carrera's acquisition of
property and a departure from the views he
had held as a peasant caudillo. His anti-
foreign feelings were well known, and the
English colonization project of the Galvez
government had been one of the major causes
of the revolt. Carrera kept closely in touch
with the government on the question of a
concession of the District of Santo Tomas on
the Caribbean coast to a Belgian colonization
company. On February 16, 1842, Santos Ca-
rrera informed the government that Rafael
warned against making any concession to the
Belgians at Santo Tomas. Such a concession,
he said, "would be prejudicial to the State
and even to the entire Republic, for the peo-
ple, upon seeing a new foreign colony
founded, would believe it to be the first link
[in the chain of their] enslavement."
120
Al-
though many of the Conservatives had shared
the distrust of the English company, there
was considerable support among them for the
less objectionable Belgian plan. Without Ca-
rrera's support the contract seemed likely to
fail in the legislature. Yet in mid-April, 1842,
Carrera reversed his position and declared
his support of the project. After sharp debate
119. Carrera's wife played a major role in the man-
agement of Carrera's personal financial affairs. See,
for example, AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. 51828, fols. 1-3.
Dunlop (Travels, p. 88) said that "by extortions and
confiscations, he has amassed some hundred thousand
dollars, in cash, lands, and houses; and it is conse-
quently his interest to maintain a settled govern-
ment and give protection to property." See also Ste-
phens, Incidents, I, 197-98; AGCA, leg. 214, exp.
4941, fol. 242; and Rafael Carrera to Secretario del
Supremo Gobierno, Guatemala, July 15, 1839, El
Tiempo, no. 17 (July 19, 1839), p. 67.
120. Santos Carrera to Ministro de Relaciones, Gua-
temala, Feb. 16, 1842, AGCA, leg. 1395, exp. 32354,
fol. 5.
the Guatemalan legislature approved the con-
tract on May 4. That there may have been
bribery by Belgian agents is strongly indi-
cated.
121
As for Carrera, it is impossible to
overlook the fact that on April 25 the govern-
ment requested that he be granted 100 caba-
llerias of land in the vicinity of the Port of
Santo Tomas and on May 6 the legislature
complied.
122
The legislation following Carrera's revolt
makes it clear that a very substantial reaction
took place, as the Conservatives restored
much of the institutional structure of the co-
lonial period. For this they paid a price. For
the first time in Guatemalan history, Indians,
and more especially ladinos, began to play
a part in Guatemalan political life. The hold
of the white elite over government was clear-
ly broken, even if their social dominance had
been restored. But it was a restoration with-
out the remainder of the colonial kingdom
of Guatemala. The Federation had ceased
to exist, and although lip service was often
paid to it thereafter, strong regional loyalties
outweighed any spirit of unification.
The new legislature installed in Guatemala
on May 29, 1839, dismantled the remains of
the Galvez program. Rivera Paz outlined the
conditions and needs of the state in a mes-
sage to the body on May 31. He noted the
depleted condition of the treasury and the
generally depressed state of the country ow-
ing to the incessant warfare. Urging the leg-
islature to pursue practical measures to pro-
mote agriculture, industry, and commerce,
he proposed restoration of Hispanic institu-
tions such as the merchant guild. In conclud-
ing, he left little doubt as to who was really
in command or what direction the govern-
would take. "The characteristics that dis-
tinguished General Rafael Carrera," said Ri-
vera Paz, "his dedication and effort to estab-
121. Griffith, Empires, pp.
135-45; William
J.
Grif-
fith, Santo Tomas, anhelado emporio del comercio en
el Atldntico (Guatemala, 1959), pp.
33-36; Pineda
cle Mont, Recopilacion, I, 824-38.
122. The official reason given for the grant was as
a gesture of gratitude for Carrera's recent military
victories against El Salvador and for the zeal that he
had shown in maintaining the rights of the State and
the integrity of its territory. AGCA, leg. 212, exp.
4815; leg. 218, exp. 4990.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
65
lish a regime of justice in the state; his love
of order, and above all his impartiality and
modesty
cannot escape your attention. The
nation owes him great service. He has been
the restorer of authority, and he is today
the strongest supporter of the rights and in-
dependence of the State. I recommend him to
the Assembly."
123
A few days later the gen-
eral himself addressed the Assembly, charg-
ing them to do his bidding. He reiterated
his opposition to the Galvez reforms and his
dedication to tradition and religion; he prom-
ised to support all efforts along these lines.
124
The Assembly moved expeditiously, begin-
ning with restoration of the religious orders
125
and an invitation for the return of the exiled
archbishop, Ramon Casaus.
126
It confirmed
a slate of appointments acceptable to the
Conservatives, including Carrera as Com-
manding General of the Army,
127
began a
process of consolidating the customs service,
and put the treasury in order.
128
Municipal
elections in July gave the Conservatives con-
trol of the capital.
129
In August the legisla-
123. Mariano Rivera Paz, Memoria que presento a la
Asamblea Constituyente, en su primera sesion, el Con-
sejero Gefe del Estado de Guatemala, por medio del
Secretario del Despacho de Relaciones (Guatemala,
1839).
124. "Felicitation del General de Brigada Rafael Ca-
rrera a la Asamblea Constituyente del Estado," El
Tiempo, no. 11 (June 14, 1839), p. 41. See also the
article praising the peace and tranquility of the His-
panic period in no. 47 (Nov. 9, 1939), pp.
187-88.
A quotation from Francois Mignet at the head of
each issue of El Tiempo reflected the philosophy of
the government toward "reform": "Cuando una re-
forma se ha hecho necesaria, y ha llegado el mo-
menta de establecerla, nada la impide, y
todo la
secunda." See also Stephens, Incidents, I, 160.
125. El Tiempo, no. 12 (June 21, 1839), p. 45;
no. 14 (July 15, 1839), p. 54; Pineda de Mont,
Recopilacion, I, 273.
126. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), p. 50;
"Rafael Carrera, General de Brigada de las armas
del Estado, a los pueblos que lo componen," El
Tiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839), p. 62; Pineda de
Mont, Recopilacion, I, 242-43.
127. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), supple-
ment. Supreme Court justices were named in Dec-
ember. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), p.
223
128'.
El Tiempo, no. 15 (July 10, 1839), p. 58. See
also the editorial, "Credito Publico," in no. 23 (Aug.
11, 1839), p. 89, calling for Hamiltonian measures
and annual budgeting to restore the public credit,
policies generally followed during the Carrera years.
129. Those elected, all by easy margins over numer-
ous other candidates, were: Damaso Angulo, Alcalde
1; Pedro Aycinena, Alcalde 2;
Manuel Rubio, Al-
ture reestablished the national mint and the
merchant guild, with a substantial road and
port development program under the latter's
supervision.
130
Later, it revived the office of
corregidor, reflecting the re-centralization of
control over the country,
131
reestablished edu-
cation under Church auspices,
132
established
a national bank,
133
and revived the residencia
examination for all public officials in the
state.
134
The legislators closed their first session with
more decrees designed to restore the His-
panic tradition. They reduced taxes on food-
stuffs in another response to popular opin-
ion,
135
and reinstituted the former alcoholic
beverages controls.
136
They abolished the
head tax altogether.
137
They restored the
tithe tax and enforced its collection.
138
They
decreed a new Declaration of the Rights of
the State and its Inhabitants, which, although
maintaining in print many civil liberties,
clearly turned the direction of the State to-
ward authoritarianism.
139
Roman Catholi-
cism once more became the official religion
and regained its fuero and cabildo eclesids-
tico.
uo
The session adjourned, having defi-
calde
3; Felipe Prado, Rejidor 8; Jose Najera,
Rejidor 9; Alejo Vaca, Rejidor 10; and Jose Maria
Palomo, Sindico. El Tiempo, no. 18 (July 22, 1839),
p. 72.
130. Ibid., no. 24 (Aug. 15, 1839), p. 95; no. 26
(Aug. 24, 1839), p. 102; Woodward, Class Privilege,
pp.
xvi-xvii, 55-104, 122, 126-27. Regarding prob-
lems of currency, see also Manuel F. Pavon, "Informe
del Consulado sobre las monedas del Sur en circula-
tion," Guatemala, June 20, 1840, El Tiempo, no.
108 (June 28, 1840), pp.
430-31; and El Tiempo,
no. 148 (Dec. 5, 1840), p. 592.
131. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 504-11; see
also the comunique from the Jefe Politico de Chi-
maltenango to the State Government, Oct. 7, 1839,
El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 153, in which
he reveals that an uncooperative local alcalde has
been removed from office in Tecpan, permitting the
town to progress.
132. El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 154.
133. Ibid., no. 45 (Nov. 3, 1839), pp.
178-79.
134. Ibid., no. 48 (Nov. 14, 1839), p. 189.
135. AGCA, leg. 214, exp. 4941, fol. 607; Gaceta
Oficial (Guatemala), I, no. 44 (June 10, 1842), 191.
136. El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec. 11, 1839), pp.
225-26.
137. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, II, 263.
138. Gaceta Extraordinaria (Guatemala), Aug. 14,
1841, t>. 1.
139. El Tiempo, no. 60 (Dec. 21, 1839), pp.
237-39;
Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, pp.
230-35.
140. Montiifar, Resena historica, III, 381-82; El
Tiempo, no. 146 (Nov. 26, 1840), p. 582.
Social Revolution in Guatemala
nitively terminated the Liberal revolution.
141
In 1840 the reaction continued. The gov-
ernment, in an effort to balance the budget
in the face of Carrera's continued military
expenditures and a sizable debt, slashed sub-
stantially the salaries of public and military
officials.
142
Reestablishment of the tobacco
monopoly increased government revenues.
143
With Carrera's cooperation, the government
sought to end military abuses against local
populations.
144
It tried to develop the econ-
omy through promotion of new crops and
subsidies and reestablished the Sociedad
Economica to aid such promotions.
145
Ca-
rrera himself proposed protective tariffs for
local industries and division of lands by mu-
nicipalities to promote production of cochi-
neal and silkworms.
146
Meanwhile, the
Church regained more of its confiscated
property, although Carrera refused to sanc-
tion restoration of all it had lost.
147
The Con-
servatives restored the colonial land institu-
tions that the Liberals had sought to destroy.
In so doing, they tied the Guatemalan econ-
omy to a relatively small group of wealthy
landowners and merchants and established a
major obstacle to movement toward a gen-
erally more dynamic prosperity.
148
The res-
toration of the University of San Carlos, with
Father Juan Aycinena as rector until 1854,
represented well the aristocratic, pro-clerical,
and reactionary philosophy that was regain-
ing control.
149
Such decrees had the effect of restoring the
stability and order of the Spanish regime.
They were accompanied by the distrust of
non-Spanish foreigners that characterized the
141. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), pp.
221-22, for a review of the accomplishments of this
legislature.
142. Ibid., no. 65 (Jan. 4, 1840), p. 260.
143. Gaceta Oficial, I, no. 55 (Aug. 9, 1842),
235-
144. El Tiempo, no. 70 (Jan. 22, 1840), p. 279.
145. Marure, Efemerides, pp.
125-26; Pineda de
Mont, Recopilacion, I, 808; AGCA, leg. 213, exp.
4868; leg. 225, exp. 5084, fol. 13.
146. Sept. 16, 1840. AGCA, leg. 3600, exp. 82802.
147. AGCA, leg. 858, exp. 20678; Dunlop, Travels,
p. 214.
148. Facio, Trayectoria, p. 83.
149. Holleran, Church and State, p. 131; Marure,
Efemerides, p. 73.
colonial period. The return to Hispanic tra-
ditions stopped short of actual return to im-
perial status, as happened briefly in the Do-
minican Republic, but in 1851 Carrera re-
turned the Spanish colors to the Guatemalan
national flag, where they remained symbolic-
ally for twenty years.
150
The white elite thus attempted to restore
their former position by alliance with Carrera
and the peasants. Certainly, by 1842 they
had achieved much success. Although some
Liberals continued to serve in the govern-
ment for several years, and Carrera often
played off Liberals against Conservatives to
hold his own position, the Conservative doc-
trines predominated. The Conservatives real-
ized that only through subservience to the
caudillo could they recoup the losses of the
Liberal period. As before, the families con-
nected with the Aycinenas, most notably the
Pavons, Pinoles, and Urruelas, set the stand-
ards in politics and society, and as before
there were those who objected to the "aristo-
cratic" domination of society.
151
A small olig-
archy came to dominate policy and society,
although a number of Spanish immigrants
had much to do with commerce. In 1846,
according to a British resident, Robert Dun-
lop, the principal trade was ,in the hands of
five Spanish firms, which had correspond-
ents in England, France, and Spain.
152
The
small group of other foreigners made few in-
roads. In 1842 U.S. Special Agent W. S.
Murphy reported that the principal division
in the state's politics was between the native
inhabitants, led by General Carrera, and pro-
English interests, which still had some
150. Maria Albertina Galvez, Emblemas nacionales
(Guatemala: Editorial del Ministro de Educacion
Publica, 1958), pp.
153-55. Red and gold were add-
ed to the blue and white adopted in 1825.
151. Cobos Batres (Carrera,
pp.
116-19) discusses
the principal figures of the Guatemalan government
of the 1840s and notes that there were a number of
Liberals who continued to hold office in this period.
But it is clear that the most prominent officers were
Conservatives. See also Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera,"
pp. 46-47; Stephens, Incidents, I, 244; and the
"Proposition" of Jorge de Viteri, Guatemala, July 17,
1840, in Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the Hemero-
teca of the AGCA.
152. Travels, p. 317.
Social Revolution in Guatemala 67
strength in the legislature.
153
Actually, there
were few English residents in Central Ameri-
ca, although from Belize British merchants
continued to control much of Guatemala's
overseas trade.
154
Growth of Conservative strength was nat-
ural as Carrera lost no opportunity to attack
the Liberals. He condemned the Liberal
economic and political philosophy as being
prejudicial to the people's interests and at-
tacked the Liberals for failing properly to
provide for the people's needs. Threatening
the Liberals with death in popular slogans,
he made it clear that their residence in Guate-
mala depended on their abstenance from
politics. The caudillo remained in contact
with the peasants, and during the first years
of his rule their interests received some at-
tention. A combination of patriotic oratory,
successful military campaigns against Guate-
mala's neighbors, and tangible actions on their
behalf kept the masses loyal to the caudillo
and thus served as a check against the Con-
servatives during the early years of his
regime.
155
Carrera's concern for the peasants inevit-
ably caused the elite to distrust him. His
guerrilla warfare had been aimed at the
wealthy and he had abstained generally from
attacking the persons or property of the
poorer classes. As he allied with the Guate-
malan elite, his attitudes perhaps changed
somewhat, but it was several years before the
wealthy felt secure.
156
Athough his concern
for the poor may have waned as his own
153. Murphy to Daniel Webster, Guatemala City,
Feb. 4, 1842, Doc. #805, Manning, Central America,
p. 173.
154. Naylor, "British Role," p. 367.
155. See, for example, "Rafael Carrera, General de
Brigada de las armas del Estado, a los pueblos que
lo componen," El Tiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839),
p. 62; "El Brigadier y
Comandante General de las
Armas del Estado: a los pueblos," El Tiempo, no.
18 (July 22, 1839), pp.
71-72; "El General Rafael
Carrera a los habitantes del Estado," El Tiempo, no.
42 (Oct. 24, 1839), p. 167; "Proclama del General
Carrera a sus soldados," El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec.
11, 1839), p. 227; "Proclama del General R. Carrera
a sus conciudadanos de los otros estados," El Tiempo,
no. 73 (Jan. 31, 1840), p. 292; "Rafael Carrera a los
pueblos de los departamentos de Los Altos," El Tiem-
po, no. 79 (Feb. 25, 1840), p. 311; and Stephens,
Incidents, I, 247.
156. Montgomery, Narrative, p. 147; Bancroft, Cen-
tral America, III, 265.
riches increased, there is little doubt that the
government he dominated provided through
charity and paternalism a better life for the
masses than had the progressivism of the
Galvez Liberals.
157
On the other hand, the
Carrera government provided for a status quo
situation, whereas the Liberals had claimed
that general prosperity would be the inevi-
table, if long-term, result of their programs.
The new government's attitude toward the
Indians is testimony to its reactionary phil-
osophy of looking back to the Hispanic peri-
od. On August 16, 1839, the Guatemalan
legislature, recognizing that Indians were a
majority of the state's population, and that
it was "an object of public interest, not only
to protect this numerous class of the society,
but also to develop and improve its customs
and civilization," decreed a code for dealing
with this class. Noting that the Liberal pro-
gram had mistreated and exploited the Indian
under a system that operated under the pre-
text of their equality, the comittee reporting
the bill said that the system of the colonial
era was really better. That system "com-
pelled them to work, to provide public serv-
ice on certain projects and to pay taxes; but
it also gave them protection against the in-
fluential and the powerful in their land
claims." It provided for their care and wel-
fare and for their self-respect, the committee
added. The system of the Liberals abolished
all that, and the Indians had lost their respect
for authority and good order. The new code
clearly reversed Galvez' idea of incorporating
the Indian into western civilization. It even
called for reestablishment of the office of In-
dian interpreter and charged the department-
al officials to have the decree translated into
the indigenous languages. Galvez' program
aimed at assimilating the Indians. The Con-
servatives claimed this meant exploitation,
with the danger of rebellion and violence.
Instead, they offered paternalism and pro-
tection.
158
157. See Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," p.
148.
158. The "Dictamen a la Comision de organization
provisional sobre establecer un regimen ^de protec-
tion y fomento en favor de los indios," is in El
Tiempo, no. 21 (Aug. 2, 1839), p. 81. The decree
Social Revolution in Guatemala
Carrera frequently communicated with
both Church and State regarding the welfare
of the Indians, as for example in July, 1840,
when he notified the government that the
Indians of Atiquizaya and other villages had
informed him that the Vicar General of the
Archdiocese had not attended to their com-
plaints or answered their questions.
159
And
the caudillo took an active interest in restora-
tion of ejidos to Indian communities, him-
self mediating land disputes in some Guate-
malan villages.
160
Such interest dropped off
sharply, however, after he assumed the office
of president in 1844, and peasant support for
him declined correspondingly. He now rode
about in a fine European carriage, had be-
come wealthy, and identified himself with the
white elite. Ironically, it was a popular peas-
ant uprising in the District of Mita that be-
gan the revolt that forced him from office in
1848.
161
He was able to return the following
of Aug. 16 is in no. 27 (Aug. 30, 1839), pp.
105-06.
Another comparison of the Liberal and Conservative
approach to the Indian in Guatemala is found in Ro-
driguez, Livingston Codes, p. 30.
159. AGCA, leg. 3594, exp. 82514.
160. Ibid., leg. 1419, exps. 33274, 33305, 33326,
33356.
161. Ibid., leg. 3601, exp. 82899; Dunlop, Travels,
p. 90; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp.
66-68.
year and in 1852 became president for life,
an office which he held until 1865, but the
attachment to the people of his youth was
not regained.
The white elite never succeeded in regain-
ing full control of the country, however, for,
if Carrera achieved nothing else, his great
contribution was the permanent entry of the
ladino class into affairs of state. His army
had few white soldiers, and he did not want
white officers.
162
Carrera's relatives and asso-
ciates, all ladinos, occupied important posi-
tions. Moreover, Indians made up a consid-
erable portion of the army and were able to
gain petty government offices as well. Thus,
while the legislature still remained largely
white, their monopoly over government was
broken, never to be regained, and the same
was true of landholding.
163
There was a
genuine, conservative reaction against the
Liberalism of Morazan, Barrundia, and Gal-
vez, but it rested on popular support and
therefore had to share political victory with
the lower classes. It is in this sense, more
than in any other, that Carrera's revolt may
be termed a social revolution.
162. Stephens, Incidents, II, 90.
163. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp.
64-65.
rpHE CARRERA REVOLT was an example
*
of Karl Marx's 1848 maximum that "the
lower widdle class, the small manufacturer,
the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all
these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save
from extinction their existence as fractions of
the middle class. They are therefore not re-
volutionary, but conservative. Nay more: they
are reactionary, for they try to roll back the
wheels of history."
164
These elements put
forth a powerful reaction in Guatemala in
1837 against ideas and reforms foreign to
their traditions and experience.
In 1838 the Guatemalan government com-
missioned the historian Alejandro Marure to
compare the Carrera revolt with the revolu-
tion in the Vendee in 1793, where peasants
in defense of Church and tradition took up
arms against the republican government. The
similarities were notable.
165
Most other rural
revolts against intellectual-dominated reform
movements, within and beyond Latin Ameri-
ca, follow a similar pattern, probably not ex-
cluding the widespread support for George
Wallace in the 1968 U.S. presidential election.
Liberal reform movements which fail to
capture support from a rural majority sel-
dom survive, particularly when they are
164. "The Communist Manifesto," section 1, in Karl
Marx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other
Writings, ed. by Max Eastman (New York: The
Modern Library, 1932), p. 332.
165. AGCA, leg. 3618, exp. 84635; Vela, Barrundia,
I, 213; Batres Jauregui, Mariano Gdlvez,
pp. 76-77;
Marure's study was entitled "Memoria sobre la in-
surrection de Santa Rosa
y Mataquescuintla, en Cen-
troamerica, comparada con la que estallo en Francia,
en 1790, en los departamentos de la Vendee." For
recent accounts and analyses of the Vendee revolt
see Charles Tilly, The Vendee (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1964); Paul Bois, Paysans de Vouest;
Des structures economiques et sociales aux options
politiques depuis Vepoque revolutionnaire dans la
Sarthe (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1960); and Marcel
Faucheux, L'insurrection vendeene de 1793: aspects
economiques et sociaux (Paris: Comision d'histoire
economique et sociale de la Revolution, Imprimerie
Nationale, 1964).
identified with foreign ideologies. As Jacques
Lambert has indicated: "The elites who had
assumed power were drawn to the ideologies
prevailing in countries far more advanced
than the Iberian countries, namely France,
England, and the United States. ... No de-
veloping country can resist the compulsion to
imitate advanced countries. . . . But the Latin
American countries more than other countries,
were irresistibly driven in this direction be-
cause of the alienation of their elites. Al-
though these elites were living in an econom-
ically and socially backward environment
without having the slightest intention of for-
saking the advantages it gave them, they
were intellectually part of North Atlantic so-
ciety."
166
The Carrera revolt ended that
phase of Central American history. What
Crane Brinton has written for Europe at the
turn of the 19th century applied equally to
Guatemala a third of a century later: "The
ideas of the Enlightenment," wrote Brinton,
"whether they sprang from the head or the
heart, or from both working hard together,
were clearly corrosive of existing institu-
tions. . . . After the French Revolution had
come to shock the civilized world with its
violence, it became fashionable in conserva-
tive circles, and even in popular circles, to
blame the philosophers of the eighteenth
century for destroying the old regime with
their criticism and leaving nothing in its place.
Into this nothing came the passions and im-
perfections of the real human beings the
eighteenth-century philosophers had neglect-
ed in their preoccupation with the rights of
abstract man."
167
The Utopia envisioned by Galvez had
ignored the realities of Central America in
166. Lambert, Latin America, p.
121.
167. Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men, The Story
of
Western Thought, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1963), p. 312.
70 Social Revolution in Guatemala
the 1830s, and the peasants served as the rock be it called Liberal or Conservative
and
on which Liberal idealism was broken. De- destroyed what they believed threatened their
manding not rapid change but traditional se- way of life. In the process they brought
curity, responding to the instinct of survival about a real social revolution by ending the
and banding around a charismatic caudillo, dominance of the white classes over politics,
they lashed out against the establishment land, and society.