CRS Ukrain March 2014

Russian Political, Economic, and
Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol, Coordinator

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
March 31, 2014
Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33407
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Summary
Russia made uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but this limited progress was
reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000, according to many observers. During
this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) became dominated by government-
approved parties, gubernatorial elections were abolished, and the government consolidated
ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The Putin
government showed low regard for the rule of law and human rights in suppressing insurgency in
the North Caucasus, according to critics. Dmitry Medvedev, Putins longtime protg, was elected
president in 2008; President Medvedev immediately designated Putin as prime minister and
continued Putins policies. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin tandem directed military
operations against Georgia and recognized the independence of Georgias separatist South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, actions condemned by most of the international community. In March 2012, Putin
was (re)elected president by a wide margin. The day after Putins inauguration in May 2012, the
legislature confirmed Medvedev as prime minister. Since then, Putin has tightened restrictions on
freedom of assembly and other human rights.
Russias Economy
Russias economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas
exports, but the decline in oil and gas prices and other aspects of the global economic downturn
beginning in 2008 contributed to an 8% drop in gross domestic product in 2009. Since then, rising
world oil prices have bolstered the economy, although reduced energy exports, faltering
investment and consumer demand have contributed to slow economic growth in 2013. Other
factors that retard economic growth include unreformed healthcare and educational institutions
and high rates of crime, corruption, capital flight, and unemployment.
Russias Armed Forces
Russias armed forces now number less than 1 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in
1986. In the 1990s and much of the 2000s, troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline
suffered, and most arms industries became antiquated. Russias economic growth in recent years
has supported greatly increased defense spending to restructure the armed forces and improve
their quality. Mismanagement, changes in plans, corruption, manning issues, and economic
constraints have complicated this restructuring.
U.S.Russia Relations
After the Soviet Unions collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with
Moscow and supplied almost $19 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992 through FY2010 to
encourage democracy and market reforms and in particular to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the past, U.S.-Russia tensions on issues such as NATO
enlargement and proposed U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe were accompanied by some
cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism and nonproliferation. Russias 2008
conflict with Georgia, however, threatened such cooperation. The Obama Administration worked
to re-set relations with Russia and hailed such steps as the signing of a new Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty in April 2010; the approval of new sanctions against Iran by Russia and other
members of the U.N. Security Council in June 2010; the accession of Russia to the World Trade
Organization in August 2012; and the cooperation of Russia in Afghanistan as signifying the
successful re-set of bilateral relations.

Many observers argued that the Obama Administrations efforts to foster improved U.S.-Russia
relations faced challenges during election cycles and from legislative and other actions in both
countries in 2012-2013. In late 2012, Russia ousted the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) from the country and criticized the help that USAID had provided over
the years as unnecessary and intrusive. Russia also declined to renew a long-time bilateral accord
on nonproliferation assistance (although a new more limited agreement was concluded in June
2013). H.R. 6156 (Camp), authorizing permanent normal trade relations for Russia, was signed
into law on December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208). The bill includes provisions sanctioning those
responsible for the detention and death of lawyer Sergey Magnitsky and for other gross human
rights abuses in Russia. A Russian bill ending U.S. adoptions of Russian children appeared to be a
reaction to the Magnitsky Act. President Obama canceled a U.S.-Russia summit meeting planned
for early September 2013 on the grounds of lack of progress by Russia on bilateral cooperation,
and the Administration announced in December 2013 that lower-level delegations would attend
the opening and closing of the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, in February 2014.
U.S.-Russia relations sharply deteriorated following Russias deployment of military forces to

Ukraines Crimea region at the end of February 2014. President Obama canceled plans to attend a
G-8 (Group of eight industrialized nations) meeting to be hosted by Russia in Sochi in June 2014,
some bilateral trade talks were halted, the Defense Department suspended planned military-to-
military contacts, a visa ban and asset freeze were imposed, and the Administration and Congress
explored other sanctions against Russia. After pro-Russian Crimean elements staged a referendum
on March 16, 2014, that approved joining Russia, the Russian legislature and President Putin
quickly approved formal annexation. Russias military forces also massed on its borders with the
rest of Ukraine, threatening further incursions. As Russia moved to annex Crimea, President
Obama issued further executive orders sanctioning individuals and one Russian bank. A revised
G-7 meeting on March 24, 2014, announced that Russia was suspended from further proceedings.

Contents
Most Recent Developments: Russias Military Intervention and Annexation of Crimea ................ 1
Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the United States ......................................................... 3
Political and Human Rights Developments ..................................................................................... 3
Background................................................................................................................................ 3
Putins First Two Presidential Terms: Consolidating Presidential Power.................................. 5
The 2008-2012 Medvedev-Putin Tandem .............................................................................. 6
Putins September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency ......................... 6
The December 4, 2011, State Duma Election ..................................................................... 7
The March 2012 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath ................................................... 9
President Putin Redux ............................................................................................................... 9
Human Rights Problems and Issues ........................................................................................ 13
The Magnitsky Case .......................................................................................................... 13
The Case of Punk Rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich, and
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova ............................................................................................... 18
Other Moves against Oppositionists.................................................................................. 18
Raids against Nongovernmental Organizations Suspected to be Foreign Agents ......... 19
The Post-Sochi Olympics Restrictions on Human Rights................................................. 21
Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus .................................................................... 21
U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................... 26
Defense Reforms ..................................................................................................................... 29
U.S. Perspectives ............................................................................................................... 31
Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues ............................................................................................. 34
Russian Economic Conditions ................................................................................................. 34
Russias Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and PNTR for Russia .............. 35
Russian Energy Policy ............................................................................................................. 35
Foreign Policy................................................................................................................................ 38
Russia and the West ................................................................................................................. 38
Russia and the European Union ........................................................................................ 39
NATO-Russia Relations .................................................................................................... 41
Russia and the Soviet Successor States ................................................................................... 44
Ukraine-Russia Relations .................................................................................................. 46
Belarus-Russia Relations................................................................................................... 47
Moldova-Russia Relations ................................................................................................ 48
South Caucasus-Russia Relations ..................................................................................... 48
Central Asia-Russia Relations ........................................................................................... 49
U.S.-Russia Relations .................................................................................................................... 49
The Obama Administrations 2009-2014 Attempt to Improve Bilateral Relations ................. 50
Bilateral Relations during Obamas Second Term ............................................................ 53
Inadequate Progress in Our Bilateral Agenda ................................................................ 54
U.S.-Russia Relations after the Occupation and Annexation of Crimea ........................... 56
Arms Control Issues ................................................................................................................ 60
Cooperative Threat Reduction........................................................................................... 60
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ....................................................................... 61
Russia and Missile Defense............................................................................................... 62
U.S.-Russia Economic Ties ..................................................................................................... 74

U.S. Assistance to Russia ........................................................................................................ 75

The Ouster of the U.S. Agency for International Development ........................................ 76
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 77
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1996-2013 ............................................................ 82
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY1999 .............. 82
Table 3. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY2000-FY2010,
and Totals, FY1992-FY2010 ...................................................................................................... 83
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 84
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 84

Most Recent Developments: Russias Military

Intervention and Annexation of Crimea1
On March 16, the Crimean authorities held a referendum on Crimeas annexation to Russia.
Crimeas union with Russia was allegedly approved by 96.77% of those voting, with a turnout of
83.1%. Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and other countries denounced the
referendum as illegal and not held in a free or fair manner. President Putin signed a treaty with
Crimean leaders on March 18 formally incorporating Crimea into Russia. This move was also
denounced by Ukraine, the United States, the EU and other countries as a blatant violation of
Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity and a violation of international law.
Until March 18, the Russian takeover of Crimea had been achieved with no bloodshed with the
Ukrainian government forces on the peninsula, even in cases where Russian troops forcibly
seized Ukrainian installations. However, on that day one Ukrainian soldier was killed when
Russian forces stormed a Ukrainian base in Simferopol. On March 24, Ukraine announced that it
would withdraw its remaining military personnel from Crimea, due to threats against them and
their families made by Russian forces. On March 28, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu
said that military installations in Crimea were under its control and that all Ukrainian troops that
remained loyal to Ukraine had left the peninsula.
On March 17, the Administration announced visa bans and asset freezes against several senior
figures from Russia and the secessionist Crimean government. On March 16 and 20, after Russia
moved to annex Crimea, the Administration issued two additional Executive Orders expanding
the scope of sanctions. They permit the Administration to freeze the assets of persons working in
key areas of the Russian economy, including financial services, energy, metals and mining,
engineering, and defense and related materiel (see also below, U.S.-Russia Relations after the
Occupation and Annexation of Crimea).
On March 18, 2014, President Putin signed a treaty with Crimea annexing the region, and that
same day presented it to the Russian Federal Assembly (legislature) for ratification, along with a
bill changing the constitution to add Crimea and Sevastopol as federal units of Russia. A speech
he delivered was viewed by many observers as reprising themes he and other officials made over
the last few weeks of the crisis, and as indicative of his thinking and grievances. He emphasized
the long history of Russian domination over Ukraine, but as depicted in Soviet historiography on
nationality issues, viewed the relationship as beneficial to both Russians and Ukrainians. He did
not distinguish between Ukrainian and Russian national identity, asserting that both nations were
one people, we cannot live without each other. He stressed that Crimea has always been an
inseparable part of Russia. He stated that in Ukraine in early 2014, nationalists, neo-Nazis, and
anti-Semites ... resorted to terror, murder, and riots, leading to a coup. He asserted that these
ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitlers accomplice during World War II, were Russo-phobes
aiming to repress Russian-speakers in Crimea. Russia created conditions for Crimeans to freely
vote on their future for the first time in history, he claimed. He asserted that the Crimean region of
Ukraine had the same right as Ukraine itself took in 1991 to self-determination, and also averred
that since Kosovo Albanians were encouraged by the United States and the West to claim
independence, then Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars could do the same.
1
For background and details, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
Congressional Research Service 1

In a second part of his speech, President Putin outlined what he viewed as a long history of U.S.
and Western abuses against Russia. He asserted that what he viewed as the orchestration of a coup
in Ukraine had finally crossed the line, that Russia had been backed into a corner from which it
could not retreat, and that an overwound spring would snap back hard. Ticking off grievances,
he depicted the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union as unstable, with the United States
sweeping aside international law and ruling by the gun, believing in its own exceptionalism to
unilaterally decide the destiny of the world. The United States acts as it pleases, he asserted,
either forcing international organizations to approve its actions or ignoring them, as it did in
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He also appeared to identify the United States as orchestrating
color revolutions in other countries to impose standards that violate the way of life, traditions,
and culture of the peoples of those countries, leading to chaos and violence, and the Arab
Winter. Such color revolutions have been aimed at Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian
integration, he asserted. He claimed that Russia had to act to prevent NATO from taking over
Crimea and threatening southern Russia. He termed the protection of Russian-speakers a priority
of all Russians and hence a foundation principle of foreign policy. He depicted those in Russia
who might object to the annexation as national traitors manipulated by the West, and argued
that 95% of Russian citizens and the great majority of Crimeans support the annexation of the
region.2
On March 20, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) almost unanimously approved the
annexation treaty and the constitutional changes. The next day, the Federation Council (upper
legislative chamber) unanimously gave its approval. Putin signed the bill into law and the federal
changes became part of the constitution. He immediately appointed a presidential representative
to administer the new federal district.
On March 27, 2014, the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution by the vote of 100-11,
with 58 abstentions, affirming Ukraines territorial integrity and terming the March 16
referendum in Crimea illegitimate and not a basis for a change in the status of the region. Russias
U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin argued that Russia could not ignore the right of Crimeans to
self-determination and that Crimea had been re-unified with Russia. Armenia and Belarus
joined Russia in voting against the resolution, while Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova voted for
it. Among other Soviet successor states that attended the session, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
abstained. China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also abstained. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan did not participate in the vote.3
In late March 2014, President Obama expressed concern about the build-up of Russian forces on
Ukrainians borders and called for their pullback. Press reports citing unnamed U.S. intelligence
officials put their number at about 30,000, although the Secretary of Ukraines National Security
and Defense Council has estimated them at about 100,000.
2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin Addressed State Duma deputies, Federation
Council Members, Heads of Russian Regions and Civil Society Representatives in the Kremlin, March 18, 2014.
3
U.N. General Assembly, Department of Public Information, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States
Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, GA/11493, March 27, 2014; Louis Charbonneau, Russia
Threatened Countries Ahead of U.N. Vote on UkraineEnvoys, Reuters, March 28, 2014.

Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the

United States
Although Russia may not be as central to U.S. interests as was the Soviet Union, engagement
between the two is essential in many areas. Russia remains a nuclear superpower. It still has a
major impact on U.S. national security interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Russia has
an important role in the future of arms control, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and the fight against terrorism. U.S.-Russia relations have faced severe
challenges posed by Russian foreign behavior, including in Georgia in August 2008 and Ukraine
in February-March 2014.
Russia is a potentially important trading partner. Russia is the only country in the world with a
greater range and scope of natural resources than the United States, including oil and gas
reserves. It is the worlds second-largest producer and exporter of oil (after Saudi Arabia) and the
worlds largest exporter of natural gas. It has a large, relatively well-educated labor force and
scientific establishment. Also, many of Russias needsfood and food processing, oil and gas
extraction technology, computers, communications, transportation, and investment capitalare in
areas in which the United States is highly competitive, although bilateral trade remains relatively
low.4
Political and Human Rights Developments
Background
Russia is a multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a complex federal structure inherited
from the Soviet period that includes regions, republics, territories, and other subunits. During
Boris Yeltsins presidency, many of the republics and regions won greater autonomy. Only the
Chechen Republic, however, tried to assert complete independence. President Putin reversed this
trend and rebuilt the strength of the central government vis--vis the regions. In coming decades,
the percentage of ethnic Russians is expected to decline because of relatively greater birthrates
among non-Russian groups and in-migration by non-Russians. In many of Russias ethnic-based
republics and autonomous regions, ethnic Russians are becoming a declining share of the
population, resulting in the titular nationalities becoming the majority populations. Implications
may include changes in domestic and foreign policies under the influence of previously
marginalized ethnic groups, including the revitalization of Yeltsin-era moves toward federal
devolution. Alternatively, an authoritarian Russian central government that carries out chauvinist
policies could contribute to rising ethnic conflict and even separatism.
4
According to the National Intelligence Council, Russia will face growing domestic and international challenges over
the next two decades. It will need to diversify and modernize its economy, but the percentage of its working-age
population will decline substantially. Under various scenarios, its economy will remain very small compared to the
U.S. economy. Social tensions may increase as the percentage of Muslims increases in the population to about 19%.
Putins legacy of mistrust toward the West could stifle the countrys integration into the world economy and
cooperation on global issues, and increasing militarism could pose threats to other Soviet successor states. See Global
Trends 2030: Alternative Futures, December 2012.

The Russian Constitution combines

elements of the U.S., French, and Russia: Basic Facts
German systems, but with an even Area and Population: Land area is 6.6 million sq. mi., about
stronger presidency. Among its more 1.8 times the size of the United States. The population is 142.47
distinctive features are the ease with million (CIA, The World Factbook, mid-2014 est.). Administrative
subdivisions include 46 regions, 22 republics, 9 territories, and
which the president can dissolve the 8 others (Crimea Republic and Sevastopol as a federal city were
legislature and call for new elections added on March 20, 2014..
and the obstacles preventing the
Ethnicity: Russian 77.7%; Tatar 3.7%; Ukrainian 1.4%; Bashkir
legislature from dismissing the 1.1%; Chuvash 1.1%; Chechen 1.0%; other 14% (2010 estimate).
government in a vote of no confidence.
The president, with the legislatures Gross Domestic Product: $2.553 trillion; per capita GDP is
about $18,100 (World Factbook, 2013 est., purchasing power
approval, appoints a prime minister, parity).
who heads the government. The
Political Leaders: President: Vladimir Putin; Prime Minister:
president and prime minister appoint Dmitry Medvedev; Speaker of the State Duma: Sergey
government ministers and other Naryshkin; Speaker of the Federation Council: Valentina
officials. The prime minister and Matviyenko; Foreign Minister: Sergey Lavrov; Defense Minister:
government are accountable to the Gen. Sergey Shoygu.
president rather than the legislature. Biography: Putin, born in 1952, received a law degree in 1975
from Leningrad State University (LSU) and a candidates degree
The bicameral legislature is called the in economics in 1997 from the St. Petersburg Mining Institute. In
Federal Assembly. The State Duma, the 1975, he joined the Committee for State Security (KGB), and
was stationed in East Germany from 1985 to 1990. In 1990-
more powerful chamber, has 450 seats. 1991, he worked at LSU and the Leningrad city council. He
In July 2005, a law was passed that all resigned from the KGB in 1991. From 1991-1996 he worked
450 Duma seats would be filled by with St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and became first
means of party list elections, with a 7% deputy mayor. Starting in 1996, he worked in Moscow on
threshold for party representation. The property management, and then on federal relations under
then-President Boris Yeltsin. In 1998-1999, he was chief of the
upper chamber, the Federation Council, Federal Security Service (a successor agency of the KGB). In
has 166 seats, two from each of the August 1999, he was confirmed as prime minister, and became
current 83 regions and republics of the acting president on December 31, 1999. He won election as
Russian Federation. These latter president in 2000 and was reelected in 2004. From 2008-2012
he was prime minister; he was reelected president in 2012.
deputies are not directly elected (see
below, President Putin Redux).
In November 2008, constitutional amendments extended the presidential term to six years and the
term of State Duma (lower legislative chamber) deputies from four to five years, and these
provisions came into force with the most recent Duma election in December 2011 and the most
recent presidential election in March 2012.
The judiciary is the least developed of the three branches. Some of the Soviet-era structure and
practices are still in place, with the courts widely perceived to remain subject to political
manipulation and control. Criminal code reform was completed in 2001. Trial by jury was
planned to expand to cover most cases, but instead has been restricted following instances where
state prosecutors lost high-profile cases. Jury tampering by prosecutors and defendants has been a
persistent problem. The Supreme Court is the highest appellate body. The Constitutional Court
rules on the legality and constitutionality of governmental acts and on disputes between branches
of government or federative entities. A Supreme Arbitration Court handles commercial disputes.
In December 2013, Putin proposed to amend the constitution to abolish the Arbitration Court,
incorporating its judges into the Supreme Court. Some observers viewed the move as a
government attempt to increase control over what these observers consider the most independent
court.

Putins First Two Presidential Terms:

Consolidating Presidential Power
Former President Boris Yeltsins surprise resignation in December 1999 was a gambit to permit
then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to become acting president, in line with the constitution, and
to situate him for election as president in March 2000. Putins electoral prospects were enhanced
by his depiction in state-owned television and other mass media as a youthful, sober, and plain-
talking leader; and by his decisive launch of military action against the breakaway Chechnya
region (see his biography above, Russia: Basic Facts).
Putins priorities as president were strengthening the central government and restoring Russias
status as a great power. His government took nearly total control of nation-wide broadcast media,
shutting down or effectively nationalizing independent television and radio stations. In 2006, the
Russian government forced most Russian radio stations to stop broadcasting programs prepared
by the U.S.-funded Voice of America and Radio Liberty. Journalists critical of the government
have been imprisoned, attacked, and in some cases, killed with impunity.
A defining political and economic event of the Putin era was the October 2003 arrest of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos, then the worlds fourth-largest oil company. Khodorkovskys
arrest was triggered by his criticism of some of Putins actions, his financing of political parties
that had launched substantial efforts in the Duma to oppose Putins policies, and his hints that he
might enter politics in the future. Khodorkovskys arrest was seen by many as politically
motivated, aimed at eliminating a political enemy and making an example of him to other Russian
businessmen. In May 2005, Khodorkovsky was found guilty on multiple criminal charges of tax
evasion and fraud and sentenced to eight years in prison. Yukos was broken up and its principal
assets sold off to satisfy alleged tax debts. Since then, the government has renationalized or
otherwise brought under its control a number of other large enterprises that it views as strategic
assets, and installed senior government officials to head these enterprises. This phenomenon led
some observers to conclude that those who rule Russia, own Russia,5
In December 2010, Khodorkovsky was found guilty in a new trial on charges of embezzlement,
theft, and money-laundering and sentenced to several additional years in prison. In February
2011, an aide to the trial judge alleged that the conviction was a case of telephone justice,
where the verdict had been dictated to the court by higher authorities. In late May 2011, the
Russian Supreme Court upheld the sentence on appeal.6 However, in December 2012, the
Moscow City Court reduced the sentence slightly. In August 2013, the Supreme Court again
upheld the sentence, but reduced it by two months, so that Khodorkovskys sentence would end in
August 2014. On December 19, 2013, President Putin commuted Khodorkovskys sentence,
ostensibly on humanitarian grounds, and he was released.
5
According to some measures, Russia has by far the greatest income inequality among industrialized countries.
6
S.Res. 189 (111th Congress), introduced by Senator Roger Wicker on June 18, 2009, and a similar bill, H.Res. 588
(111th Congress), introduced by Representative James McGovern on June 26, 2009, expressed the sense of the chamber
that the prosecution of Khodorkovsky was politically motivated, called for the new charges against him to be dropped,
and urged that he be paroled as a sign that Russia was moving toward upholding democratic principles and human
rights. S.Res. 65 (112th Congress), introduced by Senator Wicker on February 17, 2011, expressed the sense of the
Senate that the conviction of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev constituted a politically motivated case of selective arrest and
prosecution and that it should be overturned. For Congressional comments after Khodorkovsky received a second
sentence, see Senator Wicker, Congressional Record, January 5, 2011, p. S54; Representative David Dreier,
Congressional Record, January 19, 2011, p. H329.

Another pivotal event was the September 2004 terrorist attack on a primary school in the town of
Beslan, North Ossetia, that resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. President Putin seized the
opportunity provided by the crisis to launch a number of political changes he claimed were
essential to quash terrorism. In actuality, the changes marked the consolidation of his centralized
control over the political system and the vitiation of fragile democratic reforms of the 1980s and
1990s, according to many observers. The changes included abolishing the popular election of
regional governors and republic heads (replacing such elections with the appointment of
presidential nominees that were confirmed by regional legislatures) and mandating that all Duma
Deputies be elected on the basis of national party lists. The first measure made governors and
republic heads wholly dependent on, and subservient to, the federal president. The second
measure eliminated independent deputies, further strengthening the pro-presidential parties that
already held a majority of Duma seats. In early 2006, President Putin signed a new law regulating
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which Kremlin critics charged gave the government
leverage to shut down NGOs that it viewed as politically troublesome.
The 2008-2012 Medvedev-Putin Tandem

Almost immediately after the 2007 Duma electionin which the United Russia Party, headed by
Putin, won more than two-thirds of the seatsPutin announced that his protg Dmitry
Medvedev was his choice for president. Medvedev announced that, if elected, he would ask Putin
to serve as prime minister. This arrangement was meant to ensure political continuity for Putin
and those around him. The Putin regime manipulated election laws and regulations to block
inconvenient candidates from running in the March 2008 presidential election, according to
many observers. Medvedev garnered 70% of the vote against three candidates. As with the Duma
election, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to submit to
restrictions demanded by Moscow and did not send election monitors.7
Many observers hoped that President Medvedev would be more democratic than former President
Putin. Despite some seemingly liberal statements and decisions by President Medvedev, the main
trend was a continuation of the political system honed by Putin, according to most observers. In
late 2008, President Medvedev proposed a number of political changes that were subsequently
enacted or otherwise put into place. Observers regarded a few of the changes as progressive and
most of the others as regressive. These included constitutional changes extending the presidential
term to six years and State Duma deputies terms to five years (as mentioned above), requiring
annual government reports to the State Duma, permitting regional authorities to dismiss mayors,
reducing the number of signatures for a party to participate in elections, reducing the number of
members necessary in order for parties to register, abolishing the payment of a bond in lieu of
signatures for participation in elections, and giving small political parties more rights. In October
2011, President Medvedev signed legislation to reduce the voting hurdle for party representation
in the State Duma elected in 2016 from 7% to 5% (Putin had raised the limit from 5% to 7% in
2005). The flip-flop in the percentage was proclaimed to mark advancing democratization.
Putins September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency

In late September 2011, at the annual convention of the ruling United Russia Party, then-Prime
Minister Putin announced that he would run in the March 2012 presidential election. Then-
7
RFE/RL, Newsline, February 5, 20, 2008.

President Medvedev in turn announced that he would not run for reelection, and endorsed Putins
candidacy. Putin stated that he intended to nominate Medvedev as his prime minister, if elected.
The two leaders claimed that they had agreed in late 2007when they decided that Medvedev
would assume the presidencythat Putin could decide to reassume it in 2012. Russian analyst
Pavel Baev stated that the legitimacy of Putins return to the presidency is seriously
compromised because the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution is clearly violated (at issue is
one word in the constitution, which specifies that presidents are limited to two successive terms in
office).8
Some critics have warned that Putin might well feel free to fill out another two terms as president
until the year 2024, making his term in office longer than that of former General Secretary of the
Soviet Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev, who ruled for 18 years and who is remembered for his
suppression of dissidence at home and in Eastern Europe and for the political and economic era
of stagnation during the final years of his rule.
The December 4, 2011, State Duma Election

The stage would be set for the upcoming presidential election by a December 2011 State Duma
election. As this election neared, Russian officials became increasingly concerned that the ruling
United Russia Party, which had held most of the seats in the outgoing Duma, was swiftly losing
popular support. According to some observers, Russian authorities not only used their positions to
campaign for the party but also planned ballot-box stuffing and other illicit means to retain a
majority of seats for the ruling party. Russian authorities also moved against one prominent
Russian nongovernmental monitoring group, Golos (Voice), to discourage its coverage of the
election. According to OSCE observers of the election, the close ties between the Russian
government and the ruling party, the refusal to register political parties, the pro-government bias
of the electoral commissions and most media, and ballot-box stuffing and other government
manipulation of the vote marked the election as not free and fair.9
Protests after the State Duma Election

On December 4-5, rallies were held in Moscow and St. Petersburg to protest against what was
viewed as a flawed election, leading to hundreds of detentions by police. On December 5, about
5,000 protesters or more held an authorized rally in central Moscow. On December 10, large
demonstrations under the slogan For Fair Elections (a movement with this name was formed by
various political groups) were held in Moscow and dozens of other cities. At the Moscow rally,
deemed by some observers as the largest in many years, Boris Nemtsov, the co-head of the
unregistered opposition Party of Peoples Freedom, presented a list of demands that included the
release of those detained for protesting and other political prisoners, the registration of
8
Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 3, 2011.
9
OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Russian Federation Elections to the State
Duma, 4 December 2011, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, January 12, 2012. Golos has
estimated that just by padding the voting rolls, electoral officials delivered 15 million extra votes to United Russia,
nearly one-half of its vote total (by this assessment, United Russia only received some 25% of the vote, even after
authorities used various means to persuade or coerce individuals to vote for the party). Golos, Domestic Monitoring of
Elections to the 6th State Duma of the Federal Assembly, Russian Federation, 4 December 2011: Final Report, January
27, 2012. In mid-March 2013, a Russian mathematician released a report that argued that the Communist Party actually
had won the most seats in the election.

previously banned parties, and new Duma elections. Some protesters shouted Russia without
Putin. Local authorities had approved the demonstration and police displayed restraint. Another
large demonstration sponsored by the For Fair Elections group occurred in Moscow on
December 24, 2011.
According to one Russian analyst, although the authorities were alarmed by the December
opposition protests, they quickly devised countermeasures, including the rallying of state workers
and patriots to hold counter-demonstrations.10
On February 4, 2012, the For Fair Elections group sponsored peaceful protests in Moscow and
other cities. Turnout in Moscow was estimated at 38,000 by police but up to 160,000 by the
organizers. The protesters called for disqualified liberal candidate Grigory Yavlinsky (see below)
to be permitted to run in the presidential election, the release of political prisoners such as
Khodorkovsky, and legal reforms leading to new legislative and presidential elections. In
Moscow, a counter-demonstration termed Anti-Orange Protest (referring to demonstrations in
Ukraine in late 2004 that led to a democratic election) was organized by pro-Kremlin parties and
groups, including the Patriots of Russia Party and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozins
ultranationalist Congress of Russian Communities group. Moscow police claimed that 138,000-
150,000 individuals joined this protest. The counter-protesters reportedly accused the For Fair
Election demonstrators as wishing for the destruction of Russia and alleged that the United
States was fomenting regime change in Russia.
Seemingly as a reaction to the December 2011 protests, then-President Medvedev proposed

several democratic reforms. Many observers have argued that these reforms subsequently were
watered down, although some progressive measures eventually were enacted. Among the
proposals:
Amendments to the law on political parties were signed into law on April 3,
2012, permitting the registration of new parties after they submit 500 signatures
from members (a reduction from the previous requirement of 40,000 signatures).
However, the retention of strict reporting requirements on party activities and
finances and the ban on electoral blocs were viewed by some observers as less
progressive, the latter because it would prevent small parties from cooperating in
elections. By the end of 2013, the number of registered parties had increased
from seven to 63 eligible to participate in elections.
A law signed on May 2, 2012, eliminated the need for political parties not
represented in the Duma to gather signatures in order to participate in Duma
elections. The law also reduced the number of signatures required for these
parties to field presidential candidates and the number required for self-
nominated candidates. These changes were viewed by many observers as
progressive.
A law reestablishing gubernatorial elections was signed into law on May 2, 2012.
It provides for a hybrid direct and indirect electoral procedure, whereby the
president or municipal legislators may nominate candidates. The president also
has the power to remove governors. At the same time, the law places new
conditions on the election of mayors of regional capitals. The provisions on
10
CEDR, May 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-6001.

gubernatorial elections were considered only semi-progressive by many

observers (see below).
The March 2012 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath

Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Besides Putin,
three of the other four candidatesCommunist Party head Gennady Zyuganov, Liberal
Democratic Party head Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and A Just Russia Party head Sergey Mironov
were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. The remaining candidate, businessman
Mikhail Prokhorov, was self-nominated and was required to gather 2 million signatures to
register. Opposition Yabloko Party head Grigory Yavlinsky was disqualified by the Central
Electoral Commission (CEC) on the grounds that over 5% of the signatures he gathered were
invalid. Many critics argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona
fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates running against Putin, all but
Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly.
According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat
less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their final report,
OSCE monitors concluded that the election was well organized, but that there were several
problems. Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local
officials and resources to garner support for him. The OSCE monitors witnessed irregularities in
vote-counting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-
level territorial electoral commissions.11
The May 6, 2012, Bolotnaya Square Protest

The protests after Putins election by those who viewed the electoral process as tainted appeared
smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Opposition politicians Alexey Navalny,
Boris Nemtsov, and Sergey Udaltsov were among the organizers of an approved demonstration
on May 6, 2012, in Moscow. Turnout was approved for 5,000 participants, but police reported
that about 8,000 turned out. Other observers estimated that over 20,000 turned out. Allegedly,
regional authorities had been ordered to prevent dissidents from traveling to Moscow, and
warnings appeared that military enlistment offices would issue conscription summonses to young
male protesters. The demonstrators marched down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street to a destination
point at Bolotnaya Square. Police blocked the square, creating chaos that eventually triggered
large-scale violence. About 100 police and protesters reportedly were injured, and hundreds were
detained, among them Navalny, Nemtsov, and Udaltsov. Most later were released, but 18 were
held on serious charges of fomenting violence. The Investigative Committee, a presidential body,
developed cases against these and others alleged involved in the May 6 protests (for further
developments, see below, Other Moves against Oppositionists).
President Putin Redux

For Putins presidential inauguration on May 7, 2012, police and security personnel encircled a
large swath of the downtown and cleared it of humans and cars along the route that the motorcade
11
OSCE, ODIHR, Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 4 March 2012, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission: Final Report, May 11, 2012.

would take from Putins former prime ministerial office to the Kremlin for the swearing-in
ceremony. These precautions supposedly were taken in the wake of the Bolotnaya Square protest
the previous day. Because of the heavy security, the public was forced to view the inauguration
solely via television, watching as the motorcade traversed a surreal, after humans Moscow.
Putin issued a number of decrees immediately after taking the oath of office, which he explained
were aimed at implementing his campaign pledges. He ordered that healthcare and education
improvements be formulated, that financial aid be provided for families with multiple children,
that pay for government workers be increased, and that housing and utility services be improved.
He ordered that reforms should result in increased birth rates and decreased death rates, that a
new foreign policy concept (strategy document) be formulated, and that defense spending be
increased.
After his election, Putin stepped down as the leader of the United Russia Party, claiming that the
president should be nonpartisan (raising the question of why then-President Medvedev headed the
partys Duma list of candidates in late 2011). At a United Russia Party congress in late May 2012,
Putin recommended Medvedev for the chairmanship, stating that in other democracies, the head
of government oversees the ruling partys legislative efforts.
Several repressive laws were passed after Putin returned to the presidency that appeared to limit
or reverse the initiatives carried out during Medvedevs presidency that were viewed as
supporting democratization and human rights to some degree.12
In June 2012, Putin approved a law increasing the fine for individuals convicted
for violating the public order to over $9,000 and for organizers of unapproved
demonstrations to $30,500. Most observers viewed the law as a further threat to
freedom of assembly in Russia.
In July 2012, Putin approved a law requiring NGOs that receive foreign grants to
register as foreign agents. The law entered force on November 20, 2012.
Virtually all NGOs refused to register under the new law, and faced the threat of
closure. In response to the statements by some groups that they would not
register, the legislature enacted amendments to the law in October 2012 imposing
fines of up to $16,000 on NGOs that failed to register. Reportedly, nearly 7,000
NGOs were inspected in 2012 under the new law.
In late July 2012, Putin approved a law partly restoring a law changed in 2011
that had de-criminalized defamation. Under the new law, a civil penalty of up to
$155,000 could be levied. The old law, which had classified defamation as a
felony, had led to hundreds of convictions each year. Critics viewed the new law
as reinstituting means to suppress media reporting on, or citizens complaints
about, official malfeasance.
In late July 2012, Putin approved a law protecting children from Internet
content deemed harmful, including child pornography and advocacy of drug use,
as well as materials that incite racial, ethnic, or religious hatred. A blacklist of
Internet sites was established. Observers have raised concerns about the
ambiguity of the law and about the danger that whole websites, rather than
individual webpages, might be blocked.
12
For one assessment of the vitiation of the Medvedev reforms, see CEDR, January 15, 2013, Doc. No. CEP-008011.

In early November 2012, Putin signed a law broadening the definition of treason
to include divulging a state secret or providing consulting or other work to a
foreign state or international organization that later is deemed to violate Russian
security interests. The office of the High Representative of the European Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement raising concerns about
the ambiguous and broad scope of the legislation, and warned that it and other
recent laws would limit the space for civil society development, and increase the
scope for intimidation.13
In early April 2013, Putin signed a law permitting regions/republics to rescind
direct gubernatorial elections. The law permits parties represented in
regional/republic legislatures to propose a list of candidates, in consultation with
the president, which is then winnowed by the president to three candidates. The
legislature then selects one of these candidates as governor. The Russian
government justified the legislation by claiming that officials in ethnically
diverse North Caucasian republics were concerned that direct elections might
violate the rights of minority ethnic groups (perhaps alluding to long-time
arrangements of allocating posts among several ethnic groups) and contribute to
violence.14 Critics charged that the change was enacted because the United
Russia Party feared any degree of open electoral competition. Another possible
reason was that President Putin aimed to appoint new and more pliable governors
in the region in the run-up to the 2014 Olympics in Sochi. While Dagestan,
Ingushetia, and North Ossetia have opted out of direct elections of their heads, in
December 2013, Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential Plenipotentiary
Representative in the North Caucasus Federal District, called for all North
Caucasus republics to eschew such direct elections.
At the end of June 2013, Putin signed a law amending a law on the protection of
children from harmful information by adding fines for individuals and
organizations that propagandize non-traditional sexual relations, which Russian
policy makers said referred to homosexuality. The law prohibits propaganda
presenting the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relations, a distorted
picture of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual
relations, or [information] causing interest in such relationships.... The law also
calls for arresting and deporting foreigners who engage in such information,
raising concerns that LGBT individuals and organizations may be banned from
attending or participating or ousted during the upcoming 2014 Sochi Olympics.
On July 31, 2013, a State Department spokesperson called on Russia to protect
the human rights of all people attending or participating in the Olympic Games.
In early August 2013, a congressional letter was sent to Secretary Kerry calling
for him to communicate with Congress on efforts the United States will take to
ensure the rights of LGBT Americans traveling to the Olympic Games. In
November 2013, eleven Senators sent a letter to the International Olympics
Committee raising concerns that the law violates the Olympic Charter. A Russian
Foreign Ministry official expressed bewilderment at the letter, asserted that the
law is not aimed at discriminating against LGBT persons, and directed that those
13
Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative on the New Law on Treason in Russia, Press Release, Council
of the European Union, October 25, 2012.
14
RIA Novosti, April 2, 2013.

advocating LGBT rights attend to affairs in their own countries. The official also
stated that all sportsmen and guests would be welcome to the Games, as long as
they respected Russias laws.15
At the end of June 2013, President Putin signed a law providing for up to three
years in prison for individuals who commit acts offending the sensibilities of
religious practitioners in Russia.
In early July 2013, President Putin signed a law banning domestic and foreign
adoptions by same-sex couples in order to prevent spiritual suffering by
children.
In addition to these laws, President Putin submitted draft legislation to the Duma in late June
2012 to change the procedure for filling seats in the Federation Council.16 He called for regional
voters to have a role in democratically electing one of the two members of the Federation
Council (often termed senators), proposing that a candidate running in a gubernatorial election
select three possible senators who would appear on the ballot with him. After winning, the
governor would designate one of the candidates as the regional senator. The other regional
member of the Federation Council would be chosen by the regional legislature, he proposed. The
bill was approved by both chambers of the Federal Assembly in November and entered into force
on January 1, 2013. Critics charged that the process was at best an indirect means of choosing
senators. As mentioned above, the April 2013 law permitting regions/republics to rescind direct
gubernatorial elections also contained new provisions for an indirectly chosen governor to
propose three local or Duma deputies as possible members of the Federation Council, to be voted
on by the regional legislature.
Several local elections were held on October 14, 2012, including five gubernatorial elections, the
first held since they were banned in 2004. Golos reported that these elections gave no evidence of
improvements in the registration of candidates, campaigning, and voting procedures since
problematic Duma and presidential elections a few months previously. Observers also claimed
that the selection of gubernatorial candidates had been substantially controlled by the ruling
United Russia party, which facilitated the reelection of the incumbent governors.17
In mid-June 2013, Putin assumed the leadership of the Popular Front, in its new incarnation as a
civic group, similar to those headed by Central Asian presidents. The organization is composed of
some officials and members of the United Russia Party and pro-Putin parties and NGOs, as well
as individuals. In his speech at the Popular Front Congress, Putin stated that the organization
aimed to provide Russians with the opportunity to create a Great Russia, which would be a
center for culture and integration, a magnet to which other countries and other peoples are
attracted. This future Russia would be modern but would uphold traditional values, he stated.
15
Senator Chris Murphy, Press Release: Murphy, Boxer, Merkley and Colleagues Urge International Olympic
Committee to Reconsider Ruling on Russian Anti-LGBT Law, November 8, 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, Comment by Russian Foreign Ministry Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule
of Law K.K. Dolgov in Connection With a Letter Sent by Some U.S. Senators to the International Olympics Committee,
November 15, 2013.
16
Under current practice, where each region or republic has two senators, one senator is selected by the governor (and
confirmed by the regional/republic legislature), and the other is selected by the regional/republic legislature.
17
Interfax, October 15, 2012.

According to some speculation, the Popular Front may later become a new political party to
supplant the United Russia Party, which is waning in popular appeal.18
Local elections were held in Russia on September 8, 2013. Some regions held direct gubernatorial
elections, but the requirement that prospective candidates gather signatures from municipal
deputies gave the United Russia Party control over the process, according to most observers. (In
Ingushetia and Dagestan, however, candidates for president of the republic were nominated by
parties and approved by the president, after which the regional legislative assemblies selected the
republic head.) Civil Platform Party head Mikhail Prokhorov was among those calling for the
abolition of the municipal filter, since it discredits the very idea of political reform.... The
further use of the filter to eliminate ... political opponents could backfire ... and society will view
elections where it is used as illegitimate.19 Although the activities of Golos were suspended by
the Justice Ministry in late June 2013 for refusing to register as a foreign agent, Golos registered
as a civic organization (using the Popular Fronts registration as a model) under the same name in
mid-July 2013. It monitored the September 2013 elections in 22 cities, regions, and republics, and
concluded that electoral processes were increasingly problematic, although more competitive
races with greater public scrutiny in Moscow and Yekaterinburg ensured fairer elections in those
cities. Some observers pointed to wins by candidates not affiliated with United Russia in
Yekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk, and Aleksey Navalnys strong showing in Moscow, as
indicating that the ruling party was slipping in popularity in large cities.
Human Rights Problems and Issues
The Magnitsky Case

The death of Sergey Magnitskya lawyer for the Hermitage Fund, a private investment firmin
November 2009 after being detained for 11 months has been a highly visible example of the
failure of the rule of law in Russia, according to many observers. He had been detained on tax
evasion charges after he alleged that police and other officials had illicitly raided Hermitage
assets. In July 2011, a group of human rights advisors to the president issued a report providing
evidence that Magnitskys arrest was unlawful, that he had been beaten and possibly tortured
while in detention (including just before his death), and that prison officials and possibly higher-
level officials had ordered doctors not to treat him. The Russian Prosecutor-Generals Office and
Interior Ministry rejected the findings. Medvedev ordered an official investigation into
Magnitskys death, and in September 2011 these investigators narrowly concluded that his death
was due to the negligence of two prison doctors. In late November 2011, Hermitage Capital
released a report giving details of how government officials allegedly ordered that Magnitsky be
beaten and blocked medical treatment, resulting in his death. A prison doctor and the deputy head
of the prison medical service were charged in mid-2011, but the case against the doctor was
dropped in April 2012 on the grounds that the time limit for filing charges had expired. On
December 20, 2012, President Putin asserted that Magnitsky had not died of torture but of a heart
attack, and that the question was whether Magnitsky was given timely aid. A few days later, the
prison medical official was acquitted on the grounds that the death was accidental and no
negligence was involved.
18
CEDR, June 12, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-49688694; June 13, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-40595330.
19
CEDR, August 3, 2013, Doc. No. IML- 57494110.

In August 2011, the Constitutional Court upheld the resumption of criminal proceedings against
the dead man, ostensibly on the grounds that Russian law allows for such a case to proceed at the
request of the family. The family denied that it formally requested the resumption of the trial. In
February 2012, the Moscow Helsinki Committee, a human rights NGO, condemned the ongoing
trial of a dead man and persecution of the family as a new alarming symptom of complete
degradation of Russian justice.20 The unprecedented trial of the dead man was conducted and he
was found guilty of tax evasion on July 11, 2013. It was reported in late 2013 that the judge in the
case has been promoted.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 4405 (McGovern), introduced on April 19, 2012; S. 1039 (Cardin),
introduced on May 19, 2011; and S. 3406 (Baucus), introduced on July 19, 2012, imposed visa
and financial sanctions on persons responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei
Magnitsky, or for the conspiracy to defraud the Russian Federation of taxes on corporate profits
through fraudulent transactions and lawsuits against Hermitage. In addition, the bills imposed
global sanctions on persons responsible for other gross violations of human rights. H.R. 4405 was
ordered to be reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee on June 7, 2012. One amendment to the
bill changed the global applicability of some sanctions to specify that they pertain to Russia. S.
1039 was ordered to be reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as amended, on July
23, 2012. S. 3406 was ordered to be reported by the Senate Finance Committee on July 19, 2012.
Sections 304-307 of S. 3406 contain language similar to S. 1039, as reported, along with
language authorizing the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations
treatment) to Russia and Moldova.
On November 13, 2012, H.Res. 808 was reported to the House by the Rules Committee,
providing an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 6156 (Camp), containing language
authorizing normal trade relations treatment along with provisions similar to H.R. 4405 as
reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee. H.R. 6156, retitled the Russia and Moldova Jackson-
Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, was approved by
overwhelming margins by the House on November 16, 2012, and by the Senate on December 6,
2012. The bill was signed into law on December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208).
During debate over early versions of the Magnitsky bills, the State Department announced that
some unnamed Russian individuals they deemed responsible for Magnitskys detention and death
wouldunder existing lawbe subject to visa restrictions. In support of the bills, a Russian
human rights group issued an expansive list of over 300 individuals it deemed had violated
Magnitskys rights or those of other human rights activists. This latter list incensed some Russian
officials who appeared to believe that it had become part of the State Department action. In late
October 2011, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that some U.S. citizens had been placed on a
Russian visa ban list. Other ministry officials and media reported that the listed U.S. citizens had
been involved in incidents linked to the Guantanamo Bay, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib detention and
prison facilities. In addition, U.S. citizens involved in prosecuting Russian organized crime
figures allegedly were listed.
20
CEDR, February 29, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950048.

Retaliating Against the Magnitsky Act: Russias Dima Yakovlev Act

A bill was introduced in the Duma on December 10, 2012, to bar U.S. citizens from entry who
allegedly violated the rights of Russian citizens. As amended, the bill also barred designees from
investing and froze their assets in the country. Another provision facilitated the closure of NGOs
that received U.S. funding that were found to violate Russian interests. The bill also barred U.S.
adoptions of Russian children and called for terminating the U.S.-Russia adoption treaty, which
had entered into force less than two months previously.21 The bill was entitled the Dima
Yakovlev Act, in honor of a Russian adoptee who had died in the United States. The Dima
Yakovlev bill was approved and signed into law by President Putin on December 28, 2012, and
went into effect on January 1, 2013.
The Magnitsky and Yakovlev Lists

On April 12, 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department released the Magnitsky list of names of 18
Russians subject to visa bans and asset freezes. The Magnitsky list contains the names of
Russians involved in events leading to the death of accountant Sergey Magnitsky in Russia in
2009 or in other gross human rights violations. Most of the names are related to the Magnitsky
case and include police and tax officials and judges, but two individuals are associated with
human rights abuses in Chechnya. Besides this list, the State Department has an unreleased list of
Russians subject to visa bans in connection with the Magnitsky case and human rights abuses.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that the publication of the Magnitsky
list by the State Department would lead to a symmetrical response by Russia. Media in
Russia reported that Moscow planned to release its own list of U.S. citizens to be barred from
entry. Senator Jim McGovern earlier had proposed that 240 Russians associated with the
Magnitsky case be listed. On April 12, he raised concerns that the published list was too limited,
but indicated that he had been assured by the Administration that more individuals were being
investigated for inclusion on the list.
On April 13, 2013, Russia released its own list, also containing 18 names of U.S. citizens,
including former Bush Administration officials and Guantanamo base commanders allegedly
implicated in torture, and lawyers and judges involved in prosecuting Russian organized crime
figures. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported in August 2013 that a few U.S. citizens on the list
had been denied visas.
On December 18, 2013, Foreign Minister Lavrov mentioned that the Magnitsky Act was an
irritant in U.S.-Russia relations. An annual report required by the Magnitsky Act was submitted to
Congress on December 20, 2013. It did not add any new names to the Magnitsky list of Russian
officials subject to visa bans and asset freezes, but the Administration reportedly stated that cases
were being evaluated and new names could be added at any time. Senator Bob Corker reportedly
called for an explanation of why no new names had been added. Russian officials repeatedly have
threatened that Russia will make a proportional response to the addition of new names.22
21
The treaty may be terminated one year after notification by one of the parties.
22
Anne Gearan, No Names Added to Blacklist of Russian Officials, Washington Post, December 21, 2013; Interfax,
December 18, 2013; The Voice of Russia World Service, December 23, 2013.

The Adoption Ban

While initially silent while the Dima Yakovlev legislation was being considered in the Duma, on
December 20, 2012, President Putin appeared to endorse it, stating that he had been outraged
by the U.S. legal treatment of those who have harmed or killed Russian adoptees, and asserting
that the U.S.-Russia adoption treaty had turned out to be absurd, since U.S. states are
circumventing it. He also apparently referred to the U.S. Magnitsky law in terming U.S. actions
as undeserved provocations and as slaps in the face, while at the same time the United States is
up to its ears in its own human rights problems.23 Foreign Minister Lavrov, in contrast, raised
concerns about the Duma bills call for the termination of the adoption treaty. Moscow Helsinki
Group head Lyudmila Alexeyeva also criticized the bill, arguing that 19 Russian adoptees had
died in the United States over the past 20 years (other sources stated over 10 years), some of
whom had health problems when they were adopted, while over 2,200 children adopted by
Russian families had died over the past 20 years.24
After Putin signed the bill into law at the end of 2012, the Foreign Ministry harshly asserted that
the ban was justified because U.S. culture is violent, resulting in many child murders; that
Americans are prejudiced against Russian adoptees; and that the United States has not ratified the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, including because Americans approve of spanking
and incarcerating children. It also claimed that the deaths of Russian children at the hands of
American adoptersRussian sources had claimed at the time that there were at least 19 such
deathswere the tip of the iceberg, since Russian authorities usually only became aware of
deaths from U.S. news media, which might not report the origin of the child. The ministry also
dismissed the argument that Americans adopt many otherwise unadoptable Russian children with
disabilities, claiming that less than 10% of such adoptees in 2011 were disabled. It bitterly
accused the U.S. judicial system of excusing the murders of Russian adoptees because of ethnic
prejudice.25 On January 23, 2013, Lavrov additionally stated that the adoption ban was justified
because Russian authorities had become convinced that the U.S. adoption system had low
standards, which contributed to the deaths of adoptees, and he asserted that such problems and
deaths did not occur among adoptees in other counties.26
On January 22, 2013, the Russian Supreme Court issued a letter clarifying that in implementing
the new law, local courts should leave standing adoption cases finalized by the courts before the
beginning of the yearabout 56 casesand proceed to transfer the children to the custody of
their adoptive parents. According to the State Department, virtually all U.S. families since have
received custody of these legally adopted children.
The State Department urged the Russian government to permit all U.S. families in the process of
adopting Russian children to complete their adoptions, particularly the approximately 230 (some
sources say up to 300) cases where the prospective parents have met with orphans. The Russian
government, however, indicated that these latter cases would not move forward and claimed that
some of the children recently have been placed with Russian families. In one case, an orphan who
had met with a prospective U.S. family, but whose adoption was in abeyance, has since died.
23
Interfax, December 13, 2012; CEDR, December 20, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950103.
24
Interfax, December 20, 2012.
25
CEDR, December 28, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950169.
26
CEDR, January 24, 2013, Doc. No. CEP-049001.

Many Members of Congress joined in writing letters, sponsoring legislation, and otherwise
protesting the adoption ban and urging Russia to reconsider its implications for prospective U.S.
parents, Russian orphans, and U.S.-Russia relations. In the 113th Congress, the Senate approved
S.Res. 628 (Landrieu) on January 1, 2013, expressing deep disappointment in and
disapproval of the Russian Dima Yakovlev law, urging that it be reconsidered to protect the
well-being of parentless Russian children, and calling for adoptions in process to be permitted to
proceed. A similar bill to S.Res. 628 was introduced by Representative Michelle Bachmann in the
113th Congress (H.Res. 24) on January 14, 2013. On January 15, 2013, Representative
Christopher Smith introduced H.Res. 34, which expresses deep sadness over the untimely and
tragic deaths in the United States of some adopted Russian children and over the other cases of
abuse; urges the United States and Russia to continue to abide by the bilateral adoption
agreement; and calls for Russia to permit adoptions underway to proceed.
A 139-member bipartisan Congressional Coalition on Adoption (CCA), co-chaired by Senators

Mary Landrieu and James Inhofe and Representatives Michele Bachmann and Karen Bass, has
played a prominent role in protesting the adoption ban. A Russian governmental delegation
including Child Rights Ombudsman Pavel Astakhov traveled to the United States and met with
State Department officials, Members of Congress, and families on April 17, 2013, to discuss
Russian concerns about the wellbeing of Russian adoptees and U.S. concerns about unblocking
the process of adoption for the approximately 259 cases where the prospective parents had met
with and were in process of adopting Russian children. (Reportedly, these are part of a larger pool
of approximately 600 U.S. families that had begun the adoption process.) The two governments
reportedly agreed to set up a working group to meet bi-yearly to monitor the treatment of Russian
adoptees in the United States.
In mid-May 2013, a group of U.S. families facing blocked adoptions unveiled proposals to Russia
to unfreeze the adoption process, including pledges of greater Russian access to adopted children
in the United States. Later that month, a congressional delegation led by Representative Dana
Rohrabacher raised the issue of blocked adoptions with Russian Duma deputies. A letter signed
by more than 150 Members of Congress was sent to President Obama before the June 2013
Obama-Putin summit in Northern Ireland urging the President to raise the issue of the U.S.
families whose adoptions were not completed.
In late June 2013, Russian Child Rights Ombudsman Pavel Astakhov again visited the United
States, and reiterated that the pipeline adoptions would not move forward. He refused to meet
with Senator Landrieu and other Members of Congress concerned about the adoption ban.27 After
his visit, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly approved a resolution proposed by Senator Roger
Wicker calling for member states to uphold the best interests of the prospective adoptee and the
emotional bond formed with the nascent family by honoring adoptions in the pipeline even if the
states may seek a halt to future adoptions.28
In September 2013, NBC television and Reuters news service reported on Internet re-homing
websites in the United States that facilitate the transfer of adoptees from one home to another.
27
U.S. Senator: Russia Stalling On Adoption, Childrens Rights Ombudsman An Ass, RFE/RL, September 20,
2013; Interfax, September 23, 2013.
28
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Istanbul Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly at the Twenty-Second Annual Session, July 3, 2013; OSCE Parliamentarians Back Resolution On
Intercountry Adoption, RFE/RL, July 3, 2013. See also Senator Roger Wicker, Russias adoption freeze: Is a
humanitarian solution within reach? Washington Times, July 23, 2013.

These websites generally operate outside the law. The Russian Foreign Ministrys Special
Representative for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Konstantin Dolgov,
reportedly delivered a note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow requesting that U.S. authorities probe
the reports and deliver findings to Russia. The Russian Investigations Committee, a presidential
body, launched a criminal case in early December 2013, alleging that 26 Russian adoptees had
been subject to illegal trafficking.29
In November 2013, the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) requested that the Russian
government respond to 23 complaints it had received from U.S. familieswhose in the
pipeline adoptions had been haltedby providing information on the fate of the prospective
adoptees.30 Astakhov asserted that Russia was no obligation to report to the ECHR or to the U.S.
Department of State, since such information is confidential. In response to the ECHR request,
the Russian Foreign Ministry requested that U.S. authorities provide detailed information on the
U.S. families, and claimed that the majority of the U.S. families had not visited the prospective
adoptees in Russia (an assertion at odds with the ECHR findings).
In late December 2013, Astakhov claimed that of the 259 children in the pipeline, all but 79 had
been settled with Russian families, and of these, 31 would be settled soon. In late March 2014, he
complained that the State Department was failing to provide timely information on the fate of
our children in the United States.
The Case of Punk Rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich, and

Nadezhda Tolokonnikova
On August 17, 2012, a Russian court sentenced punk rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina
Samutsevich, and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova (members of the Pussy Riot singing group) to two
years in prison on charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and feminist extremism.
The group briefly had sung anti-Putin songs in the Russian Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior
in Moscow in February 2012. The court claimed that the songs were not political in nature so that
the prosecution was not political. Commenting on the sentences in early October 2012, President
Putin stated that the sentences were appropriate given the fact that the singers were undermining
morality and destroying the country, and because the case had been publicized internationally.31
A few days later, Samutsevichs sentence was reduced to two years of probation, but the other
two were sent to Siberian work camps. President Putin commuted Alekhinas and
Tolokonnikovas sentences and they were released on December 23, 2013.
Other Moves against Oppositionists

The Navalny case: In mid-2012, The Investigative Committee ruled that a case
should proceed against activist Alexey Navalny on charges that in 2009 he
illicitly had stolen timber belonging to a state-owned firm. A trial in the city of
Kirov began in April 2013. On July 18, 2013, he was found guilty and sentenced
29
CEDR, December 5, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-58382505; November 26, 2013, Doc. No. CER-30408268; Interfax,
September 17, 2013.
30
European Court of Human Rights, A.H. and Others Against Russia and 22 Other Applications, November 4, 2013, at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-138911#{"itemid:["001-138911]}.
31
Interfax, October 7, 2012.

to five years in prison. Although his intent was unclear, President Putin raised
concerns that one defendant received a suspended sentence while Navalny
received five years. Navalny was released pending appealreportedly an
unusual judicial procedure, perhaps related to widespread domestic and
international criticism of the verdictand he campaigned as a candidate in the
September 8, 2013, Moscow mayoral election, coming in second in the poll. The
sentence was suspended in October 2013, but the conviction led to Navalnys
disbarment as a lawyer. The Justice Ministry has refused to register the Peoples
Alliance Party, led by Navalny, which held its founding congress in November
2013. Instead, the ministry quickly registered a same-name pro-government
party.
The Razvozzhayev case. Opposition A Just Russia Party activist Leonid
Razvozzhayev allegedly was detained by Russian security forces in October 2012
in Ukraine, where he was meeting with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees to seek asylum, and was spirited back to Moscow, where he has been
detained for involvement in the Bolotnaya Square violence. Charges include
conspiracy to carry out mass disturbances with the aim of overthrowing the
government. In late December 2013, the Moscow City Court sent the case back
to the prosecutors for additional investigation (see below).
The Udaltsov case. Opposition Left Front coalition leader Sergey Udaltsov was
placed under house arrest in February 2013 on charges of involvement in the
Bolotnaya Square violence. A lengthy investigation has been undertaken that
authorities claim increasingly supports charges of a conspiracy to carry out mass
disturbances with the aim of overthrowing the government. Case material for
Udaltsov, Razvozzhayev, and ten other Bolotnaya defendants was submitted for
trial in May 2013. In late December 2013, the Moscow City Court sent the case
back to the prosecutors for additional investigation (see below).
Raids against Nongovernmental Organizations Suspected to be

Foreign Agents
In February 2013, Putin demanded that executive branch authorities strictly implement the law on
NGOs receiving foreign funding, and agencies ranging from consumer protection to civil defense
and the Justice Ministry reportedly launched inspections of hundreds of suspect NGOs. NGOs
that were inspected included the Moscow offices of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
Transparency International, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (closely connected to the ruling
German Christian Democrats), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (connected to the main German
opposition Social Democratic Party), as well as prominent Russian NGOs such as the Moscow
Helsinki Group, Golos, and Memorial human rights NGO. Visiting Germany in early April 2013,
President Putin rebuffed concerns by Chancellor Angela Merkel about the inspections, asserting
that they constituted proper oversight of NGO activity.
In late March 2013, the State Department raised deep concerns that the large number of NGO
inspections, which included religious and educational organizations, constituted a witch hunt
that harmed civil society. It also indicated that funding would be made available for NGOs in
Russia through third parties. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the concerns as

provocative and the plan to continue funding as an attempt to circumvent Russias laws and as
interference in its internal affairs.32
Golos was prominent among those NGOs fined for not registering as foreign agents. In April
2013, a Moscow court fined Golos about $12,000 for not registering as a foreign agent. After
losing on appeal, it paid the fine but refused to register as a foreign agent, and the Justice Ministry
suspended its operations (it has re-registered as a civic organization).
Only one NGO in Russia has registered as a foreign agent, an inter-CIS NGO. All accused NGOs
have refused to comply. Russias prosecutor general reported to President Putin in early July 2013
thatout of 2,226 NGOs that had received about $1 billion in foreign funding from November
2012 (when the law went into effect) through April 2013215 NGOs had been determined to be
foreign agents because of their political activities. These latter NGOs had received over $180
million in foreign funding over the past three years. He stated that 193 of these had closed down
or stopped accepting foreign funding, but that 22 still operated and had not duly registered as
foreign agents, so were subject to fines. While raising concerns that a few of these latter NGOs
belonged to the Presidents Human Rights Council, he also argued that NGOs on the Council
were engaging in politics by virtue of their Council work, perhaps inadvertently implying that all
NGOs on the Council were foreign agents.33
Ostensibly to compensate for the restrictions on foreign funding, President Putin decreed at the
end of July 2013 that a process of federal funding for human rights NGOs be set up. In early
December 2013, grants totaling about $6 million were provided to 124 human rights groups,
including several that had faced questions about whether they should register as foreign agents,
such as the Memorial Human Rights Center, Golos, For Human Rights, and the Moscow Helsinki
Group. Although Memorial received a grant, a St. Petersburg court on December 12, 2013, upheld
a ruling that a local branch of Memorial must register as a foreign agent. Some critics of the
grants warned that they were aimed to make the NGOs dependent on the state and more
compliant.
In February 2014, the legislature amended the law on NGOs to provide more grounds for carrying
out surprise inspections of NGOs.
On March 6, 2014, the For Human Rights NGO was ordered by the Justice Ministry to suspend
most of its activities, since it had refused to register as a foreign agent. The NGO argued that it
had not recently received such funds.
Not all Russian officials have endorsed the amended NGO law. On March 6, 2014, an official in
the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner warned that the law had given the government
excessive control over the finances and public activities of NGOs. Nonetheless, on March 27,
2014, President Putin called for tightening the law to ensure that civil society groups are not
carrying out the bidding of foreign countries. One Senator in the Federation Council asserted that
Russia needed to make sure that a situation did not transpire as in Ukraine, where foreign
interests funded violence. The proposals included requiring research institutes and universities
32
RFE/RL, March 30, 2013;U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, March 28, 2013.
33
CEDR, July 9, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-59143180; July 10, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-66549127.

that receive foreign funds and which broadcast dangerous ideas to register as foreign
agents.34
The Post-Sochi Olympics Restrictions on Human Rights

Some observers argued that the Putin government resumed suppressive actions against political
oppositionists and human rights activists after international attention on Russia waned after the
closing ceremony of the February Sochi Olympics. On February 24, 2014, the day after the end of
the Games, a Moscow Court sentenced eight defendants in the Bolotnaya Square case to prison
terms ranging from 2.5 to 4 years (one defendant received a suspended sentence). Several
hundred individuals protesting the trial and convictions were detained outside the courthouse and
elsewhere. Aleksey Navalny was among those detained, and he was placed under indefinite house
arrest. Outgoing U.S. Ambassador McFaul termed the Bolotnaya convictions excessive and
selective justice.
Razvozzhayev and Udaltsov are among Bolotnaya defendants who remain in detention pending
their trials. Reportedly, others under investigation have fled the country.
Some media restrictions were reported in the wake of the Olympics and after Russias occupation
and annexation of Crimea.
Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus

During and after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the largely Muslim North Caucasus
area of Russiaan area between the Black and Caspian Seasexperienced substantial disorder.
Among such disorder, Chechen separatism gained ground, contributing to the breakup of the
then-Chechen-Ingush Republic along ethnic lines. Russias then-President Boris Yeltsin
implemented a federal system that permitted substantial regional autonomy. While some of the
ethnic-based republics pushed for greater autonomy, but otherwise opted to remain in Russia,
Chechnya was at the forefront in demanding independence.
In 1994-1996, Russia fought against Chechen separatists in a bloody campaign that led to
thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.
Ceasefire accords in 1996 resulted in de facto self-rule in Chechnya. Organized crime and Islamic
extremism subsequently greatly increased in Chechnya (see below)infusing and supplanting the
earlier, more secular, separatist movementand spread into other areas of Russia. In 1999,
Chechen terrorists were alleged to have bombed several apartment buildings in Moscow and
elsewhere, and a group of Chechen guerrillas invaded the neighboring Dagestan republic to
support Islamic extremism there.
Ostensibly in response to this rising cross-border violence, Russias then-Premier Putin ordered
military, police, and security forces to reenter Chechnya at the end of 1999. By early 2000, these
forces occupied most of the region. High levels of fighting continued for several more years and
resulted in thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons. In 2005, then-Chechen rebel leader Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev decreed the formation of
a Caucasus Front against Russia among Islamic believers in the North Caucasus, in an attempt to
34
Interfax; March 27, 2014 and March 6, 2014; CEDR, March 7, 2014, Doc. No. CEL-44553545.

widen Chechnyas conflict with Russia. After his death, his successor, Doku Umarov, declared the
end of the secular-based Ichkeria Republic and called for continuing jihad to establish an Islamic
fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus and beyond.
Russias pacification policy in Chechnya has involved setting up a pro-Moscow government and
transferring more and more local security duties to it. An important factor in Russias seeming
success in Chechnya has been reliance on pro-Moscow Chechen clans affiliated with regional
President Ramzan Kadyrov. Police and paramilitary forces under his authority have committed
flagrant abuses of human rights, according to myriad rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights and other assessments.
In January 2010, an existing administrative grouping of southern regions and republics was
divided into two districts. A presidential envoy was appointed for each district.
A North Caucasus Federal District was formed from more restive areas, including
the Chechen, Dagestan, Ingush, Kabardino-Balkar, Karachay-Cherkess, and
North Ossetia-Alania Republics and the Stavropol Kray.
A Southern Federal District was formed from somewhat more stable areas,
including the Astrakhan, Volgograd, and Rostov Regions, the Adygea and
Kalmykia Republics, and the Krasnodar Kray.
The division appeared to permit the central government and envoys to focus on separate
development plans for each district. According to some speculation, the division also was partly
driven by the 2007 selection of Sochi, in Krasnodar Kray, as the site of the 2014 Winter
Olympics, and the need to focus on building facilities and improving security in Sochi.
A North Caucasus Federal District development strategy was promulgated in September 2010. It
sets forth goals through 2025, stressing investments in agriculture, tourism, health resorts, energy
and mining, and light industry. It also calls for encouraging ethnic Russians to resettle in the area.
The strategy sets forth an optimum scenario where average wages increase by 250% and
unemployment decreases by 70% by 2025. An inter-agency commission to carry out the strategy
was formed with then-Prime Minister Putin as its head. At a December 2011 commission
meeting, Putin rejected the views of some that the North Caucasus should be permitted to secede
from Russia, warning darkly that anti-Russian interests (presumably, foreign interests) would then
launch efforts to break up the rest of Russia. Instead, he argued, Russia must continue to foster
economic development in the region.35 At a meeting of the commission in Grozny in late June
2012, the newly installed head, Prime Minister Medvedev, pledged that economic development of
the area was one of the governments most important priorities.36 In late 2012, the government
called for spending $76 billion on economic and social development through 2025, with 90% of
the funding outside the state budget (presumably from foreign and domestic investment). At a
commission meeting on December 18, 2013, republic heads rejected a claim by Medvedev at the
meeting that the republics were in arrears on payments for electricity and gas.
35
Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, During a Visit to the Chechen Republic, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
Holds a Meeting of the Government Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal
District in Gudermes, December 23, 2011.
36
The Moscow Times, June 20, 2012.

Terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus increased from 2007 through 2009 and decreased
thereafter, according to the Open Source Center and other sources. The number of killed or
captured terrorists also increased in recent years, perhaps marking more successful counter-
terrorist efforts. According to the Open Source Center, there were 527 terrorist incidents in Russia
in 2008, 1,381 in 2009, 1,217 in 2010, 1,117 in 2011, 1,016 in 2012, and 741 in 2013. Over this
six-year period, 1,185 security personnel and 2,038 terrorists were killed.37 An appeal by Umarov
in early 2012 that his fighters cease carrying out mass casualty attacksin solidarity with
Russians demonstrating against the flawed Duma electionwas another possible contribution to
the reduced number of terrorist incidents. In early July 2013, however, Umarov lifted this appeal
(which was only partially obeyed) and called for his supporters not to allow the Olympic Games
to be held in Sochi.38
A major change in the pattern of terrorist incidents has been a reduction since 2010 in the number
of incidents in Chechnya and increases in other republics of the North Caucasus, including
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia. Dagestan has led in the level of violence. The
republic is a multi-ethnic republic where Salafi Islam, as advocated by the Caucasus Emirate or
imported from the Middle East, has made increasing inroads. Salafists have clashed with security
forces and secular authorities, and with those practicing traditional Sufi Islam in the republic.
Terrorist violence in Dagestan accounted for more than one-half of all terrorism in the North
Caucasus in 2012 (262 out of 438 terrorist incidents), according to one estimation.39 The situation
in Dagestan remained serious in 2013, with the Russian military reportedly sending more troops
to the republic.
Among recent terrorist incidents:
In early March 2012, an alleged Caucasus Emirate plan to assassinate Putin and
Medvedev, uncovered in Ukraine, was publicized by the Russian government
during the final period of the presidential election campaign (perhaps
coincidently, an assassination plot also had been alleged during Putins 2000
presidential campaign). On May 4, 2012, two suicide car bombings occurred in
downtown Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, reportedly killing over a dozen
civilians and injuring nearly 100.
On May 10, 2012, Russias National Anti-Terrorism CommitteeNAK; an
interagency coordinating and advisory bodyannounced that Russian and
Abkhazian security agents had uncovered a plot by Umarov to launch a large-
scale attack at the planned 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Several large stashes
of grenade launchers, surface to air missiles, mines, and other weaponry were
discovered in Abkhazia. The NAK asserted that Umarov had close ties to
Georgias intelligence services, implying that Georgia was assisting Umarov.
The Georgian Foreign Ministry called these allegations absurd, and pointed out
37
To compare in terms of casualties, 1,826 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan during the same period.
38
North Caucasus Incidents Database, Dataset 1: 1 January 2011-15 December 2013, and Dataset 2: 1 August 2008-
31 December 2010, Open Source Center Summary, December 17, 2013, Doc. No. CER-41368441; CEDR, July 15,
2013, Doc. No. CEL-36614850; Interfax, July 3, 2013; Interfax, December 25, 2012; Gordon Hahn, Islam, Islamism
and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER), Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2, 2012; IIPER, January
13, 2013; IIPER, February 24, 2013; The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Ethnicity, and Conflict,
International Crisis Group, October 19, 2012; The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Islam, the
Insurgency, and Counter-Insurgency, International Crisis Group, October 19, 2012.
39
Mairbek Vatchagaev, Violence in Dagestan Accelerated in 2012, North Caucasus Analysis, January 10, 2013.

that Russia has eliminated Georgian efforts to exercise authority in Abkhazia and
that Russia had not raised such claims during meetings in Geneva on resolving
issues associated with the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.40
On July 19, 2012, Tatarstan Mufti Ildus Faizov was injured by a car bomb and his
deputy and head of the Tatarstan Muslim Board educational department, Valiulla
Yakupov, was shot and killed by assailants outside his home in Kazan. The
Mujahadeen of Tatarstan, which appeared linked to Umarov, claimed
responsibility. On August 20, 2012, a car exploded in Kazan, killing four alleged
terrorists. Some observers have warned that Islamic fundamentalism has greatly
increased in Tatarstan.41
On August 28, 2012, Sufi scholar Sheikh Said-afandi al-Chirkavi (Said Atsayev)
and five other victims were killed by a suicide bomber in the village of Chirkei in
Dagestan. The bombing reportedly was carried out by Sunni Islamic extremists
targeting Sufi religious leaders. The State Department condemned the killing and
raised concerns that extremist attacks were increasing in some areas of Russia.
In mid-January 2013, a Dagestani Supreme Court judge was killed, with the
Caucasus Emirates Dagestani branch, the Dagestan Vilayet, taking
responsibility. Perhaps related to this and other ongoing terrorism in Dagestan,
the republic head was replaced in late January 2013 by former ambassador
Ramazan Abdulatipov, who may have been viewed by Putin as a more pliable
leader.
On February 14, 2013, a suicide bomber killed four policemen and wounded six
in Khasavyurt, Dagestan. Experts suggested that the Caucasus Emirates
Dagestani branch, the Dagestan Vilayet, was responsible for this first suicide
bombing in Russia in 2013.
On May 25, 2013, a suicide bomber killed one policeman and wounded over a
dozen other policemen and civilians in an attack in Makhachkala, Dagestan.
On October 21, 2013, a female suicide bomber blew up a bus in Volgograd,
Russia, in the Southern Federal District which includes Sochi, resulting in seven
deaths and over three dozen injuries. Volgograd is about 430 miles northeast of
Sochi and is a transportation hub between Moscow and southern Russia, leading
to added speculation that the attacks were aimed against the Sochi Olympics.
Russian media linked the bomber to the Dagestan jamaat (organization or front),
linked to the Caucasus Emirate. This was the first operation by the jamaat since a
bombing at Moscows Domodedovo Airport in January 2011. In mid-November
2013, Russian officials reported that police in Dagestan had killed the bombers
husband and others reputedly involved in the bombing.
On December 27, 2013, three people were killed when a car bomb exploded
outside a police building in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray, the administrative center
of the North Caucasus Federal District. Six of the presumed terrorists were
arrested in Kabardino-Balkariya.
40
CEDR, May 10, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-6019 and Doc. No. CEP-950199.
41
CEDR, August 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-015006.

On December 29-30, 2013, two suicide bombings occurred in Volgograd, the first
at a rail station and the second on a trolley car. Together they resulted in nearly
three dozen deaths and over 100 injuries. On January 18, 2014, a video was
released that allegedly showed the two suicide bombers as they planned their
attacks. They claimed membership in Ansar al-Sunna, a unit of the Dagestan
jamaat. They warned that more attacks would be carried out until Russia permits
the North Caucasus region to secede, including a bloody present for
participants and visitors to the Olympic Games.
On January 8, 2014, four cars with the bodies of six men were discovered near
villages in southern Stavropol Kray, just southeast of Pyatigorsk. Improvised
explosive devices had been placed near the cars, apparently to target police and
rescue workers, but only one harmlessly detonated.
On January 12, 2014, a website associated with the Caucasus Emirate published a
Fatwa justifying the Volgograd attacks. Citing Osama bin Laden, the Fatwa
argued that such attacks were essential since they enraged the infidels, who
were responsible for Muslim deaths in the North Caucasus and Syria (through
Russias support for the Syrian government). 42
On January 15, 2014, three Russian security officers and four alleged terrorists
were killed, and five officers wounded, in a shootout in Dagestan. Russias
National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that one of the alleged terrorists was
responsible for the car bomb attack in Pyatigorsk (see above).
In January 2014, Abu Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), the Qadi of the
Caucasus Emirate, referred to Umarevs death. In March 2014, he reaffirmed that
Umarev had died and announced that he had been selected as the new military
head of the Caucasus Emirate. Since Umarev had appointed Kebekov as Qadi in
2010, many observers suggest that Kebekov will continue Umarevs policies.
These observers suggest that the apparent difficulty in finding a replacement for
Umarev may indicate a weakening of the ranks of the Caucasus Emirate due to
counterinsurgency operations of the Russian government. They also point out
that Kebekovs ethnicity as an Aver from Dagestan exemplifies the widened
focus of the Caucasus Emirate beyond the earlier goal of independence for
Chechnya.
U.S. analyst Gordon Hahn has warned that the Caucasus Emirate forms the hub of Islamic
terrorism in Russia and receives substantial material and ideological support from the global
terrorist network. The Caucasus Emirate provides ideological, financial, and weapons support,
and loose guidance and some coordination for the activities of perhaps up to three dozen
republic/regional and local combat jamaats (assemblies or groups of believers) in the North
Caucasus and Volga areas, Moscow, and elsewhere. The Caucasus Emirate may take the lead
when major terrorist operations are planned. In April 2009, Umarov announced that the former
Riyadus Salikhin Martyrs Battalionwhich had taken responsibility for attacking the grade
school in Beslan in September 2004 and which appeared defunct after its leader, Shamil Basiyev,
was killed in 2006had been revived and was carrying out suicide bombings across Russia.
Hahn reports that major ideologists of the global jihadi movement have praised these bombings
and have supported greater material and other aid for the Caucasus Emirate. He also warns that
42
CEDR, January 14, 2014, Doc. No. CEL-53389107.

over time, the Caucasus Emirate has expanded its operations globally, with cells being discovered
in Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, France, and Azerbaijan.43
U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

U.S. policy makers long have emphasized that U.S.-Russian cooperation in combating terrorism
in Chechnya and elsewhere is an important U.S. priority. On December 3, 1999, State Department
spokesman James Rubin averred that the United States was concerned about the links between
Osama bin Laden and Chechen terrorism and thus had some understanding for Russian
government counter-terrorism actions in Chechnya. In testimony to Congress on February 2,
2000, Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tended to foresee lengthy Russian
fighting in Chechnya to prevent the separatist region from becom[ing] the calling card of this
millennium in terms of where do terrorists go and train and act. He warned that sympathizers
from abroad were going to Chechnya to train and fight, and that they later could directly threaten
U.S. interests.44
At a U.S.-Russia summit in June 2000, then-President Bill Clinton and Russian President Putin
agreed to set up a Working Group on Afghanistan to discuss joint efforts to stem the threats from
Taliban support for terrorist activities worldwide. The meetings also involved cooperation on
other counter-terrorism, and in mid-2002, the two sides renamed the conclave the Working Group
on Counter-terrorism, to reflect enhanced bilateral cooperation in combating global terrorism in
the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. At the July 2002 meeting, the
two sides discussed the U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program, under which the United States
facilitated Georgias efforts to combat Chechen and al Qaeda-linked terrorism in Georgias
Pankisi Gorge. The Working Group has met regularly, and has reported discussions involving
Chechen and North Caucasian terrorism at several meetings. In 2009, it was included as one of
the working groups under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC; see below,
The Obama Administrations 2009-2014 Attempt to Improve Bilateral Relations). Some critics
have charged that the Counter-terrorism WG has declined in significance, since it had been
headed on the U.S. side by the Deputy Secretary of State in early 2001 and currently by an acting
State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism.
In September 2002, a U.S.-Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Cooperation and

Counter-Narcotics was signed by the U.S. ambassador and the Russian deputy foreign minister.
Under this agreement, training and other support was provided for combating terrorism and
terrorist financing (but see below).
In June 2005, the then-chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Henry
Hyde, visited his Duma counterpart, the then-chairman of the International Affairs Committee,
Konstantin Kosachev. The two sides signed a joint statement On Opposition to International
Terrorism and the Illegal Drugs Trade, that called for developing legislation to combat terrorism.
43
Gordon Hahn, Russias Islamic Threat (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 59-66; Gordon Hahn,
The Caucasus Emirates Return to Suicide Bombing and Mass Terrorism, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia
Report, November 30, 2009; Gordon Hahn, Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi and the Caucasus Emirate, Islam,
Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, January 8, 2010; Gordon Hahn, Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, August 2011; Gordon Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Goes Global, Islam,
Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, November 30, 2012.
44
State Department, Daily Press Briefing, December 3, 1999; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing
on Worldwide Threats, February 2, 2000.

Some observers have speculated that the early 2011 terrorist bombing at Moscows Domodedovo
airport spurred Russia to step up its lagging counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States.
Immediately after the bombing, President Obama phoned then-President Medvedev to propose
greater cooperation in combating terrorism. At a summit meeting in Deauville, France in May
2011, the two presidents issued a joint statement on enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation.
They agreed to bolster security at airports serving the two countries and to explore methods to
enhance in-air security, such as the deployment of air marshals and greater use of high-
technology explosives detectors. They announced that an associated memorandum had been
signed by the Transportation Security Administration and the Russian Ministry of Transport to
boost reciprocal security assessments at such airports and to exchange threat information on civil
aviation. President Medvedev also thanked the United States for its terrorist designation of the
Caucasus Emirate (see below).
At a U.S.-Russia summit in June 2013, the two presidents issued a joint statement on countering
terrorism that pledged both sides to strengthen cooperation, including through the exchange of
operational information between intelligence agencies, and the conduct of coordinated operations.
They also agreed to interact in providing security for the Sochi Olympic Games.
According to the State Departments latest Country Reports on Terrorism 2012,
Under the framework of the [BPC], the U.S. and Russian Chairmen of the Counter-terrorism
Working Group met in February 2012 ... . The Chairmen discussed cooperation in the Global
Counter-terrorism Forum [GCTF; a multilateral consultative group formed in 2011],
countering violent extremism, countering terrorist threats to the tourism industry, terrorist
designations, and preparations for the Sochi Olympics. Additional BPC activity in counter-
terrorism included several joint military exercises ... , collaboration on nuclear and
transportation security, and joint programs on financial monitoring. Russia also continued to
participate in the yearly Four-Party Counter-terrorism Working Group, which includes the
Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Operational and intelligence
information regarding terrorism-related threats was shared among these four agencies, with
senior leaders meeting in Moscow and in Washington. FBI-FSB relationships at the working
level showed improvement during the year.
Russia also is an active member of the NATO-Russia Councils Counter-terrorism Working

Group, according to the State Department.45
President Obama and newly re-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged further counter-
terrorism cooperation at their June 2012 summit meeting. However, in late 2012, Russia informed
the United States that it was abrogating the U.S.-Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement
Cooperation, effective on January 31, 2013, on the grounds that it no longer needed the assistance
provided under the agreement. Cooperative efforts would be continued under other arrangements,
according to Russian officials.46
In April 2013, in the wake of the explosions in Boston, allegedly carried out by two ethnic
Chechen brothers who emigrated to the United States, Presidents Obama and Putin agreed in a
phone conversation to step up counter-terrorism cooperation, and Secretary of State John Kerry
45
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013.
46
ITAR-TASS, January 31, 2013.

and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met on the sidelines of the NATO-Russia Council
meeting in Brussels on April 23, 2013, to discuss counter-terrorism cooperation. FBI Director
Robert Mueller visited Moscow on May 7 to discuss cooperation on the Boston bombing. The
two Presidents issued a statement pledging greater counter-terrorism cooperation during a summit
meeting in June 2013 (see below). Such cooperation has faced various challenges, including new
tensions in U.S.-Russia relations.
Among U.S. terrorist designations, on September 14, 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
issued Executive Order 13224, denoting three Chechen organizationsthe Islamic International
Brigade (IIB), the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), and the Riyadus-Salikhin
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrsas Specially Designated Global
Terrorists. They had carried out acts of terrorism in Russia, including hostage-taking and
assassinations, which have threatened the safety of U.S. citizens and U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests. All three groups, it stated, had been involved in the Moscow theater
incident that included the death of one U.S. citizen. The State Department asserted that the IIB,
the SPIR, and the Riyadus-Salikhin are clearly associated with al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and
the Taliban. The executive order blocks assets of these groups that are in the United States or
held by U.S. persons.47
On June 23, 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton designated Caucasus Emirates leader Doku
Umarov as a terrorist under Presidential Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those
providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism, to help stem the flow of financial and other
assistance to Umarov. On May 26, 2011, the United States similarly designated the Caucasus
Emirate under Presidential Executive Order 13224 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
group, and included Doku Umarov in its Rewards for Justice program, offering a reward of up
to $5 million for information leading to his location.48
Congressional Response
Congress has consistently criticized Russias human rights abuses in Chechnya since the conflict
resumed in 1999 and called for various sanctions. Even after September 11, 2001when the
Administrations focus was on forging an international anti-terrorist coalition that included
RussiaCongress retained a provision first included in FY2001 foreign assistance appropriations
(P.L. 107-115) that cut some aid to Russia unless the President determined that international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were given full access to Chechnya to provide
humanitarian relief to displaced persons. However, another provisioncutting aid if Russia
provides certain technical assistance to Iranconsistently took precedence in Presidential
determinations about cutting or reprogramming Russian aid. Among other legislative action, in
November 2006, Senator Patrick Leahy urged then-President Bush to intercede with President
47
The IIB had been founded and run by long-time Chechen military and political figure Shamil Basayev and the Saudi
Arabian terrorist Emir Khattab. Basayev resigned from IIB after the Moscow hostage crisis, but remained the head of
Riyadus-Salikhin until his death in 2006. SPIRs founder, Chechen figure Movsar Barayev, was killed in the siege at
the Moscow theater, and also was a commander of Riyadus-Salikhin. The State Department reported that Basayev and
Khattab had received commitments of financial aid and guerrillas from bin Laden in October 1999, just after Russia
had launched its Chechnya campaign, and that al Qaeda helped train Chechen terrorists. U.S. Department of State,
Press Statement: Terrorist Designation Under Executive Order 13224, February 28, 2003; U.S. Department of
State,.Statement of the Case: Chechen Groups, September 28, 2003.
48
U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: Designation of Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku Umarov, June 23, 2010;
Media Note: Rewards for JusticeDoku Umarov Reward Offer, May 26, 2011.

Putin to end the ongoing human rights abuses by Russian troops in Chechnya and suggested that
the U.N. should play a larger role in the demilitarization and political settlement of the conflict.49
H.Res. 1539 (Alcee Hastings), introduced in July 2010, urged the Secretary of State to raise the
issue of human rights abuses in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia during meetings of
the OSCE and other international forums.
From FY2005 until Russia banned U.S. assistance at the end of FY2012 (see below, The Ouster
of the U.S. Agency for International Development), Congress allocated humanitarian and other
assistance for Chechnya and the North Caucasus, calling for between $5 and $9 million in each
fiscal year. This aid was provided through U.N. agencies and U.S.-based and international NGOs
operating in the region. For FY2012, conference managers for the Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 112-74; signed into law on December 23, 2011) endorsed language proposed by the
Senate calling for not less than $7 million to be made available for humanitarian, conflict
mitigation, human rights, civil society, and relief and reconstruction assistance for the North
Caucasus. The act continued to restrict aid to Russia unless access to Chechnya was provided to
international NGOs. Despite Russias ban on U.S. direct bilateral assistance to the North
Caucasus, some indirect assistance has continued through allocations to U.N. agencies operating
in the region.
Defense Reforms
Despite the sizeable reduction in the size of the armed forces since the Soviet periodfrom 4.3
million troops in 1986 to a reported 700,000 at presentthe Russian military remains formidable
in some respects and is by far the largest in the region.50 Because of the reduced capabilities of its
conventional forces, however, Russia relies on nuclear forces to maintain its status as a major
power. Russia is trying to increase security cooperation with the other Soviet successor states that
belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).51 The passage of legislation in October
2009 providing for the Federation Council to authorize the use of troops abroad to protect its
peacekeepers and citizens, and to combat piracy at sea, appears to underline that Russia might
use military force to reinforce the lesson that small countries adjacent to Russia may disregard
Moscows interests and warnings only at their peril.
The improvement of Russias economy since 1999, fueled in large part by the cash inflow from
rising world oil and gas prices, enabled Russia to reverse the budgetary starvation of the military
during the 1990s. Defense spending increased substantially in the 2000s, despite a dip after the
global financial crisis of 2008 impacted Russias economy. However, even after factoring in
purchasing power parity, Russian defense spending lags far behind current U.S. or former Soviet
levels. The efficacy of the larger defense budgets is reduced by systemic corruption. Some high-
profile military activities have been resumed, such as large-scale multi-national military
exercises, show-the-flag naval deployments to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and strategic
long-range bomber patrols that approach U.S. and NATO airspace.
49
Congressional Record, September 7, 2005, p. S9718.
50
For more detail, see CRS Report R42006, Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy, by Jim Nichol. For the report
of 700,000 troops, see Dmitry Gorenburg, The Russian Military under Sergei Shoigu: Will the Reform Continue?
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 253, June 2013.
51
Members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. Georgia withdrew following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.

In early 2007, then-President Putin appointed Anatoly Serdyukov as defense minister. With a
career outside the military establishment, many observers suggest that Serdyukov was chosen to
carry out a transformation of the armed forces from a mobilization modellarge divisions only
partially staffed and dependent upon the mobilization of reserves during emergenciesto
permanently staffed smaller brigades. Problems of force composition, training, command and
control, equipment, and doctrine were highlighted during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict.52 Partly in response, a reform plan entitled The Future Outlook of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation for the period of 20092020 was
launched in October 2008 that called for accelerating planned cuts in the bloated officer corps,
revamping the training of noncommissioned officers, cutting the number of personnel at the
Defense Ministry and General Staff, and reducing the number of higher military schools. Also,
the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments would be
altered to a three-tier system of strategic and tactical commands and brigades. The total size of the
armed forces would be reduced from 1.2 million to 1 million, according to this plan.
During 2009, the brigade system for ground forces was set up and other reforms were carried out.
Efforts to shift to a professional (contract) military faltered, and conscription of some portion of
the armed forces remains a long-term policy. The armed forces now face a crisis in finding
enough young men to conscript for a one-year term of service given a sharp decline in births in
past years and unhealthy living conditions. Alternatives include officially acknowledging and
adjusting to a smaller armed forces or increasing the length of service.
In late 2010, the existing six military districts were consolidated into Western, Eastern, Southern
and Central military districts. An over $700 billion weapons modernization plan for 2011-2020
also was launched. Substantial modernization is contingent on rebuilding the largely obsolete
defense industrial complex. Policy makers decided to import some weapons and technologies to
spur this rebuilding effort.
The policy of legally acquiring some arms technologies from abroad came under scrutiny in
2012, however, after the appointment of former NATO emissary Dmitry Rogozin as deputy prime
minister in charge of arms procurement. He and Putin have appeared to question the continuation
of foreign arms technology acquisitions. At a meeting with his Security Council in late August
2012, President Putin allowed that cooperation with foreign partners was desirable in some
areas, but stressed that Russia should not merely launch screwdriver facilities assembling
foreign ... military hardware, but should develop the full range of capabilities, from weapons
design through series production.53 In March 2013, Rogozin stated that Russia would not
purchase finished military products abroad, but would emphasize the granting of citizenship and
other incentives to encourage military arms specialists to move to Russia (see also below).54
On May 7, 2012, immediately following Putins inauguration, edicts were signed on greatly
boosting military pay, pensions, and housing allowances; on increasing the number of troops
under contract; on creating a reserve of troops; and on modernizing defense industries (OPK).
One Russian critic pointed out that none of these spending initiatives had been included in the
2012 budget or planned budgets for 2013-2014, and warned that the initiatives would raise
52
The Military Balance, p. 211.
53
The Kremlin, President of Russia, Vladimir Putin Held an Expanded-Format Security Council Meeting, Novo-
Ogarevo, Moscow Region, August 31, 2012.
54
CEDR, March 26, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54682223.

military spending as a percentage of GDP to over 4% (and possibly much more, given the opaque
nature of much of this spending), approaching the U.S. percentage.55 At a conference on defense
industries in May 2012, President Putin stressed that $89 billion out the $700 billion allocated for
weapons modernization through 2020 was targeted for modernizing the defense industrial sector
and increasing pay and educational opportunities for defense workers. Putin had announced
several of these defense initiatives in an earlier presidential campaign article.
In November 2012, Serdyukov was fired by President Putin after media reports highlighted his
alleged involvement in corrupt transfers of defense-owned real estate. Other reports alleged that
an important factor in the dismissal was ongoing opposition to Serdyukovs reforms by a large
number of officials and active and retired military officers, who finally were able to convince
Putin to remove him. The governor of the Moscow region and former emergencies minister,
Army General Sergey Shoygu, was appointed the new defense minister. Putin also quickly
replaced Makarov with Colonel General Valery Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff.
Those opposed to Serdyukovs reforms strongly urged Shoygu to roll back the reforms. In making
the appointment, however, Putin directed that Shoygu should continue the reforms. Some analysts
have suggested that a major factor in Serdyukovs dismissal was increasing friction between the
minister and defense industries that have refused to modernize the weaponry they sell to the
ministry. These analysts also have suggested that the defense industries now have triumphed in
their opposition to foreign arms technology acquisitions, with the Defense Ministry ceasing its
threats to pursue foreign purchases to encourage home-grown innovation.56 According to U.S.
analyst Dmitry Gorenburg, Shoygu has so far upheld other major features of Serdyukovs
reforms, including the reduction of officers, the establishment of unified strategic commands and
the three-tiered command structure based on brigades, and the commitment to eventually
achieving a professional, contract-based armed forces. However, these elements of a more
modern military are stymied by the political influence of the arms industries, he argues.57
U.S. Perspectives
As part of the Obama Administrations reset in U.S.-Russia relations, at the July 2009 U.S.-
Russia Summit, the two sides agreed to the resumption of military-to-military activitieswhich
had been suspended since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflictby setting up a Military
Cooperation Working Group as part of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC; see below,
The Obama Administrations 2009-2014 Attempt to Improve Bilateral Relations). The United
States has pursued military-to-military ties in order to promote cooperation in counter-terrorism
and international peace-keeping, including Russias support for U.S. and ISAF operations in
Afghanistan, to advocate democracy and respect for human rights within the Russian military,
and also to assess Russian military reforms and civil-military relations.
55
CEDR, May 15, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-358003.
56
Roger McDermott, Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 13, 2012; CEDR, December 10, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-009016.
57
Dmitry Gorenburg, The Russian Military under Sergei Shoigu: Will the Reform Continue? PONARS Eurasia Policy
Memo No. 253, June 2013. See also Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds., Russian Military Capability in
a Ten-Year Perspective, Swedish Defense Research Agency, December 2013; Walter Pincus, Russias Military is the
Largest in the Region, but it Isnt the Same Force as in Soviet Times, The Washington Post, March 10, 2014.

In April 2013, the U.S. and Russian sides signed a Military Cooperation Working Group work
plan. Among the 78 programming events contained within the work plan that were reported to
have taken place,
a delegation from Russias Military Academy of the General Staff visited U.S.
National Defense University
officers from the U.S. Pacific Command visited Russias Asia-Pacific
Region/Eastern Military District headquarters
a Russian delegation led by General-Major Konstantin Smeshko, the Deputy
Chief of Engineering Forces, visited the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization headquarters in Washington, D.C.
the Afghanistan-Pakistan Sub-Working Group held a meeting in Moscow
the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency participated in a Russian Ministry of
Defense-hosted Nuclear Security Exercise at the Abramovo Counter-Terrorism
Training Center.58
Reportedly, a planned trip by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
to Russia in June 2013 to convene a meeting of the Military Cooperation Working Group was
canceled, although a video-conference was held. In November 2013, the European Commands
Colonels Working Group (a pre-BPC body said to be a component of the Defense Cooperation
Working Group) met in Berlin to finalize the 2014 work plan of military contacts. Bilateral
military cooperation also has been evidenced by the signing of a memorandum of understanding
on counter-terrorism cooperation in May 2011 by the then-Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General
Nikolay Makarov, and the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.
In September 2010, the United States and Russia also agreed to set up a Working Group on
Defense Relations as part of the BPC, co-headed by the U.S. Defense Secretary and the Russian
Defense Minister, with eight subgroups ranging from logistics to strategy. The brief public
accounts of these meetings seem to indicate that Russia seeks knowledge of best practices as part
of its modernization effort. The Working Group met in March 2011 and the State Department
reports that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel held security consultations with visiting Defense
Minister Shoygu on August 9, 2013, during which the two also met as co-chairs of the Working
Group. The two agreed to boost military cooperation and directed staff to work out more frequent
engagement. The two officials also met on the sidelines of the NATO defense ministerial meeting
in Brussels in October 2013, where they reportedly discussed stability and security in Afghanistan
post-2014, missile defense issues, and chemical weapons in Syria. On December 6, 2013, Under
Secretary of Defense James Miller and Deputy Minister of Defense for International Military
Cooperation Anatoly Antonov met in New York under the auspices of the Defense Relations
Working Group to discuss missile defense, prompt global strike, a proposal for a counter-
improvised explosive device (Counter-IED) cooperation project, and enhanced bilateral defense
engagement.
Among sub-working group meetings, the State Department reported that the
Training/Education/Human Resources Sub-Working Group met in Colorado Springs in October
58
U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, April-May Newsletter on Upcoming and
Recent BPC Events, April 1, 2013; Summer Newsletter on Upcoming and Recent BPC Events, September 18, 2013;
Fall Newsletter on Upcoming and Recent BPC Events, December 24, 2013.

2012, and discussed cadet exchanges and other matters. The Russian co-head, Chief of the
Education Directorate of the Defense Ministry Yekaterina Priyezzheva, was ousted a few weeks
later. The Enhanced Missile Defense sub-Working Group met for the first time since 2011 in
April 2013. Reportedly, elements of the Working Group were responsible for coordinating the
holding of the Vigilant Eagle 13 exercise in late August 2013 to cooperatively detect, track,
identify, and follow a hijacked aircraft, and are now planning for Vigilant Eagle 14.
Although agreeing at the July 2009 summit to also renew the activities of the Joint Commission
on POW/MIAsthat seeks to account for personnel from World War II, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Cold War, including Soviet military personnel unaccounted for in
AfghanistanRussia only moved in June 2011 to appoint its co-chair, Yekaterina Priyezzheva,
and 30 commissioners. The Joint Commission held its first meeting under the new Russian co-
chair in St. Petersburg in June 2012. However, Priyezzheva was dismissed in December 2012,
and as of December 2013, Russia reportedly has not designated a new co-chair.
In January 2014, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper presented the intelligence
communitys annual worldwide threat assessment, which included an appraisal that following
measured improvements to [Russian military] capabilities in the past year, it is setting its sights
on the long-term challenges of professionalization and rearmament. The new [military] leadership
... has largely kept the military on the same strategic trajectory. The military in the past year has
taken an increasingly prominent role in out-of-area operations, most notably in the eastern
Mediterranean but also in Latin America, the Arctic, and other regions, a trend that will probably
continue. Moscow is negotiating a series of agreements that would give it access to military
infrastructure across the globe. These bases are generally intended to support show the flag and
presence operations that do not reflect wartime missions or a significant power projection
capability. He also assessed that Russia will continue its engagement with the United States on
issues that address its prioritiesSyrian CW as well as Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea.59
In early March 2014, the Defense Department issued its Quadrennial Defense Review 2014
(QDR), which similarly assessed that the United States is willing to undertake security
cooperation with Russia, both in the bilateral context and in seeking solutions to regional
challenges, when our interests align, including Syria, Iran, and post-2014 Afghanistan. At the
same time, Russias multi-dimensional defense modernization and actions that violate the
sovereignty of its neighbors present risks. We will engage Russia to increase transparency and
reduce the risk of military miscalculation. In regard to the U.S. military presence in Europe, the
QDR stated that we will continue to work to achieve a Europe that is peaceful and prosperous,
and we will engage Russia constructively in support of that objective.60 Perhaps marking a more
cautious assessment, on March 23, 2014, General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) stated that Russia is acting much more like an adversary than a partner,
necessitating changes in NATOs strategic planning (see below).61
59
U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
60
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, March 5, 2014.
61
Brooks Tigner, Russia Behaving Like an Adversary, Says SACEU, Janes Defense Weekly, March 23, 2014.

Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues
Russian Economic Conditions62

The Russian economy has experienced periods of turmoil and impressive growth since the end of
the Soviet Union in 1991. These various trends reflect in part the inevitable consequences of an
economy adjusting to the collapse of central planning and the introduction of market forces; an
economy in which the production of oil, natural gas, and other commodities plays a dominant role
and therefore makes economic growth highly subject to the vagaries of world commodity prices;
and poorly executed, and in some cases, conceived economic policies.
Russia experienced a decade of strong economic growth. From 1999 to 2008, Russias gross
domestic product (GDP) increased 6.9% on average per year. This trend contrasts with an average
annual decline in GDP of 6.8% during the previous seven years (1992-1998)the period
immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The surge in economic growth
largely the result of increases in world oil priceshelped raise the Russian standard of living and
brought a large degree of economic stability.
However, the Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic
downturn that began in 2008. The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy, including its
significant dependence on the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its
weak financial system. The Russian governments reassertion of control over major industries,
especially in the energy sector, has also contributed to an underachieving economy. As a result,
Russias period of economic growth came to an abrupt end. Although Russian real GDP increased
5.6% in 2008 it declined 7.9% in 2009.63
Russia is slowly emerging from its recession. Russian real GDP is estimated to have increased by
4.5% in 2010, 4.3% in 2011, and 3.4% in 2012. Russian GDP growth slowed to 1.$% in 2013.In
the long term, unless Russia can reduce its dependence on the production of oil and other
commodities and diversify and reform its economy, any recovery will likely remain fragile.64 On
several occasions, former President Medvedev expressed the need for Russia to diversify its
economy.65 Looking ahead, an important issue regarding Russia is whether President Putin will
carry through on economic reform or protect the status quo.
President Obama has issued three executive orders authorizing sanctions in the form of seizure of
U.S. assets and travel to the United States. The latest, issued on March 20, expanded the list of
sanctioned individuals to include additional government officials and non-government individuals
and one institutionBank Rossiyareportedly with close ties to the Russian leadership. The
sanctions targeted those who the Secretary of the Treasury determines to be operators and
associates in various sectors of the Russian economy, including financial services, metals and
mining, engineering, and defense. The sanctions target individuals rather than sectors of the
Russian economy and therefore their effects are designed to hit more specifically rather than the
62
Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
63
Economist Intelligence Unit.
64
The World Bank, Russian Economic Report, No. 22, June 2010, p. 1.
65
Economist Intelligence Unit. Country ReportRussia. January 2010.

Russian economy as a whole. Nevertheless, the tension that the crisis has caused may have some
effect on the Russian economic environment, at least in the short term. For example, the Russian
stock index decreased sharply during this period and the Russian ruble has depreciated. It is not
certain to what degree these trends result from the crisis over Ukraine and to what degree they
reflect declining Russian economic trends that were occurring prior to the crisis (see also below,
U.S.-Russia Relations after the Occupation and Annexation of Crimea).
Russias Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and

PNTR for Russia
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). In 1995, its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor organization of the GATT. However, after a number of fits and starts during the 18-year
process, the 153 members of the WTO, on December 16, 2011, invited Russia to join the
organization. Russia officially joined the WTO on August 22, 2012, after both houses of the
national legislature approved the protocol of accession. In joining the WTO, Russia has
committed to bring its trade laws and practices into compliance with WTO rules. Those
commitments include nondiscriminatory treatment of imports of goods and services; binding
tariff levels; ensuring transparency when implementing trade measures; limiting agriculture
subsidies; enforcing intellectual property rights for foreign holders of such rights; and forgoing
the use of local content requirements and other trade-related investment measures.
Congress did not have a direct role in Russias accession to the WTO but had an indirect role in
the form of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. Normal trade relations (NTR), or
most-favored-nation (MFN), trade status denotes nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading
partner compared to that of other countries.66 Title IV of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 applied
conditions on Russias status, including compliance with freedom of emigration criteria under
Section 402the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. Therefore, the United States was not in
compliance with the WTO requirement of unconditional MFN without Congress lifting the
applicability of Title IV as it applied to Russia and authorizing the President to grant Russia
PNTR before Russia enters the WTO.
On November 16, 2012, the House passed H.R. 6156 that authorizes PNTR for Russia. The
Senate followed by passing the bill on December 6, 2012. The bill was signed into law on
December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208). The legislation also contained provisions of the Magnitsky
Act discussed above.
Russian Energy Policy67

The Russian oil and natural gas industries are key players in the global energy market,
particularly in Europe and Eurasia. In 2012, Russia had by far the largest natural gas reserves in
66
MFN has been used in international agreements and at one time was used in U.S. law to denote the fundamental trade
principle of nondiscriminatory treatment. However, MFN was replaced in U.S. law, on July 22, 1998, by the term
normal trade relations. (P.L. 105-206). MFN is still used in international trade agreements. The terms are used
interchangeably in this report.
67
Prepared by Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs.

the world, possessing about 18% of the worlds total. It has about 5% of global oil reserves. Firms
in these industries are either directly controlled by the Russian government or are subject to
heavy government influence. The personal and political fortunes of Russias leaders are tied to
the energy firms. In 2012, about half of total Russian government revenue came from oil and
natural gas taxes, according to President Putin. Russias economic revival in the Putin era has
been heavily dependent on the massive wealth generated by energy exports to Europe.
Some Members of Congress, U.S. officials, and European leaders (particularly those in Central
and Eastern Europe) have claimed that European dependence on Russian energy and Russias
growing influence in segments of Europes energy distribution infrastructure poses a long-term
threat to transatlantic relations. Russia accounts for about 30% of the EUs natural gas supplies.
Some central and eastern European countries are almost entirely dependent on Russia for their oil
and natural gas. Analysts have noted that Russia views its natural resources as a political tool.
Russias National Security Strategy to 2020, states that the resource potential of Russia is one
of the factors that has expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to strengthen its
influence on the world arena.68
This dependence does not go only in one direction, however; Europe is also the most important
market for Russian natural gas exports. In 2011, about 53% of the Russian-government controlled
firm Gazproms natural gas exports went to the EU. About 30% went to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), many of which have been unreliable in paying what they owe and/or
receive natural gas at subsidized prices.69 The rest went to Turkey and other non-EU countries in
Europe, and to Asia.
Concerns about Russian energy policy have centered mainly on Russias natural gas supplies to
Europe. In 2009, the state-controlled Russian natural gas firm Gazprom halted all gas supplies
transiting Ukraine for nearly three weeks after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several
issues, including a debt allegedly owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would
pay for gas supplies. At the time, about 80% of Europes natural gas imports from Russia
transited Ukrainian pipelines. A similar Russian-Ukrainian dispute had led to a gas cutoff to
Europe at the beginning of 2006. In 2010 and 2011, disputes between Russian and Belarus led to
temporary reductions of oil and natural gas supplies to Belarus and neighboring countries.
These incidents provided evidence of Russias unreliability as an energy supplier, according to

some observers. Conversely, concerns about the reliability of gas transit through Ukraine caused
Russia and some European countries to support new pipeline projects to bypass Ukraine and other
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2011, Gazprom began transporting natural gas
directly from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea via the Nord Stream pipeline. Nord Stream
has a total capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Russia has proposed a third and
even a fourth Nord Stream pipeline, but Germany has rejected the idea so far.
Many European Union countries are concerned about the possible consequences of
overdependence on Russia for energy. The EU has supported the building of a Southern
Corridor of pipelines circumventing Russian territory that would transport gas supplies from
68
The text of the National Security Strategy, which was released in 2009, can be found at the website of the Russian
National Security Council at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.
69
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with Turkmenistan and Ukraine having unofficial status. Georgia
withdrew from the CIS in 2009.

Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe. The TAP pipeline is expected to transport Azerbaijans
gas from its Shah Deniz 2 project from Turkey through Greece and Albania to Italy by 2019, but
its small capacity (about 10 bcm per year to Europe initially, expandable to 20 bcm) will not
significantly reduce European dependence on Russia. It is unclear when additional pipeline
capacity in the Southern Corridor will be built.
Russias main goal appears to be to frustrate Europes efforts to diversify its natural gas supplies,
so that it may retain its dominant position. It has tried to undermine the Southern Corridor in
many ways, including by casting doubt on a possible Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, which
would transport gas from Turkmenistan (which has very large gas reserves) and other Central
Asian countries across the Caspian Sea to connect up with other pipelines that would carry gas on
to Europe.
Russia has also tried to maintain its grip on EU energy supplies by planning a rival project to the
Southern Corridor. Gazprom and the Italian firm ENI are partnering to build South Stream, which
would run from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, with branches to Austria and Italy.
Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia have also signed on to the project. In order to build political
support in European countries for South Stream, Russia enticed key Western European companies
to participate. Russia has expanded its influence in the Balkans through South Stream
construction deals and transit fees. The start of construction began in late 2013, and the first
deliveries are planned for the end of 2015. South Stream is supposed to reach its planned capacity
of 63 bcm per year in 2019.
However, the project faces some problems. In December 2013, the European Commission warned
countries participating in South Stream that they must renegotiate their deals with Gazprom
because they violate provisions of EU law that bar a company from both owning a pipeline and
supplying it with gas. Relatedly, the Commission said that the pipeline must provide
nondiscriminatory access to third-party gas producers. Another potential problem is that observers
question Russias ability to substantially expand its gas production to fill South Stream and other
current and planned pipelines. Moreover, the Russian seizure of Crimea could cause the EU to
rethink the wisdom of moving forward with South Stream.
While building pipelines that circumvent Ukraine, Russia nevertheless continues to try to gain
control of Ukraines pipeline system, which can transport over 140 bcm per year to western
Europe, although only 86 bcm were transported to Europe in 2013. Ukraines system currently
transports about 52% of Russian gas exports to Europe.
Russia gained full control of Belaruss gas infrastructure in 2011 in exchange for sharply reduced
gas prices. The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, which runs through Belarus and Poland, has a
capacity of 33 bcm. Gazprom has said it plans to modernize the Belarusian system and add an
additional pipeline by 2019.
There are factors that could diminish Russias leverage over Eurasian natural gas supplies.
Previously difficult-to-develop unconventional gas deposits, including shale gas, in the United
States, Europe and elsewhere could diversify supplies and keep prices down. The rapid growth of
the spot market for natural gas and the expansion of liquefied natural gas infrastructure in Europe
could also help diversify supplies as well as reduce dependence on Russian-controlled pipelines.
Already, European companies have successfully pressured Gazprom into cutting prices. However,
Gazprom is still strongly resisting major changes to its pricing formula (based on the price of oil,
not on gas spot market prices) or to reliance on long-term, inflexible take or pay contracts.

The Russian government plans to increase gas exports to Asian countries such as China, South
Korea, and Japan until they make up 19%-20% of total Russian gas exports by 2030. In 2010, gas
exports to Asia made up about only 7% of total Russian gas exports, all in the form of LNG.
Russian hopes of providing large amounts of natural gas to China have been stymied so far by the
fact that China can secure Central Asian gas for about two-thirds of the price Russia is
demanding.70 The Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline delivers 30 bcm per year from Central Asia to China.
This is expected to increase to 55 bcm by 2015.
After the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, Gazprom warned Ukraine that it
could cut off supplies to Ukraine if it does not pay the debts it owes. Such a move by Gazprom
could spark a third natural gas crisis in Europe in less than 10 years. Russian Prime Minister
Dmitri Medvedev has said Russia will renounce the Kharkiv agreements, which provided Ukraine
a natural gas price discount in exchange for basing rights for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in
Crimea. Ukrainian leaders say that in such a case Gazprom could start charging Ukraine as much
as $500 per thousand cubic meters of gas, about a third more than it charges any other country in
Europe.
Foreign Policy
Russia and the West

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil associated with the Yeltsin period, a
consensus emerged as the Putin era began on reestablishing Russias global prestige as a great
power and its dominance in the former Soviet space. The pursuit of these goals by President
Putin and his closest policy advisors seemed to be driven by the belief that the West, and in
particular the United States, had taken advantage of Russias political turmoil and overall
weakness during the Yeltsin years. Putin and his advisors were determined to restore what they
believed to be Russias rightful place as a significant influence on the world stage.
Fueled in part by the massive inflow of petro-dollars, Moscows self-confidence grew over the
several years prior to the late 2008 global economic downturn, and officials and observers in
Europe and the United States expressed growing concern about what they viewed as an
increasingly contrarian Russian foreign policy. This was evident in recent years in Russias sharp
political struggles with Estonia and Ukraine, its opposition to a planned U.S. missile defense
system in Eastern Europe, the suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, and its strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.
According to analyst Dmitri Trenin, President Putin became greatly alarmed following the
orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004-2005 and the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan later in
2005, and his attitude toward the United States hardened. Trenin claims that Putin viewed these
popular revolts as part of a U.S.-conceived and led conspiracy. At minimum, these activities ...
aimed at drastically reducing Russias influence.... At worst, they constituted a dress rehearsal for
... installing a pro-U.S. liberal puppet regime in the Kremlin.71 In February 2007, at the 43rd
70
For more information on Russias official energy strategy, see Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, at
http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf.
71
Dmitri Trenin, Russias Spheres of Interest, not Influence, The Washington Quarterly, October 2009.

annual Munich Security Conference, President Putin delivered a particularly harsh speech
attacking Bush Administration policies and condemning the unipolar world he alleged the
United States wanted to create.72 Such criticism of alleged U.S. foreign policies has remained a
regular theme in Putins speeches and writings.
During Medvedevs first two years in office (2008-2009), Russias relations with the West
became increasingly tense. In the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, relations
between Russia and the West reached what many considered to be their lowest point since the
Cold War. Russia continued to voice strong opposition to NATO enlargement to Georgia and
Ukraine; invaded Georgia and occupied two of its regions; refused to recognize Kosovos
independence; cut off or reduced energy supplies in disputes with Ukraine and Belarus; boosted
ties with Cuba and Venezuela; and attempted to end the use of airbases in Central Asia by the
United States and NATO. However, President Obamas efforts to reset bilateral ties in 2009
somewhat overlapped and then ameliorated some of these elements of tension.
Russian analyst Liliya Shevtsova argued that Medvedevs presidency presented a face of foreign
policy reasonableness that facilitated the reset in U.S.-Russia relations and the EU-Russia
Partnership for Modernization. She argued that these ties would not have developed if Putin had
remained the visible leader, but that the West was essentially responding to the fictitious
liberalization of the Russian political system.73
Russia and the European Union74

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has cast its relationship with Russia as a strategic
partnership. Analysts observe that EU-Russia partnership has been based largely on commercial
ties, natural gas, and practical cooperation on foreign policy issues such as Irans nuclear
program. Russias annexation of Crimea has triggered a fundamental reappraisal of the EUs
approach to its eastern neighbor, however. With uncertainty over Russias future intentions,
European policy makers have been confronted with the prospect of Russia as a potential
adversary rather than a partner.
The EU joined the United States in condemning the March 16 Crimea referendum as illegal and
refusing to recognize its outcome. The EU has also joined the United States in taking steps to
diplomatically isolate Russia, including by suspending talks on a visa waiver agreement that has
been a priority of the Russian government and on a new framework agreement under which the
EU would help develop and modernize Russias economy. On March 17, EU foreign ministers
imposed a visa ban and asset freeze on 21 officials involved in the takeover of Crimea, and added
an additional 12 names to the blacklist on March 21. EU leaders have threatened to adopt
considerably wider economic and financial sanctions against Russia should it take additional
actions with relation to territory in eastern Ukraine.
Energy, trade, and economics have conditioned debates in Europe about sanctions and other ways
of responding to Russias actions in Ukraine. Russia supplies the EU with more than one-quarter
of its total gas and oil, and some EU member states are almost completely reliant on Russian
72
The full text of Vladimir Putins speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, can be
found at http://www.securityconference.de.
73
Open Source Center, Europe: Daily Report, March 14, 2012, Doc. No. EUP-232005.
74
Prepared by Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.

energy.75 Russia is also the EUs third-largest trade partner (behind the United States and China).
EU-Russia trade totaled 379.3 billion (approximately $523.4 billion) in 2012.76 Citing concerns
about energy dependence and factors such as German jobs and exports, or even the outsized role
of wealthy Russians in the London real estate market, Europeans reluctant to threaten harsher
sanctions note that both sides pay a price. Others have argued that sanctions risk antagonizing
Russia and escalating tensions.
Nevertheless, most European political leaders and many business leaders have asserted that EU
countries must be willing to risk an economic hit as a price of standing against Russian
aggression. The EUs economic leverage is not inconsiderable: in terms of trade and investment,
the EU is far and away Russias most important partner, accounting for nearly half of Russias
trade and three-quarters of its foreign direct investment (FDI). Beyond sanctions, therefore,
perceptions of enhanced risk could have a large effect on the Russian economy if European
investors increasingly decide to pull out or avoid the Russian market. In addition, the EU-Russia
energy relationship works two ways: while Russia is a crucial energy supplier for Europe, Europe
is also a vital energy market for Russia, and gas sales to EU countries are an important revenue
source for Russia.
As discussed above (see Russian Energy Policy), energy dependence and aggressive Russian
energy policies have been a leading cause of tensions felt by some of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe with regard to Russia, and the apparent Russian inclination to use energy supplies
as an instrument of foreign policy has long raised concerns about potential vulnerabilities. Many
officials and analysts have long highlighted the need for the EU to further diversify its energy
supply in order to decrease reliance on Russia. Recent events in Ukraine and Crimea have created
a renewed sense of urgency in relation to such efforts, as well as efforts to mitigate the risks of
dependence by completing a more interconnected internal EU energy market.77
Prior to the events in Ukraine, the EU had already begun to convey that Gazprom is expected to
operate according to EU regulatory rules. In 2012, the European Commission launched an
investigation into allegations of price fixing and other rules violations by Gazprom in eight
eastern EU member states. The Commission has been considering whether to bring anti-trust
charges against Gazprom that could result in a fine of up to 10 billion. In addition, provisions of
EU energy legislation adopted in 2009 seek to increase competition in the EU energy market by
unbundling the ownership of gas production from distribution, and requiring an independent
operator of transit and transmission systems. Russian officials have argued that the requirements
unfairly target Gazprom and other Russian firms and violate WTO rules. The European
Commission has also challenged bilateral deals between Russia and six EU member states related
to the construction of the South Stream pipeline as illegal under the EU legislation.
Beyond the more tangible issues of energy and economic ties, traditional attitudes and outlooks
on Russia differ considerably among the 28 EU member states. In broad terms, the governments
of some countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have been inclined to an approach based
on pragmatism and engagement. They have tended to believe that the maintenance of extensive
75
See, for example, Daniela Schwarzer and Constanze Stelzenmller, What is at Stake in Ukraine, German Marshall
Fund of the United States, Europe Policy Paper 1/2014, p. 8.
76
European Commission DG Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/. Energy
accounts for more than three-quarters of Russias exports to the EU.
77
See European Council, Conclusions, March 21, 2014, pp. 9-10.

ties and constructive dialogue is the most effective way to influence Russia. Supporters of this
approach also observe that Russian cooperation is important on foreign policy and security issues.
Countries such as Poland and the Baltic States, on the other hand, have tended to view Russia
more as a potential threat to themselves and their neighbors. Difficult relations between these
countries and Russia are deeply rooted in the historical experiences of the Soviet domination of
Eastern Europe. Analysts have observed that the sharpness of such divisions within the EU
appeared to have diminished in recent years, giving way to an emphasis on economic and energy
cooperation with Russia. The annexation of Crimea has caused a distinct shift in perceptions
across the board, however, moving the traditional advocates of pragmatism more into alignment
with those who have tended to view Russia with wary skepticism.
In past years, the EU-Russia relationship has had its share of tensionsover governance and
human rights issues, energy issues, foreign policy disagreements, and trade disputesbut the two
sides have been able to maintain their relationship on the basis of their pragmatic strategic
partnership. Despite the adamant reaction to the annexation by EU and member state leaders,
some observers suggest that many elements of business as usual are likely to remain, especially
in the commercial and energy realms. Such skeptics suggest that the disruption to relations could
be temporary if the situation in Ukraine de-escalates, citing the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and
its aftermath as evidence of an up-and-down cycle of tensions between Russia and the West.
On the other hand, analysts have observed that forcible territorial annexation has an historical
echo in Europe that should not be underestimated. Russias military build-up on its border with
Ukraine and a lack of transparency about Russias plans, punctuated by Vladimir Putins March
18 speech, have raised alarms about the possibility of additional Russian intentions in areas
populated by Russian speakers, not only in Ukraine and Moldova but also in EU member states
Latvia and Estonia. Among some analysts and policy makers, a game-changing narrative has
therefore emerged of Putins Russia as a threat to peace and stability in Europe, and as an
adversarial power that flouts European principles and values.
Events in Ukraine have also made clear that the EUs Eastern Partnership has become a major
sticking point in the EU-Russia relationship. The Eastern Partnership is designed to deepen ties
between the EU and former Soviet states, encouraging partner countries to undertake reforms and
adopt EU standards in exchange for expanded political cooperation, trade and economic support,
and potentially a perspective on future EU membership. From the viewpoint of the EU, partner
countries participate in the Eastern Partnership under the principle that sovereign states are free to
choose their associations and alliances. According to analysts, however, Russia has come to view
the Eastern Partnership as a zero-sum game and an infringement on its perceived regional sphere
of influence. Russia has pointedly sought to assert its own influence and counteract the Eastern
Partnership, most notably in Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia.
NATO-Russia Relations78
Russias annexation of Crimea has been strongly condemned by NATO and its 28 member states
and prompted the alliance to reassess its efforts to build a cooperative partnership with Russia. In
late March 2014, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen characterized Russian
aggression in Ukraine as a turning point for NATO-Russia relations, declaring that NATO can no
78
Prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs.

longer do business as usual with Russia.79 This, at least for the short-term, marks the end of what
was portrayed at NATOs 2010 Lisbon Summit as the beginning of a new era in NATO-Russia
ties, based on practical cooperation on common security challenges. NATO has suspended staff-
level meetings with Russia and announced a review of all existing areas of cooperation. Noting an
end-goal of improved relations, NATO has kept the door open for broader political dialogue.
Post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia partnership have had mixed results, at
best. Russian views toward NATO, particularly since the beginning of the Putin era, have been
marked predominantly by suspicion and skepticism regarding NATOs intentions. Observers
point out though that while some progress has been made, Russian officials, and particularly
President Putin, have remained critical of many aspects of NATO policy. Within the alliance,
member states have criticized what some consider increasingly hostile rhetoric toward NATO and
the United States and have expressed heightened concern about the Russian governments human
rights record and perceived rejection of democratic principles and institutions. Disagreement over
NATO missile defense plans has been a continuing obstacle to closer cooperation.
The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), established in May 2002, five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided
the formal basis for bilateral cooperation. Recognizing that both NATO and Russia face many of
the same global challenges and share similar strategic priorities, Russian and NATO leaders
structured the NRC as a consensus forum of equals with a goal of political dialogue, common
approaches, and joint operations. As noted above, formal staff-level meetings of the NRC were
suspended in March 2014.
Most observers agree that despite having advanced NATO-Russia cooperation in some areas, the
NRC has failed to live up to its potential. The NRCs perceived shortcomings are often attributed
to Russian suspicion about NATOs long-term intentions. Many in Russia viewed NATOs
enlargement in 1999 and 2004 to 10 former Soviet-oppressed states as a serious affront to Russian
power and prestige and Russian leaders continue to oppose the idea of NATO enlargement to
former eastern bloc countries.80 The establishment of U.S. and NATO airbases in Central Asia for
operations in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and a United States
decision to establish military facilities, albeit nonpermanent, in Bulgaria and Romania after
NATOs 2004 enlargement were viewed by some in Moscow as further evidence of an
encirclement of Russia by NATO and the United States.
Russias actions in Ukraine have heightened long-standing tensions that last escalated in the wake
of Russias August 2008 invasion of Georgia, after which the two sides also suspended formal ties
in the NATO-Russia Council. Russias actions have sparked a strong debate within the alliance
over how Europe should react to what many considered a new, more aggressive Russian foreign
policy intended to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence along its border with Europe. Some
have argued that NATOs unwillingness or inability to prevent Russia from moving to establish a
permanent military presence in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine has diminished the
credibility of the alliances core principle of collective defense, as enshrined in Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty. Although Georgia and Ukraine are not members of the alliance, some
79
NATO, A strong NATO in a changed world, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the
Brussels Forum, March 21, 2014.
80
The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joined the alliance in March 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in March 2004.

Georgian, Ukrainian, and allied leaders have contended that NATO had given the impression that
it could concede to Russian demands in its relations with aspiring alliance members. Several
Central and Eastern European allies also expressed concern about a reported lack of appropriate
NATO contingency planning in response to the possibility of future Russian action against a
NATO ally or partner.
Since the end of the Cold War, the allies have consistently sought to assure Moscow that NATO
does not pose a security threat to Russia. However, in response to the annexation of Crimea, the
alliance has also taken steps to affirm and demonstrate its commitment to defending its members.
This includes augmenting NATOs Baltic Air Policing Mission, conducting surveillance flights
over Poland and Romania to monitor the situation in Ukraine, and heightening military
awareness. The U.S. Administration has also called for new and enhanced contingency plans to
be drawn for the defense of NATOs eastern European member states, and many member states
have indicated a willingness to conduct military exercises in these states. Such exercises could be
similar to NATOs November 2013 Steadfast Jazz exercise in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland. Steadfast Jazzthe largest NATO exercise to take place in the region in over ten years
was intended to certify command and control elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF),
including in response to a possible attack on the territory of a NATO member state. Some analysts
and NATO member states criticized the United States for sending only 300 troops to participate in
the 6,000-man exercise. Russian officials objected to the exercise so close to its border, stating,
among other things, that it was in the spirit of the Cold War.81
As NATO and Europes response to Russias actions in Ukraine continues to evolve, some areas
of ongoing NATO-Russia cooperation could be impacted. After NATOs 2010 Lisbon Summit,
the two sides developed a Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges, intended to serve as
a platform for future cooperation. Common security challenges identified include ongoing
instability in Afghanistan; terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; piracy; and
natural and man-made disasters. Since the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO-Russia cooperation has
expanded in some of these and other areas, while NRC working groups have made little or no
progress in others. In December 2013, the NATO-Russia Council agreed to a program of
activities for 2014 that defined specific areas of cooperation. This included expanding support to
the Afghan government, including in the area of mine disposal countering roadside bombs, and
enhancing joint counterterrorism efforts and initiatives to combat piracy and armed robbery at
sea. The NRC also announced a new five-year program to dispose of obsolete and dangerous
ammunition in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea.
U.S. and NATO officials have highlighted cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan as a key
example of the success of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation. Since 2008, Russia has allowed
the transit over its territory (via air and land) of cargo for NATOs International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). The transit routes are of particular importance to NATO as ISAF
coordinates the withdrawal of forces in line with NATOs goal to transition away from a lead
security role in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Moscow and NATO member states have also
jointly been training Afghan, Pakistani, and Central Asian counter-narcotics officers, with a view
toward reducing narcotics transit to and through Russia. By the end of 2013, over 3,000 officers
had been trained under the program. Finally, Russian helicopters, operated by civilian crews, have
81
Russia Slams Cold War Spirit of NATO Exercise, RiaNovosti, July 7, 201NATO officials noted that they invited
Russian observers to attend the exercise, and, in turn, accepted a Russian invitation to observe a joint Russian-
Belarusian military exercise in Belarus and parts of the Barents and Baltic Sea in September 2103. Some NATO
member states reportedly viewed the planned Russian Zapad exercise as a provocation aimed at the alliance. 3.

been providing transport in Afghanistan, and the NATO-Russia Council has established a
Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) to provide maintenance, repair support, and training
to the Afghan National Security Forces. By the end of 2013, 40 Afghan helicopter maintenance
staff had been trained by the program.
Observers point out that while progress has been made in the aforementioned areas, disagreement
both within the alliance and between NATO and Russia persists on some core issues. NATO and
Russias November 2010 agreement to pursue cooperation on missile defense was seen as a
significant breakthrough and was recognized as one of the primary achievements of the Lisbon
Summit. Negotiations have, however, been marked by disagreement and increasingly vocal
Russian opposition to NATO plans, with Russian officials even reportedly suggesting that Russia
could use preemptive force against NATO missile defense installations (discussed in more detail
below).82 In addition, little, if any, progress has been made on the issue of Georgias territorial
integrity and NATO membership prospects, the unratified Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE Treaty), and Russian calls for more influence within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
Moscow has criticized NATO member states for their refusal to recognize the Russian-
encouraged independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has vocally opposed proposals to
enhance NATO ties with Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow was also highly critical of NATOs Libya
operation in 2011, which it believes was intended to topple the Qadhafi regime, despite a U.N.
mandate and stated intention to protect civilians.
Russia and the Soviet Successor States83

Russias May 2009 National Security Strategy and February 2013 foreign policy concept hail
cooperation within the CIS as a priority. The National Security Strategy proclaims that the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO; see below) is the main interstate instrument to
combat regional military threats. The February 2010 Military Doctrine states that the priorities of
military-political cooperation are Belarus (formally part of a union with Russia), the CSTO, and
the CIS.84 Despite Russias emphasis on interests in the CIS, there has long been scant progress
toward overall CIS integration. Many CIS summit meetings have ended in failure, with many of
the presidents sharply criticizing lack of progress on common concerns and Russian attempts at
domination.
As an alternative, in early October 2011, then-Prime Minister Putin published an article calling
for the creation of a Eurasian Union of Soviet successor states. This Eurasian Union would
be integrated economically, politically, and militarily, and would unite the structures and
functions of the CIS, the Union State between Belarus and Russia, and the CSTO, as well as the
Eurasian Economic Community among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (a wider element of the
Customs Union between the three states). Putin raised the hope that the Soviet successor states
would be able to integrate more rapidly than states forming the EU. The Eurasian Union would
forge close links with the EU, he argued. The arguments strong presumption appears to be that
82
Russian Military Ups the Ante on Missile Defense, The Associated Press, May 3, 2012.
83
Prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, and Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European
Affairs.
84
Russian Federation Security Council, Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020, May 12, 2009; The
Kremlin, President of Russia. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Approved by President of the Russian Federation V.
Putin, February 12, 2013.

economic and other contacts between Soviet successor states and the rest of the world (including
the EU) would be mediated by Russia. One Russian critic dismissed the article as campaign
rhetoric, arguing that in his past elections, Putin had attempted to attract the votes of those
nostalgic for the Soviet era.85 In late July 2012, Putin appointed a Russian ultranationalist as his
advisor on Eurasian integration.
During 2013, Russia increasingly pressured Soviet successor states to join the Eurasian Economic
Community and the Customs Union, rather than signing association agreements with the EU. In
early September 2013, Armenia suspended negotiations with the EU on an association agreement,
and pledged to join the Customs Union, and in November 2013, Ukraine similarly suspended
talks with the EU and instead reached agreement with Russia on economic assistance and
subsidies (see below).
The worth of the CSTO (currently composed of CIS members Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) has been a matter of debate among its members and others,
since it has not been efficacious in protecting borders or halting internal disorder. The CSTO was
formed in 2002 with a headquarters in Moscow.86 An airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, was designated
in 2002 to provide support for Central Asian rapid reaction forces, but the base has housed
Russian troops. Then-President Medvedev called in February 2009 for forming a new and
sizeable CSTO rapid reaction force based in Russia, which he claimed would rival NATO.
Uzbekistan raised concerns that the force could be used by Russia to intervene in its internal
affairs, and refused to sign a June 2009 agreement on the formation of the force. Belarus too
balked at signing the agreement until October 2009 (see below). Despite the lack of consensus
within the CSTO, Russia moved forward unilaterally, assigning the 98th Airborne Division and the
31st Airborne Assault Brigade (reportedly 8,000 troops) to the force. The rapid reaction force
ostensibly is to be used to repulse military aggression from outside the CSTO, react to natural
disasters, and to combat terrorist groups, trans-national organized crime, and drug traffickers. The
decision to use the rapid reaction force is made by the presidents of the member-states at the
request of one or a group of member states.
At a CSTO summit in December 2011, all the members signed a pledge that no nonmember
military bases could be established on their territories unless all members agreed, a measure that
appeared aimed against the United States. They also reportedly agreed on procedures for
intervening in domestic emergency situations within a member state at the behest of the
member. Uzbekistan reportedly objected to these procedures, perhaps spurring its decision to
leave the CSTO.87 At a CSTO summit in December 2012, a new CSTO Collective Security Force
was proclaimed, to include the rapid reaction forces, as well as new special operations, aviation,
and emergencies (natural and man-made disasters) components. A CSTO General Staff with a
dedicated chief also was created, and Russia appointed Lieutenant-General Alexander Studenikin
to the post. President Putin, addressing the other heads of the member-states, called for bolstering
the capabilities of the organization to cope with the challenges posed by the ISAF drawdown in
Afghanistan in 2014. Armenian President Serzh Sargisyan stated that he expected the CSTO to
85
Vladimir Socor, Putins Eurasian Manifesto Charts Russias Return To Great Power Status, Eurasia Daily
Monitor, October 7, 2011; Pavel Felgenhauer, Putin Prioritizes Rebuilding the Lost Empire, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
October 6, 2011.
86
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992 and renewed in 1999.
87
Interfax, December 21, 2011.

act in case of aggression by Azerbaijan against Nagorno Karabakh, but raised concerns that the
member-states were not voicing support for Armenian foreign policy regarding Azerbaijan.
Ukraine-Russia Relations
Relations between Russia and Ukraine improved after pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych became
President of Ukraine in 2010. Yanukovych renounced the NATO membership aspirations of the
previous government, saying that the country will remain outside all military blocs. Russia and
Ukraine agreed to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042. In
exchange, Russia agreed to provide Ukraine with discounted prices for natural gas supplies for 10
years. However, rising global energy prices negated much of the savings Kyiv counted on from
the accord, and Yanukovych sought further gas price reductions from Russia. This situation has
given Moscow more leverage to secure foreign policy and economic concessions from Kyiv.
In late 2013, Russia demonstrated its ability to force concessions from Ukraine. Starting in
August 2013, as it appeared possible that Ukraine would sign an Association Agreement (AA)
with the EU (which included a free trade zone), Russia banned imports of Ukrainian chocolates
from a firm owned by a supporter of the AA and briefly held up steel and other Ukrainian exports
to Russia at the border. Russian officials warned that if Ukraine signed the AA, it would result in
an even more serious disruption of Ukraines exports to Russia. Under this pressure, the
Ukrainian government announced just days before the planned signature of the accord in
November 2013, that it would in fact not sign it, citing the impact on trade with Russia. The
governments move sparked massive anti-government demonstrations in Ukraine that led to the
collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014.
Russia reacted with hostility to the collapse of the Yanukovych regime and the emergence of a
new, more pro-Western leadership. A Russian foreign ministry statement on February 24 claimed
that terroristic methods were being used to suppress dissent in the Russian-speaking regions of
the country. The statement also criticized Western partners for acting not out of concern for the
people of Ukraine, but out of unilateral geopolitical considerations. Moscow has not recognized
the new government in Kyiv as legitimate, and still recognizes Yanukovych, now residing in
Russia, as President.
Russia also moved quickly to seizure Ukraines Crimea region. Starting on February 27, heavily
armed Russian-speaking troops poured into Crimea, seizing airports and other key installations
throughout the peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that the troops were not
Russian Federation military forces, but only local Crimean self-defense forces. Most observers on
the ground noted the training, equipment, vehicle license plates, and even statements by the
soldiers themselves all point to the Russian armed forces, not unofficial, local militia. Ukrainian,
U.S. and officials from EU countries flatly rejected Putins statement as a falsehood, charging that
Russian Federation military forces have in fact invaded and occupied Crimea in a clear violation
of international law. On March 11, Ukraines Foreign Ministry said there were nearly 19,000
Russian troops in Ukraine.
On March 16, the Crimean authorities held a referendum on Crimeas annexation to Russia.
According to Crimean officials, Crimeas union with Russia was allegedly approved by 96.77%
of those voting, with a turnout of 83.1%. Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and
other countries denounced the referendum as illegal and not held in a free or fair manner. Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty with Crimean leaders on March 18 formally
incorporating Crimea into Russia. This move was also denounced by Ukraine, the United States,

the EU and other countries as a blatant violation of Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity
and a violation of international law.
Until March 18, the takeover had been achieved with no bloodshed with the Ukrainian
government forces on the peninsula, even in cases where Russian troops have forcibly seized
Ukrainian installations. However, on that day one Ukrainian soldier was killed when Russian
forces stormed a Ukrainian base in Simferopol. On March 24, Ukraine announced that it would
withdraw its remaining military personnel from Crimea, due to threats against them and their
families made by Russian forces. On March 28, Russia said that military installations in Crimea
were under its control and that all Ukrainian troops that remained loyal to Ukraine had left the
peninsula.
The Ukrainian government is struggling to establish control over eastern and southern Ukraine.
Thousands of pro-Russian protestors have demonstrated in the region, especially in the cities of
Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas region and in Kharkiv. Some demonstrators favor union with
Russia, others only greater autonomy from the government in Kyiv. Demonstrators have seized
and relinquished government buildings. The Ukrainian government complains that many of the
most militant (and armed) demonstrators have come from Russia.
Observers have speculated about Russias goals and next moves with regard to Ukraine. The
seizure and annexation of Crimea appeared to surprise some policy makers by its speed and
brazenness. Russias moves in Crimea could be one stage in a multi-stage effort that could
involve an effort to seize control over eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials say they
have proof that Russia is playing a key role in stirring up demonstrations in eastern Ukraine.
Russian officials have said the situation in eastern Ukraine is chaos, which could provide a
pretext for invasion. Ukrainian officials claim there are 100,000 combat-ready Russian troops
near Ukraines borders. Ukraines armed forces have only 6,000 combat-ready soldiers at present,
according to acting President Turchynov.
Even if no invasion occurs, Russia could continue to try to destabilize and discredit the pro-
Western government in Kyiv, as well as the Ukrainian presidential elections set for May 25. In
addition to its seizure of Crimea and reported efforts to stir unrest in eastern and southern
Ukraine, Russia has imposed some de facto trade sanctions against Ukrainian imports. Ukrainian
government servers have been hit by sophisticated cyber attacks, which may have come from
Russia, although no proof of this has been publicly disclosed so far. Russia could expand these
trade and cyber attacks, and possibly harass or expel some of the large number of Ukrainian
citizens living and working in Russia.
Belarus-Russia Relations
Belarus is perhaps Russias most loyal ally. Russian policy toward Belarus has been focused on
gaining control of Belaruss key economic assets and ensuring the country remains in Moscows
geopolitical orbit. Moscow forced Belarus to sell full control of its natural gas infrastructure to
Russia in 2011 by threatening steep gas price rises if it did not. Moscow has manipulated the
supply of inexpensive Russian crude oil to Belarusian refineries, which has been a key de facto
subsidy to Belaruss economy. Russia has also provided loans to prop up Belaruss economy, in
exchange for a commitment by Belarus to privatize state-owned firms. Belarus, already member
of a Russia-led Customs Union, is further integrating its economy with Russias in the Eurasian
Union, which is planned to be operational in 2015. Russias membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has created problems for the competitiveness of Belarusian firms. As a

result, Belarus is seeking to accelerate its own efforts to join the WTO. However, current WTO
member-states will demand that Lukashenko reduce state control of the countrys economy,
which he has been reluctant to do so far. Russian economic pressure on Belarus has caused Minsk
to seek closer ties with the United States and EU. However, relations with the West remain
seriously damaged as a result of Lukashenkos repression of the political opposition in Belarus.
Russias invasion of Ukraines Crimea region has appeared to put Lukashenko in a difficult
position. He has said that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation on the one hand and that
Ukraine should stay a single, undivided country on the other. Observers speculate that such
apparently contradictory statements are an effort by Lukashenko to placate a possibly more
menacing Putin while trying to maintain a shred of foreign policy independence from Moscow.
Moldova-Russia Relations
In Moldova, Russian objectives appear to be to thwart that countrys moves toward EU
integration as well as any prospect of closer cooperation with NATO. In what many experts
viewed as an attempt to dissuade Moldova from initialing an Association Agreement (AA) with
the EU, Russia barred imports of Moldovan wine and spirits, dealing a blow to Moldovas
economy. Nevertheless, Moldova initialed the agreement in November 2013, and intends to sign
it in June 2014. Judging from its past conduct, Russia could try to pressure Moldova to not sign
the AA by barring imports of other Moldovan goods (such as fruits and vegetables) and cause
problems for the large number of Moldovan economic migrants in Russia. Another important tool
in this effort has been Russias support for Moldovas breakaway Transnistria region. Russian
forces remain stationed in Transnistria against the wishes of the Moldovan government. Russia
provides subsidies to bolster the pro-Russian regime in Transnistria and Russian firms own key
Transnistrian businesses. Russian leaders have conditioned the withdrawal of their troops on the
resolution of Transnistrias status. Transnistrian leaders have sought Russias recognition of their
regions independence, so far without success. However, observers speculate that Moscow might
be tempted to recognize Transnistrias independence (perhaps when Moldova signs its AA in
June), now that it has already braved strong international condemnation for its seizure of Crimea
in Ukraine.
South Caucasus-Russia Relations

Moscow has used the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to pressure both
sides, maintain Armenia as an ally, and otherwise exercise influence in the South Caucasus
region. The international community condemned Russias military incursion into Georgia in early
August 2008 and President Medvedevs August 26, 2008, decree officially recognizing the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian officials announced in September 2008
that two army brigades, each consisting of approximately 3,700 troops, would be deployed to new
military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the brigades were reduced to a reported 1,700-
1,800 troops each in mid-2009). A part of the Black Sea Fleet also was deployed to Ochamchire
in Abkhazia. The United States and others in the international community have called for Russia
to reverse these deployments and rescind the recognitions of independence.
On September 3, 2013, visiting Armenian President Serzh Sargisyan announced after talks in
Russia with President Putin that Armenia aimed to join the Russia-led Customs Union and would
postpone plans to initial an association agreement with the EU. He and other Armenian officials
and observers argued that the country is heavily dependent on Russia for security, that over 1

million or more Armenians are migrant workers in Russia, and that major industries in Armenia
are dominated by Russian interests, including the energy sector.88
Russia and Georgia have yet to reestablish diplomatic relations that Georgia broke off following
the August 2008 conflict. In 2011, Switzerland mediated talks between Georgia and Russia to
address Georgias calls for customs control along its borders between Russia and the breakaway
regions, as a condition for Georgias consent for Russias joining the World Trade Organization.
Then-President Medvedev stated in November 2011 that Russia would accept some private third-
party monitoring of the border and electronic data on trade, resolving this issue blocking Russias
WTO accession. After Bidzana Ivanishvili became prime minister of Georgia in October 2012
(succeeded by fellow Georgia Dream party coalition member Irakli Garibashvili in November
2013), the Georgian government raised hopes that political and economic relations with Russia
could improve. Some formerly restricted trade relations have been partly restored, but ties remain
cool on the issue of the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Central Asia-Russia Relations

Citing instability and the threatened spread of Islamic extremism on its southern flank as a threat
to its security, Moscow intervened in Tajikistans civil war in 1992-1996 against Tajik rebels.
Russias policy of trying to exclude U.S. influence from Central Asia as much as possible was
temporarily reversed by President Putin after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but appeared to be
put back in place as the 2000s progressed. In July 2005, the Uzbek government directed the
United States to cease its operations at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase within six months.
Tashkent is believed to have acted not only in response to Russian and Chinese urging but also
after the United States criticized the Uzbek governments repression in Andijon in May 2005. In
February 2009, Kyrgyzstan accepted a large loan proffered by Russia and simultaneously
requested that the United States wind up operations at the Manas airbase by August 2009. After
intense U.S.-Kyrgyz talks, Kyrgyzstan reversed course in late June 2009 and agreed to permit
U.S. and NATO cargoes to transit through Manas, reportedly angering Putin.89 In the wake of the
reset in U.S.-Russia relations since 2009, however, there appeared to be some cooperation from
Russia regarding the transit of U.S. and NATO materiel to and from Afghanistan. However, this
cooperation has appeared less evident after 2013, when Russia strongly and successfully
advocated that Kyrgyzstan close the Manas airbase.
U.S.-Russia Relations
The spirit of U.S.-Russian strategic partnership of the early 1990s was replaced by increasing
tension and mutual recrimination in succeeding years. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, the two nations reshaped their relationship on the basis of cooperation against terrorism
and Putins goal of integrating Russia economically with the West.90 However, tensions soon
88
CEDR, October 22, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-40829587; October 15, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-51285601; September 18,
2013, Doc. No. CEL-57379774.
89
For more on Russian policy in these regions, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political
Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests, all by Jim Nichol.
90
For the change in Russian policy toward integration with the West and cooperation with the United States, see CRS
Report RL31543, Russian National Security Policy After September 11, by Stuart D. Goldman.

increased on a number of issues that contributed to ever-growing discord in U.S.-Russian

relations. Cooperation continued in some areas, and then-Presidents Bush and Putin strove to
maintain at least the appearance of cordial personal relations. In the wake of the August 2008
Russia-Georgia conflict, however, bilateral ties deteriorated to their lowest point since the Cold
War. Some observers have argued that this nadir in relations in 2008 is one bookend to the late
February-March 2014 occupation and annexation of Ukraines Crimea region, which constitutes
the other bookend to the Obama Administrations 2009-2014 attempt to improve relations.
The Obama Administrations 2009-2014 Attempt to Improve

Bilateral Relations
The incoming Obama Administration called for starting a dialogue with Russia from a fresh slate.
A February 2009 speech in Munich by Vice President Biden to re-set U.S.-Russian relations
was an early sign of the Presidents intentions. At their first get acquainted meeting on April 1,
2009, in London, President Obama and then-President Medvedev issued joint statements on
opening nuclear weapons talks and on U.S.-Russia relations.
At the July 2009 summit in Moscow, President Obama stated that the relationship between
Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of drift in recent years, and that the two
presidents had resolved to re-set U.S.-Russian relations. He stressed that the United States
wanted to deal as equals with Russia, since both countries are nuclear superpowers, and that the
United States has recognized that its role is not to dictate policy around the world, but to be a
partner with other countries to solve global problems. Some observers have argued that these
statements were aimed at assuaging Russian sensitivities about the countrys status in the world.
President Obama met with then-Prime Minister Putin during the summit, and stated that Putin
was tough, smart, shrewd, very unsentimental, [and] very pragmatic, but reportedly added that
he did not anticipate a meeting of the minds anytime soon on areas of disagreement such as
Georgia.91
One achievement of the summit was the establishment of a U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission (BPC) intended to strengthen consultations and diplomacy. President Obama
highlighted the commission as the foundation element in re-setting relations, since it would
greatly expand communications between the two countries. The presidents are the co-chairs, and
the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister coordinate meetings. In some respects, the BPC is
similar to what was commonly termed the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission that was set up
during the Clinton Administration to advance U.S.-Russia relations.
The Obama Administrations National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, asserts that the
United States endeavors to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with
Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and
prosperous Russia that respects international norms. The strategy calls for bilateral cooperation
with Russiatermed one of the 21st century centers of influence in the worldin bolstering
global nonproliferation; in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan; in forging
new trade and investment arrangements; in promoting the rule of law, accountable government,
and universal values within Russia; and in cooperating as a partner in Europe and Asia. At the
91
Federal News Service, July 8, 2009.

same time, the strategy stresses that the United States will support the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Russias neighbors.92 The Administration plans to update the strategy in 2014.
Then-President Medvedev visited the United States on June 22-24, 2010, to focus on business and
technology ties between the two countries.93 Just days after Medvedevs U.S. visit, the United
States announced on June 28, 2010, the arrest of 11 Russian spies (one spy was outside the United
States and apparently escaped). The spies had lived in several U.S. metropolitan areas for up to 10
years or longer. They were arrested on charges that included money-laundering and not
registering as foreign agents. An FBI investigation against the deep cover agents reportedly had
been ongoing for several years. The timing of the arrests may have been determined by suspicions
of one of the agents that her cover had been blown. The 10 agents were swapped in Vienna,
Austria, on July 9 for 4 Russian citizens whom Moscow had alleged were U.S. or British spies.
Some U.S. observers suggested that the focus of the 10 Russian agents on seemingly public
information gathering was a reflection of the paranoia and myopia of Russias political leaders.94
Some observers in the United States and Russia speculated that the quick resolution of the spy
case indicated a concerted effort among policy makers in both countries to preserve the re-set in
bilateral relations.
In November 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev met on the sidelines at the Group of 20
industrialized states in Seoul, South Korea, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit in Yokohama,
Japan, and at the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon, Portugal. At the session of the NATO-Russia
Council in Lisbon, the heads of state agreed to work on cooperation on common security
challenges, to resume theater ballistic missile defense exercises, to identify opportunities for
Russia to cooperate with NATOs new territorial missile defense capability, to expand Russias
support for NATO operations in Afghanistan, and to explore revitalizing and modernizing the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. President Obama hailed the agreements as part of
the reset in NATO-Russia relations and as indicating that Russia is a partner rather than an
adversary of NATO.
In May 2011, President Obama and then-President Medvedev met on the sidelines at the Group of
8 (G-8; a grouping of industrialized countries) meeting in Deauville, France. The main topics
discussed included U.S. plans for missile defense deployments in Central Europe, counter-
terrorism cooperation, and economic issues, including Russias efforts to obtain entry into the
WTO. Medvedev indicated that Russia would continue discussions about its concerns over NATO
missile defense plans, but stated that there was no breakthrough at the talks and suggested that
progress might have to be deferred to 2020 (the then-planned final phase of missile deployments)
and to other politicians. The two sides signed or issued nine agreements, statements,
memoranda of understanding (MoU), and reports, ranging from statements of cooperation on visa
issues, counter-terrorism, and the Bering Strait Region to a report assessing future missile
challenges (the presidents stated that the latter report had been finalized, but it was not released).
It also was announced that two new working groups had been created as part of the BPC, a
working group on innovation and a working group on the rule of law. According to McFaul, a
major goal of the working group on innovation was to assist in then-President Medvedevs
modernization campaign (which has received lukewarm verbal support from his successor,
92
The White House. National Security Strategy, May 2010.
93
The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. U.S.-Russia Joint Statements, June 24, 2010; Remarks by President
Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at Joint Press Conference, June 24, 2010.
94
Financial Times (London), July 1, 2010.

President Putin), and a major goal of the working group on the rule of law was to strengthen legal
institutions in Russia to facilitate investment.95
President-elect Putin cancelled plans to attend the May 18-19, 2012, G-8 meeting at Camp
Davidgiving as a reason his preoccupation with selecting new cabinet ministersalthough he
detailed Medvedev to attend. Other observers viewed the cancelation as reflecting a related
decision to cancel the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Chicago to be held immediately
thereafter, particularly because of lack of progress on missile defense issues, or as a snub in the
wake of Putins anti-American presidential election campaign.
At the presidential summit on June 18, 2012, on the sidelines of the G-20 (Group of 20 major
developed and developing countries) summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, Presidents Obama and Putin
issued a long joint statement listing areas of existing and proposed cooperation, including on
Afghanistan, bilateral investment and trade, health, the environment, and educational and cultural
exchanges.96 However, it appeared that the activities of the many Working Groups and Sub-
Working Groups of the BPC had fallen off somewhat, perhaps related to the electoral cycles in
both countries, and on the Russian side, to the anti-Americanism that was a leitmotif of Putins
presidential campaign. Putin and Medvedev openly indicated that they supported Obamas
reelection.
In September 2012, Russia requested that the United States wrap up USAID programs in Russia
by October 1, 2012, many of which had been part of the BPC process (see below, The Ouster of
the U.S. Agency for International Development). In late 2012, Russia also informed the United
States that it was unwilling to renew an agreement in its current form sanctioning Cooperative
Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) programs in Russia (see below, Cooperative Threat
Reduction). In both cases, Russia asserted that the United States was interfering in its affairs and
that it was capable of carrying out further activities by its own means.
As a sign of Putins continuing anti-Western and anti-American orientation, the RT (Russia

Today) news agency, a propaganda organ of the government, reportedly has stepped up its
activities, including in the United Kingdom and the United States. The U.S. governmental Open
Source Center warned in late 2012 that an RT television channel in the United States was working
to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest.97 In early December 2013,
Putin ordered that a state news agency and radio broadcasting agency be absorbed into RT, and
appointed state television official and news anchor Dmitry Kiselev as its head. Some observers
have viewed the consolidation as part of Putins efforts to explain and justify what he terms his
conservative foreign and domestic policies to international audiences.98
95
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
after Bilateral Meeting in Deauville, France, May 26, 2011; Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russia Agreements and Joint Statements,
May 26, 2011; Press Briefing by National Security Council Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia McFaul and
Deputy National Security Advisor Rhodes, May 26, 2011.
96
The White House, Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet: The United States and Russia: A Multifaceted
Relationship, June 18, 2012.
97
Kremlins TV Seeks to Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in U.S., Open Source Center Analysis, December 12,
2012.
98
CEDR, December 10, 2013, Doc. No. CER-49477923.

Bilateral Relations during Obamas Second Term

Although there was some media speculation in late 2012 and early 2013 that the Obama
Administration would alter its Russia policy during its second term, the Administration appeared
to attempt to sustain and build on cooperative ties where possible, while also expressing concerns
about ebbing cooperation in some areas.99
Indicating stresses in relations, on January 25, 2013, the State Department announced that the
United States was withdrawing from the Civil Society Working Group because it was not
effective in addressing the increasing restrictions on civil society in Russia. At the same time, the
State Department stated that it hoped to continue assisting civil society groups in Russia and
rejected that the withdrawal signaled that the BPC was not working on other issues.100
Another ongoing issue of contentionSyria policywas the main topic discussed during a
meeting between new Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov in Berlin on
February 26, 2013. Lavrov termed the meeting constructive, and indicated that he had raised
concerns about the lack of diplomatic notification and access to Russian adoptees.
Kerry met with Lavrov on April 10, 2013, on the sidelines of the G-8 foreign ministerial meeting
in London. Reportedly, Syria was again a major topic, with Lavrov also stating that the two sides
agreed to step up the activities of the BPC. The two sides also discussed North Korea and the
Middle East peace process. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon visited Russia and met
with officials on April 15, 2013. Russian officials reported that he carried a letter from President
Obama to President Putin outlining possible areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Some of these areas appeared to be reflected in a statement issued at a June 2013 bilateral summit
(see below).
In written testimony during a hearing in April 2013 on his nomination to be the commander of the
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Philip Breedlove
stated that Russia was an aspirational superpower, as well as a regional power, but that
mounting internal stressorspolitico-economic, socio-cultural, and demographic, would
challenge its aspirations. The United States and NATO will need to reassure allies and partners
who reside in Russias declared sphere of influence of their resolve to counter untoward influence
efforts, he stated. At the same time, he called for continuing successful engagement with Russia,
such as through the Arctic Council and the NATO-Russia Council, and on such issues as health,
combating terrorism, and countering piracy, and for encouraging Russia to play a constructive
role in world affairs.101
Presidents Obama and Putin met on June 17, 2013, on the sidelines of the G-8 meeting in
Northern Ireland. The presidents issued three joint statements, including on bilateral relations,
99
For examples of these statements, see U.S. Department of State, Background Briefing on Secretary of State Kerrys
Trip to Great Britain, Germany, and France: Special Briefing, Senior State Department Official, February 24, 2013;
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of Telephone Call between President Obama and President
Putin, March 1, 2013; U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Ambassador McFauls Blog, 28 Days of Cooperation: U.S. and R.F.,
March 1, 2013.
100
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, January 25, 2013.
101
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the Nomination of Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe., Testimony by Philip Breedlove, April 11, 2013.

counter-terrorism cooperation, and cyber-security. Both indicated that they continued to disagree
on many issues related to the Syria crisis, but that they were continuing to work to hold a
conference between the warring factions.
The Statement on Enhanced Bilateral Relations was similar to those of past

Administrations in mentioning areas of engagement, including arms control and
nonproliferation, trade and investment, countering terrorism, and exchanges. The two
Presidents announced that Vice President Biden and Prime Minister Medvedev would
expand their dialogue, and that a regular two plus two dialogue would be launched
involving the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Ministers of Defense and Foreign
Affairs.
A joint statement on countering terrorism called for the exchange of operational

information between intelligence agencies and the conduct of coordinated operations.
A joint statement on cyber-security noted that communications links had been

authorized or established between each countrys computer emergency response
teams, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the U.S. Cybersecurity Coordinator
and the Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council. The two sides agreed
to form a new Cyber Security Working Group as part of the BPC.
President Obama stated that the summit had finalized negotiations leading to the
signing of a follow-on protocol to the expiring Comprehensive Threat Reduction
Agreement (see below, Cooperative Threat Reduction).
U.S.-Russia relations faced further strains after intelligence leaker Edward Snowden fled to
Russia (via China) on June 23, 2013. Despite high-level requests that Snowden be returned to the
United States, Russia instead granted him temporary asylum on August 1, 2013. Responding to
the granting of asylum, Senator John McCain termed it a deliberate effort to embarrass the
United States, and called for a more realistic approach to our relations with Russia, including
by expanding the Magnitsky list, pushing for Georgias quick admission to NATO, moving
forward with all phases of missile defense deployment in Europe, and denouncing human rights
abuses in Russia.102
Inadequate Progress in Our Bilateral Agenda

On August 7, 2013, the White House announced that it had postponed a planned early
September 2013, U.S.-Russia presidential summit in Russia because of inadequate progress in
our bilateral agenda [in] the last twelve months, appearing to refer to Vladimir Putins return as
president of Russia. The Administration referred to lack of progress on missile defense, arms
control, trade and commercial relations, global security issues, and human rights, and stated that
the grant of temporary asylum to Edward Snowden also was a factor in the decision. Pro-Putin
ultranationalist academic Sergey Markov claimed that the cancelation was due to Obamas
weakness vis-a-vis the cold war lobby in Congress.103 Despite this announcement, Foreign
Minister Lavrov and Defense Minister Shoygu proceeded with a two plus two visit to
102
U.S. Senate, Senator John McCain, Press Release: Statement by Senator John McCain on Russian Government
Asylum for Edward Snowden, August 1, 2013.
103
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Presidents Travel to
Russia, August 7, 2013; Interfax, August 7, 2013.

Washington, DC, on August 9, 2013, to meet with Secretaries Kerry and Hagel to engage in
intense discussions on a range of bilateral issues, according to the White House. Reportedly,
Syria and the Snowden featured prominently. President Obama still traveled to St. Petersburg,
Russia, to attend the G-20 (Group of Twenty industrial and industrializing countries) meeting on
September 5-6. Despite the cancelation of the summit, the two presidents did meet briefly on the
sidelines of the G-20 meeting, and focused on the Syria conflict (see below, Error! Reference
source not found.).
The Annual Report of the BPC, issued in late December 2013, and combining 2012 and most of
2013, as well as the latest issues of the Administrations BPC Newsletter, list a number of
meetings of the Working Groups and sub-Working Groups that have taken place and are
scheduled to take place in coming months, perhaps indicating some revivification of the BPC.104
However, many activities appear to have been delayed or postponed, or involve person-to-person
contacts rather than more substantive meetings.
Russias February 2013 foreign policy concept views relations with the Euro-Atlantic states
(including the United States) as a top foreign policy priority, just behind relations with the CIS
states. The concept echoed statements by Russian officials in calling for the development of trade
and other U.S.-Russian economic ties as the central focus of a post-reset. The concept also
spells out that Russia expects the United States not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other
states and that Russia will work to prevent the U.S. imposition of sanctions against Russian
citizens and businesses. The concept cautions that further reductions in strategic nuclear arms
depend on global strategic stability and the balance of strategic offensive and defensive warfare.
In mid-June 2013, President Putin suggested that U.S.-Russia relations were complicated by
fundamental cultural differences that made understanding difficult. He claimed that American
identity is based on individual wants, racism, and genocidal and other extreme violence, while
Russia identity is based on loftier ambitions, more of a spiritual kind. He also argued that the
reset in U.S.-Russia relations had faced problems because the United States continued to view
itself as the sole superpower, an imperial attitude that was only slowly changing within the U.S.
ruling elite.105 After granting Snowden temporary asylum (see above), Putin stated that he
hoped that U.S.-Russia relations would not be harmed.
On December 17, 2013, President Barack Obama announced the names of members of the
presidential delegations for the opening and closing ceremonies for the upcoming Sochi Olympic
Games in February 2014. Neither delegation included the President or the Vice President. Janet
Napolitano, former Secretary of Homeland Security, was named to lead the delegation for the
opening ceremony, and William Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, was named to head the
delegation for the closing ceremonies. Several members of the presidential delegations to the
opening and closing ceremonies were prominent members of the LGBT community. While
stating that scheduling problems had prevented the President or Vice President from attending the
Games, the Administration also averred that the selection was not the only means through which
the President had underlined that he finds it offensive, the anti-LGBT legislation in Russia, for
example. And we take very clear and strong stands on that issue, as well as the curtailment of
104
U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Russia BPC 2013 Joint Annual Report, December 27, 2013; U.S.-Russia BPC:
Newsletter, February-March 2013; April-May 2013; Summer 2013; Fall 2013.
105
CEDR, June 14, 2013, Doc. No. CER-46749216.

civil society in Russia, as well as the harassment caused to those who protest corruption in
Russia.106
In testimony to Congress in January 2014 on worldwide threats, Director of National Intelligence

James Clapper warned that Russia and China are the most persistent intelligence threats and
aggressively target the U.S. government, defense industries, and companies that deal with energy,
finance, and the media. He assessed that President Putins crackdown on the political opposition
had defused popular challenges to his rule. He argued that political opponents might run for office
to gain power (although he did not mention the OSCEs assessments of the quality of such
elections). He stated that the government must balance the risks of an increasing Muslim
population needed to offset a shrinking labor pool against rising ethnic Russian nationalism. He
cautioned that the legitimacy of Putins rule will face risks from slowing economic growth which
could harm his military modernization and social welfare plans. He stated that the Russian-
mediated chemical weapons initiative in Syria strengthened Russias role in a settlement of the
Syrian conflict and added legitimacy to the Syrian regime. He warned that Russia was making
overtures to Egypt. He assessed that Russia would continue to pursue Eurasian integration, and
would have to compete with the EU in the West and increasingly with China in Central Asia in
pursuit of Eurasian integration. He stated that the bilateral relationship with the United States
will remain a priority for Russian foreign policy. We assess that Russia will continue its
engagement with the United States on issues that address its prioritiesSyrian CW as well as
Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea.107
In the run-up to the February 2014 Olympic Games, several terrorist attacks took place in Russia,
and the United States and other Western countries offered to boost counter-terrorism cooperation
with Russia. President Putin discounted that several Western leaders chose not to attend the
Games, and welcomed those who did attend, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
Chinese President Xi Jinping, Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev, and others.108
U.S.-Russia Relations after the Occupation and Annexation of Crimea

U.S.-Russia relations appeared to sharply deteriorate following Russias deployment of military
forces to Ukraines Crimea region at the end of February 2014. President Obama canceled plans
to attend a G-8 (Group of eight industrialized nations) meeting to be hosted by Russia in Sochi in
June 2014, some bilateral trade talks were halted, the Defense Department suspended planned
military-to-military contacts, a visa ban and asset freeze were imposed on persons involved with
violating Ukraines sovereignty, and the Administration and Congress undertook other sanctions
against Russia.
Among Administration actions, on March 6, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13660,
invoking his authority under the International Emergency Powers Act, the National Emergencies
Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and other legislation. The EO finds that the actions of
personsincluding persons who asserted governmental authority in Ukraines Crimea region
106
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, December 18, 2013.
107
U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
108
For details, see CRS Report R43383, The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics: Security and Human Rights Issues,
coordinated by Jim Nichol.

without authorization by Ukraines central governmentwho undermine democratic processes

and threaten the peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy. The President thereby declared a
national emergency and ordered blocking the U.S. property and interests of persons whose acts
undermine democratic processes in Ukraine, threaten the peace, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of Ukraine, misappropriate assets of Ukraine, or illegitimately assert governmental
authority over Ukrainian territory without the approval of the central government. He also
declared that the immigrant entry of such persons into the United States is detrimental to U.S.
interests and is suspended.
The Administration explained on March 6 that the State Department is putting in place visa
restrictions on a number of officials and individuals, which reflects a policy decision to deny
visas to officials or other persons who have been complicit in or responsible for supporting
actions which threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,
including the Russian troop movements not authorized to or consented to by the government of
Ukraine, and potentially, any other unauthorized actions by regional authorities in Ukraine.109
No list of individuals subject to the visa ban was released.
A statement by the White House press secretary issued on March 6 stressed that discussions with
Russia on trade and investment had been suspended, military-to-military engagement had been
put on hold, and planning for a G-8 meeting in Sochi had been put on hold.
On March 16, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13661, invoking his authority under the
International Emergency Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and other legislation. This EO expanded on the March 6 EO, finding that the
deployment of Russian military forces in Ukraines Crimea region and other actions undermine
democratic processes and threaten the peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and
thereby constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy.
He directed that U.S. property and interests of eleven individuals be blocked, and for the Treasury
Secretary to determine who else may fall under the sanctions, among those who are Russian
government officials, work in Russias arms industries, or act on behalf of such persons. He also
directed that entry into the United States of such persons is detrimental to U.S. interests and is
suspended.
The seven Russian individuals include Russian Duma deputy Yelena Mizulina
anti-LGBT legislator and architect of the ban on U.S. adoptions of Russian
orphans; Chairman of the Dumas Commonwealth of Independent States
Committee Leonid Slutsky; Chairman of the Federation Councils Constitutional
Law Committee Andrey Klishas, Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina
Matviyenko; Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin; Presidential advisor
Vladislav Surkov; and Presidential advisor Sergei Glazyev.
The four Ukrainian individuals include the former president of Ukraine, Viktor
Yanukovych, two Crimean separatist leaders, Sergey Aksyonov and Vladimir
Konstantinov, and the pro-Yanukovych head of the Ukrainian Choice Party
Viktor Medvedchuk. Aksyonov claimed to be the prime minister of Crimea and
requested Russian military intervention and annexation. Konstantinov has acted
109
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on
Executive Order on Ukraine, March 6, 2014.

as the speaker of the Crimean legislature, which declared Crimeas independence

from Ukraine on March 11, and later called for Russia to annex the region. After
Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Medvedchuk advocated for Crimeas secession from
Ukraine.
On March 20, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13662, invoking his authority under the
International Emergency Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and other legislation. This EO expands the scope of the national emergency
declared in the earlier EOs to include sectors of the Russian economy. The EO finds that Russias
purported annexation of Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine continue to undermine democratic
processes and threaten the peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and thereby
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy. He
directed that U.S. property and interests of 15 individuals and one business are blocked who
operate in sectors of the Russian economy. He also directed that entry into the United States of
certain aliens is detrimental to U.S. interests and is suspended. The list includes some of the
richest people in Russia, political leaders, and others associated with or alleged to be close to
President Putin, and the Rossiya Bank, controlled and patronized by senior officials.
Among Putins associates listed are: Aide to the President (and partner in the
Rossiya Bank), Andrey Fursenko); chief of the presidential staff, Sergey Ivanov;
and first deputy chief of the presidential staff, Aleksey Gromov.
Politicians include the head of the Defense Ministrys Main Intelligence
Directorate, Igor Surgun; the Speaker of the Duma, Sergey Naryshkin; the
Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council (upper legislative chamber), Evgeni
Bushmin, who heads the Budget Committee; the First Deputy Chairman of the
International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, Vladimir Dzhaborov;
Chairman of the Security and Defense Committee of the Federation Council;
Duma member and head of the A Just Russia Party, Sergei Mironov,; and head of
Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin.
Putins alleged friends include Yuri Kovalchuk, the largest single shareholder in
Rossiya Bank; and Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, oligarchs.
President Putin and several of the named persons have been dismissive of the Administrations
sanctions. On March 20, 2014, Russia issued its own list of nine U.S. citizens subject to visa
bans, including assistants to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the Senate Majority
Leader.
On March 20, 2014, President Obama delivered remarks condemning the illegal referendum in
Crimea and Russias illegitimate move to annex the region, and threats to southern and eastern
Ukraine. He underlined that Russias moves had been rejected by the international community as
well as by Ukraine, and he announced that under the executive order he had just issued, more
Russian officials would be sanctioned as well as the Rossiya Bank that supports many Russian
oligarchs. He stated that the world was watching with grave concern as Russia masses troops
further threatening Ukraine, and that the United States and its allies were discussing further
actions to take if Russian escalates the situation. He stated that he had signed a new executive
order to impose sanctions on parts of the Russian economy, if necessary, even though such
sanctions might be disruptive to the global economy. He stressed that Russia must know that
further escalation will only isolate it further from the international community. The basic
principles that govern relations between nations in Europe and around the world must be upheld
in the 21st century. That includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. He urged

Congress and the world to support Ukraines economy during the crisis, and reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to strengthening NATOs collective defense capabilities. He stated that U.S.-Russia
diplomacy continued, with the United States continuing to urge a de-escalation of the conflict and
talks between Russia and Ukraine. He averred that Ukraine should have good relations with the
West as well as with Russia.110
The G-7 countries met on March 24, 2014, in the Netherlands, and issued the Hague Declaration
reaffirming G-7 support for Ukraines sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. They
stressed that international law prohibited the coercive acquisition of another states territory and
stated that they did not recognize Russias illegal annexation of the region. The states affirmed
that they would step up sanctions against Russia if it escalated the situation. The G-7 leaders
reminded Russia of its responsibilities in the world economy and the need to diplomatically de-
escalate the crisis through talks with Ukraine, and urged Russia to accept international mediation
and monitoring of the situation. The G-7 leaders declared that Russias actions in recent weeks
were incompatible with their countries shared values, so they would not take part in a planned
Sochi summit in June and would suspend participation in the G-8 format until Russia changes
course. They also directed that their energy ministers would meet to discuss means to strengthen
collective energy security.111
In a speech in Brussels on March 26, 2014, President Obama argued that Russias claimed
annexation of Crimea violated the international system of law and democracy that the United
States and Europe had worked to build since World War II. He stated that Russia had challenged
this world order by redrawing Europes borders by force, and that the world should condemn the
Russian invasion and reject the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. While the United States
and others have moved to isolate Russia, this is not a new Cold War, he stated, since Russia does
not lead a bloc of countries or espouse a global ideology and NATO does not seek conflict with
Russia. He raised the hope that Western unity in condemning Russias actions would convince its
people that their peace and prosperity are not ensured through brute force. He rejected Putins
comparison of his annexation to Kosovos independence effort, and argued that in the case of
U.S. operations in Iraq, the United States attempted to work within the international system and
did not annex the country. He also stated that it was absurd for Russian voices to constantly
repeat that the United States orchestrated political developments in Ukraine and does not respect
the Russian people. He averred that successive U.S. administrations had attempted to strengthen
U.S.-Russian relations and Russian engagement with the world, including backing for Russian
membership in the WTO and the enlargement of the G-7 to the G-8, and that the world had
benefitted from times when Russia chose to cooperate on such issues as Syrias chemical
weapons and the reduction of nuclear weapons. But he warned that Russia should not feel that it
can run roughshod over its neighbors. Just because Russia has a deep history with Ukraine does
not mean it should be able to dictate Ukraines future.112
Some policy makers have criticized the Obama Administrations reset, pointing out that it was
implemented in the months after Russias August 2008 military operation in Georgia and
Moscows recognition of two Georgian regions as independent, and that Russia has again invaded
and (this time) formally annexed a region of Ukraine. Others have suggested that the reset was
110
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Ukraine, March 20, 2014.
111
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The Hague Declaration, March 24, 2014.
112
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Address to European Youth, March 26,
2014.

an attempt to launch a virtuous cycle of relations that ultimately has not been sustained. These
policy makers and others nonetheless urge continued cooperation with Russia where possible on
issues of mutual strategic interest.113 At a press conference with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte
on March 26, 2014, visiting President Obama responded to a question about whether in light of
recent developments, the assessment that Russia is Americas biggest geopolitical foe, had
proven correct. President Obama stated that Russia is a regional power that is threatening some
of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness.... The fact that Russia felt
compelled to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicates less
influence, not more. And so my response to [critics] continues to be what I believe today, which is
Russias actions are a problem. They dont pose the number-one national security threat to the
United States.114
In other areas of the world, Russias recent role in the Iranian sanctions agreement, the Middle
East Quartet, the International Conference on Syria, chemical weapons removal from Syria, and
other Middle Eastern issues have led some observers to speak of Russias return to the region,
although most argue that Russias moves are mainly diplomatic and reflect limited capabilities
and interests. Analyst Tarek Fahmy argues that President Putin appears to want to increase
Russias influence in the Middle East, but has not formulated a coherent policy and instead reacts
to U.S. policies in a limited fashion. He also claims that some elements of the Russian elite
oppose a robust superpower role for Russia in the region. Analyst Richard Weitz argues that
Russian foreign policy places a lower priority on relations with the Middle East than with Europe
and Asia, and with Soviet successor states. In the Middle East, Russia offers itself as a mediator
of regional conflicts, but generally has played only a minor role compared to the United States,
Weitz argues. Columnist Michael Weiss argues that while Russia does not have the capability or
reputation to negate U.S. influence in the Middle East, its recent little performance in the region
does pose a risk to U.S. interests.115
Arms Control Issues116
Cooperative Threat Reduction

Since 1992, the United States has spent over $10 billion to help Russia and the other former
Soviet states dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of nuclear weapons, weapons-
grade nuclear material, other weapons of mass destruction, and related technological know-how.
This funding supported the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) managed by the
Department of Defense, along with nonproliferation programs managed by the Departments of
Energy and State. These programs helped eliminate nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and transport, store, and eliminate weapons in Russia. They
also funded improvements in security at storage areas for both nuclear weapons and nuclear
113
Congressional Record, March 25, 2014, pp. S1701-S1702; George Shultz and Sam Nunn, The Leverage the West
holds over Russia, The Washington Post, March 28, 2014.
114
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte
of the Netherlands, March 25, 2014.
115
Tarek Fahmy, Debate: Russia Can Play a Major Role in the Middle East, Asharq Al-Awsat, November 4, 2013;
Richard Weitz, Debate: Russia Cannot Play a Major Role in the Middle East, Asharq Al-Awsat, November 4, 2013;
Michael Weiss, Russias Return to the Middle East, The American Interest, December 13, 2013. See also Russia:
Eyeing Broader Middle East Role After 2013 Diplomatic Successes, Open Source Center Analysis, January 7, 2014.
116
Prepared by Amy Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.

materials. The two sides also cooperated to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in
Shchuchye.
The focus of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance changed over the years.
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance as an emergency response to impending chaos in
the Soviet Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many
analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss
of control of nuclear and other weapons. As much of the work on strategic offensive arms
reductions was completed, the United States allocated a growing proportion of its funding to
projects that focused on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons and securing
storage sites that house nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems. The United
States also increased funding for projects that sought to secure borders and track materials, in an
effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. This has directed a growing
proportion of the funding to nations other than Russia.
The Memorandum of Understanding that governs implementation of U.S.-Russian cooperation in

threat reduction and nonproliferation expired in June 2013. The two nations have replaced it with
a bilateral protocol under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian
Federation Agreement (MNEPR). Under this new agreement, the two countries will continue to
cooperate on some areas of nuclear security, but nuclear weapons dismantlement and chemical
weapons destruction projects will cease.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

The Obama Administration pledged to pursue arms control negotiations with Russia and to,
specifically, negotiate a new treaty to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that a new treaty would
address deployed strategic offensive nuclear forces, leaving discussions on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons and warheads in storage to a future agreement, and to reduce their deployed forces to
levels below those set by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
After nearly a year of negotiations, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty
on April 8, 2010. This treaty limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry
nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty
also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The new treaty also contains a
number of complex and overlapping monitoring provisions that will help each side verify the
others compliance with the treaty. Many analysts believe that this verification regime is
particularly important because it mandates transparency and cooperation between the two sides.
The Obama Administration argued that the New START Treaty would strengthen U.S. security
and contribute to the reset in relations with Russia. The Administration also noted that the
treaty contributes to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by indicating that the United States and
Russia are both committed to meeting their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Some observers, however, have questioned whether the United
States and Russia need a treaty to maintain stability in their relationship and reduce their nuclear
weapons. They note that Russia is already reducing its forces as it retires aging systems.
Moreover, some question whether arms control agreements between the United States and Russia
will have any effect on the goals and interests of nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.

The Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senate Intelligence
Committee held a total of 21 hearings and briefings with Administration officials, senior
statesmen, and outside analysts between April and July 2010. Most witnesses praised the treaty,
and, although recognizing that it contains only modest reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons, argued that, on balance, it would enhance stability and predictability. Many also noted
that its verification regime would restore the ability of the United States and Russia to monitor
each others strategic forces. Some, however, questioned whether the treaty might restrain U.S.
missile defense programs. The Administration sought to alleviate this concern by noting that the
treaty contains no limits on current or planned missile defense programs and simply
acknowledges that robust missile defenses can undermine offensive forces. Others have noted
that the treaty did not address Russias stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Treaty
supporters agreed with this point but argued that the United States and Russia could only move on
to a treaty that will address these weapons after they ratify and implement New START.
On September 16, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Resolution of
Ratification on the New START by a vote of 14-4. The full Senate approved the treatys
ratification by a vote of 71-26, on December 22, 2010. New START entered into force on
February 5, 2011. According to the U.S. State Department, implementation is well underway, and
the process so far has been positive and pragmatic.
Questions about the future of the treaty arose in March 2014, during the crisis over the Crimea.
Some in Russia suggested that Russia would suspend the inspection process under New START if
the United States imposed sanctions on Russia. Others, however, indicated that New START
implementation would continue. The U.S. State Department indicated that it believed the United
States and Russia would, and should, continue New START inspections, in spite of growing
tensions over Ukraine and Crimea.
The Obama Administration has indicated that it believes the United States can reduce its nuclear
weapons further. In a speech in Berlin, in June 2013, President Obama stated that he would seek
to negotiate with Russia to bring about reductions in strategic nuclear weapons of up to one-third
below the New START levels. Russia has shown little interest in this proposal. It has, in the past,
indicated that it will not reduce offensive nuclear weapons further until the United States agrees
to legally binding limits on its missile defense programs. The United States has rejected this
proposal and has sought to engage Russia in separate talks on missile defense cooperation.
Russia and Missile Defense117
Background: Recent U.S. Missile Defense Plans118

Successive U.S. governments have supported the development of a ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system to protect against limited long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states.
The Bush Administration argued that North Korea and Iran represented strategic threats and
questioned whether they could be deterred by conventional means. In 2007, the Bush
Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the
117
For additional information, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven
A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
118
Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.

larger Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe to defend against a possible Iranian
missile threat. This European Capability (EC) system would have included 10 interceptors in
Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Both countries signed agreements with the Bush
Administration permitting GMD facilities to be stationed on their territory; however, the two
countries parliaments decided to wait to ratify the accords until after the Obama Administration
clarified its intentions on missile defense policy.
In September 2009, the Obama Administration canceled the Bush-proposed European BMD
program. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to further develop a regional
BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation
might demand. Gates argued this new capability, known as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA),
would be based initially around existing BMD sensors and Patriot, THAAD and Aegis BMD
interceptors, and would be more responsive and adaptable to growing concern over the direction
and pace of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. The Administration
plans for the PAA to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD against
intermediate- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This effort is largely supported by
Congress. Phase 1 of the Administrations European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was
completed on December 21, 2011, as planned.
In March 2013, the Obama Administration dropped Phase 4 of the EPAA, which would have
deployed no earlier than 2022 in Europe land-and possibly sea-based versions of advanced naval
BMD interceptors designed to destroy limited numbers of first generation Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Instead, the Administration proposed adding 14 additional ground-
based interceptors to the existing GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) site in Alaska by
2017. This would represent an almost 50% increase in the numbers of ICBM interceptors
designed to destroy potential long-range missile threats from North Korea and Iran and available
at least five years before Phase 4 would have been available. Plans for Phases 2 and 3 of the
EPAA remain unchanged and on track, according to the Department of Defense. The Pentagon is
currently examining options for beyond Phase 3 of the EPAA.
The Russian Response119

The EC program significantly affected U.S.-Russia relations. At the February 2007 Wehrkunde
security conference in Munich, President Putin strongly criticized the Bush Administrations
proposal, maintaining that it would lead to an inevitable arms race. Russia announced that it
had suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. In August 2008,
following the signing of the U.S.-Poland agreement, Russia once more vociferously objected to
the Bush Administrations missile defense plan; a Russian general stated that Polands hosting of
the interceptors could make it a target for a nuclear attack.
Some analysts argued that Russia had other motives for raising alarms about the U.S. missile
defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states; and to draw attention away from
Russias suppression of domestic dissent, its aggressive foreign policy actions, and its past
nuclear technology cooperation with Iran. Observers pointed out that Russian acceptance of
NATO enlargement in 2004 was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military
expansion into the new member states would not occur. The proposed European GMD in this
regard was seen as unacceptable to Russia.
119
Prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations.

In a joint statement issued at their get acquainted meeting on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama
and Medvedev acknowledged that differences remained in their views toward the placement of
U.S. missile defenses in Europe, but pledged to examine new possibilities for mutual
international cooperation in the field of missile defense. In a Russian media interview, Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov was asked to comment on U.S.-Russia-NATO
cooperation on missile defense through the use of Russian radar installations. He explained that
the Russian offer was predicated on the fulfillment of certain preliminary stages, including the
U.S. cancellation of the EC program, followed by a threat assessment, and then by political and
economic measures to eliminate the threat.120
As noted above, in September 2009 the Obama Administrations announced a new program for a
European-based BMD. In Russia, President Medvedev called the change a responsible move,
adding that we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am
ready to continue our dialogue.121 In addition, Moscow appeared to back away from an earlier
signal that it might deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. In October 2009, during a visit to
Warsaw by Vice President Biden, Polish President Donald Tusk announced that Poland would
participate in the Obama Administrations new BMD program by hosting SM-3 short- to
medium-range missiles.122
Some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic argued that cancelling the Bush Administrations
BMD plan could be viewed by Moscow as a climb-down resulting from Russias incessant
diplomatic pressure. Further, some critics faulted the White House for not having gained anything
from Moscow in exchange for its change in policy. However, Obama Administration supporters
maintained that Russia likely would not have wished to reveal an obvious quid pro quo
immediately; Administration backers advised critics to wait and see what actions Russia would
take.
In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers commented favorably on the new U.S. missile
defense plan, and reiterated the alliances willingness to cooperate with Russia on the issue,
stating that they reaffirmed the Alliances readiness to explore the potential for linking United
States, NATO and Russian missile defense systems at an appropriate time. The United States new
approach provides enhanced possibilities to do this. The Russian media reported that NATO and
Russia had formed a working group to study the issue. In a speech shortly thereafter, NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that he hoped the alliance and Russia would have
a joint system by 2020.123
120
President Obama, Russian President Medvedev Commit To Reduce Nuclear Arms, Reset Relationship, US Fed
News, April 11, 2009; Russia Warns U.S. Stepping Up Shield PlansAgency, Reuters, April 21, 2009; Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov on Disarmament
Issues, April 23, 2009.
121
Obama Cancels Bush Plan For European Missile Shield That Had Soured Relations With Russia, Associated
Press Newswire. September 17, 2009; Medvedev Praises Obamas Move on Europe Missile Shield, RIA Novosti,
September 17, 2009.
122
US/CEE: Biden Touts New Missile Plan In Central Europe, Oxford Analytica, October 22, 2009.
123
NATO. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels: Final Statement, December 4, 2009, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.htm?mode=
pressrelease; Russia, NATO Form Working Group on Missile DefenseRogozin, RIA Novosti, December 5, 2009;
Russia Not Ready to Set Up Missile Defense Shield Together With U.S.Lavrov, Interfax, January 22, 2010.

Before long, however, Russia began to criticize the new U.S. plan, reviving the argument that it
would compromise Russias nuclear forces. Later in December 2009, Prime Minister Putin tied
discussions over missile defense to the renegotiation of START. He asserted that Moscow would
need to beef up its offensive nuclear weapons forces in order to preserve a strategic balance
with the planned U.S. missile defense system. The State Department acknowledged the
relationship between offensive and defensive missile capabilities, but maintained that the two
countries should discuss missile defense in a separate venue. The Administration also said that
it would continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.124
In January 2010, the United States and Poland announced that, under the terms of the August
2008 agreement between Warsaw and Washington, a battery of short-range, surface-to-air Patriot
missiles would be rotated from Germany to Poland in June and stationed close to Polands border
with Kaliningrad. Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that he doesnt understand the apparent
need for Poland to defend itself from Russia. In response to the planned deployment of the
Patriots, a Russian official indicated that Moscow might strengthen its Baltic fleet.125
On February 4, 2010, the U.S. and Romanian governments announced that Bucharest had agreed
to host U.S. short-to-medium-range interceptor missiles to extend missile defense into southern
Europe. The Romanians reportedly hope that the deployment would help cement bilateral ties, as
well as protect Romanian territorythe Bush Administrations plan would only have covered the
western part of the country from a possible Iranian missile launch. A State Department
spokesperson and Romanian President Traian Basescu both stated that the system was not
intended to guard against Russia. Russian officials, including the chief of Russias general staff,
countered that the missile defense system was indeed directed at Russia, and that the proposed
deployment likely would delay negotiations in arms talks between Russia and the United States.
Moscow also expressed vexation over the possibility of U.S. Aegis anti-missile ships patrolling
the Black Sea. Nevertheless, commenting on Irans stepped-up uranium enrichment activities, the
head of Russias National Security Council appeared to confirm international concerns about
whether Irans eventual goals are scientific or military; he stated that doubts about Irans
intentions are fairly well-grounded.
Similarly, a Russian military analyst, writing in RIA Novosti, conceded that the Obama-proposed
SM-3 interceptors stationed anywhere in Europe would be incapable of downing Russian long-
range ballistic missiles. He argued that Moscows main objections were that (1) it had not been
consulted on the decision, and (2) the U.S. system might be subject to change. On the first point,
a spokesperson for the Romanian Foreign Ministry maintained that Russia had been kept in the
loop, stating that information coming from our American partners indicate that in the time that
followed the September 2009 announcement by the U.S. president, the U.S. had detailed
consultations with Russia concerning their plans for the anti-missile defense system. Also, on
February 16, a State Department official said that Russia had been told of the planned deployment
to Romania. On the latter point, Russia is concerned that the SM-3 interceptors could eventually
be upgraded to bring down ICBMs without Russias knowledge, as the United States is not
required to share information about its missile defense system.126
124
U.S. Department of Defense. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Pt. IV, February 2010.
125
CEE/Russia: CEE Attitudes to Russia become More Sober, Oxford Analytica, January 21, 2010; Polish Missile
Base Reignites Tension with Russia, Deutsche Welle, January 22, 2009; USA May Renege on Patriot Missile
Deployment AccordPolish Daily, BBC Monitoring European, February 12, 2010.
126
Romania Says U.S. Informed Russia on Anti-missile Shield Plan, BBC Monitoring European, February 10, 2010;
(continued...)

On February 12, Bulgarias prime minister announced that he supported participation in the U.S.
missile defense system. Bulgarias foreign minister noted that the missile shield would also
protect Russia from the threat of Iranian missiles. Russia, however, professed that it had been
caught unawares by the announcement; Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that we have already
questioned our U.S. partners in Washington ... as to the meaning of this, and why we have this
Bulgarian surprise after the Romanian surprise.127
Russia sought to tie discussions over missile defense to the renegotiation of START, contrary to
the July 2009 agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Medvedev not to link the two.
However, the United States refused to accede to the Russian position, and on April 8, 2010, the
two governments signed the New START Treaty, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in
December and by the Russian Duma in January 2011. The agreement acknowledges that there is a
relationship between offensive and defensive systems, but does not place any limits on missile
defense or on the expanded system that has been proposed by the Obama Administration.128
On July 3, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton and Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski signed an
annex to the 2008 U.S.-Poland agreement permitting the deployment of U.S. BMD in Poland.
The amendment provided approval for the deployment of SM-3 missiles, rather than silo-based
interceptors. After the signing ceremony, Sikorski stated that Russia would be permitted to
inspect the facilities.
At their November 19-20, 2010, summit in Lisbon, NATO heads of state and government
officially identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective, and adopted it as a
NATO program in response to the threat of ballistic missile proliferation by potentially unfriendly
regimes. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, held in conjunction with the alliance
meeting, endorsed cooperation between NATO and Moscow in the area of missile defense. The
NRC Joint Statement declared that
[w]e agreed to discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic
missile threat assessment and to continue dialog in this area. The NRC will also resume
Theater Missile Defense Cooperation. We have tasked the NRC to develop a comprehensive
Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation. The progress of this
Analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of NRC Defense Ministers.129
The NATO-Russia accord did not constitute immediate full collaboration; rather, Russia approved
the involvement of Russian technicians in the planning and development of the system. President
Medvedev cautioned that missile defense cooperation must eventually amount to a full-fledged
strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. However, a State Department official
(...continued)
U.S. Kept Russia Informed About Romania Missiles PlanU.S. Diplomat, Interfax, February 16, 2010; U.S. and
Romania: A New Alignment? RIA Novosti, February 9, 2010; Russia Cool to U.S. Plan for Missiles in Romania,
New York Times, February 6, 2010.
127
Bulgaria Wants to Participate in US Missile Defense Shield: PM, Agence France Presse, February 12, 2010;
Russia Wants Bulgaria to Explain favor of U.S. Missile Shield, Agence France Presse, February 14, 2010; U.S.
Missile Shield Not Targeting Russia, Bulgaria Says, Agence France Presse, February 17, 2010.
128
CRS Report R41251, Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions: A Review of the Historical Record,
by Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf.
129
NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. November 20, 2010. NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_68871.htm?selectedLocale=en

emphasized that, although Russia would be involved in the program, the United States would
continue to reject any constraints or limitations on our missile defense plans. In a televised
interview with Larry King, Prime Minister Putin indicated that if Russia perceives that the
PAA/NATO missile defense program is compromising Moscows nuclear deterrent, Russia will
just have to protect itself using various means, including the deployment of new missile systems
to counter the new threats to our borders.130
Analysts have argued that, despite its often-voiced reservations, Moscow may have believed itself
compelled to cooperate on missile defense; because Russia could neither block the [emergence
of missile defense] in Europe nor restrict its capacity by means of treaty constraints, [instead] the
only way ... to influence its shape is to join the [missile defense] program on as favorable terms as
can possibly be snatched.131 On December 20, 2010, Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that
Russian acceptance of and participation in NATO missile defense would be fundamental to the
success of such a systemand for improved Russia-NATO relations.132 Although details as to
how Russia might cooperate technologically remain to be seen, it is clear that NATO and the
United States want to find ways to engage Russia in partnership on BMD.
At the Lisbon summit, then-President Medvedev suggested without elaborating that Moscow
preferred a sectoral approach to missile defense. The plan was later clarified as one under
which Russia and NATO would guard the airspace above their respective territories: Russia
would be responsible for taking out missiles crossing its territory toward Europe, while NATO
countries would shoot down over Europe any missiles headed toward Russia. Moscow reportedly
is seeking agreement on such a plan because it remains concerned that the Phased Adaptive
Approach might eventually compromise Russias nuclear forces.
Although Moscow is advocating a common system with sectoral defense responsibilities,

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has insisted that NATO and Russia must maintain
independent systems, and that cooperation will consist of information sharing. The Russian
proposal is unacceptable to NATO for reasons of both sovereignty and capabilities. According to
Rasmussen, NATO is responsible for protecting the territory of NATO member states and for the
safety of their populations. We do not intend to transfer that responsibility to anyone else. In
addition, analysts note that current Russian missile defense technology lags far behind that of the
NATO countries.133 Moscow also stated that it sought written assurances from the United States
and NATO that the interceptors not be aimed at Russia.134
130
NATO Invites Russia To Join Europe Missile Shield, The Washington Post, November 20, 2010. Russia To Aid
NATO On Anti-Missile Network In Europe. The Washington Post, November 20, 2010. Europe and Eurasia: The
Obama Administrations Efforts To Implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Testimony before the House
Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank A. Rose.
December 2, 2010. Transcript of TV Interview Vladimir Putin to CNNs Larry King. RIA-Oreanda News. December 2,
2010.
131
Prospects For Joint Russia-NATO Missile Defense System. By Beata Gorka-Winter, Robert Smigielski. Bulletin of
the Polish Institute of International Affairs. No. 129 (205). October 29, 2010.
132
Success of Russia-NATO Relations Improvement Process Not GuaranteedLavrov Tells Interfax, Interfax Russia
and CIS General Newswire. December 20, 2010.
133
Medvedev Wants Missile Defense Carve-up Of Europe: Reports, Agence France Presse, November 22, 2010.
NATO, Russia Missile Systems To Stay Separate: NATO Chief, Agence France Presse, January 20, 2011. NATO,
Russia vow unity on terrorism, disagree on shield, Agence France Presse, January 26, 2011. The Boogeyman the
Kremlin Loves To Hate, The Moscow Times, February 8, 2011.
134
Russia Seeks Pledge From NATO On Missile Defense, New York Times, May 21, 2011.

Negotiations over a new missile defense architecture continued through the first half of 2011.
Vice President Biden met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin in March 2011, and
the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with his Russian counterpart in May 2011; and
at the end of the month, President Obama and Medvedev discussed the issue during the G-8
meeting in Deauville, France. Russia voiced objections to the announcement that Turkey would
permit missile defense radar to be based on its soil, and to Spains decision in October to permit
Aegis ships to be stationed at its the naval port at Rota.135
Discussions in the second half of 2011 focused on two major sticking points: Moscows proposal
for sectoral missile defense, and its insistence upon written legal guarantees that the missile shield
would not be directed against Russia. Both proposals are unacceptable to NATO. As Secretary-
General Rasmussen noted, acceding to the first demand would violate the very concept of Article
5, NATOs mutual defense clause, and would be equivalent to outsourcing missile defense for
the treaty area. Similarly, the alliance has rejected the demand for written legal guarantees
because it would permit Russia to determine alliance defense doctrine and would tie the hands of
future political and military leaders. As an alternative, the State Department proposed that Russia
be offered written assurances that the EPAA would not be directed against Russia.
In November 2011, Russian officials renewed their objections to NATOs plans to proceed with
its missile defense plans, and countered by indicating that Moscow would develop new missiles
equipped with counter-measures capable of foiling missile defenses. The Russians also once more
said that they might deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. In addition, Moscow announced its
intention to base a radar station in the Russian exclave, a move that one Russian analyst argued
was already planned. Finally, officials indicated that Russia might withdraw from the New
START Treaty and disallow NATO use of the northern supply routes to Afghanistan.136 In
response, at the NATO-Russia Council meeting of foreign ministers in early December, U.S. and
NATO officials reiterated their intention to continue with the development of EPAA. NATO
Secretary General Rasmussen argued that It would definitely be a waste of valuable money if
Russia started to invest heavily in countermeasures against an artificial enemy that doesnt
exist. That money could be invested to the benefit of the Russian people in job creation and
modernization.137
Some observers have questioned whether the Russian leadership might have realized at the outset
that their proposals would be unacceptable, but stuck to them anyway because they never
intended to cooperate on missile defense and wished to portray the alliance as unreasonable.
Other observers speculate that the hardline stance might be motivated by domestic political
considerations. Finally, some argue that Russia may be hoping to create a rift within NATO.138
In March 2012, Medvedev said Russia would adopt its nuclear forcesin phasesto account for
upgrades of the EPAA, arguing that we are not closing the door on dialog, [b]ut we need to
prepare ourselves.139 A few days later, in a side meeting during an arms control summit in Korea,
135
Moscow Anxious On Turkeys Shield Role, Hurriyet Daily News [Turkey], July 28, 2011. Russia Says U.S.
Approach to Missile Defense Unacceptable, Bloomberg Government, October 6, 2011.
136
Medvedev Mollifies the West. The Moscow Times. November 20, 2011. NATO Rebuffs Russian Missile-Defense
Threats. Washington Post. December 8, 2011.
137
Russia and NATO Trade Barbs Over Missile Shield. Agence France Presse. December 7, 2011.
138
Russia May Develop Nuclear Offensive, RIA Novosti, June 8, 2011.
139
Medvedev Urges Military To Parry U.S. Missile Shield. International Herald Tribune. March 22, 2012.

President Obama discussed missile defense with Medvedevin the vicinity of a hot
microphone. During the conversation, Obama told the Russian leader This is my last election,
and after my election Ill have more flexibility. Medvedev replied that he understood, and that he
would transmit that point to Vladimirthen-Prime Minister Putin. Obamas comments were
sharply criticized by presidential candidate Mitt Romney as caving to Russia. Representative
Turner, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, requested a
clarification of the remarks. Vice President Joseph Biden later argued that, given the political
environment in both countries during an election year, President Obama had stated the
obvious.140
During a conference on missile defense hosted in early May 2012 by Russia, a State Department
official said that [w]e cannot agree to preconditions outlined by the Russian government. We
cannot agree to any limitations on our missile defense deployment. We are able to agree,
however, to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. Later, at the
same conference, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov indicated that
[w]ere open to consider different kinds of guarantees. However, Makarov also warned that, in
response to continued development of EPAA, a decision to use destructive force preemptively
will be taken if the situation worsens.141
Newly reelected President Putin, claiming he needed to remain at home to form a new
government, declined to attend either the NATO summit in Chicago or the G-8 meeting, held in
Camp David, MDboth were in late May 2012. At the NATO summit, the alliance declared
EPAA to have an interim capability. It is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability in
2015, and full operational capability by 2018.142 In their summit declaration, alliance leaders
proposed
to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the
current respective missile defense capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile
defense cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks
regarding NATOs missile defense plans and capabilities. In this regard, we today reaffirm
that the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO
missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russias strategic
deterrence capabilities. While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible
measures directed against NATOs missile defense system, we welcome Russias
willingness to continue dialogue.143
The Kremlin remained unsatisfied. On May 24, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that,
while the declaration was a step in the right direction political statements cannot serve as a
foundation for cooperation. Reliable and based on precise military and technical parameters, legal
guarantees of the nontargeting of the deploying missile defense network against the Russian
140
Obama To Medvedev: No Missile Deal Before the Vote. Wall Street Journal. March 26, 2012. Obama Stated the
Obvious In Russia Remarks: Biden. Agence France Presse. April 1, 2012.
141
Russia To Make Hi-tech Case Against NATO Missile Shield. Reuters. May 2, 2012. Moscow Raises Alarm On
European Missile-Defense Plan. Wall Street Journal. May 3, 2012. Russias Military Threatens Preemptive Strike If
NATO Goes Ahead With Missile Plan. Canadian Press. May 3, 2012.
142
NATO Activates Missile Shield, Reaches Out To Russia. Agence France Presse. May 20, 2012. Fact Sheet:
Chicago SummitNATO Capabilities. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. May 20, 2012.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/20/fact-sheet-chicago-summit-nato-capabilities.
143
Chicago Summit Declaration. May 20, 2012. NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease.

nuclear deterrence forces are essential to us.144 However, this appeared to contradict General
Marakovs statement (see above) three weeks earlier that Russia was open to consider different
kinds of guarantees.
In response to Russian statements about developing strategic countermeasures, Secretary General

Rasmussen told Russian officials that NATO had no intention of attacking their country, and
advised that they not to step up their defense budget to defend against an artificial enemy.
In a sideline meeting of the G-20, Presidents Putin and Obama discussed missile defense, among
other issues. They issued a joint statement, declaring that [d]espite differences in assessments,
we have agreed to continue a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile
defense.145
Russia has continued to press for a joint missile defense system, and for written guarantees. As
noted above, the May 2012 NATO Chicago summit declaration reaffirmed that the alliances
missile defense capability would not be directed against Russia, and would not compromise
strategic stability. But in July, Russias acting NATO ambassador reiterated Moscows stance that
this was not enough. It must be upheld by explanations as to why it is so, what parameters of this
system need to be taken into consideration, and how Russia, regardless of what it hears, could
judge by itself that these parameters are being observed. Perhaps in response, NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen on July 16 pointed out that 15 years ago, the alliance and Russia had signed a
statement declaring that they would not use force against each other. We are still committed
to this declaration.146
There was little movement on the missile defense issue in the months after the U.S. elections.
Following a December 4, 2012, NATO-Russia Council meeting, Russias NATO envoy
pronounced the talks stalemated; however, Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that the two sides
would hold further consultations to assess a proposal regarding joint threat analysis.147 Speaking
at a December 20, 2012, news conference, President Putin averred that [t]he creation of [the
U.S./NATO PAA] annuls our nuclear missile potential. He added that deployment of a missile
defense does worsen our relations. But we are not enemies. Weve got to be patient and look for
compromises, and added that, although these disputes will not likely harm the investment
climate or hinder the development of the economy ... we must defend the interests of Russia.148
For the first few weeks of 2013, Russian officials sent mixed signals on missile defense,
announcing on the one hand that they were prepared to discuss the issue, while on the other
continuing to call for legal assurances from NATO and the United States that EPAA would not be
used to deter Russias nuclear forces. In mid-February, following a meeting with U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that
144
Moscow Still Needs Legal Guarantees NATO Missile Defense Not Aimed At ItLukashevich. Interfax. May 24,
2012.
145
US, Russia to Seek Joint Solutions To Missile Defense Row. Agence France Presse. June 18, 2012. Russia Hopes
to Resume Missile Defense Talks After US ElectionsAide. ITAR-TASS World Service. June 22, 2012.
146
Moscow Insists On Legal Guarantees That European Missile Shield Not Targeted Against ItDiplomat. Interfax.
July 12, 2012. Rasmussen Notes Lack of Progress with Russia on Missile Defense System. Interfax. July 16, 2012.
147
Dialogue Over Missile Defense With NATO StalledGrushko. ITAR-TASS. December 7, 2012. Russia, NATO To
Hold Consultations on Missile DefenseLavrov. Interfax. December 5, 2012.
148
Interfax Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama. Interfax. December 21, 2012. Russia, US Must Seek Compromises on
Complex ProblemsPutin. ITAR-TASS. December 20, 2012.

Russias position remains without any new nuances.... He also took note of the most recent
U.S. test launch, observing that it was, I think, the 24th successful test of the 30 accomplished.
The U.S. capabilities must not be underestimated.149
As noted above, the Obama Administration on March 15, 2013, announced the curtailment of the
fourth phase of EPAA, along with plans to emplace additional interceptors in Alaska. Observers
noted that this final phase, which was intended to establish the capability to intercept long-range
ballistic missiles, was the one that Russia most objected to. Soon after this, some observers
detected an apparent effort by Russia to call for dialogue. On March 25, Russian Defense
Minister Sergey Shoygu telephoned Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and invited him to hold
discussions on missile defense. NATO officials also expressed optimism that talks could move
forward.150
During his April 11, 2013, confirmation hearing to become commander of the U.S. European
Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, U.S. Air Force General Phillip Breedlove
reaffirmed the NATO/U.S. commitment to continue negotiations with Moscow by stating Both
the U.S. and NATO Russia Council are working on constructive engagements with Russia on
Missile Defense, to include joint technical studies and exercises when Russia is ready.151
On May 6, 2013, Russias Deputy Defense Minister, Anatoly Anonov responded to the
cancellation of the 4th stage of EPAA by saying that essentially nothing has changed, and
complained about a lack of predictability on the American side. He added, however, that the
window of opportunity exists today to agree on missile defense.152 Another Russian official later
referred to the changed U.S. policy as a cosmetic adjustment.153 Andonov also rebuffed the
proposal to provide written assurances on missile defense transparency that had allegedly been
made in a letter from President Obama to President Putin, arguing that it was no substitute for
legal guarantees. He also noted that the U.S. side would be unable to secure congressional
ratification of an agreement, and that some Members of Congress had urged that the missile
defense system be used as a deterrent against Russia.154
On March 13, 2013, Representative Mo Brooks introduced H.R. 1128, the Protecting U.S.
Missile Defense Information Act of 2013, which would restrict the Administration from sharing
information on missile defense capabilities with Russia. On July 24, 2013, during consideration
149
Russia Ready to Discuss Missile Defence Cooperation with NATO. ITAR-TASS. January 16, 2013. Russia, US Can
Start Concrete Missile Defence Talks After Kerrys Appointment. ITAR-TASS. January 28, 2013. Moscow Insists on
Being Given Legally-binding Guarantees on European Missile DefenseDuma Chairman. Interfax. February 6, 2013.
Russia, U.S. Positions on Missile Defense Have Not ChangedRyabkov. Interfax. February 15, 2013. Russia to Press
for Legal Guarantees that US Missile Defence Not Aimed at It. ITAR-TASS. February 18, 2013.
150
RF Sees No Grounds to Change Stance on Missile DefenseDeputy FM. ITAR-TASS. March 18, 2013. U.S.
Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed. New York Times. March 16, 2013. Moscow to Discuss Changes
in the US Missile Defense Plans. RIA Novosti. March 20, 2013. Russia Tones Down Criticism of New U.S. Missile
Plans. Reuters. March 21, 2013. Russia Keen for Talks on Missile Defense: Pentagon. AFP. March 25, 2013. NATO
Eyes Missile Shield Progress with Russia After US Move. Reuters. March 31, 2013.
151
The nomination of Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, to be Commander of the U.S. European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. April 11, 2013.
152
Postponement of 4th Stage of U.S. Missile Defense Increases Chances of Agreement with Russia, Interfax, May 6,
2013.
153
U.S. Political Guarantees on Missile Defense Are Not Enough, Interfax, May 27, 2013.
154
Transparency Cannot Solve Missile Defense Problems without Legal GuaranteesAntonov, Interfax, May 6,
2013.

of the Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397), the House approved by voice vote an
amendment by Mr. Brooks to prohibit funds from being used to implement or execute any
agreement with Russia concerning missile defenses.
In a press conference held during a visit to Poland, Secretary of State Kerry stated that the
United States has made zerozeroconcessions to Russia with respect to missile defense.155
Russian officials continued to reiterate their insistence that, although Moscow was open to
discussions over data sharing, legal guarantees constituted the single main condition for Russian
cooperation. Nonetheless, in July, Russias Security Council secretary stated that I think we will
reach an understanding [on missile defense] in the end, noting the U.S. view that the main
threat is coming from Iran and North Korea. Actually [the United States] is farther than us from
these countries ..., so it must understand that threats to it also threaten us.156
In August 2013, Russia announced that it had destroyed the S-300 missiles that had been once
been intended for sale to Iran; Moscow had cancelled the $800 million deal in 2010. The
following month, a Russian analyst speculated that his countrys government was beefing up its
naval presence in the Arctic in response to possible voyages to the region by NATO/U.S. Aegis-
equipped frigates. In addition, the Kremlin registered its objections in October when construction
began on the Aegis Ashore missile defense facility in Romania; U.S. Undersecretary for
Defense Policy James Miller was present for a ceremony at the base in Deveselu.157
Although Foreign Minister Lavrov in October 2013 said that Russia open to talks and
compromise, shortly thereafter it was announced that President Putin had scrapped an interagency
working group on missile defense cooperation with NATO and eliminated the position of Special
Envoy for missile defense negotiations.
In mid-December, the governments of Lithuania and Poland, as well as the U.S. State
Department, expressed concern over media reportslater confirmed by a Russian defense
ministry spokespersonthat Russia had deployed 10 Iskander tactical ballistic missiles to
Kaliningrad, within striking range of the planned NATO EPAA interceptor site. However, the
initial confirmation was subsequently contradicted by President Putin, who said that one of the
possible responses it to deploy Iskander complexes in Kaliningrad ... but I want to draw your
attention to the fact that such a decision has not yet been taken, let them be calm.158 Also,
Russian officials have been arguing that if Iran should agree to halt its nuclear program, there
would be no need for the EPAA.
In March 2014, in response to Russias aggressive stance toward Ukraine, along with its takeover
of Crimea, some policy makers have argued that the United States should resurrect the Bush
Administrations plan for European ballistic missile defense, which, as noted above, would have
entailed stationing ten silo-based interceptors in Poland and an X-band radar facility in the Czech
Republic. They argue that the cancellation of the fixed-silo BMD system was regarded by
155
Kerry: No Concessions to Russia on European Missile Shield, The Canadian Press, June 3, 2013.
156
Russian Security Council Secretary Believes Russia-U.S. Missile Defense Accord Possible, Interfax, July 3, 2013.
157
Russia Destroys Missiles Destined for Iran: Report, Agence France Presse, August 29, 2013. Russias Arctic
Military Moves Seen as NATO Missile Shield Response, UPI, September 15, 2013.
158
Russia Confirms Tactical Missile Deployment on NATO Borders, RIA Novosti, December 16, 2013. Putin Says
Missiles Not Yet Deployed to Kaliningrad Region, Reuter, December 19, 2013.

governments in the region as a walk-back, and that the move emboldened Russia. Revival of the
plan, they argue, would both send a message of determination to Russia and of solidarity to
Central and Eastern European allies.159
Others, however, contend that this would amount to an empty gesture, as such a system would not
be able to serve as a deterrent against Russian ICBMs, as the Bush Administration repeatedly
maintained in the past. To claim otherwise, they argue, would constitute an admission that earlier
statements had consistently misrepresented U.S. intentions and were knowingly false. Critics also
note that, even if the planned interceptors had been able to take out Russian ICBMs, they would
have had only a very limited effect against Russias extensive nuclear missile arsenal. There are
other, far more effective meanssuch as a targeted sanctions regimeof pressuring Russia to
curb its expansionist policies, some analysts contend.160
It was former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a holdover from the Bush to the Obama
Administration, who proposed in 2009 that The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
replace the first, static plan (a plan he approved during the Bush Administration); the revised plan
was designed in response to a new assessment by the intelligence community of the threat posed
by Iran. However, even though Iran is the country against which the EPAA is intended to defend,
some experts note that, because the new system is newer and largely sea-based, its mobility and
sophistication might enable it to take down ICBMs launched from other locations.161 According
to a press report, [t]he [Pentagon] budget retains a commitment to NATO and to building a
missile defense system in Europe.162 Aegis-ashore interceptors are scheduled to be installed in
Romania in 2015 and in Poland in 2018.
Russian President Putin in a wide-ranging speech on March 18 argued that NATOs adoption of a
missile defense capability, along with multiple enlargements to include former member states and
allies of the former Soviet Union, had created a sense of encirclement for Russia.163 A senior
Obama Administration official commented that missile defense has never been about Russia.164
Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul stated that, in response to the
Ukraine/Crimea crisis, the United States should cease cooperation with Russia on a number of
fronts, including negotiations over joint missile defense under the auspices of the NATO-Russia
Council.165 The Washington Times reported on March 26, 2014, that the Administration had
suspended talks with Russia on missile defense cooperation.166
159
Heat Rises As Obama Confronts Russia. International Herald Tribune. March 4, 2014. A Return to U.S. Realism.
International Herald Tribune. March 15, 2014. Romney Slams Obama for Faulty Judgement on Russia. Associated
Press Newswires. March 23, 2014. U.S. Congress Republicans Want Small Arms Sent to Help Ukraine. Reuters. March
23, 2014.
160
How to Sanction Russia; And Why Obamas Current Strategy Won't Work. By Lee S. Wolosky. Foreign Affairs.
March 19, 2014.
161
Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense. Federation of American
Scientists. FAS Special Report No. 1. September 2011.
162
2015 Defense Plan Would Keep Links to Europe. Associated Press Newswires. March 4, 2014.
163
Putin Signs Treaty to Add Crimea to Map of Russia. Associated Press Newswires. March 18, 2014.
164
Threats Did Not Sway Putin, Now US Tries Pain. Agence France Presse. March 18, 2014.
165
Confronting Putins Russia. New York Times. March 24, 2014.
166
Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: U.S. Fears Russia Planning to Federalize Ukraine, Alarming Congress, Washington
Times, March 26, 2014.

U.S.-Russia Economic Ties167

U.S.-Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post-Cold War period, reflecting
the changed U.S.-Russian relationship. Many experts have suggested that the relationship could
expand even further. U.S.-Russian trade, at least U.S. imports, has grown appreciably. The surge
in the value of imports is largely attributable to the rise in the world prices of oil and other natural
resourceswhich comprise the large share of U.S. imports from Russiaand not to an increase
in the volume of imports. U.S. exports span a range of products including meat, machinery parts,
and aircraft parts.
Russia accounted for 1.2% of U.S. imports and 0.7% of U.S. exports in 2013, and the United
States accounted for 2.7% of Russian exports and 6.0% of Russian imports. (See Table 1.) Russia
was the 28th-largest export market and 18th-largest source of imports for the United States in 2013.
According to Russian government data, by the end of 2012, the United States accounted for less
than 0.5%% of total accumulated foreign direct and portfolio investments in Russia. However, the
first three countries were other countries (45.6%), the Netherlands (13.7%), Cyprus (10.6%)
and Luxembourg (7.5%), suggesting that more than 70% of the investments might have been
repatriated Russian funds.
Russia and the United States have never been major economic partners, and it is unlikely that the
significance of bilateral trade will increase much in the near term. U.S. exports to Russia of
energy exploration equipment and technology, as well as industrial and agricultural equipment,
have increased. Russian demand for these products could increase as old equipment and
technology need to be replaced and modernized. Russias significance as a supplier of U.S.
imports will also likely remain small given the lack of international competitiveness of Russian
production outside of oil, gas, and other natural resources. U.S.-Russian investment relations
could grow tighter if Russias business climate improves; however, U.S. business concerns about
the Russian governments seemingly capricious intervention in energy and other sectors could
dampen the enthusiasm of all but adventuresome investors. U.S. Russian economic relations
could be affected by the dispute over Russias annexation of Crimea and its confrontation with
Ukraine.
On March 17, 2014, President Obama issued an executive order authorizing sanctions in the form
of seizure of U.S. assets and travel to the United States. The sanctions were imposed on seven
Russian officials who are influential in the Russian government and involved in Russian
government actions against Ukraine. These individuals included aides and advisors to President
Putin and leaders in both houses of the Russian parliament. The March 17 executive order also
included three members of the Crimean government that declared Crimeas independence from
Ukraine and also included former Ukrainian president Yanukovich because he called upon the
Russian government to send forces into Crimea. On March 20, President Obama issued a second
executive order expanded the list of sanctioned individuals to 16 additional government officials
and three non-government individuals and one institutionBank Rossiyareportedly with close
ties to the Russian leadership.
167
Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.

U.S. Assistance to Russia

U.S. assistance to Russia began around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union to address
concerns over possible nuclear proliferation risks and humanitarian needs. The former was
authorized by the Soviet Threat Reduction Act (P.L. 102-228; termed the Nunn-Lugar program
after its sponsors), and the latter was formalized in the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-511). Initially, more U.S. assistance was provided to Russia than to any other Soviet
successor state, but aid to Russia as a percentage of all aid to Eurasia declined over the years.
From FY1992 through FY2010, the U.S. government budgeted nearly $19 billion in assistance to
Russia (see Table 2 and Table 3, below; the amounts are intended to represent budgeting for all
agencies and programs, but a few classified amounts possibly may not be included). The bulk of
this assistance (nearly 60%) was expended on CTR (Nunn-Lugar) and other security-related
programs aiming to prevent the proliferation of WMD, combat drug-trafficking and transnational
crime, foster law enforcement and criminal justice sector reforms, and support reconciliation and
recovery efforts in Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus. Other aid was provided for
democratization, market reform, and health needs.168
Annual foreign operations appropriations bills contained conditions that Russia was expected to
meet in order to receive assistance:
A restriction on aid to Russia was approved in the FY1998 appropriations act and
each year thereafter, prohibiting any aid to the central government (local and
regional government assistance is permitted) unless the President certified that
Russia had not implemented a law discriminating against religious minorities.
Other democratization and human rights conditions were added for FY2008 and
retained thereafter in the face of abuses during the run-up to the December 2007
State Duma election. Although religious freedom generally was respected in
recent years, successive administrations issued waivers to overcome the
restrictions on aid because of ongoing problems of democratization and other
human rights.
Since FY1996, direct assistance to the government of Russia hinged on whether
it was continuing the sale of nuclear reactor technology to Iran. As a result, 60%
of planned U.S. assistance to Russias central government was cut. In actuality,
little if any aid was provided directly to the central government in recent years.
The FY2001 foreign aid bill prohibited 60% of aid to the central government of
Russia if it was not cooperating with international investigations of war crime
allegations in Chechnya or providing access to NGOs doing humanitarian work
in Chechnya. Possibly as a result of Russian cooperation with the United States
in anti-terrorism efforts, the war crime provision was dropped in subsequent
years.
A condition in the FREEDOM Support Act prohibited aid to a Soviet successor
state that had violated the territorial integrity of another successor state.
Presidential waivers for Russia were exercised after the 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict.
168
See CRS Report RL32866, U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union, by Curt Tarnoff.

The Ouster of the U.S. Agency for International Development

During a September 8, 2012, meeting between then-Secretary Clinton, Russian President Putin,
and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (a meeting that took place on the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, summit in Vladivostok), Clinton was informed that
Russia was planning to end USAID programs in the country by October 1, 2012. A formal
diplomatic note was sent to the State Department on September 12. On September 19, the
Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the work of USAID in Russia did by no means always meet
the stated purposes of contributing to the development of bilateral humanitarian cooperation.
There were attempts to influence, by means of allocating grants, political processes including
elections at different levels and civic institutions. The activity of USAID in Russian regions,
especially in the North Caucasus, raised serious questions.... It should also be noted that Russia ...
rejects the status of recipient of aid from all international organizations. As for the Russian
society, it has become mature enough and does not need external guidance.169 The State
Department asked for time beyond the deadline to close its USAID office and wind up existing
programs.
In a press briefing on September 18, State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated that
USAID had administered about $2.7 billion in assistance to Russia since 1992 and that its
programs in FY2012 amounted to about $51 million. She averred that it was Russias sovereign
right to end the programs, but voiced the hope that the United States would be able to continue
some support to Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that support democratization
and human rights. However, she appeared to acknowledge that other U.S. programs might not be
continued after the end of FY2012 when she stated that the United States has worked over the
years with the Russian Government on programs that fight AIDS there, fight tuberculosis, help
orphans, help the disabled, combat trafficking, support Russian programs in the environmental
area, [such as] wildlife protection. So it is our hope that Russia will now, itself, assume full
responsibility and take forward all of this work. She also indicated that the planned USAID
funding for Russia ($52 million was requested for FY2013, of which the bulk would have been
administered by USAID) could now be reallocated to other countries with needs.170 Many of
these programs have been part of cooperation efforts discussed by the working groups of the BPC
and had been the subject of accords reached at the U.S.-Russia summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, in
June 2012, and at other U.S.-Russia summits.
On September 20, 2012, Nuland pointed out that the ruling United Russia Party had received aid
for voter education and other party-representative efforts over the years, in effect disputing the
characterization by the Foreign Ministry that U.S. assistance favored opposition parties.
On March 28, 2013, Nuland indicated that the United States hoped to continue some aid to
Russian NGOs through third parties, referring to international organizations. The Russian Foreign
169
Comment from the Russian Foreign Ministrys Official Spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich on the USAID
Shutting Down its Activity in the Russian Federation, reported in CEDR, September 19, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950104.
On September 18, 2012, USAID had issued a fact sheet on its 20 years of activities in Russia, including support for
health, civil society, rule of law, judicial reform, and entrepreneurship. USAID stated that it had given support for the
writing of Russias constitution, civil code, tax code, and land code. See USAID, USAID in Russia, September 18,
2012, at http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-russia.
170
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, September 18, 2012; Press Statement: On Russian Decision to End
USAID Activities in Russia, September 18, 2012.

Ministry denounced such plans as attempts to circumvent Russian law and as interference in
Russias internal affairs.
Since FY2012, the Administration and Congress have supported the provision of assistance via
third parties to support democratization and human rights in Russia.
Legislation in the 113th Congress

H.R. 4278 (Royce). Ukraine Support Act. Introduced on March 21, 2014. Passed the House on
March 27, 2014. Authorizes $50 million for FY2014 for democratization assistance, reaffirms the
$1 billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine (in H.R. 4152, see below), authorizes up to $10 million
for FY2014 for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the Voice of America to provide
programming to Ukraine, and authorizes $8 million for FY2014 for law enforcement assistance.
Also calls for blocking assets and visas for Russians who influence Russian foreign policy,
particularly with respect to violations of Ukraines sovereignty, and for those responsible for
corruption in senior levels of the government. States that it is the sense of Congress that the
United States should suspend meetings of the NATO-Russia Council. Received in the Senate on
March 27, 2014.
H.R. 4152 (Rogers). To provide for the costs of loan guarantees for Ukraine. Introduced on March
5, 2014. Passed the House on March 6, 2014. The House version called for amounts appropriated
or otherwise made available under `Economic Support Fund in division K of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), and prior Acts making appropriations for the Department
of State, foreign operations, and related programs, funding from unobligated balances shall be
made available for the costs of loan guarantees for Ukraine. Passed the Senate with an
amendment on March 27, 2014. The amended version contains similar language calling for loan
guarantees for Ukraine. Authorizes $50 million to be appropriated for FY2015 for
democratization assistance for Ukraine. Authorizes $100 million to be appropriated for FY2015-
FY2017 for enhanced security cooperation with Ukraine. Calls for blocking assets and visas of
persons threatening the peace, security, and sovereignty of Ukraine, with a national security
waiver. Calls for blocking assets and visas of Russian government officials or associates
responsible for corruption. Calls for a report on Russian military power and objectives.
S. 2124 (Menendez). Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability
of Ukraine Act of 2014. Introduced on March 12, 2014. Reported to the Senate by the Foreign
Relations Committee on March 12, 2014. On March 13, 2014, a cloture motion on the motion to
proceed was presented in the Senate. Calls for the unobligated balance of amounts appropriated
or otherwise made available under the heading `Economic Support Fund under title III of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
(division K of P.L. 113-76) loan guarantees for Ukraine, authorizes $50 million for FY2015 to be
appropriated for democracy and economic reforms in Ukraine and Eastern Partnership countries,
authorizes $100 million for FY2015-FY2017 to be appropriated for additional security assistance
for Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, calls for a visa ban and asset freeze on
persons responsible for violence, gross human rights violations, or acts undermining stability and
territorial integrity in Ukraine, calls for a visa ban and asset freeze on officials of the Russian
government responsible for corruption in Ukraine or Russia, and appropriates an increase in the
U.S. quota in the IMF the dollar equivalent of 40.8718 billion in special drawing rights.

H.R. 4154 (Poe). Russia Visa Sanctions Act. Introduced on March 5, 2014. Referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 4278 (Royce). To support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine,
and for other purposes. Introduced on March 21, 2014. Referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.Res. 499 (Royce). Condemning the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity by military forces of the Russian Federation. Introduced on March 5, 2014.
Passed by the House on March 11, 2014.
S.Res. 370 (Coats). A resolution supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine and condemning
Russian military aggression in Ukraine. Introduced on March 5, 2014. Referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 378 (Durbin). A resolution condemning illegal Russian aggression in Ukraine. Introduced
on March 11, 2014. Passed by the Senate on March 11, 2014.
H.R. 1881 (Bishop)/S. 17 (Vitter). Energy Production and Project Delivery Act of 2013. H.R.
1881 was introduced February 27, 2013; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources. Sec. 305 prohibits the U.S. government from enforcing any regulations, proposals, or
actions establishing any carbon dioxide or greenhouse gas emissions reductions until a
certification is made that Russia and others have enforced such measures. A similar bill, S. 17,
was introduced May 8, 2013, and referred to the Committee on Natural Resources, and in
addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Transportation and Infrastructure, and the
Judiciary.
H.R. 893 (Ros-Lehtinen). Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of
2013. Introduced February 28, 2013; referred to the to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in
addition to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform, the Judiciary, Science, Space,
and Technology, Financial Services, and Transportation and Infrastructure. Directs the President
to impose sanctions on any foreign person, entity, or country that engaged in a uranium-related
joint venture with Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or with its agents. Prohibits the U.S. government
transfer of extraordinary payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station
unless the President reports to Congress that it is Russian policy to oppose the proliferation to or
from Iran, North Korea, and Syria of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems
and transfers that could contribute to Irans nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, or missile
programs. Authorizes some payments under certain conditions.
H.R. 1128 (Brooks). Protecting U.S. Missile Defense Information Act of 2013. Introduced March
13, 2013; referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Requires the President to submit a semi-annual report on any discussions on
missile defense between the U.S. government and the Russian government. Prohibits the use of
certain FY2014 funds for missile defense cooperation with Russia. Directs the President to
encourage Russia to disclose any support provided for the ballistic missile programs of China,
Syria, Iran, or North Korea.
H.R. 1692 (McGovern). Sudan Peace, Security, and Accountability Act of 2013. Introduced April
24, 2013; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on
Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and the Judiciary. Requires a semi-annual

report that includes a description of efforts to work with Russia and other governments and
persons that have significant influence or interests related to Sudan to engage the Government of
Sudan in achieving a comprehensive agreement for democratic reform.
H.R. 1793 (Connolly). Global Partnerships Act of 2013. Introduced April 26, 2013; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Government
Reform, Rules, and Ways and Means. Sec. 4384 calls for a Congressional review period for
licenses for export of commercial communications satellites for launch from Russia.
H.R. 2281 (Mike Rogers)/S. 1111 (Ron Johnson). Cyber Economic Espionage Accountability
Act. H.R. 2281 was introduced June 6, 2013; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in
addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Financial Services. Calls for U.S. diplomacy to
emphasize cyber economic espionage as a priority issue in all economic and diplomatic
discussions with Russia and other countries determined to encourage, tolerate, or conduct cyber
economic espionage. Calls on the Department of Justice should increase its efforts to bring
economic espionage criminal cases against offending foreign actors. Calls for the denial of visas
for U.S. entry of persons who are officials of a foreign government or persons acting on behalf of
a foreign government that the President determines are responsible for cyber espionage. A similar
bill, S. 1111, was introduced on June 6, 2013, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 2397 (Young). Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014. Introduced and reported by
the Committee on Appropriations June 17, 2013, (H.Rept. 113-113). Passed July 24, 2013.
Received in the Senate July 30, 2013; referred to the Committee on Appropriations. Sec. 10033
prohibits funding to execute any U.S.-Russia agreement pertaining to missile defense other than a
treaty or to provide Russia with information about the ballistic missile defense systems of the
United States.
H.R. 2855 (Granger). FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 113-185) July 30, 2013. Sec. 7072 directs
that no bilateral economic assistance is to be provided for the Russian government. Calls for the
Secretary of State to report on Russian arms and other support for the Syrian government and
nuclear support for Iran, as well as on the Russian governments persecution of civil society
organizations, corruption, discrimination against religious minorities, and efforts to prosecute law
enforcement personnel alleged to have committed human rights abuses.
H.R. 3304 (Deutch). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. Introduced
October 22, 2013. Passed October 28, 2013. Passed the Senate with amendments November 19,
2013. House agreed to the Senate amendments with an amendment December 12, 2013. Senate
agreed to the House amendment to the Senate amendment December 19, 2013. Signed into law
December 26, 2013, (P.L. 113-66). Sec. 1051 expresses the sense of the Congress that the
President should not reduce dual-capable aircraft based in Europe unless consideration is given to
whether Russia has undertaken such reductions. Also calls for notification of whether Russias
force posture changed as a result of such plans. Sec. 1056 expresses the sense of the Congress
that the force structure required by the New START Treaty should preserve Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile silos that contain a deployed missile. Sec. 1057 calls for the
retention of the capability to deploy multiple independently targetable vehicles on Minuteman III
missiles. Sec. 1060 expresses the sense of the Congress that future U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear
arms reductions be pursued through a verifiable treaty and take into account the full range of
nuclear weapons threatening the United States. Sec. 1246 expresses the sense of the Congress that
any missile defense cooperation with Russia should not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense

capabilities, and should be mutually beneficial and reciprocal in nature, and that Russia should
not be provided with missile defense information that would compromise U.S. national security.
The section also limits the provision of certain missile defense information to Russia. Sec. 1248
expresses the sense of the Congress that the U.S. government elicit Russian cooperation as part of
a plan to reduce the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
Sec. 1251 expresses the sense of the Congress that any U.S.-Russia executive agreement not limit
the deployment or capabilities of U.S. or NATO ballistic missile defense systems. Sec. 1254 calls
for the Secretary of Defense to report on Russias security and military strategy and on U.S.-
Russia military cooperation. Sec. 1255 prohibits contracts or agreements with Rosoboronexport
for FY2014, although a national security waiver is provided.
H.R. 3561 (Kingston). Prevent Russian Infiltration Act of 2013. Introduced November 20, 2013;
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Prohibits Department of State approval for
the Russian space agency to build or operate a ground monitoring station in the United States
unless the station does not raise counterintelligence or other national security concerns.
H.R. 3547 (Lamar), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. Introduced on November 20, 2013.
Passed the House on December 2, 2013. Passed the Senate on December 12, 2013. House agreed
to the Senate amendment on January 15, 2014. Senate concurred in the House amendment on
January 16, 2014. Signed into law on January 17, 2014, (P.L. 113-76). Sec. 8138 bans funding
contravening Sec. 1246 of the NDAA (see above) on providing certain missile defense
information to Russia. Sec. 7071 directs that before obligating assistance to the central
government of Russia, the Secretary of State should consult with the Committees on
Appropriations on how such assistance supports the national interests of the United States. Calls
for funds appropriated to countries designated by the European Union to be Eastern Partnership
countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) to be made available to
advance the signing and implementation of Association Agreements, trade agreements, and visa
liberalization agreements with the European Union (EU), and to reduce the vulnerability of the
states to external pressure not to enter into such accords with the EU. Also calls for a report on
pressure by Russia on the Eastern Partnership states to prevent their further integration into
Europe, and an assessment of whether Russia is erecting nontariff barriers against imports of
goods from these countries, and a description of actions by the U.S. government to ensure that the
countries maintain full sovereignty in their foreign policy decisionmaking. Also calls for a report
describing efforts by Russia to prosecute police and government personnel credibly alleged to be
responsible for gross human rights violations against Russians affiliated with civil society
organizations, the private sector, opposition political parties, and the media. Also calls for a report
detailing Russias support to Syria, including arms sales, and to Iran, including for nuclear
research cooperation and sanctions relief.
H.Con.Res. 53 (Barbara Lee). Urges all parties to the conflict in Syria to resolve the crisis in
Syria through a negotiated political settlement and to work through the United Nations and with
the international community to hold the Assad regime accountable. Introduced September 12,
2013; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 24 (Bachmann). Expresses the deep disappointment of the House of Representatives in the
enactment by the Russian government of a law ending inter-country adoptions of Russian
children by United States citizens and urges the Russian government to reconsider the law and
prioritize the processing of inter-country adoptions involving parentless Russian children who
were already matched with United States families before the enactment of the law. Introduced
January 14, 2013; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H.Res. 34 (Christopher Smith). Calls on the United States and Russia to continue cooperation in
securing safe and loving homes for un-parented children. Introduced January 15, 2013; referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 402 (Engel). Supports the European aspirations of the peoples of the European Unions
Eastern Partnership countries. Introduced November 12, 2013; referred to the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs. Ordered to be reported November 20, 2013. Calls on Russia to respect the
rights of states to make their own sovereign choices with regard to international partnerships,
including to sign Association Agreements with the European Union.
S. 960 (Menendez). Syria Transition Support Act of 2013. Introduced May 15, 2013; referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported July 24, 2013, (S.Rept. 113-79) and placed on the
legislative calendar. Calls for the Secretary of State to submit a report on a strategy for ensuring a
political transition in Syria, providing humanitarian assistance, and limiting extremist and
weapons proliferation threats, to include a description of efforts to establish a consensus with
Russia on ending Russian financial and military support for the Assad regime; establishing a
transition and post-transition period and government in Syria; and avoiding the expansion of
extremist ideologies and terrorist groups in Syria and the region.
S. 1021 (Shaheen). Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013. Introduced May
22, 2013; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Calls for the U.S. government to seek
increased financial and other support from Russia and other countries for stronger worldwide
physical security for WMD-related weapons and materials and for other international
nonproliferation efforts, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa.
S.Res. 198 (Graham). Expresses the sense of the Senate that Russia should turn over Edward
Snowden to U.S. authorities. Introduced July 18, 2013; referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations.
S.Res. 311 (Merkley). Calls on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to strongly oppose
Russias discriminatory law against the freedom of expression for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender persons and to obtain written assurance that host countries of the Olympic Games
will uphold all international human rights obligations for all persons observing or participating in
the Games regardless of race, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Introduced November
21, 2013; referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
S.Res. 317 (Sessions). Expresses the sense of the Senate on the continuing relationship between
the United States and Georgia. Introduced December 11, 2013; referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations. States that contrary to the 2008 Russia-Georgia ceasefire agreement, Russia
has constructed barriers along the administrative boundaries between South Ossetia and the rest
of Georgia, declares that the United States supports Georgias sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity, and raises concerns over the continued Russian occupation of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.

Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1996-2013

(in billions of dollars)
U.S. U.S.
U.S. U.S. Trade U.S. U.S. Trade
Year Exports Imports Balances Year Exports Imports Balances
1996 3.3 3.6 -0.3 2005 3.9 15.3 -11.3

1997 3.4 4.3 -0.9 2006 4.7 19.8 -15.1
1998 3.6 5.7 -2.1 2007 7.4 19.4 -12.0
1999 2.1 5.9 -3.8 2008 9.3 26.8 -17.5
2000 2.1 7.7 -5.6 2009 5.4 18.2 -12.8
2001 2.7 6.3 -3.5 2010 6.0 25.7 -19.7
2002 2.4 6.8 -4.4 2011 8.3 34.6 -26.3
2003 2.4 8.6 -6.2 2012 10.7 29.3 -18.6
2004 3.0 11.9 -8.9 2013 11.2 27.0 -15.8
Source: Compiled by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau data. FT900.
Note: Major U.S. exports: machinery; vehicles; meat; aircraft. Major U.S. imports: mineral fuels; inorganic
chemicals aluminum; steel.
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY1999

(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year/
Program Area 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Economic
84.68 137.21 1,187.92 231.37 72.69 39.35 51.21 74.0
Growth
Governing Justly
33.93 63.82 238.65 70.8 49.97 38.16 67.27 83.85
& Democratically
Humanitarian
167.89 1060.4 39.49 48.44 35.34 0.93 6.34 1,167.34
Assistance
Investing in
13.1 8.31 79.85 12.67 10.98 10.59 10.55 15.42
People
Peace & Security 28.81 182.71 361.69 203.19 323.18 456.21 461.36 790.05
Program Support 0 0 4.0 0.44 0 0 0 0
Cross-Cutting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2320.41 3445.45 3,905.6 2561.91 2488.16 2542.24 2594.73 4,129.66
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes all spigot program and agency assistance. Classified assistance is excluded.

Table 3. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY2000-FY2010, and Totals, FY1992-FY2010
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year/ Total
Program FY1992-
Area 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 FY2010
Economic
58.65 60.13 60.62 54.47 33.93 9.54 7.71 3.41 1.21 0.91 1.3 2,170.3
Growth
Governing Justly
& 68.26 82.26 79.89 79.98 64.31 64.04 78.7 57.41 67.88 60.57 64.6 1,414.3
Democratically
Humanitarian
243.1 92.37 23.83 26.1 19.97 1.5 13.23 0.0 3.67 4.2 1.7 2,955.8
Assistance
Investing in
15.88 21.92 21.92 19.36 21.31 28.59 23.82 23.95 29.64 23.71 9.9 366.0
People
Peace &
667.52 694.86 822.79 727.59 802.43 897.75 854.8 926.66 779.58 1,093.58 790.5 1,1865.3
Security
Program
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 1.25 1.41 7.84 5.9 20.9
Support
Cross-Cutting 0 4.19 5.49 5.0 2.71 6.88 4.48 0 0 0 0 28.74
Total 3053.41 2956.73 3016.54 2915.5 2948.66 3013.3 2988.84 3019.68 2891.39 3,199.81 2883.9 18,821.4
As % of Eurasia
48
aid
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Note: Includes Freedom Support Act and other program and agency assistance.
CRS-83
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol, Coordinator Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289 awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
William H. Cooper Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in International Trade and Finance Specialist in Missile Defense
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749 shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Carl Ek Paul Belkin
Specialist in International Relations Analyst in European Affairs
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286 pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
Steven Woehrel Derek E. Mix
Specialist in European Affairs Analyst in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291 dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Acknowledgments
Some portions of this report are based on the work of former Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Stuart Goldman.

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Russian Political, Economic, and

Security Issues and U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol, Coordinator

March 31, 2014

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

U.S.-Russia relations sharply deteriorated following Russias deployment of military forces to

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Assistance to Russia ........................................................................................................ 75

Congressional Research Service

Most Recent Developments: Russias Military

Congressional Research Service 1

Congressional Research Service 2

Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the

Political and Human Rights Developments

Congressional Research Service 3

The Russian Constitution combines

Congressional Research Service 4

Putins First Two Presidential Terms:

Congressional Research Service 5

The 2008-2012 Medvedev-Putin Tandem

Putins September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency

Congressional Research Service 6

The December 4, 2011, State Duma Election

Protests after the State Duma Election

Congressional Research Service 7

Seemingly as a reaction to the December 2011 protests, then-President Medvedev proposed

Congressional Research Service 8

gubernatorial elections were considered only semi-progressive by many

The March 2012 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath

The May 6, 2012, Bolotnaya Square Protest

President Putin Redux

Congressional Research Service 9

Congressional Research Service 10

Congressional Research Service 11

Congressional Research Service 12

Human Rights Problems and Issues

The Magnitsky Case

Congressional Research Service 13

Congressional Research Service 14

Retaliating Against the Magnitsky Act: Russias Dima Yakovlev Act

The Magnitsky and Yakovlev Lists

Congressional Research Service 15

The Adoption Ban

Congressional Research Service 16

A 139-member bipartisan Congressional Coalition on Adoption (CCA), co-chaired by Senators

Congressional Research Service 17

The Case of Punk Rockers Mariya Alekhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich, and

Other Moves against Oppositionists

Congressional Research Service 18

Raids against Nongovernmental Organizations Suspected to be

Congressional Research Service 19

Congressional Research Service 20

The Post-Sochi Olympics Restrictions on Human Rights

Insurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus

Congressional Research Service 21

Congressional Research Service 22

Among recent terrorist incidents:

Congressional Research Service 23

Congressional Research Service 24

Congressional Research Service 25

U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

In September 2002, a U.S.-Russia Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Cooperation and