American Academy of Political and Social Science

A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism

Author(s): Franco Ferracuti
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 463,
International Terrorism (Sep., 1982), pp. 129-140
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ANNALS, AAPSS, 463, September
1982
A
Sociopsychiatric
Interpretation
of Terrorism
By
FRANCO FERRACUTI
ABSTRACT: Definitions of terrorism are
imprecise
and difficult.
Even the units of
analysis
are not
uniform,
and
existing typologies
are
merely descriptive. Forecasting, however, particularly
middle-
and
long-range,
would
improve
if we could
provide
a valid theoreti-
cal formulation. This would have to be
interdisciplinary
and should
encompass
both the idioverse of the terrorist and the universe of the
terrorist events.
Psychiatric
contributions are few and
they
lack
general validity.
Violence and death
wishes,
which translate into
fantasy war,
are
generally accepted
characteristics. Four theories
are
briefly
discussed:
(1) frustration-aggression, (2)
unbalance of
the social
system, (3)
Olson's rational
choice,
and
(4)
Marxist
theory.
A subcultural
approach
would allow consideration of
group
and
individual factors and would
permit
some valid
policy
choices.
Franco Ferracuti has been
professor of criminological
medicine and
forensic
psychiatry, University of Rome,
since
1973,
and previously
taught criminology,
clinical
psychology,
and
psychopathology
there. Since
1977,
he has been a
consultant,
Department of
Social
Services, government of
Puerto
Rico;from
1980-81, consultant,
project
on
drugs
and
crime;
and consultant on
kidnapping
in
Sardinia,
United
Nations Social
Defense
Research
Institute, Rome; from 1978-81, consultant,
Italian
Ministry of
the Interior on antiterrorism. He has been
visiting professor
at various
universities in the United States and was
aformer staff member,
UN Secretariat. He
is a member
of
the American and International Societies
of Criminology
and was
former
chairman and member
of
the
Criminological Scientific
Council
of
the Council
of Europe.
129
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
EFINITIONS of terrorism, as
well as
descriptive
or histori-
cal
studies,
are
many
and several
attempts
have been made to outline
prescriptions
for the
prevention,
control,
and
management
of the
phenomenon.
Attempts
to
explain
this emer-
gence
of terrorism at a
group pheno-
menon
level,
or the
process
of
becoming
a
terrorist,
are less com-
mon.
They range
from
individual,
biographical
accounts to
sweeping
sociopolitical
or
psychiatric gener-
alizations. No
single theory
has
emerged,
and the various
hypo-
theses that have been
proposed
are
still
awaiting testing
and confirma-
tion. The
attempt
will be made to
present
an
integrated, interdiscipli-
nary
theoretical
approach, keeping
in mind
existing
studies and the
rather
disappointing
lessons that
criminologists
and
psychiatrists
have learned whenever
they
have
tried to reach a
scientifically accep-
table level of theoretical
exploration.
Some
preliminary
definitions
and/
or statements of
approach
are
obviously
needed.
WHICH TERRORISM?
Terrorism is not new. Its
impact
is, though,
and it has forced itself
into the
limelight
of international
awareness.
Many types
of terror-
isms
coexist,
and an
objective
defini-
tion,
in
spite
of the
many attempts,
is
still debated. One obvious
difficulty
is the need to abstain from value
judgments
and
personal
involve-
ments,
a
position
that is
practically
impossible
in relation to a
pheno-
menon in which we can all be
partic-
ipants, victims,
or even actors.
Moral and
political judgments
cloud
the
issue,
and
today's
terrorist can
be tomorrow's "freedom
fighter,"
if
his actions are successful. Pontara's
definition is as
good
a
starting point
as
any:
"A terrorist act is
any
action
carried out as
part
of a method of
political struggle,
aimed at
influencing,
or
conquering
or
defending
the State
power, imply-
ing
the use of extreme violence
(inflicting death,
or
suffering
or
injuries) against innocent,
non-
combatant
persons."1
This defini-
tion includes both terrorism "from
below" and terrorism "from
above,"
by
a state
against
its internal or
external enemies.
In the
following discussion, only
political
terrorism will be consid-
ered,
and within this
category,
criminal or
frankly psychopatholog-
ical
subjects
will also be excluded.
Although
terrorist movements can
use the criminal
element,
or
merge
with
it,
and
although mentally
imbalanced
individuals,
in the
psy-
chiatric
range,
can be used
by
ter-
rorist
groups,
what is of
greater
interest
is,
of
course,
the "normal"
terrorist,
that
is,
the individual who
is
mentally sane,
or
only slightly
altered,
at most in the
psychoneu-
rotic or
psychopathic range,
and
who is
engaged
in
subrevolutionary
or
revolutionary
activities. Criminal
terrorists are
using terror,
but their
goals
and motivations remain crimi-
nal,
and
they
must be
approached
as
such.
Psychiatric
terrorists and
assassins of
major political figures
remain
unpredictable,
almost
chance
occurrences,
and
defy
fore-
casting
and theoretical
explana-
tions.2
1. G.
Pontara,
"Violenza e Terrorismo: il
Problema della Definizione e della Giustifi-
cazione,"
in Dimensioni del Terrorismo Poli-
tico,
ed. L. Bonanate
(Milan:
Franco
Angeli,
1979), pp.
25-98.
2.
Many
studies of
political
assassina-
tions exist. Two recent
examples
are: M. C.
Havens,
C.
Leiden,
and K. M.
Schmitt,
The
Politics
of
Assassination
(Englewood Cliffs,
130
SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION
The
phenomenon
of terrorism
also
merges
with other forms of dis-
sent and
protest.
The
range
of
actions
begins
with
legal
and
accepted
forms of
dissent,
such as
individual oral
protests, petitions
or
grievances,
and
peaceful
demon-
strations;
moves to
illegal
but often
tolerated
behavior,
such as coercive
demonstrations,
violent demonstra-
tions,
seizures of
property
and van-
dalism;
and
finally
escalates to
illegal
and
unacceptable behavior,
such as
sabotage, personal assault,
bombing, kidnapping,
and assassi-
nation.3 The latter can take the for-
mat of mass
murder,
and serious
warnings
have been voiced about
the
possibility
of future
chemical,
bacteriological,
or nuclear threats.4
The "war
by proxy,"
which terror-
ism
is, goes
on in
spite
of
occasional,
often
temporary
"victories"
by
coun-
NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1970);
and J. F.
Kirkham,
S.
Levy,
and W. J.
Crofty,
Assassination and
Political
Violence,
Vol. 8 of a
report
to the
National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence
(Washington,
DC:
Government
Printing Office, 1969).
3. B.
McClure,
The
Dynamics
of
Terror-
ism
(Washington,
DC: International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of
Police, 1976).
4.
Among
the
many
studies of future ter-
rorist
strategy,
the
following
are some of the
most often
quoted:
B. M.
Jenkins, "Interna-
tional Terrorism: A New Mode of
Conflict,"
in International Terrorism and World Secur-
ity,
eds. 0. Carlton and C. Schaerf
(New
York: Halsted Press, 1975), pp. 13-49;
B. M.
Jenkins, High Technology
Terrorism and
Surrogate
War: The
Impact of
New Technol-
ogy
on Low-Level
Violence,
P-5339
(Santa
Monica: CA: The Rand
Corporation, 1975);
B.
M.
Jenkins,
Terrorism: Trends and Poten-
tialities
(Santa Monica,
CA: The Rand
Corpo-
ration, 1977);
R. H.
Kupperman
and D.
Trent, Terrorism:
Threat, Reality, Response
(Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution
Press,
1979);
National
Advisory
Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals,
Dis-
orders and Terrorism
(Washington,
DC: U.S.
Department
of Justice,
1976);
P.
Wilkinson,
Political Terrorism
(London: Macmillan,
1974).
terterrorists, perhaps
because it is
the
only possible
method of
waging
war left in a world where
large-scale
warfare has been rendered un-
thinkable
by
the
finality
of
global
atomic destruction. As it will be
seen
later,
this
perception
of low-
level
conflict, represented by
terror-
ism as
war, may
be essential to the
terrorist mind set.
In the final
analysis,
the
relativity
and the ex
post
facto nature of the
concept
of terrorism
defy
definition.
Cynically,
but
perhaps truly,
terror-
ism could be defined as "what the
other
person
does." What
we,
or the
state,
do is "anti- or counter-
terrorism,"
but
obviously
the
posi-
tions can be reversed
by shifting
sides,
or
simply by
the flow of
history.
THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS
Leaving aside,
at least momentar-
ily,
a
general definition,
we can
try
to
satisfy
our
historically
and statis-
tically
oriented
colleagues
and con-
centrate on a
description
of a
terrorist act as a unit of
analysis.
Again,
serious difficulties arise.
The scale of
events,
which has
already
been
presented, ranges
from
very
minor
acts,
some of them
even
quasi-legal
or at least toler-
ated,
such as
painting graffiti
on a
national monument to the
Bologna
Railroad Station
massacre,
at the
100 casualties level.
Obviously,
the
two events cannot be counted as
equal. Also,
the valence of the event
must be assessed
against
the
general
climate of the
country,
or even the
area of the
country,
in a
given
histor-
ical and
political
moment. To burn a
police
car in Central America or in
Northern Ireland has a different
value and
impact
than the same
event, undoubtly illegal
and claimed
as
terrorist,
in Switzerland or in
131
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
Norway.
The level of
reporting
will
also
vary, according
to the fre-
quency
of events and the
public per-
ception
of them.
Criminologists
have been faced with the
problem
of
indexing crimes,
and the Sellin-
Wolfgang
index has marked a
major
progress
in the
attempt
to refine our
measurements.5 Not
only
does it
allow for the
weighting
of events but
it also takes into account the relativ-
ity
and the
temporal
variations of
the
weights.
So
far,
such an index is
missing
in the
study
of
chronologies
of terrorist events and is
obviously
a
required
tool before
adequate
com-
puterization
can be
attempted6
or
before statistical tests,
such as the
Poisson
model,7
can be
applied
to
series of incidents. The
rarity
of
events makes statistical tests
ques-
tionable and unreliable. More
refined measures-or
entirely
dif-
ferent
areas,
such as the
public per-
ception
or fear of
terrorism,
or
public concern-may
have to be
tapped
if we are to make our mea-
surements
meaningful.8
5. T. Sellin and M. E.
Wolfgang,
The
Measurement
of Delinquency (New
York:
John
Wiley, 1964).
6.
See,
for a concise discussion,
D. A.
Waterman and B. M.
Jenkins,
"Heuristic
Modeling Using
Rule-Based
Computer Sys-
tems,"
in Terrorism,
eds. R. H.
Kupperman
and D.
Trent, pp. 285-330;
and W. W.
Fowler,
An
Agenda for Quantitative
Research on Ter-
rorism
(Santa Monica,
CA: The Rand
Corpo-
ration, 1980).
7. J. M. Gleason,
"A Poisson Model of
Incidents of International Terrorism in the
United States," Terrorism, 4(1-4):259-65
(1980).
8. For an
example
of a
public opinion
study,
see S. G.
Levy, "Special
Research
Report:
Attitudes Toward Political Vio-
lence,"
in Assassination and Political Vio-
lence,
eds. J. F.
Kirkham,
S.
Levy,
and W. J.
Crofty,
1969.
Examples
of Italian studies,
unpublished,
are
reported
in F. Bruno and F.
Ferracuti, "Aggression
in
Perspective:
Italy,"
in Global
Perspectives
on
Aggression,
eds. A. P. Goldstein and M.
Segall (New
York:
Pergamon Press, forthcoming).
Typologies
are also of
questiona-
ble value. To be
useful, they
must be
at least
descriptive,
inclusive,
dis-
crete,
endowed with
forecasting
or
prognostic
value, policy-generating,
possibly etiological,
and theoreti-
cally grounded.
No such
taxonomy
exists for
terrorism,
and available
typologies
of revolution or destabili-
zation do not fare better. McClure's
types by
cause are of some
help
in
identifying
the main
motives,
but
they stop
at a
very superficial
level
of
ideological
commitment and fall
short of
any
other criterion of valid-
ity.9
He lists five
major types by
"cause":
-resistance to colonial
rule,
for
example, Algeria
or
Cyprus,
the
only type fading
into histor-
ical oblivion ater
victory
and
international
global support;
-separatism,
for
example,
the
Basques
or the Puerto
Ricans,
allied to colonial
resistance,
but
ethnically
based and
politically
varied;
-internal-political,
for
example,
early
Mao or
early Castro,
in-
volving
an
attempt
to seize
power
within a
country
which
may
have different
political
connotations and
may
even
change political
affiliations;
-ideological,
for
example, Tupa-
maros,
the Red
Brigade,
Baader
Meinhof,
or Weather Under-
ground;
this is the most
danger-
ous and the one that attracts
theoretical attention;
the
goal
is
the destruction of the
system
without a viable and coherent
alternative in
view;
-supporting
external takeover,
for
example,
Vietnam in the
9. B.
McClure,
The Dynamics of
Terror-
ism,
1976.
132
SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION
sixties,
which
may
be a covert
operation,
and is
generally
of
limited interest.
The five
types may merge,
and
the identification of the terrorist
group may attempt
to
encompass
more than one
type,
such as the
unsuccessful
attempt by
the Red
Brigade
to establish a Sardinian
branch,
labeled
"Barbagia Rossa,"
exploiting deep-rooted feelings
of
independence.
Bonanate10
presents
a concise
typology,
based on the double
dichotomy
of
tactical/strategical
and
instrumental/goal-oriented
ter-
rorism. This is oriented
primarily
toward the modus
operandi
and car-
ries little
explanatory power.
A
sociopsychiatric theory
will
have,
at
present,
to concentrate on
ideological, goal-oriented
terrorism.
Many descriptive
works exist on the
individual and
group
characteris-
tics of other
types,
such as the well-
documented
study by
A. R.
Molnar,"
but their
transferability
to the
"pure," ideologically
commit-
ted,
full-time
enemy
of the state is
limited. Thus the heuristic value of
existing typologies
remains limited.
THEORY AS PREDICTION
A
sociopsychiatric theory
of ter-
rorism,
like
any theory
of deviant
behavior,
or in
general, any theory
at
all,
is a
logically integrated
set of
propositions
about the relations of
meaningful
variables. The
requi-
10. L.
Bonanate, ed.,
Dimensioni del Ter-
rorismo Politico
(Milan:
Franco
Angeli,
1979);
and L.
Bonanate,
"Realta e Miti di un
Fenomeno a Piu
Varianti,"
Politica Interna-
zionale,
11-12:59-67
(1981).
11. A. R.
Molnar,
Human Factors Con-
siderations
of Undergrounds
in
Insurgencies
(Washington,
DC:
Special Operations
Research Office,
The American
University,
1
December
1965).
sites of a
theory
have been the
object
of serious
scrutiny by
social and
behavioral scientists. For Talcott
Parsons the
principal
criteria of
good theory
are
conceptual clarity,
precision,
and
logical integration.12
The clearest statement of criteria is
probably
that made
by
Clarence
Schrag
for
criminological theory.s1
For
him,
before
theory
can be used
in
predictions
and
explanations,
it
must be
given
an
empirical
inter-
pretation by operational
definitions.
The
requisites
also include the fol-
lowing:
-logical adequacy;
-generality;
-comprehensiveness (number
and relevance of variables ac-
counted
for);
-informative
content;
-fertility (adaptability
to math-
ematical and
logical operation
and,
of
course,
heuristic fer-
tility
for "better"
theories);
-parsimony (the
elimination of
redundancy);
-credibility (congruence
between
claims and observed
evidence);
-significance (capacity
for solv-
ing problems);
and
-predictability (will
the claims
hold for future
observations?).
For Gunnar
Myrdal, theory
is a
priori
to the
empirical
observation
of
facts,
but in
science,
facts are sov-
12. T.
Parsons,
"Comment" to L.
Gross,
"Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework,"
American Journal of Sociology,
67:136-40
(Sept. 1961).
13. C.
Schrag,
"Some Notes on Crimino-
logical Theory,"
in
Conference
on Research
Planning
on Crime and
Deliquency,
ed. R.
Larson
(Los Angeles: University
of Southern
California Youth Studies
Center, 1962), p.
2.
133
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
ereign.14
Given the
paucity,
the
limited
validity,
and the
relativity
of
"facts" about
terrorism,
a theoreti-
cal statement
may
well be
premature.
Yet
forecasting requires theory,
to
get
out of actuarial
straitjackets
and to allow
planning.
In terrorism,
two kinds of
forecasting obviously
coexist.
On one
side, limited, short-range
forecasting,
which does not
tamper
with
major
variables but
only
with
predictable
terrorists' and other
"actors"' activities and
behaviors,
essentially
a
police
or criminalistic
operation,
is better solved
by
such
tested tools as simulation
games,
association
charting,
and
profiles
or
psychobiographies.
On the other
hand,
middle- and
long-range forecasting imply
a dif-
ferent set of
operations
to be con-
ducted
using
the full
array
of the
social
planner's
and
policymaker's
tools,
from
Delphi
methods to
mathematical
modeling
to
systems
analysis. Admittedly,
the difference
between
short-, middle-,
and
long-
range forecasting
is not
simply
an
issue of
temporal extension,
and the
variables to be included in the
analy-
sis
may
extend
beyond generational
limits,
thus
raising
the
interesting
question
of our
right
to make
policy
choices for future
generations.16
14. G.
Myrdal,
Value and Social Theory:
A Selection
of Essays
on
Methodology,
ed. P.
Streeten
(New
York:
Harper
&
Row, 1958),
p.
236.
15. On
forecasting, many methodological
issues have been raised. For a discussion of
pertinent aspects,
see G.
Marbach,
Previsioni
di
Lungo
Periodo: Analisi
esplorative (Milan:
Franco
Angeli, 1980);
G. Marbach, "Condi-
tions and Problems of the Scientific
Study
of
the Future,"
Economic
Notes,
10
(1981);
and
W. W.
Deutsch,
"Some
Prospects
for the
Future,"
Journal
of
International
Affairs,
31(2):315-26 (1977).
Another
problem
in
forecasting
is
the difference between
(1)
the
pre-
diction of future actions
by
individu-
als,
or the identification of
prospective terrorists,
their
entry
into the
groups,
their
"careers,"
and
the forced or
spontaneous
termina-
tion of their activities
compared
with
(2)
the
analysis
of future behav-
ior of
groups,
or the
forecasting
of
destabilization.
Forecasting
individuals' behav-
ior is a
clinically
oriented
activity
where
psychiatrists
and criminolo-
gists
have not fared too well. The
idioverse of the individual
terrorist,
in
spite
of various
in-depth analyses
and
biographies,16
remains
largely
unknown
except
for a few unrelated
facts. The risk of
overgeneralization
and
overprediction
remains
large.
Forecasting group
behavior has
seen a
relatively large body
of stu-
dies, particularly by political
scient-
ists
searching
for the correlates and
predictors
of destabilization.17 The
16.
See,
for
example,
F. J.
Hacker,
Cru-
saders, Criminals,
Crazies: Terror and Ter-
rorism in Our Time
(New
York: W. W.
Norton, 1976);
F. J.
Hacker,
"Terror and Ter-
rorism: Modern Growth
Industry
and Mass
Entertainment," Terrorism, 4(1):163-69
(1980).
See also K.
Kellen,
Terrorists-What
Are
They
Like? How Some Terrorists Des-
cribe Their World and Actions
(Santa
Mon-
ica,
CA: The Rand
Corporation, 1979).
For a
recent
autobiography,
see
Giorgio,
Memorie
dalla Clandestinita: un Terrorista Non Pen-
tito Si Racconta
(Milan: Savelli, 1981).
17. The correlates of destabilization and
revolution have been
analyzed by many
authors;
few
large-scale studies, however,
exist. See the
following:
S.
Lipset,
Political
Man: The Social Bases
of
Politics
(New
York:
Doubleday, 1960);
J. C.
Davies,
"Toward a
Theory
of
Revolution,"
American
Sociologi-
cal
Review,
27:5-19
(1962);
C.
Johnson,
Revo-
lutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown,
1966);
S. P.
Huntington,
Political Order in
Changing
Societies
(New Haven,
CT: Yale
University Press, 1968);
T. R.
Gurr, Why
Men
Rebel
(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton
University
Press, 1970);
T. R.
Gurr,
"The Revolution-
134
SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION
instability
of
political systems
neither
automatically generates
ter-
rorism nor ensures its
vitality.
Whatever
theory emerges,
it
should
admittedly
be
interdiscipli-
nary
and should
attempt
to encom-
pass
both the idioverse of the
terrorist and the universe of his or
her social
systems.
Of
course, forecasting
could be
futile. To
quote Ortega y
Gasset in
a 1951
speech
on the occasion of his
Ad Honorem Doctorate at the Uni-
versity
of
Glasgow:
"Man is at all
times
projected
over the
frightening
emptiness
which future is."18 But
according
to
Ortega,
the future is
empty
because it is the
problematic
dimension of our life: For
him,
prophets
were useless:
With the
noon-bright clarity
which
Greek minds
enjoyed, already
Oeschilus
says
to the first
prophetess, Cassandra,
that to
prophetize
is the most useless
operation
of
all,
because it leads to two
alternatives
only:
if to
prophetize
a
future disaster could be
useful,
men
would avoid
it,
and the
prophecy, being
unfulfilled,
would not be valid.
If,
how-
ever,
the
prophecy
would
anyhow
be
fulfilled,
it would mean that to forecast
the
negative
future would have been
useless.
Thus
Apollus gave
Cassandra the
gifts
to "see" the
future,
on the one
condition that
nobody
would
pay
her
any
attention.
Social
Change
Nexus: Some Old Theories
and New
Hypotheses," Comparative Politics,
Apr. 1973, 359-92;
J. C.
Davies, "Aggres-
sion, Violence,
Revolution and
War,"
ch. 9 in
Handbook
of
Political
Psychology,
ed. J. N.
Knutsen
(San
Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1973),
pp. 234-60;
E. N.
Muller, Aggressive
Political
Participation (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1979);
D. J.
Monti,
"The Rela-
tion Between Terrorism and Domestic Civil
Disorders," Terrorism, 4(1-4):123-61 (1980).
18. J.
Ortega y Gasset,
"Sobre la Rebelion
de las Masas," Apendice
11 in La Rebelion de
las Masas
(Madrid:
Revista de Occidente en
Alianza Editorial, 1980).
Forecasting
terrorist
activities,
in
spite
of
Ortega's pessimism,
is a
needed art. In a
way,
terrorists are
somewhat
helpful.
Their need for an
audience
and,
in most
instances,
their
highly politicized
behavioral
patterns
make some
forecasting
feasible.
AVAILABLE FACTS
A. C.
Hazelip
has tried to deter-
mine the
unity
in the
principles
of
terrorists,
and their adherence to
the same
principles, through
an
analysis
of the statements of
promi-
nent terrorist
leaders, ranging
from
Bakunin to
Marighella.19
The 12
principles
are the
following: (1)
Vio-
lence is
necessary
to overthrow
oppression. (2)
There is no limit to
the extent of violence
justified. (3)
Actions should
clearly convey
their
purpose. (4) Reprisal killings
are
counterproductive. (5)
Ruthlessness
and
extraordinary
violence are
essential to terrorist success.
(6)
Government failures can be used to
gain popular support. (7)
Terrorism
exposes
the
repressive
side of
government. (8)
Terrorists aim to
incapacitate government directly
or
indirectly. (9) Secrecy
is
important
to terrorist
operations. (10) Syste-
matic
planning
and execution are
critical to terrorist success.
(11)
Small-scale, persistent
attacks are
most effective.
(12)
Terrorists are
dedicated to destruction for the sake
of their cause.
From a behavioral science
pers-
pective,
the most
important
ele-
ments
appear
to be the commitment
to violence and the
operational
flexi-
bility,
a contrast to the
rigidity
of the
19. A. C.
Hazelip,
Twelve Tenets
of
Ter-
rorism An Assessment
of Theory and Prac-
tice
(Ann Arbor,
MI:
University
Microfilms
International, 1980).
135
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
political
credo. Another common
element in
ideological
terrorism
is,
as A. Koestler
indicated,
the
urge
to
dedicate oneself to a
cause,
a
leader,
an
ideology.20
This can be a needed
replacement
for anomie or for an
existential
vacuum,
which
may
drive other individuals to
drifting
or
to
entering
the
drug
culture.
Thus,
to
engage
in terrorism
may
be an
adoptive response,
and this
may
explain
its
appeal
for affluent or
middle-class
youth
faced with value
conflicts.21 Alternative
explanations
are Davies's2
gap
between
rising
expectations
and need
satisfaction,
and Gurr's23
model, already implied
in
Marx,24 which introduces the
discrepancy
between "value
expec-
tations" and "value
capabilities"
of
youth's
environment.
Aggression
and violent
action,
as
F. Fanon25
stated,
increase self-
esteem,
thus
generating
Sorel's
"sentiment of
glory."26
A "blockade"
hypothesis
has been
formulated
by Bonanate,
somewhat
in line with the earlier frustration-
aggression hypotheses.27
Available
facts,
at least in
Europe,
contradict
the
"blocks,"
unless
they
are seen as
20. A.
Koestler, quoted by
J. C.
Davies,
"Aggression, Violence,
Revolution and War."
21. F. Ferracuti and F. Bruno,
"Psychiat-
ric
Aspects
of Terrorism in
Italy,"
in The
Mad,
the Bad and the
Different,
eds. I. L.
Barak-Glantz and C. R. Huff
(Lexington,
MA:
Lexington Books,
1981).
22. J. C.
Davies, "Aggression, Violence,
Revolution and War."
23. T. R.
Gurr, Why Men
Rebel; and T. R.
Gurr,
"The Revolution-Social
Change
Nexus."
24. K.
Marx, "Wage,
Labor and
Capital,"
in K. Marx and F.
Engels,
Selected Works in
Two Volumes
(Moscow: Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1949)
1.
25. F.
Fanon, quoted by
J. C.
Davies,
"Aggression, Violence, Revolution and
War,"
p.
245.
26.
Sorel, quoted, ibid., p.
245.
27. L.
Bonante, Dimensioni del Terro-
rismo Politico.
internal, perceived obstacles,
not
related to social realities.
In line with a more
psychiatric
approach, patricidal impulses, rig-
idity,
and death wishes have been
invoked as
explanations. They
all
fall short of
predictive power
and
general applicability.
The
relationship
with death is an
interesting, dynamic
element of the
terrorist's
personality.
The
biologi-
cal instinct to
survive,
for the indi-
vidual and
society,
is the
authority
that vetoes the
acceptance
of death.
Man
escapes
from death
using every
available
mechanism,
but
particu-
larly through
a
specific psychologi-
cal
attitude,
defined as "the delusion
of
immortality," through
which man
lives
day by day
as if death either did
not exist or did not concern him.
This defense mechanism is a remo-
val and denial of
reality,
an
escape
from
reality.
Death
per
se cannot be
accepted
at the
experiential
level
and must therefore be
rationalized,
attributed to chance or to natural
processes,
made into a
symbol
of an
exceptional event,
or denied and
lived
simply
as a
religious
transition
from life on earth to eternal life.
The
only
condition under which
this attitude toward death is drasti-
cally changed
and the survival
instinct
appears
not to
operate,
is
war. In a war situation man
appears
ready
to kill and be
killed,
the most
aberrant forms of
aggression
are
carried out
by highly
civilized cul-
tures,
and
every
soldier can
engage
in murder. War
permits
the rule of
death over life and the
legitimiza-
tion of terror. The "normal" terror-
ist is therefore like a soldier outside
of time and
space, living
in a
reality
of war that exists
only
in his or her
fantasy.
This is
widely
reflected in
terrorists'
writings
and in their
pos-
ture,
when
captured,
of
claiming
"prisoner
of war" status.
136
SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION
At this
point,
to understand the
differences
among terrorists,
"nor-
mal"
citizens,
and
criminals,
it
may
be useful to
analyze
the elements
that allow one to live in a
fantasy
state of war within a
reality
of
peace
and
democracy,
and to
compare
and
contrast real war with the terrorist's
fantasy
war.28
Real war is a
complex pheno-
menon
involving
the subversion of
norms, values,
and habits in the lives
of two or more societies
trying
to
solve
through strength
a conflict
based on
opposite
interests. A status
of real war can take
place only
if
some conditions exist. The first is
the need for two or more
clearly
dis-
tinguishable groups
or
societies,
each with a clear and discrete social
identity.
War is a collective and
organized phenomenon.
One neces-
sary
and
irreplaceable prerequisite
for a collective event is the existence
of a
collectivity.
To
modify
itself
through
a state of
war,
it must
pos-
sess a certain
degree
of
organization
and
sovereignty.
The
organization
is
needed in order to maintain a viable
social
structure,
and
sovereignty
ensures the
independence
of
power
from the structure.
A second condition for a real war
to take
place
is the existence of a
crisis
involving
two or more collec-
tivities due to a
reciprocal
conflict of
interests. In other
words,
for war to
happen,
the concerned
groups
or
nations must
experience
the need
for the
appropriation
of
something-
a
physical object
or an instrumental
asset-whose
property
is contested
and which is considered indivisible.
The third condition is the transi-
tion from a state of
peace
to a state of
war,
with the
acceptance
of new
values,
new
goals,
and new behav-
28. F. Bruno and F.
Ferracuti, "Aggres-
sion in
Perspective: Italy."
ioral
patterns,
which must be func-
tional to the new
lifestyle.
The last condition is the need for
the use of
strength
and all the
sophisticated technological
aids
man has created to
multiply
his
limited
physical power
for the
pur-
pose
of
inflicting
harm.
The
process
that
precedes
enter-
ing
a state of war involves the identi-
fication
by
the
participating
societies of the
"enemy"
as such and
therefore of the latter's transforma-
tion into
something
alien and hos-
tile.
Implied
is a
projection
of one's
own dramatic anxieties over the loss
or destruction of the contested
object;
also
implied
is the decision to
destroy
the
enemy
in order to
pre-
vent the
appropriation
or destruc-
tion of the
object.
Together
and
parallel
with the
process
of alienation of the
enemy,
there is a maniacal
feeling
of
increasing power
and invulnerabil-
ity
in the
parties
involved.
All these mechanisms
produce
what the Latin
expression
identifies
as the animus
belli,
the will to
wage
war that is
psychologically
domi-
nant in at least one of the
contending
groups.
The
opposite group,
in order
to
survive,
must assume a similar
posture.
Terrorism, however,
is
fantasy
war,
real
only
in the mind of the
terrorist.
Fantasy war,
of
course,
is
only partial war,
real for
only
one of
the contestants who then
adopts
war
values, norms,
and behaviors
against
another, generally larger group,
trying
to solve
through strength
a
conflict based on
legitimate
or
illeg-
itimate
grievances.
A
fantasy
war is
neither
accepted
nor
acknowledged
by
the other
group who,
in
effect,
tends to
deny
it.
Fantasy
war is
therefore an
ongoing phenomenon,
in a
continuously
unstable balance
between two
possible stabilizing
137
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
processes:
real war or diffuse terror.
Fantasy
war becomes real
only
if
acknowledged by
the
"enemy,"
and
becomes terrorism
when,
unable to
compel
the
enemy
to
accept
a state of
war,
it must limit itself to
harassing
and
destabilizing
the
enemy through
the utilization and diffusion of fear.
The
operational
conditions of fan-
tasy
war are similar to those of real
war,
but are in
part artificially pro-
duced so as to mimic
reality.
For
example,
even
fantasy
war needs the
existence of at least two
groups,
dis-
tinct and
organized.
Within the
same
society,
since
sovereignty
can
only
be attributed to one
group,
that
to which it is denied tries to achieve
it, carrying
out the
symbolic
duties
and
privileges
of the
other,
dominat-
ing group
and
rejecting existing
laws and
prevailing
values. Thus the
terrorist
group
claims
power
of life
and death over
citizens, engages
in
criminal activities while
claiming
their
lawfulness,
establishes courts
of
law,
and
promulgates
sentences,
applying
new laws. A crisis is neces-
sary (if
none is
taking place,
it must
be
generated);
solutions to the crisis
are
rejected ("reforms delay
the
revolution");
and the existence of a
love
object, perceived
as in
danger,
is also
necessary.
This
object
is not
contested
by
the other
group,
but it
is threatened in its structure and
functions. The
process
of
singling
out and
alienating
the
enemy
is iden-
tical to what takes
place
in real
war,
but it can assume much more
serious
pathological
connotations
because it is less
subject
to
reality
testing
and criticism.
Lastly, fantasy war,
as real
war,
is carried out
by executing projects
of
destruction,
but the chain reac-
tion,
not
being completely
main-
tained
by
counteractions
by
the
other
group,
must be self-sustained
through
an escalation of terror that
does not
permit
the
participants
to
abstain from action or even to lower
the level of conflict.
As
already stated,
two
possible
scenarios exist in
fantasy
war:
either it
changes
into real
war,
and
thus ends with the defeat of one con-
testant;
or it stabilizes itself into ter-
ror,
and in this case it can
only
enter
into a new
crisis,
thus
removing
the
threat to the
object
and
making
it
accessible to both
contestants,
or it
can
change
the
system, reducing
or
abolishing
the
prerequisites
of war.
At this
point,
it can be
hypothes-
ized that terrorists differ from "nor-
mal" citizens and from criminals
first of all because
they perceive
themselves as different and alien
vis-a-vis the
ruling society;
because
they belong
to a
group
characterized
by
a
strong ideological, cultural,
and
political identity;
and also because
they
feel that their love
object
is
threatened
by
the rest of
society,
which
they identify
as an
enemy
and
therefore
try
to
destroy.
To achieve
this
goal,
which is love and not
hate,
they
choose
violence,
which
they
use
to
generate terror,
this
being
the
only option,
in their
perception, open
to them.
AVAILABLE THEORIES
Salert has summarized the four
main theories.29
Briefly, they
are as
follows:
1. Olson30
Theory,
or Revolution
as a Rational Choice. Revolution is
the best
alternative, given
the
pre-
vailing
social circumstances. Game
theory
and cost-benefit
analysis
29. B.
Salert,
Revolutions and Revolution-
aries: Four Theories
(New
York:
Elsevier,
1976).
30. J. M.
Olson,
The
Logic of
Collective
Action,
rev. ed.
(New
York: Schocken
Books,
1971).
138
SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION
should
permit verification, given
its
inherent
rationality.
No role is
envisaged
for individual motives.
2. A
Psychological Theory.31
This
is
mostly
based on frustration-
aggression,
and on the
already-cited
Davies reformulation.32 This moves
the
problem
from the social universe
to the
idioverse,
and motives and
countermotives are
superficially
handled.
Also,
the
theory
is at least
partially tautological
and does not
account for those who abstain from
terrorism, although frustrated,
or
for
"repented"
terrorists.
3. A
Theory
of the Unbalance of
the Social
System. Proposed by
C.
Johnson,
this is a
homeostatic, "sys-
tem"
approach, essentially
based on
the
validity
of the selection of
variables-increase of
ideological
activity,
armed
forces, general
and
political criminality,
and suicide-
as an index of anomie.33
Again,
the
individual idioverse
component
is
overlooked.
4. Marxist
Theory.34
This is the
most difficult to
synthesize
because
of its
long history
and its various
interpretations.
Its elaborations
have followed different
paths,
although
not
necessarily incompati-
ble,
such as the scientific-
positivistic
on one
side,
based on the
social and economic
aspects,
con-
trasted with the
Hegelian,
individu-
alistic, praxis-oriented aspect,
as in
Marcuse.35 The transfer from "class
31. T. R.
Gurr, Why
Men
Rebel;
and T. R.
Gurr,
"The Revolution-Social
Change
Nexus."
32. J. C.
Davies, "Aggression, Violence,
Revolution and War."
33. C.
Johnson, Revolutionary
Change.
34. K.
Marx,
"A Contribution to the Cri-
tique
of Political
Economy,"
in The Marx-
Engels Reader,
ed. R. C. Tucker
(New
York:
Norton, 1972), pp.
4-5.
35. H.
Marcuse, Ragione
e Rivoluzione:
Hegel
e il
Sorgere
della "Teoria Sociale"
(Bologna:
II
Mulino, 1965).
consciousness" to
"revolutionary
consciousness" remains
historically
unproved,
and further
conceptual
elaborations are in
progress,
as in
Negri.36
It is
important
to acknowl-
edge
the official
rejection
of revolu-
tionary
terrorist violence
by
classic
Marxism.
None of the four theories ana-
lyzed by
Salert fulfills the criteria of
sound
theory
or
provides adequate
basis for
forecasting
and
planning.
New efforts are
needed, particu-
larly
if the
attempt
is
going
to be
made to cover universe and idio-
verse. Terrorists live in cultures and
try
to establish their own value
sys-
tems and
subcultures,
both to
justify
themselves and to
proselytize.
A
subcultural
approach37
would fall
within an established form of refer-
ence for the
analysis
of violent
behavior,
of which
political
violence
would be a
specific subcategory.
The
learning process, implied
in the
subcultural
theory,
would
explain
indoctrination and terrorist
careers. At the same
time,
individ-
ual differences in life
experience
would find
proper placement
in the
process
of
entering
the subculture.
Moreover,
the
psychological
dynamics
would
permit psychiatric
handling
in terms of value
changes.
Co-option,
for
example,
would be a
more valid
policy
than
military
con-
trol. In
addition, dispersal
of the
subculture,
for
example,
in the
pri-
son
environment,
could be a useful
indication for short-term
policy.
Of
course,
verification is for the
future,
and constitutes the task
facing
the
behavioral scientist
approaching
the
subject
of terrorism.
36. A.
Negri,
II Communismo e la Guerra
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980).
37. M. E.
Wolfgang
and F.
Ferracuti,
The
Subculture
of
Violence
(London: Tavistock,
1967).
139
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
In
closing,
a statement
by Henry
David
Thoreau,
dated
1849,
in Civil
Disobedience should
guide
the
search for
understanding:
"All men
recognize
the
right
of
revolution;
that is the
right
to refuse
allegiance
to and to resist the
government,
when its
tyranny
or its
inefficiency
are
great
and unendurable."
Terrorists are not
aliens; they
are
our
youth.
We cannot dismiss them
as
enemies, except
in a
short-range
approach.
In the
long range,
if we
want to
stop terrorism,
we must
understand terrorists.
140