INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

FORTHESOUTHERNDISTRICTOFALABAMA

CARID.SEARCY,etal., )
)
PLAINTIFFS, )
)
VS. ) CASENO.:1:14cv00208
)
ROBERTBENTLEY,etal., )
)
)
DEFENDANTS. )

BRIEFINSUPPORTOFMOTIONTODISMISS
BYDEFENDANTNANCYBUCKNER

PursuanttoFED.R.CIV.P.12(b)(1),12(b)(6)andS.D.ALA.L.R.7.1Defendant,
Commissioner Nancy Buckner, submits the following brief in support of her
MotiontoDismiss:
CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1
II. RULE12(b)(1)STANDARD.............................................................................................................3
III. RULE12(b)(6)STANDARD.............................................................................................................4
IV. ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................................................6
A. PlaintiffslackstandingtobringaclaimagainstCommissionerBuckner..............................6
B. CommissionerBucknerisentitledtoqualifiedimmunity.....................................................13
V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................16

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff McKeand gave birth to plaintiff, minor, K.S., in 2005, in Mobile,

Alabamaandsubsequentlylegallymarriedplaintiff,SearcyinCaliforniain2008.
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 1 of 18

(Complaint, Doc. #1, 13, 18). Plaintiff Searcy petitioned the Probate Court of
MobileCounty,AlabamaseekingtoadoptK.S.asstepparentandwasdeniedby
defendant, Judge Don Davis. (Complaint, 2122). Upon denial, a Notice of
Appeal was filed with the Supreme Court of Alabama, which subsequently
assigned the case to the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama. (Complaint, 23).
The Court of Civil Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed Judge Davis
decision.(Complaint,23).
On May 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a federal claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief against defendants alleging violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
14
th
Amendment Equal Protection rights and violation of 14
th
Amendment Due
Process rights. (Complaint, 2). Searcy and McKeand claim that they were
denied the right to a stepparent adoption specifically because they are a same
sexmarriedcouple.ThisclaimconteststheconstitutionalityofALA.CODE301
19andALA.CONST.AMEND.No.774.(Complaint,1).
Plaintiffs named multiple defendants which include: Robert Bentley,
Governor of Alabama; Luther Strange III, Attorney General for the State of
Alabama; Honorable Don Davis, Mobile County, Alabama Judge of Probate;
Catherine M. Donald, Alabama State Registrar for Vital Statistics; and Nancy
Buckner, Commissioner for the State of Alabama Department of Human
Resources.
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 2 of 18

Plaintiffs allege that DHR has the authority to amend birth certificates to
reflect the adoption of a child thereby having enforcement authority relative to
thestatutesandlawsoftheStateofAlabama.(Complaint,11).Plaintiffsallege
that Defendant Buckner, as Commissioner of Alabama DHR, has enforcement
authority in connection with the Sancity Laws in relation to the altering and/or
amendmentofbirthcertificates.(Complaint,11).
II. RULE12(b)(1)STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
powerauthorizedbyConstitutionandstatute,seeWillyv.CoastalCorp.,,503U.S.
131, 136137, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed. 2d 501 (1986),
which is not to be expanded by judicial decree, American Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Finn,341U.S.6,71S.Ct.534,95L.Ed.702(1951).Itistobepresumedthatacause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction, Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 8, 11, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799), and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
298 U.S. 178, 182183, 56 S.Ct. 780, 782, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Kokkonen v.
GuardianLifeInsuranceCompanyofAmerica,511U.S.375,377,114S.Ct.1673,1675
(1994). A defendant can move to dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)forlackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionbyeitherfacialorfactualattack.A
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 3 of 18

facial attack on the complaint requires the court merely to look and see if the
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the
allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.
(quotation, citation, and alterations omitted). By contrast, a factual attack on a
complaint challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction using material
extrinsic from the pleadings, such as affidavits or testimony. Staley v. Orlando
regionalHealthcareSystem,Inc.,524F.3d1229,1233(11
th
Cir.2008).
The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are
anessentialingredientofseparationandequilibrationofpowers,restrainingthe
courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting
permanently regarding certain subjects. Friends of Everglades v. United States
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,699F.3d1280,1288(11
th
Cir.2012);quotingSteel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998).
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
functionremainingtothecourtisthatofannouncingthefactanddismissingthe
cause.AnagoFranchising,Inc.v.Shaz,LLC,677F.3d1272,1281(11
th
Cir.2012).
III. RULE12(b)(6)STANDARD

UnderFED.R.CIV.P.12(b)(6)dismissalofthecomplaintforfailuretostate
acauseofactionisappropriatewhennoconstructionofthefactualallegationsof
thecomplaintwillsupportthecauseofaction.MarshallCountyBoardofEducation
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 4 of 18

v. Marshall County Gas District, 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11

th
Cir. 1993). The Court
maydismissthecomplaintonlyifitisclearthatnoreliefcouldbegrantedunder
any set of facts in support of its claims. Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of America
Mideast,Ltd.,800F.2d1577,1579(11
th
Cir.1986).
Therulefordismissalissummarizedasfollows:
ARule12(b)(6)motionteststhelegalsufficiencyofthecomplaint.
Prior to the Supreme Courts recent decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss could only be
granted if a plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would
entitlehimtorelief.SeeConleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,4546(1957);
see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Wright v.
Newsome,795F.2d964,967(11
th
Cir.1986).Now,inordertosurvive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must
allegeenoughfactstostateaclaimtoreliefthatisplausibleonits
face.Twombly,127S.Ct.at1974.Whilethefactualallegationsofa
complaint need not be detailed, a plaintiff must nevertheless
providethegroundsofhisentitlementtoreliefandaformulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. at
1965.Theplaintiffs[f]actualallegationsmustbeenoughtoraisea
right to relief above a speculative level on the assumption that the
allegations in the complaint are true. Id. It is not sufficient that
thepleadingsmerelyle[ave]openthepossibilitythattheplaintiff
might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
recover. Id. At 1968 (internal quotation and altercation omitted).
Inconsideringadefendantsmotiontodismiss,adistrictcourtwill
acceptastrueallwellpleadedfactualallegationsandviewthemin
alightmostfavorabletotheplaintiff.SeeAm.UnitedLifeIns.Co.v.
Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11
th
Cir.2007). Accord Nelson v.
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 640 (2004) (where a court is considering
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 5 of 18

dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage, it must assume the

allegationsofthecomplaintaretrue).

McCleskyv.CityofDothan,Alabama, F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 4671454, 454

at3(M.D.Ala.December3,2009).
TheCourtisnotrequiredtoacceptaplaintiffslegalconclusions,Ashcroft
v.Iqbal,566U.S.662(2009)(notingthetenetthatacourtmustacceptastrueall
oftheallegationscontainedinacomplaintisinapplicabletolegalconclusions).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiffs pleadings, the court makes
reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor, but [is] not required to draw
plaintiffsinference.Aldanav.DelMonteFreshProduce,N.A.,Inc.,416F.3d1242,
1248(11
th
Cir.2005).Similarly,unwarranteddeductionsoffactinacomplaint
are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiffs
allegations.Id.;seealsoAshcroftv.Iqbal,556U.S.662,129S.Ct.1937,1951(2009)at
1951(statingconclusoryallegationsarenotentitledtobeassumedtrue).
IV. ARGUMENTS

A. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim against

CommissionerBuckner.

Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendant Buckner in her official capacity

as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources. (Alabama
DHR) It is undisputed that Alabama DHR is a state agency. A suit against a
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 6 of 18

government official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the

officialsofficeitself.SeeKentuckyv.Graham,473nU.S.159,16566(1985).When
thatofficeisanarmofthestategovernment,theEleventhAmendmentprotects
the sovereignty of the state by prohibiting suits when recovery would be paid
fromstatefunds.Robinsonv.Ga.DeptofTransp.,966F.2d637,63839(11
th
Cir.
1992); see Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1976) (defining scope of sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). Becausethe Eleventh Amendment
bars suits for monetary relief against a state or its instrumentalities by its own
citizens.
WhiletheEleventhAmendmenthasbeenconstruedtobarsuitsagainsta
statebroughtbythatstatesowncitizens,absentthestatesconsent,thereexistsa
wellrecognized exception to this general rule for suits against state officers
seekingprospectiverelieftoendcontinuingviolationsoffederallaw.McClendon
v. Ga. Dept of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11
th
Cir. 2001) (emphasis in
original);seealsoExparteYoung,209U.S.123,15960(1908).
In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an
Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a
straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective. Idaho v. couer dAlene Tribe of Idaho,
521U.S.261,296,117S.Ct.2028(SOUTER,J.,joinedbySTEVENS,
GINSBURGandBREYER,JJ.,(dissenting).

VerizonMaryland,Inc.v.PublicServ.CommnofMaryland,535U.S.635,645(2002).
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 7 of 18

However, the plaintiffs may not employ the doctrine under Ex parte
Young, unless they can establish Article III standing. Article III standing is a
constitutionallimitationontheexerciseoffederalcourtjurisdiction.SeeLujanv.
DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555(1992).Aplaintiffwillgenerallyhavestanding
only where (a) they experienced injury in fact that is (1) concrete and
particularized and (2) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (b)
they injury is fairly traceable to the defendants conduct; and (c) their harm is
likelytoberedressedbyafavorabledecision.Id.At560561.Plaintiffsbearthe
burdenofestablishingeachofthethreestandingelements.SeeBennetv.Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 16768 (1997). At the motion to dismiss stage, the party seeking
standing must rely on the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. (citing Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561). Here, assuming there is an injury, plaintiffs simply cannot meet
prongs(2)and(3).
In order to have standing to bring a claim for prospective or injunctive
relief, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate a sufficient likelihood that
hewillagainbewrongedinasimilarway.CityofLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.
95,112(1983).
Because injunctions regulate future conduct a party has standing to
seekinjunctivereliefonlyifthepartyalleges,andultimatelyproves,a
realandimmediateasopposedtomerelyconjecturalorhypothetical
threatoffutureinjury.Logically,aprospectiveremedywillprovide
no relief for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the
past.Althoughpastwrongsareevidencebearingonwhetherthereis
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 8 of 18

arealandimmediatethreatofrepeatedinjury,pastexposuretoillegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing,
presentadverseaffects.

Church v. City of Hunstville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11

th
Cir. 1990) (alteration to
original)(citationsandinternalquotationmarksomitted).
TheseminalcaseapplyingthisstandardisCityofLosAngelesv.Lyons.The
plaintiffinLyonssuedtheCityofLosAngelesandfourpoliceofficersafterbeing
subjected to a chokehold without provocation during the course of his arrest.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98. The plaintiff sued for damages, as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief that would bar the city from enforcing a policy that allowed
officers to use chokeholds absent an immediate threat of deadly force. Id.
AlthoughtheSupremeCourtallowedtheplaintiffsclaimformoneydamagesto
proceed, it found that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue injunctive
relief because there was not a sufficient likelihood that he will again be
wronged in a similar way. Id. at 111. In other words, there was no real and
immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for
any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness without provocation or resistance on his part. Id. at 105. See
Thomas v. Buckner, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103260, 2011 WL 4071948 (M.D. Ala.
Sept.13,2011).(Plaintiffsdidnothavestandingtoseekgeneralizedinjunctiveor
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 9 of 18

10

declaratory relief from a DHR policy that did not require a hearing before
placingallegedchildabusersonacentralregistrythatlistedabusers).
Relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act is explained in Jallali v. USA
Funds, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113578, at * 1820. (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2012). as
follows:
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202, does not grant
litigants an absolute right to relief. Rather, under the Act, federal courts
haveuniqueandsubstantialdiscretionindecidingwhethertodeclarethe
rights of litigants. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286, 115 S. Ct.
2137, 132 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1995). The main purpose of the Act is to settle
actualcontroversiesbeforetheyripenintoviolationsoflaworbreachesof
duty. While past injury may confer a plaintiff standing to seek money
damages, it does not ordinarily confer standing unless a plaintiff
demonstrates a sufficient likelihood that she will again be wronged in a
similar way. Similarly, [b]ecause injunctions regulate future conduct, a
party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party alleges . . . a
realandimmediateasopposedtoamerelyconjecturalorhypothetical
threat of future injury. Lugo v. 141 NW 20th Street Holdings, LLC, No. 12
80440,2012U.S.Dist.LEXIS90524,2012WL2524288,at*3(S.D.Fla.June
29, 2012) (Marra, J.) (quoting Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Canadian Steel, Inc. v. HFP
Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 1123650, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84441, 2012 WL
2326119,at*10(S.D.Fla.June19,2012)(Altonaga,J.)(Inordertoreceive
declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiffs must establish that there was a
violation,thatthereisaseriousriskofcontinuingirreparableinjuryifthe
relief is not granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.
(quoting Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000))). Thus, a
prayer for declaratory or injunctive relief requires the Court to assess
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently shown a real and immediate threat
of future harm. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2006);
accordCityofLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.95,105,103S.Ct.1660,75L.Ed.
2d 675 (1983); Am. Federation of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. City of
Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 10 of 18

11

F.3d1234,1265(11thCir.2001).InthisCircuit,foraninjurytosufficefor
prospective relief, it must be imminent. Elend, 471 F.3d at 1207 (citing 31
FosterChildrenv.Bush,329F.3d1255,1266(11thCir.2003)).

The Plaintiffs allege that DHR has the authority and power to, among
other things, amend birth certificates to reflect the adoption of a child .
(Complaint11).DHRsdutiesaresetoutinALA. CODE 3826.(1975)which
concern the development of welfare activities. DHRs varying public welfare
responsibilities include, but is not limited to, the administration of public
assistance, conducting investigations upon complaints concerning minor
children, licensing child care institutions and licensing adult foster homes. ALA.
CODE 3826. (1)(10)(13)(18) (1975). Commissioner Buckners duties as DHRs
Chief Executive Officer are specifically set out in ALA. CODE 3823 (1975) as
summarizedbelow:
conferencewithStateDepartmentofHumanResourcesBoard(hereinafter
Board) for the adoption of policies, rules and regulations for the
governmentoftheBoardandtheDepartment

performadministrativeandexecutivedutiessubjecttotheauthorityofthe
Board

submit annual budget of all funds appropriated to the Department for

approvalbytheStateDHRBoard

publish annual report of the operation and administration of the

Department and submission of the report with recommendations to the
Board

appoint a director for each bureau and such other personnel as may be
necessaryfortheefficientperformanceofduties
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 11 of 18

12

interpret policies, rules and regulations formulated by the Board and

authority to create bureaus as necessary for effective operation of the
public assistance program, and to allocate functions among bureaus and
departmentalagencies
Inthiscase,theplaintiffsarenotentitledtoseekprospectiveinjunctiveor
declaratoryreliefagainstCommissionerBucknergiventhatshehasnoauthority
to amend birth certificates. To the contrary, ALA. CODE 2610A32 states as
follows:
(b) Upon receipt of a copy of any final order of adoption the State
RegistrarofVitalStatisticsshallcausetobemadeanewrecordofthe
birth in the new name and with the name or names of the adopting
parent or parents as contained in the final decree. The state registrar
shall then cause to be sealed and filed the original certificate of birth
withthedecreeofthecourt.

Hence, the complaint does not allege a sufficient likelihood that the plaintiffs
will suffer a future wrong by Commissioner Buckner. Any alleged real and
immediatefutureharmcannotbedirectlyconnectedtoCommissionerBuckner
because she has no duty for amending birth certificates nor for granting a step
parentadoption.
Here, plaintiffs cannot establish prong (2) because their alleged injury is
not traceable to Commissioner Buckner. Second, plaintiffs failed to establish
prong (3) because there is legal impossibility that Commissioner Buckner has a
duty to amend birth certificates. Moreover, Commissioner Buckner does not
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 12 of 18

13

havethepowertoenactlegislationtochangetheSancityLaws.Therefore,sheis
simplynottheproperdefendant.
B. CommissionerBucknerisentitledtoqualifiedimmunity.

The test for whether a government defendant is entitled to qualified

immunityinhisorherindividualcapacityinvolvesatwostepanalysis.Thefirst
inquiry concerns whether the defendant government official was performing a
discretionary function. Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11
th
Cir. 1997).
CommissionerBucknersdutiesareexecutiveandadministrativeinnature.The
plaintiffs do not allege that she does not have discretionary authority as to her
duties set out in ALA. CODE 3823 (1975). Rather, plaintiffs are challenging a
specificstatute.
Once theofficial has establishedthathe was engagedinadiscretionary
function, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the official is not
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. If the plaintiff fails to furnish sufficient
factualallegationsatthisstage,thedefendantofficerisentitledtojudgmentasa
matter of law. See Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 248 F.3d at 1014, 1028 (11th
Cir.2001).
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation and
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 13 of 18

14

internal quotations omitted). This standard does not require a prior court
decisiontohavedeclaredtheprecisesetoffactspresentlyallegedunlawful,but
it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.Andersonv.Creighton,483U.S.635,640(1987).Thesalientquestion
is whether the state of the law gave [the officers] fair warning that their
allegedtreatmentof[theplaintiff]wasunconstitutional.Hope,536U.S.at741.
The Eleventh Circuit has further refined the analysis of when the law is
clearlyestablished.Ithasobservedthatfairandclearnoticemaybegivenby
(1) the obvious clarity of the pertinent federal statute or constitutional
provision, such that qualified immunity may be overcome in the total absence
ofcaselaw,(2)thejudicialdeterminationthatcertainconducthasbeendefined
asunlawfulwithoutregardto particularfacts, and (3)holdingsin specific cases
that are tied to certain facts. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 135051 (11th Cir.
2002) (emphasis removed). The decisions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit,andthehighestcourtinthestateinwhichthecasearoseprovidethecase
law capable of clearly establishing the boundaries of rights in the qualified
immunityanalysis.Thomasexrel.,Thomasv.Roberts,323F.3d950,953(11thCir.
2003).Therelevantinquiryisfactspecific,39F.3d308,311(11
th
Cir.1994),and
aplaintiffmustpointtoacontrollingcase,decidedbeforetheeventsatissuethat
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 14 of 18

15

establishes a constitutional violation of immaterially similar facts. Lassiter v.

AlabamaA&MUniv.Bd.ofTrustees,28F.3d1146,1150(11
th
Cir.1994).
The qualified immunity analysis consists of two separate components:
first,thegovernmentofficialmustestablishthatheorsheactedwithinthescope
of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred, and
second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officials actions clearly violated
established rights. Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th
Cir. 1992). The term discretionary authority includes all actions of a
governmentofficialthat(1)wereundertakenpursuanttotheperformanceofhis
duties, and (2)were within the scope of his authority. Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d
1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.
1988)).
The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to
carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal
liability or harassing litigation, Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346(11thCir.2002),byensuringthatonlytheplainlyincompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law are subjected to liability.
Chesser,248F.3dat1122(quotingMalleyv.Briggs,475U.S.335,341,
106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). To receive qualified
immunity, the public official must first prove that he was acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Lee v.
Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). If the defendants were not acting within their
discretionary authority, they are ineligible for the benefit of
qualifiedImmunity.SeeLee,284F.3dat1194.
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 15 of 18

16

Smithv.Siegleman,322F.3d1290,12941295(11thCir.2003).
All of Commissioner Buckners duties concern administration of an
welfare agency which would be within her discretion. There is no clear
precedentthatestablishesanydutyonherparttoenactlegislationregardingthe
Sanctity Laws. Additionally, she has no responsibilities that mandate or even
givehertheauthoritytoamendabirthcertificate.Instead,thatlieswithanother
agency. Plaintiffs simply cannot be permitted to discharge their burden by
referring to general rules and to the violation of abstract rights. Lassiter v.
Alabama A&M, 28F.3dat 1150;See also Bartsv.Joyner,865 F.2d 1187,1190(11
th

Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs may not rely on general conclusory allegations of some
constitutionalviolation,orbystatingbroadlegaltruisms).
V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant Commissioner Buckner requests

thisHonorableCourttodismissplaintiffsclaimswithprejudice.
RESPECTFULLYSUBMITTEDonthisthe3
rd
dayofJune,2014.
LUTHERSTRANGE(STR003)
ATTORNEYGENERAL

SHARONE.FICQUETTE
(FIC001)
GENERALCOUNSEL
Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 16 of 18

17

/s/FeliciaM.Brooks
FeliciaM.Brooks(BRO153)
DeputyAttorneyGeneral

COUNSELFORDEFENDANT
COMMISSIONERBUCKNER

OFCOUNSEL:
STATEOFALABAMADEPARTMENT
OFHUMANRESOURCES
LegalOffice
P.O.Box304000
Montgomery,Alabama361304000
PhoneNumber:(334)2429330
Facsimile:(334)2420689
Email:felicia.brooks@dhr.alabama.gov

Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 17 of 18

18

CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANT NANCY BUCKNER on the
followingviaCM/ECFEfilesystemand/orU.S.mailtothefollowingonthisthe
3
rd
dayofJune,2014.
Hon.ChristineC.Hernandez
christine@hernandezlaw.comcastbiz.net

Hon.DavidG.Kennedy
david@kennedylawyers.com

Hon.JasonKirkHagmaier
jkh100@bellsouth.net

Hon.LutherStrange,III
501WashingtonAvenue
Montgomery,AL36104

CatherineM.Donald
201MonroeStreet,Ste.1150
Montgomery,AL36104

/s/FeliciaM.Brooks
FeliciaM.Brooks(BRO153)
OfCounsel

Case 1:14-cv-00208-N Document 15 Filed 06/03/14 Page 18 of 18