Introduction to Special Issue: Performing Islamic Revival in Africa

Author(s): Chanfi Ahmed

Source: Africa Today, Vol. 54, No. 4, Performing Islamic Revival in Africa (Summer, 2008),
pp. vii-xiii
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Introduction to
Special
Issue:
Performing
Islamic Revival in Africa
Chanfi Ahmed
This
special
issue offers different case studies that
pursue
a set of common
propositions
in the
analysis
of the Islamic revival in Africa.
Topics
covered
include activities of Muslim Bible
preachers
in
public spaces
in East Africa
(Ahmed), performances
of collective
prayer
in West African towns
(Schulz),
narratives of
(re-(conversion
to Islam in Northern
Nigerian
video films
(Krings),
and demonstrative conversion to Islam as an instrument of
struggle
for
gang
leaders in Southern
Nigeria (M?ntelos).
First,
these studies transcend the
widely
used distinction between
instrumentalist and essentialist
interpretations
of
religious performance by
looking
at their
topics
as means for African Muslims to internalize Islamic
revivalist ideas
developed
in Arabic countries. At the same
time, they
inter
nalize other
important
features: the habitus of
competition
and
performance
particular
to
many
African cultural
practices,
and the conversion methods
and
strategies
of African Pentecostal churches.
Secondly,
these studies ask how these
performative practices
of Islam
in sub-Saharan Africa have been
perceived by
other
religious actors,
Muslims
as well
as
Christians,
who are all
engaged
in the African "market of
religious
conversion."
From the
beginning
of the era of
independence
to the end of the
1980s,
the
public sphere
in Africa has been dominated almost
entirely by
the state
and its
propaganda.
The end of the Cold
War, symbolically
marked
by
the
fall of the Berlin
Wall,
saw
processes
of liberalization and democratization
everywhere
in the
world, including
sub-Saharan Africa. Since
then,
non
governmental groups?associations, foundations, NGOs, political parties,
and
religious organizations?have
started to take over the
public sphere.
In
particular,
Islam and
Christianity
have established
strong
new
public
movements. Both
religions
had been
present
in the
public sphere before,
with
public
ceremonies such as Christian
masses and
processions
and the
Islamic Mawlud. Celebrations for the two main Islamic
holidays,
'Id al-Fitr
and 'Id
al-Adha,
had
always
been an
important part
of the
religious tradition,
but in the
1980s, religious public presence began
to
change substantially.
Currently,
it is the Pentecostal churches and the
Salafiyya
that show the
strongest public presence.
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<z
These extremes of
religious
activism have not
completely superseded
other
religious groups,
but
they
are
by
far the most active in the
public
sphere.
The articles in this volume look at a
plethora
of Islamic
agents
active
in the
public sphere, ranging
from extremist Salafism to moderate forms of
Islam.1
2. Mass,
Enactment of
Power,
and Conversion
o
O
The current increase of
groups promoting
the
expansion
of Islam in sub
5
Saharan Africa must be contextualized within the historical framework of
2
religious
activism in the
region:
it has to be considered in relation to the
*
degree
of concurrence these
groups
face in a
genuine
market of
religious
~^~
conversion.
=:
Another
point
that merits closer attention is the efficient
organization
_
of these
groups
in networks. Modern means of communication not
only
5
render
fundraising easier,
but also
help propagate
the
religious message
and
o
thus
gain
new
adherents.
Newspapers, books, propaganda leaflets,
and audio
and
videotapes containing
sermons are sold in
bookshops,
at
markets,
and
in streets
throughout
Africa. The
religious message
is transmitted to a wider
public through
radio and television broadcasts and the Internet. As if this
was not
enough, huge public
events are
organized, including
mass
prayers
or sermons or a mixture of the
two,
as in the case of the famous Pentecostal
"crusades/'2 The latter
gained
a certain
notoriety
with the controversial
stag
ings
of the German
missionary
Reinhard Bonnke
(Heuser 2006;
K?rschner
Pelkmann
2002).
Despite
their Christian
origin,
these methods of
appropriating
the
public sphere
have been imitated and
adapted by
Muslims. Since the
1980s,
these forms of
performance
have become an
important
manifestation of
Islamic revivalism in sub-Saharan Africa. In
fact,
one of their aims is to
take over the
public sphere, emphasizing
the
power
of the
group
and attract
ing
new converts. These
hopes
are shared
by
both Muslim and Christian
activists,
who
engage
in new forms of
religious performance.
However,
there are certain differences between Muslims and Chris
tians in the field of
public performance.
In seminaries and
public prayer
assemblies,
Christian Pentecostalists and Charismatics focus on tech
niques
of
healing
and the exorcism of evil
spirits
and demons?a tradition
they
trace
back to
Jesus.3
So
far,
no
such
production
of miracles exists in
Muslim
public gatherings; rather,
Muslims resort to
emphatic preaching,
a
genuine
Islamic tradition. Some of the
preachers
are
ulama, i.e., religious
scholars with a
classical education in Islamic
studies;
others have studied
science while
taking
classes in Islamic studies.
However,
most of the
Muslims in these
public
assemblies have no
classical education in Islamic
sciences at all?an
entirely
novel
phenomenon
in the
history
of Islamic
preaching.
Like the charismatic
Pentecostalists,
most often
they
have
nothing
but
a
firmly grounded faith,
which seems
qualification enough
>
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to
preach?a phenomenon
reminiscent of the
Tabligh Jamaat (or Jamaat
at-Tabligh),
the
biggest missionary
movement in Islam
today.
The mem
bers of the
Tabligh Jamaat
start
preaching
before
acquiring
wider
religious
knowledge (Heuser, K?rschner-Pelkmann,
and
Asamoah-Gyadu 2005).
Once their faith is deemed
strong enough, they
are
encouraged
to
preach.
Most Muslims look down on the
Tabligh Jamaat
because its
practice goes
back to the
evangelical
churches.
Despite
the
contempt many
Muslims
P
display
toward
it,
their ideas and methods are
increasingly gaining ground
?2.
in the Muslim world. p
An
example
of this
phenomenon
is
given by
Ahmed in his article on O
the Muslim Bible scholars or Muslim
preachers
in East
Africa,
whose main
5
performances
consist of
giving
sermons in
public places,
like
markets,
bus
!?
stations,
football
stadiums,
and
so on.
Although
the
public
at these sessions
*
consists of Muslims and
Christians,
the sermons are directed
mainly
at
~z~
the latter. These
preachers,
as
former Christians
having
converted to Islam
_
(many having
even been
parsons
or
pastors
before their
conversion), shape n
their sermons
essentially
as deconstructions of biblical texts in favor of >
Islam,
with the aim of
converting
Christians to Islam.
zi
These
public
sermons attract
huge
numbers of
people
for several
^
reasons: the Muslim Bible
preachers
are
eloquent, they
understand how to
g
argue, they
have a remarkable
knowledge
of biblical
texts,
and their melo
dramatic
way
of
performing
is
highly entertaining.
The number of
people
who convert
during
these
public gatherings
and the wide media
coverage
of
these events add to their success.
They
are much criticized
by
Christians
(especially
church
officials),
for
stirring up
interreligious conflicts,
and
by Muslims,
who consider them
lacking
in Islamic
knowledge
and thus
unqualified
to
preach
Islam.
Similar observations on the battle for the
public sphere
are made
by
Schulz in her contribution
on a
group
of Muslim
women in Mali. These
women
captured
the
religious public sphere by praying together
with men
and
celebrating
the Mawlud next to male fellow Muslims.
During
the
Mawlud,
their
leaders,
who are women
too, preach
in
public?a novelty
not
only
for
Mali,
but Islamic societies in
general,
where women are
traditionally
confined to the household and are forbidden to
practice
their faith in
public
places.
Women who attend
prayer
at the
mosque usually
have to
pray
in a
separate
corner behind the
men,
curtained off
by
a screen. This
applies
to
Muslim women in Mali as much as elsewhere in the Muslim
world;
how
ever,
the
women described
by
Schulz
pray
in
public, clearly
visible
by
male
Muslims. Like the Muslim Bible
scholars,
these women
hope
to
gain
wider
public
notice
through
new
religious practices.
While these
practices
are
considered scandalous
by many,
the fact that
they
are talked about in
public
and further transmitted
through
the media
helps
increase these
groups'
impact
in the
public sphere.
The introduction of collective du'a
(supplicatory
prayer)
and salat
(ritual
of
worship),4
as much
as the
huge public prayer
meet
ings
that
bring together great
numbers of
Muslims,
is
clearly
derived from
Christian
groups,
in
particular
the Pentecostalists.
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Traditionally,
Muslims used to
say
their du'a
prayers individually,
regardless
of whether these concerned
spiritual pleas
for God's
mercy
or
forgiveness?or
more
worldly demands,
such as
for material
prosperity
in
this world. To do this in a
public assembly,
as
happens nowadays
in
Mali,
Nigeria,
and other West African
countries,
is an
entirely
novel
phenomenon.5
Even more
striking
is the fact that these
meetings bring together
Muslim
^ men
and
women,
and sometimes even Muslims and Christians.6
Here, prayer
2.
deploys
its fullest
economic, communicative,
and sociable
meaning,
o
3
>
Mass,
Enactment of
Violence,
and Conversion
en
?
Islamic revivalism in the
public sphere
of sub-Saharan Africa is also
promul
gated through
the circulation of
videotapes (Krings).
These
tapes
use crowds
-
of believers to
impress
the
public by
their
numbers,
and
they
show masses
_
of
"pagans" converting
to Islam after
succumbing
to victorious Muslim
^
jihadists
or the
persuasion
of Muslim missionaries.
o
The need to show masses of
people converting
to Islam echoes
an
C? (imagined
or
real)
era in Islamic
history.
In that
golden age, Islam, being
?
the dominant
religion,
attracted
huge
amounts numbers of converts. This
0 celebration of mass conversation is reflected in sura
110,
al-Nasr
(Victory).7
^
The
presentation
of mass
subjugation
to Islam as a
result of battle
> with the sword
and/or
the word echoes not
only
Islam's
early golden age,
^ but also the historic
expansion
of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa.
Krings,
in his
^
contribution on this
topic, analyzes
a new
film
genre,
which
emerged
around
S
2002 within the
popular
video film
industry
of Northern
Nigeria.
These
3
feature films
depict
Muslim
mujahids
and missionaries in their efforts to
1
convert "heathen" tribes to Islam. The
impact
of these films is enhanced
ci
by
the
press,
which
reports
on
the films'
storylines
and comments on the
?
socioreligious
debates
they inspire. Krings
reminds us that there is a
long
tra
1
dition of
medialization, politicization,
and sometimes
exaggeration
of mass
30
conversion in Northern
Nigeria,
from the
19th-century jihads
to the mass
^
conversions led
by
Ahmadu
Bello,
Sardauna of Sokoto and Prime Minister
^
of North
Nigeria
between 1954 and 1966.
According
to
Krings,
these films
J
are
but the last
staging
of mass
conversions to
Islam in Northern
Nigeria,
2 even if these conversions are
purely
fictional. One has to ask whether these
>
films
represent
a
sublimated
or
repressed
desire for
jihad, which,
instead of
being actually pursued
are
enacted on
screen,
or
whether
they
are
proof
of a
general
sense of frustration over a
glorious
lost
past.
Krings
maintains that the
emergence
of these films has to be seen
in the context of Islamic revivalism in
Nigeria, especially
in the northern
region,
where Islamic law
[Sharia)
has been
implemented. Interestingly,
the
new
genre
is directed at a
Muslim
public
and does not aim at
converting
non-Muslims to Islam. These
films,
as
much as
Sharia,
serve above all to
reinforce the
religious identity
of
Nigeria's
Muslim
population, particularly
in the north of the
country. Nigerian
Muslims have come to
feel more and
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more threatened
by
the influence of Christians in the
country, especially
that of the
PentecostalistS; they
feel
they
are
losing
to the Christians much
of their former
political power
within the federal
system.
It is difficult to
say
whether this
sense of loss is
justified
or
not;
its
consequences, however,
are
very real,
and
they
have to be taken into account when
dealing
with the
current
sociopolitical
discontent.
However,
Islamic revivalism in sub-Saharan Africa is not
only happen-
P
ing
in a sublimated form
through
the films described
by Krings,
in which
?3.
religious
violence is
projected
on screen: it is also carried out
by
armed pa
rebel
groups,
whose leaders convert to Islam to
gain
a better status in local
O
politics.
De
M?ntelos,
in his
contribution,
looks at a wave of conversions
5
and violent clashes that have resulted from
rivalry
between rebel
gangs
in
2
Niger.
He focuses
on Asari Dokubo
(El-Hadj),
leader of the armed
group
*
Niger
Delta Volunteer Force. A former
Christian,
Dokubo became head of
-
the
group
after his conversion to Islam. De M?ntelos
explains why many
~'
Nigerian gang
leaders are attracted
by
Islam. After their
conversion,
most of
the rebel
gang
leaders
promote
a
radical form of Islam. De M?ntelos raises >
the
question
whether it is Islam that is radical
or the rebel leaders'
adapta-
2
tion of
it,
with their
military-political
ambitions. In
questioning
the
reasons
^
for Islamic
radicalism,
De M?ntelos transcends the
conceptual
framework
3
of this volume. Is radical Islam based on
purely religious
motivations? or is
it a
part
of
a
political struggle
that uses Islam?
Surprisingly
few
people
have
thought
it
possible
that the answer
may
lie somewhere in between. To
put
it in the words of Asari Dokubo himself: "The God took me to
Islam,
and
Islam suited
my revolutionary spirit/'
Dokubo's
rhetoric, intentions,
and
objectives
echo those of radical Islamists
elsewhere,- however,
De M?ntelos
is above all concerned with the reasons
why
African rebel
gang
leaders are
attracted to Islam.
De M?ntelos finds that one of the main reasons for this
affinity
is
that the Islamic
Republic
of Iran and
al-Qaeda
have
challenged
the
allegedly
omnipotent
U.S.
hegemony?which
makes Islam
very appealing
to
many
young
African rebels.
Subsequently,
de M?ntelos
compares
Asari Dokubo
of the
Niger
Delta Volunteer Force with Ndura
Waruinge (who,
since his
conversion to
Islam,
calls himself
Ibrahim),
head of the
Mungiki
movement
in Kenia. Neither case is
unique
or
exceptional.
The
"religious
turn" of
these leaders?that
is,
their conversion to Islam?was
probably politically
motivated in the
beginning,
but
genuine religious feelings
have
eventually
emerged.
This refers to the nature of conversion in
general: people
may
con
vert for
purely
mundane
reasons,
and
yet
this
"opportunist"
move makes
way
for
truly religious beliefs,
thus
representing
a
major
secret of the
conver
sion
process.
The articles
present
in this issue
point
to the distinctiveness of
Islamic revivalism in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although
in
many ways
it bears
resemblance
to revivalist movements
elsewhere, particularly
in the Arab
world,
sub-Saharan Islamic revivalism is first and foremost
shaped through
local cultures and
religious particularities.
In this
context,
the
competition
between Muslim
groups
and Christian churches is of
particular importance.
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Both Muslims and
Christians, especially
the Pentecostalists and Charismat
ics, simultaneously
mimic and
fight
each other.
Moreover,
both Muslim
and Christian leaders in sub-Saharan Africa
increasingly
engage
in social
matters and
politics. However,
what
prevails
in the end for both Muslim
and Christian leaders is
rarely
the
public good
but rather the need to win
more and more converts.
Thus,
their contribution to conflict resolution and
promotion
of
democracy
in the
region
is
negligible.
NOTES
1. The
present
volume is the outcome of a conference on
"Conversion,
Modernity
and the
Individual with
particular
reference to Islam in Africa and
Asia," held in Berlin on 25 and 26
November 2005. Some of the
papers given
at this conference will be
published) separately
in the Journal of
Religion
in Africa under the title
Biographies
of African Conversion. The confer
ence was
organized by
Tabea
Scharrer,
Chanfi
Ahmed,
and Achim von
Oppen
at the Zentrum
Moderner Orient / Centre for Modern Oriental Studies
(ZMO),
directed
by
Professor Dr. Ulrike
Freitag,
a Middle Eastern historian. Founded in
1996,
the ZMO is the
only
research center in
Germany
that follows an
interdisciplinary
and
comparative approach
to the
history
of the
Middle
East, Africa,
South
Asia,
and Southeast Asia. Research focuses on Muslim societies and
their
linkages
to
neighboring
non-Muslim
regions.
2. Reinhard
Bonnke,
born in 1940 in
Kaliningrad (K?nigsberg), belongs
to the Pentecostal ist
movement. He studied
theology
at the Bible
College
of Wales in Swansea before
working
as
a
pastor
in a small
municipality
in northern
Germany
for seven
years.
In
1974, he founded his
own
mission, the Christus f?r alle Nationen
(Christ
for All
Nations)
in Frankfurt-am-Main. His
mission is
entirely
financed
through
donations. It is most active in
Africa,
especially
southern
Nigeria.
Its main activities consist
of'crusades,"
which assemble hundreds of believers.
During
these
events, Bonnke
preaches
and
produces miracles,
ranging
from the
healing
of sick
people
to exorcism
through
the
laying
on
of hands. These
practices,
and the fact that Bonnke
mostly
chooses
regions
with a
strong
Muslim
population
for his
crusades,
have been much
criticized,
especially
since
they
often incite
interreligious clashes,
which have so far led to the death of
a dozen
people.
3. On the methods of this Islamic
missionary
movement,
see Gaborieau
2006; Masud
2000;
Reetz
2006; Sikand
2002;
van der Veer 2004.
4. For the different
meanings
of
prayer
in
Islam,
see Bowen
2000;
Parkin 2000.
5.
During
the ZMO conference in
Berlin, Amidu Sani
gave
a
paper
on the new
phenomenon
of
Muslim
prayer groups.
These are
organized public prayers
in which
believers,
both men and
women,
gather
at
huge public places
to ask God for his benefaction in this world and the next.
Sometimes
they
are
joined by Christians,
who
pray
to the
god
of Islam to accord them
prosper
ity.
These
prayers
closely
resemble
prayers
in Pentecostal
prayer
assemblies and
exemplify
the
Pentecostal
theology
of
prosperity.
6.
Surprisingly,
discussions on the
emergence
of a new Islamic
public sphere
have so far
neglected
this
phenomenon.
Similarly,
no research has been done on the rise of "tele-Islamist"
preachers,
such as the
Egyptian
'Amr Khaled.To take but one
example,
there is no mention of these issues
in a
recently published
book on the Islamic
public sphere
(Salvatore and Eickelman
2004).
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7. "When God's
help
and
victory
come, and
you
see men embrace God's faith in
multitudes,
give glory
to
your
Lord and seeks His
pardon.
He is ever
disposed
to
mercy."
Sura 110:
1-3,
The Koran 1995:603.
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John R. 2000.
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by
David Parkin and
Stephen Headley.
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Doing
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