G.R. No. 146099. April 30, 2003.

*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JIMMEL SANIDAD, PONCE
MANUEL alias PAMBONG, JOHN DOE (at large) and PETER DOE (at large),
accused. JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG, appellants.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; The assessment on the
credibility of witnesses is a function best discharged by the trial court which is in a
better position to determine conflicting testimonies after having heard the witnesses,
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.It is axiomatic that the
assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a function best discharged by the trial
court which is in a better position to determine conflicting testimonies after having
heard the witnesses, and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. This
Court will not interfere with the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses
unless those findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight and
influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the judge which, if
considered, would have affected the outcome of the case. None of the exceptions
have been shown to exist in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy
their credibility.After a cursory reading of the transcripts, however, we find that
the supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not
affect the veracity of the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi
and Raymund Fontanilla. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies
of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their
credibility. Such minor inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness
and candor, and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Denial and Alibi; Denial and alibi should be rejected
when the identities of accused-appellants are sufficiently and positively established
by eyewitnesses to the crime.The general denial and alibi of the defense are too
lame to be legally accepted as true, especially when measured up against the positive
identification of accused-appellants. The doctrine is well-settled that denial and alibi
are the weakest of all defenses as they are easy to concoct and fabricate but difficult
to disprove. Denial and alibi should be rejected when the identities of accused-
appellants are sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For alibi to be credible, the accused must not
only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense
but must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at that time.For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only
prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but
must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at that time. In the case at bar, accused-appellants claimed that they
were in their respective houses at the time of the ambush. But the record shows that
the house of accused-appellant Jimmel Sanidads sister where he was staying in
Sitio Bio, San Isidro, Lagangilang, Abra, is but a mere six (6) to seven (7)-minute
walk, or about 700 meters, from the crime scene. While accused-appellant Ponce
Manuel lived in the same place, (in) the same community.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay by a witness in divulging what he or she
knows about a crime is not by itself a setback to the evidentiary value of such
witness testimony, where the delay is sufficiently justified by any acceptable
explanation.Delay in reporting a crime to the authorities is not an uncommon
phenomenon. The rule is, delay by a witness in divulging what he or she knows
about a crime is not by itself a setback to the evidentiary value of such witness
testimony, where the delay is sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation.
Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal or the individual manner by which individuals
react when confronted by a gruesome event as to place the viewer in a state of shock
for sometime, is a valid excuse for the temporary silence of witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; For collective responsibility to be
established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a
prior agreement to commit the crime.Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial court
found, attended the commission of the crime. For collective responsibility to be
established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a
prior agreement to commit the crime. Only rarely would such an agreement be
demonstrable because criminal undertakings, in the nature of things, are rarely
documented by written agreements. The concerted actions of accused-appellants,
however, clearly evinced conspiracy. Their simultaneous acts of peppering the
victims jeepney with bullets, and thereafter chasing the vehicle to prevent its
escape, were undoubtedly in pursuance of a common felonious design. All these
sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to consummate the
killing of the victim.
Same; Complex Crime; In a complex crime, although two or more crimes
are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well
as in the conscience of the offender.We fully agree with the lower court that the
instant case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which,
speaking of complex crimes, provides that when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its
maximum period. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the
conscience of the offender.
Same; Same; Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single
purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked down as
a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.Although
several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate shots
from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who among them
actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-
appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and
distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single
criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadis group as a whole. Thus, one of
accusedappellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: My gosh, we were not
able to kill all of them. Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single
purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a
single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.


G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS
SANTOS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Penalties; Where the death penalty is involved, the
trial court should be more scrupulous in weighing the evidence.Considering that
death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in
weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial courts finding that
GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was
wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an
intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not
criminal intent, should be indulged. From the convergence of circumstances, we are
inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence
than of a malicious intent on GLENNS part.
Same; Same; Instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment
he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the
same, and more so if the one on the road is a person.Indeed, as pointed out by
appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a
cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same; and
more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for
GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young
children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group
with his truck.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence.It is a well-entrenched rule that if
the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanationsone consistent with
the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent
with his guilt or grave responsibilitythe Court should adopt the explanation which
is more favorable to the accused.
Same; Same; Motive; Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a
conviction, especially where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is,
nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the
incident is more likely to be true.Although proof of motive is not indispensable-to
a conviction especially where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is,
nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the
incident is more likely to be true. Thus, in People v. Godinez, this Court said that the
existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes decisive in determining the
probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely accidental.
Same; Same; Same; Rebellion; If there be evidence that the motive of the
killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, the accused cannot be convicted
of murder, because if such were the case, the proper charge would be rebellion.
Neither is there any showing of a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of
police elements disguised in a vehicular accident. Even if there be such evidence,
i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement,
GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the case, the proper charge would
be rebellion, and not murder.
Same; Reckless Imprudence; Negligence; A man must use common sense,
and exercise due reflection in all his actsit is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.GLENNs
offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a
safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so,
many trainees would have been spared. We have once said: A man must use
common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts
which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be
exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
Same; Same; Same; The test for determining whether a person is negligent
in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued?The test for determining whether a
person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Could a, prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Reckless Imprudence,
Explained.GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or
occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Same; Same; Same; Where the incident resulting in several deaths and
injuries was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act
of reckless driving, the accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries
and less serious physical injuries; If a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results
in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or
omissions punishable by law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa). In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in
conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence, and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the
two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the
accused was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with damage to
property through reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to capsize thereby
drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
Same; Same; Same; Slight Physical Injuries; Being light felonies, which are
not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, slight physical injuries should
be treated and punished as separate offenses.The slight physical injuries caused
by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not
covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses.
Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; When two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged
and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.It must be noted that
only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple
attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the
record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to
quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged
and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Same; Same; Same; In felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying
circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.Now, we
come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim,
therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises
the penalty by one degree. Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the
imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard
to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through imprudence
or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of
the penalty.


G.R. No. 152044. July 3, 2003.*
DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Criminal Law; Probation Law; Appeals; By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law.Hence,
upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein,
petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal,
petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at
once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.


G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995.*
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Probation Law; Probation should be availed of at the
first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated who
manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the
result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at
the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated,
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Same; Same; Probation is a mere privilege, not a right.Probation is a
mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or
by all.
Same; Same; The grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
Same; Same; An appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the
clear and express mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law.Therefore, that an
appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken
solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negative clause, no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other and if
none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than
six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically
disqualified.At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already
probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to
within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused
found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up.
And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not
be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The
multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds
the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is
entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of
offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are
within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the
word maximum, not total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those x x x x sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six years. Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.
Same; Same; The basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of
the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed.Fixing the
cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a
risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious
wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they
might further commit. The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who
have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of
The Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of
multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence,
the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed
and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum
term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core
criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
Same; Same; The law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed
up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner
should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already
qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled,
was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his
right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.


G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y
CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Actions; Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.
Same; Same; The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be obligation other than
delict.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x x x x x x x; e) Quasi-
delicts.
Same; Same; Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Same; Same; Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file the separate civil action by prescription.Finally, the private offended party
need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation
of right by prescription.
Same; Same; Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.Applying this set of
rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.


G.R. No. 167571. November 25, 2008.*
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON
C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; The verification
is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in
order that the ends of justice may be served.Petitioner submits that the
verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially
complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held
in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or
dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. Indeed, the
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, as in the instant case. In the
case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Same; Prescription; Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled an Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.There is no
question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription
for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods.
Same; Same; Act No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22.We
agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
prescriptive period.
Same; Same; The prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused.In Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997) and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 546
SCRA 303 (2008), which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),
which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al., 567 SCRA 354 (2008), the Court ruled that
the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special
law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
Same; Same; Petitioners filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings
for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.We rule and so
hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaint
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause,
with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.


G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005.*
BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F.
GATBALITE, as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, as the City Jail Warden of Angeles City,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Prescription of Penalties; The period of
prescription of penaltiesthe succeeding Article 93 providesshall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.The
case of Tanega v. Masakayan falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In
that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the execution of
her sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She
was never arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through counsel moved to
quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner
claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and since light offenses prescribe
in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus: x x x The
period of prescription of penaltiesthe succeeding Article 93 providesshall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence.
Same; Same; Same; Evasion of Service of Sentence; Elements.Elements of
evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
(2) he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty; and (3) he
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be
so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by
the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . . Indeed,
evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term jail breaking.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The period for prescription of penalties begins only when
the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
This Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and
are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for
prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation
of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded
sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never
began.


G.R. No. 139033. December 18, 2002.*
JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Prescription; For prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with
the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit
should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Same; Same; Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, prescription of
penalties shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence; Evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have
been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same
Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Same; Same; Escape means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody; One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.