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HERITAGE,
URBAN CULTURE
AND DEMOCRACY
IN EUROPE
Pascal Gielen
PREFACE
Philip Heylen
EUROCITIES, Antwerp 26-28 October 2011 1
INTRODUCTION
Steven Thielemans
A pamphlet to reflect, to take position
and to find out where you stand 2
PAMPHLET
Pascal Gielen
Heritage, urban culture and democracy
in Europe 5
Democracy as culture 6
The democratic formula 8
The European universe of conservation 12
Heritage for fun 13
Neo-nationalism 15
Heritage activism or the re-politicisation
of the heritage landscape 17
Urban agony 19
Bibliography 22
Notes 23
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HERITAGE,
URBAN CULTURE
AND DEMOCRACY
IN EUROPE
Pascal Gielen
PREFACE
Philip Heylen
INTRODUCTION
Steven Thielemans
PAMPHLET
Pascal Gielen
in Europe 5
Heritage for fun 13
Neo-nationalism 15
Urban agony 19
Bibliography 22
Notes 23
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EUROCITIES, Antwerp 26-28 October 2011
From 26-28 October, the city of Antwerp hosts Heritage, urban
culture and democracy in Europe, a meeting of the EUROCITIES
Culture Forum.
EUROCITIES is a network of large cities across Europe. The network
brings together local governments of more than 130 large cities in
over 30 European countries. Its members work with the EU institu-
tions to enhance response to common issues that have an impact
on the day-to-day lives of European citizens. EUROCITIES provides a
platform for its member cities where they can share knowledge and
ideas, exchange experiences, analyse common problems and develop
innovative solutions, through a wide range of forums, working groups,
projects, activities and events.
One of the main themes of EUROCITIES is Culture. The members of the
Culture Forum meet three times a year in a different member city.
After Turku and Aarhus, Antwerp hosts the last meeting of 2011.
The Antwerp forum will bring together an audience of around 100
participants consisting of local politicians and ofcers responsible for
culture all over Europe.
The heritage theme of this meeting is of course inspired by the
opening of the MAS, our new museum about the city, the harbour and
the world. We are very proud to be able to present this experience to
our colleagues of other European cities. Even more important is the
opportunity which is created by the Forum to exchange experiences
and to receive information about similar heritage projects in other
cities. The second theme of the meeting is inspired by the fact that
Antwerp is European youth capital 2011, which means that the forum
will also pay special attention to urban youth culture.
For the heritage segment of the meeting which will focus on Cultural
Heritage and Democracy and the question How do cities deal with
their past and with their cultural heritage, Pascal Gielen, professor
of sociology of art at Groningen University has been invited to write a
pamphlet entitled Heritage, Urban Culture and Democracy in Europe.
Philip Heylen
Vice-mayor for culture and tourism
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2 Museums and Heritage Antwerp | I 2011 Pamphlet | Heritage, urban culture and democracy in Europe 3
and to find out where you stand
The decision to devote the rst thematic session of the Eurocities Culture
Forum in Antwerp to cultural heritage and democracy does not only
require clarication but also a bold starting point that can be endorsed as
well as rejected.
The organizing committee in Antwerp came to the conclusion that
numerous cities in Europe and outside had and still have different
ways of dealing with their past and their cultural heritage. This differing
kind of relationship very often has, but by no means only, an impact on
the way museums work.
In the European context, the relationship with heritage and especially
the way how collections were built was more than often closely related
to power and powerful people or rulers. The origins of museums can
frequently be found in these collections, in cities as well as in broader
geographical areas.
The notion of museums as places where collections are accessible for
a wide and diverse public gained ground slowly but surely. It really
commenced with the development of modern democracy at the end of the
18
th
century.
Heritage also became a tool for the cultural policy of governments and
that is why, especially in less or in non democratic forms of governance,
heritage was regularly abused.
In recent times quite a lot of countries, regions and cities have set up
programmes which give a new momentum to heritage that is linked with
the past. All around, we see an impressive number of new and renewed
national and regional historical museums and even more new or renewed
city museums.
In his pamphlet Heritage, urban culture and democracy Pascal Gielen
takes a closer and very personal look at the relationship between heritage
and power, in this particular case democracy as a form of governance, and
the relationship between heritage and urban culture, a phenomenon with
a long and very diverse history in the European context.
As an academician Pascal Gielen was naturally allowed complete freedom
of thought for exploring, linking, problematizing and illustrating these
three concepts. The result is an essay that stimulates the reader to reect,
to take position and to nd out where he or she stands.
Pascal Gielen associates the democratic decit which he assesses in
Europe, among other factors, to the lack of cultural policy; he is a strong
advocate of culture as a political value, he reects upon the relationship
between populism and democracy and he delineates the position of
heritage commitment as being caught between neoliberalism and
neonationalism.
In his conclusion the author of the pamphlet opts for heritage activism or
a repoliticization of the heritage landscape.
When Pascal Gielen promotes heritage initiatives which preferably bring
out a diverse past and when he comes to the conclusion that the heritage
sector will probably nd these complex histories particularly in urban
surroundings, he launches an appeal for polyphony that must sound
like music in the ears of many professionals working in heritage or in
museums.
It is of course entirely up to the reader whether he recognizes or accepts
the ideas put forward by the author.
Steven Thielemans
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Heritage,
urban culture
and democracy
in Europe
The EU has reached a stage in its history
where its cultural dimension can no longer
be ignored. It would be a mistake to pretend
that culture and economy are two totally
separate worlds. Without proper attention to
knowledge, science and culture, our societies
at large - our economies - cannot prosper.
Jos Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission 2004
Democracy is
based on cultural
attainments and
insights rather
than on economic
welfare.
Democracy as culture
European politics is weighed down by a democratic decit. Belief in its
possibilities has decreased with the idea of a European constitution.
Not only is European policy perceived as bureaucratic and cumbersome,
but, above all, it is also considered not to be especially representative of
European citizens concerns. One of the reasons for this democratic decit
is the lack of cultural politics. Europe has given priority to economics,
while seriously neglecting both the social and cultural dimension.
Eventually, politics will pay the price. Democracy is based on cultural
attainments and insights rather than on economic welfare.
In the citation heading of this essay, it is remarkable that Manuel Barroso
is blind to the relationship between culture and his own political actions.
Indeed, while it would be a mistake to see culture and the economy as
two separate worlds, it would be an even bigger mistake not to recognise
cultures centrality to political action. In fact, this blind spot is typical
not only of Barroso, but also of all political life during the past two
decades. While it is true nowadays that culture is perhaps being upgraded
somewhat to the status of a nancial asset, it is hardly something with
political value. Democracy, however, is based on a collective belief in
acquired values and standards that are still relatively recent in terms of
tradition.
Although it is a form of government based on principles dating back
to 508 BC, it was only at the end of the eighteenth century that the
principles of modern democracy were consolidated. In the United States
this was expressed through the Declaration of Independence. In Europe,
people had to wait until the French Revolution. Let us not forget that the
polis in Athens did not provide for the participation of slaves, immigrants
and women. Classical democracy applied only to a small part of the
population. Thus, whether we can legitimately refer to Athens as a
democracy at all is a question that at least has to be posed
(Held, 2006: 19).
We must not ignore the fact that we are dealing with a relatively youthful
governmental system, which is one of the reasons why it is still fragile and
vulnerable. Conversely, quite a number of politicians and citizens take it
too easily as being a self- evident course. On the other hand, by analogy
with love, democracy can also be seen as a verb: to democratise. The
Dutch artist Jonas Staal even includes it as an ideology in line with the
Japanese translation of the word democracy as democratism (Staal,
2009:69). Just as one can refer to communism or neo-liberalism, one
can also refer to democratism. In other words, those choosing democracy
take sides, making a political/ideological choice that has to be justied
and defended.
Democracy is only one of many possible systems of government.
A journey of discovery around the world reveals that it is not only
sovereign dictatorships that persist, but also theocracies and even
capitalist-communist systems. Both China and Russia show how regimes
that are hardly democratic may correspond better to the neo-liberal
market imperative than does our familiar democratism. According to the
German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, Chinas national communism may be
a foretaste of a fundamental development in the twenty-rst century, i.e.
the transition to an authoritarian capitalist world system (Sloterdijk, 2006:
189). This system implies a project that will bring together all forms of
labour, wishes and the expression of people trapped within the system in
the immanence of purchasing power (Sloterdijk, 2006; 191).
Thus democracy is only one possible option. It is precisely this dimension
of possibility (one possible choice out of several others) that provides
proof of democracys cultural nature. Just as in the case of free market
capitalism, democracy is a cultural choice and not a natural state.
Yet, if that is so, just what is democracy?
... a cultural
programme
is necessary
for generating
repeatedly
the requisite
frameworks for
decisions and the
reectivity needed
for conceiving
alternative forms
of government
and expressions
of power. This
knowledge
places particular
responsibility on
cultural policies
and thus on the
shoulders of cultural
sectors of which
heritage is one.
The democratic formula
Just as there are various forms of government, there are self- evidently
different interpretations of democracy as well. The English political
scientist David Held, for example, has distinguished between four basic
types, ranging from the classical Athens model to republicanism, the
liberal model and forms of direct democracy. Further variants expanded
upon this in the twentieth century (Held, 2006).
Nevertheless, this abundance does not make it impossible to bring
back every modern democracy to a concise basic formula. Expressed
concisely, the essential criteria are for any democratic regime to possess
two fundamental ingredients: rstly, the assurance that the majority
represents the power of the demos or the people and, secondly, the
minimum guarantee of a legal framework or legal system able to protect
the minority (or minorities) (Lukacs, 2005: 5). In the best cases, such
legal frameworks are responsible for the support, encouragement and
emancipation of minorities.
The paradox within a democracy is that the majority creates or protects
the opportunity for a minority to become a majority that is able to take
over power. Consequently, it can be said in essence that the place of
power within a democratic form of government is empty, which in more
specic, de jure terms is to say that it can always be declared vacant.
In other words, those occupying positions of power within a democracy
accept that there will be a time when they will have to surrender that
privilege. Indeed, the majority even encourages this process within a
radical democracy, thus preparing its own abdication.
This simple formula for democracy also claries the precise meaning of
populism. Populist politicians acknowledge the power of the majority
but give no consideration to the rights of the minority. As soon as these
populists attain power, they will do anything to reduce the apparatus
of legal protection and the opportunities for emancipation open to
the minority, their objective being to hold on to power. It comes as no
surprise that politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi are constantly ghting
the judicial apparatus. Populism is based on the theoretical idea that the
position of power is not empty but, instead, occupied and that, once
occupied, it can also remain so. Populism and democracy have a special
relationship. Populism is not possible without democracy populists court
the people in order to win their votes and come into power. Subsequently,
however, they aspire to destroy the very conditions that made their
achievement possible: i.e. democracy.
While populism tries to liquidate the rights of the minority in a rather
obvious manner, one should not forget that there are also far subtler
mechanisms for denying power to minorities or to those not entitled to
vote. The thresholds for education can be raised thus making it more
difcult for lower social classes or less well-off immigrants to have
access to better schools. More subtly, a masters thesis can be linked to
so many bureaucratic rules as to render truly free thought impossible.
Alternatively, governments can fail to make adequate provision for
households (childcare, etc.), thus making it more difcult for women to
maintain an equal position in society. The media can also be weakened
intellectually, resulting in citizens being misinformed or else the stiing of
critical voices through unchallenging entertainment.
Setting up or maintaining blockades against upward cultural, intellectual
and social mobility prevents people from the opportunity to participate.
That is why collective solidarity mechanisms between social classes,
between generations, between men and women, between native-born
and foreign-born citizens and even between regions or continents are
crucial for the preservation of democracy. In the long term, ideologies
or political regimes such as neo-liberalism, which advocates a reduction
of such collective responsibility by placing as much as possible on the
shoulders of the individual (through private insurance policies, study loans
instead of scholarships, etc.), tend to develop into a timocracy where the
actual decision-making power is in the hands of the better-off if not
de jure, then certainly de facto.
However, political programmes seeking to provide democratic guarantees
only within the limits of the nation state can also act undemocratically
regarding all those who fall outside the political domain. This kind of
political commitment, so typical of all forms of nationalism, has become
intolerable in a globalised world at least, it is if one still wants to
endorse the rules of democracy. Indeed, according to Held (2006), quoted
previously, many national decisions have a direct or indirect inuence
on the environment beyond a sovereign decision-makers territory. Along
with biological or virtual viruses and nuclear fallout, cultural ows and
mediascapes cannot be halted at the borders of a nation state any longer.
This also implies that all unilateral decisions are de facto undemocratic for
an outside world without any say in the matter.
In short, in a globalised world in which everyone is networking with
everyone else and in which everything is connected, neither neo-
liberalism nor neo-nationalism offers a satisfying answer to the demands
of a democracy.
The European Unions problem is connected undoubtedly to current
neo-nationalism, and this sometimes nds its way by stealth into the
European political arena. Unlike its predecessor nationalism neo-
nationalism employs a reective pragmatism which applies all knowledge
on globalisation, including neo-liberalism, to obtain national (or regional)
privileges. It no longer invokes a heavy-handed blood-and-honour type
of nationalism. Instead, it uses the ontology of cultural diversity with a
view to limiting, or even better, disintegrating the transcultural power of
Europe.
Neo-nationalism and neo-liberalism have a peculiar effect on one
another. Whereas, from a neo-liberal point of view, the Union calls for
and stimulates the free movement of money, goods and people, neo-
nationalism prevents transnational (or transregional) solidarity structures
as much as possible. For example, free movement of money is encouraged
within the European zone; but as soon as a member state undergoes
nancial problems, this zone proves to be nothing more than a collection
of well-guarded nation states. Peoples movement is free within the Union
until such a time, that is, when Fortress Europe is ooded with refugees.
Then, all of a sudden, only the country of arrival bears full responsibility.
While neo-liberalism benets from neo-nationalism, which restricts the
freedom it feigns to defend, neo-nationalism uses neo-liberalism to pocket
its prots outside the nation state. In short, the European zone may be
an economic union, but socially and culturally it is nothing more than a
collection of feudal states and regions.
The Unions faulty social and cultural form of government also has to
do with the obsolete model on which European political life was based
historically: liberal representative democracy. This model reduces
democracy overmuch to the responsibility of individual citizens who
enjoy their democratic moment only every so many years, namely at
election time. In other words, it fails to encourage and organise a civil
society in which there are also minorities. Held: The structures of civil
society (including forms of productive and nancial property, sexual and
racial inequalities) misunderstood or endorsed by liberal democratic
models do not create conditions for equal votes, effective participation
and deliberation, proper political understanding and equal control of
the political agenda, while the structures of the liberal democratic state
(including large, frequently unaccountable, bureaucratic apparatuses,
institutional dependence on the imperatives of private capital
accumulation and political representatives preoccupied with their own
re- election) do not create an organisational force which can adequately
regulate civil power centres (Held, 2006: 275).
In other words, liberal representative democracy is a majority democracy
and one for which the European Union also serves as a model; however,
it neglects to feed opposition from the minority owing to a lack of
serious social and cultural programmes. Yet a social programme is
necessary for giving minorities and weaker groups the opportunity to
acquire participative power, while a cultural programme is necessary for
generating repeatedly the requisite frameworks for decisions and the
reectivity needed for conceiving alternative forms of government and
expressions of power. This knowledge places particular responsibility on
cultural policies and thus on the shoulders of cultural sectors of which
heritage is one.
The heritage sector
has learned how to
transmit a positive
message that can
raise peoples
spirits, uniting
and reconciling
them, and even
making them feel
at home. It goes
without saying that
such a movement
implies quite
some historical
selectivity.
Between the two
extremes of, on
the one hand,
depositories that
are lled to capacity
but closed and, on
the other, museums
that are accessible
to the public but
empty, there is of
course an enormous
range of heritage
initiatives.
The European universe of conservation
When we look at how heritage is handled in Europe, we see many
different methodologies and ways in which this is solved. On the one
hand, there is the classic type of conservation, which focuses on the
upkeep of tangible objects. On the other, there are action plans of a more
innovative nature that put intangible objects, as well as the abstract
meaning of tangible artefacts, to the fore.
Some European heritage consists of dusty archives and museums
where the preference continues to be to keep objects safely locked away
whether valuable or otherwise. There are also state-of-the-art, digital
and interactive heritage sites, which sometimes promise more than they
really have to offer. Over the past few decades, along with the hype of
the culture industry and creative cities, we have seen the creation of the
most spectacular museum buildings buildings for which the heritage
on display has yet to be discovered. Nowadays, some city authorities
and national governments are building the most beautiful museums
beautiful but empty.
Between the two extremes of, on the one hand, depositories that are lled
to capacity but closed and, on the other, museums that are accessible to
the public but empty, there is of course an enormous range of heritage
initiatives. A lot of conservation societies are trying to make young and old
alike more aware of the environment in which they live. Everywhere, there
is the emergence of new museum displays and educational programmes
that are presenting and transmitting complex histories in different
segments and at adjusted levels.
In Europe, we frequently see forms of heritage activism that reinstate
repressed or hidden histories with a view to focussing on political rights.
Nevertheless, none of these forms of sincere heritage commitment can
prevent the sector from getting wedged between neo-liberalism and neo-
nationalism as aforementioned.
Heritage for fun
The motley collection of heritage initiatives, as outlined, is enhanced by a
varied group of heritage workers, ranging from well-meaning but bungling
amateurs, amateurs with a professional approach, serious scientic
experts and educational collaborators all the way to public managers
and heritage entrepreneurs who are just as able to turn a motor show
into a success as a Rubens exhibition. This last group is also responsible
for dispensing with the old-fogey image formerly attached to those in
society interested in the past. Museums and heritage centres, as well as
all manner of heritage societies, have achieved a more relevant place not
only within society, but also within the mass media. An important role in
this has certainly been played by the aforementioned development of the
culture industry and creative sector, with this having started life in the
United Kingdom.
Even so, removing the mantle of dust from the past and from traditions
has also taken its toll. Heritage has also had to jockey for position within
a ercely competitive range of leisure activities by using strategies
that are almost unavoidable in a consumer society: shows, events and
entertainment. The ultimate message for sweeping away the last particle
of dust would seem to be that heritage can also be fun. Nowadays, there
is a part of the European heritage sector that is ostentatious and ashy,
and we have to acknowledge that this strategy has not been unsuccessful.
Museums and arts-focused cities are mobilising more people than ever.
Once again, the sector has created an important social base for itself,
this being alongside other cultural sectors such as those involving
contemporary art. Whether one is for or against these developments,
the strategys success cannot be denied.
The heritage sector has learned how to transmit a positive message that
can raise peoples spirits, uniting and reconciling them, and even making
them feel at home. It goes without saying that such a movement implies
quite some historical selectivity. Upbeat history sells better than human
misery; amusing anecdotes are easier to digest than complex socio-
political or economic discussions. An underground coalmine experience
is more appealing within the context of a family day out than is that
mines story about child labour and its trade union struggle. The story
of the latter is also told, but it often loses its impact within the way the
Instead, history
is used in a
more subtle
way to create
a positive self-
image, explicitly
or implicitly
implying
the negative
characteristics of
others.
total experience is perceived. The weighty signicance of social, political
and economic events is eroded at the very least by having them viewed
through the lens of the past. The articial creation of heritage and
creation of culture often lead to neutralisation.
Neo-nationalism
Alongside this conservation economy and the tourist industry of
competitive artistic heritage cities - as well as other heritage-related
areas intended to generate income to a greater or lesser extent - Europe
also has new types of nationalism. Within this political folklore of
territorialism, as referred to by Sloterdijk (2006: 163), traditions are
being rediscovered or simply invented to give some (political) legitimacy
to a nation or locality. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, discussions
about a historical national canon have developed not only in the former
communist block countries of Eastern Europe, but also more recently in
uncontested or non-suppressed nation states, such as the Netherlands.
Historical heritage has not been neutralised in this discourse but, instead,
re-politicised.
Ancient stories about blood, soil and roots are carefully left behind.
Instead, history is used in a more subtle way to create a positive self-
image, explicitly or implicitly implying the negative characteristics of
others. To give but one example: does the image of the hard-working
Fleming not also imply an alleged laziness on the part of those living
on the other side of the linguistic divide? Neo-nationalism eagerly avails
itself of neo-liberal principles such as marketing strategies and brands
in order to emphasise national identity and cultural singularity. Cultural
essentialism is regularly referred to with a view to achieving economic
benets.
Both in respect of politics, as aforementioned, and also at a cultural
level, neo-nationalism sometimes enters into a rather peculiar union with
neo-liberalism. It is certain that the heritage rhetoric of neo-nationalists
is inspired by the fear that a Europe without borders could also be one
without cultural plurality. Or, as the Dutch professor of European cultural
history Pim den Boer puts it bluntly: In their reasoning it is always
about the preservation of singularity and about the defence of national
heritage and national identity within the European context, not about the
importance and value of the joint European culture as such
(Den Boer, 2003: 161). As long as the European Union limits itself to a
policy of lexception culturelle (Obuljen, 2005: 70), in which cultural
policy and national identity policies are synonyms, it will be difcult to
overcome this deadlock.
Only those heritage
initiatives that
bring back a diverse
past will be able
to support real
democracy. It is a
matter of not being
embarrassed to
disclose painful and
deeply suppressed
histories.
... there are few
heritage workers
or initiatives that
include either
Europe or the
wider world in
their history.
Just as there are few politicians who look further than their local,
regional or, at best, national electorate, there are few heritage workers or
initiatives that include either Europe or the wider world in their history.
It is important to note that old-fashioned heritage management and
commercial heritage business, as well as the newest forms of nationalism,
all fail to support democratic thought within Europe. Quite the reverse
is true. They actually contribute in large part to the aforementioned
democratic decit.
of the heritage landscape
The empty museums created by the culture industry in a globalised,
competitive world are clear evidence of real indifference to heritage and
the past. How this heritage box is lled is of little importance, as long
as it attracts people within the competitive global market of places to
be and see this is the cynical lesson taught by neo-liberalism. Against
this empty market image, neo-nationalism as described above is making
serious attempts to turn heritage back into a full symbol linking language,
culture, territory, history and politics in a seemingly ontological way.
This dual movement demonstrates unequivocally that neo-liberalism and
neo-nationalism are simply two sides of the same coin and this coins
name is globalisation. While neo-liberalism aims at strong uniformity and
cultural homogenisation to the benet of free competition in a globalised
market, neo-nationalism seems to be acquiring a political advantage from
its opposition against the background of this global sameness. Oddly
enough, and as mentioned before, these two trends render political and
economic services to each other through this sophisticated double play.
However, recent history shows how easily either one of these sides can
tempt the heritage sector. Consequently, the question arises concerning
how these temptations might be resisted and concerning the strategies
that will have to be developed in order to embark on an alternative course
or alternative courses, at least if the heritage sector is willing to.
There are several heritage players within the European heritage landscape
who could be considered to be either genuinely seeking or else setting
examples of alternating programmes. Rather than elaborate further on
these examples, a few general principles are suggested which could easily
be used to set up such a programme. The combination of neo-liberalism
and neo-nationalism should alert us to heritage navet, as this could
easily lead us to dance to one particular political tune.
Therefore, it is imperative that we awake from the post-political dream
which pretends that the globalisation of free market capitalism has no
decisive role to play in the formation of both the political and cultural
landscape. All dealings with the past can easily be politicised, and it
would seem a good idea for heritage workers to be aware of this at the
very least. Moreover, the only way to emerge from the current post-
Taking the city as
their historical
source, city
museums and city
heritage projects
can easily show
how each voice
can generate
many singular
counter-voices.
It is even up to
these initiatives
to encourage
and organise this
polyphony.
political deadlock is to formulate ones own political position and thus
make it more explicit. For the record, this is not about socio-political
groups and party politics. When politics is described in the terms of French
philosopher Jacques Rancire (2007) as giving shape to living together,
each heritage activity can also be seen as a political act.
The re-politicisation of heritage business would mean all heritage workers
having to consider how they wanted to shape this society and how this
was related to prevailing neo-liberal and neo-national trends. However,
thinking on its own is not enough. It is also necessary to make this
introspection more explicit and to turn it into action. Each heritage worker
who acknowledges the political nature of his or her actions according to
Rancires above concept is actually a potential heritage activist. This also
helps make lost voices heard or the aforementioned suppressed histories
of minorities visible again.
Only those heritage initiatives that bring back a diverse past will be able
to support real democracy. It is a matter of not being embarrassed to
disclose painful and deeply suppressed histories. Heritage activists show
the courage to counteract, to subjectivise and re-politicise historical
artefacts and events. Whether this is done with a bias towards neo-
liberalism or neo-nationalism as previously outlined is less important.
All that matters is that it is done explicitly, because it is this that makes
it possible to hear the other voices. For example, heritage workers can
show that the totality of the social, political and economic past consists
of paradoxes, conicts and ashpoints, illustrating the vulnerability of the
basis on which the current democratic system is built.
To be sure, the latter is a complex matter and one that is certainly made
no easier as a result of current competitive pressures. However, it is
precisely in this respect that European cultural policy has a duty, a duty
that will have to go further than current symbolic grant programmes
(Obuljen, 2005). All-inclusive and pro-active cultural policies will have to
offer sufcient nancial and logistic breathing space in the future and
buy time for this in order to sort out complex histories and develop the
right methods of disclosure. The heritage sector of today may nd that
these complex histories are mainly to be found in the city.
Urban agony
Cities have always been a melting pot of religions, cultures, classes
and contradictions. Urban cultures take shape at an intersection of
commercial capitalism, ne arts and carefree cosmopolitanism, as well
as at the intersection of exploitation, forced migration and deportation.
Historical tensions can be found everywhere in cities. In this historical
setting, democracy means continuous conict and struggle, or at least
dissensions and polyphony. In other words, the agonies of life have
always been familiar territory within cities. They contain a host of
contradictions, a variety of cultures and a number of conicting parties
cheek by jowl, without these constantly denying each other their right to
exist or legitimacy.
Although citys citizens and long-term residents often fail to nd a
rational solution to or compromise for their contradictions, most of the
time they dene relations between each other as being irreconcilable but
not hostile. According to Belgian political philosopher Chantal Mouffe,
who introduced the notion of agony in this respect, this is possible only
when we see each other as belonging to the same political community,
as sharing a joint symbolic space in which the conict occurs (Mouffe,
2005: 27). This symbolic space is called democracy. However, in this
case the antagonism of free market capitalism (where less money means
fewer liberties) as well as that of neo-nationalism (where not belonging
to the geopolitical territory means fewer rights) is turned into a state of
agonising. This is a social form of life that the urban fabric knows best.
Due to its social, cultural, economic, political and media-based density,
it is like a kind of training camp where you learn to live with insoluble
contradictions.
One can learn lessons from this form of life for a new democracy
capable of handling the globalised world. According to Held, it will
not be classical, republican, liberal or direct in format but, instead,
democratically autonomous (Held, 2006). This political scientist was
referring to a type of democracy that encourages and organises a great
many aspects of active citizenship: a formula that experiments extensively
with the self-management of companies, citizen initiatives, organisations
and all manner of cooperative or collective formats. An experiment can
succeed only when potential self-governing bodies have the necessary
intellectual and cultural capacities. Moreover, it is precisely this that
requires a strong cultural policy. In other words, democratic autonomy is
a form of government that permanently encourages and facilitates the
autonomous economic, social and cultural development of minorities.
In turn, this wide range of initiatives will strive to the greatest possible
extent for democratic self-government. Owing to their wide range, these
initiatives will result in an increasingly symmetric bargaining position with
states, transnational governments, local authorities, citizen initiatives,
etc. The state or supranational forums of global governance will come
to be just one democratic decision apparatus in addition to many others.
In the future, democracy will maintain its legitimacy only if it places the
transformation of injustice at the heart of its policies. Although Held does
not disavow the state, his point of view does come close to the political
goal promoted as long ago as the late 1970s by the Autonomia Movement
in Italy: Political autonomy is the desire to allow differences to deepen at
the base without trying to synthesise them from above, to stress similar
attitudes without imposing a general line, to allow parts to co- exist side
by side in their singularity (Lotringer and Marazzi, 2007: 8).
It is the duty of the heritage sector to focus on this autonomous voicing
of expression in order to show that every history can always be different.
Taking the city as their historical source, city museums and city heritage
projects can easily show how each voice can generate many singular
counter-voices. It is even up to these initiatives to encourage and
organise this polyphony. It is only by this means that they will support
the basic principle of an autonomous democracy, i.e. radical openness
to every other possibility. It is only a culture such as this that will allow
democratic thought to survive in a globalised world. Politics that does not
develop intelligent policies eventually undermines its own (democratic)
foundations. The choice is politicians own.
Pascal Gielen
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Bibliography
Boer, (den), P. (2003), Europa. De geschiedenis van een idee.
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Fagel.
Held, D. (2006), Models of Democracy.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lotringer, S. and Marazzi, C. (2007), Autonomia. Post-Political Politics.
Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Lukacs, J. (2005), Democracy and Populism. Fear and Hatred.
New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Mouffe, C. (2005), Over het politieke.
Kampen: Klement/Pelckmans.
Obuljen, N. (2004), Why we need European cultural policies.
Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation.
Rancire, J. (2007), Het esthetische denken.
Amsterdam: Valiz.
Sloterdijk, P. (2006), Het kristalpaleis. Een losoe van de globalisering.
Amsterdam: SUN.
Staal, J. (2009), Post-propaganda.
Amsterdam: Fonds voor Beeldende Kunsten, Vormgeving en Bouwkunst.

COLOPHON
Author: Pascal Gielen
Editorial Committee: Leen Beyers, Charlotte Franckx, Karel Hermans,
Steven Thielemans, Johan Vansteenkiste
Coordination: Erna Croenen, Ann Op de Beeck, Steven Thielemans
Translation: Hilda Paelinck, Stedelijke tolk- en
vertaaldienst Antwerpen
Copy editors: Griet Claerhout, Guy Shipton
Graphic design: gnoe
Printing: Gazelle-Godefroit
D/2011/0306/292 V.u. Steven Thielemans,
Hessenhuis, Falconrui 53, 2000 Antwerpen
Dit pamet is een Engelstalige uitgave van
Musea en Erfgoed Antwerpen voor het
EUROCITIES Culture Forum in Antwerpen.
Pascal Gielen lives in Antwerp (Belgium), but is professionally based
in the Netherlands at the University of Groningen
as professor sociology of art. He is also director of
the research centre and book series Arts in Society
(Fontys College for the Arts, Tilburg). Gielen has written
serveral books on contemporary art, cultural heritage
and cultural politics.
24 Museums and Heritage Antwerp | I 2011
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HERITAGE,
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AND DEMOCRACY
IN EUROPE
Pascal Gielen
PREFACE
Philip Heylen
INTRODUCTION
Steven Thielemans
PAMPHLET
Pascal Gielen
in Europe 5
Heritage for fun 13
Neo-nationalism 15
Urban agony 19
Bibliography 22
Notes 23
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