Vda de Barroga vs.

Albano, 157 SCRA 131

FACTS: CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Delfina
Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in
default. For unrecorded reasons, the decree of registration did not issue
except until after the lapse of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955). It was
only after 24 years (November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name.
1970 - after the decree of registration had been handed down but before
title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta
Pascual appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit
against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino appellees Angel Albano,
et al.
Barroga et.al.: had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were
the real owners thereof; they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided
and cancelled and that a new title be made out in their names.
Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an
adjoining Lot 9822, belonging to Cesar Castro. Castro filed complaint in
intervention for the recovery thereof.
CFI: DISMISSED Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring
intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by
Delfina Aquino's title.
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of
success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of Lot No. 9821. Their
action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral
proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in
which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual,
had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The
judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and
therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing.
On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the
motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No.
9821. Writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga
and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano,
et al.
They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to
Revoke Writ of Possession Issued.
Their argument: as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be
ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not they can be ejected.
HELD: Yes. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not
inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the
registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe
pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and
Lucero v. Loot, It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter
portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had
no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which
was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the
cadastral case.
Conformably with the established axioms set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be
declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in
enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued
in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may
correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as
successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the
registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q.
Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are
entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years,
their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons
who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The
appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy
long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

Veranga vs. Republic, July 21, 2006
Facts:

In 1931, the Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government,
instituted a Cadastral Case for Gumaca, Quezon. More than six decades
later, spouses Tan Sing Pan and Magdalena S. Veranga filed their Answer
in the Cadastral Case over which jurisdiction was assumed by the 7th
MCTC of Atimonan-Plaridel, Quezon, acting as a special land registration
court. They asserted ownership over a lot covered by the Cadastre.
Petitioners averred that they acquired the lot in question pursuant to a
deed of sale executed in their favor by the children of the late Juan Laude
who, in turn, inherited the property from his own deceased father, Leon
Laude, the original claimant thereof. Petitioners alleged that they have
been in possession of the lot for about 18 years from the time they
purchased it from their predecessors-in-interest, have paid the realty
taxes due thereon, and that their possession thereof was public, peaceful,
in the concept of an owner, continuous and against the world. Tacking
their possession to that of their predecessors-in-interest, petitioners
claimed that they have been in possession of the subject lot for almost 60
years now.

(Note: lot involved was originally surveyed as Lot No. 1027 but what was
adjudicated to petitioners is a portion designated as Lot No. 1027-A now
equal to Lot No. 18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre.)

Come 1996, the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-Plaridel issued an Order admitting
petitioners Answer. After hearing, it rendered its decision confirming
petitioners title over the lot being claimed and directing the issuance of a
decree of registration in their favor. The Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, went on appeal to the CA on the sole
jurisdictional issue of whether the trial court erred in proceeding with the
hearing of the case despite petitioners failure to prove the publication of
the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Office Gazette. CA granted the
Republics appeal and accordingly reversed and set aside the appealed
decision.

To petitioners, the jurisdictional requirement of publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing has been complied with way back in 1931 when the Director
of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government, instituted the
Cadastral Case because the present case is merely a continuation thereof.
Petitioners insist that the Cadastral Case has long been the subject of
court proceedings even before the outbreak of the Second World War and,
consequently, all lots covered therein have already been included in the
required publication. They also contend that the Republic cannot raise, and
is already estopped from raising, this jurisdictional issue at this point in
time when thousands of lots have already been adjudicated by the
cadastral court without the need of publication. Petitioners hasten to add
that, since it was the Director of Lands who initiated the cadastral
proceedings, it was incumbent upon him to show proof of publication of
the Notice of Initial Hearing.

Issue:

W/N new publication is required

Ruling:

Yes. Without which, the trial court has no jurisdiction. The publication
requirement is rendered even more imperative by the fact that the lot
involved was originally surveyed as Lot No. 1027 but what was adjudicated
to petitioners is a portion designated as Lot No. 1027-A now equal to Lot
No. 18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre. It is incumbent upon the petitioners
to establish by positive proof that the publication requirement has been
complied with, what with the fact that they are the ones who stood to be
benefited by the adjudication of the subject lot. Regrettably, they failed to
present proof of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. Their argument
that the instant case is a mere continuation of the proceedings in
Cadastral Case No. 67 whereat the Director of Lands must have caused
the publication of the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette cannot
hold water.

In view of want of publication, it is only necessary to pronounce the order
void, and a new trial is not called for.

Doctrine:

Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette is one of
the essential requisites for a court to acquire jurisdiction in land
registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new publication.

Before a cadastral survey can be amended so as to include land in which
no publication has been made, new publication is necessary, - a step
essential to the protection of persons interested in the property which is
intended to be included.

Director of Land vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557
In a previous cadastral proceedings, respondents were declared owners of
lot 2457 in Tacloban Leyte 14.5k sq/m. After 26yrs, the respondents
under the same cadastral court and under Republic Act 931 claims that
through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of said
Lot No. 2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in
the original survey. the court a quo issued an order admitting the petition,
ordered that copies of the original as well as of the amended petition be
furnished the Solicitor General, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City
Fiscal of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds of the province, setting
the case for hearing on October 18, 1958. The court then declared the
petitioners the owners of the said misplaced lot. The spouses then moved
for a write of execution and possession, but the 62 people who were
already occupying the said additional lot opposed saying that they were
granted the land by Dir of Lands. Subsequently, the Dir of lands made a
motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground, among others, that
said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for
the reopening of the cadastral proceedings for lack of the requisite
publication and notice as required by law. This was denied, and hence this
petition.
Issue: is the re-opening of the cadstral proceedings legal?
a) due to lack of publication
b) there were already legal existing claimants at that time.
Held: There is no question that respondents Emilio Benitez and his wife
may file a petition for reopening of the Cadastral pursuant to Republic Act
No. 931 with a view of claiming such portion of land which they may have
failed to include in their original petition for survey and registration as
authorized by the Cadastral Act provided that the petition be filed within
the period prescribed by said Republic Act No. 931. HOWEVER
a) An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as
to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless
new publication is made as a preliminary to such step. Publication is one of
the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and
cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment
of the plan without new publication
b) Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to have
an additional portion of land registered in his name is concerned in the
sense that it can only be entertained if it does not refer "to such parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or authorized
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." Here it
appears that the additional portion of land claimed by respondents is
actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of
lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands


Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210
Doctrine: A land subjected to cadastral adjudication under the Land
Registration Act cannot be subject to registration by voluntary
proceedings, except where the applicant can still petition for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Facts:
These case involves two petitions for review.

G.R. No. L-35778

Respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court of Bataan an
application for registration under Act No. 496 of one parcel of land situated
in Mariveles, Bataan. The Republic opposed the application claiming that
the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain, thus
not subject to private appropriation. Commission of Land Registration
(LRC) issued a certificate that such land is inside Lot 626 of the Cadastral
Survey of Mariveles.

G.R. No. L-35779

Respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration before
the same court for two parcels of land described as portions of Lot 626 of
the Mariveles Cadastre. The Chief Surveyor of LRC filed a report in the
lower court that such parcels of land do not appear to have been passed
upon and approved by the Director of Lands, and further examination will
be conducted in order to determine whether or not a patent or title has
been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles.

The Republic opposed the registration claiming that the land applied for
are portions of the public domain thus not subject to private appropriation.

***********************
In both cases, the lower court ruled in favor of applicants Martinez and
Tanalega, hence this petition. Republic argued that Mariveles Cadastre was
declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court in 1937, thus
the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter for voluntary
registration under Act 496. The Republic also claimed that the lands in
question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings,
for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration
proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

Issue:

W/N lower court has jurisdiction over application of registration of land
which was already subjected to cadastral registration.

Held:

NO, the lower court does not have jurisdiction. In cadastral proceedings
any person claiming any interest in any part of the land object of the
petition is required by Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the
return date or within such time as may be allowed by court. In the instant
cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in
the cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the
portions they were then occupying. The Cadastral Court must have
declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already
become final and conclusive.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over
the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding
is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are
precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final
judgment.

Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, the same must necessarily fail. In the instant cases,
evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions
of the entire area applied for are cultivated. Mere cultivation of portions of
land does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.

In addition, the survey plans submitted by private respondents were not
approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration
Commission (LRC). The LRC has no authority to approve original survey
plans. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character and unless the plan and its technical descriptions are duly
approved the by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.

* Respondents should have filed a petition to reopen the cadastral case
under RA 931.

Merced vs. CA, 55 SCRA 240
FACTS:
Ezequiel Santos was claiming ownership of Lot 395 of the Rizal Cadastre
by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court in favor of his father. He
sought recovery of ownership and possession of the land from De la
Merced and of the landlords share in the harvests for 6 years.

De la Merced, on the other hand, asserted her ownership over the property
as evidenced by an OCT issued to her predecessor Juan de la Merced and
their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.

1957 - RTC ruled in favor of Santos as evidenced by the OCT issued in
the name of Santos father.
That in 1926, TCT was issued in the name of Ezequiel Santos
That in 1926, the cadastral court declared lot 395 public land, and
as a consequence, De la Merced was able to obtain an OCT after
filing a homestead application
That the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to declare lot 395 as
public land and ordered the cancellation of the OCT in the name of
De la Merced
Directed De la Merced to vacate the property

CA affirmed RTCs ruling
That upon the finality of the decree of the cadastral court,
adjudicating ownership of the land, the title becomes
incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription.
As the land was no longer part of the public domain when the
homestead patent was obtained by De la Merced, it cannot prevail
over the cadastral courts decree of registration of Lot 395 in favor
of Santos

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court adjudicating the lot in
favor of Santos and the subsequent order directing the issuance of a
certificate of title to Santos?
Did these orders constitute registration under the law even though the
corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? - YES
Could the property still be lost by adverse possession? - NO

RULING:
1) These important facts must be considered first:
a) 1923 final decision was rendered in the cadastral case =
Santos title was confirmed as against the whole world,
including the Government
b) 1925 the cadastral court issued a decree and directed
the Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title,
although no such certificate was actually issued
c) 1926 the same cadastral court declared the same lot
public land and as a result, de la Merced applied for a
homestead patent
d) 1931 De La Merced obtained a homestead patent
e) De La Merced was the overseer of the Santos lands
therefore, he was a trustee at the time he applied for a
homestead
f) 1952 complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession was filed
2) With regards to public lands, the act of registration is the operative
act to convey and affect such registration. It shall be made in the
office of the RD. THEREFORE, the property is not considered
registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of
the RD had been accomplished.
3) Decree of registration and certificate of title are two
different things.
o It is the decree of registration, to be issued by the LRC
which shall be the basis of the certificate of title that quiets
the title to the land.
o HOWEVER, this only applies to VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION
under the Land Registration Act
4) WHEN IS A TITLE TO THE LAND IN A CADASTRAL PROCEEDING
VESTED?
The court cited Govt. vs. Abural =
o After trial, 3 actions are taken:
i. Adjudication of ownership in favor of one of the
claimants constitutes the decision, judgment, the
decree of the court
ii. The declaration by the court that the decree is final
and its order for the issuance of the certificates of
title
iii. The Land Registration Offices duty to issue the
certificates - a ministerial act
o Registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage o f the 30-
day period allowed for an appeal
5) The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon
the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision of
adjudication by the court.
6) THEREFORE, the decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance to Santos of the certificate of title over Lot 395 had
already become final. From that moment, the land had become
registered property which could not be acquired by adverse
possession.



Heirs vs. CA, 623 SCRA 637
Doctrine: A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies
each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of
title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties, the
purpose of the survey plan being simply to identify and delineate
the extent of the land it is not a proof of ownership of the land
covered by the plan.
Facts:
Petitioners sought to enjoin National Power Corporation (Napocor) from
selling the Caliraya Hydroeletric Power Plant, as they claimed ownership
over the portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot
1873 and Lot 72.

Napocor denied petitioners allegations and claimed that it acquired Lot
1873 through purchase from the petitioners half sister, Olivia Ferrer
(evidenced by two deeds of absolute sale, both duly notarized and
registered under Act. No. 3344). As for Lot 72, Napocor claimed that its
right to occupy it stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement.

Petitioners opposed Napocors claims, arguing that the sale was void. They
alleged that Olivia, as a co-heir, inherited only a portion of lot 1873, thus
the sale of an area in excess of her legitime made the sale void. They also
presented a Certification issued by the Bureau of Lands (BL) that the
questioned lot was claimed and surveyed by Crispulo Ferrer.

RTC dismissed the petition for injunction. Trial court ruled that petitioners
failed to present convincing proof other than the BL Certificate, which by
itself is not a proof of ownership. Napocor, on its part, was able to present
two deeds of sale. In addition Napocor has been in possession of the lot
and has constructed structures since 1936, making it ridiculous for
petitioners not to protest during Napocors long occupation.

CA found no reason to reverse the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue:
W/N the certification from the BL showing that their predecessor,Crispulo
Ferrer was a survey claimant, is sufficient to establish ownership over lot
1873.
Held:
NO. The certification did not adequately establish their right to Lot 1873.
The certification only proved that Ferrer was a survey claimant. The
purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of
the land. A survey plan, even if approved by the BL, is not a proof of
ownership of the land. The petitioners were not even able to present the
actual survey plan approved by the BL, they only relied on a copy of the
certificate which states that Lot 1873 is in the name of C. Ferrer (as a
survey claimant). Nothing in the certificate indicated whether C. Ferrer
was actually in possession of the said lot or for how long he had been in
possesion thereof.

The court also ruled that petitioners reliance on Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
(Acquisition of ownership through prescription) is misplaced. Petitioners
alleged that Lot 1873 is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. However, acquisition of ownership over alienable public land is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Claimants in
order to acquire ownership over an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain (in compliance to CA No. 141) must be able to prove an
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said
land. And in the case of the petitioners, they failed to do so.

The court added that any objection against the sale of lot 1873 between
Napocor and Olivia Ferrer has already been barred by laches. Petitioners
made no move to assert their claim for 61 years.

*The Second motion for Reconsideration was denied since the case did not
involve higher interest of justice.

Director of Lands vs. CA 106 SCRA 426
Facts:
Respondent Manuela Pastor filed an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over 13 lots.
Seven of the lots inherited from her parents.
The other six lots inherited from her aunt.
Respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lots under
claim of ownership for more than 30 years.
Director of Lands filed opposition applicant and her predecessors neither
had title in fee simple nor imperfect title over the lots
Respondent submitted a certification from the Land Registration
Commission stating that Lot 9330 from which Lot 9330-A and Lot 9330-C
were derived, was declared public land in a cadastral survey.
The CFI as land registration court approved the application. Director
appealed but the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in granting the application over Lots
9330-A and 9330-C despite evidence presented by applicant herself that
the lots were declared public land in a previous cadastral proceeding
Held and Ratio:
NO, the lower court did not err.
Petitioner asserts res judicata over Lots 9330-A and 9330-C because of the
previous cadastral proceeding declaring them as public land, and is
therefore a bar to respondents application.
The defense of res judicata was raised for the first time on appeal
which cannot be cured.
Even if res judicata was properly raised, petitioner still fails.
There is NO PRIOR FINAL JUDGMENT a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree
contemplated in sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public land remains alienable and disposable.
Respondent has amply shown that no final decree was ever issued
in connection with the cadastral case.
Petitioner asserts that there is no substantial evidence to show that
respondent nor her predecessors have been in possession for more than
30 years.
Testimony of respondent which was corroborated by other
testimonies and evidence has established beyond doubt her claim.

Widows vs. CA, 201 SCRA 165
Doctrine:
A certificate of title cannot be altered or cancelled except in a different
proceeding in accordance with law.
No correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the
court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in
which the decree of registration was entered.

Facts:
August 27, 1974, WIDORA filed an application for registration of
title of a parcel of land LRC-15352
WIDORA alleged that the parcel of land is covered by TITULO DE
PROPRIEDAD 4136 issued in the name of the deceased Mariano
San Pedro Y Esteban.
In 1978, WIDORA filed an amended application for registration and
alleged that the parcel of land is situated in Malitlit Uoogong
Quezon City with an area of 156 hectares described in Plan
15352 and that WIDORA acquired said parcel from Don Marian San
Pedro Y Esteban in 1954
In 1978, MOLINA filed an opposition claiming ownership over 12-
14 hectares of Lot 8 LRC-SWO 15352 and praying for the
registration over said parcels
In the same year, ORTIGAS filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being
applied for having been already registered in the Torrens
System and in the name of ORTIGAS in TCT 77652 and 77653
1979, Trial Court issued an order directing WIDORA to prove
its contention that the two TCTs of ORTIGAS are not the
proper derivatives of the OCT which they purportedly
issued.
Same year, ORTIGAS filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and the same
becomes conclusive against the whole world. Even the LRC itself
has advised the court that the 156 hectares is covered by valid
and subsisting titles in the name of ORTIGAS
Motion was denied by trial court but set a date for hearing in order
for WIDORA to prove that the TCTs of ORTIGAS are not
proper derivatives of the OCT issued
Trial court ruled, that TCTs presented by ORTIGAS show on its
face that they were not derived from the OCTs of WIDORA and
that if there was any error in the correct number of OCT on said
titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was taken.
Decree 1425- from which the TCTs of ORTIGAS were derived
shows only 17hectares and is 4 km away from the 156
hectares subject of the application for registration of
WIDORA.
1988, ORTIGAS filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to hear an application for
registration of a registered land.
CA ruled in favor of ORTIGAS contending that although the TCTs
issued do not reflect the OCTs presented by WIDORA they
are actual derivatives of the same and the lots covered by
the TCTs are also covered by the OCTs presented by
WIDORA. OCT 351 secondary evidence presented by
ORTIGAS clearly reflects Decree 1425. There has been a
MISTAKE in the entries therefore the motion for
reconsideration shall be granted in favor of ORTIGAS

IS THE CAS FINDING THAT ORTIGAS IS THE REGISTERED OWNER
CORRECT?

SC RULED:
ON THE SHOWING OF A SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHICH
ALLEGEDLY IS THE COPY OF DECREE 1425
o The evidence submitted by ORTIGAS adduced by
respondent CA is merely secondary and should not have
been admitted in the first place.
o Before a secondary evidence may be admitted there must
be:
Proof of the execution of the original handwriting
It has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court or that it is in the possession of
an adverse party
ORTIGAS has not shown compliance on the above-
mentioned and thus CA should not have
accepted the secondary evidence in the first
place
On the unilateral action of CA
o Upon presentation of the secondary evidence, CA
substituted the findings of the trial court and ruled in favor
of ORTIGAS
o SC is in the opinion that there should have been a trial
on the merits for this case involves a 156-hectare
land, a vast track of land
o There was not even a request for evidentiary hearing
of this case. CA went out of its way to rule in favor of
ORTIGAS
On correcting the alleged errors in the TCTs
o CA committed a procedural lapse in correcting the
questioned TCTs.
o A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or
cancelled except in a DIRECT PROCEEDING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. No correction of certificate of
title shall be made except by order of the court in a
petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original
case in which the decree of registration was entered.
o What ORTIGAS should have done, if there was really
a mistake in the TCTs, is to file a PETITION FOR THE
CORRECTION OF THE QUESTIONED TCTS

Gabriel vs. CA, 159 SCRA 461
FACTS
A survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of land
located in Orani, Bataan. This parcel of land was registered and Original
Certificate of Title No. 46 was issued in favor of Quimson. Subsequently, a
cadastral survey was made which resulted in the increase of the area of
the land and the designation of the land as Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre,
which was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A and Lot No. 363-B. Lot No. 363-B
was subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 787 was issued in his name.
A parcel of land located in Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed for
Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742 was prepared and approved by
the Director of Lands, but was subsequently amended because it was
found that certain portions of the land transferred to Naval were included.
The undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan
Psu- 9742 was amended with a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The
Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of Potenciano
Gabriel contained the reduced area.
Another cadastral survey was made of the Municipality of
Hermosa, Bataan and the land of Potenciano Gabriel became Lot No. 557
with a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new certificate of
title was issued showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate of
Title No. 1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under
Plan Psu-9742. Accordingly, the partition of the estate of Potenciano
Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu-9742 with an area of 2,436,280
square meters, instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433
square meters.
Later, the heirs of Gabriel filed a complaint against the
administratrix and administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law
of Don Potenciano. They claim that said land was usurped by the late
Eligio Naval who was also an adjoining owner; that said land was only
loaned to the latter for dike and water control purposes of the latter's
fishpond and that after the death of Don Potenciano, private respondents
continued to possess, occupy and use said property and notwithstanding
repeated demands refused to vacate and to return the possession thereof,
to the petitioners. It is prayed that private respondents herein be ordered
to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay damages.
The records show that the portion of 1,196 square meters sought to be
recovered by petitioners is included in Lot No. 363-B of the Orani Cadastre
and in amended plan Psu-9742. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said
portion always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval included
in TCT No. 787 in his name.
The lower court ruled in favor of repondents, which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Prior to the current petition, the property
in litigation was transferred by absolute sale to the spouses Morencio Lucio
and Conchita Gandan and Petrita Pascual prayed that said spouses be
substituted in this action in her capacity as co-administratrix. Petitioners
prayed instead that said parties be joined as additional respondents, and
the court authorized the inclusion of new parties.

ISSUE
Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary
correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform to
the correct area.

HELD
NO.
Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made to
conform with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557, the trial court
and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their property as
registered owners. Such act, petitioners insist, would amount to a
reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the one-year statutory
period, or the granting of an entirely new decree to a land already
registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529.This contention is untenable. The
lower court did not order the reopening of the decree of registration. What
the lower court did was merely to correct the error in the technical
description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to
the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso
Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct
technical description thereof.
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of
the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such
corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner,
and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of
his title. In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and
amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from
the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of over-
lapping or over- lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition
which militates against allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine
which one of several conflicting registered titles shall prevail.
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the
property of the late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by the
Hermoso and Orani Cadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel
himself, who is the original owner. He did not take the necessary action to
recover said lot during his lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation
in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued
use and occupation of the same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio
Naval and his successors-in-interest have always been in possession of
said property since that date.
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for
failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches
their right to recover their property.

Abes vs. Rodil, 17 SCRA 832
- This is a suit for reconveyance and damages.
FACTS:
- In the cadastral proceeding for the Penarandacadastre (consisting
of 5 lots in Nueva Ecija) defendant spouses and Alejandro Abes,
the predecessor in interest of petitioner (AlejoAbes) are claiming
ownership of the lots.
- In October 11, 1958 the cadastral court adjudicated the lots to the
Rodil Spouses and pursuant thereto a Torrens Title was issued in
their favor
- Feb 26, 1959, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for
review of the decree claiming they are the rightful owners of the
land and that respondent spouses were awarded the lot by means
of fraud
- The cadastral court in July 1961, ruled that the petitioners failed to
overcome the evidence of the adjudicates (Rodil spouses)
- The petitioners did not appeal to the ruling
- Instead on September 1961, plaintiffs sued the respondent
spouses demanding for reconveyance averring that they acquired
the properties though fraud, misrepresentation and the use of
falsified deeds of sale. (essentially the same grounds they invokes
in the former petition for review)
- Defendants claimed res judicata and moved to dismiss the case
- The court dismissed it and hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
W/N Res Judicata has set in
HELD: YES. The action for reconveyance will not prosper

RATIO:
1. To set up res judicata the following requisites must be
present
o Final judgment
o Court must have jurisdiction
o Judgment must be on the merits
o Identity of i. parties, ii. Subject matter iii. Cause of
action
- In this case, all were present.
Here, in the cadastral case, both the judgment and the order
denying plaintiffs' petition for review, are final; the jurisdiction of the
cadastral court both on the subject matter and parties is beyond
debate. For, defendants and Alejandro Abes, plaintiffs' predecessor,
were claimants of the same lots in said cadastral case; and the present
plaintiffs were the petitioners for review in the same case. The original
judgment in the cadastral case is on the merits. There, defendant
spouses proved their ownership over the properties. By reason
thereof, the two were issued their Torrens title. In the petition for
review of the cadastral decree', the heirs of Alejandro Abes and the
same defendants already battled over the question of ownership.
Defendants were the prevailing party. It thus results that there was
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of
action. Res judicata perfectly fits into this case. The present action was
properly dismissed.
2. The original proceeding was one in rem and the subsequent one
was an action for reconveyance (in personam) however you should
not be misled to thinking that this impairs the identity of cause of
action. The main thing to take into account is that the point of the
litigation is OWNERSHIP.
The test to determine the existence of res judicata is this:
Would the same evidence support and establish both the
present and the former cause of action?If the answer is yes
then res judicata sets in.

3. Plaintiffs aver that their petition for review did not put in issue "the
question of ownership or title". They claim that said petition was
but a mere preliminary step to reopening and that this should not
be confused with the second step which is the new trial. This
argument is flawed. Obviously the plaintiffs have misconceived the
reach of the court order denying their petition. The lower court
allowed them due course and permitted them to submit their
evidence however they were unable to overcome the evidence of
the respondents.
The court discovered that they only began paying taxes on the
land one month before the filing of their petition for review