Operation Unthinkable

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Operation Unthinkable
Allied army positions in central Europe on 10 May 1945. The Soviet numerical
superiority in relation to the Western Allies was roughly 4:1 in men and 2:1 in tanks at the
end of hostilities in Europe.
Operation Unthinkable was a
code-name of two related plans of a
conflict between the Western Allies
and the Soviet Union. Both were
ordered by British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill in 1945 and
developed by the British Armed
Forces' Joint Planning Staff at the end
of World War II in Europe.
The first of the two assumed a surprise
attack on the Soviet forces stationed in
Germany in order to "impose the will
of the Western Allies" on the Soviets
and force Joseph Stalin to honour the
agreements in regards to the future of
Central Europe.Wikipedia:Citation
needed When the odds were judged "fanciful", the original plan was abandoned. The code-name was used instead for
a defensive scenario, in which the British were to defend against a Soviet drive towards the North Sea and the
Atlantic following the withdrawal of the American forces from the continent.
The study became the first of Cold War-era contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union. Both plans were highly
secret at the time of their creation and it was not until 1998 that they were made public.
Offensive operations
The initial primary goal of the operation was declared as follows: "to impose upon Russia the will of the United
States and the British Empire. Even though 'the will' of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square
deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment". The word "Russia" is used heavily
throughout the document, as during the Imperial period the term was used as pars pro toto for the Czarist Empire,
with which the USSR was almost coterminous.
The Chiefs of Staff were concerned that given the enormous size of Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of
the war, and the perception that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was unreliable, there existed a Soviet threat to
Western Europe. The Soviet numerical superiority was roughly 4:1 in men and 2:1 in tanks at the end of hostilities in
Europe. The Soviet Union had yet to launch its attack on Japan, and so one assumption in the report was that the
Soviet Union would instead ally with Japan if the Western Allies commenced hostilities.
The hypothetical date for the start of the Allied invasion of Soviet-held Europe was scheduled for 1 July 1945. The
plan assumed a surprise attack by up to 47 British and American divisions in the area of Dresden, in the middle of
Soviet lines. This represented almost a half of roughly 100 divisions (ca. 2.5 million men) available to the British,
American and Canadian headquarters at that time.
The plan was taken by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee as militarily unfeasible due to a three-to-one superiority
of Soviet land forces in Europe and the Middle East, where the conflict was projected to take place. The majority of
any offensive operation would have been undertaken by American and British forces, as well as Polish forces and up
to 100,000 German Wehrmacht soldiers. Any quick success would be due to surprise alone. If a quick success could
not be obtained before the onset of winter, the assessment was that the Allies would be committed to a total war
Operation Unthinkable
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which would be protracted. In the report of 22 May 1945, an offensive operation was deemed "hazardous".
Defensive operations
In response to an instruction by Churchill of 10 June 1945 a follow up report was written concerning "what measures
would be required to ensure the security of the British Isles in the event of war with Russia in the near future".
United States forces were relocating to the Pacific Theatre to prepare for the invasion of Japan, and Churchill was
concerned that this reduction in supporting forces would leave the Soviets in a strong position to take offensive
action in Western Europe. The report concluded that if the United States focused on the Pacific theatre, Great
Britain's odds "would become fanciful."
The Joint Planning Staff rejected Churchill's notion of retaining bridgeheads on the continent as having no
operational advantage. It was envisaged that Britain would use its air force and navy to resist, although a threat from
mass rocket attack was anticipated, with no means of resistance except for strategic bombing.
Subsequent discussions
By 1946 tensions and conflicts were developing between democratic and communist areas of Europe. These were
seen as being potential triggers for a wider conflict. One such area was the Julian March (which was applied to an
area of southeastern Europe, today split among Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy), and on 30 August 1946 informal
discussions took place between the British and US Chiefs of Staff concerning how such a conflict could develop and
the best strategy for conducting a European war. Again the issue of retaining a bridgehead on the continent was
discussed, with Dwight D. Eisenhower preferring a withdrawal to the Low Countries, rather than Italy, for their
proximity to the United Kingdom.
Citations
References
Books
(English) Jonathan Walker (2013). Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War. The History Press. p.192.
ISBN9780752487182.
(English) David Reynolds (2006). From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International
History of the 1940s. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.376. ISBN978-0-19-928411-5.
(English) Joel Clarke Gibbons (2009). The Empire Strikes a Match in a World Full of Oil. Bloomington, IN:
Xlibris Corporation. p.352. ISBN9781450008693.
(English) Frank Costigliola (2011). Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War.
Princeton University Press. p.544. ISBN9780691121291.
Documents
(English) British War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Public Record Office, CAB 120/691/109040 / 002 (11
August 1945). "Operation Unthinkable: 'Russia: Threat to Western Civilization'" (https:/ / web. archive. org/ web/
20101116160624/ http:/ / www. history. neu. edu/ PRO2/ ) (online photocopy). Department of History,
Northeastern University. Archived from the original (http:/ / www. history. neu. edu/ PRO2/ ) on 16 November
2010. Retrieved 9 May 2006.
Operation Unthinkable
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External links
Richard Northon-Taylor: Churchill plotted invasion of Russia; Richard Norton-Taylor on allied blueprint to crush
Soviet system after the end of the war in Europe, The Guardian, 2 October 1998
Julian Lewis: 978-0-415-49171-6 Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence
(http:/ / www. routledge. com/ books/ Changing-Direction-ISBN), 2nd edn., Routledge, 2008, pp.xxx-xl (ISBN
0-415-49171-1)
Operation Unthinkable: Churchills plan to start World War III (http:/ / indrus. in/ blogs/ 2013/ 06/ 13/
operation_unthinkable_churchills_plan_to_start_world_war_iii_26091. html)
Article Sources and Contributors
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Article Sources and Contributors
Operation Unthinkable Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611235346 Contributors: Ahmad510, Ahpook, Alan Liefting, Alysg, Amcalabrese, Artem-S-Tashkinov, Atrix20,
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Glossologist, Gob Lofa, Ground Zero, Guinness man, Halibutt, Hibernian, HisSpaceResearch, Hmains, Hunter2005, JCDenton2052, Jacurek, JanSuchy, Jaraalbe, Laurinavicius, Ligulem,
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
File:Allied army positions on 10 May 1945.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Allied_army_positions_on_10_May_1945.png License: Creative Commons
Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors: User:W. B. Wilson
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