A Mighty Dirge Presents:

Mongol Military Conquests: A Brief Overview

The Mongol Conquests are some of the most important military campaigns in all
of history. The Mongol incursion lead to untold changes in medieval economics,
demographics, and politics. And yet, efore this great triumph, the Mongols were a
incredily small and seemingly insignificant trie of nomads. Their leader was orn in
!!"#, named Temu$in, now %nown y his title of Chinggi& 'han
(!)
, meaning *the +reatest
,eader.- By the middle of the ne.t century, his empire had reached its &enith under his
immediate successors. The Mongol /mpire remains the largest land empire ever seen
in history, it0s ma.imal orders completely overshadowed the conquests of 1apoleon
and Ale.ander the +reat 2Onon "3. 4ow could such a mighty empire e orn out of a
nomadic trie, lead y a man who received no education higher than what was
necessary to survive in the desert 24oworth 5637
8cholars from the Medieval era and even recent history claim that the Mongols
won through illegitimate ways, either y outnumering their opponents, or $ust y simply
fighting opponents that were wea% and disorgani&ed. 4owever, due to the sheer si&e of
their conquests, the Mongols fought against a greater variety of cultures and militaries
than any other army in history, yet performed ama&ingly well against foes they had little
prior understanding of 2Turnull !93. :t is not satisfactory to simply say they could have
outnumered and destroyed that many foes through rute force alone. There must e
some deeper reason for their unparalleled success.
These arguments are most li%ely colored y histories written y the people the
Mongols defeated. :ndeed, Muslims would fear the Mongols as a punishment of +od
equal to famine and disease, even # centuries after the invasions had passed 28omogyi
;<=3. >iewing an enemy on such a mystical and religious level does not lead to
accurate histories. A less iased view reveals that there are several other factors that
can e.plain the Mongol military campaigns. ?irst, they were so outnumered that they
could not have won through sheer force or mass alone, they had to use other means of
victory. 8econdly, the Mongols pursued strangely enlightened ideas aout organi&ation
and equipment. ?inally, the crowning aspect of the Mongols was their strategy, their
artful, masterful strategy that has indeed een copied y militaries thereafter, even
stretching into the modern era. Though the Mongol conquests occurred nearly 9@@
years ago, they still hold surprising lessons for the modern strategist.
There is a modern perception of the Mongols as a *horde- of countless men on
horseac% that swept across the world, overrunning it with rute force and numerical
superiority 2Martin 5"3. This is simply not true. /uropean sources place Mongol
numers in the hundreds of thousands, half a million supposedly conquered Aussian
and /astern /urope. :n reality, the Mongols possessed, at the death of Chinghi& 'han,
aout !#6,@@@ comatants 2Martin 593.
/ven though the Mongols conscripted soldiers from areas they captured 2Carpini
#3, this cannot have allooned Mongol fighting strength to half a million. The largest
Mongol host is estimated to have had aout #@@,@@@ men 2Martin 5=3, ut this was a
force assemled in !#=<, nearly fifty years after the initial invasions. By that time, the
Mongol /mpire had acquired much more land and was ale to gather men from a much
larger population ase. Therefore, it0s unli%ely that a force that si&e saw action during
the first Mongol invasions, efore they had access to such large recruiting populations.
On the other hand, the MongolsB enemies almost always outnumered the
1omadic *hordes-. Cpon invading the 'hwara&im /mpire, Chinghi&D enemies mustered
some ;@@,@@@ soldiers, outnumering the Mongols #:! 2Martin 5"3. The Mongol general
8uutai
(#)
was said to have split his !@@,@@@ strong army into four parts, his personal
detachment met a 4ungarian army of !@@,@@@ and laid waste to it 24art #" !6"=3. At this
point, even ignoring Mongol tactics and strategy, it is safe to discredit the theory of
numerical superiority E the numers reveal that the Mongols could not have afforded to
win using numers alone.
1ow focus must e paid on the Mongol soldier himself. The argument of a
numerless Asiatic horde implies that a single Mongol soldier was inferior, wea% y
himself. The Mongol armies are often rememered as a *locust swarm,- individually,
they are ut insects, ut in great numers they are powerful 24oworth 563. Fhile it is
indeed true that the typical Mongol soldier had a humle ac%ground of a nomadic
hunter, it was actually this upringing that instilled %eys to victory.
At the age of three, a Mongolian oy was, as he is in the present day, taught to
ride a horse. This means the child simultaneously learned how to wal% and how to ride.
At the age of 5 to <, he received his first ow, and then was taught how to hunt on
horseac% 2Martin <#3. As he grew older, he would participate in mass hunting
e.peditions ordered together y his ruling leader, %nown as a 'han. These hunting
e.peditions resemled actual military campaigns in almost every way E lasting aout a
month, the terrain was scouted, %ill &ones were planned, and the assemled Mongol
*army- made sweeping maneuvers over incredile distances to ring together a large
mass of animals. Once the animals had een %illed and the meat collected, the 'han
would review the hunt as he would a military campaign 2Martin <;E<53.
Automatically, a Mongolian had an advantage over his foes, as he was ale to
practice military s%ills during peacetime. There was no separating a Mongolian civilian
from a Mongolian soldier, oth occupations required the same s%ills. On the other hand,
/urope operated on a ?eudal system that employed a small group of 'nights, privileged
y hereditary, only they would receive proper military training. Fithin the /uropean
sphere, 'nights could smash their way through any unit of nonE'nights, as the other
types of soldiers were ine.perienced and lac%ed firm military training 2GelrHc% #;<3.
/ven though %nights received formidale military training, they were lac%ing
certain s%ills the Mongols had. The massive hunts the Mongol went on taught him how
to wor% with others, to act as a unit, to %eep formation and perform maneuvers as part
of a large ody of men. On the other hand, 'nights stressed a more personal sort of
comat, stressing s%ill and ravery over formation and maneuvers 2GelrHc% #;;3. The
Mongol focus on discipline and coherence as a unit would play an important role in their
conquests, allowing them to coordinate and e.ecute comple. attle plans.
A Mongolian had superior equipment, as well. Mongols actually rode a type of
pony. These ponies had superior endurance to /uropean horses, and were e.tremely
sturdy. They required only a single watering a day, and could eat mostly wild grass. The
rapidity of these ponies was astonishing, some sources say they could cover "@@ miles
in nine days 2Martin <@E<!3. On the other hand, /uropean %nights were so heavy that
they couldn0t use their war horse as a primary method of transportation, they had to
preserve their war horse0s strength until the last possile minute, riding other horses in
the meantime 2GelrHc% #;;3. The /uropean %night couldn0t have moved fast anyways,
as they still utili&ed a ase of infantry as a sort of anvil 24art !6"= ;#3, slowing the
mounted men to the pace of someone on foot. Mongols, eing all mounted, were ale to
move at voracious speeds. :f need e, the Mongols could also retreat at the same pace.
The Mongols were moile due to their horses, ut their favor of archery made
them even more so. /uropean %nights could not use ranged weapons, as they were
laden down with heavy armor 2GelrHc% #;;3. Thus, the /uropean 'nights had to close
into hand to hand comat to win attles. Mongols could simply pepper their foes at a
distance. :f charged, they could retreat. :f the enemy fled, they could pursue. This
tactical fle.iility was %ey to their success, it was a vital aspect of the Mongol military.
:t is easily seen how Mongol soldiers were equal or superior to their counterparts,
ut there is another line of argument that discredits the Mongol conquests. 4istorians
li%e Charles Oman argue that the Mongols had a good army, yes, ut the real %ey to
their success lies in who they fought 2;!"3. 4e argues that the /astern /uropeans and
Iersians that fought the Mongols were divided and wea%, that the Mongols were inferior
and would have lost had they attac%ed any further into /urope, where supposedly more
organi&ed and deadly foes were.
This argument is flawed on many levels. :t has already een shown that the
Festern /uropean 'nights were decidedly inferior to the Mongols. The argument also
does not mention how sophisticated the Chin /mpire was, nor does it see% to
understand why the Mongol0s opponents were divided. Analy&ing the Mongol0s actions
against the /astern /uropeans sheds light on what actually happened. 8pecifically,
8uutai0s campaign into Ioland and 4ungary is a perfect case study.
1early a year efore the campaign started, 8uutai used a comple. spy networ%
to find out more aout the type of militaries he would face in Ioland and 4ungary.
Armed with this %nowledge 8uutai choose to audaciously split his !@@,@@@ strong army
into four armies 24art !6"= #!E#;3. The first thing that is evident aout this campaign is
the characteristic speed and coordination of the Mongol invasion force. One of the army
groups was assigned to go north to sudue Ioland while 8uutai and the remaining
armies tac%led 4ungary in the south. Fithin a month, Ioland was conquered. The
Battle of ,iegnit&, where a large multiEnational army was defeated y the outnumered
Mongols, signaled the end of the Iolish campaign 24art !6"= #53.
8imultaneously, 8uutai was marching into 4ungary. 4is own army went straight
across while his other two army groups flan%ed high and low to provide a distraction,
drawing 4ungarian forces away from the main area of engagement. 8uutai0s army
covered !9@ miles in three days, despite harsh weather and unfamiliar territory 24art
!6"= #"3. 8uutai0s army met up with his flan%ing element, then encountered an
entrenched 4ungarian force sitting across the Ganue Aiver. :n response, 8uutai
pulled ac%, feigning retreat. The 4ungarians followed the retreating army, and were
lead out into the open. 8eemingly out of nowhere, 8uutai decided to attac%, wiping out
the 4ungarian force. :t must e noted that 8uutai decided to attac% only after the Battle
of ,iegnit& had een won. 8uutai was separated from his army in Ioland y some ;<@
miles, yet it seems as if 8uutai was in communication with them.
Fhat can e learned from this campaign7 The Iolish and 4ungarian forces were
divided because 8uutai made it so. 8ending an army group into Ioland ensured that
there would e no Iolish interference in the 4ungarian campaign, and y launching
simultaneous invasions, the reverse was impossile as well. 8uutai utili&ed what is
called economy of force, that is, every single unit in his army was utili&ed to its fullest.
1o unit was simply there, each unit had a specific purpose. Fhether it was a part of the
main attac%, or a distraction unit, his armies were used in the most efficient way
possile.
Fe can also step ac% and appreciate the art of coordinating two different armies
over distances of hundreds of miles. Fe do not %now how the Mongols communicated,
ut it still stands that they had the capacity to %eep trac% of armies in two different
countries. Gespite the moility the Mongols displayed, they were ale to %eep order and
control.
?urthermore, these campaigns displayed the Mongol0s love of firepower. That is,
the ow was the primary weapon, and enemy units would e softened up y hails of
arrows efore a charge would e made. /ven more fascinating is 8uutai0s use of siege
artillery to aide in a river crossing. Fhen 4ungarian crossowmen set up on the
opposite an% of a vital ridge, 8uutai used siege stone throwers and catapults to clear
the an%. /uropeans had never seen siege weaponry efore, and we essentially have
an e.ample of literal artillery eing used to support a ground assault 2rather than a
siege, which is what the /uropeans only used them for3.
These campaigns show us five things aout the Mongol armyJ they were moile,
they used economy of force, they used intelligence gathering, they e.ercised tight
communication and control etween separate groups, and they favored using firepower.
These are five aspects of warfare that significantly alter the way an army fights. :ndeed,
after the Mongol :nvasion, /uropeans would play catchEup, slowly learning and
implementing these concepts in their own armies.
One of the most ovious changes that occurred after the Mongol :nvasions was
the widespread adoption of firepower. By the later years of the !;th Century, the /nglish
started to adopt the longow as a principal comat weapon 2Oman ""3. By the
eginning of the 4undred Kears0 Far in !;;=, the /nglish longow was a weapon of
supreme importance, ale to turn ac% charges made y heavily armored %nights
2Oman !#53.
4owever, the adoption of the longow as a primary weapon is a very specific
effect that only pertains to the Middle Ages. Oviously, longows are not the premier
infantry weapon today. 4owever, there are aspects to the Mongol military that are nonE
specific, that are still emulated today. ?or e.ample, 8uutai0s use of intelligence
gathering efore the invasion of Ioland and 4ungary was a rilliant action, modern day
military theorist and retired Aear Admiral 4enry /ccles holds that intelligence is one of
the most important aspects of warfare 2!6<3.
On a different level, we can compare Mongol comat engineering to modern day
comat engineering. 8pecifically, the Mongols made e.tensive use of quic%lyEuilt
ridges to cross rivers. Guring the Iolish and 4ungarian :nvasion, 8uutai used
ridging across rivers to outflan% and destroy his opponents 24art !6"= #93. Bridging is
not a specific effect li%e longows, it0s something that is still highly valuale today. A
modern C.8. Military ?ield Manual, entitled, *Comined Arms +ap Crossing,- states
that, *+ap crossings and gapEcrossing operations are essential to enale comat and
supporting forces to do their mission- 2?M 6@E!; !3. Fhile the terminology is different
2crossing rivers is included in the term *gapEcrossing-3, the effect is the same. :t lists
*fundamentals of surprise- as a goal of gapEcrossing, as well as stating that modern
military operations are characteri&ed y *a high degree of moility, firepower, and
situational understanding.-
The parallels are latant. The Mongol0s use of spies and scouts gave them
situational understanding, and they favored firepower. The last %ey aspect to Mongol
military strategy is their moility. Fhile Mongol ponies are not in military use anymore,
the essence of their moility is, through the proliferation of tan%s and armored vehicles.
:s this a fair comparison7 Can we really compare horses to tan%s7 8everal
military theorists elieve that it is indeed fair. 8ir Basil ,iddell 4art was a British FF:
veteran and military theorist during the :nterwar period. 4is oo% Great Captains
Unveiled pays heavy attention to the Mongol conquests. /ven though it is $ust a history
oo%, it was given to Britain0s /.perimental Mechani&ed ?orce 2Britain0s first tan% unit3
as a te.too% 24art !66! "#3.
,iddell 4art was spurred on to study historical tactics in order to prevent
slaughters li%e the ?irst Forld Far from happening again 24art !6=# !"3. Fith that goal
in mind, it is very valuale to study the Mongols, for they valued each of their men
dearly. :nfluenced y their 8hamanistic culture, every Mongol was considered equal.
Commanders who lost men due to carelessness or rec%lessness were severely
punished. :n one instance, 8uutai was severely reprimanded after a slight delay in his
river crossing lead to the deaths of #@ Mongol soldiers 2Onon !#93. :t is hard to elieve
that in an army of more than !@@,@@@ men, merely #@ soldiers would e so highly
valued.
:n that sense, it is reasonale to claim that the Mongols had one of the greatest
militaries of all time. They were outnumered and disadvantaged from the start, and
their victories were legitimate and their own. By reali&ing this fact, it is easier to start to
study the Mongolian system as one to emulate. 1ot only does the Mongol system hold
valuale lessons on how to win wars, it also teaches how to minimi&e casualties. Fhile
we may claim, at a distance of nearly 9@@ years, superiority to the Mongols through
technology or %nowledge, our own century has seen warfare slaughter almost
inconceivale amounts of human eings. 1umerically, that amount of death was never
seen during the Mongol :nvasions. 4ow then can we e superior7 :f we reflect on the
methods the Mongols used, perhaps future utchery in warfare may e avoided.
For%s Cited
AdhEGhahai. Gestruction of Gamascus y the Mongols. Trans. Loseph 8omogyi. 1.p.:
n.p., n.d. Irint.
Carpini, ?riar Lohn of Ilano. Gescription of Mongol Farfare. Ge Ae Militari, #@@6. Fe.
Comined Arms +apECrossing Operations. Fashington, G.C.: 4eadquarters, Gept. of
the Army, #@@9. Fe.
GelrHc%, 4ans. 4istory of the Art of Far: Fithin the ?ramewor% of Iolitical 4istory. >ol.
::: The Middle Ages. Festport, CT: +reenwood, !69#. Irint.
/ccles, 4enry /. Military Concepts and Ihilosophy. 1ew Brunswic%, 1L: Autgers CI,
!6"<. Irint.
4art, Basil 4. ,., 8ir. +reat Captains Cnveiled. ?reeport, 1K: for ,iraries, !6"=. Irint.
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4art, Basil 4. ,., 8ir. 8trategy. 1ew Kor%: Iraeger, !66!. Irint.
4oworth, 4enry 4., 8ir. 4istory of the Mongols: ?rom the 6th to the !6th Century. >ol. :
,ondon: ,ongmans, +reen, and, !9=". Irint.
Martin, 4. Gesmond. MThe Mongol Army.M Lournal of the Aoyal Asiatic 8ociety of +reat
Britain and :reland 1o.! 2!65;3: 5"E9<. Irint.
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>olumes. >ol. #, !#=9E!59<. 1ew Kor%, 1K: ?ran%lin, !6#5. Irint.
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Chinggis 'han. Aichmond, 8urrey: Cur&on, #@@!. Irint.
Turnull, 8tephen A. +enghis 'han N the Mongol Conquests !!6@E!5@@. O.ford:
Osprey, #@@;. Irint.
(!)
Chinggi& 'han is a more accurate spelling of +hengis 'han
(#)
Also spelled as 8audai, 8uodai, 8eudei