AN ANALYSIS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND EFFECTS

OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO

ON THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF MUSLIM MINDANAO




A Term Paper Presented to
Atty. Joenar C. Pueblo
Faculty, College of Law
University of San Agustin
Iloilo City




In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Subject
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION




Roz Lourdiz Paada Camacho
May 2014

2

Table of Contents

Introduction...3
Brief History.4
Quandaries on Agreements Creation.6
Grave abuse of discretion in guaranteeing constitutional
amendments..7
Violation of the peoples constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern....8
Creation of an autonomous political entity
for a religious organization..........................................................................9
Creation of an autonomous political entity
for a minority......................................................................10
Authorizing a foreign entity to aid and be part
of the process in amending the Philippine Constitution.....11
Effects in the Local Government of Muslim Mindanao..12
Normalization.........12
Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing..13
Power Sharing14
Conclusion16
Bibliography17











3

University of San Agustin
COLLEGE OF LAW
Iloilo City
oOo

IN THE MATTER OF
FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS IN LAW ON
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
AY 2013-2014
ROZ LOURDIZ P. CAMACHO
2C, COLLEGE OF LAW, A.Y.
2013-14
Petitioner.
X--------------------------------------X
PETITION
PETITIONER, to this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

An Analysis on the Constitutionality and Effects of the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on the
Local Government of Muslim Mindanao


Introduction
In furtherance of its duty to provide peace to its citizenry, the
Philippine Government has been pursuing peaceful negotiations to bring the
armed conflict in Mindanao to a definite conclusion. Indeed, long has it
been awaited by the Mindanaoans that peace may be restored to the region
and their economic development be focused on.
1
Thus, to quell hostilities
and provide settlement of decades of discontentment, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GPH), under President Benigno Aquino III, and

1
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Brief Background on the Moro
Struggle (June 6, 2011, 17:38) available at http://opapp.gov.ph/milf/brief-background-
moro-struggle

CASE NO.1
FOR: LAW ON PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS
4

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) met halfway with the signing of
the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
2


Brief History
At the southern end of the Philippine archipelago lies Mindanano, the
second largest of the country's major islands.
3
Its contact with Muslim
traders before the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16
th
century became the
catalyst for its inhabitants' conversion to Islam. Thus, Muslim Sultanates of
Maguindanao and Sulu were established. During the Spanish colonization
period, while Spain invaded Luzon and most of the Visayas converting
Filipinos to Catholicism, Mindanao confronted the Spanish with disdain and
refused to profess the Christian faith introduced by the latter. This was the
genesis of its conflict with the central government. Mindanao was only
brought under central control at the end of the Philippine-American War at
the turn of the 20
th
century and the conflict became dormant.

Mindanao was calm until sometime in 1967 when the conflict flared
yet again between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Mindanaoans. This originated from the infamous Jabidah Massacre,
otherwise known as the Corregidor Massacre, which occurred during the
Marcos administration's plot to try and reclaim Sabah. Operation Merdeka,
as this plan was called, involved the recruitment of nearly 200 Tausug and
Sama Muslims aged 18 to 30 from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. However, upon
gaining knowledge that they will be made to fight against their Muslim
brothers in Sabah, the Tausug and Sama Muslims resisted against the
government. The resistance only upsurged when the recruits were not
accorded their promised monthly allowance. Disgruntled with the turn of
events, the recruits demanded to be returned home but this was not granted
and several members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines massacred the
mutinous recruits.
4
This incident eventually resulted to the emergence of the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and, subsequently, the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) organizations representing the interests of
Mindanao's Muslim population. Over the years, continued violence has been
occurring in Mindanao due to MNLF and MILF's opposition to the central
government and such confrontation between both parties has led to
numerous deaths and poverty in war-stricken areas.


2
Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0
3 Funk and Wagnalls New Encyclopedia Vol. 17, p. 345.
4 Paul F. Whitman "The Corregidor Massacre - 1968" available at
http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/jabidah.html

5

In December 1976, the Government of the Philippines under the
Marcos regime sought the intercession of Libya in the signing of the Tripoli
Agreement
5
with the MNLF. The agreement provided for the cessation of
hostilities and an autonomous government in southern Philippines but this
provision for autonomy was not implemented. The implementation was only
realized upon President Corazon Aquino's term after holding a plebiscite to
determine which provinces stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement agree to
being part of the proposed autonomous region. Out of the thirteen (13)
specified provinces, only four (4) provinces where Muslims are a majority
opted to be part of the autonomous region. With this outcome, the
government again obtained desistance from the MNLF which accused the
former of violating the Tripoli Agreement.

In December 1996, a peace settlement was initiated under President
Fidel Ramos in continuance of the preceding administration's advocacy. The
Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), headed
by Chairman Nur Misuari, was made to be responsible for supervising and
coordinating development projects in an area designated as the Special Zone
for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). SZOPAD covered all the provinces
specified in the Tripoli Agreement. The SPCPD agreement only added one
province to the autonomous region and the problem in other areas in
Mindanao continued.
6


Upon President Joseph Estrada's election in 1998, the MNLF's threat
was abated with its support from the government through its members'
occupancy of government positions. The threat was now delivered by MILF,
a breakaway group of the MNLF. Between the two Moro fronts, the
Government's stellar rival is the MILF which is more religion-oriented than
the nationalistic-oriented MNLF. An Islamic organization, the MILF became
a threat to the country having relations with terrorist and criminal group Abu
Sayyaf and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah. MILF has also
maintained close relations with Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia,
benefiting from their support as member of the Organization of Islamic
Conferences. Consequently, Estrada declared an all-out war policy in
April 2000, mobilizing the military in Mindanao. However, the MILF

5 The Tripoli Agreement available at http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/Tripoli-
Agreement-December-23-1976.pdf
6
Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco THE SPCPD and the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement-- the betrayal of
the Bangsa-Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination available at
https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact
=8&ved=0CDUQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.arkibongbayan.org%2F2011%2F2011-
01Jan14-
Peacetalks%2Fspcpd.rtf&ei=f0ZnU4nIINeUuASslYKgAw&usg=AFQjCNELQdIqu30VuIeCeKlp
OPvrpdfKGw&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E

6

avoided the government's assault by being divided in smaller groups and
hiding in remote areas.

On July 27, 2008, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's
administration initially signed the Memorandum of Agreement Ancestral
Domain, Bangsamoro Juridical Entity which was scheduled to be formally
signed on August 5, 2008. However, by virtue of a restraining order of the
Supreme Court on August 4, 2008, the signing was stopped. The agreement
aimed for the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
7
, providing further
that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity would have its own internal waters and
territorial seas that should only pertain to states. This and other provisions
violating the sovereignty of the Philippines were struck down because of its
failure to reconcile with the Constitution. The Supreme Court deemed the
aforesaid agreement to be unconstitutional on October 14, 2008.


Quandaries on Agreements Creation

After the failure of its predecessors, comes the making of the 2012
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. On October 7, 2012, the GPH
and MILF, parties to the agreement, released by publishing on-line the
Framework of Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which will pave the way for
the establishment of the new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro,
to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The agreement
was signed on the afternoon of October 15, 2012, in ceremonies held in the
Malacaan Palace, witnessed by President Benigno Aquino III and
Malaysian Prime Minister Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul
Razak.
8


The 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, despite its
laudable purpose of promoting peace, contemplates and provides for certain
measures which are dubious and essentially unconstitutional.


7 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0
8 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 available at
http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/20121007-GPH-MILF-Framework-
Agreement.pdf

7

Grave abuse of discretion in guaranteeing constitutional
amendments
There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.
9
In the present case, the Peace Negotiationg Panel of the Republic of
the Philippines is guaranteeing changes in the Constitution, particularly its
replacement of the provisions on the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, in order to conform with the creation of the Bangsamoro.
Regardless of Peace negotiating parties' claim that the framework agreement
does not compel any of the parties to work for charter change, charter
change is inevitable because the Bangsamoro would not have a
constitutional anchor to justify its existence, including the ministerial
government expressly stipulated in the agreement and absent in the
Constitution, if no amendment is to be made. Their contention that the
major political commitments that were made in the Framework Agreement
can be achieved within the flexibilities of the existing constitution is absurd
because the Constitution is a rigid one. Flexibility can only come with
changes or amendments. Even if the Constitution allows any citizen to
recommend ideas to amend the Constitution through proper legal process
10
,
it is merely a recommendation or a proposal that is allowed, not a guarantee
in an agreement of such recommendation or proposal which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the peace panel.

The Peace Negotiating Panel has gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it guaranteed that there is
no need to amend the Constitution, when in truth and in fact, through the
agreement's provision stating the creation of the Bangsamoro autonomous
political entity in Muslim Mindanao to replace the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, a Constitutional amendment is essential or indispensable.
The Agreement virtually states its guarantee to a constitutional amendment
when it promised to work on proposals to amend the Philippine
Constitution for the purpose of accommodating and entrenching in the
Constitution the agreement of the Parties whenever necessary...
11
The
power to guarantee such amendments lies only with those who have been
vested the power to make amendments possible. This power belongs
ultimately to the legislature and/or the sovereign people it represents as
clearly provided by the Constitution in Article XVII. In addition, it bears
stressing that this agreement's latest predecessor had been deemed
unconstitutional for the very same reason. According to the Supreme Court,

9 Infotech Foundation, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.159139, January 13, 2004.
10 Constitution, Article XVII

11 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.4.b.

8

no one has the power to commit to amend the Constitution to make it
conform to any agreement:

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind
the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
Peace negotiating parties' almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by
itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The
grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within
a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that
Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their
imprimatur to their solution(Emphasis supplied)
12


Violation of the peoples constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
13
The Framework Agreement is such matter of
public concern because it shall be decided by the people and its
implementation shall bring alterations to the fundamental law that the people
have revered. The aforementioned right has been violated for there was
failure to give a clear and transparent presentation of what the 2,973-word
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro is all about. Gung-ho as it is with
its aims, the Peace negotiating parties failed to abide by the Constitution's
provision that the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
14
It leaves the
Filipino citizen in confusion by the non-clarification of its provisions.

First, the Framework states that the form of government shall be
ministerial
15
. Does this mean that Bangsamoro officials will compose of a
prime minister and cabinet members or ministers? The Framework fatally
fails to specify on this.


12 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

13 Constitution, Article III, Section 7

14 Ibid., Article II, Section 28

15 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, I.2.

9

Second, the Framework stipulates an assymetric relationship
16

between the Bangsamoro and the central government. Assymetric is defined
as without symmetry
17
Is this stipulation the same as the relationship
between China and Vietnam where the former is powerful and the latter the
weak one? Which then would be more powerful? This leaves the reader with
more questions than answers again.

Third, The Framework's section on Revenue Generation and Wealth
Sharing provides that The Bangsamoro may create its own auditing body
and procedures for accountability over revenues and other funds generated
within or by the region from external sources.
18
This statement does not
give any distinction as to what auditing body or procedure shall be
implemented and is again left to the discretion of the Bangsamoro
government. Without limits or restrains, this could lead to the still
continuing systemic plunder in ARMM.

Fourth, and most important, the Framework asserts in its
Normalization annex that the MILF will be decommissioning its forces.
19

However, there is no mention of the MILF surrendering their firearms. There
is also no timetable for the MILF's decommissioning of its forces. It should
also be taken note of that the MILF, once the agreement is implemented, will
metamorphose into members of the army of the Philippines as part of the
police force of the Bangsamoro. This means that they will still be able to
possess firearms, this time legally. Without the MILF's surrender of
firearms, it is possible that not only rebellion in Mindanao will still continue,
but the rebels will have access with impunity to the internal organs of the
Philippines.

The People of the Philippines are entitled to an in-depth discussion of
the above-mentioned matters but were afforded none and were clearly
deprived of their right to information and its full disclosure. Ergo, despite its
publication of the Agreement, the Peace negotiating parties disseminated
very lacking information and violated the people's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern.


16 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, I.4.

17 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/british/asymmetric visited October 24,
2012

18 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, IV.5.

19 Ibid., VIII.5.
10

Creation of an autonomous political entity for a religious
organization
The beneficiary of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
creating a political entity in Muslim Mindanao is undisputedly the followers
of the Islam faith. This is due to the fact that the envisioned Bangsamoro
government will be populated by a Muslim majority. The Framework
Agreement states: The core territory of the Bangsamoro shall be composed
of: (a) the present geographical area of the ARMM; (b) the Municipalities of
Baloi, Munai, Nunugan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of
Lanao del Norte and all other barangays in the Municipalities of Kabacan,
Carmen, Aleosan, Pagkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap that voted for inclusion
in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite
20
These areas that will be
incorporated in the creation of Bangsamoro are part of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao and are dominated ipso facto by Muslims. The
supreme and fundamental law states that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion...
21
and the separation of Church and State
shall be inviolable
22
Hence, the creation then of the Bangsamoro is also the
creation of a territory for the MILF, an Islamic organization, and Muslims in
general which is prohibited by the Philippine Constitution.

Creation of the Bangsamoro as an autonomous political entity for a
minority
As it appears in the published map
23
highlighting the areas that will
comprise the Bangsamoro Autonomous Political entity, the Bangsamoro
territory would encompass a total area larger by a small fraction than the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and, proportionally, a
population increased by an almost insignificant percentage. However, the
statistics as to the areas and people who are willing to become an integral
part of the Bangsamoro government is still subject to a reduction since the
contiguous areas, cities and municipalities reckoned by the Agreement may
not opt for inclusion in the said entity. This will lead to the creation of the
Bangsamoro for a minority which is unconstitutional as this will be an
encroachment of the constitutional right of other minorities to equal
protection.
24
It will be inequitable to the other minorities for they will not be
given a government of their own as the Bangsamoro minority will have.

20 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.

21 Constitution, Article III, Section 5

22 Id., Section 6

23 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0
24 Constitution, Article III, Section 1
11

Authorizing a foreign entity to aid and be part of the process in
amending the Philippine Constitution

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro provides that: An
international third party monitoring team shall be present to ensure that the
process is free, fair, credible, legitimate and in conformity with international
standards.
25
This proviso allowing the intervention of foreign entities to the
possible amendment of the Constitution, which has already been established,
is reiterated in its section for Transition and Implementation stating that:
There will be created a third party monitoring team to be composed of
international bodies, as well as domestic groups to monitor the
implementation of all agreements.
26
Both of these stipulations are
unconstitutional because it would encroach the independence of the
Philippine state by a unilateral and voluntary surrender of sovereignty to
foreign power or foreign intervention.

Intervention is not sanctioned in international
relations except only when it is exercised as an act of self-
defense or when it is decreed by the Security Council as a
preventive or enforcement action for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
27


Even the United Nations is bound not to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
28
The
Bangsamoro Agreement's inclusion of a foreign party as a monitoring body
is surely an unjustifiable intervention. An entity outside the Philippines' area
of sovereignty cannot and should never be included in the amendment of the
Constitution because it is a violation of this state's independence. If the
Bangsamoro Agreement will be implemented, the freedom of the Philippines
to control its own affairs will be foisted by foreign entities and its
jurisdiction will forever be questioned, not only by other nations but by its
own people.






25 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.2.

26 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.11.

27 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p.102.

28 U.N. Charter, Art. 2(7)
12

Effects on the Local Government of Muslim Mindanao

The following issues pertain to the last three of the four annexes of the
Bangsamoro Agreement which have been signed later than the annex on
Transitional Arrangements and Modalities due to their intricate nature.

Normalization
Among the annexes included in the final draft of the agreement is the
Annex on Normalization. Normalization was defined as a process whereby
communities can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the
pursuit of a sustainable livelihood and political participation within a
peaceful deliberative society
29
This part of the Agreement enjoins the
decommissioning of the MILFs armed wing, redeployment of government
forces within the Bangsamoro, clearing of unexploded mines in once
battlefront areas; disbanding of private armed groups (PAGs), socio-
economic support to former combatants, transitional justice, and grant of
amnesty or pardon to persons who committed offenses connected to the
armed conflict in Mindanao. An Independent Decommissioning Body
(IDB) shall see that these undertakings shall be achieved.

As good as the annex sounds, the decommissioning cannot be
expected to happen in a fortnight and there are still dissatisfied members of
the MILF. The fact remains that they have long been in antagonistic efforts
against the government and the immobilization and disarming of their forces
would become a foreign idea. There is also no mention that other Moro
fronts such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) will
succumb to the disarmament process. The working tandem of the
government and the MILFs pursuit to a peaceful autonomous entity through
disbanding private armies is yet to be witnessed.





29 Annex on Normalization available at
https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact
=8&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fopapp.gov.ph%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F
Annex%2520on%2520Normalization_0.pdf&ei=fsJnU-
mJEMeD8gXzloDoDg&usg=AFQjCNGQLU2YVvqF5m-
ZqSu9sAxNsfjAXg&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E
13

Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing
Aside from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) that the local
government of Mindanao will be automatically appropriated, the
Bangsamoro shall benefit from the income brought by taxes and natural
resources. The Agreements annex on wealth sharing mandates that the
powers that were previously devolved to the ARMMs local government on
revenue generation will be reassigned to the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro
will be given the authority to create its own sources of revenue as well as
enjoy 75 percent of revenue for taxes and charges "other than tariff and
custom duties" collected within its jurisdiction.
30


In this geopolitical world, the natural resources of a territory must also
be utilized for income generation of the local government and the benefit of
the general public. It is not unbeknownst that Mindanao, particularly the
areas that are covered by the Agreement, abounds in acreages of natural
resources. Thus, the Agreement seeks a 75-25 arrangement in favor of the
Bangsamoro for profits from metallic minerals. A hundred percent of
revenues from non-metallic minerals (sand, gravel and quarry resources)
will also go to Bangsamoro. In addition to this, there will be an "equal
share" between the Bangsamoro government and the central government for
income from energy sources, such as petroleum, natural gas and uranium.
31


As shown above, the ratios in profit sharing provides the Bangsamoro
entity a larger aliquot and a different scheme from the usual centralized
system wherein local governments are required to give to the government
their income before their shares are distributed to them.


Power Sharing
The entrenchment of the Bangsamoro would eventually make the
local government of Muslim Mindanao into the equivalent of an independent
state but with finances or expenses provided by the Philippine state.
According to the Agreement:


30
Angela Casauay GPH-MILF agree on wealth sharing July 13, 2013 available at
http://www.rappler.com/nation/33659-gph-milf-agree-wealth-sharing

31
Angela Casauay Bangsamoro gets 75% of taxes, resources July 14, 2013 available at
http://www.rappler.com/nation/special-coverage/peacetalks/33714-bangsamoro-gets-75-
of-taxes-natural-resources

14

The Central Government shall have powers on:

a) Defense and external security
b) Foreign policy
c) Common market and global trade, provided that the power to
enter into economic agreements already allowed under
Republic Act. 9054 shall be transferred to the Bangsamoro
d) Coinage and monetary policy
e) Citizenship and naturalization
f) Postal service
32


Even without the powers mentioned in the above-stated list, the
Bangsamoro can become a state upon its implementation and not merely a
sub-state as the Peace negotiating parties claim it is. A state is a
community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a
fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for
political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual
obedience
33
In order for a state to become independent, it only needs the
elements which are territory, people, government and sovereignty. These
elements are just waiting to be accorded to the Bangsamoro through its
establishment.

Under the rule of par in parem non habet imperium, even the
strongest state cannot assume jurisdiction over another state, no matter how
weak, or question the validity of its acts in so far as they are made to take
effect within its own territory. All states including the smallest and least
influential are also entitled to their dignity and the protection of their honor
and reputation.
34
The creation of the Bangsamoro which could independently
work as a state would make this political autonomous entity into an equal of
the Philippine state. The making of the Bangsamoro state is definitely
unconstitutional. The Philippines cannot create a state within itself because
the Constitution recognizes only the Philippine state. If the agreement
wishes to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, it should
only give the Bangsamoro the powers of a special local government unit and
not the transcendent powers of a state.

32 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, III.2.

33 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.

34 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p. 106.

15


The establishment of the Bangsamoro will also infringe the
archipelago doctrine, under which we connect the outermost points of our
archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed
thereby as internal waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one
integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so many thousand islands.
35

Once Bangsamoro assumes its identity as a state, there is no telling if the
conflict in Mindanao will end for there will surely be a territorial dispute and
other controversies. Moreover, Bangsamoro will certainly, once asked by it,
be recognized by the Muslim and Arab nations in the international
community which the Philippines will be unable to stop.

The recognition of a new state is the free act by
which one or more states acknowledge the existence on a
definite territory of a human society politically organized,
independent of any other existing state, and capable of
observing the obligations of international law, and by which
they manifest therefore their intention to consider it a
member of the international community.
36


Should the Bangsamoro Agreement, upon the creation of a new
autonomous entity, fail to make good on its provisions resulting to its
inability to realize the undertakings for peace in Mindanao, turmoil will
ensue. The Philippines will certainly find itself with a tapered territory,
lessened populace, undermined government and retrenched sovereignty as it
becomes the laughing-stock of its fellow nations for having done all these to
itself.















35 Cruz, Phil. Pol. Law, 1987, p. 16.

36 Art. I. Institute de Droit International.
16

Conclusion


The final draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law that will repeal Republic
Act 9054, providing for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, has already been submitted to the President for his approval.
Whether it will be a shaky promise or a milestone shall soon be
determined by the entire Philippines. However, one thing is inevitable a
shift in the government once the Agreement has become legally instituted. If
peace is to really reign in Mindanao, then the creators of the Bangsamoro
entity will have achieved their goal of delivering peace to the Mindanaoans.
In the meantime, the boggled minds of Filipinos as to certain aspects of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law will still have to be quelled. The citizens are
rightfully entitled to be assured that such law is not merely a ploy to enrich a
distinct group but a system to pave the way for better government in the
country. Nevertheless, amidst all odds, every Filipino must endeavour to
seek what is beneficial to his homeland and his countrymen. If a threat
should emerge, it should be snuffed out before it can become a menace.
Thus, the Bangsamoro Agreement will have to pass the scrutiny of the
people in order to receive a judgment rendering it able to prove its true and,
hopefully, noble intent.




17

Bibliography

1 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Brief
Background on the Moro Struggle (June 6, 2011, 17:38), available at
http://oppap.gov.ph/milf/brief-background-moro-struggle

2 Framework Agreement of the Bansamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://oppap.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0

3 Funk and Wagnalls New Encyclopedia Vol. 17, p. 345.
4 Paul F. Whitman "The Corregidor Massacre - 1968" available at
http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/jabidah.html

5 The Tripoli Agreement available at
http://pdcspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/Tripoli-Agreement-
December -23-1976.pdf
6 Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco THE SPCPD and the GRP-MNLF Peace
Agreement-- the betrayal of the Bangsa-Moro struggle for freedom
and self-determination available at
https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web
&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.arkibongbayan.org%2F2011%2F2011-01Jan14-
Peacetalks%2Fspcpd.rtf&ei=f0ZnU4nIINeUuASslYKgAw&usg=AF
QjCNELQdIqu30VuIeCeKlpOPvrpdfKGw&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2
E

7 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available
at http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0
8 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 available at
http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/20121007-GPH-MILF-
Framework-Agreement.pdf

9 Infotech Foundation, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.159139, January
13, 2004.
10 Constitution, Article XVII

11 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.4.b.

12 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

13 Constitution, Article III, Section 7

14 Ibid., Article II, Section 28
18


15 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, I.2.

16 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, I.4.

17 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/british/ asymmetric
visited October 24, 2012

18 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, IV.5.

19 Ibid., VIII.5.

20 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.

21 Constitution, Article III, Section 5

22 Id., Section 6

23 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (Oct. 15, 2013), available
at http://oppap.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0
24 Constitution, Article III, Section 1

25 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, V.2.

26 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, VII.11.

27 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p.102.

28 U.N. Charter, Art. 2(7)

29 Annex on Normalization available at
https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web
&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
opapp.gov.ph%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FAnnex%2520on%252
0Normalization_0.pdf&ei=fsJnU-
mJEMeD8gXzloDoDg&usg=AFQjCNGQLU2YVvqF5m -
ZqSu9sAxNsfjAXg&bvm=bv.65788261,d.c2E

30 Angela Casauay GPH-MILF agree on wealth sharing July 13, 2013
available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/33659-gph-milf-agree-
wealth-sharing

31 Angela Casauay Bangsamoro gets 75% of taxes, resources July 14,
2013 available at http://www.rappler.com/nation/special-
coverage/peacetalks/33714-bangsamoro-gets-75-of-taxes-natural-
resources

19

32 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, III.2.

33 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.

34 Cruz, International Law, 1989, p. 106.

35 Cruz, Phil. Pol. Law, 1987, p. 16.

36 Art. I. Institute de Droit International.
























20

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this term paper be
admitted as a partial requirement in the subject Law on Public Corporations,
AY 2013-2014.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.

6 May 2014, Iloilo City, Philippines




ROZ LOURDIZ P. CAMACHO
Second Year Student, Section C
University of San Agustin, College of Law
Gen. Luna St., Iloilo City, Philippines, 5000
I.D. No. 7600069591
rozzie_camacho@yahoo.com
+6399 8385 8110