Professional Documents
Culture Documents
David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilisation: Ideas, Power and Terror in Interwar
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Russia, (Oxford, 2007), pp. 191-192.
Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from the Revolution to Cold
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War, (Princeton, 2000), pp. 108-112.
See for example his speech at the Writers Congress, quoted in Priestland, op. cit., p. 269.
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worth noting that the spreading of these ideas was not solely due to censorship and
terror.
As Sheila Fitzpatrick and other revisionist scholars pointed out, the cultural
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revolution was initiated from above but answered from below.
What remains to be
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accounted for is Stalins enthusiasm for reforming culture. Two reasons to this may be
given. The rst draws from the contemporary cult that presented Stalin as the genius of
communism, the great thinker.
That is to say that it was Stalins conviction that his
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actions will lead to the achieving of the goals of the Revolution. A more nuanced look,
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however, reveals that controlling culture was one of the key ways in which Stalin
centralised power in his hands. Even the most nuanced analysis of Stalins personality
cannot reveal whether one or the other was his real goal. However, the important fact is
that contemporaries acted as if the former was true, therefore legitimising Stalins cult.
It is
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therefore clear that while full responsibility for the new culture in the thirties cannot be
attributed solely to Stalin, his role was undeniably crucial and most importantly conscious
in its creation, therefore the use of the term Stalinist culture gains legitimacy.
As I have said, Stalinist culture can be described as new. The playwright Sergei
Tretiakov described the task that lay ahead as the need for the recasting of cultural forms
as well as sociological bouleversement.
Stalinist culture stemmed from the conviction
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that arts and the thinking of the individual have to be subjugated to politics.
The master-
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plan of politics was to achieve the leap in economy. The key to this was seen in the
creation of a new Soviet man. However, what being the Soviet man implied remained
relatively vague and uctuant. In fact, Stalinisms most powerful self-denition was as an
Katerina Clark, Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism Cosmopolitanism and the Evolution of
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Soviet Culture, 1931-1941, (London, 2011), pp. 79-82.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution as Class War, in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Cultural
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Revolution in Russia 1928-1931, (Bloomington, 1978), pp. 8-41; Fitzpatricks contribution continues
to inuence scholars, see for example G. Alexopulos et al., Writing in the Stalin Era: Sheila
Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography, (New York, 2011), esp. chapter 11.
Ibid., p. 64.
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Ibid., p. 79.
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antithesis of capitalism.
The Soviet Union was placed in comparison with the capitalist
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world: whereas in the West, workers are exploited, in the Soviet Union, they work for
themselves and through this the country of the future.
This of course stems from Marxs
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view of dialectic materialism and class struggle. However, by this time, the comparison
with capitalism has become much more: they have become what Reinhart Koselleck
described as asymmetrical counterconcepts.
According to Kosellecks thesis, the self-
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denition of a group can remain vague, as far as there are well-developed
counterconcepts (Gegenbegriffen). By contrasting these, the self-denition of a group can
be strengthened without a strong sense of coherence in the depiction of either side.
Extrapolating from this concept, we can see that a similar self-denition was in place in the
USSR. Stalinisms aim was to draw sharp boundaries between Good (i. e. building
Socialism) and Evil (Capitalism and all its agents).
This led to the emergence of class-
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struggle rhetorics and the search for internal enemies: kulaks, members of the
intelligentsia, and what was deemed bourgeois elements in culture.
All aspects of life
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were militarised: the industrial front and literary front opened, the battle for coal
began.
An example would be G. B. Gelmans speech at the First Congress of Shock
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Brigades: Working in the foremost lines of the economic battlefront, one must not forget
that we nd ourselves amid the ercest class struggle.
However, there was no coherent
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image of what a kulak or an opportunist agent was.
What everyone knew was the fact
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Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilisation, (London, 1995), pp. 187-192.
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Koselleck uses different case studies, however, I believe that his theory corresponds with the
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themes of Stalinist culture. Reinhart Koselleck, Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric
Counterconcepts, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, (London, 1985), pp.
159-313.
Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin,
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(London, 1997), p. 212.
Quoted in Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in
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Documents, (New Haven, 2000), p. 32.
Clark, op. cit., p. 93; For a concrete example, see Kotkin, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
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Much in accordance with Clark, op. cit., pp. 106-107; Priestland, op. cit., p. 290.
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One of the rst revisionist scholars to point this out was Sheila Fitzpatrick. See, for example
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Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 8-41.