Macariola vs.

Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs. HONORABLE
ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MAKASIAR, J p:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola
charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with
"acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971
of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals
now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case
was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
"Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning
the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,
the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
"In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs.
Macariola alleged among other things that: a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the
deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes
with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who
were the children of the deceased by his second
marriage with Irene Ondes; c) the properties left by the
deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties
were acquired by the deceased during his second
marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,
those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into
two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased
mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the
share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be
divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
"On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent
Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds,
and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes
as the only children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to
have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as
belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras;
(4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes
Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of
her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner
of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,
4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining
one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive
owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-
half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the
remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of one fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition
of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a
manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as
surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a
hereditary share of one-twelfth (1/12) of the
whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in
relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and
the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the
extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of
any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the
latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary
estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;
Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);
(9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit to
this court, for approval, a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above
indicated, and in such manner as the parties may,
by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable
to them taking into consideration the location,
kind, quality, nature and value of the properties
involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to
pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-
third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3)
by the second named; and (11) Dismissing all
other claims of the parties [pp. 27-29 of Exh. C].
"The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of
an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves
but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order
dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:
'The parties, through their respective counsels,
presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:
'COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in
the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
'1. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506
shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;
'2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of
the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
'3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
'4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
1,834.55 square meters along the western part of
the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes-Bales;
'5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided
equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
'6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot
No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under
item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal
shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively
to Priscilla Reyes.
'WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
Project of Partition indicated above which is made
in accordance with the decision of the Honorable
Court be approved.
'Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO
Atty. for the
Defendant
Tacloban City
'(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE
Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
'While the Court thought it more desirable for all
the parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of
the respective parties to this Court that the Project
of Partition, as above-quoted, had been made after
a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and
the defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to
the Court that they are given full authority to sign
by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted project of
Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations
which were adjudicated to the respective parties,
as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated
to each one in view of said Project of Partition,
and to perform such other acts as are legal and
necessary to effectuate the said Project of
Partition.
'SO ORDERED.
'Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October,
1963.
'(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION
Judge'
"EXH. B.
"The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on
November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority
to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective
adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see
Exh. U).
"One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition
was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of
15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision
was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes,
was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs
Luz, Anacorita, Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed
Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was
approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184
to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
"Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a
stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of
2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
"On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq.
meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion
(Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter
for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
"On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest
in Lot 1184-E to 'The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc.' (Exh. 15 & 16). At the time of
said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime
Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the
President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-
4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of 'The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.' which we
shall henceforth refer to as 'TRADERS' were registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
January 9, 1967 (Exh. E)" [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the
instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of
action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article
1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a
ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor
and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing
with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in
fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not
a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent
Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to
which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In
Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice
Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report
and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice
submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent
Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first
cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of
action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth
causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp.
481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition
made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders
issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition
of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears,
however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For
one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he
was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E
to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the
case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground
that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her
and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on
August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina
Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo
Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and
Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of
complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by
the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No.
4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.
ASUNCION
"(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity
of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the
two Orders [Exhibits 'C' and 'C-3'] approving the
partition;
"(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.
Asuncion;
"(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R.
Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,
"(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;
"(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P200,000.00] for exemplary
damages;
"(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
"(d) the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
[P10,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
"B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;
"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo
Villasin the cost of the suit.
"C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and
Ruperto O. Reyes.
"D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO
RAMO
"(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant
Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
"SO ORDERED" [pp. 531-533, rec.].
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was
elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on
February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant
Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent
Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which
was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
That Article provides:
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession" [italics supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or
assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that ". . . for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979]; Rosario
vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6,
1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which
he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the
parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the
lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the
time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23,
1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said
orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March
6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E
from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and
Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half
thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of
partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot
1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register
of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of
said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for
taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and
interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was
the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein
approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about
November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to
annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the
same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the
finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No.
4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid
decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of
Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and
unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for
the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree
with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
"And so we are now confronted with this all-important
question whether or not the acquisition by respondent
of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer
of the whole lot to 'TRADERS' of which respondent was
the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately
related to the Order of respondent approving the project
of partition, Exh. A.
"Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation
in the transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons
concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in
the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his
wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
"On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no
evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon
acted as a mere 'dummy' of respondent in acquiring Lot
1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and
I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in
good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses
without any intervention of, or previous understanding with
Judge Asuncion" (pp. 391-394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted
illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed
by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating
Justice, as follows:
"1. I agree with complainant that respondent should
have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of
partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that
respect was done in good faith as according to Judge
Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the
counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, that he was
authorized by his client to submit said project of
partition, (See Exh. B and tsn. p. 24, January 20, 1969).
While it is true that such written authority if there was
any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor
did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of
respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was
presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations
of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that
she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A,
and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the
following documents:
"1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No.
19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco
Reyes holds a '1/4 share' (Exh. 9-a). On this
certificate of title the Order dated November 11,
1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition
was duly entered and registered on November 26,
1963 (Exh. 9-D);
"2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute
sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on
October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector
Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the
vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been
adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly
registered and annotated at the back of OCT
19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
"In connection with the abovementioned documents it is
to be noted that in the project of partition dated October
16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on
October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on
November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was
adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot
1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October
22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the
project of partition.
"Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however,
that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by
virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not
because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such
contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,
it is clear that one-half of one-fourth of Lot 1154
belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while
the other half of said one-fourth was the share of
complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words,
the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-
fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs.
C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the
entire one fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola
sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was well aware of the distribution
of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A
and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs.
Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that
she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of
Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn. p. 92, November 28, 1968)
from which we can deduce that she could not have
been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010
relative to the project of partition.
"Complainant also assails the project of partition because
according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant,
however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to
prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
distribution of the real properties when she could have easily
done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind,
the assessed and market value of said properties. Without
such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that
there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father" (pp. 386-389, rec.).
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph
5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires
that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice:
". . . it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have
purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had
been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a
corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of
such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has
the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the
citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest
and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this
particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over
Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion
and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was
no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a
third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it
to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to
avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or
another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers
practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp.
395-396, rec.). LexLib
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that
respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article
provides that:
"Article 14 The following cannot engage in
commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or
towns in which they discharge their duties:
"1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and
officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision
shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys
nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or
prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
"5. Those who by virtue of laws or special
provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory."
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial
laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals
with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the
State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its
territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be
recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and
elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the
conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to
engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish
Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the
"Comision de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was
extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and
took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and
later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311
[1912]) that:
"'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory
by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty.' (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
"While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in
conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force
without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law,
chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force
if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the
commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time
of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins.
Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L.
Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
'On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never
been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each
other undergo any change. Their relations with their
former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers
their country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of
individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.'"
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court
stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition
of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated."
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated
paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
"Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
"(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest."
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph
because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in
his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has
obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business
of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes
part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held
in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly
or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it
is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official
to be subject to this crime: it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official
who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his
office cannot commit this crime" (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.
11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code,
p. 1174, Vol. II [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation
gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of
respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited
in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is
undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either
party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"
wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the
aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No.
4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent
Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of
his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because
there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the
Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members
of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to
that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal
judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district
judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges
from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated
automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,
because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the
court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply
to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took
place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as
his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was
no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or
employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having
any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
without a written permission from the Department Head may not
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the Head of Department . . ."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of
the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article
X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges
was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely,
serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of
the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or
upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct
the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines
the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of
judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only
the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as
other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The
Commissioner may, for . . . violation of the existing Civil Service Law
and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the
service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service,
demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay
or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a
violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action
against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service
officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not
the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state
that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the
Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1,
Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule
XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be
adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated,
Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and
employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to
have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and
suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and
efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE
have already ruled that ". . . in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act
No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees
who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs.
Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710, 713 [1965l, Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA
619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private
business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the
provisions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly
unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
expressly declares that:
"A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the
bench, he should not retain such investments
previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is
desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible,
refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias
his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in
the administration of his judicial duties. . . ."
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and
his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid
corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it
appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in
any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time
of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on
March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the
eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said
corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the in corporation of the
corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.
Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for
their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and
before it became involved in any court litigation.
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant
alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in
disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of
the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be
exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and
WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
"The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the
claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as
certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan
was an 'impostor' and claims that all the time he believed that
the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason
for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been
shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan
represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the
extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words
'Attorney-at-Law' (Exh. I and I-1) to indicate his office, and it
was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter
to have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that
respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador
Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a
godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-
1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty
of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his
friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did
not influence his official actuations as a judge where
said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any
undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan
or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from
his personal relations with respondent, or that he used
his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other
branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
"Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the
judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising
attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or
friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but
if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would
not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it
be clearly shown that his social relations beclouded his
official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends" (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase
a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in
business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as
judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to
be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his
conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized
with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE
DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez,
Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Barredo, J., I vote with Justice Aquino.
Aquino, J., I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.


Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114
SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77


FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their
inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and
Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit
rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the
parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the
parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But
her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as
counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision
became final in 1963 as well.



Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold
the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.



On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion
with acts unbecoming a judge on the ground that he bought a property
(formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case
decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be
against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:



"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even
at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of
another:



xxx xxx xxx



"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession".



Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment.
Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned by her and that
what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the
parcels of land.



ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.



HELD:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The
judge bought the property in 1965 2 years after his decision became
final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of
the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then
sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted
as a dummy of Asuncion.



Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in
the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.



The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more
discreet in his personal transactions.
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In re: Albino Cunanan, G.R. No. L-6784. March 18, 1954
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007







---------------


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T.
ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM
ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity
as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA,
and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197392
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-
Intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three
(3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national
and local elections. The law as well granted the President the
power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.
10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill
No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions
filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153
was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to
enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely
carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November
6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734,
thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140
1
-
on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections
originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It
likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than
August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on
the same date.
RA No. 9333
2
was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on
June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as
House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the
ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,
2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with
one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011.
Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June
7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate
amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through
a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271
3
- assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and
challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-
compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed
another petition
4
also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave
rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
5
filed by Rep. Edcel
Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives
against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
6
filed by Atty.
Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and
Preliminary Injunction
7
filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against
the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
8
filed by Jacinto
Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana
as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August
8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus
9
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011,
the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court
ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and
RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,
2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform
their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have
to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage
of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the
"elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials
until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the
power of appointment also gave the President the power of
control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were
recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of
August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular
elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article
XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in
the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to
the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is
constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented
above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that
the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined
by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and
the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has
to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
10
which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.
11

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three years.
12
This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations.
13

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization
of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In
Osmea v. Commission on Elections,
14
we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution
that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously
as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"
election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.1avvphil
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used
should be understood in the sense that they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails.
15
As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,
16
"[a]s
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common.
Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political
subdivision.
17
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the
elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."
Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a
form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated
by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the
course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the
consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must
be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of
RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution
18
which provides that before bills
passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
19
explained the
effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second
and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same
day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
20
Following
our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to
our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2)
is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals
may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification
of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of
their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under
our power of judicial review.
21

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certification by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them
by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.
22

In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold
purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable
our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of
the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment process.
23

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that
both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA
No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These
provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends
RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No.
9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections
and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need
therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA
No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change
or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap
in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of
the subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No.
6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it
did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM
elections,
24
leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,
25
RA No. 8176,
26
RA No.
8746,
27
RA No. 8753,
28
and RA No. 9012
29
were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these
laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No.
6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently,
there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law
on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held
on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9140
30
to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for
the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was
not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve
RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,
31
which
further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this
law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed
RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving
RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
32
has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
"majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of
the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these
bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient
to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote
of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS
33
on this subject
best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles
for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of
future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are
regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to
forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors
under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself
or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
34
(Emphasis
ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is
a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged
the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an
unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.
As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite
is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be
included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective,
35
questions on the
extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise
because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and
the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be
required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings
as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-
essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those
aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b)
the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent
of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
36

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide
for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On
this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166
as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the
national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153
provides is an old matter for local governments (with the
exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that
regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.
37

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which
should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)
with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by
RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options
are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII
of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office;
38
(2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with
the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the
President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No.
10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in
choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose
the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely
valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying
material premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent
of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the
constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and
the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.
39
The legislative body possesses plenary power
for all purposes of civil government.
40
Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.
41
Except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects
and extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.
42

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either
express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided
in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3).
Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the
autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express
limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident
purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a
part of organic law."
43

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections
15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express
limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise
the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of
the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government
i.e., that the government must have an executive department
and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and
representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers
granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly
reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and functions not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions
shall be vested in the National Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve
as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with
legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The
terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution
intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the
power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions
are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-
quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.
44
In other words, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio
45
in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is
in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and
limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To
succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then,
its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the national,
congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and
sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period
between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away
of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13,
2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this
period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its
established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to
the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a
strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The
Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the
new
46
and for the introduction of new concepts.
47
As previously
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus,
the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances
when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon
del Sur
48
and Dinagat Islands,
49
the creating statutes authorized
the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive
officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall
have been elected and qualified.
50
A similar authority to appoint is
provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-
province to a province.
51

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by
necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were
adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight
in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of
measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional
discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall
serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the
options available to Congress to address the problems brought
about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly
understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide.
The proper understanding of the options as interim measures
assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the
passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be
faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the
Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily
brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected
in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the
2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen
because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered
and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As
this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:
52

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers
by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by
clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period,
even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited
by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the
period as limited by the Constitution." [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its
mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be
respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary
corollary is that none of the three branches of government can
deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the
Constitution itself may allow.
53
If at all, Congress may only pass
legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-
executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the
mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.
54

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness
that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.
55
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President.
56
Hence, holdover whichever way it is
viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not
have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where
the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,
57
Adap v.
Comelec,
58
and Montesclaros v. Comelec,
59
where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers
to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII
of RA No. 9054) in the past,
60
we have to remember that the rule
of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
61

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it
had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The
deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers;
this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation,
62
except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is
for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct
special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely
to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when
so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body
or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power
or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.
63

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion.
64
But our power rests on very narrow ground
and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to
supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress
itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we
cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional
power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress
to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing
and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election.
65
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for
the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific
statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of
BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to
another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be
exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious
cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be
heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should
be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to
address instances where elections have already been scheduled
to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence,
(b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of
such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous
causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected
events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These
"analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible."
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations
where elections have already been scheduled but do not take
place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism,
(d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspendedbefore the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section
5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections
do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is
by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be
given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers.
66
Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP
881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely
no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective
officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to
compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis
likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall
hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms
of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in
the case of barangay officials,
67
is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when
the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes,
68
and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President
69
in order to synchronize elections; Congress was
not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed
by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.
70
More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years
71
as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will
happen a term of less than two years if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved,
the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those
officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on
their term (where the "term" means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the "tenure" represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office).
72
As with the fixing of the elective term,
neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the
tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an
unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do
so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim
measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President
of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only
measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however,
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of
this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.
73
The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;
other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in
this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
74

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from
RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the
authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be "elective and representative of the
constituent political units." This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged
constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the
supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that
RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA
No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and
based on its unambiguous facial terms.
75
Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim
measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given
the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought
with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above
considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for
a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials,
is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend
beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to
foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For
then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may
be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach
the "elective and representative" governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is
fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054
will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged
and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures
that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily
disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as
well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place
under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the
manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units
76
and the adjustments of sub-
provinces to the status of provinces.
77
These measures, too, are
used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization
of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved).
The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the
State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of
the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders
need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as
this requirement is really a function of the appointment process;
only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment
of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by providing,
under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in
the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing
OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153
viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of the
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is
reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral
arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the
power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing
him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of
Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress,
as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it
was for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization
of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the
synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support
that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific,
and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of
elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the
COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue
to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms,
and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special
elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a
vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be
forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years
intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective
officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao
history past and current teach us, many developments, some
of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim
areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the
past.
78
Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the
present circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We
hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc.,
et al.:
79

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two
laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their
right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through
their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,
may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay
in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the
Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
80
(Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM.
Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a
conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary
to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic
principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam
pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,
81
and
one mandate should not be given importance over the other
except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.
82
We
refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et
al.,
83
thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation
from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a
whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force
and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that
Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to
transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly,
regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as
the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as
necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections
should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in
order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own
electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and
local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its
merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation
from the central government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region and the central
government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a
separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought
of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.
84
[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the
above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the
express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that
autonomy shall be "within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in
light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions
in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection,
the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to "make it
clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of
the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national government[.]"
85
Of note is the
Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre
86
which
we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as
a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a
national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy
granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from
having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional
mandate the synchronization of national and local elections
when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the
manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary
does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.
87
As judges, we can only interpret and
apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it.
88

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which
Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge
laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive
prerogative of Congress.
89
The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the
realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most
basic principles of a republican and democratic government the
separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress
acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
90

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly
within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it
acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to
perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we
can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is
presumed valid.
91
Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity
of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.
92
Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
93
As this Court
declared inGarcia v. Executive Secretary:
94

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption
is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the
other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress
and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally enacted.
95
[Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for
lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our
Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment
of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J.
Carpio but disagree on the
power of the Pres. to
appoint OIC-Governor of
ARMM
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of Justice
Velasco
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J.
Velasco
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J.
Carpio
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J.
Carpio
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Entitled "An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the
approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and
setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the last
Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose
Republic Act No. 9054, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended," and for other
purposes.
2
Entitled "An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular
elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054,
entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending
for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as amended"
3
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal
capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao Federation
of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina
Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol
Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar
Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.
4
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed
against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC, to
challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been
submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative,
any other law seeking to amend it is also null and void.
5
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory
Injunction dated June 30, 2011.
6
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
7
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order dated July 12, 2011.
8
With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order dated July 11, 2011.
9
With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the
Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both Prohibitory
and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
10
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday
of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the
Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of
the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila
area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three
years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis ours]
11
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
fixes the term of office of elective local officials at three
years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the
incumbent local officials who were elected in January 1988,
which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed
to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the
terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who
were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of
June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize
the elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the
twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the
1992 elections were made to serve only half the time of their
terms.
12
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p.
1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
V, p. 429-4.
13
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will
now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as
Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL
SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
JUNE 1992."
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may
we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed
amendment, I would only state that in view of the action
taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am
formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS
FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION
SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the
Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the
incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992.
Necessarily then, since the term provided by the
Commission for Members of the Lower House and for
local officials is three years, if there will be an election
in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in
1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could
never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of
election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should
not have a local election or an election for Members of
the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to
complete their term of three years each. And if we also
stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in
an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will
be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the
remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is
for six years, their election will be in 1993. So,
consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992
and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12
Senators and of course to local officials and the
Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter
we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission
when we adopted the term of six years for the President
and another six years for the Senators with the
possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years
and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are
concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect
the first synchronized election which would mean,
necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of
the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local
elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does
the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the
synchronization of elections, I was the one who
proposed that in order to synchronize the elections
every three years, which the body approved the first
national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall
continue in office for five years, the same thing the
Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they
will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the
President will be for six years and continue beginning in
1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local
and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the
President shall have a term until 1998 and the first
twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials
elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we
shall have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner
Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our
elections every three years which was already
approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore,
is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-
President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee
not synchronize the election of the Senators and local
officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer.
The attempt here is on the assumption that the
provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President would really
end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single
election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record of the
Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3,
1986)
14
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30,
1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.
15
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Ordillo v.
Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
16
271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.
17
Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged,
p.1327 (1993).
18
Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
19
G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
20
A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of
Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
of the Philippines
Malacaang
14 March 2011
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City
Dear Speaker Belmonte:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2)
of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the
necessity of the immediate enactment of House Bill No.
4146, entitled:
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION
OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH
THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333, ENTITLED AN ACT
FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES"
to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen
ARMMs autonomy by synchronizing its elections with
the regular elections of national and other local officials,
to ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will
not be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to
institutionalize electoral reforms in the interim, all for the
development, peace and security of the region.
Best wishes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Senate President
Philippine Senate
Pasay City
Taken
from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15
th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-031611.pdf. Last accessed on
September 26, 2011.
21
See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
22
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455,
October 30, 1995.
23
Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction 10.04, p. 282 (1972).
24
Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: "The first
regular elections of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic
Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the ratification of this Act. The
Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said
election."
25
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Date of Regular
Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other
purposes," which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on
the second Monday after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.
26
Entitled "An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Section One of
Republic Act Numbered Seventy-Six Hundred and Forty-
Seven Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular
Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other
purposes", which changed the date of the ARMM elections
to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three (3)
years thereafter.
27
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular
Elections of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled
An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for
Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, As
Amended, and for other purposes", which moved the
regional elections to the second Monday of September and
every three (3) years thereafter.
28
Entitled "An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for
other purposes", which reset the regional elections,
scheduled on September 13, 1999, to the second Monday of
September 2000.
29
Entitled "An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao to the Second Monday of September 2001,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8953", which
reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September 2001.
30
Entitled "An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the
Approval of the Amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and
setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last
Monday of November 2001, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled "An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended," and For Other
Purposes."
31
Entitled "An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections for
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled "An
Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended," which rescheduled the ARMM
regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of
November 2004 to "the second Monday of August 2005."
32
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised
by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate voting separately.
33
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.
34
Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36 (1915);
Lewis Southerland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, Section
244, pp. 456-457.
35
This has been established by the following exchange
during the Constitutional Commission debates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far
with respect to this organic act are: What segment of
the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what
capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes
this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a
legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this
organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the
Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this
organic act, what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light
of what is now appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units
composing the region should be allowed to participate
in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the
character of a charter passed by Congress, not as a
constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature
and, therefore, the organic act will still be subject to
amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now
constituted, unless the Gentleman has another
purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis
ours.];
III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-
183; August 11, 1986.
36
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people of
the region.
37
See discussions at pp. 14-15.
38
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.
(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the
Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years,
which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect
until their successors are elected and qualified. [emphasis
ours]
39
Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176
(1974).
40
Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose P.
Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 266
(1936).
41
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
42
Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring
opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel inSchneckenburger v.
Moran, supra note 40, at 266.
43
State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in
Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)
44
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines.
45
An empire within an empire.
46
Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers of
Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005 ed., p. 1249.
47
Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article
VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to issue
sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover
orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in
Section 26 of the Transitory Provisions.
48
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del
Sur Province was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province
in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.
49
RA No. 9355.
50
Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.
51
Section 462, RA No. 7160.
52
Supra note 14.
53
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798
(1970)] the Court held that, "The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
[sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the
Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed." 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
54
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice
Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
55
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water
District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.
56
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,
2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.) 768.
57
481 Phil. 661 (2004).
58
G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.
59
G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.
60
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.
(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a period of three
(3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of
September next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The
incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall
continue in effect until their successors are elected and
qualified.
61
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
62
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589
SCRA 356.
63
Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-25349,
December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.
64
See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
65
See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
66
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA
654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29,
2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R. No.
29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
67
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
68
Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the
first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three
years.
69
Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
70
Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p.
285, citing Mechem, Section 387.
71
Ponencia, p. 21.
72
See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946);
Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683, 694
(1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31,
1984, 127 SCRA 231.
73
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National
Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al.,G.R. No.
191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No.
L-79974, December 17, 1987,156 SCRA 549.
74
Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.
75
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil.
812 (2003).
76
Supra notes 47 and 48.
77
Supra note 50.
78
The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where the
Ampatuans stand charged, the insurrection by the MILF and
its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations,
among others, are immediately past and present events that
the nation has to vigilant about.
79
274 Phil. 523 (1991).
80
Id. at 532.
81
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
82
As noted under footnote 37.
83
118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
84
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August
11, 1986, p. 179.
85
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.
86
391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
87
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
88
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil.
411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511
(1993).
89
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos.
162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468,
581.
90
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010,
618 SCRA 315.
91
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,
et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-
47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-
Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
92
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
(2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes,
etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections,
supra.
93
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,
et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
94
G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
95
Id. at 523.

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