Topics

By Aristotle
Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
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BOOK I
Part 1
Our treatise proposes to ind a line o in!uiry "#ereby "e s#all
be able to reason rom opinions t#at are generally accepted about
e$ery problem propounded to us% and also s#all oursel$es% "#en standing
up to an argument% a$oid saying anyt#ing t#at "ill obstruct us. &irst%
t#en% "e must say "#at reasoning is% and "#at its $arieties are% in
order to grasp dialectical reasoning' or t#is is t#e ob(ect o our
searc# in t#e treatise beore us.
)o" reasoning is an argument in "#ic#% certain t#ings being laid do"n%
somet#ing ot#er t#an t#ese necessarily comes about t#roug# t#em. *a+
It is a ,demonstration,% "#en t#e premisses rom "#ic# t#e reasoning
starts are true and primary% or are suc# t#at our kno"ledge o t#em
#as originally come t#roug# premisses "#ic# are primary and true'
*b+ reasoning% on t#e ot#er #and% is ,dialectical,% i it reasons
rom opinions t#at are generally accepted. T#ings are ,true, and ,primary,
"#ic# are belie$ed on t#e strengt# not o anyt#ing else but o t#emsel$es'
or in regard to t#e irst principles o science it is improper to
ask any urt#er or t#e "#y and "#ereore o t#em- eac# o t#e irst
principles s#ould command belie in and by itsel. On t#e ot#er #and%
t#ose opinions are ,generally accepted, "#ic# are accepted by e$ery
one or by t#e ma(ority or by t#e p#ilosop#ers-i.e. by all% or by t#e
ma(ority% or by t#e most notable and illustrious o t#em. Again *c+%
reasoning is ,contentious, i it starts rom opinions t#at seem to
be generally accepted% but are not really suc#% or again i it merely
seems to reason rom opinions t#at are or seem to be generally accepted.
&or not e$ery opinion t#at seems to be generally accepted actually
is generally accepted. &or in none o t#e opinions "#ic# "e call generally
accepted is t#e illusion entirely on t#e surace% as #appens in t#e
case o t#e principles o contentious arguments- or t#e nature o
t#e allacy in t#ese is ob$ious immediately% and as a rule e$en to
persons "it# little po"er o compre#ension. .o t#en% o t#e contentious
reasonings mentioned% t#e ormer really deser$es to be called ,reasoning,
as "ell% but t#e ot#er s#ould be called ,contentious reasoning,% but
not ,reasoning,% since it appears to reason% but does not really do
so. &urt#er *d+% besides all t#e reasonings "e #a$e mentioned t#ere
are t#e mis-reasonings t#at start rom t#e premisses peculiar to t#e
special sciences% as #appens *or e/ample+ in t#e case o geometry
and #er sister sciences. &or t#is orm o reasoning appears to dier
rom t#e reasonings mentioned abo$e- t#e man "#o dra"s a alse igure
reasons rom t#ings t#at are neit#er true and primary% nor yet generally
accepted. &or #e does not all "it#in t#e deinition- #e does not
assume opinions t#at are recei$ed eit#er by e$ery one or by t#e ma(ority
or by p#ilosop#ers-t#at is to say% by all% or by most% or by t#e most
illustrious o t#em-but #e conducts #is reasoning upon assumptions
"#ic#% t#oug# appropriate to t#e science in !uestion% are not true-
or #e eects #is mis-reasoning eit#er by describing t#e semicircles
"rongly or by dra"ing certain lines in a "ay in "#ic# t#ey could not
be dra"n.
T#e oregoing must stand or an outline sur$ey o t#e species o reasoning.
In general% in regard bot# to all t#at "e #a$e already discussed and
to t#ose "#ic# "e s#all discuss later% "e may remark t#at t#at amount
o distinction bet"een t#em may ser$e% because it is not our purpose
to gi$e t#e e/act deinition o any o t#em- "e merely "ant to describe
t#em in outline- "e consider it !uite enoug# rom t#e point o $ie"
o t#e line o in!uiry beore us to be able to recogni0e eac# o t#em
in some sort o "ay.
Part 1
)e/t in order ater t#e oregoing% "e must say or #o" many and or
"#at purposes t#e treatise is useul. T#ey are t#ree-intellectual
training% casual encounters% and t#e p#ilosop#ical sciences. T#at
it is useul as a training is ob$ious on t#e ace o it. T#e possession
o a plan o in!uiry "ill enable us more easily to argue about t#e
sub(ect proposed. &or purposes o casual encounters% it is useul
because "#en "e #a$e counted up t#e opinions #eld by most people%
"e s#all meet t#em on t#e ground not o ot#er people,s con$ictions
but o t#eir o"n% "#ile "e s#it t#e ground o any argument t#at t#ey
appear to us to state unsoundly. &or t#e study o t#e p#ilosop#ical
sciences it is useul% because t#e ability to raise searc#ing diiculties
on bot# sides o a sub(ect "ill make us detect more easily t#e trut#
and error about t#e se$eral points t#at arise. It #as a urt#er use
in relation to t#e ultimate bases o t#e principles used in t#e se$eral
sciences. &or it is impossible to discuss t#em at all rom t#e principles
proper to t#e particular science in #and% seeing t#at t#e principles
are t#e prius o e$eryt#ing else' it is t#roug# t#e opinions generally
#eld on t#e particular points t#at t#ese #a$e to be discussed% and
t#is task belongs properly% or most appropriately% to dialectic' or
dialectic is a process o criticism "#erein lies t#e pat# to t#e principles
o all in!uiries.
Part 2
We s#all be in perect possession o t#e "ay to proceed "#en "e are
in a position like t#at "#ic# "e occupy in regard to r#etoric and
medicine and aculties o t#at kind' t#is means t#e doing o t#at
"#ic# "e c#oose "it# t#e materials t#at are a$ailable. &or it is not
e$ery met#od t#at t#e r#etorician "ill employ to persuade% or t#e
doctor to #eal- still% i #e omits none o t#e a$ailable means% "e
s#all say t#at #is grasp o t#e science is ade!uate.
Part 3
&irst% t#en% "e must see o "#at parts our in!uiry consists. )o" i
"e "ere to grasp *a+ "it# reerence to #o" many% and "#at kind o%
t#ings arguments take place% and "it# "#at materials t#ey start% and
*#+ #o" "e are to become "ell supplied "it# t#ese% "e s#ould #a$e
suiciently "on our goal. )o" t#e materials "it# "#ic# arguments
start are e!ual in number% and are identical% "it# t#e sub(ects on
"#ic# reasonings take place. &or arguments start "it# ,propositions,%
"#ile t#e sub(ects on "#ic# reasonings take place are ,problems,.
)o" e$ery proposition and e$ery problem indicates eit#er a genus or
a peculiarity or an accident-or t#e dierentia too% applying as
it does to a class *or genus+% s#ould be ranked toget#er "it# t#e
genus. .ince% #o"e$er% o "#at is peculiar to anyt#ing part signiies
its essence% "#ile part does not% let us di$ide t#e ,peculiar, into
bot# t#e aoresaid parts% and call t#at part "#ic# indicates t#e essence
a ,deinition,% "#ile o t#e remainder let us adopt t#e terminology
"#ic# is generally current about t#ese t#ings% and speak o it as
a ,property,. W#at "e #a$e said% t#en% makes it clear t#at according
to our present di$ision% t#e elements turn out to be our% all told%
namely eit#er property or deinition or genus or accident. 4o not
let any one suppose us to mean t#at eac# o t#ese enunciated by itsel
constitutes a proposition or problem% but only t#at it is rom t#ese
t#at bot# problems and propositions are ormed. T#e dierence bet"een
a problem and a proposition is a dierence in t#e turn o t#e p#rase.
&or i it be put in t#is "ay% 5,An animal t#at "alks on t"o eet5
is t#e deinition o man% is it not6, or ,5Animal5 is t#e genus o
man% is it not6, t#e result is a proposition' but i t#us% ,Is 5an
animal t#at "alks on t"o eet5 a deinition o man or no6, 7or ,Is
5animal5 #is genus or no6,8 t#e result is a problem. .imilarly too
in ot#er cases. )aturally% t#en% problems and propositions are e!ual
in number' or out o e$ery proposition you "ill make a problem i
you c#ange t#e turn o t#e p#rase.
Part 9
We must no" say "#at are ,deinition,% ,property,% ,genus,% and ,accident,.
A ,deinition, is a p#rase signiying a t#ing,s essence. It is rendered
in t#e orm eit#er o a p#rase in lieu o a term% or o a p#rase in
lieu o anot#er p#rase- or it is sometimes possible to deine t#e
meaning o a p#rase as "ell. People "#ose rendering consists o a
term only% try it as t#ey may% clearly do not render t#e deinition
o t#e t#ing in !uestion% because a deinition is al"ays a p#rase
o a certain kind. One may% #o"e$er% use t#e "ord ,deinitory, also
o suc# a remark as ,T#e 5becoming5 is 5beautiul5,% and like"ise
also o t#e !uestion% ,Are sensation and kno"ledge t#e same or dierent6,%
or argument about deinitions is mostly concerned "it# !uestions
o sameness and dierence. In a "ord "e may call ,deinitory, e$eryt#ing
t#at alls under t#e same branc# o in!uiry as deinitions- and t#at
all t#e abo$e-mentioned e/amples are o t#is c#aracter is clear on
t#e ace o t#em. &or i "e are able to argue t#at t"o t#ings are
t#e same or are dierent% "e s#all be "ell supplied by t#e same turn
o argument "it# lines o attack upon t#eir deinitions as "ell' or
"#en "e #a$e s#o"n t#at t#ey are not t#e same "e s#all #a$e demolis#ed
t#e deinition. Obser$e% please% t#at t#e con$erse o t#is last statement
does not #old' or to s#o" t#at t#ey are t#e same is not enoug# to
establis# a deinition. To s#o"% #o"e$er% t#at t#ey are not t#e same
is enoug# o itsel to o$ert#ro" it.
A ,property, is a predicate "#ic# does not indicate t#e essence o
a t#ing% but yet belongs to t#at t#ing alone% and is predicated con$ertibly
o it. T#us it is a property o man to-be-capable o learning grammar'
or i A be a man% t#en #e is capable o learning grammar% and i
#e be capable o learning grammar% #e is a man. &or no one calls anyt#ing
a ,property, "#ic# may possibly belong to somet#ing else% e.g. ,sleep,
in t#e case o man% e$en t#oug# at a certain time it may #appen to
belong to #im alone. T#at is to say% i any suc# t#ing "ere actually
to be called a property% it "ill be called not a ,property, absolutely%
but a ,temporary, or a ,relati$e, property' or ,being on t#e rig#t
#and side, is a temporary property% "#ile ,t"o-ooted, is in point
o act ascribed as a property in certain relations- e.g. it is a
property o man relati$ely to a #orse and a dog. T#at not#ing "#ic#
may belong to anyt#ing else t#an A is a con$ertible predicate o A
is clear' or it does not necessarily ollo" t#at i somet#ing is
asleep it is a man.
A ,genus, is "#at is predicated in t#e category o essence o a number
o t#ings e/#ibiting dierences in kind. We s#ould treat as predicates
in t#e category o essence all suc# t#ings as it "ould be appropriate
to mention in reply to t#e !uestion% ,W#at is t#e ob(ect beore you6,-
as% or e/ample% in t#e case o man% i asked t#at !uestion% it is
appropriate to say ,:e is an animal,. T#e !uestion% ,Is one t#ing
in t#e same genus as anot#er or in a dierent one6, is also a ,generic,
!uestion- or a !uestion o t#at kind as "ell alls under t#e same
branc# o in!uiry as t#e genus' or #a$ing argued t#at ,animal, is
t#e genus o man% and like"ise also o o/% "e s#all #a$e argued t#at
t#ey are in t#e same genus- "#ereas i "e s#o" t#at it is t#e genus
o t#e one but not o t#e ot#er% "e s#all #a$e argued t#at t#ese t#ings
are not in t#e same genus.
An ,accident, is *i+ somet#ing "#ic#% t#oug# it is none o t#e oregoing-i.e.
neit#er a deinition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to t#e
t#ing' *somet#ing "#ic# may possibly eit#er belong or not belong to
any one and t#e sel-same t#ing% as *e.g.+ t#e ,sitting posture, may
belong or not belong to some sel-same t#ing. ;ike"ise also ,"#iteness,%
or t#ere is not#ing to pre$ent t#e same t#ing being at one time "#ite%
and at anot#er not "#ite. O t#e deinitions o accident t#e second
is t#e better' or i #e adopts t#e irst% any one is bound% i #e
is to understand it% to kno" already "#at ,deinition, and ,genus,
and ,property, are% "#ereas t#e second is suicient o itsel to
tell us t#e essential meaning o t#e term in !uestion. To Accident
are to be attac#ed also all comparisons o t#ings toget#er% "#en e/pressed
in language t#at is dra"n in any kind o "ay rom "#at #appens *accidit+
to be true o t#em- suc# as% or e/ample% t#e !uestion% ,Is t#e #onourable
or t#e e/pedient preerable6, and ,Is t#e lie o $irtue or t#e lie
o sel-indulgence t#e pleasanter6,% and any ot#er problem "#ic# may
#appen to be p#rased in terms like t#ese. &or in all suc# cases t#e
!uestion is ,to "#ic# o t#e t"o does t#e predicate in !uestion #appen
*accidit+ to belong more closely6, It is clear on t#e ace o it t#at
t#ere is not#ing to pre$ent an accident rom becoming a temporary
or relati$e property. T#us t#e sitting posture is an accident% but
"ill be a temporary property% "#ene$er a man is t#e only person sitting%
"#ile i #e be not t#e only one sitting% it is still a property relati$ely
to t#ose "#o are not sitting. .o t#en% t#ere is not#ing to pre$ent
an accident rom becoming bot# a relati$e and a temporary property-
but a property absolutely it "ill ne$er be.
Part <
We must not ail to obser$e t#at all remarks made in criticism o
a ,property, and ,genus, and ,accident, "ill be applicable to ,deinitions,
as "ell. &or "#en "e #a$e s#o"n t#at t#e attribute in !uestion ails
to belong only to t#e term deined% as "e do also in t#e case o a
property% or t#at t#e genus rendered in t#e deinition is not t#e
true genus% or t#at any o t#e t#ings mentioned in t#e p#rase used
does not belong% as "ould be remarked also in t#e case o an accident%
"e s#all #a$e demolis#ed t#e deinition- so t#at% to use t#e p#rase
pre$iously employed%, all t#e points "e #a$e enumerated mig#t in a
certain sense be called ,deinitory,. But "e must not on t#is account
e/pect to ind a single line o in!uiry "#ic# "ill apply uni$ersally
to t#em all' or t#is is not an easy t#ing to ind% and% e$en "ere
one ound% it "ould be $ery obscure indeed% and o little ser$ice
or t#e treatise beore us. =at#er% a special plan o in!uiry must
be laid do"n or eac# o t#e classes "e #a$e distinguis#ed% and t#en%
starting rom t#e rules t#at are appropriate in eac# case% it "ill
probably be easier to make our "ay rig#t t#roug# t#e task beore us.
.o t#en% as "as said beore%, "e must outline a di$ision o our sub(ect%
and ot#er !uestions "e must relegate eac# to t#e particular branc#
to "#ic# it most naturally belongs% speaking o t#em as ,deinitory,
and ,generic, !uestions. T#e !uestions I mean #a$e practically been
already assigned to t#eir se$eral branc#es.
Part >
&irst o all "e must deine t#e number o senses borne by t#e term
,.ameness,. .ameness "ould be generally regarded as alling% roug#ly
speaking% into t#ree di$isions. We generally apply t#e term numerically
or speciically or generically-numerically in cases "#ere t#ere is
more t#an one name but only one t#ing% e.g. ,doublet, and ,cloak,-
speciically% "#ere t#ere is more t#an one t#ing% but t#ey present
no dierences in respect o t#eir species% as one man and anot#er%
or one #orse and anot#er' or t#ings like t#is t#at all under t#e
same species are said to be ,speciically t#e same,. .imilarly% too%
t#ose t#ings are called generically t#e same "#ic# all under t#e
same genus% suc# as a #orse and a man. It mig#t appear t#at t#e sense
in "#ic# "ater rom t#e same spring is called ,t#e same "ater, is
some#o" dierent and unlike t#e senses mentioned abo$e' but really
suc# a case as t#is oug#t to be ranked in t#e same class "it# t#e
t#ings t#at in one "ay or anot#er are called ,t#e same, in $ie" o
unity o species. &or all suc# t#ings seem to be o one amily and
to resemble one anot#er. &or t#e reaon "#y all "ater is said to be
speciically t#e same as all ot#er "ater is because o a certain likeness
it bears to it% and t#e only dierence in t#e case o "ater dra"n
rom t#e same spring is t#is% t#at t#e likeness is more emp#atic'
t#at is "#y "e do not distinguis# it rom t#e t#ings t#at in one "ay
or anot#er are called ,t#e same, in $ie" o unity o species. It is
generally supposed t#at t#e term ,t#e same, is most used in a sense
agreed on by e$ery one "#en applied to "#at is numerically one. But
e$en so% it is apt to be rendered in more t#an one sense- its most
literal and primary use is ound "#ene$er t#e sameness is rendered
in reerence to an alternati$e name or deinition% as "#en a cloak
is said to be t#e same as a doublet% or an animal t#at "alks on t"o
eet is said to be t#e same as a man' a second sense is "#en it is
rendered in reerence to a property% as "#en "#at can ac!uire kno"ledge
is called t#e same as a man% and "#at naturally tra$els up"ard t#e
same as ire' "#ile a t#ird use is ound "#en it is rendered in reerence
to some term dra"n rom Accident% as "#en t#e creature "#o is sitting%
or "#o is musical% is called t#e same as .ocrates. &or all t#ese uses
mean to signiy numerical unity. T#at "#at I #a$e (ust said is true
may be best seen "#ere one orm o appellation is substituted or
anot#er. &or oten "#en "e gi$e t#e order to call one o t#e people
"#o are sitting do"n% indicating #im by name% "e c#ange our description%
"#ene$er t#e person to "#om "e gi$e t#e order #appens not to understand
us- #e "ill% "e t#ink% understand better rom some accidental eature-
so "e bid #im call to us ,t#e man "#o is sitting, or ,"#o is con$ersing
o$er t#ere,-clearly supposing oursel$es to be indicating t#e same
ob(ect by its name and by its accident.
Part ?
O ,sameness, t#en% as #as been said%, t#ree senses are to be distinguis#ed.
)o" one "ay to conirm t#at t#e elements mentioned abo$e are t#ose
out o "#ic# and t#roug# "#ic# and to "#ic# arguments proceed% is
by induction' or i any one "ere to sur$ey propositions and problems
one by one% it "ould be seen t#at eac# "as ormed eit#er rom t#e
deinition o somet#ing or rom its property or rom its genus or
rom its accident. Anot#er "ay to conirm it is t#roug# reasoning.
&or e$ery predicate o a sub(ect must o necessity be eit#er con$ertible
"it# its sub(ect or not' and i it is con$ertible% it "ould be its
deinition or property% or i it signiies t#e essence% it is t#e
deinition- i not% it is a property' or t#is "as "#at a property
is% $i0. "#at is predicated con$ertibly% but does not signiy t#e
essence. I% on t#e ot#er #and% it is not predicated con$ertibly o
t#e t#ing% it eit#er is or is not one o t#e terms contained in t#e
deinition o t#e sub(ect' and i it be one o t#ose terms% t#en it
"ill be t#e genus or t#e dierentia% inasmuc# as t#e deinition consists
o genus and dierentiae- "#ereas% i it be not one o t#ose terms%
clearly it "ould be an accident% or accident "as said, to be "#at
belongs as an attribute to a sub(ect "it#out being eit#er its deinition
or its genus or a property.
Part @
)e/t% t#en% "e must distinguis# bet"een t#e classes o predicates
in "#ic# t#e our orders in !uestion are ound. T#ese are ten in number'
Assence% Buantity% Buality% =elation% Place% Time% Position% .tate%
Acti$ity% Passi$ity. &or t#e accident and genus and property and deinition
o anyt#ing "ill al"ays be in one o t#ese categories' or all t#e
propositions ound t#roug# t#ese signiy eit#er somet#ing,s essence
or its !uality or !uantity or some one o t#e ot#er types o predicate.
It is clear% too% on t#e ace o it t#at t#e man "#o signiies somet#ing,s
essence signiies sometimes a substance% sometimes a !uality% sometimes
some one o t#e ot#er types o predicate. &or "#en man is set beore
#im and #e says t#at "#at is set t#ere is ,a man, or ,an animal,%
#e states its essence and signiies a substance- but "#en a "#ite
colour is set beore #im and #e says t#at "#at is set t#ere is ,"#ite,
or is ,a colour,% #e states its essence and signiies a !uality. ;ike"ise%
also% i a magnitude o a cubit be set beore #im and #e says t#at
"#at is set t#ere is a magnitude o a cubit% #e "ill be describing
its essence and signiying a !uantity. ;ike"ise% also% in t#e ot#er
cases' or eac# o t#ese kinds o predicate% i eit#er it be asserted
o itsel% or its genus be asserted o it% signiies an essence' i%
on t#e ot#er #and% one kind o predicate is asserted o anot#er kind%
it does not signiy an essence% but a !uantity or a !uality or one
o t#e ot#er kinds o predicate. .uc#% t#en% and so many% are t#e
sub(ects on "#ic# arguments take place% and t#e materials "it# "#ic#
t#ey start. :o" "e are to ac!uire t#em% and by "#at means "e are to
become "ell supplied "it# t#em% alls ne/t to be told.
Part 1C
&irst% t#en% a deinition must be gi$en o a ,dialectical proposition,
and a ,dialectical problem,. &or it is not e$ery proposition nor yet
e$ery problem t#at is to be set do"n as dialectical' or no one in
#is senses "ould make a proposition o "#at no one #olds% nor yet
make a problem o "#at is ob$ious to e$erybody or to most people'
or t#e latter admits o no doubt% "#ile to t#e ormer no one "ould
assent. )o" a dialectical proposition consists in asking somet#ing
t#at is #eld by all men or by most men or by t#e p#ilosop#ers% i.e.
eit#er by all% or by most% or by t#e most notable o t#ese% pro$ided
it be not contrary to t#e general opinion- or a man "ould probably
assent to t#e $ie" o t#e p#ilosop#ers% i it be not contrary to t#e
opinions o most men. 4ialectical propositions also include $ie"s
"#ic# are like t#ose generally accepted- also propositions "#ic# contradict
t#e contraries o opinions t#at are taken to be generally accepted%
and also all opinions t#at are in accordance "it# t#e recogni0ed arts.
T#us% supposing it to be a general opinion t#at t#e kno"ledge o contraries
is t#e same% it mig#t probably pass or a general opinion also t#at
t#e perception o contraries is t#e same' also% supposing it to be
a general opinion t#at t#ere is but one single science o grammar%
it mig#t pass or a general opinion t#at t#ere is but one science
o lute-playing as "ell% "#ereas% i it be a general opinion t#at
t#ere is more t#an one science o grammar% it mig#t pass or a general
opinion t#at t#ere is more t#an one science o lute-playing as "ell'
or all t#ese seem to be alike and akin. ;ike"ise% also% propositions
contradicting t#e contraries o general opinions "ill pass as general
opinions' or i it be a general opinion t#at one oug#t to do good
to one,s riends% it "ill also be a general opinion t#at one oug#t
not to do t#em #arm. :ere% t#at one oug#t to do #arm to one,s riends
is contrary to t#e general $ie"% and t#at one oug#t not to do t#em
#arm is t#e contradictory o t#at contrary. ;ike"ise also% i one
oug#t to do good to one,s riends% one oug#t not to do good to one,s
enemies' t#is too is t#e contradictory o t#e $ie" contrary to t#e
general $ie"- t#e contrary being t#at one oug#t to do good to one,s
enemies. ;ike"ise% also% in ot#er cases. Also% on comparison% it "ill
look like a general opinion t#at t#e contrary predicate belongs to
t#e contrary sub(ect' e.g. i one oug#t to do good to one,s riends%
one oug#t also to do e$il to one,s enemies. it mig#t appear also as
i doing good to one,s riends "ere a contrary to doing e$il to one,s
enemies' but "#et#er t#is is or is not so in reality as "ell "ill
be stated in t#e course o t#e discussion upon contraries. Clearly
also% all opinions t#at are in accordance "it# t#e arts are dialectical
propositions- or people are likely to assent to t#e $ie"s #eld by
t#ose "#o #a$e made a study o t#ese t#ings% e.g. on a !uestion o
medicine t#ey "ill agree "it# t#e doctor% and on a !uestion o geometry
"it# t#e geometrician- and like"ise also in ot#er cases.
Part 11
A dialectical problem is a sub(ect o in!uiry t#at contributes eit#er
to c#oice and a$oidance% or to trut# and kno"ledge% and t#at eit#er
by itsel% or as a #elp to t#e solution o some ot#er suc# problem.
It must% moreo$er% be somet#ing on "#ic# eit#er people #old no opinion
eit#er "ay% or t#e masses #old a contrary opinion to t#e p#ilosop#ers%
or t#e p#ilosop#ers to t#e masses% or eac# o t#em among t#emsel$es.
&or some problems it is useul to kno" "it# a $ie" to c#oice or a$oidance%
e.g. "#et#er pleasure is to be c#osen or not% "#ile some it is useul
to kno" merely "it# a $ie" to kno"ledge% e.g. "#et#er t#e uni$erse
is eternal or not' ot#ers% again% are not useul in and by t#emsel$es
or eit#er o t#ese purposes% but yet #elp us in regard to some suc#
problems- or t#ere are many t#ings "#ic# "e do not "is# to kno" in
and by t#emsel$es% but or t#e sake o ot#er t#ings% in order t#at
t#roug# t#em "e may come to kno" somet#ing else. Problems also include
!uestions in regard to "#ic# reasonings conlict *t#e diiculty t#en
being "#et#er so-and so is so or not% t#ere being con$incing arguments
or bot# $ie"s+- ot#ers also in regard to "#ic# "e #a$e no argument
because t#ey are so $ast% and "e ind it diicult to gi$e our reasons%
e.g. t#e !uestion "#et#er t#e uni$erse is eternal or no' or into
!uestions o t#at kind too it is possible to in!uire.
Problems% t#en% and propositions are to be deined as aoresaid. A
,t#esis, is a supposition o some eminent p#ilosop#er t#at conlicts
"it# t#e general opinion- e.g. t#e $ie" t#at contradiction is impossible%
as Antist#enes said- or t#e $ie" o :eraclitus t#at all t#ings are
in motion- or t#at Being is one% as Delissus says' or to take notice
"#en any ordinary person e/presses $ie"s contrary to men,s usual opinions
"ould be silly. Or it may be a $ie" about "#ic# "e #a$e a reasoned
t#eory contrary to men,s usual opinions% e.g. t#e $ie" maintained
by t#e sop#ists t#at "#at is need not in e$ery case eit#er #a$e come
to be or be eternal' or a musician "#o is a grammarian ,is, so "it#out
e$er #a$ing ,come to be, so% or being so eternally. &or e$en i a
man does not accept t#is $ie"% #e mig#t do so on t#e ground t#at it
is reasonable.
)o" a ,t#esis, also is a problem% t#oug# a problem is not al"ays a
t#esis% inasmuc# as some problems are suc# t#at "e #a$e no opinion
about t#em eit#er "ay. T#at a t#esis% #o"e$er% also orms a problem%
is clear' or it ollo"s o necessity rom "#at #as been said t#at
eit#er t#e mass o men disagree "it# t#e p#ilosop#ers about t#e t#esis%
or t#at t#e one or t#e ot#er class disagree among t#emsel$es% seeing
t#at t#e t#esis is a supposition in conlict "it# general opinion.
Practically all dialectical problems indeed are no" called ,t#eses,.
But it s#ould make no dierence "#ic#e$er description is used- or
our ob(ect in t#us distinguis#ing t#em #as not been to create a terminology%
but to recogni0e "#at dierences #appen to be ound bet"een t#em.
)ot e$ery problem% nor e$ery t#esis% s#ould be e/amined% but only
one "#ic# mig#t pu00le one o t#ose "#o need argument% not punis#ment
or perception. &or people "#o are pu00led to kno" "#et#er one oug#t
to #onour t#e gods and lo$e one,s parents or not need punis#ment%
"#ile t#ose "#o are pu00led to kno" "#et#er sno" is "#ite or not need
perception. T#e sub(ects s#ould not border too closely upon t#e sp#ere
o demonstration% nor yet be too ar remo$ed rom it' or t#e ormer
cases admit o no doubt% "#ile t#e latter in$ol$e diiculties too
great or t#e art o t#e trainer.
Part 11
:a$ing dra"n t#ese deinitions% "e must distinguis# #o" many species
t#ere are o dialectical arguments. T#ere is on t#e one #and Induction%
on t#e ot#er =easoning. )o" "#at reasoning is #as been said beore'
induction is a passage rom indi$iduals to uni$ersals% e.g. t#e argument
t#at supposing t#e skilled pilot is t#e most eecti$e% and like"ise
t#e skilled c#arioteer% t#en in general t#e skilled man is t#e best
at #is particular task. Induction is t#e more con$incing and clear'
it is more readily learnt by t#e use o t#e senses% and is applicable
generally to t#e mass o men% t#oug# reasoning is more orcible and
eecti$e against contradictious people.
Part 12
T#e classes% t#en% o t#ings about "#ic#% and o t#ings out o "#ic#%
arguments are constructed% are to be distinguis#ed in t#e "ay "e #a$e
said beore. T#e means "#ereby "e are to become "ell supplied "it#
reasonings are our' *1+ t#e securing o propositions- *1+ t#e po"er
to distinguis# in #o" many senses particular e/pression is used- *2+
t#e disco$ery o t#e dierences o t#ings- *3+ t#e in$estigation
o likeness. T#e last t#ree% as "ell% are in a certain sense propositions'
or it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to eac# o
t#em% e.g. *1+ ,T#e desirable may mean eit#er t#e #onourable or t#e
pleasant or t#e e/pedient,- and *1+ .ensation diers rom kno"ledge
in t#at t#e latter may be reco$ered again ater it #as been lost%
"#ile t#e ormer cannot,- and *2+ T#e relation o t#e #ealt#y to #ealt#
is like t#at o t#e $igorous to $igour,. T#e irst proposition depends
upon t#e use o one term in se$eral senses% t#e second upon t#e dierences
o t#ings% t#e t#ird upon t#eir likenesses.
Part 13
Propositions s#ould be selected in a number o "ays corresponding
to t#e number o distinctions dra"n in regard to t#e proposition'
t#us one may irst take in #and t#e opinions #eld by all or by most
men or by t#e p#ilosop#ers% i.e. by all% or most% or t#e most notable
o t#em- or opinions contrary to t#ose t#at seem to be generally #eld-
and% again% all opinions t#at are in accordance "it# t#e arts. We
must make propositions also o t#e contradictories o opinions contrary
to t#ose t#at seem to be generally #eld% as "as laid do"n beore.
It is useul also to make t#em by selecting not only t#ose opinions
t#at actually are accepted% but also t#ose t#at are like t#ese% e.g.
,T#e perception o contraries is t#e same,-t#e kno"ledge o t#em being
so-and ,"e see by admission o somet#ing into oursel$es% not by an
emission,- or so it is% too% in t#e case o t#e ot#er senses- or
in #earing "e admit somet#ing into oursel$es- "e do not emit- and
"e taste in t#e same "ay. ;ike"ise also in t#e ot#er cases. Doreo$er%
all statements t#at seem to be true in all or in most cases% s#ould
be taken as a principle or accepted position- or t#ey are posited
by t#ose "#o do not also see "#at e/ception t#ere may be. We s#ould
select also rom t#e "ritten #andbooks o argument% and s#ould dra"
up sketc#-lists o t#em upon eac# se$eral kind o sub(ect% putting
t#em do"n under separate #eadings% e.g. ,On Eood,% or ,On ;ie,-and
t#at ,On Eood, s#ould deal "it# e$ery orm o good% beginning "it#
t#e category o essence. In t#e margin% too% one s#ould indicate also
t#e opinions o indi$idual t#inkers% e.g. ,Ampedocles said t#at t#e
elements o bodies "ere our,' or any one mig#t assent to t#e saying
o some generally accepted aut#ority.
O propositions and problems t#ere are-to compre#end t#e matter in
outline-t#ree di$isions' or some are et#ical propositions% some are
on natural p#ilosop#y% "#ile some are logical. Propositions suc# as
t#e ollo"ing are et#ical% e.g. ,Oug#t one rat#er to obey one,s parents
or t#e la"s% i t#ey disagree6,- suc# as t#is are logical% e.g. ,Is
t#e kno"ledge o opposites t#e same or not6,- "#ile suc# as t#is are
on natural p#ilosop#y% e.g. ,Is t#e uni$erse eternal or not6, ;ike"ise
also "it# problems. T#e nature o eac# o t#e aoresaid kinds o proposition
is not easily rendered in a deinition% but "e #a$e to try to recogni0e
eac# o t#em by means o t#e amiliarity attained t#roug# induction%
e/amining t#em in t#e lig#t o t#e illustrations gi$en abo$e.
&or purposes o p#ilosop#y "e must treat o t#ese t#ings according
to t#eir trut#% but or dialectic only "it# an eye to general opinion.
All propositions s#ould be taken in t#eir most uni$ersal orm- t#en%
t#e one s#ould be made into many. A.g. ,T#e kno"ledge o opposites
is t#e same,- ne/t% ,T#e kno"ledge o contraries is t#e same,% and
t#at ,o relati$e terms,. In t#e same "ay t#ese t"o s#ould again be
di$ided% as long as di$ision is possible% e.g. t#e kno"ledge o ,good
and e$il,% o ,"#ite and black,% or ,cold and #ot,. ;ike"ise also
in ot#er cases.
Part 19
On t#e ormation% t#en% o propositions% t#e abo$e remarks are enoug#.
As regards t#e number o senses a term bears% "e must not only treat
o t#ose terms "#ic# bear dierent senses% but "e must also try to
render t#eir deinitions- e.g. "e must not merely say t#at (ustice
and courage are called ,good, in one sense% and t#at "#at conduces
to $igour and "#at conduces to #ealt# are called so in anot#er% but
also t#at t#e ormer are so called because o a certain intrinsic
!uality t#ey t#emsel$es #a$e% t#e latter because t#ey are producti$e
o a certain result and not because o any intrinsic !uality in t#emsel$es.
.imilarly also in ot#er cases.
W#et#er a term bears a number o speciic meanings or one only% may
be considered by t#e ollo"ing means. &irst% look and see i its contrary
bears a number o meanings% "#et#er t#e discrepancy bet"een t#em be
one o kind or one o names. &or in some cases a dierence is at
once displayed e$en in t#e names- e.g. t#e contrary o ,s#arp, in
t#e case o a note is ,lat,% "#ile in t#e case o a solid edge it
is ,dull,. Clearly% t#en% t#e contrary o ,s#arp, bears se$eral meanings%
and i so% also does ,s#arp,- or corresponding to eac# o t#e ormer
terms t#e meaning o its contrary "ill be dierent. &or ,s#arp, "ill
not be t#e same "#en contrary to ,dull, and to ,lat,% t#oug# ,s#arp,
is t#e contrary o eac#. Again Bar#u *,lat,% ,#ea$y,+ in t#e case
o a note #as ,s#arp, as its contrary% but in t#e case o a solid
mass ,lig#t,% so t#at Bar#u is used "it# a number o meanings% inasmuc#
as its contrary also is so used. ;ike"ise% also% ,ine, as applied
to a picture #as ,ugly, as its contrary% but% as applied to a #ouse%
,rams#ackle,- so t#at ,ine, is an ambiguous term.
In some cases t#ere is no discrepancy o any sort in t#e names used%
but a dierence o kind bet"een t#e meanings is at once ob$ious'
e.g. in t#e case o ,clear, and ,obscure,' or sound is called ,clear,
and ,obscure,% (ust as ,colour, is too. As regards t#e names% t#en%
t#ere is no discrepancy% but t#e dierence in kind bet"een t#e meanings
is at once ob$ious' or colour is not called ,clear, in a like sense
to sound. T#is is plain also t#roug# sensation' or o t#ings t#at
are t#e same in kind "e #a$e t#e same sensation% "#ereas "e do not
(udge clearness by t#e same sensation in t#e case o sound and o
colour% but in t#e latter case "e (udge by sig#t% in t#e ormer by
#earing. ;ike"ise also "it# ,s#arp, and ,dull, in regard to la$ours
and solid edges' #ere in t#e latter case "e (udge by touc#% but in
t#e ormer by taste. &or #ere again t#ere is no discrepancy in t#e
names used% in t#e case eit#er o t#e original terms or o t#eir contraries'
or t#e contrary also o s#arp in eit#er sense is ,dull,.
Doreo$er% see i one sense o a term #as a contrary% "#ile anot#er
#as absolutely none- e.g. t#e pleasure o drinking #as a contrary
in t#e pain o t#irst% "#ereas t#e pleasure o seeing t#at t#e diagonal
is incommensurate "it# t#e side #as none% so t#at ,pleasure, is used
in more t#an one sense. To ,lo$e, also% used o t#e rame o mind%
#as to ,#ate, as its contrary% "#ile as used o t#e p#ysical acti$ity
*kissing+ it #as none' clearly% t#ereore% to ,lo$e, is an ambiguous
term. &urt#er% see in regard to t#eir intermediates% i some meanings
and t#eir contraries #a$e an intermediate% ot#ers #a$e none% or i
bot# #a$e one but not t#e same one% e.g. ,clear, and ,obscure, in
t#e case o colours #a$e ,grey, as an intermediate% "#ereas in t#e
case o sound t#ey #a$e none% or% i t#ey #a$e% it is ,#ars#,% as
some people say t#at a #ars# sound is intermediate. ,Clear,% t#en%
is an ambiguous term% and like"ise also ,obscure,. .ee% moreo$er%
i some o t#em #a$e more t#an one intermediate% "#ile ot#ers #a$e
but one% as is t#e case "it# ,clear, and ,obscure,% or in t#e case
o colours t#ere are numbers o intermediates% "#ereas in regard to
sound t#ere is but one% $i0. ,#ars#,.
Again% in t#e case o t#e contradictory opposite% look and see i
it bears more t#an one meaning. &or i t#is bears more t#an one meaning%
t#en t#e opposite o it also "ill be used in more t#an one meaning-
e.g. ,to ail to see, a p#rase "it# more t#an one meaning% $i0. *1+
to ail to possess t#e po"er o sig#t% *1+ to ail to put t#at po"er
to acti$e use. But i t#is #as more t#an one meaning% it ollo"s necessarily
t#at ,to see, also #as more t#an one meaning' or t#ere "ill be an
opposite to eac# sense o ,to ail to see,- e.g. t#e opposite o ,not
to possess t#e po"er o sig#t, is to possess it% "#ile o ,not to
put t#e po"er o sig#t to acti$e use,% t#e opposite is to put it to
acti$e use.
Doreo$er% e/amine t#e case o terms t#at denote t#e pri$ation or presence
o a certain state' or i t#e one term bears more t#an one meaning%
t#en so "ill t#e remaining term' e.g. i ,to #a$e sense, be used "it#
more t#an one meaning% as applied to t#e soul and to t#e body% t#en
,to be "anting in sense, too "ill be used "it# more t#an one meaning%
as applied to t#e soul and to t#e body. T#at t#e opposition bet"een
t#e terms no" in !uestion depends upon t#e pri$ation or presence o
a certain state is clear% since animals naturally possess eac# kind
o ,sense,% bot# as applied to t#e soul and as applied to t#e body.
Doreo$er% e/amine t#e inlected orms. &or i ,(ustly, #as more t#an
one meaning% t#en ,(ust,% also% "ill be used "it# more t#an one meaning-
or t#ere "ill be a meaning o ,(ust, to eac# o t#e meanings o ,(ustly,-
e.g. i t#e "ord ,(ustly, be used o (udging according to one,s o"n
opinion% and also o (udging as one oug#t% t#en ,(ust, also "ill be
used in like manner. In t#e same "ay also% i ,#ealt#y, #as more t#an
one meaning% t#en ,#ealt#ily, also "ill be used "it# more t#an one
meaning' e.g. i ,#ealt#y, describes bot# "#at produces #ealt# and
"#at preser$es #ealt# and "#at betokens #ealt#% t#en ,#ealt#ily, also
"ill be used to mean ,in suc# a "ay as to produce, or ,preser$e, or
,betoken, #ealt#. ;ike"ise also in ot#er cases% "#ene$er t#e original
term bears more t#an one meaning% t#e inle/ion also t#at is ormed
rom it "ill be used "it# more t#an one meaning% and $ice $ersa.
;ook also at t#e classes o t#e predicates signiied by t#e term%
and see i t#ey are t#e same in all cases. &or i t#ey are not t#e
same% t#en clearly t#e term is ambiguous' e.g. ,good, in t#e case
o ood means ,producti$e o pleasure,% and in t#e case o medicine
,producti$e o #ealt#,% "#ereas as applied to t#e soul it means to
be o a certain !uality% e.g. temperate or courageous or (ust' and
like"ise also% as applied to ,man,. .ometimes it signiies "#at #appens
at a certain time% as *e.g.+ t#e good t#at #appens at t#e rig#t time'
or "#at #appens at t#e rig#t time is called good. Oten it signiies
"#at is o certain !uantity% e.g. as applied to t#e proper amount'
or t#e proper amount too is called good. .o t#en t#e term ,good,
is ambiguous. In t#e same "ay also ,clear,% as applied to a body%
signiies a colour% but in regard to a note it denotes "#at is ,easy
to #ear,. ,.#arp,% too% is in a closely similar case' or t#e same
term does not bear t#e same meaning in all its applications' or a
s#arp note is a s"it note% as t#e mat#ematical t#eorists o #armony
tell us% "#ereas a s#arp *acute+ angle is one t#at is less t#an a
rig#t angle% "#ile a s#arp dagger is one containing a s#arp angle
*point+.
;ook also at t#e genera o t#e ob(ects denoted by t#e same term% and
see i t#ey are dierent "it#out being subaltern% as *e.g.+ ,donkey,%
"#ic# denotes bot# t#e animal and t#e engine. &or t#e deinition o
t#em t#at corresponds to t#e name is dierent' or t#e one "ill be
declared to be an animal o a certain kind% and t#e ot#er to be an
engine o a certain kind. I% #o"e$er% t#e genera be subaltern% t#ere
is no necessity or t#e deinitions to be dierent. T#us *e.g.+ ,animal,
is t#e genus o ,ra$en,% and so is ,bird,. W#ene$er t#ereore "e say
t#at t#e ra$en is a bird% "e also say t#at it is a certain kind o
animal% so t#at bot# t#e genera are predicated o it. ;ike"ise also
"#ene$er "e call t#e ra$en a ,lying biped animal,% "e declare it
to be a bird' in t#is "ay% t#en% as "ell% bot# t#e genera are predicated
o ra$en% and also t#eir deinition. But in t#e case o genera t#at
are not subaltern t#is does not #appen% or "#ene$er "e call a t#ing
an ,engine,% "e do not call it an animal% nor $ice $ersa.
;ook also and see not only i t#e genera o t#e term beore you are
dierent "it#out being subaltern% but also in t#e case o its contrary'
or i its contrary bears se$eral senses% clearly t#e term beore
you does so as "ell.
It is useul also to look at t#e deinition t#at arises rom t#e use
o t#e term in combination% e.g. o a ,clear *lit. "#ite+ body, o
a ,clear note,. &or t#en i "#at is peculiar in eac# case be abstracted%
t#e same e/pression oug#t to remain o$er. T#is does not #appen in
t#e case o ambiguous terms% e.g. in t#e cases (ust mentioned. &or
t#e ormer "ill be body possessing suc# and suc# a colour,% "#ile
t#e latter "ill be ,a note easy to #ear,. Abstract% t#en% ,a body
,and, a note,% and t#e remainder in eac# case is not t#e same. It
s#ould% #o"e$er% #a$e been #ad t#e meaning o ,clear, in eac# case
been synonymous.
Oten in t#e actual deinitions as "ell ambiguity creeps in una"ares%
and or t#is reason t#e deinitions also s#ould be e/amined. I *e.g.+
any one describes "#at betokens and "#at produces #ealt# as ,related
commensurably to #ealt#,% "e must not desist but go on to e/amine
in "#at sense #e #as used t#e term ,commensurably, in eac# case% e.g.
i in t#e latter case it means t#at ,it is o t#e rig#t amount to
produce #ealt#,% "#ereas in t#e or it means t#at ,it is suc# as to
betoken "#at kind o state pre$ails,.
Doreo$er% see i t#e terms cannot be compared as ,more or less, or
as ,in like manner,% as is t#e case *e.g.+ "it# a ,clear, *lit. "#ite+
sound and a ,clear, garment% and a ,s#arp, la$our and a ,s#arp, note.
&or neit#er are t#ese t#ings said to be clear or s#arp ,in a like
degree,% nor yet is t#e one said to be clearer or s#arper t#an t#e
ot#er. ,Clear,% t#en% and ,s#arp, are ambiguous. &or synonyms are
al"ays comparable- or t#ey "ill al"ays be used eit#er in like manner%
or else in a greater degree in one case.
)o" since o genera t#at are dierent "it#out being subaltern t#e
dierentiae also are dierent in kind% e.g. t#ose o ,animal, and
,kno"ledge, *or t#e dierentiae o t#ese are dierent+% look and
see i t#e meanings comprised under t#e same term are dierentiae
o genera t#at are dierent "it#out being subaltern% as e.g. ,s#arp,
is o a ,note, and a ,solid,. &or being ,s#arp, dierentiates note
rom note% and like"ise also one solid rom anot#er. ,.#arp,% t#en%
is an ambiguous term' or it orms dierentiae o genera t#at are
dierent "it#out being subaltern.
Again% see i t#e actual meanings included under t#e same term t#emsel$es
#a$e dierent dierentiae% e.g. ,colour, in bodies and ,colour,
in tunes' or t#e dierentiae o ,colour, in bodies are ,sig#t-piercing,
and ,sig#t compressing,% "#ereas ,colour, in melodies #as not t#e
same dierentiae. Colour% t#en% is an ambiguous term- or t#ings
t#at are t#e same #a$e t#e same dierentiae.
Doreo$er% since t#e species is ne$er t#e dierentia o anyt#ing%
look and see i one o t#e meanings included under t#e same term be
a species and anot#er a dierentia% as *e.g.+ clear, *lit. "#ite+
as applied to a body is a species o colour% "#ereas in t#e case o
a note it is a dierentia- or one note is dierentiated rom anot#er
by being ,clear,.
Part 1<
T#e presence% t#en% o a number o meanings in a term may be in$estigated
by t#ese and like means. T#e dierences "#ic# t#ings present to eac#
ot#er s#ould be e/amined "it#in t#e same genera% e.g. ,W#erein does
(ustice dier rom courage% and "isdom rom temperance6,-or all
t#ese belong to t#e same genus- and also rom one genus to anot#er%
pro$ided t#ey be not $ery muc# too ar apart% e.g. ,W#erein does sensation
dier rom kno"ledge6' or in t#e case o genera t#at are $ery ar
apart% t#e dierences are entirely ob$ious.
Part 1>
;ikeness s#ould be studied% irst% in t#e case o t#ings belonging
to dierent genera% t#e ormulae being ,A'B F C'4, *e.g. as kno"ledge
stands to t#e ob(ect o kno"ledge% so is sensation related to t#e
ob(ect o sensation+% and ,As A is in B% so is C in 4, *e.g. as sig#t
is in t#e eye% so is reason in t#e soul% and as is a calm in t#e sea%
so is "indlessness in t#e air+. Practice is more especially needed
in regard to terms t#at are ar apart- or in t#e case o t#e rest%
"e s#all be more easily able to see in one glance t#e points o likeness.
We s#ould also look at t#ings "#ic# belong to t#e same genus% to see
i any identical attribute belongs to t#em all% e.g. to a man and
a #orse and a dog- or in so ar as t#ey #a$e any identical attribute%
in so ar t#ey are alike.
Part 1?
It is useul to #a$e e/amined t#e number o meanings o a term bot#
or clearness, sake *or a man is more likely to kno" "#at it is #e
asserts% i it bas been made clear to #im #o" many meanings it may
#a$e+% and also "it# a $ie" to ensuring t#at our reasonings s#all
be in accordance "it# t#e actual acts and not addressed merely to
t#e term used. &or as long as it is not clear in #o" many senses a
term is used% it is possible t#at t#e ans"erer and t#e !uestioner
are not directing t#eir minds upon t#e same t#ing' "#ereas "#en once
it #as been made clear #o" many meanings t#ere are% and also upon
"#ic# o t#em t#e ormer directs #is mind "#en #e makes #is assertion%
t#e !uestioner "ould t#en look ridiculous i #e ailed to address
#is argument to t#is. It #elps us also bot# to a$oid being misled
and to mislead by alse reasoning' or i "e kno" t#e number o meanings
o a term% "e s#all certainly ne$er be misled by alse reasoning%
but s#all kno" i t#e !uestioner ails to address #is argument to
t#e same point- and "#en "e oursel$es put t#e !uestions "e s#all be
able to mislead #im% i our ans"erer #appens not to kno" t#e number
o meanings o our terms. T#is% #o"e$er% is not possible in all cases%
but only "#en o t#e many senses some are true and ot#ers are alse.
T#is manner o argument% #o"e$er% does not belong properly to dialectic-
dialecticians s#ould t#ereore by all means be"are o t#is kind o
$erbal discussion% unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss
t#e sub(ect beore #im in any ot#er "ay.
T#e disco$ery o t#e dierences o t#ings #elps us bot# in reasonings
about sameness and dierence% and also in recogni0ing "#at any particular
t#ing is. T#at it #elps us in reasoning about sameness and dierence
is clear' or "#en "e #a$e disco$ered a dierence o any kind "#ate$er
bet"een t#e ob(ects beore us% "e s#all already #a$e s#o"n t#at t#ey
are not t#e same' "#ile it #elps us in recogni0ing "#at a t#ing is%
because "e usually distinguis# t#e e/pression t#at is proper to t#e
essence o eac# particular t#ing by means o t#e dierentiae t#at
are proper to it.
T#e e/amination o likeness is useul "it# a $ie" bot# to inducti$e
arguments and to #ypot#etical reasonings% and also "it# a $ie" to
t#e rendering o deinitions. It is useul or inducti$e arguments%
because it is by means o an induction o indi$iduals in cases t#at
are alike t#at "e claim to bring t#e uni$ersal in e$idence' or it
is not easy to do t#is i "e do not kno" t#e points o likeness. It
is useul or #ypot#etical reasonings because it is a general opinion
t#at among similars "#at is true o one is true also o t#e rest.
I% t#en% "it# regard to any o t#em "e are "ell supplied "it# matter
or a discussion% "e s#all secure a preliminary admission t#at #o"e$er
it is in t#ese cases% so it is also in t#e case beore us' t#en "#en
"e #a$e s#o"n t#e ormer "e s#all #a$e s#o"n% on t#e strengt# o t#e
#ypot#esis% t#e matter beore us as "ell' or "e #a$e irst made t#e
#ypot#esis t#at #o"e$er it is in t#ese cases% so it is also in t#e
case beore us% and #a$e t#en pro$ed t#e point as regards t#ese cases.
It is useul or t#e rendering o deinitions because% i "e are able
to see in one glance "#at is t#e same in eac# indi$idual case o it%
"e s#all be at no loss into "#at genus "e oug#t to put t#e ob(ect
beore us "#en "e deine it' or o t#e common predicates t#at "#ic#
is most deinitely in t#e category o essence is likely to be t#e
genus. ;ike"ise% also% in t#e case o ob(ects "idely di$ergent% t#e
e/amination o likeness is useul or purposes o deinition% e.g.
t#e sameness o a calm at sea% and "indlessness in t#e air *eac# being
a orm o rest+% and o a point on a line and t#e unit in number-eac#
being a starting point. I% t#en% "e render as t#e genus "#at is common
to all t#e cases% "e s#all get t#e credit o deining not inappropriately.
4einition-mongers too nearly al"ays render t#em in t#is "ay' t#ey
declare t#e unit to be t#e startingpoint o number% and t#e point
t#e startingpoint o a line. It is clear% t#en% t#at t#ey place t#em
in t#at "#ic# is common to bot# as t#eir genus.
T#e means% t#en% "#ereby reasonings are eected% are t#ese' t#e commonplace
rules% or t#e obser$ance o "#ic# t#e aoresaid means are useul%
are as ollo"s.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
BOOK II
Part 1
O problems some are uni$ersal% ot#ers particular. Gni$ersal problems
are suc# as ,A$ery pleasure is good, and ,)o pleasure is good,- particular
problems are suc# as ,.ome pleasure is good, and ,.ome pleasure is
not good,. T#e met#ods o establis#ing and o$ert#ro"ing a $ie" uni$ersally
are common to bot# kinds o problems- or "#en "e #a$e s#o"n t#at
a predicate belongs in e$ery case% "e s#all also #a$e s#o"n t#at it
belongs in some cases. ;ike"ise% also% i "e s#o" t#at it does not
belong in any case% "e s#all also #a$e s#o"n t#at it does not belong
in e$ery case. &irst% t#en% "e must speak o t#e met#ods o o$ert#ro"ing
a $ie" uni$ersally% because suc# are common to bot# uni$ersal and
particular problems% and because people more usually introduce t#eses
asserting a predicate t#an denying it% "#ile t#ose "#o argue "it#
t#em o$ert#ro" it. T#e con$ersion o an appropriate name "#ic# is
dra"n rom t#e element ,accident, is an e/tremely precarious t#ing-
or in t#e case o accidents and in no ot#er it is possible or somet#ing
to be true conditionally and not uni$ersally. )ames dra"n rom t#e
elements ,deinition, and ,property, and ,genus, are bound to be con$ertible-
e.g. i ,to be an animal t#at "alks on t"o eet is an attribute o
.,% t#en it "ill be true by con$ersion to say t#at ,. is an animal
t#at "alks on t"o eet,. ;ike"ise% also% i dra"n rom t#e genus-
or i ,to be an animal is an attribute o .,% t#en ,. is an animal,.
T#e same is true also in t#e case o a property- or i ,to be capable
o learning grammar is an attribute o .,% t#en ,. "ill be capable
o learning grammar,. &or none o t#ese attributes can possibly belong
or not belong in part- t#ey must eit#er belong or not belong absolutely.
In t#e case o accidents% on t#e ot#er #and% t#ere is not#ing to pre$ent
an attribute *e.g. "#iteness or (ustice+ belonging in part% so t#at
it is not enoug# to s#o" t#at "#iteness or (ustice is an attribute
o a man in order to s#o" t#at #e is "#ite or (ust- or it is open
to dispute it and say t#at #e is "#ite or (ust in part only. Con$ersion%
t#en% is not a necessary process in t#e case o accidents.
We must also deine t#e errors t#at occur in problems. T#ey are o
t"o kinds% caused eit#er by alse statement or by transgression o
t#e establis#ed diction. &or t#ose "#o make alse statements% and
say t#at an attribute belongs to t#ing "#ic# does not belong to it%
commit error- and t#ose "#o call ob(ects by t#e names o ot#er ob(ects
*e.g. calling a planetree a ,man,+ transgress t#e establis#ed terminology.
Part 1
)o" one commonplace rule is to look and see i a man #as ascribed
as an accident "#at belongs in some ot#er "ay. T#is mistake is most
commonly made in regard to t#e genera o t#ings% e.g. i one "ere
to say t#at "#ite #appens *accidit+ to be a colour-or being a colour
does not #appen by accident to "#ite% but colour is its genus. T#e
assertor may o course deine it so in so many "ords% saying *e.g.+
t#at ,Hustice #appens *accidit+ to be a $irtue,- but oten e$en "it#out
suc# deinition it is ob$ious t#at #e #as rendered t#e genus as an
accident- e.g. suppose t#at one "ere to say t#at "#iteness is coloured
or t#at "alking is in motion. &or a predicate dra"n rom t#e genus
is ne$er ascribed to t#e species in an inlected orm% but al"ays
t#e genera are predicated o t#eir species literally- or t#e species
take on bot# t#e name and t#e deinition o t#eir genera. A man t#ereore
"#o says t#at "#ite is ,coloured, #as not rendered ,coloured, as its
genus% seeing t#at #e #as used an inlected orm% nor yet as its property
or as its deinition' or t#e deinition and property o a t#ing belong
to it and to not#ing else% "#ereas many t#ings besides "#ite are coloured%
e.g. a log% a stone% a man% and a #orse. Clearly t#en #e renders it
as an accident.
Anot#er rule is to e/amine all cases "#ere a predicate #as been eit#er
asserted or denied uni$ersally to belong to somet#ing. ;ook at t#em
species by species% and not in t#eir ininite multitude' or t#en
t#e in!uiry "ill proceed more directly and in e"er steps. Iou s#ould
look and begin "it# t#e most primary groups% and t#en proceed in order
do"n to t#ose t#at are not urt#er di$isible' e.g. i a man #as said
t#at t#e kno"ledge o opposites is t#e same% you s#ould look and see
"#et#er it be so o relati$e opposites and o contraries and o terms
signiying t#e pri$ation or presence o certain states% and o contradictory
terms. T#en% i no clear result be reac#ed so ar in t#ese cases%
you s#ould again di$ide t#ese until you come to t#ose t#at are not
urt#er di$isible% and see *e.g.+ "#et#er it be so o (ust deeds and
un(ust% or o t#e double and t#e #al% or o blindness and sig#t%
or o being and not-being' or i in any case it be s#o"n t#at t#e
kno"ledge o t#em is not t#e same "e s#all #a$e demolis#ed t#e problem.
;ike"ise% also% i t#e predicate belongs in no case. T#is rule is
con$ertible or bot# destructi$e and constructi$e purposes' or i%
"#en "e #a$e suggested a di$ision% t#e predicate appears to #old in
all or in a large number o cases% "e may t#en claim t#at t#e ot#er
s#ould actually assert it uni$ersally% or else bring a negati$e instance
to s#o" in "#at case it is not so' or i #e does neit#er o t#ese
t#ings% a reusal to assert it "ill make #im look absurd.
Anot#er rule is to make deinitions bot# o an accident and o its
sub(ect% eit#er o bot# separately or else o one o t#em% and t#en
look and see i anyt#ing untrue #as been assumed as true in t#e deinitions.
T#us *e.g.+ to see i it is possible to "rong a god% ask "#at is ,to
"rong,6 &or i it be ,to in(ure deliberately,% clearly it is not possible
or a god to be "ronged' or it is impossible t#at Eod s#ould be in(ured.
Again% to see i t#e good man is (ealous% ask "#o is t#e ,(ealous,
man and "#at is ,(ealousy,. &or i ,(ealousy, is pain at t#e apparent
success o some "ell-be#a$ed person% clearly t#e good man is not (ealous'
or t#en #e "ould be bad. Again% to see i t#e indignant man is (ealous%
ask "#o eac# o t#em is' or t#en it "ill be ob$ious "#et#er t#e statement
is true or alse- e.g. i #e is ,(ealous, "#o grie$es at t#e successes
o t#e good% and #e is ,indignant, "#o grie$es at t#e successes o
t#e e$il% t#en clearly t#e indignant man "ould not be (ealous. A man
s#ould substitute deinitions also or t#e terms contained in #is
deinitions% and not stop until #e comes to a amiliar term' or oten
i t#e deinition be rendered "#ole% t#e point at issue is not cleared
up% "#ereas i or one o t#e terms used in t#e deinition a deinition
be stated% it becomes ob$ious.
Doreo$er% a man s#ould make t#e problem into a proposition or #imsel%
and t#en bring a negati$e instance against it' or t#e negati$e instance
"ill be a ground o attack upon t#e assertion. T#is rule is $ery nearly
t#e same as t#e rule to look into cases "#ere a predicate #as been
attributed or denied uni$ersally' but it diers in t#e turn o t#e
argument.
Doreo$er% you s#ould deine "#at kind o t#ings s#ould be called as
most men call t#em% and "#at s#ould not. &or t#is is useul bot# or
establis#ing and or o$ert#ro"ing a $ie"' e.g. you s#ould say t#at
"e oug#t to use our terms to mean t#e same t#ings as most people mean
by t#em% but "#en "e ask "#at kind o t#ings are or are not o suc#
and suc# a kind% "e s#ould not #ere go "it# t#e multitude' e.g. it
is rig#t to call ,#ealt#y, "#ate$er tends to produce #ealt#% as do
most men' but in saying "#et#er t#e ob(ect beore us tends to produce
#ealt# or not% "e s#ould adopt t#e language no longer o t#e multitude
but o t#e doctor.
Part 2
Doreo$er% i a term be used in se$eral senses% and it #as been laid
do"n t#at it is or t#at it is not an attribute o .% you s#ould s#o"
your case o one o its se$eral senses% i you cannot s#o" it o bot#.
T#is rule is to be obser$ed in cases "#ere t#e dierence o meaning
is undetected- or supposing t#is to be ob$ious% t#en t#e ot#er man
"ill ob(ect t#at t#e point "#ic# #e #imsel !uestioned #as not been
discussed% but only t#e ot#er point. T#is commonplace rule is con$ertible
or purposes bot# o establis#ing and o o$ert#ro"ing a $ie". &or
i "e "ant to establis# a statement% "e s#all s#o" t#at in one sense
t#e attribute belongs% i "e cannot s#o" it o bot# senses' "#ereas
i "e are o$ert#ro"ing a statement% "e s#all s#o" t#at in one sense
t#e attribute does not belong% i "e cannot s#o" it o bot# senses.
O course% in o$ert#ro"ing a statement t#ere is no need to start t#e
discussion by securing any admission% eit#er "#en t#e statement asserts
or "#en it denies t#e attribute uni$ersally' or i "e s#o" t#at in
any case "#ate$er t#e attribute does not belong% "e s#all #a$e demolis#ed
t#e uni$ersal assertion o it% and like"ise also i "e s#o" t#at it
belongs in a single case% "e s#all demolis# t#e uni$ersal denial o
it. W#ereas in establis#ing a statement "e oug#t to secure a preliminary
admission t#at i it belongs in any case "#ate$er% it belongs uni$ersally%
supposing t#is claim to be a plausible one. &or it is not enoug# to
discuss a single instance in order to s#o" t#at an attribute belongs
uni$ersally- e.g. to argue t#at i t#e soul o man be immortal% t#en
e$ery soul is immortal% so t#at a pre$ious admission must be secured
t#at i any soul "#ate$er be immortal% t#en e$ery soul is immortal.
T#is is not to be done in e$ery case% but only "#ene$er "e are not
easily able to !uote any single argument applying to all cases in
common% as *e.g.+ t#e geometrician can argue t#at t#e triangle #as
its angles e!ual to t"o rig#t angles.
I% again% t#e $ariety o meanings o a term be ob$ious% distinguis#
#o" many meanings it #as beore proceeding eit#er to demolis# or to
establis# it' e.g. supposing ,t#e rig#t, to mean ,t#e e/pedient, or
,t#e #onourable,% you s#ould try eit#er to establis# or to demolis#
bot# descriptions o t#e sub(ect in !uestion- e.g. by s#o"ing t#at
it is #onourable and e/pedient% or t#at it is neit#er #onourable nor
e/pedient. .upposing% #o"e$er% t#at it is impossible to s#o" bot#%
you s#ould s#o" t#e one% adding an indication t#at it is true in t#e
one sense and not in t#e ot#er. T#e same rule applies also "#en t#e
number o senses into "#ic# it is di$ided is more t#an t"o.
Again% consider t#ose e/pressions "#ose meanings are many% but dier
not by "ay o ambiguity o a term% but in some ot#er "ay' e.g. ,T#e
science o many t#ings is one,' #ere ,many t#ings, may mean t#e end
and t#e means to t#at end% as *e.g.+ medicine is t#e science bot#
o producing #ealt# and o dieting- or t#ey may be bot# o t#em ends%
as t#e science o contraries is said to be t#e same *or o contraries
t#e one is no more an end t#an t#e ot#er+- or again t#ey may be an
essential and an accidental attribute% as *e.g.+ t#e essential act
t#at t#e triangle #as its angles e!ual to t"o rig#t angles% and t#e
accidental act t#at t#e e!uilateral igure #as t#em so' or it is
because o t#e accident o t#e e!uilateral triangle #appening to be
a triangle t#at "e kno" t#at it #as its angles e!ual to t"o rig#t
angles. I% t#en% it is not possible in any sense o t#e term t#at
t#e science o many t#ings s#ould be t#e same% it clearly is altoget#er
impossible t#at it s#ould be so- or% i it is possible in some sense%
t#en clearly it is possible. 4istinguis# as many meanings as are re!uired'
e.g. i "e "ant to establis# a $ie"% "e s#ould bring or"ard all suc#
meanings as admit t#at $ie" and s#ould di$ide t#em only into t#ose
meanings "#ic# also are re!uired or t#e establis#ment o our case'
"#ereas i "e "ant to o$ert#ro" a $ie"% "e s#ould bring or"ard all
t#at do not admit t#at $ie"% and lea$e t#e rest aside. We must deal
also in t#ese cases as "ell "it# any uncertainty about t#e number
o meanings in$ol$ed. &urt#er% t#at one t#ing is% or is not% ,o,
anot#er s#ould be establis#ed by means o t#e same commonplace rules-
e.g. t#at a particular science is o a particular t#ing% treated eit#er
as an end or as a means to its end% or as accidentally connected "it#
it- or again t#at it is not ,o, it in any o t#e aoresaid "ays.
T#e same rule #olds true also o desire and all ot#er terms t#at #a$e
more t#an one ob(ect. &or t#e ,desire o J, may mean t#e desire o
it as an end *e.g. t#e desire o #ealt#+ or as a means to an end *e.g.
t#e desire o being doctored+% or as a t#ing desired accidentally%
as% in t#e case o "ine% t#e s"eet-toot#ed person desires it not because
it is "ine but because it is s"eet. &or essentially #e desires t#e
s"eet% and only accidentally t#e "ine' or i it be dry% #e no longer
desires it. :is desire or it is t#ereore accidental. T#is rule is
useul in dealing "it# relati$e terms' or cases o t#is kind are
generally cases o relati$e terms.
Part 3
Doreo$er% it is "ell to alter a term into one more amiliar% e.g.
to substitute ,clear, or ,e/act, in describing a conception% and
,being ussy, or ,being busy,' or "#en t#e e/pression is made more
amiliar% t#e t#esis becomes easier to attack. T#is commonplace rule
also is a$ailable or bot# purposes alike% bot# or establis#ing and
or o$ert#ro"ing a $ie".
In order to s#o" t#at contrary attributes belong to t#e same t#ing%
look at its genus- e.g. i "e "ant to s#o" t#at rig#tness and "rongness
are possible in regard to perception% and to percei$e is to (udge%
"#ile it is possible to (udge rig#tly or "rongly% t#en in regard to
perception as "ell rig#tness and "rongness must be possible. In t#e
present instance t#e proo proceeds rom t#e genus and relates to
t#e species' or ,to (udge, is t#e genus o ,to -percei$e,- or t#e
man "#o percei$es (udges in a certain "ay. But per contra it may proceed
rom t#e species to t#e genus' or all t#e attributes t#at belong
to t#e species belong to t#e genus as "ell- e.g. i t#ere is a bad
and a good kno"ledge t#ere is also a bad and a good disposition' or
,disposition, is t#e genus o kno"ledge. )o" t#e ormer commonplace
argument is allacious or purposes o establis#ing a $ie"% "#ile
t#e second is true. &or t#ere is no necessity t#at all t#e attributes
t#at belong to t#e genus s#ould belong also to t#e species- or ,animal,
is lying and !uadruped% but not so ,man,. All t#e attributes% on
t#e ot#er #and% t#at belong to t#e species must o necessity belong
also to t#e genus- or i ,man, is good% t#en animal also is good.
On t#e ot#er #and% or purposes o o$ert#ro"ing a $ie"% t#e ormer
argument is true "#ile t#e latter is allacious- or all t#e attributes
"#ic# do not belong to t#e genus do not belong to t#e species eit#er-
"#ereas all t#ose t#at are "anting to t#e species are not o necessity
"anting to t#e genus.
.ince t#ose t#ings o "#ic# t#e genus is predicated must also o necessity
#a$e one o its species predicated o t#em% and since t#ose t#ings
t#at are possessed o t#e genus in !uestion% or are described by terms
deri$ed rom t#at genus% must also o necessity be possessed o one
o its species or be described by terms deri$ed rom one o its species
*e.g. i to anyt#ing t#e term ,scientiic kno"ledge, be applied% t#en
also t#ere "ill be applied to it t#e term ,grammatical, or ,musical,
kno"ledge% or kno"ledge o one o t#e ot#er sciences- and i any one
possesses scientiic kno"ledge or is described by a term deri$ed rom
,science,% t#en #e "ill also possess grammatical or musical kno"ledge
or kno"ledge o one o t#e ot#er sciences% or "ill be described by
a term deri$ed rom one o t#em% e.g. as a ,grammarian, or a ,musician,+-t#ereore
i any e/pression be asserted t#at is in any "ay deri$ed rom t#e
genus *e.g. t#at t#e soul is in motion+% look and see "#et#er it be
possible or t#e soul to be mo$ed "it# any o t#e species o motion-
"#et#er *e.g.+ it can gro" or be destroyed or come to be% and so ort#
"it# all t#e ot#er species o motion. &or i it be not mo$ed in any
o t#ese "ays% clearly it does not mo$e at all. T#is commonplace rule
is common or bot# purposes% bot# or o$ert#ro"ing and or establis#ing
a $ie"' or i t#e soul mo$es "it# one o t#e species o motion% clearly
it does mo$e- "#ile i it does not mo$e "it# any o t#e species o
motion% clearly it does not mo$e.
I you are not "ell e!uipped "it# an argument against t#e assertion%
look among t#e deinitions% real or apparent% o t#e t#ing beore
you% and i one is not enoug#% dra" upon se$eral. &or it "ill be easier
to attack people "#en committed to a deinition' or an attack is
al"ays more easily made on deinitions.
Doreo$er% look and see in regard to t#e t#ing in !uestion% "#at it
is "#ose reality conditions t#e reality o t#e t#ing in !uestion%
or "#at it is "#ose reality necessarily ollo"s i t#e t#ing in !uestion
be real' i you "is# to establis# a $ie" in!uire "#at t#ere is on
"#ose reality t#e reality o t#e t#ing in !uestion "ill ollo" *or
i t#e ormer be s#o"n to be real% t#en t#e t#ing in !uestion "ill
also #a$e been s#o"n to be real+- "#ile i you "ant to o$ert#ro" a
$ie"% ask "#at it is t#at is real i t#e t#ing in !uestion be real%
or i "e s#o" t#at "#at ollo"s rom t#e t#ing in !uestion is unreal%
"e s#all #a$e demolis#ed t#e t#ing in !uestion.
Doreo$er% look at t#e time in$ol$ed% to see i t#ere be any discrepancy
any"#ere' e.g. suppose a man to #a$e stated t#at "#at is being nouris#ed
o necessity gro"s' or animals are al"ays o necessity being nouris#ed%
but t#ey do not al"ays gro". ;ike"ise% also% i #e #as said t#at kno"ing
is remembering' or t#e one is concerned "it# past time% "#ereas t#e
ot#er #as to do also "it# t#e present and t#e uture. &or "e are said
to kno" t#ings present and uture *e.g. t#at t#ere "ill be an eclipse+%
"#ereas it is impossible to remember anyt#ing sa$e "#at is in t#e
past.
Part 9
Doreo$er% t#ere is t#e sop#istic turn o argument% "#ereby "e dra"
our opponent into t#e kind o statement against "#ic# "e s#all be
"ell supplied "it# lines o argument. T#is process is sometimes a
real necessity% sometimes an apparent necessity% sometimes neit#er
an apparent nor a real necessity. It is really necessary "#ene$er
t#e ans"erer #as denied any $ie" t#at "ould be useul in attacking
t#e t#esis% and t#e !uestioner t#ereupon addresses #is arguments to
t#e support o t#is $ie"% and "#en moreo$er t#e $ie" in !uestion #appens
to be one o a kind on "#ic# #e #as a good stock o lines o argument.
;ike"ise% also% it is really necessary "#ene$er #e *t#e !uestioner+
irst% by an induction made by means o t#e $ie" laid do"n% arri$es
at a certain statement and t#en tries to demolis# t#at statement'
or "#en once t#is #as been demolis#ed% t#e $ie" originally laid do"n
is demolis#ed as "ell. It is an apparent necessity% "#en t#e point
to "#ic# t#e discussion comes to be directed appears to be useul%
and rele$ant to t#e t#esis% "it#out being really so- "#et#er it be
t#at t#e man "#o is standing up to t#e argument #as reused to concede
somet#ing% or "#et#er #e *t#e !uestioner+ #as irst reac#ed it by
a plausible induction based upon t#e t#esis and t#en tries to demolis#
it. T#e remaining case is "#en t#e point to "#ic# t#e discussion comes
to be directed is neit#er really nor apparently necessary% and it
is t#e ans"erer,s luck to be conuted on a mere side issue Iou s#ould
be"are o t#e last o t#e aoresaid met#ods- or it appears to be
"#olly disconnected rom% and oreign to% t#e art o dialectic. &or
t#is reason% moreo$er% t#e ans"erer s#ould not lose #is temper% but
assent to t#ose statements t#at are o no use in attacking t#e t#esis%
adding an indication "#ene$er #e assents alt#oug# #e does not agree
"it# t#e $ie". &or% as a rule% it increases t#e conusion o !uestioners
i% ater all propositions o t#is kind #a$e been granted t#em% t#ey
can t#en dra" no conclusion.
Doreo$er% any one "#o #as made any statement "#ate$er #as in a certain
sense made se$eral statements% inasmuc# as eac# statement #as a number
o necessary conse!uences' e.g. t#e man "#o said ,J is a man, #as
also said t#at it is an animal and t#at it is animate and a biped
and capable o ac!uiring reason and kno"ledge% so t#at by t#e demolition
o any single one o t#ese conse!uences% o "#ate$er kind% t#e original
statement is demolis#ed as "ell. But you s#ould be"are #ere too o
making a c#ange to a more diicult sub(ect' or sometimes t#e conse!uence%
and sometimes t#e original t#esis% is t#e easier to demolis#.
Part <
In regard to sub(ects "#ic# must #a$e one and one only o t"o predicates%
as *e.g.+ a man must #a$e eit#er a disease or #ealt#% supposing "e
are "ell supplied as regards t#e one or arguing its presence or absence%
"e s#all be "ell e!uipped as regards t#e remaining one as "ell. T#is
rule is con$ertible or bot# purposes' or "#en "e #a$e s#o"n t#at
t#e one attribute belongs% "e s#all #a$e s#o"n t#at t#e remaining
one does not belong- "#ile i "e s#o" t#at t#e one does not belong%
"e s#all #a$e s#o"n t#at t#e remaining one does belong. Clearly t#en
t#e rule is useul or bot# purposes.
Doreo$er% you may de$ise a line o attack by reinterpreting a term
in its literal meaning% "it# t#e implication t#at it is most itting
so to take it rat#er t#an in its establis#ed meaning' e.g. t#e e/pression
,strong at #eart, "ill suggest not t#e courageous man% according to
t#e use no" establis#ed% but t#e man t#e state o "#ose #eart is strong-
(ust as also t#e e/pression ,o a good #ope, may be taken to mean
t#e man "#o #opes or good t#ings. ;ike"ise also ,"ell-starred, may
be taken to mean t#e man "#ose star is good% as Jenocrates says ,"ell-starred
is #e "#o #as a noble soul,., &or a man,s star is #is soul.
.ome t#ings occur o necessity% ot#ers usually% ot#ers #o"e$er it
may c#ance- i t#ereore a necessary e$ent #as been asserted to occur
usually% or i a usual e$ent *or% ailing suc# an e$ent itsel% its
contrary+ #as been stated to occur o necessity% it al"ays gi$es an
opportunity or attack. &or i a necessary e$ent #as been asserted
to occur usually% clearly t#e speaker #as denied an attribute to be
uni$ersal "#ic# is uni$ersal% and so #as made a mistake' and so #e
#as i #e #as declared t#e usual attribute to be necessary' or t#en
#e declares it to belong uni$ersally "#en it does not so belong. ;ike"ise
also i #e #as declared t#e contrary o "#at is usual to be necessary.
&or t#e contrary o a usual attribute is al"ays a comparati$ely rare
attribute' e.g. i men are usually bad% t#ey are comparati$ely seldom
good% so t#at #is mistake is e$en "orse i #e #as declared t#em to
be good o necessity. T#e same is true also i #e #as declared a mere
matter o c#ance to #appen o necessity or usually- or a c#ance e$ent
#appens neit#er o necessity nor usually. I t#e t#ing #appens usually%
t#en e$en supposing #is statement does not distinguis# "#et#er #e
meant t#at it #appens usually or t#at it #appens necessarily% it is
open to you to discuss it on t#e assumption t#at #e meant t#at it
#appens necessarily' e.g. i #e #as stated "it#out any distinction
t#at disin#erited persons are bad% you may assume in discussing it
t#at #e means t#at t#ey are so necessarily.
Doreo$er% look and see also i #e #as stated a t#ing to be an accident
o itsel% taking it to be a dierent t#ing because it #as a dierent
name% as Prodicus used to di$ide pleasures into (oy and delig#t and
good c#eer' or all t#ese are names o t#e same t#ing% to "it% Pleasure.
I t#en any one says t#at (oyulness is an accidental attribute o
c#eerulness% #e "ould be declaring it to be an accidental attribute
o itsel.
Part >
Inasmuc# as contraries can be con(oined "it# eac# ot#er in si/ "ays%
and our o t#ese con(unctions constitute a contrariety% "e must grasp
t#e sub(ect o contraries% in order t#at it may #elp us bot# in demolis#ing
and in establis#ing a $ie". Well t#en% t#at t#e modes o con(unction
are si/ is clear' or eit#er *1+ eac# o t#e contrary $erbs "ill be
con(oined to eac# o t#e contrary ob(ects- and t#is gi$es t"o modes'
e.g. to do good to riends and to do e$il to enemies% or per contra
to do e$il to riends and to do good to enemies. Or else *1+ bot#
$erbs may be attac#ed to one ob(ect- and t#is too gi$es t"o modes%
e.g. to do good to riends and to do e$il to riends% or to do good
to enemies and to do e$il to enemies. Or *2+ a single $erb may be
attac#ed to bot# ob(ects' and t#is also gi$es t"o modes- e.g. to do
good to riends and to do good to enemies% or to do e$il to riends
and e$il to enemies.
T#e irst t"o t#en o t#e aoresaid con(unctions do not constitute
any contrariety- or t#e doing o good to riends is not contrary
to t#e doing o e$il to enemies' or bot# courses are desirable and
belong to t#e same disposition. )or is t#e doing o e$il to riends
contrary to t#e doing o good to enemies' or bot# o t#ese are ob(ectionable
and belong to t#e same disposition' and one ob(ectionable t#ing is
not generally t#oug#t to be t#e contrary o anot#er% unless t#e one
be an e/pression denoting an e/cess% and t#e ot#er an e/pression denoting
a deect' or an e/cess is generally t#oug#t to belong to t#e class
o ob(ectionable t#ings% and like"ise also a deect. But t#e ot#er
our all constitute a contrariety. &or to do good to riends is contrary
to t#e doing o e$il to riends' or it proceeds rom t#e contrary
disposition% and t#e one is desirable% and t#e ot#er ob(ectionable.
T#e case is t#e same also in regard to t#e ot#er con(unctions' or
in eac# combination t#e one course is desirable% and t#e ot#er ob(ectionable%
and t#e one belongs to a reasonable disposition and t#e ot#er to a
bad. Clearly% t#en% rom "#at #as been said% t#e same course #as more
t#an one contrary. &or t#e doing o good to riends #as as its contrary
bot# t#e doing o good to enemies and t#e doing o e$il to riends.
;ike"ise% i "e e/amine t#em in t#e same "ay% "e s#all ind t#at t#e
contraries o eac# o t#e ot#ers also are t"o in number. .elect t#ereore
"#ic#e$er o t#e t"o contraries is useul in attacking t#e t#esis.
Doreo$er% i t#e accident o a t#ing #a$e a contrary% see "#et#er
it belongs to t#e sub(ect to "#ic# t#e accident in !uestion #as been
declared to belong' or i t#e latter belongs t#e ormer could not
belong- or it is impossible t#at contrary predicates s#ould belong
at t#e same time to t#e same t#ing.
Or again% look and see i anyt#ing #as been said about somet#ing%
o suc# a kind t#at i it be true% contrary predicates must necessarily
belong to t#e t#ing' e.g. i #e #as said t#at t#e ,Ideas, e/ist in
us. &or t#en t#e result "ill be t#at t#ey are bot# in motion and at
rest% and moreo$er t#at t#ey are ob(ects bot# o sensation and o
t#oug#t. &or according to t#e $ie"s o t#ose "#o posit t#e e/istence
o Ideas% t#ose Ideas are at rest and are ob(ects o t#oug#t- "#ile
i t#ey e/ist in us% it is impossible t#at t#ey s#ould be unmo$ed'
or "#en "e mo$e% it ollo"s necessarily t#at all t#at is in us mo$es
"it# us as "ell. Clearly also t#ey are ob(ects o sensation% i t#ey
e/ist in us' or it is t#roug# t#e sensation o sig#t t#at "e recogni0e
t#e &orm present in eac# indi$idual.
Again% i t#ere be posited an accident "#ic# #as a contrary% look
and see i t#at "#ic# admits o t#e accident "ill admit o its contrary
as "ell' or t#e same t#ing admits o contraries. T#us *e.g.+ i #e
#as asserted t#at #atred ollo"s anger% #atred "ould in t#at case
be in t#e ,spirited aculty,' or t#at is "#ere anger is. Iou s#ould
t#ereore look and see i its contrary% to "it% riends#ip% be also
in t#e ,spirited aculty,' or i not-i riends#ip is in t#e aculty
o desire-t#en #atred could not ollo" anger. ;ike"ise also i #e
#as asserted t#at t#e aculty o desire is ignorant. &or i it "ere
capable o ignorance% it "ould be capable o kno"ledge as "ell' and
t#is is not generally #eld-I mean t#at t#e aculty o desire is capable
o kno"ledge. &or purposes% t#en% o o$ert#ro"ing a $ie"% as #as been
said% t#is rule s#ould be obser$ed' but or purposes o establis#ing
one% t#oug# t#e rule "ill not #elp you to assert t#at t#e accident
actually belongs% it "ill #elp you to assert t#at it may possibly
belong. &or #a$ing s#o"n t#at t#e t#ing in !uestion "ill not admit
o t#e contrary o t#e accident asserted% "e s#all #a$e s#o"n t#at
t#e accident neit#er belongs nor can possibly belong- "#ile on t#e
ot#er #and% i "e s#o" t#at t#e contrary belongs% or t#at t#e t#ing
is capable o t#e contrary% "e s#all not indeed as yet #a$e s#o"n
t#at t#e accident asserted does belong as "ell- our proo "ill merely
#a$e gone to t#is point% t#at it is possible or it to belong.
Part ?
.eeing t#at t#e modes o opposition are our in number% you s#ould
look or arguments among t#e contradictories o your terms% con$erting
t#e order o t#eir se!uence% bot# "#en demolis#ing and "#en establis#ing
a $ie"% and you s#ould secure t#em by means o induction-suc# arguments
*e.g.+ as t#at man be an animal% "#at is not an animal is not a man,'
and like"ise also in ot#er instances o contradictories. &or in t#ose
cases t#e se!uence is con$erse' or ,animal, ollo"s upon ,man but
,not-animal, does not ollo" upon ,not-man,% but con$ersely ,not-man,
upon ,not-animal,. In all cases% t#ereore% a postulate o t#is sort
s#ould be made% *e.g.+ t#at ,I t#e #onourable is pleasant% "#at is
not pleasant is not #onourable% "#ile i t#e latter be untrue% so
is t#e ormer,. ;ike"ise% also% ,I "#at is not pleasant be not #onourable%
t#en "#at is #onourable is pleasant,. Clearly% t#en% t#e con$ersion
o t#e se!uence ormed by contradiction o t#e terms o t#e t#esis
is a met#od con$ertible or bot# purposes.
T#en look also at t#e case o t#e contraries o . and P in t#e t#esis%
and see i t#e contrary o t#e one ollo"s upon t#e contrary o t#e
ot#er% eit#er directly or con$ersely% bot# "#en you are demolis#ing
and "#en you are establis#ing a $ie"' secure arguments o t#is kind
as "ell by means o induction% so ar as may be re!uired. )o" t#e
se!uence is direct in a case suc# as t#at o courage and co"ardice'
or upon t#e one o t#em $irtue ollo"s% and $ice upon t#e ot#er-
and upon t#e one it ollo"s t#at it is desirable% "#ile upon t#e ot#er
it ollo"s t#at it is ob(ectionable. T#e se!uence% t#ereore% in t#e
latter case also is direct- or t#e desirable is t#e contrary o t#e
ob(ectionable. ;ike"ise also in ot#er cases. T#e se!uence is% on t#e
ot#er #and% con$erse in suc# a case as t#is' :ealt# ollo"s upon $igour%
but disease does not ollo" upon debility- rat#er debility ollo"s
upon disease. In t#is case% t#en% clearly t#e se!uence is con$erse.
Con$erse se!uence is% #o"e$er% rare in t#e case o contraries- usually
t#e se!uence is direct. I% t#ereore% t#e contrary o t#e one term
does not ollo" upon t#e contrary o t#e ot#er eit#er directly or
con$ersely% clearly neit#er does t#e one term ollo" upon t#e ot#er
in t#e statement made' "#ereas i t#e one ollo"ed t#e ot#er in t#e
case o t#e contraries% it must o necessity do so as "ell in t#e
original statement.
Iou s#ould look also into cases o t#e pri$ation or presence o a
state in like manner to t#e case o contraries. Only% in t#e case
o suc# pri$ations t#e con$erse se!uence does not occur' t#e se!uence
is al"ays bound to be direct' e.g. as sensation ollo"s sig#t% "#ile
absence o sensation ollo"s blindness. &or t#e opposition o sensation
to absence o sensation is an opposition o t#e presence to t#e pri$ation
o a state' or t#e one o t#em is a state% and t#e ot#er t#e pri$ation
o it.
T#e case o relati$e terms s#ould also be studied in like manner to
t#at o a state and its pri$ation' or t#e se!uence o t#ese as "ell
is direct- e.g. i 2K1 is a multiple% t#en 1K2 is a raction' or
2K1 is relati$e to 1K2% and so is a multiple to a raction. Again%
i kno"ledge be a concei$ing% t#en also t#e ob(ect o kno"ledge is
an ob(ect o conception- and i sig#t be a sensation% t#en also t#e
ob(ect o sig#t is an ob(ect o sensation. An ob(ection may be made
t#at t#ere is no necessity or t#e se!uence to take place% in t#e
case o relati$e terms% in t#e "ay described' or t#e ob(ect o sensation
is an ob(ect o kno"ledge% "#ereas sensation is not kno"ledge. T#e
ob(ection is% #o"e$er% not generally recei$ed as really true- or
many people deny t#at t#ere is kno"ledge o ob(ects o sensation.
Doreo$er% t#e principle stated is (ust as useul or t#e contrary
purpose% e.g. to s#o" t#at t#e ob(ect o sensation is not an ob(ect
o kno"ledge% on t#e ground t#at neit#er is sensation kno"ledge.
Part @
Again look at t#e case o t#e co-ordinates and inlected orms o
t#e terms in t#e t#esis% bot# in demolis#ing and in establis#ing it.
By co-ordinates, are meant terms suc# as t#e ollo"ing' ,Hust deeds,
and t#e ,(ust man, are coordinates o ,(ustice,% and ,courageous deeds,
and t#e ,courageous man, are co-ordinates o courage. ;ike"ise also
t#ings t#at tend to produce and to preser$e anyt#ing are called co-ordinates
o t#at "#ic# t#ey tend to produce and to preser$e% as e.g. ,#ealt#y
#abits, are co-ordinates o ,#ealt#, and a ,$igorous constitutional,
o a ,$igorous constitution, and so ort# also in ot#er cases. ,Co-ordinate,%
t#en% usually describes cases suc# as t#ese% "#ereas ,inlected orms,
are suc# as t#e ollo"ing' ,(ustly,% ,courageously,% ,#ealt#ily,%
and suc# as are ormed in t#is "ay. It is usually #eld t#at "ords
"#en used in t#eir inlected orms as "ell are co-ordinates% as *e.g.+
,(ustly, in relation to (ustice% and ,courageously, to courage- and
t#en ,co-ordinate, describes all t#e members o t#e same kindred series%
e.g. ,(ustice,% ,(ust,% o a man or an act% ,(ustly,. Clearly% t#en%
"#en any one member% "#ate$er its kind% o t#e same kindred series
is s#o"n to be good or praise"ort#y% t#en all t#e rest as "ell come
to be s#o"n to be so' e.g. i ,(ustice, be somet#ing praise"ort#y%
t#en so "ill ,(ust,% o a man or t#ing% and ,(ustly, connote somet#ing
praise"ort#y. T#en ,(ustly, "ill be rendered also ,praise"ort#ily,%
deri$ed "ill by t#e same inle/ion rom ,t#e praise"ort#y, "#ereby
,(ustly, is deri$ed rom ,(ustice,.
;ook not only in t#e case o t#e sub(ect mentioned% but also in t#e
case o its contrary% or t#e contrary predicate' e.g. argue t#at
good is not necessarily pleasant- or neit#er is e$il painul' or
t#at% i t#e latter be t#e case% so is t#e ormer. Also% i (ustice
be kno"ledge% t#en in(ustice is ignorance' and i ,(ustly, means ,kno"ingly,
and ,skilully,% t#en ,un(ustly, means ,ignorantly, and ,unskilully,'
"#ereas i t#e latter be not true% neit#er is t#e ormer% as in t#e
instance gi$en (ust no"' or ,un(ustly, is more likely to seem e!ui$alent
to ,skilully, t#an to ,unskilully,. T#is commonplace rule #as been
stated beore in dealing "it# t#e se!uence o contraries- or all
"e are claiming no" is t#at t#e contrary o P s#all ollo" t#e contrary
o ..
Doreo$er% look at t#e modes o generation and destruction o a t#ing%
and at t#e t#ings "#ic# tend to produce or to destroy it% bot# in
demolis#ing and in establis#ing a $ie". &or t#ose t#ings "#ose modes
o generation rank among good t#ings% are t#emsel$es also good- and
i t#ey t#emsel$es be good% so also are t#eir modes o generation.
I% on t#e ot#er #and% t#eir modes o generation be e$il% t#en t#ey
t#emsel$es also are e$il. In regard to modes o destruction t#e con$erse
is true' or i t#e modes o destruction rank as good t#ings% t#en
t#ey t#emsel$es rank as e$il t#ings- "#ereas i t#e modes o destruction
count as e$il% t#ey t#emsel$es count as good. T#e same argument applies
also to t#ings tending to produce and destroy' or t#ings "#ose producti$e
causes are good% t#emsel$es also rank as good- "#ereas i causes destructi$e
o t#em are good% t#ey t#emsel$es rank as e$il.
Part 1C
Again% look at t#ings "#ic# are like t#e sub(ect in !uestion% and
see i t#ey are in like case- e.g. i one branc# o kno"ledge #as
more t#an one ob(ect% so also "ill one opinion- and i to possess
sig#t be to see% t#en also to possess #earing "ill be to #ear. ;ike"ise
also in t#e case o ot#er t#ings% bot# t#ose "#ic# are and t#ose "#ic#
are generally #eld to be like. T#e rule in !uestion is useul or
bot# purposes- or i it be as stated in t#e case o some one like
t#ing% it is so "it# t#e ot#er like t#ings as "ell% "#ereas i it
be not so in t#e case o some one o t#em% neit#er is it so in t#e
case o t#e ot#ers. ;ook and see also "#et#er t#e cases are alike
as regards a single t#ing and a number o t#ings' or sometimes t#ere
is a discrepancy. T#us% i to ,kno", a t#ing be to ,t#ink o, it%
t#en also to ,kno" many t#ings, is to ,be t#inking o many t#ings,-
"#ereas t#is is not true- or it is possible to kno" many t#ings but
not to be t#inking o t#em. I% t#en% t#e latter proposition be not
true% neit#er "as t#e ormer t#at dealt "it# a single t#ing% $i0.
t#at to ,kno", a t#ing is to ,t#ink o, it.
Doreo$er% argue rom greater and less degrees. In regard to greater
degrees t#ere are our commonplace rules. One is' .ee "#et#er a greater
degree o t#e predicate ollo"s a greater degree o t#e sub(ect' e.g.
i pleasure be good% see "#et#er also a greater pleasure be a greater
good' and i to do a "rong be e$il% see "#et#er also to do a greater
"rong is a greater e$il. )o" t#is rule is o use or bot# purposes'
or i an increase o t#e accident ollo"s an increase o t#e sub(ect%
as "e #a$e said% clearly t#e accident belongs- "#ile i it does not
ollo"% t#e accident does not belong. Iou s#ould establis# t#is by
induction. Anot#er rule is' I one predicate be attributed to t"o
sub(ects- t#en supposing it does not belong to t#e sub(ect to "#ic#
it is t#e more likely to belong% neit#er does it belong "#ere it is
less likely to belong- "#ile i it does belong "#ere it is less likely
to belong% t#en it belongs as "ell "#ere it is more likely. Again'
I t"o predicates be attributed to one sub(ect% t#en i t#e one "#ic#
is more generally t#oug#t to belong does not belong% neit#er does
t#e one t#at is less generally t#oug#t to belong- or% i t#e one t#at
is less generally t#oug#t to belong does belong% so also does t#e
ot#er. Doreo$er' I t"o predicates be attributed to t"o sub(ects%
t#en i t#e one "#ic# is more usually t#oug#t to belong to t#e one
sub(ect does not belong% neit#er does t#e remaining predicate belong
to t#e remaining sub(ect- or% i t#e one "#ic# is less usually t#oug#t
to belong to t#e one sub(ect does belong% so too does t#e remaining
predicate to t#e remaining sub(ect.
Doreo$er% you can argue rom t#e act t#at an attribute belongs% or
is generally supposed to belong% in a like degree% in t#ree "ays%
$i0. t#ose described in t#e last t#ree rules gi$en in regard to a
greater degree., &or supposing t#at one predicate belongs% or is supposed
to belong% to t"o sub(ects in a like degree% t#en i it does not belong
to t#e one% neit#er does it belong to t#e ot#er- "#ile i it belongs
to t#e one% it belongs to t#e remaining one as "ell. Or% supposing
t"o predicates to belong in a like degree to t#e same sub(ect% t#en%
i t#e one does not belong% neit#er does t#e remaining one- "#ile
i t#e one does belong% t#e remaining one belongs as "ell. T#e case
is t#e same also i t"o predicates belong in a like degree to t"o
sub(ects- or i t#e one predicate does not belong to t#e one sub(ect%
neit#er does t#e remaining predicate belong to t#e remaining sub(ect%
"#ile i t#e one predicate does belong to t#e one sub(ect% t#e remaining
predicate belongs to t#e remaining sub(ect as "ell.
Part 11
Iou can argue% t#en% rom greater or less or like degrees o trut#
in t#e aoresaid number o "ays. Doreo$er% you s#ould argue rom t#e
addition o one t#ing to anot#er. I t#e addition o one t#ing to
anot#er makes t#at ot#er good or "#ite% "#ereas ormerly it "as not
"#ite or good% t#en t#e t#ing added "ill be "#ite or good-it "ill
possess t#e c#aracter it imparts to t#e "#ole as "ell. Doreo$er% i
an addition o somet#ing to a gi$en ob(ect intensiies t#e c#aracter
"#ic# it #ad as gi$en% t#en t#e t#ing added "ill itsel as "ell be
o t#at c#aracter. ;ike"ise% also% in t#e case o ot#er attributes.
T#e rule is not applicable in all cases% but only in t#ose in "#ic#
t#e e/cess described as an ,increased intensity, is ound to take
place. T#e abo$e rule is% #o"e$er% not con$ertible or o$ert#ro"ing
a $ie". &or i t#e t#ing added does not make t#e ot#er good% it is
not t#ereby made clear "#et#er in itsel it may not be good' or t#e
addition o good to e$il does not necessarily make t#e "#ole good%
any more t#an t#e addition o "#ite to black makes t#e "#ole "#ite.
Again% any predicate o "#ic# "e can speak o greater or less degrees
belongs also absolutely' or greater or less degrees o good or o
"#ite "ill not be attributed to "#at is not good or "#ite' or a bad
t#ing "ill ne$er be said to #a$e a greater or less degree o goodness
t#an anot#er% but al"ays o badness. T#is rule is not con$ertible%
eit#er% or t#e purpose o o$ert#ro"ing a predication' or se$eral
predicates o "#ic# "e cannot speak o a greater degree belong absolutely'
or t#e term ,man, is not attributed in greater and less degrees%
but a man is a man or all t#at.
Iou s#ould e/amine in t#e same "ay predicates attributed in a gi$en
respect% and at a gi$en time and place' or i t#e predicate be possible
in some respect% it is possible also absolutely. ;ike"ise% also% is
"#at is predicated at a gi$en time or place' or "#at is absolutely
impossible is not possible eit#er in any respect or at any place or
time. An ob(ection may be raised t#at in a gi$en respect people may
be good by nature% e.g. t#ey may be generous or temperately inclined%
"#ile absolutely t#ey are not good by nature% because no one is prudent
by nature. ;ike"ise% also% it is possible or a destructible t#ing
to escape destruction at a gi$en time% "#ereas it is not possible
or it to escape absolutely. In t#e same "ay also it is a good t#ing
at certain places to ollo" see and suc# a diet% e.g. in inected
areas% t#oug# it is not a good t#ing absolutely. Doreo$er% in certain
places it is possible to li$e singly and alone% but absolutely it
is not possible to e/ist singly and alone. In t#e same "ay also it
is in certain places #onourable to sacriice one,s at#er% e.g. among
t#e Triballi% "#ereas% absolutely% it is not #onourable. Or possibly
t#is may indicate a relati$ity not to places but to persons' or it
is all t#e same "#ere$er t#ey may be' or e$ery"#ere it "ill be #eld
#onourable among t#e Triballi t#emsel$es% (ust because t#ey are Triballi.
Again% at certain times it is a good t#ing to take medicines% e.g.
"#en one is ill% but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly t#is again
may indicate a relati$ity not to a certain time% but to a certain
state o #ealt#' or it is all t#e same "#ene$er it occurs% i only
one be in t#at state. A t#ing is ,absolutely, so "#ic# "it#out any
addition you are prepared to say is #onourable or t#e contrary. T#us
*e.g.+ you "ill deny t#at to sacriice one,s at#er is #onourable'
it is #onourable only to certain persons' it is not t#ereore #onourable
absolutely. On t#e ot#er #and% to #onour t#e gods you "ill declare
to be #onourable "it#out adding anyt#ing% because t#at is #onourable
absolutely. .o t#at "#ate$er "it#out any addition is generally accounted
to be #onourable or dis#onourable or anyt#ing else o t#at kind% "ill
be said to be so ,absolutely,.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
BOOK III
Part 1
T#e !uestion "#ic# is t#e more desirable% or t#e better% o t"o or
more t#ings% s#ould be e/amined upon t#e ollo"ing lines' only irst
o all it must be clearly laid do"n t#at t#e in!uiry "e are making
concerns not t#ings t#at are "idely di$ergent and t#at e/#ibit great
dierences rom one anot#er *or nobody raises any doubt "#et#er
#appiness or "ealt# is more desirable+% but t#ings t#at are nearly
related and about "#ic# "e commonly discuss or "#ic# o t#e t"o "e
oug#t rat#er to $ote% because "e do not see any ad$antage on eit#er
side as compared "it# t#e ot#er. Clearly% in suc# cases i "e can
s#o" a single ad$antage% or more t#an one% our (udgement "ill record
our assent t#at "#ic#e$er side #appens to #a$e t#e ad$antage is t#e
more desirable.
&irst% t#en% t#at "#ic# is more lasting or secure is more desirable
t#an t#at "#ic# is less so' and so is t#at "#ic# is more likely to
be c#osen by t#e prudent or by t#e good man or by t#e rig#t la"% or
by men "#o are good in any particular line% "#en t#ey make t#eir c#oice
as suc#% or by t#e e/perts in regard to any particular class o t#ings-
i.e. eit#er "#ate$er most o t#em or "#at all o t#em "ould c#oose-
e.g. in medicine or in carpentry t#ose t#ings are more desirable "#ic#
most% or all% doctors "ould c#oose- or% in general% "#ate$er most
men or all men or all t#ings "ould c#oose% e.g. t#e good' or e$eryt#ing
aims at t#e good. Iou s#ould direct t#e argument you intend to employ
to "#ate$er purpose you re!uire. O "#at is ,better, or ,more desirable,
t#e absolute standard is t#e $erdict o t#e better science% t#oug#
relati$ely to a gi$en indi$idual t#e standard may be #is o"n particular
science.
In t#e second place% t#at "#ic# is kno"n as ,an /, is more desirable
t#an t#at "#ic# does not come "it#in t#e genus ,/,-e.g. (ustice t#an
a (ust man- or t#e ormer alls "it#in t#e genus ,good,% "#ereas
t#e ot#er does not% and t#e ormer is called ,a good,% "#ereas t#e
latter is not' or not#ing "#ic# does not #appen to belong to t#e
genus in !uestion is called by t#e generic name- e.g. a ,"#ite man,
is not ,a colour,. ;ike"ise also in ot#er cases.
Also% t#at "#ic# is desired or itsel is more desirable t#an t#at
"#ic# is desired or somet#ing else- e.g. #ealt# is more desirable
t#an gymnastics' or t#e ormer is desired or itsel% t#e latter
or somet#ing else. Also% t#at "#ic# is desirable in itsel is more
desirable t#an "#at is desirable per accidens- e.g. (ustice in our
riends t#an (ustice in our enemies' or t#e ormer is desirable in
itsel% t#e latter per accidens' or "e desire t#at our enemies s#ould
be (ust per accidens% in order t#at t#ey may do us no #arm. T#is last
principle is t#e same as t#e one t#at precedes it% "it#% #o"e$er%
a dierent turn o e/pression. &or "e desire (ustice in our riends
or itsel% e$en t#oug# it "ill make no dierence to us% and e$en
t#oug# t#ey be in India- "#ereas in our enemies "e desire it or somet#ing
else% in order t#at t#ey may do us no #arm.
Also% t#at "#ic# is in itsel t#e cause o good is more desirable
t#an "#at is so per accidens% e.g. $irtue t#an luck *or t#e ormer
in itsel% and t#e latter per accidens% t#e cause o good t#ings+%
and so in ot#er cases o t#e same kind. ;ike"ise also in t#e case
o t#e contrary- or "#at is in itsel t#e cause o e$il is more ob(ectionable
t#an "#at is so per accidens% e.g. $ice and c#ance' or t#e one is
bad in itsel% "#ereas c#ance is so per accidens.
Also% "#at is good absolutely is more desirable t#an "#at is good
or a particular person% e.g. reco$ery o #ealt# t#an a surgical operation-
or t#e ormer is good absolutely% t#e latter only or a particular
person% $i0. t#e man "#o needs an operation. .o too "#at is good by
nature is more desirable t#an t#e good t#at is not so by nature% e.g.
(ustice t#an t#e (ust man- or t#e one is good by nature% "#ereas
in t#e ot#er case t#e goodness is ac!uired. Also t#e attribute is
more desirable "#ic# belongs to t#e better and more #onourable sub(ect%
e.g. to a god rat#er t#an to a man% and to t#e soul rat#er t#an to
t#e body. .o too t#e property o t#e better t#ing is better t#an t#e
property o t#e "orse- e.g. t#e property o Eod t#an t#e property
o man' or "#ereas in respect o "#at is common in bot# o t#em t#ey
do not dier at all rom eac# ot#er% in respect o t#eir properties
t#e one surpasses t#e ot#er. Also t#at is better "#ic# is in#erent
in t#ings better or prior or more #onourable' t#us *e.g.+ #ealt# is
better t#an strengt# and beauty' or t#e ormer is in#erent in t#e
moist and t#e dry% and t#e #ot and t#e cold% in act in all t#e primary
constituents o an animal% "#ereas t#e ot#ers are in#erent in "#at
is secondary% strengt# being a eature o t#e sine"s and bones% "#ile
beauty is generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry o t#e
limbs. Also t#e end is generally supposed to be more desirable t#an
t#e means% and o t"o means% t#at "#ic# lies nearer t#e end. In general%
too% a means directed to"ards t#e end o lie is more desirable t#an
a means to anyt#ing else% e.g. t#at "#ic# contributes to #appiness
t#an t#at "#ic# contributes to prudence. Also t#e competent is more
desirable t#an t#e incompetent. Doreo$er% o t"o producti$e agents
t#at one is more desirable "#ose end is better- "#ile bet"een a producti$e
agent and an end "e can decide by a proportional sum "#ene$er t#e
e/cess o t#e one end o$er t#e ot#er is greater t#an t#at o t#e latter
o$er its o"n producti$e means' e.g. supposing t#e e/cess o #appiness
o$er #ealt# to be greater t#an t#at o #ealt# o$er "#at produces #ealt#%
t#en "#at produces #appiness is better t#an #ealt#. &or "#at produces
#appiness e/ceeds "#at produces #ealt# (ust as muc# as #appiness e/ceeds
#ealt#. But #ealt# e/ceeds "#at produces #ealt# by a smaller amount-
ergo% t#e e/cess o "#at produces #appiness o$er "#at produces #ealt#
is greater t#an t#at o #ealt# o$er "#at produces #ealt#. Clearly%
t#ereore% "#at produces #appiness is more desirable t#an #ealt#'
or it e/ceeds t#e same standard by a greater amount. Doreo$er% "#at
is in itsel nobler and more precious and praise"ort#y is more desirable
t#an "#at is less so% e.g. riends#ip t#an "ealt#% and (ustice t#an
strengt#. &or t#e ormer belong in t#emsel$es to t#e class o t#ings
precious and praise"ort#y% "#ile t#e latter do so not in t#emsel$es
but or somet#ing else' or no one pri0es "ealt# or itsel but al"ays
or somet#ing else% "#ereas "e pri0e riends#ip or itsel% e$en t#oug#
not#ing else is likely to come to us rom it.
Part 1
Doreo$er% "#ene$er t"o t#ings are $ery muc# like one anot#er% and
"e cannot see any superiority in t#e one o$er t#e ot#er o t#em% "e
s#ould look at t#em rom t#e standpoint o t#eir conse!uences. &or
t#e one "#ic# is ollo"ed by t#e greater good is t#e more desirable'
or% i t#e conse!uences be e$il% t#at is more desirable "#ic# is ollo"ed
by t#e less e$il. &or t#oug# bot# may be desirable% yet t#ere may
possibly be some unpleasant conse!uence in$ol$ed to turn t#e scale.
Our sur$ey rom t#e point o $ie" o conse!uences lies in t"o directions%
or t#ere are prior conse!uences and later conse!uences' e.g. i a
man learns% it ollo"s t#at #e "as ignorant beore and kno"s ater"ards.
As a rule% t#e later conse!uence is t#e better to consider. Iou s#ould
take% t#ereore% "#ic#e$er o t#e conse!uences suits your purpose.
Doreo$er% a greater number o good t#ings is more desirable t#an a
smaller% eit#er absolutely or "#en t#e one is included in t#e ot#er%
$i0. t#e smaller number in t#e greater. An ob(ection may be raised
suppose in some particular case t#e one is $alued or t#e sake o
t#e ot#er- or t#en t#e t"o toget#er are not more desirable t#an t#e
one- e.g. reco$ery o #ealt# and #ealt#% t#an #ealt# alone% inasmuc#
as "e desire reco$ery o #ealt# or t#e sake o #ealt#. Also it is
!uite possible or "#at is not good% toget#er "it# "#at is% to be
more desirable t#an a greater number o good t#ings% e.g. t#e combination
o #appiness and somet#ing else "#ic# is not good may be more desirable
t#an t#e combination o (ustice and courage. Also% t#e same t#ings
are more $aluable i accompanied t#an i unaccompanied by pleasure%
and like"ise "#en ree rom pain t#an "#en attended "it# pain.
Also% e$eryt#ing is more desirable at t#e season "#en it is o greater
conse!uence- e.g. reedom rom pain in old age more t#an in yout#'
or it is o greater conse!uence in old age. On t#e same principle
also% prudence is more desirable in old age- or no man c#ooses t#e
young to guide #im% because #e does not e/pect t#em to be prudent.
Wit# courage% t#e con$erse is t#e case% or it is in yout# t#at t#e
acti$e e/ercise o courage is more imperati$ely re!uired. ;ike"ise
also "it# temperance- or t#e young are more troubled by t#eir passions
t#an are t#eir elders.
Also% t#at is more desirable "#ic# is more useul at e$ery season
or at most seasons% e.g. (ustice and temperance rat#er t#an courage'
or t#ey are al"ays useul% "#ile courage is only useul at times.
Also% t#at one o t"o t#ings "#ic# i all possess% "e do not need
t#e ot#er t#ing% is more desirable t#an t#at "#ic# all may possess
and still "e "ant t#e ot#er one as "ell. Take t#e case o (ustice
and courage- i e$erybody "ere (us