TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS PAGE NO

CERTIFICATE i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 01
LIST OF FIGURES 02
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 03
ABSTRACT 04
INTRODUCTION 05
RATIONALE BEHIND UNMANNED SHIPS 06
SHIP TO SHORE COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS 10
SHIP ARCHITECTURE SPECIFICATION 15
PROCESS MAP FOR AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION 19
GENERAL TECHNICAL SYSTEM REDESIGN 24
CHALLENGES OF UNMANNED SHIPPING 30
CONCLUSION 32
REFERENCES 33





LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE NO
FIGURE 1.1 07
FIGURE 2.1 08
FIGURE 3.1 10
FIGURE 3.2 11
FIGURE 4.1 15
FIGURE 4.2 16
FIGURE 4.3 17
FIGURE 4.4 18


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3G, 4G Third and Fourth generation mobile telephony systems
AIS Automatic Identification Systems
ASC Autonomous Ship Controller
COLREG International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
DSC Digital Selective Calling (for VHF radio)
EPIRB Emergency PositionIndicating Radio Beacon
GLONASS Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
IMO International Maritime Organization
INS Integrated Navigation System
ISC Integrated Ship Control
ISM Instrumentation, Scientific and Medical frequency bands (unlicensed)
ITS Intelligent Transport System
ITU International Telecommunication Union
kbps Kilobits per second
Mbps Megabits per second
NAVTEX Navigational Telex
OOW Officer of Watch
RCU Rendezvous Control Unit
SART Search and Rescue Transponder
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/IP
UDP Unreliable Datagram Protocol (IP)
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
VHF Very high frequency
VPN Virtual Private Network (Protocol)
VHF Very High Frequency



ABSTRACT


The shift from manned to unmanned and autonomous navigation raises fundamental questions on
how operational processes should be structured in order to ensure the safety of future shipping.
This paper provides an overview of the initial position and rationale regarding the development
of an unmanned ship. It goes through some critical issues related to communication in
autonomous ship systems. This includes ship to shore, internal ship and internal shore issues. The
report develops general requirements to communication for unmanned ships and analyses current
technology to see how it can be used to satisfy these requirements. This report also gives an
overview of the MiTS (Maritime Intelligent Transport System) architecture which is an on
going initiative to link the enavigation and emaritime initiatives in such a way that the shipping
community gets workable and efficient communication standards to work with. In addition,
present manned ship operation is analysed, taking into account technology, information
requirements, legal framework, processes and responsibilities, and finally necessary measures
and the scope of redesign are derived based on an analysis of technical failures in the machinery
systems.

This evaluation shows that there many technical, organizational and legal issues so vision of
unmanned ships cannot be realized in short term. However efforts are on to update the current
fleet and allow a gradual change from manned to unmanned fleets.




1. INTRODUCTION



Europe played an important part in maritime trading already shortly after its historical roots five
millennia ago. Despite several radical changes over the last century, like e.g. the transition from
sail to steam ships, then again to diesel engines, the introduction of containerized cargo and
changing trade centres all around the globe, Europe still manages to maintain a leading global
position in numerous maritime domains. To maintain and strengthen this position, the European
Waterborne Technology Platform (Waterborne TP), which is a cluster of leading maritime-
related European stakeholders, has created a vision for the waterborne industry in 2020 that is
based on three pillars :
Safe, sustainable and efficient waterborne transport,
a competitive European waterborne industry and
growth in transport volumes and changes in trade patterns.
On the basis of this vision, Waterborne TP has identified twelve prioritized exploitation
outcomes that shall help Europe developing its maritime sector within these pillars. One outcome
that is important for all three pillars is the Autonomous Ship or Drone Ship, which is defined
as a vessel with: next generation modular control systems and communications technology that
will enable wireless monitoring and control functions both on and off board . These will include
advanced decision support systems to provide a capability to operate ships remotely under semi
or fully autonomous control. Existing ships are equipped with anticollision, electronic
positioning and satellite communication systems. New sensor systems, such as those based on
infrared technology, are also becoming increasingly common. Much of the technology needed
for autonomy is therefore already available.

These next generation crewless ships would have multiple redundancy built into all systems
to protect from any single or multiple system failure. And to deal with piracy the ships would be
fitted with a range of countermeasures that could easily disable anyone unauthorized who
attempts to board.



2. RATIONALE BEHIND UNMANNED SHIPS
The most likely case for unmanned vessels will be the dry bulker. This kind of ship is typically
rather slow, operates on long distances with only one loading and one discharging port and
transports cargo that does not require much in terms of human supervision or intervention during
the voyage. In this case, implementing an unmanned vessel offers not only the possibility to
increase the efficiency of ship operation but to enhance the sustainability of maritime transport as
a whole. This should make the idea attractive for shippers and ship-owners as well as for seamen.
In general, sustainable development consists of three dimensions

al sustainability: environmental friendliness and

2.1 Economic sustainability
The most obvious potential of unmanned vessels for maritime trade will be in terms of costs.
Labour costs onboard are one of the main operational cost categories. In 2011, these costs are on
average between 31 and 36% of the total ship operation costs for bulkers according to the
Drewry Report on Ship Operating Costs. ( see also Figure 1.1)
If this is compared to the average trip rates for the last five years, manning expenses still
account up to 10% of the charter. Looking on the expected future trip rates, it must be noted that
the share of manning costs in relation to the achievable charter is expected to increase further,
especially for large bulkers. Thus, unmanned or at least partly unmanned shipping offers a
potential to reduce a significant part of the operational costs.





Figure 1.1: Costs Of Dry Bulkers
2.2 Ecological sustainability
Besides efforts to increase efficiency, the shipping business also has to acknowledge an
increasing awareness in the public of the environmental sustainability of maritime transport.
While international shipping represents a relatively small part of current greenhouse gas
emissions of about 3%, the industry has acknowledged that it also needs to contribute to future
reductions [10]. One of the most obvious areas where fuel can be saved and emissions reduced is
by slow steaming. Looking at an exemplary route from Porto de Tubarao to Hamburg, a transit
speed reduction from 16 to 11 knots should reduce fuel consumption by about 54% and thus
avoid about 1.000 tons of carbon dioxide emissions(Figure 2.1). Of course, the idea to save fuel
through slower transit speeds is not only motivated by environmental friendliness, but also by an
economic rationale as slow steaming results in a trade-off between bunker and charter costs. A
general costs calculation of the same exemplary route is shown in table 2. Although bunker cost
reductions of 46% represents a huge savings in money, this is offset by a correspondingly higher
charter cost and the net benefit with the average charter rates are only on the order of USD 7000
over the voyage.
However, an additional savings of USD 50 000 could conceivably have been made if the




Figure 2.1: Exemplary Costs Calculation To Show Slow Steaming Benefits
ship had been unmanned. Even with a relatively much more substantial savings on a forecasted
lower charter rate, the manning cost could contribute an additional 50% to the USD 100 000
saved on normal operations in this case.
Economically, the benefits of slow steaming for this type of bulker are not very high given
historical charter rates. However, if crew costs could be eliminated, one would get significant
savings also for this trade. For lower charter rates, the crew savings will be less, but is still on the
order of one third of the overall voyage savings for slow steaming.
Thereby, an unmanned vessel could diminish this effect as it focuses on the reduction of the
demand side of the maritime labour market.
3.3 Social sustainability
Of course, in economic theory, a shortage of labour would lead to higher wages making it more
attractive for workers and thus possibly solving the deadlock situation. It might be argued that
instead of investigating automation technology, education and the labour market should be
encouraged to avoid the described scenario. However, especially in Europe the labour market for
seagoing personnel faces an inherent problem: It is unattractive for youngsters and suffers from
an obvious lack of family and social life friendliness. In several studies, experts and institutions
have highlighted that the isolation from family and friends as well as the decreasing ratio
between sailing and berthing times make this profession uninteresting .
While most of the deep-sea transit represents routine and undemanding tasks, economic
pressure in the business has already decreased crew sizes to a minimum. When emergencies
arise, human errors resulting from fatigue are one of the main causes for ship incidents
worldwide. In contrast, an autonomous and unmanned vessel would free officers from routine


tasks and let them focus on more cognitively demanding and challenging tasks in a shore side
operations centre. This could ensure a more interesting working environment for the maritime
professionals while also having the potential to increase the safety of shipping. Due to the fact
that such a centre would be located ashore, the navigating and engineering professions would get
the same characteristics regarding family friendliness and social contact as a normal continuously
manned workplace






















3. SHIP TO SHORE COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
The general conclusion from studies undertaken is that the communication services that are
available today are sufficient to implement an unmanned ship. However, there are some special
issues that need to be taken into consideration during design of autonomous control system and
communication services and they are summarized in the following sections:
3.1 Communication Channel Requirements
Table 1 lists the general communication channel requirements identified there together with the
three main communication modes and what parts of the communication streams they utilize. The
columns are capacity in kbps, maximum latency in seconds, security rating and reliability (1 is
highest quality for both)

Figure 3.1 Summary Of General Communication Requirements
The unmanned ship needs satellite communication for all data streams except the rendezvous
type communication. The latter needs to be operational in a range up to 2 km from the ship and
will be used to control the ship directly through boarding and disembarkation processes. The
accumulated bandwidth requirement of up to 4 Mbps will not be required at all times. The high
capacity services are mainly used to handle unexpected situations where intervention often can
be delayed until bandwidth becomes available. However, certain situations such as analysis of
objects detected in the sea may need to be prioritized and may also require high definition (HD)
video. If this can be handled with still pictures or lower definition video, bandwidth requirements
are lower than indicated in the table.


A high capacity line of sight service (LOS) may also be used for other data streams when the
ship is within range of shore mobile telecommunication services.
Within each of these categories, different data streams have different importance. Table 4 lists
some of these streams and indicates their importance. The classification shown here is tentative
and may be changed over the projects life time. Classification is also relative so low does not
mean one can generally do without that particular data channel. The intention is mainly to show
what types of traffic need to be supported and that each type has different properties with respect
to what services it requires.
The bandwidth column indicates required bandwidths for the different streams and the
latency column specifies the maximum acceptable latency. The actual delay perceived by the
user will typically be twice this value as most interactions require controls sent to ship and
thereafter some response.

Figure 3.2 : Importance Of Data Streams
The streams listed are:
Rendezvous: This is a communication channel used to control the ship by a boarding team to
facilitate entry to the ship. This may be after loss of communication or during normal boarding
and disembarkation procedures. This needs to have high reliability and security, i.e. protection
against false control signals and listening in to the exchange of data as well as good protection
against link or message loss. Only simple telemetry such as position, speed, heading and
similarly simple controls are transmitted so a 2 kbps channel should be sufficient (see also next
paragraph).
Remote control: This includes communication between ship and shore for high level
monitoring and control of the ship. Security has to be high, but reliability requirements are lower
than for the previous as the ship has the possibility to go to autonomous modes if communication
is lost. Bandwidth requirements are more or less the same as for rendezvous. ITU estimates that
an unmanned aircraft will be able to operate with a maximum requirement of about 15 kbps in


flying mode for remote control functions .A ship should be able to operate at substantially lower
bandwidth due to much slower changes in operational status, so around 2 kbps should be
sufficient.
Telemetry: This is status updates from the ship beyond high level monitoring, but excluding
visual data streams such as radar and video images. Here, both security and reliability is a
medium strong requirement. Security is lower than previous as it is assumed that hostile
intervention in transmission will be less critical here than for remote control. 32 kbps is sufficient
for about 5000 data values updated each 2.5 seconds. This satisfies most requirements except
very high sample rate signals from engines or other fast moving equipment. Telemetry is not
normally mission-critical, but is important in cases where problems have developed and
diagnostic procedures are required.
Radar and radar targets: These data are similar to telemetry, but the transmission requires
higher bandwidth. The calculation here is that the operator may need one image of 1024*1240
pixels transferred each 30 second with an effective compression down to 2 bits per pixel. This
data stream may also include some still pictures from video systems. Reliability is set to medium.
HD Video: This stream contains high definition live video from the ship. This can include
external as well as internal views. It is assumed that basic control of the ship normally can be
done without video, so the criticality is set to low. ITU-T Recommendation G.1010 /5/ lists about
400 kbps as needed for video conferencing and similar applications. A typical bandwidth
requirement for high definition video (films etc.) is between 2 and 4 mbps according to various
Internet resources. Thus, 3 mbps is selected to allow a mix of at least one high quality channel
and one or more lower quality channels. This will also allow transfer of high bandwidth
telemetry data that can be used, e.g. in detailed engine diagnostics.
The quantitative bandwidth requirements are not based on very accurate analysis at this
stage, but have been set from previous experience and estimates. It is believed that they are
representative, but they may be updated in later publications from the projects undertaken.
3.2 Evaluation Of Various Communication Means
The analysis of means of communication available today in a manned ship and their further
requirements is given below:
3.2.3 High capacity satellite data links
The high capacity communication link for use at high seas should be able to provide around 4
Mbps bandwidth. This can be supplied by modern VSAT services in the Ka and Ku bands. The


availability of bandwidth may be lower in certain deep sea areas as there are very few customers
there and services will probably be provided by wide beam transponders only. This is based on
commercial considerations and satellite communication providers will be sure to satisfy users'
demands, but at a cost. The new Inmarsat Global Express or any of a number of competing
service providers should be able to deliver the required bandwidth if somebody is able to pay for
it.3.2.4 High capacity Line of Sight (LOS) data link
4G or advanced 3G mobile telephony services will be good alternatives to satellite
communication in shore areas, with high security and reliability for ship to shore communication.
However, these will only be secondary to satellite as the latter still is necessary outside shore
radio range.
WiMAX is technically also a very good candidate. However, problems with licensing and
frequencies make this technology less relevant.
3.2.4 Transmission protocols
For high latency and relatively low bandwidth links where there are possibilities for packet loss,
it may be necessary to use a more efficient protocol than TCP/IP for transmitting time critical
information . A simpler UDP based protocol with periodic handshakes as well as negative
acknowledgements only will be investigated.
3.3 Security issues
Communication security is a main factor for unmanned ship. Pirates could conceivably use
security holes in command data links to hijack ships and intentional jamming could lead to
serious accidents. To address this, the following measures must be taken:
- The rendezvous and command data link must be secure against hostile attacks as they are
intended to be used close to the ship and will be attractive for hijacking attempts. All critical data
must be encrypted and authenticated before use.
- Other data links must also be protected from attacks, but these links are somewhat less critical
to the operations and may use less strict security arrangements. - The ship must have fail to safe
procedures to handle loss of communication due to hostile attacks.
- The ship also needs to have fail-to-safe procedures for loss of GNSS data feeds.

Scenarios will be developed to address GNSS and rendezvous communication loss.


3.5 Radio propagation and coverage issues
This section discusses radio propagation issues in general, but with a strong emphasis on satellite
communication. The reason for this is that satellites normally have a more restricted link budget
than terrestrial communication systems as power must be generated from limited area solar
panels and also because transmission distances are much longer.
3.5.1 Signal degradation sources
There are different external influences on communication systems that can lead to reduced
bandwidth, higher latency, lower reliability and security and they can occur within different parts
of communication system architecture.
Degradation factors for radio transmissions can loosely be collected in three groups. The
main group is loss due to distance and frequency which is independent of the medium the radio
signal passes through:
Free space dispersion loss is caused by the spatial propagation of the radio signal and will be
proportional to the square of the distance.
Antenna aperture loss, which is generally proportional to the square of the frequency.
Transmitter electronics loss, which can be expected to be about linear with frequency. This is
mainly an issue for the satellite with a limited power budget.
Other examples of environmental degradation factors for radio communication are listed
below. These factors are normally relatively small, but can have significance in some cases.
Ionospheric losses: Mostly for lower frequency signals and vary considerably with time of day
and sunspot activity.
Beam dissipation: Loss due to the spreading of signals passing through the atmosphere.
Polarization loss: Losses due to phase rotation of the signal passing through atmosphere.
Rayleigh fading: Interference between main signals and the same signal arriving through other
paths through the atmosphere.
3.5.2 Frequency allocation
One potential challenge for safety critical systems is the frequency allocation plan. If maritime
mobile services need to share frequency spectrum with other types of mobile services, this can
lead to crowded spectrum and possibilities for interference.



4. SHIP ARCHITECTURE SPECIFICATION
This section contains the description of an information architecture framework for the
autonomous ship,based on Maritime Intelligence Transport System(MiTS).
The purpose of the general architecture is to define a standard framework for development of
autonomous and remotely controlled ships and other systems. The The MiTS (Maritime
Intelligent Transport System) architecture is a proposed system of information technology
components that shall ensure efficient and safe interoperability between ship and shore services
/1/ . The focus is on merchant shipping and related activities, such as marine offshore operations.

4.1 Domain Model And Semantics

The domain of the MiTS Architecture as defined in /1/ is illustrate d in Figure 7. This shows the
onboard operations as the focus of attention and th e main groups of stakeholders
surrounding it.

Figure 4.1:General MiTS Domain Model
4.2 The system context and modularisation
The main components internally to the autonomous ship system are:
ASS: Advanced sensor systems, comprising radar, video and other systems for lookout,
object detections and in general sensing the ship's environment.
BAS: Bridge Automation System, comprising all bridge systems and equipment related to
navigation of the ship. These are likely to be modified somewhat to be used on an unmanned
ship, but should in basic functionality correspond to what is found on ships today. However, one
should assume that it is implemented as an Integrated Bridge System (IBS) with a high degree
of interconnectivity and integration between components.
EAS: Engine Automation System comprising all power generation and propulsion requirements.

ASC: The Autonomous Ship Controller, which is the additional control and monitoring
functions implemented on the ship to allow autonomous operation. This also include an


"Autonomous Engine Monitoring and Control" (AEMC) function as well as the "Autonomous
Navigation System" (ANS) modules. The ASC will also include communication management
functions for all communication between ship and SCC.
SCC: The Shore Control Centre, containing all on shore functions to handle the unmanned ship.
This also includes remote bridge and engine control modules that may be used to directly
control the ship in certain case s. Additionally, the initially voyage planning for the vessel
will be pe formed h ere and any voice communication to the ship will be relayed to the
operator.
Context
The ship will operate in a context as illustrated in Figure 1. This diagra m shows the main objects
that influences or are responsible for ship control as well as their relationships.

Figure 4.2: Operational Context Relationship Diagram

This shows the autonomous ship as linked to certain environment al constraints and some
internal ship restrictions while it executes its voyage phases. The execution of each phase will
require most of the functions the ship can perform, but obviously with different
constraints and purpose .The voyage ship as well as ship internal and external constraints will
determine the overall situation the ship is in.The ASC together with other ship function controls
implements the autonomy of autonomous ship. It controls the different ship functions to
perform the voyage. The performance of these functions together with the ships situation is used
to generate status indicators for the different function groups. The ASC have different modes,
partly dependent on the status of the function and partly by commands from SSC.


4.3 The Autonomous Voyage

Figure 4.3 The Autonomous Voyage
The voyage will be performed in several distinct phases:
Berth: The ship is berthed and normal loading and unloading o perations can take place.
Parts of or the whole Onboard Control Team (OCT) is onboard to assist. This may be a
different OCT than that used during voyage.
Pilotage: The first and last part of the voyage will be done with a pilot and a minimal
OCT on board. The ship will be under full manual co ntrol, but will not need full manning due to
highly automated systems.
Approach: Between ports and points where the ship can sail at full speed in open sea,
normally the points "Full Away On Passage" (FAOP) and "End Of Sea Passage" (EOSP),
an OCT will have manual control of ship.
Rendezvous: A special phase exists when OCT or Emergency C ontrol Team (ECT) is
boarding or leaving the ship.
Unmanned: In open and unhindered sea passages the ship can sail in fully
unmanned mode. In this phase, different operational modes exist .
Emergency: If anything happens with the ship during unmanned passage, it will be
necessary to put an Emergency Control team (ECT) on board. This is not detailed in the MUNIN
scenarios, but is included here for completeness. The ECT may have different composition,
depending on the type of incident. The ECT may also consist of personnel from passing ships in
some cases.



4.4 Ship Modes
The figure shows three main modes where two are sub-divided into sub-modes each. The
main are autonomous control (green, top), remote control(blue, bottom) and fail to safe.

Figure 4.4: Main Ship Modes
The full set of five modes is defined as follows:
1. Autonomous execution: The ship follows a predefined "program" supplied by the SCC.It
does not need intervention from SCC, except for periodic updates of plans etc.
2. Autonomous control: The ship deviates from predefined plans within envelope allowed for
by SCC. Does not need intervention from SCC, except for periodic updates of plans etc.
3.Direct remote control: The SCC has taken over all direct control of ship systems.
ASC is not participating or interfering in control operations.
4. Fail to safe: Ship has lost contact with SCC and has identified a condition, where an update
from the SCC is needed. It then selects one of several fail to safe plans, previously provided
by SCC. Ship is waiting for the SCC or emergency control team to reestablish contact
with the ship. Fail to safe may also be invoked if the SCC is slow in responding to a critical
situation. For details in the scenario and functional descriptions, the ship modes need
to be examined in conjunction with the SCC modes.
5. Indirect remote control: Ship is under control from SSC with SSC giving update plans to
ASC. The ASC is transferring these to new set-points and controls the ship.







5. PROCESS MAP FOR AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION
This section represents the first integral layout for bridge processes from restructuring the task
of ship navigation for unmanned and autonomous deep sea voyages.
5.1 As-Is-Analysis Of Present Manned Ship Operation
5.1 Stateoftheart technology analysis
Since the introduction of satellite navigation for civil use, GNSS has changed the face of
navigation. Reliable position data is ever since available on every spot of the planets surface.
GPS receivers which are in use on present day merchant ships work with an accuracy of 10 to
20 meters on the open sea and DGPS with the correction of land-based reference stations
with an accuracy of 3 to 10 meters. The use of GNSS devices is the most preferred method
of producing valid position data. Both GPS and GLONASS offer worldwide coverage at a
sufficient position data quality. To be prepared for a malfunction of these GNSS devices,
other means to determine the ships position have to be available. Another means of
positioning commonly used on manned ships is celestial navigation.
5.1.1Heading measurement
Every ship is equipped with a gyro compass and a magnetic compass to indicate the ships
heading. The gyro compass is used as the principle compass on board, mainly for its high
accuracy and low likeliness of breakdown. The magnetic compass may appear to be a relic
from another age. Yet actually, it is still in use because of its robustness and its complete
independence from electric power supply. Both of these compass types have the disadvantage
of relatively low course accuracy during heavy sea or intense maneuvering so that the
displayed heading cant be precisely relied upon for navigation Depth measurement
The echo sounding devices which are in use in commercial shipping measure the vertical
depth below the ships keel by means of acoustic sound waves. The current and past depth
contour is displayed with a possible error in accuracy of approximately 2.5 % of the
measured depth which ranges up to 1500 meters. A threshold can be set so that a depth alarm
will sound in case the preselected depth contour is underrun.
5.1.2 Speed and distance measurement


The ships voyage speed can be determined by four different measurement devices. A
hydromechanic speed log measures the aheadspeed through water by the pressure at an
impact tube with the major disadvantage that this tube gets easily clogged. A less errorprone
method for speed measurement through water is by an electromagnetic log, where voltage is
being induced between a probe and a pair of electrodes to determine the speed through water.
5.1.3 Track pilot
On todays ships the steering control can easily be automated to a great extent. Modern track
control autopilots are able to precisely follow the course over ground laid out by the voyage
plan with deviations of only about half of the ships breadth. Furthermore, through self
tuning adoption many steering parameters are determined by the system itself. The ships
loading characteristics and the indirect steering compensated. Through the rudder actuating
values the permissible rate of turn and the radius of turn can be set,
5.1.4 AIS
The use of AIS transceivers has had a major impact on the safety of shipping .Information
about as many as 500 targets within a range of up to 30 nm has become easily available. The
device transmits and receives data about a ships name, type, size, status, position, heading,
speed, cargo and next port of call. The data is either fixed input, needs to be entered manually
or originates directly from the ship sensors. Due to the fact that the displayed data accuracy
and reliability can be assessed, AIS is accredited as an aid to navigation only.
5.1.5 Radar/ARPA
The most proven method to detect and monitor objects is by the use of radar which works
through the emission and reception of electromagnetic impulses. Merchant ships are always
equipped with one short pulse Xband antenna for high resolution and one long pulse Sband
antenna for high range. Both of them operate with an error in accuracy of no more than 1.0 %
of their current working range or 30 meters at the most.
5.1.6 ECDIS/INS
The vast majority of merchant ships which travel the oceans nowadays are obliged to be
fitted with an ECDIS. The performance capabilities vary to some degree, depending on the
manufacturer and the age of the application. But all of them must generally be able to fully
replace paper charts on a ships bridge as a twounitinstallation. The navigation information


system displays digital navigable sea charts and offers the possibility for integration of
nautical publications. Furthermore, sensor data from AIS, echo sounder, GNSS, NAVTEX,
radar/ARPA can also be interfaced with the system and displayed on the screen.
5.1.7 VDR
A Voyage Data Recorder gathers and stores all available information about the own
ships status, position and movement as well as all sounds from within the wheelhouse and
from voice radio. The recorded data of at least the past twelve hours is kept within a
retrievable unit to be used for future analysis in case of an incident and must therefore be
secured against any attempts of tampering. The VDR must be equipped with an emergency
power supply to be able to operate even in case of blackout for at least 2 hours.
5.1.8 Telecommunication
All means of maritime telecommunication are part of the Global Maritime Distress and
Safety System which is based on both radio and satellite communication devices. DSC
radiotelephony operates on VHF, MF and HF and is used for the transmission and reception
of voice radio, distress alert and distress relay messages. Also, mobile VHF devices are in use
for voice radio communication, while radiotelex transceivers for written communication and
NAVTEX receivers for navigational and meteorological warnings operate on MF and HF.
for distress alerting while EPIRB and SART are installed on board for that sole purpose only.
5.2 Processes And Responsibilities
5.2.1 Activities related to voyage planning
Before commencing an oversea passage, a thorough voyage plan needs to be prepared. On
conventional ships, this activity is carried out completely on board. Only in some specific
cases data might be required from shoreside information providers. For voyage planning,
various routing information has to be gathered and applied from nautical publications and the
ships stability has to be calculated. Also, the required provisions for the upcoming voyage
have to be accounted for. From this information, the voyage plan is prepared by the
navigational officer and verified by the ships master.
5.2.2 Activities related to lookout


During the conduct of an overseas passage the keeping of a thorough lookout is the main
source of information to the navigator. These activities must be performed continuously using
visual, acoustic and technical means. This comprises e.g. monitoring of the ships
environmental and traffic situation, keeping a radio watch and determining of the ships
position using methods of terrestrial, celestial and technical navigation. Furthermore, all
available bridge devices must be operated correctly to gather information relevant for safe
navigation such as heading, speed and underkeel clearance.
5.2.3 Activities related to bridge watch
The information which have been gathered in the preceding chapter about lookout activities
are required to carry out bridge watch activities. It is the obligation of the OOW to check the
bridge equipment for proper functioning and to follow the approved voyage plan and the
order books. All available information has to be utilized to ensure the safety of navigation.
The ships movements and maneuvers have to be operated and controlled. while all COLREG
regulations have to be complied with in all respects. Also, safety and alarm systems have to
be monitored and appropriate responses to contingency and emergency situations have to be
taken.
5.2.4 Activities related to maneuvering
To be aware of the ships capabilities and limitations when it comes to maneuverability,
various factors have to be accounted for. Besides the ships specific fixed and variable
properties, changing external forces and effects have to be identified and compensated, if
applicable. On conventional ships this is done mostly by using data from sea trials, by
calculating buoyancy and stability and by observing the sea state.
5.2.5 Activities related to communication
Information exchange on a ship can roughly be divided into two groups. On the one hand
communication can occur internally between different compartments of the same ship and
will either be done by automatic data exchange between interlinked technical devices or by
voice telephony or voice radio. External communication between the ship and another sea
based or landbased station on the other hand takes always place either by means of radio or
satellite communication. The only exemptions are visual and acoustic distress signals, of
course.


5.2.6 Activities related to administration
From the perspective of many mariners administrative work does consume a lot of their
working time on board. Correcting of sea charts and other nautical publications, filling out of
checklists and log books, updating of ship and crew certification and keeping up with
information demands from shoreside stakeholders are just some of the examples.
5.2.7Activities related to emergencies
Any case of emergency poses a potential significant threat to safety and requires high
attention from all available onboard resources. Especially on the open seas, ship crews
depend very much on their own capabilities for problemsolving as external assistance is
often several days time away. Upon detection of a situation which might endanger ship
safety, the crew has to assess the situation and react to it accordingly, usually accompanied
by an alarm of some kind.















6. GENERAL TECHNICAL SYSTEM REDESIGN
In this section, the system boundaries of monitoring and control and the scope of the
unmanned machinery plant were defined for a bulk carrier. Based on this, the main
components used in the involved systems are described and the analysis of technical failures
is done.
6.1 Technical failures in the system groups
The flagindependent results demonstrated that the main system groups main engine, fuel
oil system, cooling water system, electrical system and rudder plant were the most
frequently affected groups.
Technical failures in the system groups are:
Main engine 37.3%
Fuel oil system 15.5%
Cooling water system 13.6%
Propulsion plant, shafting 5.5%
Diesel generator 3.6%
6.2 Possibilities Of Operation With Faulty systems,Interactions In Terms Of
Maintenance
The unmanned machinery operation should take place during the open sea voyage. This
operation is the basis of the evaluation of the failures named in chapter 6.1. It also is the focus
of the now following possibility of ship engine operation with faulty main engine groups.
6.2.1 Main engine failures
In cases of main engine power losses, there is enough ship service power supplied by the
GenSets.The GenSets are able to deliver roughly enough power to the emergency propulsion
and steering unit pump jet.
6.2.2 Start, reverse and control devices
The starting air system is rarely used during open sea operation. Therefore, possible failures
cannot be determined. Neither are they highly critical. However, these devices are necessary
if sudden maneuvers (e.g. in dangerous situations) must be executed. In these cases, possible
failures must be analysed, because they would be highly critical. Through integration into the


electronically control individual cylinders or parts of the system, these devices can be
decommissioned, or redundancies can be used.
6.2.3 Faulty inlet/outlet valves
Since an electronically controlled motor is used as a basis, it is possible to exclude the
affected cylinders from the operation. It is then possible to operate the engine with reduced
power.
6.2.4 Sticking injection pumps
Since an electronically controlled motor is used as a basis, it is possible to exclude the
affected cylinders from the operation. It is then possible to operate the engine with reduced
power. If a high pressure fuel common rail is used, it is not necessary to install an injection
pump for every single cylinder. The injection pressure is created by high pressure pump units
with their own redundancies.
6.2.5 Cracked or leaking cylinder covers
It is very risky to operate engines with cracked or leaking cylinder covers, because there is no
way to eliminate these failures during engine operation. An immediate exchange of these
cylinder covers is necessary. The engine has to be stopped. It is necessary to develop
diagnosis systems, which can detect such crack formations
6.2.6 Cracked cylinder liners
It is also very risky to operate engines with cracked cylinder liners, because there is no way to
eliminate this failure during engine operation. An immediate exchange of the cylinder liner is
necessary. The engine has to be stopped. It is also necessary to develop diagnostic systems,
which can detect cylinder liner crack formations.
6.2.7 Broken or leaking injection pipes
Since an electronically controlled motor is used as a basis, it is possible to exclude the
affected cylinders from the operation. It is then possible to operate the engine with reduced
power.
6.2.8 Total failures of Exhaust Gas Turbochargers (EGT)


In case of a total failure of an EGT, it is necessary to fix the rotating parts (e.g. brake
redesign).A system to automatically fix the rotor of the affected turbocharger must be
developed for that. It is possible to operate the ship with matched load (reduced) by using the
engines auxiliary blowers. All functions of the turbocharger must be electronically
controlled, including a daily cleaning of compressor and turbine side.
6.2.9 Incompatibility of mixing fuel oils
It is extremely unlikely that mixing fuel oils are incompatible because the unmanned ships
engine is only operated with distillate fuels
6.2.10 Failures in supply systems
6.2.10.1 Cooling water pumps
When the pump malfunctions, it is possible to continue operation automatically with standby
pumps. The defective pump can be replaced in port. Piping, controller and sensors of the high
temperature, low temperature and seawater systems.It is necessary to have double
implementation of sensors and monitoring, which detect cable breaks. In case contamination
is detected, it is possible to operate with a correspondingly reduced load.
6.2.10.2 Electrical system
Black out, caused by over or underload switch off, over or underfrequency
The immediate transfer to an emergency supply of key consumer and the ecommissioning,
activation of GenSets and the normal load distribution must be automatically done.
6.2.10.3 Problems on electronics, e.g. failure of the main switch board
The major systems of the main switchboard must be redundant and switched automatically.
Sufficient redundancies, like the redundancy at the electronic controls of the engines, must
reduce the total failures to zero.
6.2.11 Rudder plants
If the main steering gear fails, the redundant steering gear is usually of limited use only.
Therefore, there should be the possibility to supply energy (2 large GenSets) to the pump jet
and thus obtain maneuverability. In the individual assessment of errors in supply systems, it
has to be considered that this has an impact on main and auxiliary engine operation. Because


there is no crew on board during the open sea voyage, the input of human operator errors is
only possible by the SCC.The usual repair and maintenance works done by the crew (e.g.
pump overhaul) are no longer feasible.
6.3 Minimum scope of necessary systems for reduced emergency operation
6.3.1Minimum shaft power
To ensure a minimum shaft power, which may be different depending on the operating
conditions of the vessel, e.g. decreasing the main engine output, 4000 kW can be fed through
the electrical shaft motor as additional power to the shaft or they can be used over the pump
jet for propulsion purposes.
6.3.2 Minimum electrical power
In normal sea operation, an electric power of 600 kW should be sufficient. For the maneuver
operation an additional 1000 kW must be available (e.g. bow thruster, anchor). To provide
minimal electric power during open sea operation with the main engine, the electrical output
of the steam generator and the three redundant GenSets are available. In maneuver operation,
the supply with electrical energy could be carried out by one of the two large auxiliary diesel
engines.
6.3.2 Minimum function of steering
Steering the ship must always be guaranteed. In cases of failures of the rudder gear, this can
be done via steering by the emergency rudder gear. But it is not sure that the emergency
operation can be carried out for all kinds of failures of the steering gear. Therefore, it is
proposed that an additional pump jet in the forward part of the ship can be put into operation
and thus ensures steering and maneuvering.
6.3.3 Emergency function of main fire system
Flooding the holds and the engine room with inert gas must be possible, i.e. the current
amount of carried along gas must be significantly increased and distributed on board in a
different manner. The initiation must be automatic or it can be controlled by the SCC. In
addition to the installed fire alarms, hotspots can also be detected by infrared cameras; smoke
or leaking fluids by regular cameras.
6.3.4 Emergency functions of bilge and ballast system


The emergency bilge suction or bilge injection valve is used to prevent the flooding of the
ship. It is a direct suction from the machinery space bilge, which is connected to the largest
capacity pump or pumps. It must be a completely independent unit capable of operation even
if submerged. The power supply for the pump is arranged via the emergency generator. The
various pumps and lines are interconnected to some extent so that each pump can act as an
alternative or standby of the other pump.
6.4 Derived measures, additional redundancies, additional condition monitoring systems
1 If necessary, all operating functions that are possible in the engine control room (ECR)
must be carried out from shoreside control center.
2 Pump jet as a solution for defective main propulsion or steering system to obtain a
minimum of maneuverability .
3 Full access to the electronic control systems of the main engine for the shoreside
operation center (incl. monitoring, modifying of parameters, orders).
4 Double implementation of sensors and monitoring of cable breaks.
5 High redundancy in electrical power generation, that means that one GenSet is able to
deliver the required electrical power.
6 Additional standby pumps in the supply systems of the main engine and the auxiliary
engines are not necessary because operation with only one pump is possible, optionally
with reduced load.
7 Additional automatic filters for fuel oil and lubrication oil of the main engine.
8 Installation of an electrically driven shaft motor (or electric motor to an engine
installed power take in gear) for more shaft power, if necessary, by taking electrical
power from the GenSets.
9 Automatically, autonomously functioning module for waste heat recovery (exhaust gas
boiler, steam turbine with generator, feeding into main switchboard).
10 Changeover of all necessary heating and preheating to electrical .
11 Design an automatic, redundant system for switching the tanks .
12 Possibility of shorebased control of the Exhaust Gas Turbocharger (EGT) during
operation (lubrication, cooling, fixing of rotor).
13 Shorebased control of the normally installed emergency steering plant, diagnostic
system for the steering plant is necessary.
14Additional noise, vibration monitoring in the machinery spaces.


15 Monitoring of the machinery spaces and bilges via infrared cameras and corresponding
lighting for normal cameras.
16 More fire alarm and bilge monitoring.
17 Filling the main engine crankcase with inert gas so that explosions are avoided and the
risk of fire is reduced.













7. CHALLENGES OF UNMANNED SHIPPING
It is doubtful if the unmanned merchant ships will be a reality in the short term. This doubt is
not primarily caused by technical obstacles, although there certainly are some technical
problems to be solved related to sensor and decision technology and, in particular, the
increased technical system robustness that is required in unmanned ships.
The main problem is arguably the integration of the autonomous ship into the existing


maritime transport systems as well as the lack of legal and contractual frameworks suitable
for this type of ships. These issues are organizational rather than technical. The following
subsections will give a brief overview of some important technical and organizational
challenges.
7.1 Communication, sensor and control technology
Ships are already equipped with a number of systems to support remote or even autonomous
operations. One can argue that the technology needed to supporting autonomy is not the
biggest challenge.
However, the following main areas where more research is needed have been identified:
1.Merging of detected targets from different sensor systems to classify into objects that either
can be ignored, or that can be automatically avoided or that require the attention of a shore
operator.
2.Automatic avoidance of detected and recognized targets in accordance with good
seamanship and established rules.
3.Reception of new sailing plans from shore or weather routing services and automatic and
safe integration into current sailing plans. This may include remote control from pilot, vessel
traffic service (VTS) or shore side operations center.
4.Fail to safe functions in case of missing communication during critical operations or other
unexpected situations, including assisted or automatic recovery from fail to safe modes.
7.2 Improved system robustness
Ship systems are today designed and built to utilize a combination of maintenance strategies
to provide a sufficient safety and reliability level for the complete system. This includes the
use of technical and operational redundancy, periodic maintenance intervals and the
possibility to repair or replace components by the crew. In the case of an unmanned ship, the
latter strategy is obviously not available. Thus, a major challenge for unmanned ships is to
improve the system robustness to a degree where the operator can have a very high
confidence that critical subsystems will not fail during the trip. Some important research
issues here include:
1.Looking at critical system design and improving where necessary to avoid single points of
failures with sufficiently high confidence.
2.Current preventive maintenance procedures need to be updated to ensure operability during


intervals at sea also for components that currently have been designed to be replaceable
during voyage.
3.Determining the need for new sensors as well as new procedures and analysis methodology
to detect early signs of degradation and failure.
4.Developing fail-to-safe procedures in case of major system failure. This needs to be
complemented with appropriate recovery strategies.
7.3 Integration with existing transport system
Another challenge is the design of a ship concept that can be used in a world where the
majority of vessels are still controlled by humans. This puts particularly pressure on an
autonomous navigation system, as it also has to interact with manned vessels according to
existing rules of road and practices for good seamanship. It also needs to include new
concepts for rescue operations at sea. Some issues that MUNIN will investigate are:
1.Remote pilotage including integration with ship and the shore side operations centre.
2.More advanced VTS with some direct control over ship and routes, again in cooperation
with a shore side operations centre.
3.Participation of an autonomously operated ship in a search and rescue operation(SAR). This
includes detection of emergency situations, e.g., identifying life boats or rafts and reporting
this to the appropriate SAR authority.
7.4 Legal and contractual issues
One of the main obstacles to the fully autonomous ship is arguably existing regulations and
contract forms. Some issues that will be addressed in the project are:
Required updates to general laws of the sea. This includes liability for any accidents and the
enforcement of the unmanned ship as flag state "territory".

8. CONCLUSION
The concept of an autonomous ship provides one important pathway for a sustainable
development for bulk shipping. The feasibility of autonomous ships will be investigated
within the next three years by developing technical solutions and suggestions for legal and
contractual changes for the challenges that unmanned vessels represent. The developed
concepts will be validated in an integrated simulation prototype of an autonomous vessel. An


explicit aim is to generate a solution that also allows updating the current fleet and which
allows a gradual change from manned to unmanned fleets. Although full autonomy may be
difficult to realize, the results from research will have direct applications in the short term:
1.Better navigation support and obstacle detection can reduce accidents by providing decision
support for the officer of the watch.
2. Small object detection can provide valuable assistance in search and rescue operations. 3.
Better maintenance strategies can reduce technical incidents and off-hire costs.
4.Improved ship-shore communication and coordination can be used to simplify pilotage,
VTS operations and management of the ship.
Thus, the expected results of research also provide a significant potential to make
manned shipping safer and less stressful for the mariners in the near future.










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