1.

GERMANY AND MITTELEUROPA

An Introduction
Peter J. Katzenstein
T he return of central Europe is a sign of profound political change.
Like the name Adolf, the concept of Mitteleuropa had all but vanished from the political
vocabular in !onn, !erlin and "ienna after #itler$s %thousand&ear% empire 'ent up in smoke
and flames. (n Prague and !udapest, on the other hand, the idea of central Europe, as
Timoth )arton Ash 'rites, %continued to be cherished bet'een consenting adults in private.%
*
As in the +est, ho'ever, central Europe 'as eviscerated from public discourse. ,tirrings of
political reform, vigorous debate b Polish, -zech, and #ungarian intellectuals, and the end of
the -old +ar have given the concept current coinage once again. %.itteleuropa is coming
back.%
/

!ut 'ill it be more than a short&term engagement0 )erman, for e1ample, remains politicall
unsettled. +hile the ne' capital of united )erman 'ill be !erlin, about a third of )erman$s
federal ministries, including defense, 'ill continue to have their main seats in !onn. The !onn
republic 'as not +eimar. And united )erman 'ill not be a !erlin republic.
The ne' )erman 'ill be multicephalic 'ith numerous political, financial, communication, and
cultural centers. 2nited )erman is unlikel to be haunted b the traditional )erman 3uestion
of ho' to accommodate under one political roof ethnic )ermans living in different central and
eastern European states. The international dimensions of )erman$s national 3uestion appear
to have been settled for the foreseeable future. !ut other )erman 3uestions, as Elizabeth
Pond and 4avid ,choenbaum note in their recent book, are far from settled.
5
The
uncertainties of the political and economic transformations affecting central European politics
are even greater. +ill post&-ommunism push ahead 'ith the task of institutionalizing a
democratic capitalism0 And ho' 'ill this process be aided or disrupted b international
developments in the East0 Less than a decade after the end of the -old +ar there are no
unambiguous ans'ers to these 3uestions.
6et there is a range of possible responses. -ontemporar geostrategic and geoeconomic
perspectives are not necessaril limited to dra'ing tired historical analogies 'ith the *758s.
Ackno'ledging the dramatic changes that have transformed )erman in the second half of the
t'entieth centur, these perspectives envision not militant domestic pressures for east'ard
e1pansion 9%Drang nach Osten%:, but irresistible international pressures for eastern
stabilization 9%Zwang nach Osten%:. ;rom this vantage point, )erman purchases of Polish
farmland and the muted political demands of some )erman political organizations seeking to
alter the status of the <ussian enclave of Kaliningrad are not harbingers of a ne' phase of
irredentist )erman politics.
=
<ather, )erman$s gro'ing Eastern orientation 'ill be dictated
b po'erful international developments that no )erman government 'ill be able to resist.
2navoidable political instabilities and possibl violent conflicts 'ill make )erman foreign polic
seek to build political buffers on its Eastern border. ;urthermore, the gro'ing competitive
pressures that )erman producers are e1periencing in 'orld markets 'ill make them flock to
central and eastern Europe as a natural economic hinterland. #ence an international vacuum
'ill recreate )erman hegemon in central Europe.
This book offers a different response. The preliminar evidence offered here indicates that the
end of the -old +ar and )erman unification are not returning )erman and central Europe to
historicall troubled, asmmetric, bilateral relationships. <ather, changes in the character of
)erman and European politics as 'ell as the transformations no' affecting Poland, #ungar,
the -zech <epublic, and ,lovakia point to the emergence of multilateral relationships linking
)erman and central Europe to an internationalizing Europe.
>
;urthermore, the collapse of
markets and political instabilities in <ussia and the -ommon'ealth of (ndependent ,tates
9-(,: help make this shift self&evident to most leaders and mass publics in central Europe.
+ith the end of the -old +ar the central European states are seeking to engage Europe and
)erman on man levels. !erlin!onn lie on the road leading to !russels? 'ithout )erman$s
active support, membership in the European 2nion 9E2: 'ill be slo' in coming. And !russels
is a kind of reassurance against e1cessive reliance on !erlin&!onn? the central European states
seek to shelter their bilateral dependence on )erman in multilateral European arrangements.
(n brief, the central European states are emulating in the *778s a strateg that other smaller
European states had deploed 'ith great success in earlier times.
@
-entral European politics is
thus defined b its )erman and European relationships rather than b its traditional position
bet'een East and +est.
Central Europe: A Geopolitical Terrain
and an Ideoloical Con!truct
Aur map of Europe and the 'orld 'as devised b )erardus .ercator in )erman in *>@7. (t
dates back to a historical era 'hen Europe discovered, dominated, and e1ploited the 'orld.
And at the center of that Eurocentric map 'as central Europe and )erman.
B

+ithin this cartographic perspective the hperbolic assertion am deutschen Wesen soll die
Welt genesen 9)erman 3ualities 'ill cure the 'orld: appeared to make sense. )erman and
Europe looked like the center of the 'orld based, as 'e no' kno', on inaccurate
representations of size as 'ell as une3ual a1es and positions. (n contrast to .ercator, the
maps of the )erman historian Arno Peters sho' all areas&&countries, continents, and oceans&&
according to their actual size. The map$s north&south lines run vertical, permitting us to see
geographic points in their precise directional relationship. And its east&'est lines run parallel,
permitting us to determine easil the relationship of an point on the map to its distance from
the e3uator. Peters$s ne' and more accurate map corrects the striking visual over&
representation of the northern hemisphere over the south, 'hich makes Europe$s 5.C million
s3uare miles loom large over ,outh America$s @.7 million, and the ,oviet 2nion$s C.B million
s3uare miles d'arf Africa$s **.@ million. .ore important for the purpose of this chapter and
book, Peters$s map removes central Europe and )erman from the center of the 'orld.
(nstead, these geographic areas are no' located at the 'orld$s northern rim. This induces an
altogether salutar shift in political perspective. The premise of this book is to avoid 'hat one
could call Delson$s perspective, reversing the telescope and putting it on the blind ee. The
northern rim of the 'orld has been of great importance in recent times. (t is not marginal. !ut
it is not central either.
Ackno'ledging that central Europe e1ists, there is no agreement about 'here it starts
precisel, and 'here it ends. (s its center in !erlin, Prague, "ienna or further east0 Are the
!altic states part of central Europe0 +hat about ,erbia, -roatia, ,lovenia, <omania, and
!ulgaria0 There are no precise or uncontestable ans'ers to these 3uestions. !ut this much is
certainE 'hile the coordinates of 'orld politics are shifting a'a from Europe, central Europe
remains politicall important because it evokes po'erful memories of some of the maFor
disasters of the t'entieth centurE fascism, t'o 'orld 'ars, and the holocaust. ;urthermore,
central Europe 'as the staging area of the -old +ar and the most likel flashpoint 'here that
'ar might have turned hot.
C

Europe is a geopolitical terrain of considerable importance. !oth before and after the -old
+ar, the north )erman plains and the eastern states of united )erman are central to past,
and possibl future, conflagrations. The positioning and plans of DATA and +arsa' pact
troops until the end of the *7C8s, and the political controversies about DATA enlargement in
the *778s, illustrate the importance of geographical space in central Europe. (ntent on
creating a zone of stabilit to its east, )erman is particularl concerned 'ith the enlargement
of DATA. ;acing severe problems to their south, ;rance and ,pain have no particular interest
in the rapid e1pansion of the E2. )erman does. And )erman has been helped b the 2nited
,tates. 4riven b electoral concerns and the liberal impetus of the foreign polic of the -linton
administration, 2.,. polic in *77@ has accelerated movement to'ard DATA enlargement,
thus reinforcing )erman preferences.
The border that is separating )erman and central Europe has been transformed since *7C7.
A Fournalistic account of various stops along )erman$s C88 mile&long eastern border
underlines the importance of economic ine3ualit, political indifference, ethnic stereotpes,
and historical amnesia. This is a border patrolled b police, not militar forces. ,muggling,
illegal immigration, prostitution, and automobile theft constitute the ne' securit threats.
7

Territorial spaces and their borders are material as 'ell as social facts. (n the *7C8s
intellectuals in particular sought to recreate the political space that a central Europe, shorn of
all )erman, liberal imperialist connotations, might create for a regional cultural identit that
could further the process of political reform.
*8
Like Europe$s other subregions, central Europe
is a specific ideological construct that is open to varied and contested political interpretations.
**
;or man decades ,candinavia and southern Europe retained specific collective identities
that overlapped in part 'ith European and national ones. Anl 'ith the acceleration of the
European integration process and the end of the -old +ar have these subregional identities
'eakened significantl.
A corresponding process is apparentl under'a in central Europe. As "alerie !unce illustrates
in chapter @, since *775 Europe, not central Europe, has become the maFor focus of the
securit and economic policies of Poland, #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and, possibl,
,lovakia. Europe smbolizes democratic 'elfare states that are at peace 'ith themselves and
their neighbors. .eeting the re3uirements that the E2 has set forth for membership is not
merel an instrumental goal for the central European states, it is also a 'a of enacting an
identit that, 'ith the collapse of socialism, has no international rival. %(solationists% 'ho
oppose the %cosmopolitans% in domestic politics&&to adopt the terminolog of +todek Aniot,
Timoth !rnes, and Elena (ankova in chapter /&&invoke different issues, such as religion and
nationalism. To date, ho'ever, these isolationists have not succeeded in articulating politicall
a collective identit for central Europe that rivals that of Europe.
(f Europe is a positive pole of attraction that affirms the central European %self,% <ussia, (ver
Deumann argues, is its constituting %other.%
*/
<egional identities are based not onl on
inclusive affirmations but on e1clusive demarcations. ,pecificall 'hat is at stake for central
European identit politics are the underlining principles of political and social pluralism,
political democrac and capitalist efficienc that contradict the political homogenization, as
'ell as authoritarianism and state socialism of past ,oviet and potential future <ussian
policies. 4ifferentiated from the ,oviet 2nion and <ussia, central Europe is thus a 'a station
in a Europeanization process that marks the transformation of these four states in different,
though broadl comparable, 'as.
This 'ish to differentiate is also noticeable in )erman. (t tpicall refers directl or obli3uel,
to a civilizational divide bet'een <oman -atholicism and Eastern Arthodo1. +hat divided the
#absburg .onarch historicall remains important in )erman$s contemporar public
discourse, even though that division does not fit ver neatl the geographic facts either of the
!altic states or of the 'estern 2kraine.
*5
(n the *7C8s central Europe re&emerged as a
political categor in +est )erman$s public debate, primaril on the Left. ,ocial 4emocrats
like Peter )lotz sought to undermine the divisive effects of the (ron -urtain b looking to
central Europe as one bridge among several that might help to reintegrate Europe and
)erman.
*=

!ecause <ussia is the state from 'hich central European states, 'ith the possible e1ception of
,lovakia, 'ish to differentiate themselves, does this open central Europe to the increasing
cultural influence of )erman0 #nek JeGHbek and ;rantiIek Jich, document in chapter = the
e1tent to 'hich )erman o'nership of the regional press in the -zech <epublic has created a
potential opening for 'hat might turn out to be an illegitimate foreign influence.
*>
!ut
because the influence of regional print media is countered b an international electronic media
that is mostl dominated b American interests, the -zech government has not regarded the
)erman takeover of the regional press as threatening.
The relation bet'een the )erman and English languages among secondar and universit
students in central Europe amplifies the same point. Although there are significant variations
b countr, English is ever'here the preferred first foreign language. And American mass
culture enFos in central Europe, as in )erman, an un3uestioned hegemonic position.
4emand for )erman language for business is at record levels? )erman$s official and private
cultural presence in central Europe is on a marked ups'ing? and )erman cultural diplomac is
toing 'ith a more assertivel political approach to presenting )erman abroad. 6et
embedded in the global hegemon of the man products of American mass culture, )erman
cultural influence, though strong and rising in central Europe, 'ill not be able to emerge from
a position of Funior partner even as )erman$s economic influence increases.
*@

;urthermore, the multilateral bent in )erman$s cultural diplomac runs deep. +orking on
maFor proFects 'ith other +est European states, and 'ith several local organizations, is
standard operating procedure for parapublic )erman institutions such as the )oethe (nstitute
and the -enter for Advanced ,tud, !erlin.
*B

-entral Europe$s cultural orientation 'ill be to the +est, including )erman, rather than on
)erman e1clusivel. (n brief, central Europe is e1periencing simultaneous processes of
internationalization and Europeanization that contain a strong )erman component.
Ger"an# and Central Europe in $i!tor#
This is a surprising development. ;or there e1ists an alternative historical vision of a middle
'a, of an in&bet'een Europe or Zwischeneuropa, of small, sovereign, and democratic states
that constitute the core of European culture and thus help to anchor +estern Europe against
undue Americanization and an overbearing <ussia.
*C
TomHs .asark$s definition of central
Europe, for e1ample, articulated during +orld +ar (, included man different national groups
from northern, eastern, and southern Europe? but it e1cluded )ermans and Austrians. ;or
;riedrich Daumann, b contrast, central Europe 'as, in the 'ords of Timoth )arton Ash, %all
about the )ermans and Austrians, 'ith the others included onl insofar as the 'ere subFects
of the )erman and Austro&#ungarian empires.%
*7

(n a broader historical perspective central and eastern Europe are marked b belated
processes of industrialization, nation&building, and modernization processes that left these
societies 'ith both deep social and economic ine3ualities and a concentration of economic and
political resources that provided a fertile basis for state socialism.
/8
This legac reinforced a
mosaic pattern of various nationalit groups that lived in close pro1imit to one another in
'hat Karl 4eutsch called a %polka&dot% pattern that is arguabl different from the %patch'ork&
3uilt% pattern characteristic of +estern Europe.
/*
The polka&dot pattern 'as the result of a
flo' of 'est&to&east migration in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Although the
migrants did not think of themselves as )erman, the similarit, for e1ample, in the legal codes
that the brought 'ith them earned them the name %)erman% in the ees of local populations.
The territories in east&central Europe thus settled 'ere united under the Arder of Teutonic
Knights and e1isted under the protectorate of the Emperor and the Pope, in contrast to those
in the eastern part of )erman 'hich 'ere part of the #ol <oman Empire.
Europe$s religious 'ars and the modernization policies of Peter the )reat and -atherine (( led
to a second 'ave of migration that dispersed ethnic )ermans into the inner reaches of <ussia.
A net'ork of commercial, financial, and political privileges stretched unevenl across
countrside and cit throughout eastern&central Europe, subFect to local variations that 'ere
magnified b the absence of an imperial center.
(n the nineteenth and t'entieth centuries this comple1 pattern of central&eastern European
and )erman relations 'as simplified into the bifurcation bet'een the Kleindeutsche 9small
)erman: and the Grossdeutsche 9large )erman: solutions to )erman$s national 3uestion.
Prussia stood for the former, the #absburg monarch for the latter solution. The political
defeat of Austrian plans for a central European federation at the hands of Prussia, and )erman
unification under Prussian leadership in *CB* in the 'ake of three 'ars, provided a temporar
ans'er to )erman$s national 3uestion. )erman and Prussia adopted a polic of forced
assimilation that engendered deep hostilities, especiall among members of the Polish
population residing in the eastern parts of (mperial )erman.
Published during +orld +ar ( ;riedrich Daumann$s book Mitteleuropa popularized plans that
had circulated especiall in Austria&#ungar in the late nineteenth centur. Daumann dre' up
a plan for a federal union of central Europe that aimed at incorporating the 'estern parts of
<ussia, Poland, and the !altic states. Ather plans 'ere geographicall more e1pansive and
sought to consolidate southeast Europe under )erman leadership. These plans 'ere spurred
b the conviction that rivalr 'ith the 2nited ,tates, !ritain, and <ussia re3uired )erman to
enlarge the territorial and demographic base of this potential fourth %'orld state% through the
establishment of close links 'ith central and eastern Europe.
//
(n the vie' of its )erman and
Austrian proponents such plans 'ould create a fle1ible international political order, marked b
a spirit of political compromise, in 'hich various nationalities and states 'ould be able to
coe1ist peacefull? in the vie' of its foreign critics this 'as crass imperialism designed to
cement )erman po'er on the continent. ;rom either perspective such plans 'ere embedded
in the process of capitalist development that increasingl came to penetrate central and
eastern Europe.
)erman$s defeat in +orld +ar ( and the breakup of Austria#ungar created a cordon
sanitaire of states in central and eastern Europe increasingl referred to as east&central
Europe or Zwischeneuropa. (t restored Poland$s sovereignt and gave independence to a rump
Austria, #ungar, and -zechoslavakia as 'ell as to the !alkan states. The +ilsonian principle
of national self&determination 'as violated in numerous instances&&for e1ample, in the case of
Austria, in 'estern Poland, #ungar, and in !ohemia and .oravia. Ethnic )ermans thus found
themselves living under non)erman governments. The revision of the "ersailles treat
regarding )erman$s eastern border became an important polic obFective for both the
governments of +eimar )erman and Dazi )erman.
-entral Europe thus became part of a revisionist political agenda that, 'ithout relin3uishing its
economic&imperialist character, ac3uired radical nationalist overtones. !ased on its outright
reFection of the "ersailles and ,t. )ermain treaties, )erman and Austrian political revisionism
accorded )erman the role as central Europe$s undisputed political and economic leader and,
eventuall, sanctioned militar aggression and political anne1ation.
/5
Liberals advocated an
imperialism of free trade that put )erman at the center of an informall organized zone of
economic influence intimatel linked to an open international econom. Proponents of
autarchic economic development put )erman at the center of an economic bloc that 'as
protectionist in its e1ternal orientation and hierarchical in its internal organization.
/=

After *755 Dazi )erman opted une3uivocall for the second option. (t instituted bilateral
trade and monetar clearing arrangements designed to cement a sstem of asmmetric
vulnerabilities bet'een )erman and its smaller neighbors to the east.
/>
)erman domination
over central Europe and further east 'as an act of destructive colonization that brought about
'ars of ethnic cleansing, resettlements of vast tracts of land, outright anne1ation of 'estern
Poland, and the creation of a vicious apartheid regime in central Poland. And the )erman ,,,
militar, police, and courts closel cooperated in conducting a genocidal 'ar and the running
of the death camps in 'hich )ermans murdered millions of Je's and members of other
minorit groups.
The total failure of this polic and the unconditional surrender of Dazi )erman in .a *7=>
signified an end to )erman e1pansionism in central Europe. .ore than ten million ethnic
)ermans became refugees 'ho resettled in a rump )erman in *7=>. ,ubse3uent decades
have 'itnessed a slo' draining of the reservoir of ethnic )ermans from central and eastern
Europe that has continued up to the present da. (n a broader perspective, *7=> heralded the
loss of an informal )erman %empire% comparable to the ver different kinds of losses that
!ritain and ;rance e1perienced after +orld +ar ((.
%arietie! o& Corporati!" in Central
Europe
The -old +ar redefined all aspects of European politics. (t divided )erman. (t eviscerated the
ver notion of central Europe for several decades? and it recreated a ne' kind of central
Europe in the form of Austria and ,'itzerland, states that 'ere capitalist, democratic, and
neutral and thus not part of either DATA or the E-. ,ince +orld +ar ((, Austria and
,'itzerland have e1hibited a specific stle of politics marked b negotiated compromises
premised on a far&reaching depoliticization of political conflicts in the interest of stabilit.
/@

;or this reason it is note'orth that scholars 'ho are beginning to analze the emerging
political characteristics in the post-ommunist polities in central Europe point to some
surprising similarities 'ith the politics of democratic corporatism in Austria and ,'itzerland. (n
their analsis of post&socialist path'as, 4avid ,tark and LHszlK !ruszt, for e1ample, compare
privatization politics in #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and the former )4<.
/B
The focus on
ho' politicians deal 'ith the interdependencies of assets and the chains of liabilities. ;or ,tark
and !ruszt %deliberative association% is a process of creating binding agreements over large
stakes and long periods of time. The identif a stle of politics that recognizes, to different
degrees in different conte1ts, the net'ork characteristics of assets and liabilities and sees
these as central to the politics of privatization.
;or e1ample, )erman$s agenc for privatization, the Treuhandanstalt, found itself in charge
of privatizing virtuall all of the state&o'ned assets of the )4<. Although it began 'ith an
e1plicit reFection of all net'ork ties, prompted b social protests and electoral competition,
,tark and !ruszt argue that the agenc eventuall shifted course and created social ties in
negotiating fora that are responsible for restructuring net'orks of firms. (n #ungar a rich
legac of inter&enterprise links has generated dense, e1tensive, and comple1 net'orks of
o'nership bet'een various enterprises, thus mitigating some of the enormous uncertainties in
the post&socialist era. As ,tark and !ruszt argue, the government neglected these net'orks
and proceeded to privatize on a firm&b&firm basis, thus spa'ning a 'ave of bankruptcies and
a severe financial crisis that in turn forced a dramatic change in polic and an e1tensive
government bail out. ;inall, despite the free&market rhetoric of Prime .inister Klaus, the
-zech government recognized the net'ork properties of assets and liabilities from the outset.
(t favored both active anti&bankruptc policies on the one hand and ne' forms of inter&
organizational o'nership on the other.
(n short, the empirical form of net'ork ties varies from case to case. As ,tark and !ruszt
describe, in #ungar a tight coupling of direct ties bet'een enterprises has occurred? in the
-zech <epublic close links e1ist bet'een banks and investment funds at the meso level? and in
East )erman the po'erful effect of a politics of deliberative association has reversed the legal
approach that the Treuhand took initiall. As chapter > argues belo', a politicall hotl
contested privatization program in ,lovakia appears to follo' a traditional, )erman, bank&led
model that is also distinguished b net'ork characteristics. (n these cases the organizational,
institutional, and political responses to the net'ork properties of assets and liabilities ield
political economies that, at this earl stage, resemble the liberal Anglo&,a1on model much less
than Austria$s and ,'itzerland$s democratic corporatism.
Elena (ankova$s analsis of the social partnership evident in 'hat she calls a %transformative
corporatism% in !ulgaria and Poland points in the same direction.
/C
#er surve of post&
socialist, central and eastern European politics points to pervasive indications of a tripartite
corporatist politics that has varing political effects. #ungar$s version, for e1ample, 'as
relativel 'eak. The tripartite Dational -ouncil for <econciliation of (nterests, established in
*7CC, focuses on consensual 'age bargaining and the negotiation of a host of social issues.
<evived in *778 in the interest of buffering the shock of market competition, it is comprised of
representatives of si1 unions and emploer organizations. -zechoslovakia$s federal tripartite
-ouncil of ,ocial and Economic Accord 'as constituted in *778 and, after the countr$s split&
up, 'as succeeded in *775 b -zech and ,lovak successor organizations. (n Poland tripartite
negotiations accelerated after the signing of the Enterprise pact of ;ebruar *775 and the
formation of the Dational -ommission on ,ocial&Economic (ssues in ;ebruar *77=. (t brings
around one table representatives of the government, the confederation of Polish emploers,
D,JJ&,olidarit, the All&Polish Trade 2nion Alliance, and seven other national unions. (n
!ulgaria, <omania, and the successor states to the ,oviet 2nion similar corporatist
arrangements have also sprung up.
(ankova, furthermore, sho's in her detailed research in !ulgaria and Poland that these
councils are not merel empt institutional shells at the national level. The are replicated at
regional levels, in different industrial branches and 'ithin particular enterprises. The net'ork
structure of the political economies of central Europe that ,tark and !ruszt uncovered and
interpreted in their stud of privatization, (ankova finds to be ver prominent on issues of
macroeconomic polic and 'age bargaining. (n her vie', beond all national, regional, local,
and sectoral variations 9marked, for e1ample, b a more adversarial form of social dialogue in
Poland than in #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and ,lovakia: tripartite corporatism in central
and eastern Europe has developed a similar transformative design.
The rapid and almost simultaneous emergence of transformative corporatism, (ankova argues,
is due to the convergence of three factors that, in a different historical conte1t, had brought
forth a different kind of corporatism in Austria and ,'itzerland.
/7
;irst, one legac of socialism
'as a collectivist culture that is reflected in the emergence of ne', centralized unions and,
more slo'l, of ne' emploer associations. ,econd, in all central European states the opening
to +estern markets and high levels of international indebtedness created strong pressures for
domestic concertation policies. ;inall, in an era of great uncertaint corporatism facilitates
the signing of social pacts and agreements that are vitall important in the absence of
consolidated norms of conduct. (n brief, under great political and economic pressure and in an
environment of high uncertaint both unions and emploers agreed 'ith the post&-ommunist
governments that, in radicall ne' circumstances, centralized decision making is a virtue.
(t is too earl to Fudge confidentl 'hether the central European e1perience 'ill generate in
due course political mechanisms sufficientl strong to sustain corporatist structures and
practices. !ut 'ith !ulgaria and Poland as e1emplars, (ankova$s research on transformative
corporatism generates a novel perspective that points to some important similarities 'ith
Austria and ,'itzerland.
Their democratic corporatism has three defining traits.
58
;irst, business and labor subscribe to
an ideolog of social partnership that subordinates the natural antagonism of different
producer groups to an overarching consensus on a peaceful and stable politics. Political
conflict, 'hile not eliminated, occurs 'ithin a frame'ork that, ho'ever vaguel, is designed
around a shared notion of the public good. ,econd, the maFor interest groups are ver
centralized. (ndeed, the ver concept of %peak association%&in 'hich associations, not
individuals are organized&&is a central European institutional innovation that dates back to the
nineteenth centur. (nterest group leaders tpicall enFo ver strong po'ers and control over
a membership that rarel challenges its political prerogatives. And these groups tpicall
organize broad segments of the relevant social sectors. 6et the image of order that this
institutional order conves is misleading. Political struggle is intense, but man of these
conflicts occur 'ithin organizations in private rather than bet'een them in public, thus
preventing a cluttering of the public agenda 'ith fights, for e1ample, bet'een various
segments of labor or business. This tpe of corporatist structure remains democratic. Periodic
electoral competition interrupts a potentiall dangerous consensus among the elites running
these organizations. ;inall, democratic corporatism features a particular stle of political
bargaining that is informal, voluntar, and uninterrupted. This bargaining process facilitates
consensus b permitting trade&offs across different polic sectors.
(n their man differences ,'itzerland and Austria e1emplif a liberal and social variant of
democratic corporatism. (n ,'itzerland international business and finance dominate national
business, the unions, and the political Left. (n Austria, conversel, a large union and a ver
large public sector prevail over internationall oriented business interests b diminishing
margins. Thus ,'itzerland chooses liberal foreign trade, large direct investments abroad, and
the reliance on a large number of foreign 'orkers 'hile Austria prefers a cautious pursuit of
free trade, subsidization of domestic investment, and an active labor market polic. And
,'itzerland favors a relativel privatized social polic sstem and limited public e1penditures,
'hereas Austria chooses large public e1penditures, publicl funded social policies, and an
incomes polic supported b both emploers and unions. !ut these differences bet'een
international and national adaptation to change, and bet'een private and public compensation
for change, reflect onl one&half of a picture that differentiates bet'een liberal and a social
variants of corporatism.
The other half is conveed b the fact that in both countries business and labor accommodate
their divergent interests, on different terms, in centralized institutions. (n both countries
producer groups, state bureaucracies and, at times, political parties are linked through
multiple institutional channels that often make it virtuall impossible to distinguish the public
from the private sector. (n both countries producer groups are 'ell&organized in tpicall
centralized and all&encompassing peak associations. <eaching a consensus bet'een the
divergent vie'points e1pressed 'ithin these organizations is a ke to the institutional stabilit
of the national polic net'ork and the predictabilit of the polic process. 6et some differences
in institutional form remain apparent. The state bureaucrac, for e1ample, is larger and more
centralized in Austria than in ,'itzerland. And the degree of centralization tends to be
some'hat larger in the dominant social sector&&business in ,'itzerland and the unions in
Austria&&than in the subordinate sectors. !ut both ,'itzerland and Austria seek to link their
institutions, including political parties, to polic net'orks that reliabl shield the polic process
from e1ogenous shocks and unpredictabilities.
The consensual and democratic political arrangements that emerged in Austria after +orld
+ar (( and that 'ere reinforced b a series of far&reaching constitutional amendments
adopted b ,'itzerland soon after *7=> resulted from the traumatic convulsions of the *758s
and *7=8s. The )reat 4epression, fascism, 'ar, and occupation convinced Austrian and ,'iss
voters and leaders that moderation in the e1ercise of po'er 'as a marriage of virtue 'ith
necessit.
(n Austria a strong political consensus emerged after the 'ar 'hich vie'ed that countr as
occupied bet'een *75C and *7>>, first b the Dazis and later b the Allied Po'ers. (t matters
little that the empirical evidence does not support this historical mth about the ears *75C&
=>.
5*
Anl in the *7C8s did the +aldheim affair put seriousl into 3uestion this instance of
collective historical re&interpretation. The Austrians learned an important lesson specificall
from the brief civil 'ar of *75= and more generall from the events of the *758s and *7=8s.
Left and <ight agreed that it 'as dangerous and undesirable to push political conflicts too far.
4omestic tran3uillit and prosperit as 'ell as international neutralit became the obFect of
Austrian policies and politics. 4emocratic corporatism became the anchor.
Although it 'as spared Austria$s difficult e1periences, ,'itzerland$s e1perience of the perilous
*758s and *7=8s, the depression, and the threat of 'ar nonetheless left a deep imprint.
Lacking a broad political consensus, rule b emergenc decree became almost normal in the
abnormal *758s. !ut the victor of reformism over radicalism on the political Left and the
trade union movement encouraged the political incorporation and pacification of all maFor
social sectors b the mid&*7=8s. This broadened the political base of ,'iss liberalism and
eventuall transformed it into a liberal version of democratic corporatism.
(n the evolution of democratic corporatism it is difficult to overestimate the role 'hich the
liberal international econom has plaed since *7=>.
5/
As is true of other small industrial
states, the economies of ,'itzerland and Austria are remarkabl open to the international
econom. (ncreasing international liberalization provided ample opportunities in gro'ing
e1port markets, but it also greatl increased the competitive pressures that 'ere placed on all
of the maFor producer groups and political actors. (n their dail lives everone in ,'itzerland
and Austria 'as constantl reminded of ho' open and vulnerable their economies reall are.
-orporatist practices thus became valued as tools that are essential for the consensual
fashioning of national strategies in an international econom that is tpicall perceived as a
rigorous taskmaster that leaves little room for self&indulgence or self&pit. Economic
competitiveness and social 'elfare 'ere vie'ed as being ine1tricabl linked. Political
adFustment to the changes imposed b developments in the international econom have been
made easier b the fact that corporatist institutions 'ere the conduits b 'hich the 'elfare
policies of compensation 'ere e1panded during the post'ar period&&some in response to the
pressures of the international econom, others as the result of the internal dnamics of
democratic corporatism.
(n the *7C8s and *778s this pattern has undergone important changes, especiall in Austria.
The Austrian decision to Foin the E2 in *77> has increased international competition. And a
partial destabilization of the Austrian part sstem is apparent in the gro'th of a number of
small parties.
55
.ore specificall, in the case of Austria democratic corporatism in the *778s is
no' seriousl challenged b a populist right&'ing part that packages its 1enophobia and
furtive support of the Dazi past in a heav dose of anti&European rhetoric. (n ,'itzerland, b
'a of contrast, it is uncertaint about the course the countr should navigate in an
integrating Europe that is increasing numerous political cleavages. These challenges to its
hegemon not'ithstanding, democratic corporatism continues to define Austrian and ,'iss
politics more accuratel than does an other label.
In!titutional A&&initie! o& Ger"an# 'it(
Corporati!"
)erman politics arguabl has a greater similarit 'ith democratic corporatism than do the
politics of an other larger capitalist states. )erman$s semi&sovereign state helps bring about
this convergence in politics and polic.
5=
)overnment and state bureaucrac are closel
connected to the political process of consultation, b 'a of an ideological frame'ork of social
partnership that links parapublic institutions 'ith broadl based, centralized producer groups
and 'ith political parties that are decidedl centrist in outlook. The e1treme <ight has been
delegitimated b the horrors of the Dazi past. The e1treme Left never overcame the liabilit of
espousing a socialist ideal that to most +est )ermans 'as hidden behind a cement 'all and
barbed 'ire. The sharpl narro'ed spectrum of partisan preferences that has dominated
)erman politics since *7=7 has reinforced an ideolog of social partnership that eventuall
superseded the language of class conflict.
The organization of )erman politics is 3uite decentralized. This can be traced to several
factorsE historical legacies of a decentralized )erman polit, American political precepts, such
as federalism and Fudicial revie', and emerging political characteristics, such as the gro'ing
significance of the Bundesrat and the increasing role of the Fudiciar in polic making during
the last fort ears. )erman politics, to be sure, features some countervailing centralizing
tendencies, most important among 'hich are legal norms that help to shape a comple1
sstem of intergovernmental relations and general political practices.
.an other )erman institutions are, b contrast, 3uite centralized in their structure and highl
encompassing in their membership. This is especiall true of the maFor producer
organizations.
)erman business had begun organizing in the form of peak associations as earl as the *CB8s.
And after *7=> +est )erman unions also decided on a more centralized organizational
structure along industr lines. And although )erman$s banking sstem is no longer vie'ed
ade3uatel as a contemporar version of #ilferding$s finance capitalism, its organization and
the legal rules under 'hich it is permitted to operate still give it a position of great importance
in the )erman polit.
)erman$s similarit to democratic and other forms of corporatism is underlined b parapublic
institutions that are open to centralized interest groups as 'ell as part leaders and senior civil
servants. E1amples include -hambers of (ndustr, -ommerce, and Agriculture, professional
associations, public radio and television stations, and a variet of research institutes and
universities. Parapublic institutions are both political actors and polic arenas. ,ome of these
institutions, such as the social 'elfare funds, date back to the nineteenth centur. Athers,
such as the !undesbank, 'ere created b the Allies after *7=>. Especiall on economic and
social 3uestions these institutions have acted like political shock absorbers. The tend to limit
the scope for innovation in the formulation of policies, and the limit political controversies in
the process of polic implementation.
)erman politics shares characteristic traits 'ith both social and liberal variants of corporatism.
As is true of ,'itzerland, )erman business is po'erful and has an international cast. And a
strong federalism introduces an element of decentralization into electoral politics and
intergovernmental relations. .oreover, as in Austria political parties pla a prominent role,
and the position of the labor movement is ver significant. ;inall, )erman politics shares 'ith
both ,'itzerland and Austria a penchant for organizing politics along stable institutional lines
that encourage incremental changes in polic.
At the same time there e1ist significant differences. ;or e1ample, institutional net'orks linking
political actors in the ;ederal <epublic are less centralized and less tight than those in
,'itzerland and Austria. Political bargaining across issue areas is less fre3uent and more
difficult. This is due to the normative and political importance of the state in )erman politics
and is not characteristic of ,'itzerland and Austria. The )erman state provides a normative
reference point that in ,'itzerland is confined to the institution of direct democrac. (n
,'itzerland onl in times of crisis is the federal government granted emergenc po'ers that
help it to define and implement polic. Austria$s political parties, on the other hand, have
penetrated the state bureaucrac so totall as to have robbed the state of almost all vestiges
of autonom. (f an one Austrian institution is singled out 'hich could claim to provide a
normative order for politics, it 'ould be the social and economic partnership bet'een the
maFor producer groups as opposed to the state. Thus neither the ,'iss emasculation of the
state in normal times, and its enhancement in times of crisis, nor the Austrian neutralization of
the state resemble the role the state plas in )erman. (f one considers ,'itzerland and
Austria as e1emplars of liberal and social variants, )erman could be called a third,
attenuated e1ample of democratic corporatism.
After *7=> )erman had little choice but to ackno'ledge its profound vulnerabilit. 4efeated
and divided, it 'as the staging area for the -old +ar that threatened to annihilate )erman
should that 'ar ever turn hot. )erman 'as a medium&sized po'er 'ith resources inade3uate
to bring about national unification. A 3uiet agreement kept the Allied po'ers united
throughout the -old +ar. (t 'as summarized b the flippant, though accurate, aperu %if ou
keep do'n our )ermans, 'e 'ill keep do'n ours.% ;urthermore, as in Austria and
,'itzerland, international economic pressures have had a comparable though 'eaker effect.
The concept of vulnerabilit describes ver 'ell the situation of +est )erman after *7=>.
Totall defeated in 'ar, the countr 'as made much smaller b its division. The traditional
breadbasket in the eastern territories ceded to Poland and in the )4< 'ere no longer
available. +est )erman 'as thus condemned to e1port in order to pa for the foodstuff it
no' had to import as 'ell as the ra' materials necessar to fuel its manufacturing sector.
Eventuall its four maFor manufacturing sectors&&automobiles, chemicals, electrical e3uipment,
and machiner&&all e1ported more than half of their total production to foreign markets.
)erman became the 'orld$s leading e1porter in the late *7C8s. !ut its e1port&led gro'th
strateg induced a structural dependence on the international econom over 'hich it had, 'ith
fe' e1ceptions, precious little control.
The direct effects of )erman unification have made remarkabl little difference to the
countr$s institutional net'orks, thus keeping the similarit 'ith other tpes of central
European corporatism in place. This 'as largel due to the constitutional provision under
'hich )erman united. (n choosing Article /5 rather than Article *=@ the )erman government
made sure that +estern institutions 'ould remain unaltered rather than open to renegotiation
b the governments of the ;<) and )4<. -onse3uentl, +est )erman institutions in all
spheres of state and societ have spread to the five ne' Lnder&&including the Fudiciar, the
local and state bureaucrac, the armed forces and police, the federal sstem of government,
political parties, interest groups, social 'elfare funds, vocational training, labor market boards,
universities, and research and development sstems. ;rom this perspective )erman unification
is a stor of transferring institutions from 'est to east.
5>

!ut institutions that are transferred to ne' settings remain open to eventual transformation.
The e1tent of change that is no' concealed can be measured indirectl b the e1plosive
gro'th of )erman$s national debt. )erman bought political tran3uillit at an economic price
that is sustainable in the longer term onl if important aspects of the )erman political
econom are greatl modified. As +est )erman$s capacit and 'illingness to subsidize the
economic and social changes in the east diminishes, institutional and political discontinuities
ma become apparent in political practices matching the division of the countr in their
collective consciousness.
This does not mean, as a small group of neo&conservatives 'riting on )erman foreign affairs
argues, that the !erlin <epublic 'ill have no commonalities 'ith the !onn <epublic. +ith a
number of ministries, most importantl defense, staing put in !onn and 'ith man federal
offices moving from !erlin to !onn, the capital of the ne' )erman 'ill be hphenated. !ut it
is 3uite plausible to e1pect that some polic domains 'ill be opened to market processes as
the fiscal capacities of the )erman social market econom are strained under the triple impact
of unification, European integration, and increasing global competition? that the traditional
sectoralization of polic making tpifing )erman 'ill go hand in hand 'ith more
centralization? and that a harsher public climate 'ill coe1ist 'ith or pervade informal net'orks
of cooperation that have been a hallmark of )erman politics since the *7@8s. This 'ould
herald the coming of a Third )erman <epublic under auspices 3uite different from those
foreseen in the late *7C8s.
5@
(t is unlikel, though possible, that such changes 'ould
fundamentall undercut the institutional similarities bet'een )erman, ,'iss, and Austrian
versions of corporatism.
Central Europe )et'een Ger"an#* t(e
European Union* and NATO Enlare"ent
The central European states are strongl oriented 'est'ards through overlapping relationships
that link them to )erman, the E2 and DATA. After *7C7 most e1perts e1pected that
)erman 'ould come to prevail economicall in its o'n backard b recreating through
politics and markets a contemporar analog to the economic hegemon that it had enFoed in
central and eastern Europe before +orld +ar ((. The picture 'hich is beginning to emerge a
fe' ears after the end of the -old +ar is more complicated. )ro'ing bilateral ties 'ith
)erman, especiall in the economic sphere, are mitigated b different national strategies that
seek to anchor central Europe in a Europe encompassing )erman and, on securit issues, a
+estern alliance that ties Europe to the 2nited ,tates.
Central Europe and Ger"an#
!efore unification the )4< 'as, after the ,oviet 2nion, the largest partner in the -ouncil for
.utual Economic Assistance 9-.EA:. And 'hile foreign trade 'as relativel unimportant in
state socialist economies follo'ing policies of import substitution, the ;<) 'as central
Europe$s most important +estern trade partner. As .arkovits and <eich 'rite, %it is e1tremel
difficult to identif any categor of commerce and trade in 'hich the ;ederal <epublic has not
consistentl been the most important +estern presence in Eastern Europe.%
5B
<anking behind
onl the ,oviet 2nion, the ;<) and the )4< in *7C7 accounted for a total of *=.7 percent of
-zechoslovak trade, *B.= percent of #ungarian trade, and *7 percent of Polish trade.
5C
The
collapse of trade relations in the ,oviet bloc and central Europe in *778 and *77* set the
stage for a breathtakingl 3uick economic reorientation of the central European economies
to'ards )erman and European markets. !et'een *7C7 and *77/, for e1ample, +est )erman
imports increased b *@@ percent 9 -zechoslovakia:, *8C percent 9 Poland:, and @@ percent
9 #ungar: 'hile e1ports increased b *B5 percent 9 -zechoslovakia:, B/ percent 9 Poland:
and /5 percent 9 #ungar:. ! contrast, in *77/ central European trade 'ith the former )4<,
no' part of united )erman, reached onl /8 percent of its *7C7 level.
57
!et'een *775 and
*77> )erman$s foreign trade 'ith central and Eastern Europe increased b a further 58
percent, a figure that 'as larger than for an other region of the 'orld. ! *77> )erman
e1ports to central and eastern Europe e1ceeded e1ports to the 2nited ,tates b a slight
margin and imports b a substantial one.
=8
! contrast, the importance of the <ussian market
in the foreign trade of central Europe had shrunk to about > percent of total trade? onl in
#ungar 'as the proportion slightl larger 9C percent:.
=*

)erman is also the most important source of foreign direct investment and technolog
imports. (n Poland and -zechoslovakia, for e1ample, )erman firms moved 'ith great speed
and accounted for 58 to =8 percent of all Foint ventures in the earl months of *778.
=/
(t is
not surprising that, in light of historical memories, the Polish and -zech governments have
tried to counterbalance )erman investments 'ith those from other states. (n #ungar such
compensating policies do not e1ist even though )erman and Austrian firms account for more
than one&third of the total number of Foint ventures.
=5
Trailing onl the 2nited ,tates,
)erman is the region$s second largest investor 'ith more than LB billion in cumulative
investments in central and eastern Europe. This figure reflects not onl big proFects like "+$s
investment in ,koda, discussed in chapter = belo', of )erman Telekom$s and Audi$s
investments in #ungar. (t is, rather, medium&sized firms that are driving )erman$s
investment push in central Europe. (n the -zech <epublic )erman companies had, b *77=,
invested in more than >,888 Foint ventures, compared to onl @88 for the 2nited ,tates.
==
+ith much larger 'age than productivit differentials, investment opportunities are ver
enticing for smaller )erman firms. And these firms do not carr the heav historical baggage
that accompanies large )erman investment proFects like "+$s Foint venture 'ith ,koda. These
economic statistics should be interpreted in the conte1t of the size of )erman$s total
investment of about 4.B88 billion in *775. The total foreign investment of all AE-4 states in
central Europe, to 'hich )erman contributes about one&third, accounted for onl about *
percent of )erman$s total domestic investment.
=>

)erman seeks to stabilize the social and political conditions to its east b assisting the
process of economic transformation and liberalization through various aid programs. (n this
respect )erman$s position in central Europe and further east is unrivaled. ! Januar *77>
)erman had provided 4.=>.= billion to the central and eastern European states, in addition
to the 4.*88 billion allocated to assist the successor states of the ,oviet 2nion? most of these
funds 'ere provided in the form of tied loans, granted at concessionar interest rates.
=@

)erman influence is spread not onl directl through aid but also indirectl through
institutions. )erman foreign polic operates in a dual mode. The government$s traditional
foreign polic is complemented b )erman$s societal foreign polic 9gesellschatliche
!ussenpoliti":. .ost of the maFor )erman institutions conduct their o'n foreign relations.
Tpicall, the engage partner institutions in other countries thus creating or reinforcing a
pattern of transnational relations. This gives )erman political actors ample opportunities to
intervene obli3uel in the domestic affairs of the central European states, 'ithout thro'ing
their 'eight around undul. This is a distinctive stle of foreign polic that, 'rites Jeremiah
<iemer, %has been institutionalized and internalized.%
=B
The creation of electoral sstems in
central Europe, for e1ample, 'as assisted b man European parties, %especiall the )erman
-42 and ,P4, but also !ritish conservatives and American 4emocratic and <epublican
strategists.%
=C
And like their 2.,. colleagues, )erman la'ers 'ere being busil consulted as
central and eastern European states drafted ne' constitutional provisions.
)oing beond electoral and constitutional affairs 'here )erman$s part foundations have
been ver active in central Europe, institutional effects are also readil apparent in the field of
business. The corporate and banking sstems in central Europe, for e1ample, are developing
along the lines of )erman$s universal banks 'hich not onl take deposits and make loans but
also trade and sell securities and other financial products. According to .ark Delson, )erman
spent heavil bet'een *778 and *77= on programs seeking to draft the la's and regulations
b 'hich capitalism evolves in central and eastern Europe.
=7
(n the monetar realm,
specificall, )erman influence is relativel uncontested. And the !undesbank served as an
institutional model for several national banks in central Europe, including #ungar as PMter
)edeon discusses in chapter 5. ;ollo'ing in the footsteps of other )erman institutions, it has
offered e1tensive training to about >88 central bankers from central and eastern Europe. Each
of the central European states floats against a trade&'eighted average of foreign currencies in
'hich the 4. or E-2 account for about t'o&thirds.
>8

,trong as the )erman position has rapidl become in central Europe during the *778s, it is not
uncontested. An alternative institutional model is offered b the more free&'heeling
AngloAmerican banking model 'hich the 2nited ,tates promoted at considerable cost.
>*
And
despite its phenomenal gro'th since *778, )erman trade accounts for onl about one&third of
the total e1ternal trade and investment figures of the central European economies.
>/
This
figure is, broadl speaking, in line 'ith )erman$s economic 'eight in the E2.
>5
(t remains to
be seen 'hether central Europe$s economic dependence on )erman 'ill further increase in
the coming ears or 'hether it 'ill taper off at levels that are roughl comparable to those of
other +estern European economies. Earl E2 enlargement and the lo'ering of E2 tariff
barriers 'ould facilitate such a development.
Central Europe and t(e EU
+ith the political and economic revolutions of *7C7, the collapse of the -.EA, and the
disintegration of the ,oviet 2nion, central European trade has shifted 'ith remarkable speed
to the E2. +hile domestic )4P in central Europe declined b about one&fifth bet'een *7C7
and *77/, from a ver lo' base -zechoslovakia$s imports from the E2 rose b 7@ percent,
Poland$s b @/ percent, and #ungar$s b =8 percent. 4espite these strong increases the
central European economies accounted for less than *.> percent of the E2$s total e1ternal
trade in *77/ and this figure has increased onl slightl since then.
>=
,ince the start of the
*778s +estern corporations have invested about L/> billion in the four "isegrad countries.
>>

Af similar importance are the institutional links that the central European states have forged
'ith the E2.
>@
.ovement a'a from the -ommunist sstem 'as complemented b movement
to'ards the European model. %The most po'erful force e1erted both on the political sstems
and the peoples of East Europe,% 'rites <on Linden, %'as the pull of the idea of Europe itself.
As the revolutions of *7C7 spread, the sentiment 'as increasingl voiced b those making the
changes that the 'anted their countr to be $European,$ to Foin or reFoin a political continent
from 'hich the had been forcibl cut off.%
>B
The E- foreign ministers, in turn, issued in
4ecember *77* a declaration 'hich specified the conditions for diplomatic recognition of the
central and eastern European states and the successor states to the ,oviet 2nionE respect for
the rule of la'? for democrac and human rights as laid do'n in the provisions of the 2D
-harter, the ;inal Act of #elsinki setting up the -,-E, and that organization$s -harter of Paris
adopted in Dovember *778? and for guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups
and minorities as specified in the general frame'ork of the -,-E.
(n Jul *7C7 the E- took over the coordination of the aid programs of the )&/= for central and
eastern Europe. (t signed bilateral trade agreements 'ith the central European states in *778&
7*. (n *778 the E2 initiated a special assistance program for Poland and #ungar? in Januar
*77* it granted the central European states )eneralized ,stem of Preferences 9),P: status
normall reserved for developing economies? subse3uentl, in *77*, it eliminated some
3uantitative restrictions on steel and iron and increased the 3uotas for the import of te1tiles
and garments? and after eighteen months of negotiations the E2 signed Association
Agreements 9the so&called %Europe Agreements%: in 4ecember *77* 'hich also sought to
institutionalize a regular polic dialogue 'hile specifing conditions on 3uestions of economic
and political reforms and guarantees of human rights. ! the end of *77* central European
firms enFoed E2 tariff preferences over non&European firms. !ut because the E2 e1empted
sensitive sectors such as agriculture, te1tiles, and steel from trade liberalization, sectors in
'hich the enFo the largest comparative advantage, the central European states have had a
more restricted access to the E2 market than do some of the associate .editerranean
members of the E2.
(n the summer of *775, at its -openhagen summit, the E2 made additional polic concessions
'hile specifing a catalogue of conditions that the central European states had to meet prior
to becoming full E2 members. ,ubse3uentl, in .a *77=, the E2 offered its central and
eastern European associate members an %associate partnership% in the +est European 2nion
9+E2:, the E2$s securit and defense organizations.
The applications that Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic subse3uentl filed for full
membership have met stiff resistance from several members of the E2. (mports in sensitive
sectors, such as agriculture, steel, chemicals, and garments, are meeting stiff protectionist
resistance in the E2. After sharp increases in central European e1ports in these sectors
bet'een *7C7 and *77/, the European Association Agreements of *77* brought e1port
gro'th to a halt. Thus imports from central Europe in sensitive sectors barel topped /
percent of the E2$s total imports in *77/.
>C
;inall, for strategic and economic reasons ;rance
and the southern European states do not see the E2$s eastern enlargement as a high&priorit
issue. ,trategicall, the 'orr about a possible destabilization of Dorth African politics
through (slam. And on economic grounds ;rance fears that Polish membership could 'reck the
sstem of the -ommon Agricultural Polic 9-AP:, 'hile ,pain, Portugal, and )reece are fearful
of diminishing subsidies from the E2$s structural and cohesion funds.
>7
An a per capita basis
#ungar$s income 'as L/,B/8 in *77* as compared to L/,=B8 for -zechoslovakia and L*,B78
for Poland? these figures amounted, respectivel, to =>, =*, and 58 percent of Portugal$s per
capita income, 'hich itself is onl half of ,pain$s. #aving greatl benefited from E2
membership, the southern European states, together 'ith ;rance, are not eager to help create
the unavoidable political pressures for redistribution favoring central Europe in an enlarged E2.
@8
)erman polic 'ill thus be crucial in determining the pace of the E2$s incorporation of
central Europe.
Central Europe and NATO
+ith the end of the -old +ar, for a brief moment in *778 the debate about the future securit
structure of Europe 'as genuinel open.
@*
DATA, the -onference for ,ecurit and -ooperation
in Europe 9-,-E:, and the +E2 9as the foreign polic arm of the E-: all offered different
institutional possibilities. Among these the 2nited ,tates preferred redefining and broadening
DATA$s mission, beond the collective defense provisions of Article ", to act as guarantor of
European securit? )erman favored upgrading the importance of the -,-E, an institution
that it had helped found in *7B>, into the center of a ne' pan&European securit structure
embedding East and +est? and ;rance hoped to enhance the importance of the E- and +E2 in
providing for European securit. Political reactions to the initial crises of the post&-old +ar era
in *77* 9the )ulf +ar, the beginning of the 'ar in 6ugoslavia, and the failed coup in the
,oviet 2nion: all helped bring about a DATA&centered securit structure.
6et in the fall of *7C7 this outcome 'as not preordained. Adopted in Dovember *778, the
-,-E -harter of Paris 'as based on the assumption that states 'ould be 'illing to compl
'ith the procedures, rules, and norms laid do'n b -,-E mechanisms and institutions. ,mall
organizational head3uarters dealing 'ith securit, dispute and conflict resolution, and
elections and democrac 'ere set up, respectivel, in Prague, "ienna, and +arsa', soon to be
marginalized b the crises in the post&-old +ar era. The -,-E #elsinki ,ummit 4eclaration
emphasized human and democratic rights and, seeking a global affiliation, in effect made the
-,-E a regional organization of the 2D.
@/

(n an initial move designed to facilitate contacts 'ith central Europe, DATA$s London ,ummit
set up liaison officers bet'een central Europe and DATA in June *778. DATA created the Dorth
Atlantic -ooperation -ouncil 9DA--: in late *77* as the main forum for dialogue and
cooperation on securit issues affecting DATA and the former member states of the +TA. !
fall *77/, at its Aslo summit, DATA agreed that it should act on behalf of the -,-E. This 'as a
precursor for DATA$s Partnership for Peace 9P;P:. The Partnership offered a vehicle for
concrete militar cooperation bet'een DATA and the former members of the +TA, including
operational cooperation in defense budgeting, Foint planning and e1ercises, peacekeeping
operations, disaster relief and crisis management. This is also a possible, though not an
automatic, path'a to'ard eventual DATA membership for states that have successfull
consolidated their transitions to marketoriented, democraticall organized political sstems
and that have refurbished their militaries and ac3uired the capabilities necessar to operate
under Foint DATA command. The chief tasks for the central European states are establishing a
clear civilian control over the militar? fundamental changes in strategic doctrine and
operational planning? and significant changes in procurement and logistics.
@5

4uring his trip to Europe in Jul *77=, President -linton stated that it is %no longer a 3uestion
of 'hether, but 'hen and ho'.% The 2.,. Presidential election in *77@ fi1ed the date 'ith
,enator 4ole and the President both agreeing that enlargement should happen before the ear
/888. Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic have e1pressed a strong interest in being
admitted to DATA at an earl date. ,ecurit concerns, especiall about the stabilit of <ussian
democrac and the peacefulness of <ussian foreign polic, have mattered greatl. ,o does a
strong sense that to be part of the +est means to be part not onl of the E2 but also of DATA.
;or reasons that chapter > discusses in some detail, alone among the central European states
,lovakia ma not be included in the initial group to be admitted to full DATA membership.
;or the same reasons that the central European states 'ish to Foin DATA at an earl date,
government and opposition in <ussia are strongl opposed.
@=
DATA$s Eastern enlargement
'ould tilt the balance of po'er further against a much 'eakened <ussian militar? and,
barring a fi1ed timetable for <ussian DATA membership, it 'ould smbolize that even a
capitalist and democratic <ussia 'as not part of the +est. ;or this reason the )erman
government has not taken a uniform position on this issue. +hile 4efense .inister <Nhe has
been a strong advocate of earl DATA enlargement, -hancellor Kohl and ;oreign .inister
Kinkel have adopted a more cautious line 'hich leaves open the interpretation that the favor
enlargement as a long&term process that eventuall 'ould also include <ussia and thus might
transform DATA from a collective defense to a collective securit institution.
@>
To date,
)erman$s Eastern polic is thus predicated on an un'illingness to choose bet'een DATA
enlargement 'ith or 'ithout <ussia. +hether earlier or later, 'ith the 2nited ,tates and
)erman both committed to their Foining DATA, the central European states, 'ith the possible
e1ception of ,lovakia, are 'ell on their 'a to becoming DATA members.
Pre+ie'
-hapters /&> cover a total of fourteen cases dealing 'ith man of the economic, social, and
ethnic problems that the central European states are facing in the *778s. The concluding
chapter @ argues that, for a number of reasons, the dnamics of central European integration
e1isted onl before *775? since then the central European states have been po'erfull
affected b European and international rather than subregional factors.
+Oodek AnioO, Timoth !rnes, and Elena (ankova argue in chapter / that Poland$s return to
Europe is marked b the strong cross&currents bet'een Polish nationalists, organized around
the trade union and the -atholic -hurch, 'hich helped bring the -ommunist sstem do'n and
cosmopolitans, man of 'hom are voters of post&-ommunist parties, 'ho are deepl attracted
b the model of a secular 'elfare state and a capitalist democrac. Poland$s +estern
orientation is reflected in the affinit bet'een its transformative corporatism that helps govern
its political econom, its embracing of European norms and conventions dealing, for e1ample,
'ith issues of identit 9the )erman ethnic minorit:
@@
and securit 9migration:. <eturning to
Europe can mean importing liberal norms, as in the case of ethnic minorities, or adopting
restrictive policies, as in the case of migration. !ut in all instances it means choosing a
multilateral over a bilateral approach. Poland$s -atholic -hurch mean'hile has in mind not
merel adFusting to European norms but civilizing of +estern Europe, multilaterall if possible
and unilaterall if necessar, through the revitalization of a religious faith and moralit long
lost in a secular and commercial 'orld.
PMter )edeon argues in chapter 5 that, compared to Poland, the role of the -hurch in #ungar
is much 'eaker as is the legac of fearing )erman. (n the case of privatization and the inflo'
of foreign investment, for e1ample, )erman influence is no source of political debate or
concern. (n the area of social polic the )erman model sho's a certain amount of influence
but this effect is undermined b the contradictor constraints of democratic politics and
economic efficienc. !oth constraints limit #ungar$s emulation of the )erman 'elfare state.
The crucial international actors affecting #ungar$s social polic are the (.; and the +orld
!ank. The are ver active in helping develop the formation of a ne' social polic regime in
#ungar. The situation differs in the case of #ungar$s Dational !ank 9D!#:. #ere the )erman
institutional model is po'erful, although democratic politics has mediated this influence. As a
result of legal regulations the autonom of the D!# does not match that of the !undesbank,
and the government made efforts to circumvent the legal restrictions under 'hich it operates.
!ut under circumstances of economic crisis a hardening of e1ternal constraints in international
markets ma counterbalance the effect of democratic politics and pressure the government to
observe more strictl the institutionalized autonom of the Dational !ank.
(n chapter = #nek JeGHbek and ;rantiIek Jich argue that "+$s ac3uisition of ,koda
illuminates the gro'ing international links that tie the -zech econom to )erman, European,
and 'orld markets. !oth ,koda and the -zech government badl 'anted an infusion of
+estern capital and kno'&ho' in order to secure the future of a corporation occuping a
strategic position inside the -zech econom. #o'ever, "+$s takeover has e1posed ,koda to
economic dependence. This opens the -zech econom to international influences fe'
envisaged 'hen the initial deal 'as signed. #ard times in +olfsburg sharpl reduced the
gro'th and technological potential of this crucial -zech compan. -zech media have
internationalized even more rapidl than the automobile industr. )erman influence 'as
virtuall unchecked in the regional press, 'ith one !avarian publishing compan 3uickl
ac3uiring monopol control over the regional press in !ohemia. (n electronic media, on the
other hand, the issuance of a license to the first private national television station in *775
opened the -zech market not to )erman but to American investors 'ho provided t'othirds of
the capital of -ET /*.
;inall, the historicall laden issue of -zech&)erman relations in the -zech borderlands and
the position of the ,udeten )ermans illustrates ho' progress to'ard -zech membership in the
E2 is complicated b a political issue that has bedeviled central European politics for man
decades. Euroregions as a concrete counter have none of the political salience that the
,udeten )ermans evoke 'ith their political demands for official recognition as a dialogue
partner for the -zech government. The difficulties in official )erman&-zech relations e1plain
'h b .arch *77@ half of the -zech public vie'ed )erman as a danger for the -zech
econom, a slight increase as compared to *77/. The proportion of those vie'ing )erman as
a source of political danger Fumped b ten points to 57 percent.
@B
A Foint declaration agreed to
in 4ecember *77@ and signed in Januar *77B b Prime .inister Klaus and -hancellor Kohl
trades )erman apologies for its invasion and anne1ation of -zechoslovakia in *75C&57 for
-zech apologies for the e1pulsion of three million ,udeten )ermans at the end of +orld +ar
((.
@C
Do' ratified, this declaration ma help to graduall improve bilateral relations as both
governments have no' agreed not to burden their future relationship 'ith the burdens of the
past.
4aneI !rzica, Juzana PolHPkovH, and (vo ,amson argue in chapter > that, beond the double
transformation of moving to democrac and capitalism, ,lovakia is e1perimenting, for the first
time in a thousand ears, 'ith sovereign statehood. Thus the fight for po'er in ,lovakia$s
domestic politics is intense and the reluctance of the government to embrace an integration
strateg is palatable. ;or reasons of national identit ,lovakia is interested in charting its o'n
'a, separate from the -zech <epublic. (t sees itself as a bridge bet'een East and +est. (n
some polic areas, such as the conversion of its armaments industr, the ,lovak government
has moved 'ith dramatic speed to shut do'n most of its production facilities in record time,
thus creating enormous unemploment problems in several regions of the countr. <ather
than follo'ing through 'ith the voucher privatization that -zechoslovakia had started, the
decision of the government to maintain national control over privatized firms has been the
source of intense domestic conflict and some nervousness in international capital markets.
!ecause it fits current political needs ,lovakia, more than the other central European states, is
intent on institutionalizing a bank&led )erman rather than a market&led Anglo&American
sstem. ,lovak polic regarding the #ungarian ethnic minorit is not firml committed to
European norms and practices. ,lovakia has permitted the issue of minorit rights to be at the
center of the political agenda since the countr gained its independence in *775. ;inall, in its
securit polic the ,lovak government, more than the Polish government, stresses traditional
militar concerns and has chosen to maintain cordial relations 'ith <ussia 'hile vie'ing DATA
'ith some suspicion. An most counts then ,lovakia is less strongl oriented to'ard 'estern
Europe than are Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic.
The international relations of central Europe, "alerie !unce argues in chapter @, have seen a
substantial change in a ver short time. ,eeking to revive historical memories and consolidate
the gains of the revolution of *7C7, the central European states undertook numerous attempts
at institution building in the region bet'een *778 and *77/. (n Dovember *7C7 Austria,
-zechoslovakia, #ungar, (tal, and the former 6ugoslavia signed the Pentagonale Agreement
'hich Poland Foined in *77* and the 2kraine in *77/? !elarus, !ulgaria, <omania, and
)erman$s !avaria have asked to participate in specific proFects. Poland, #ungar and
-zechoslovakia signed in ;ebruar *778 the so&called Trilateral -ooperation Agreement.
Evoking the historical memor of the *55> meeting bet'een their three kings, the "isegrad
summit of ;ebruar *77* codified the trilateral cooperation bet'een these three central
European states, specificall a strengthening of economic and defense ties as 'ell as the
development of a common approach to DATA and the E2. (n *77/ this organization 'as
renamed the -entral European (nitiative 9-E(:, even though the four central European states
and the 2kraine signed in ;ebruar *775 an agreement covering broader cooperation. "arious
cooperative ventures are covering a 'ide arra of polic sectors dealing 'ith, among other
things, energ, migration, the environment, research and development, culture, tourism,
transport, telecommunications, information, and small enterprises. ;inall, the establishment
of the -entral European ;ree Trade Area 9-E;TA: in *77/ prepared the ground for a decision
to abolish tariffs in the region b *77C.
!ut as chapter @ argues, since *775 these attempts have flagged as central Europe became in
the ees of the -zech government in particular a hindrance for rapid integration 'ith +estern
Europe. !ecause the -zechs, in their o'n self&perceptions, are Europeans, not central
Europeans, European, not central European multilateralism is for the -zech government the
preferred 'a of linking up 3uickl to )erman and Europe. This contrasts sharpl 'ith the
polic the 2krainian government has adopted in its relations 'ith <ussia and the -(,. 4espite
its apparent 'eakness it has opted for bilateralism. Even though it receives the lion$s share of
2.,. aid in central&eastern Europe, the 2krainian government reFects the notion that
multilateralism 'ill someho' constrain <ussia as the stronger po'er. (t fears that
multilateralism 'ill become a vehicle through 'hich <ussian po'er in the -(, 'ill be
magnified. -entral European governments have no similar fears in their relations 'ith the E2
and )erman. -entral European integration 'as also hindered b the constant irritation that
the minorit issue has generated in the relations bet'een #ungar and ,lovakia since *775.
(n short, as has been true of ,candinavia in recent ears, central European cooperation 'as
stmied b the dnamic of European integration 'hich has eaten a'a at integration
processes in all of Europe$s subregions.
The case studies in this book illustrate t'o broad sets of factors that are affecting the political
choices of the central European states. (nternational factors are shaping the definition of
interests of Poland and the -zech <epublic. (n the case studies presented in chapters / and =
Polish interests are shaped b the primac of international norms, -zech interests b the
primac of economic internationalization. !ecause the seven case studies are onl illustrative,
'e cannot be sure that this reflects a more general difference bet'een the t'o countries. The
analtical difference bet'een international norms and economic internationalization is,
ho'ever, significant since, to varing degrees, these t'o factors are affecting all four central
European states.
(n contrast, chapter 5 argues for the relativel greater importance of domestic factors in
#ungar$s policies of economic and social e1perimentation. ,imilarl, chapter > illustrates the
importance of domestic politics in the ,lovak <epublic 'hich, on issues such as privatization
and minorit rights, appears to be motivated substantiall b a domestic politics of regime
consolidation. Although the #ungarian and ,lovak case studies are onl illustrative, the point
to the range of conditions under 'hich domestic politics greatl matter in all four central
European states.
;inall, these chapters illustrate the different 'eight of the memories of past )erman policies,
less po'erful in Poland than in the -zech <epublic, and virtuall absent in #ungar and the
,lovak <epublic.
@7
The effects that the policies and developments of recent ears are having
on the reconstruction of the relationships bet'een )erman and the central European states
remain unclear toda. !ut because the are occurring in a Europe, and 'ith a )erman, that
is much more internationalized than 'as true before *7=>, the evidence of this book suggests
that the developments and policies of the *778s are cutting against a deep historical grain.
;riedrich Daumann$s vision of central Europe %sought a comprehensive political solution for the
national and social problems of his era ... a post'ar )erman societ interrelated 'ith other
nations of .iddle Europe and living 'ith them in a ne' conte1t of social and cultural
relationships.%
B8
( have argued here that central Europe is no longer a political program. (t
ma 'ell be in the process of becoming a set of distinctive domestic structures that 'e can
analze as tpes of corporatist politics that differ but are related to the tpes that have
evolved in Austria, ,'itzerland, and )erman. The effect of international politics on this
'estern&central European corporatism has been profound as a liberal international econom
has contributed to the consolidation and perpetuation of democratic corporatism in the cases
of )erman, Austria, and ,'itzerland. The E2 and international markets more generall are
probabl having an analogous effect on Poland, #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and ,lovakia in
the *778s and beond.
(n the post'ar era central Europe shrank to )erman, 'ith Austria and ,'itzerland as little
noticed appendages. A transatlantic historical consensus measured the )erman problem in
terms of its deviation from the +estern path to modernit. The peaceful citizen revolutions
'hich helped bring about the end of the -old +ar, the liberation of central Europe, and
)erman unification open up the possibilit, indeed the necessit, of rethinking afresh %the
)erman 3uestion,% and other )erman 3uestions in central Europe and in Europe at large.
B*

Daumann$s conception of central Europe entailed the vie' of politics as a zero&sum game. %+e
kno' that 'hen 'e 'in, others must lose. 6et this fact should not keep us from 'anting to
'in.%
B/
)erman nationalism and imperialism, its dnamic societ and its Dietzschean lust for
po'er, no longer preoccup and threaten the 'orld as the once did.
B5
And central European
affairs have moved to the margins of 'orld politics. This development is remarkable in light of
the profound upheavals and horrors 'hich )erman has caused in the past and 'hich central
and eastern Europe have suffered. .ultilateral regimes are inhibiting unilateral )erman
initiatives along the lines of traditional po'er politics. This is also occurring in the 'a po'er
is organized in )erman domestic politics. Po'er and 'ealth in central Europe are beginning to
be thought of not onl in relative but also in absolute terms. 6et if this 'a of thinking is to
become firml institutionalized, the convergence of central Europe 'ith +estern Europe as
'ell as their integration 'ill have to be taken to a ne' and higher level.
;or their helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter (
'ould like to thank "alerie !unce, Timoth !rnes, .arc Ellingstad, PMter )edeon, Elena
(ankova, and Andrei .arkovits.

* Timoth )arton Ash, %4oes -entral Europe E1ist0% in )eorge ,chQpflin and Danc +oods,
eds., (n ,earch of -entral Europe 9 LondonE Polit Press, *7C7:, p. *7*.
/ +alter <ussell .ead, %The Ance and ;uture <eich,% +orld Polic Journal B 9 *778:E @85.
,ee also James Kurth, %)erman and the <eemergence of .itteleuropa,% -urrent #istor 7=,
>7> 9 Dovember *77>:E5C*&C@, and %2nited )erman in Eastern EuropeE The De' Eastern
Ruestion,% Problems of Post&-ommunism =/, * 9 Januar&;ebruar *77>:E >*&>>.
5 Elizabeth Pond and 4avid ,choenbaum, The )erman Ruestion and Ather )erman Ruestions
9 De' 6orkE ,t. .artin$s, *77@:.
= .ichael KumpfmNller, %KQnigsberg und andere Kleinigkeiten,% 4ie Jeit 9 C April *77=:E *5.
> Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Po'erE )erman in Europe 9 (thacaE -ornell 2niversit
Press, *77B:.
@ (bid.
B According to Timoth )arton Ash, ;rench geographers determined a place north of "ilnius
to be the center of Europe. (t is marked b a black granite slab engraved 'ith the longitude
9/>S *7$: and latitude 9>=S >=$: and the 'ords Europos centras. As Ash reports, %( stand on it
'ith 'hat eighteenth&centur travelers used to call sublime emotion, and nearl fall off. (t$s
slipper out there, on the center of Europe.% Timoth )arton Ash, %Journe to the Post&
-ommunist East,% The De' 6ork <evie' of !ooks 9 /5 June *77=:E *C.
C Andrei ,. .arkovits and ,imon <eich, The )erman PredicamentE .emor and Po'er in the
De' Europe 9 (thacaE -ornell 2niversit Press, *77B:.
*8 (mportant contributions to that debate are translated and interpreted in ,chQpflin and
+ood, (n ,earch of -entral Europe.
** ;or an application of a similar analtical perspective to Europe and Asia, see Peter J.
Katzenstein, %(ntroductionE Asian <egionalism in -omparative Perspective,% in Peter J.
Katzenstein and Takashi ,hiraishi, eds., Det'ork Po'erE Japan and Asia 9 (thacaE -ornell
2niversit Press, *77B:, pp. B&*/.
7 %)renze ohne ,chatten,% 4er ,piegel=* T *77@E *5=&@5, and =/T *77@E *=/&@5.
*/ (ver !. Deumann, %<ussia as -entral Europe$s -onstituting Ather,% East European Politics
and ,ocieties B, / 9 ,pring *775:E 5=7&@7, and Deumann, <ussia and the (dea of Europe
9 LondonE <outledge, *77@:. ,ee also .atthias Jimmer, %<eturn of the .ittellage0 The
4iscourse of the -entre in )erman ;oreign Polic,% )erman Politics @, * 9 April *77B:E /5&5C.
*5 ,amuel P. #untington, %The -lash of -ivilizations0% ;oreign Affairs B/, 5 9,ummer *775:E
//&=7.
*= Peter )lotz, %4eutsch&bQhmische Kleinigkeiten oderE Abgerissene )edanken Nber
.itteleuropa%,% 4ie Deue )esellschaftT;rankfurter #efte 55 9 *7C@:E >C=&C>.
*> The Polish data are comparable. A parliamentar debate in ;ebruar *77> revealed that
>@ percent of all national publications and >8 percent of all regional ones, 'ith about B8
percent of the total print run in both instances, 'ere foreigno'ned. The Passauer Deue Presse
has ac3uired almost a monopol position in the regional press of the -zech <epublic and is
also ver prominent in Poland. +odek Anio, personal communication, *5 June *77>.
*@ Andrei ,. .arkovits and -aroln #Qfig, %)erman as a !ridgeE )erman ;oreign -ultural
Polic in a -hanging Europe,% paper presented as part of the seminar series of the American
(nstitute for -ontemporar )erman ,tudies on %)erman$s <ole in ,haping the De' EuropeE
Architect, .odel, !ridge,% +ashington 4.-., 7 Januar *77@, pp. 5>&=@. ,ee also .arkovits
and <eich, The )erman Predicament, pp. *C5&/8/, 'hich are Fointl authored 'ith #Qfig.
*B ( gathered the information on the )oethe (nstitute$s approach in intervie's conducted in
+arsa', !udapest, and Prague bet'een *77/ and *77=. The e1perience of the -enter for
Advanced ,tud is reported in +olf Lepenies, %+ie stUrkt man lokale +issenskulturen0 4rei
;allbeispiele aus !udapest, +arschau und !ukarest,% paper prepared for a meeting of the
'orking group %+issenschaften und +iedervereinigung,% !erlin&!randenburgische Akademie
der +issenschaften, !erlin, >&@ Actober *77>.
*C ,chQpflin and +oods, (n ,earch of -entral Europe. Peter ,tirk, ed., .itteleuropaE #istor
and Prospects 9 EdinburghE Edinburgh 2niversit Press, *77=:. #enr -ord .eer ,
.itteleuropa in )erman Thought and Action *C*>&*7=> 9 The #agueE .. DiFhoff, *7>>:.
*7 Ash, %Post&-ommunist East,% p. *@.
/8 +erner -onze, Astmitteleuropa 9 .unichE -.#. !eck, *77/:.
/* Karl +. 4eutsch, Dationalism and (ts Alternatives 9 De' 6orkE Knopf, *7@7:, pp. 5B&@@.
// <ainer Eisfeld, %.itteleuropa in #istorical and -ontemporar Perspective%,% )erman Politics
and ,ociet/C 9 ,pring *775:E 57.
/5 Konrad #. Jarausch. %;rom ,econd to Third <eichE The Problem of -ontinuit in )erman
;oreign Polic,% -entral European #istor */, * 9 .arch *7B7:E @C&C/. Peter J. Katzenstein
and Takashi ,hiraishi, %-onclusionE <egions in +orld Politics. Japan and Asia&)erman in
Europe,% in Katzenstein and ,hiraishi, Det'ork Po'er, pp. 5B>&BC.
/= "olker !erghahn, %)erman !ig !usiness and the Ruest for a European Economic Empire in
the T'entieth -entur,% in "olker !erghahn, <einhard Deebe, and Jeffre J. Anderson,
)erman !ig !usiness and Europe in the T'entieth -entur 9 Providence, <.(.E !ro'n
2niversit, *775:, pp. *&5C.
/> Peter .. <. ,tirk, %(deas of Economic (ntegration in (nter'ar .itteleuropa,% in ,tirk,
.itteleuropa, pp. C@&***. Anthon .cElligott, %<eforging .itteleuropa in the -rucible of +arE
The Economic (mpact of (ntegration under )erman #egemon,% ibid., pp. */7 & >C. <obert
.ark ,paulding Jr., %)erman Trade Polic in Eastern Europe, *C78&*778E Preconditions for
Appling (nternational Trade Leverage,% (nternational Arganization =>, 5 9 ,ummer *77*:E
5=5&@C. (dem, Asthandel and AstpolitikE )erman ;oreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe
from !ismarck to Adenauer 9 Providence, <(E !erghahn !ooks, *77B:.
/@ Peter J. Katzenstein, -orporatism and -hangeE Austria, ,'itzerland and the Politics of
(ndustr 9 (thacaE -ornell 2niversit Press, *7C=:. Andreas !usch, %The Politics of Price
,tabilitE +h the )erman&,peaking Dations are 4ifferent,% in ;rancis ). -astles , ed.,
;amilies of DationsE Patterns of Public Polic in +estern 4emocracies 9 AldershotE 4artmouth,
*775:, pp. 5>&7*. Andrei ,. .arkovits, %Austrian&)erman <elations in the De' EuropeE
Predicaments of Political and Dational (dentit ;ormation,% )erman ,tudies <evie' *7, *
9 ;ebruar *77@:E 7*&***. .arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, pp. *8*&8C.
/B Postsocialist Path'asE Transforming Politics and Propert in East -entral Europe 9 De'
6orkE -ambridge 2niversit Press, forthcoming:. ;or a useful schematic description of central
European privatization schemes, see also -atherine .ann, ,tefanie Len'a, and 4erek 2tter,
%Political and Economic -onse3uences of Alternative Privatization ,chemes,% 2niversit of
-alifornia, -enter for )erman and European ,tudies, +orking Paper >.*= 9 June *775:.
/C Elena Atanassova (ankova, %The Transformative -orporatism of Eastern Europe,% paper
presented at the conference %The Politics of <egional <estructuring,% -ornell 2niversit, -enter
for (nternational ,tudies, *C&*7 Actober *77@, and %,ocial Partnership after the -old +arE The
Transformative -orporatism of Eastern Europe,% Ph.4. dissertation, ,chool for (ndustrial and
Labor <elations, -ornell 2niversit, *77B.
/7 (ankova, %Transformative -orporatism,% pp. @&*=.
58 Peter J. Katzenstein, ,mall ,tates in +orld .arketsE (ndustrial Polic in Europe 9 (thacaE
-ornell 2niversit Press, *7C>:. Katzenstein, -orporatism and -hange.
5* Peter J. Katzenstein, 4isFoined PartnersE Austria and )erman since *C*> 9 !erkeleE
2niversit of -alifornia Press, *7B@:, pp. *@5&*B@.
5/ Katzenstein, ,mall ,tates in +orld .arkets.
55 #ans&)eorg !etz, %-ontinuit and -hange in Austria, ,'itzerland and )erman,%
unpublished paper, Paul #. Ditze ,chool of Advanced (nternational ,tudies, Johns #opkins
2niversit, n.d.
5= Peter J. Katzenstein, Polic and Politics in +est )ermanE The )ro'th of a ,emisovereign
,tate 9 PhiladelphiaE Temple 2niversit Press, *7CB:.
5> ,cott )issendanner, %4ie dritte <epublik or the ,ame Ald ;ederal <epublic0 +hat the
)erman ,ocial ,cience Literature has to ,a about )erman 2nification and (ts ,stemic
Effects,% .a1&Planck ,ociet, Arbeitsgruppe Transformationsprozesse in den neuen
!undeslUndern, #umboldt 2niversit, !erlin, ,eptember *77@. Klaus von !eme, %The ;ailure
of a ,uccess ,torE )erman <eunification in Light of Polic Evaluation,% -enter for )erman and
European ,tudies, )eorgeto'n 2niversit, Actober *77=.
5@ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., (ndustr and Politics in +est )ermanE To'ard the Third
<epublic 9 (thacaE -ornell 2niversit Press, *7C7:.
5B .arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B/.
5C AndrHs (notai, %The Economic (mpact of )erman <eunification on -entral and Eastern
Europe,% A(-), ,eminar Paper * 9 June *77/:, pp. / & 5 and table *. ;or a variet of data
covering the ears *7C7 T78&*77/T75, see also <elations bet'een )erman and East -entral
Europe until /888E Prospects and Polic AptionsE Proceedings of an (nternational -onference
9 !udapestE (nstitute for +orld Economics of the #ungarian Academ of ,ciences, *77=:, pp.
@>&@B, C8&C=, 78&75, 7C&77. ,e also Patricia 4avis and Peter 4ombros'ki, %Appetite of the
+olfE )erman ;oreign Assistance for -entral and Eastern Europe,% )erman Politics @, * 9 April
*77B:E *&//.
57 Klaus&4ieter ,chmidt and Petra DauFoks, %+estern Enterprises on Eastern .arketsE The
)erman Perspective,% Kiel +orking Paper Do. @8B 9 KielE Kiel (nstitute of +orld Economics,
4ecember *775:, pp. *8&**.
=8 4ie Jeit 5* 9 /@ Jul *77@:E *C. .arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B=. .arc
Ellingstad, %)erman 4omination in -entral EuropeE <oom for Potential -oncern,% JATE
,ociolog 4epartment, ,zeged, #ungar, p. >.
=* Trade among the central European economies has declined in all four countries after *7C7
and remains ver limited, despite the political efforts of organizing a free trade area. Anl the
trade bet'een the -zech <epublic and ,lovakia is an e1ception? it is almost t'ice as large as
the total trade in the rest of the region.
=/ .arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B@. Ellingstad, %)erman 4omination,% p. >.
=5 .arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *BB.
== AnFana ,hrivastava, %,maller ;irms Lead )erman Push to East,% The +all ,treet Journal
9 *= June *77>:E A*>.
=> %Dur 'enige fliehen,% 4er ,piegel @T *77>E 7=&7>. ,chmidt and DauFoks, %+estern
Enterprises on Eastern .arkets,% p. *5.
=@ <einhard +olf, %The 4oubtful .overE )erman and DATA E1pansion,% in 4avid #aglund,
ed., +ill DATA )o East0 The 4ebate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance 9forthcoming?
currentl, unpublished paper, 2niversit of #alle, ;ebruar *77@:, p. =, footnote 5. .arkovits
and <eich, )erman Predicament, pp. *BB, *C8.
=B Jeremiah <iemer, %+est )erman and the Transition in Eastern Europe,% paper prepared
for the Annual .eeting of the American Political ,cience Association, ,an ;rancisco,
,eptember *778, p. /8. ,ee also, Peter J. Katzenstein, %The ,maller European ,tates,
)erman, and Europe,% in Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Po'er, chapter C, pp. /8&// 9manuscript:.
=C <onald #. Linden, %The De' (nternational Political Econom of East Europe,% ,tudies in
-omparative -ommunism />, * 9 .arch *77/:E B.
=7 .ark .. Delson, %T'o ,tles of !usiness "ie in East EuropeE Americans, )ermans have a
.otive in Tring to .old La's,% The +all ,treet Journal 9 5 April *77>:E A*8. Delson reports
an implausibl high figure of L>.@C billion
>8 The Polish zlot has since .a *77> fluctuated 'ithin a band of VB percent against a
basket of five currencies 9=> percent dollar? 5> percent 4.? /8 percent other:. The #ungarian
forint has been on a cra'ling peg since *77> 'ith a band of V/./> percent around a 'eighted
currenc basket 9B8 percent E-2 and 58 percent dollar:. ;or the -zech koruna the band is
VB.> percent and the trade 'eights are @> percent E-2 and 5> percent dollar. +ith identical
trade 'eights, for the ,lovak koruna the band is onl V5 percent.
>* Delson, %T'o ,tles of !usiness "ie in East Europe.% Delson mentions an unrealisticall
high figure of four billion dollars 'hich the 2nited ,tates supposedl spent bet'een *775 and
*77>.
>/ <aimo "Urnen, %Post&#egemonic and Post&,ocialist <egionalismE A -omparison of -entral
Europe and East Asia,% paper prepared for the (,A&JA(< Joint -onvention in .akuhari, Japan,
/8&// ,eptember *77@, p. /*.
>5 Joseph .. )rieco, %"ariation in <egional Economic (nstitutions in +estern Europe, East
Asia and the AmericasE .agnitude and ,ources% 9 4uke 2niversit, Political ,cience
4epartment, *77=:, pp. /8&/=, 58&5@, and tables /, 5, B&7. Alan ,iaroff , %(nterdependence
versus Asmmetr0 A -omparison of the European and Asia&Pacific Economic <egions,% paper
presented at the (,A&+est .eetings, ,eattle, *=&*> Actober *77=.
>= Ale1is )alinos, %-entral Europe and the E2E Prospects for -loser (ntegration,% <;ET<L
<esearch <eport 5, /7 9 // Jul *77=:E /*. ,ee also AndrHs (notai, %-entral and Eastern
Europe,% in -. <andall #enning, Eduard #ochreiter, and )ar -lde #ufbauer , eds., <eviving
the European 2nion 9 +ashington 4.-.E (nstitute for (nternational Economics, April *77=:, pp.
*57&@=, and !arr P. !os'orth and )ur Afer , <eforming Planned Economies in an (ntegrating
+orld Econom 9 +ashington 4.-.E The !rookings (nstitution, *77>:, pp. **7&=@. John Pinder,
The European -ommunit and Eastern Europe 9 De' 6orkE -ouncil of ;oreign <elations Press,
*77*:.
>> Ellingstad, %)erman 4omination in -entral Europe,% p. =.
>@ Thomas A. !alis, The +est and Eastern EuropeE Economic ,tatecraft and Political -hange
9 +estport, -onn.E Praeger, *77=:. +olfgang #. <einicke, !uilding a De' EuropeE The
-hallenge of ,stem Transformation and ,stemic <eform 9 +ashington 4.-.E !rookings
(nstitution, *77/:. %After -ommunismE +hat0% 4$dalus */5, 5 9 ,ummer *77=:.
>B Linden, %De' (nternational Political Econom,% p. B.
>C )alinos, %-entral Europe and the E2,% pp. /8&/*.
>7 AndrHs (notai estimates that the total transfer of E2 funds to the central European
economies 'ould amount to about si1t to 78 percent 9or ten to si1teen billion E-2: of the
current subsidies paid to the southern European states. The longer the dela before the
central European states become full&fledged members, the smaller the needed transfer
paments. ,ee his paper, %;rom the Association Agreements to ;ull .embership0 The
4namics of <elations bet'een the -entral and Eastern European -ountries and the European
2nion,% paper presented at the ;ourth !iennial (nternational -onference of European
-ommunit ,tudies Association, **&*= .a *77>, -harleston, ,outh -arolina, p. *5.
@8 -hristian 4eubner, #einz Kramer, Elke Thiel, %4ie Er'eiterung der EuropUischen 2nion
nach .ittel& und Asteuropa,% ,+P&AP /C*C 9,tiftung +issenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen,
Dovember *775:, p. /=.
@* Allen ,ens, The ,ecurit of ,mall ,tates in Post&-old +ar EuropeE A De' <esearch
Agenda0, +orking Paper Do. *, 2niversit of !ritish -olumbia, (nstitute of (nternational
<elations, Januar *77=. ,ee also the debate bet'een -harles A. Kupchan and -lifford A.
Kupchan, %-oncerts, -ollective ,ecurit, and the ;uture of Europe,% (nternational ,ecurit *@,
* 9 ,ummer *77*:E **=&@*, and <ichard K. !etts, %,stems for Peace or -auses of +ar0%
(nternational ,ecurit *B, * 9 ,ummer *77/:E >=5.
@/ Lecture delivered b .artin Palous, former foreign minister of -zechoslovakia, %,ecurit
(ssues in Eastern and -entral Europe,% -ornell 2niversit, (nstitute for European ,tudies, *C
April *77=.
@5 Thomas ,. ,zana and E ,tephen Larrabee, East European .ilitar <eform after the -old
+arE (mplications for the 2nited ,tates 9 ,anta .onicaE <AD4, Dational 4efense <esearch
(nstitute, *77>:. -onversion of the .ilitar ProductionE -omparative Approach 9 !ratislava?
;riedrich&Ebert ;oundation, *775:. ,zemlMr, <elations bet'een )erman and East -entral
Europe, pp. B&>5. Joltan !aran, %The .ilitar and Political Transitions in Eastern Europe,%
unpublished manuscript, 4epartment of )overnment, 2niversit of Te1as at Austin, n.d.
@= Though less vocal, the 2krainian government also fears being left out of an emerging
European securit architecture and thus having to cope 'ith <ussia on its o'n.
@> +olf, %The 4oubtful .over.%
@@ ,ee also )rzegorz Ekiert, %The <eturn of the )erman .inorit to Poland,% )erman Politics
and ,ociet /@ 9 ,ummer *77/:E 78&*8C.
@B ;rankfurter Allgemeine Jeitung 9 *8 April *77@:E *.
@C -raig <. +hitne, %)ermans and -zechs Tr to #eal #atreds of the Dazi Era,% The De'
6ork Times 9 // Januar *77B:E A5.
@7 .arkovits and <eich, The )erman Predicament, pp. *87&*7. Petr Prhoda, %+enn die
Erinnerung die Jukunft blockiert,% 4ie Jeit 9 *8 .a *77@:E C.
B8 #enr -ord .eer, %Daumann and <athenauE Their Paths to the +eimar <epublic,% in
Leonard Krieger and ;ritz ,tern, eds., The <esponsibilit of Po'erE #istorical Essas in #onor
of #aFo #olborn 9 )arden -itE 4oubleda, *7@B:, pp. 58/, 58@.
B* .ichael )eer and Konrad #. Jarausch, %The ;uture of the )erman PastE Transatlantic
<eflections for the *778s,% -entral European #istor //, 5T= 9 ,eptember T 4ecember *7C7:E
//7&>7. ;or an earl attempt that seeks to place )erman 3uestions in a ne' light after *7C7,
see Pond and ,choenbaum, The $)erman Ruestion$ and other )erman Ruestions.
B/ .eer, %Daumann and <athenau,% pp. 58=&>.
B5 4avid -alleo, The )erman Problem <econsideredE )erman and the +orld Arder, *CB8 to
the Present 9 -ambridgeE -ambridge 2niversit Press, *7BC:.