Multiple Modernities

Author(s): S. N. Eisenstadt
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp. 1-29
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S. N. Eisenstadt
Multiple
Modernities
I
The
notion of
"multiple
modernities" denotes
a certain
view of the
contemporary
world?indeed of the
history
and characteristics of the modern era?that
goes against
the views
long prevalent
in
scholarly
and
general
discourse. It
goes against
the view of the "classical" theories of moderniza
tion and of the
convergence
of industrial societies
prevalent
in
the
1950s,
and indeed
against
the classical
sociological analy
ses of
Marx, Durkheim,
and
(to
a
large
extent)
even of
Weber,
at least in one
reading
of his work.
They
all
assumed,
even if
only implicitly,
that the cultural
program
of
modernity
as it
developed
in modern
Europe
and the basic institutional constel
lations that
emerged
there would
ultimately
take
over in all
modernizing
and modern
societies;
with the
expansion
of mo
dernity, they
would
prevail throughout
the world.1
The
reality
that
emerged
after the so-called
beginnings
of
modernity,
and
especially
after World War
II,
failed to bear out
these
assumptions.
The actual
developments
in
modernizing
societies have refuted the
homogenizing
and
hegemonic
as
sumptions
of this Western
program
of
modernity.
While
a
gen
eral trend toward structural differentiation
developed
across a
wide
range
of institutions in most of these societies?in
family
life,
economic and
political
structures, urbanization,
modern
education,
mass
communication,
and individualistic orienta
S. N. Eisenstadt is Rose Issacs
Professor
Emeritus
of Sociology
at The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem.
1
2 S. N. Eisenstadt
tions?the
ways
in which these arenas were
defined and
orga
nized varied
greatly,
in different
periods
of their
development,
giving
rise to
multiple
institutional and
ideological patterns.
Significantly,
these
patterns
did not constitute
simple
continua
tions in the modern
era
of the traditions of their
respective
societies. Such
patterns
were
distinctively modern, though greatly
influenced
by specific
cultural
premises, traditions,
and histori
cal
experiences.
All
developed distinctly
modern
dynamics
and
modes of
interpretation,
for which the
original
Western
project
constituted the crucial
(and usually ambivalent)
reference
point.
Many
of the movements that
developed
in non-Western societ
ies articulated
strong
anti-Western or even
antimodern
themes,
yet
all
were
distinctively
modern. This
was true not
only
of the
various nationalist and traditionalist movements that
emerged
in these societies from about the middle of the nineteenth
cen
tury
until after World War
II,
but
also,
as we
shall
note,
of the
more
contemporary
fundamentalist
ones.
The idea of
multiple
modernities
presumes
that the best
way
to understand the
contemporary
world?indeed to
explain
the
history
of
modernity?is
to see it as a
story
of continual consti
tution and reconstitution of a
multiplicity
of cultural
programs.
These
ongoing
reconstructions of
multiple
institutional and ideo
logical patterns
are
carried forward
by specific
social actors in
close connection with
social, political,
and intellectual
activists,
and also
by
social movements
pursuing
different
programs
of
modernity, holding
very
different views
on
what makes societ
ies modern.
Through
the
engagement
of these actors with broader
sectors of their
respective societies, unique expressions
of
mo
dernity
are realized. These activities have not been confined to
any single society
or
state,
though
certain societies and states
proved
to be the
major
arenas
where social activists were
able
to
implement
their
programs
and
pursue
their
goals. Though
distinct
understandings
of
multiple modernity developed
within
different
nation-states,
and within different ethnic and cultural
groupings,
among communist, fascist,
and fundamentalist
move
ments, each,
however different from the
others,
was in
many
respects
international.
One of the most
important implications
of the term
"multiple
modernities" is that
modernity
and Westernization are not
Multiple
Modernities 3
identical;
Western
patterns
of
modernity
are not the
only
"au
thentic"
modernities, though they enjoy
historical
precedence
and continue to be
a
basic reference
point
for others.
In
acknowledging
a
multiplicity
of
continually evolving
mo
dernities,
one
confronts the
problem
of
just
what constitutes the
common core
of
modernity.
This
problem
is exacerbated and
indeed transformed with the
contemporary
deconstruction
or
decomposition
of
many
of the
components
of "classical" models
of the nation and of
revolutionary
states,
particularly
as a
consequence
of
globalization. Contemporary
discourse has raised
the
possibility
that the modern
project,
at least in terms of the
classical formulation that held
sway
for the last two
centuries,
is exhausted. One
contemporary
view claims that such exhaus
tion is manifest in the "end of
history."2
The other view best
represented
is
Huntington's
notion of
a "clash of
civilizations,"
in which Western civilization?the
seeming epitome
of moder
nity?is
confronted
by
a
world in which
traditional,
fundamen
talist, antimodern,
and anti-Western civilizations?some
(most
notably,
the Islamic and so-called Confucian
groupings)
view
ing
the West with animus or
disdain?are
predominant.3
II
The cultural and
political
program
of
modernity,
as it devel
oped
first in Western and Central
Europe, entailed,
as
Bj?rn
Wittrock
notes,
distinct
ideological
as well as
institutional
pre
mises. The cultural
program
of
modernity
entailed
some
very
distinct shifts in the
conception
of human
agency,
and of its
place
in the flow of time. It carried a
conception
of the future
characterized
by
a
number of
possibilities
realizable
through
autonomous human
agency.
The
premises
on
which the
social,
ontological,
and
political
order
were
based,
and the
legitima
tion of that
order,
were no
longer
taken for
granted.
An inten
sive
reflexivity developed
around the basic
ontological pre
mises of structures of social and
political authority?a
reflexiv
ity
shared
even
by modernity's
most radical
critics,
who in
principle
denied its
validity.
It was most
successfully
formu
lated
by
Weber. To follow
James
D. Faubian's
exposition
of
Weber's
conception
of
modernity:
4 S. N. Eisenstadt
Weber finds the existential threshold of
modernity
in a certain
deconstruction: of what he
speaks
of
as
the "ethical
postulate
that
the world is a
God-ordained,
and hence somehow
meaningfully
and
ethically
oriented cosmos...."
. . .
What Weber asserts?what in
any
event
might
be
extrapolated
from his
assertions-fis
that the threshold of
modernity may
be
marked
precisely
at the moment when the
unquestioned legitimacy
of
a
divinely preordained
social order
began
its decline.
Modernity
emerges?or,
more
accurately,
a
range
of
possible
modernities
emerge?only
when what had been seen as an
unchanging
cosmos
ceases to be taken for
granted.
Countermoderns
reject
that re
proach, believing
that what is
unchanging
is not the social
order,
but the tasks that the construction and
functioning
of
any
social
order must address.
...
. . .
One can extract two theses: Whatever else
they may be,
mo
dernities in all their
variety
are
responses
to the same existential
problematic.
The second: whatever else
they may be,
modernities
in all their
variety
are
precisely
those
responses
that leave the
problematic
in
question
intact,
that formulate visions of life and
practice
neither
beyond
nor in denial of it but rather within
it,
even
in deference
to it.
. .
.4
The
degree
of
reflexivity
characteristic of
modernity
went
beyond
what
was
crystallized
in the axial civilizations. The
reflexivity
that
developed
in the modern
program
not
only
focused
on
the
possibility
of different
interpretations
of core
transcendental visions and basic
ontological conceptions
preva
lent in a
particular society
or
civilization;
it came to
question
the
very givenness
of such visions and the institutional
patterns
related to them. It
gave
rise to an awareness of the
possibility
of
multiple
visions that
could,
in
fact,
be contested.5
Such awareness was
closely
connected with two central
com
ponents
of the modern
project emphasized
in
early
studies of
modernization
by
both Daniel Lerner and Alex Inkeles.6 The
first
recognized
among
those either modern
or
becoming
"mod
ernized" the
awareness of
a
great variety
of roles
existing
beyond
narrow,
fixed, local,
and familial
ones.
The second
recognized
the
possibility
of
belonging
to wider
translocal,
possibly changing,
communities.
Multiple
Modernities 5
Central to this cultural
program
was an
emphasis
on
the
autonomy
of
man:
his
or
her
(in
its initial
formulation, certainly
"his") emancipation
from the fetters of traditional
political
and
cultural
authority.
In the continuous
expansion
of the realm of
personal
and institutional freedom and
activity,
such
autonomy
implied, first, reflexivity
and
exploration; second,
active con
struction and
mastery
of
nature,
including
human nature. This
project
of
modernity
entailed
a
very strong emphasis
on
the
autonomous
participation
of members of
society
in the consti
tution of the social and
political order,
on the autonomous
access
of all members of the
society
to these orders and to their
centers.
From the
conjunctions
of these different
conceptions
arose a
belief in the
possibility
that
society
could be
actively
formed
by
conscious human
activity.
Two
complementary
but
potentially
contradictory
tendencies
developed
within this
program
about
the best
ways
in which social construction could take
place.
The
first, crystallized
above all in the Great
Revolutions, gave
rise, perhaps
for the first time in
history,
to the belief in the
possibility
of
bridging
the
gap
between the transcendental and
mundane orders?of
realizing through
conscious human
agency,
exercised in social
life, major Utopian
and
eschatological
vi
sions. The second
emphasized
a
growing recognition
of the
legitimacy
of
multiple
individual and
group
goals
and
interests,
as a
consequence
allowed for
multiple interpretations
of the
common
good.7
ill
The modern
program
entailed also a
radical transformation of
the
conceptions
and
premises
of the
political order,
the consti
tution of the
political
arena,
and the characteristics of the
political process.
Central to the modern idea was
the break
down of all traditional
legitimations
of the
political order,
and
with it the
opening up
of different
possibilities
in
the construc
tion of a new order. These
possibilities
combined themes of
rebellion, protest,
and intellectual
antinomianism,
allowing
for
new
center-formation and
institution-building, giving
rise to
6 S. N. Eisenstadt
movements of
protest
as a
continual
component
of the
political
process.8
These
ideas,
closely aligned
with what
were
emerging
as
the
defining
characteristics of the modern
political
arena,
empha
sized the
openness
of this
arena
and of
political processes,
generally, together
with
a
strong acceptance
of active
partici
pation by
the
periphery
of
"society"
in
questions
of
political
import. Strong
tendencies toward the
permeation
of social
pe
ripheries by
the
centers,
and the
impingement
of the
peripheries
on
the
centers, led, inevitably,
to a
blurring
of the distinctions
between center and
periphery.
This laid the foundation for a
new
and
powerful
combination of the "charismatization" of the
center or centers with themes and
symbols
of
protest; these,
in
turn,
became the elemental
components
of modern transcen
dental visions. Themes and
symbols
of
protest?equality
and
freedom, justice
and
autonomy, solidarity
and
identity?be
came
central
components
of the modern
project
of the emanci
pation
of
man. It was
indeed the
incorporation
of the
periphery's
themes of
protest
into the center that heralded the radical
transformation of various sectarian
Utopian
visions into central
elements of the
political
and cultural
program.
From the
ideology
and
premises
of the
political program
of
modernity
and the
core
characteristics of modern
political
insti
tutions,
there
emerged
three central
aspects
of the modern
political
process:
the
restructuring
of
center-periphery
relations
as
the
principal
focus of
political dynamics
in modern
societies;
a
strong tendency
toward
politicizing
the demands of various
sectors of
society,
and the conflicts between
them;
and
a con
tinuing struggle
over
the definition of the realm of the
political.
Indeed,
it is
only
with the
coming
of
modernity
that
drawing
the
boundaries of the
political
becomes
one
of the
major
foci of
open
political
contestation and
struggle.
IV
Modernity
entailed also a distinctive mode of
constructing
the
boundaries of collectivities and collective identities.9 New
con
crete definitions of the basic
components
of collective identities
developed?civil, primordial
and
universalistic,
transcendental
Multiple
Modernities 7
or
"sacred."
Strong
tendencies
developed
toward
framing
these
definitions in absolutist
terms,
emphasizing
their civil
compo
nents. At the
same
time,
connections were
drawn between the
construction of
political
boundaries and those of cultural collec
tivities. This made inevitable
an
intensified
emphasis
on
the
territorial boundaries of such
collectivities, creating
continual
tension between their territorial and/or
particular components
and those that were
broader,
more
universalistic. In at least
partial
contrast to the axial
civilizations,
collective identities
were no
longer
taken as
given, preordained by
some transcen
dental vision and
authority,
or
sanctioned
by perennial
custom.
They
constituted foci of contestation and
struggle,
often couched
in
highly ideological
terms.
V
As the civilization of
modernity developed
first in the
West,
it
was
from its
beginnings
beset
by
internal antinomies and
con
tradictions, giving
rise to continual critical discourse and
politi
cal contestations. The basic antinomies of
modernity
consti
tuted
a
radical transformation of those characteristics of the
axial civilizations. Centered
on
questions
unknown to that ear
lier
time,
they
showed an awareness
of
a
great range
of tran
scendental visions and
interpretations.
In the modern
program
these were
transformed into
ideological
conflicts between
con
tending
evaluations of the
major
dimensions of human
experi
ence
(especially
reason
and emotions and their
respective place
in human life and
society).
There were new
assertions about the
necessity
of
actively constructing society;
control and
autonomy,
discipline
and freedom became
burning
issues.
Perhaps
the most critical
rift,
in both
ideological
and
political
terms,
was
that which
separated
universal and
pluralistic
vi
sions?between
a
view that
accepted
the existence of different
values and rationalities and a
view that conflated different
values
and,
above
all,
rationalities in a
totalistic
way.
This
tension
developed primarily
with
respect
to the
very concept
of
reason
and its
place
in the constitution of human
society.
It was
manifest,
as
Stephen
Toulmin has shown in a
somewhat
exag
gerated way,
in the difference between the
more
pluralistic
8 S. N. Eisenstadt
conceptions
of
Montaigne
or Erasmus as
against
the
totalizing
vision
promulgated by
Descartes.10 The most
significant
move
ment to universalize different rationalities?often identified
as
the
major message
of the
Enlightenment?was
that of the
sov
ereignty
of
reason,
which subsumed
value-rationality
(Wertrationalit?t),
or
substantive
rationality,
under instrumen
tal
rationality (Zweckrationalit?t), transforming
it into a
total
izing
moralistic
Utopian
vision.
Cutting
across
these
tensions,
there
developed
within the
program
of
modernity
continual contradictions between the
basic
premises
of its cultural and
political
dimensions and
major
institutional
developments.
Of
particular importance?so strongly
emphasized by
Weber?was the creative dimension inherent in
visions
leading
to the
crystallization
of
modernity,
and the
flattening
of these
visions,
the "disenchantment" of the
world,
inherent in
growing
routinization and bureaucratization. This
was a
conflict between
an
overreaching
vision
by
which the
modern world became
meaningful
and the
fragmentation
of
such
meaning by
dint of
an
unyielding
momentum toward
au
tonomous
development
in all institutional
arenas?economic,
political,
and cultural. This reflects the
inherently
modern ten
sion between
an
emphasis
on human
autonomy
and the restric
tive controls inherent in the institutional realization of modern
life: in Peter
Wagner's formulation,
between freedom and
con
trol.11
VI
Within modern
political discourse,
these stresses have been
manifest in the intractable contention between the
legitimacy
of
myriad
discrete individual and
group interests,
of different
conceptions
of the
common
good
and moral
order,
and the
totalistic
ideologies
that
flatly
denied the
legitimacy
of such
pluralities.
One
major
form of totalistic
ideology emphasized
the
primacy
of collectivities
perceived
as
distinct
ontological
entities based
on common
primordial
or
spiritual
attributes?
principally
a national
collectivity.
A second has been the
Jacobin
view,
whose historical roots
go
back
to
medieval
eschatological
sources.
Central
to
Jacobin thought
was a belief in the
primacy
Multiple
Modernities 9
of
politics,
in
politics being
able to reconstitute
society,
trans
forming society through
the mobilization of
participatory po
litical action. Whatever the differences between these collectiv
ist
ideologies, they
shared
a
deep suspicion
of
open, public
discussion, political
processes,
and
(especially) representative
institutions. Not
surprisingly, they
shared
strong
autocratic
tendencies.
These various stresses in the
political program
of
modernity
were
closely
related to those between the different modes of
legitimation
of modern
regimes?between,
on
the
one
hand,
procedural legitimation
in terms of civil adherence to rules of
the
game, and,
on
the
other,
"substantive" modes of
legitima
tion,
relying
above
all,
in Edward Shils's
terminology,
on
vari
ous
primordial, "sacred," religious,
or
secular-ideological
com
ponents.12
Parallel contradictions
developed
around the con
struction of collective
identities, promulgated by
new
kinds of
activists?the national movements.
VII
Of
special importance among
these activists were
social move
ments,
often movements of
protest. They transformed,
in the
modern
setting,
some
of the
major
heterodoxies of the axial
civilizations, especially
those heterodoxies that
sought
to
bring
about, by political
action and the reconstruction of the
center,
the realization of certain
Utopian
visions. Most
important among
the movements that
developed during
the nineteenth
century
and the first six decades of the twentieth were
the
liberal,
socialist,
or
communist
movements;
they
were
followed
by
two
others,
fascist and
national-socialist,
building
on
nationalist
prejudices.
These movements were
international,
even
where
their bases
or roots
lay
in
specific
countries. The more success
ful
among
them
crystallized
in distinct
ideological
and institu
tional
patterns
that often became identified with
a
specific
state
or
nation
(as
was
the
case
with
Revolutionary
France
and,
later,
with Soviet
Russia),
but their reach extended far
beyond
national frontiers.13
The contestations between these movements and others?
religious, cooperative, syndicalist,
or
anarchist?were not sim
10 S. N. Eisenstadt
ply ideological. They
all took
place
within the
specific
confines
of the modern
political
arena;
they
were
affected
as
well
by
the
modern
political
process,
especially
the
continuing struggle
over
the boundaries of the realm of the
political.
Patterns of contention between these social actors
developed
in all modern societies around
poles
rooted in the antinomies
inherent in the
specific
cultural and
political programs
of mo
dernity.
The first
was
the extent of the
homogenization
of
major
modern
collectivities, significantly
influenced
by
the
ex
tent to which the
primordial, civil,
and universalistic dimen
sions or
components
of collective
identity
became interwoven
in these different societies. The second
pole
reflected
a
confron
tation between
pluralistic
and
universalizing
orientations.
These clashes
emerged
in all modern collectivities and
states,
first in
Europe,
later in the
Americas, and,
in
time,
throughout
the world.
They
were
crucially important
in
shaping
the
vary
ing patterns
of modern
societies,
first within territorial and
nation-states, generating
within them
differing
definitions of
the
premises
of
political
order.
They
defined the
accountability
of
authority
relations between state and civil
society; they
established
patterns
of collective
identity, shaping
the self
perceptions
of individual
societies,
especially
their
self-percep
tion as
modern.
As these contestations
emerged
in
Europe,
the dominant
pat
tern of the conflicts
was
rooted in
specific European traditions,
focused
along
the rifts between
Utopian
and civil orientations.
Principles
of
hierarchy
and
equality competed
in the construc
tion of
political
order and
political
centers. The state and civil
society
were seen as
separate
entities
by
some.
Collective iden
tity, very
often couched in
Utopian
terms,
was
differently
de
fined. The
variety
of
resulting
societal outcomes can
be illus
trated
by
the different
conceptions
of state that
developed
on
the continent and in
England.
There
was
the
strong homogeniz
ing
"laicization of"
France, or,
in a
different
vein,
of the Lutheran
Scandinavian
countries,
as
against
the much more consocia
tional and
pluralistic arrangements
common to Holland and
Switzerland,
and to a
much smaller extent in Great Britain. The
strong
aristocratic semifeudal
conception
of
authority
in Brit
Multiple
Modernities 11
ain contrasted with the
more
democratic,
even
populist,
views
in other
European
countries.14
In the twenties and
thirties, indelibly
marked
by
the tensions
and antinomies of
modernity
as
they developed
in
Europe,
there
emerged
the first
distinct, ideological,
"alternative" moderni
ties?the communist Soviet
types,
discussed in this issue
by
Johann Arnason,
and the fascist/national-socialist
type.15
The
socialist and communist movements were
fully
set within the
framework of the cultural
program
of
modernity,
and above all
within the framework of the
Enlightenment
and of the
major
revolutions. Their criticism of the
program
of modern
capitalist
society
revolved around their
concept
of the
incompleteness
of
these modern
programs. By
contrast,
the national or
national
istic
movements,
especially
of the extreme fascist
or
national
socialist
variety,
aimed above all at
reconfiguring
the bound
aries of modern collectivities.
They sought
to
bring
about
a
confrontation between the universalistic and the more
particu
laristic,
primordial components
of the collective identities of
modern
regimes.
Their criticism of the
existing
modern order
denied the universalistic
components
of the cultural
program
of
modernity, especially
in its
Enlightenment
version.
They
showed
less
missionary
zeal in
transcending purely
national bound
aries.
Yet,
significantly, though they repudiated
the universal
istic
components
of the cultural and
political program
of
mo
dernity, they sought
in some
ways
to
transpose
them into their
own
particularistic
visions, attempting
to
present
these visions
in some
semi-universalistic terms?of
which, paradoxically,
race
might
be one.
By
the middle of the
century,
the continual
development
of
multiple
modernities in
Europe
testified to an
ongoing
evolu
tion. As Nil?fer G?le
observed,
one of the most
important
characteristics of
modernity
is
simply
its
potential capacity
for
continual self-correction. That
quality, already
manifest in the
nineteenth
century,
in the encounter of modern societies with
the
many
problems
created
by
the industrial and democratic
revolutions,
could
not, however,
be taken for
granted.
The
development
of
modernity
bore within it destructive
possibili
ties that were
voiced,
somewhat
ironically,
often
by
some of its
most radical
critics,
who
thought modernity
to be
a
morally
12 S. N. Eisenstadt
destructive
force, emphasizing
the
negative
effects of certain of
its core
characteristics. The
crystallization
of
European
moder
nity
and its later
expansion
was
by
no means
peaceful.
Con
trary
to the
optimistic
visions of
modernity
as
inevitable
progress,
the
crystallizations
of modernities
were
continually
interwoven
with internal conflict and
confrontation,
rooted in the contra
dictions and tensions attendant
on
the
development
of the
capi
talist
systems, and,
in the
political
arena,
on
the
growing
de
mands for democratization. All these factors
were
compounded
by
international
conflicts,
exacerbated
by
the modern state and
imperialist
systems.
War and
genocide
were
scarcely
new
phe
nomena in
history.
But
they
became
radically transformed,
intensified, generating specifically
modern modes of barbarism.
The
ideologization
of
violence, terror,
and war?first and most
vividly
witnessed in the French Revolution?became the most
important,
indeed the
exclusive, citizenship components
of the
continuation of modern states. The
tendency
to such
ideologies
of violence became
closely
related to the fact that the nation
state became the focus of
symbols
of collective
identity.16
The
Holocaust,
which took
place
in the
very
center of
modernity,
was
the extreme manifestation and became
a
symbol
of its
negative,
destructive
potential,
of the barbarism
lurking
within
its
very
core.
VIII
In the discourse
on
modernity,
several themes
developed,
none
more
important
than the
one that stressed the continual
con
frontation between
more "traditional" sectors of
society
and
the so-called modern centers or sectors that
developed
within
them.
So, too,
there was an
inherent tension between the cul
ture of
modernity,
the modern "rational" model of the
Enlight
enment that
emerged
as
hegemonic
in certain
periods
and
places
and others construed
as
reflecting
the
more
"authentic" cul
tural traditions of
specific
societies.
Among
the bearers of
ideologies
of traditional
authenticity,
and within the
more tra
ditional sectors of certain
societies,
there
developed
also
an
enduring
ambivalence to modern cultures and their
putatively
universalistic,
exclusivist
premises
and
symbols
and
a
continual
Multiple
Modernities 13
oscillation between
cosmopolitanism
and localism. These themes
developed
first within
Europe itself; they continued, though
in
a
different
vein,
with the
expansion
of
modernity
to the Ameri
cas and
(especially)
to Asian and African countries.
IX
The first radical transformation of the
premises
of cultural and
political
order took
place
with the
expansion
of
modernity
in
the Americas.
There,
distinctive
modernities, reflecting
novel
patterns
of institutional
life,
with
new
self-conceptions
and new
forms of collective
consciousness, emerged.
To
say
this is to
emphasize
that
practically
from the
beginning
of
modernity's
expansion multiple
modernities
developed,
all within what
may
be defined
as
the Western civilizational framework. It is
impor
tant to note that such
modernities,
Western but
significantly
different from those in
Europe, developed
first not in Asia?
Japan, China,
or
India?or in Muslim societies where
they
might
have been attributed to the existence of distinct
non
European traditions,
but within the broad framework of West
ern
civilizations.
They
reflected
a
radical transformation of
European premises.
The
crystallization
of distinct
patterns
of
modernity
in the
Americas took
place,
as
J?rgen Heideking's
essay shows, through
a
confrontational discourse with
Europe?especially
with En
gland
and France. While it was not common to couch these
arguments
in terms of
differing interpretations
of
modernity,
they
were
indeed focused
on
the
advantages
and
disadvantages
of institutional
patterns
that
developed
in the United
States,
distinctly
different from those in
Europe. Moreover,
in this
discourse the
major
themes
relating
to the international dimen
sion of
modernity
were
clearly
articulated. Such confrontations
became characteristic of the
ongoing
discourse about moder
nity
as it
expanded through
the world. While this was
also true
of Latin
America,
there were
important
differences between the
Americas,
especially
between the United States and Latin
America. In Latin
America,
"external"?even if often ambiva
lent?reference
points
remained
crucial,
as
the
essay
by
Renato
Ortiz in this volume makes clear. The
enduring importance
of
14 S.N. Eisenstadt
these reference
points,
above all in
Europe?Spain, France,
and
England?and
later the United
States,
were
critical to the self
conception
of Latin American societies. Such considerations
became
gradually
less
important
in the United
States,
which
saw
itself
increasingly
as
the center of
modernity.
x
The
variability
of modernities
was
accomplished
above all
through
military
and economic
imperialism
and
colonialism,
effected
through superior economic, military,
and communication tech
nologies. Modernity
first moved
beyond
the West into different
Asian
societies?Japan, India, Burma,
Sri
Lanka, China,
Viet
nam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia,
Indonesia?to the Middle
Eastern
countries, coming finally
to Africa.
By
the end of the
twentieth
century,
it
encompassed nearly
the entire
world,
the
first true wave
of
globalization.
In all these societies the basic model of the territorial state
and later of the nation-state was
adopted,
as were
the basic
premises
and
symbols
of Western
modernity. So, too,
were the
West's modern
institutions?representative, legal,
and adminis
trative. But at the
same time the encounter of
modernity
with
non-Western societies
brought
about
far-reaching
transforma
tions in the
premises, symbols,
and institutions of
modernity?
with
new
problems arising
as a
consequence.
The attraction of
many
of
modernity's
themes and institu
tional forms for
many groups
in these societies was
caused first
by
the fact that it
was
the
European (later
the
Western) pattern,
developed
and
spread throughout
the world
by
Western eco
nomic, technological,
and
military expansion,
that undermined
the cultural
premises
and institutional
cores
of these ancient
societies. The
appropriation
of these themes and institutions
permitted
many
in
non-European societies?especially
elites
and intellectuals?to
participate actively
in the
new
modern
universal
(albeit initially
Western) tradition,
while
selectively
rejecting
many
of its
aspects?most notably
that which took for
granted
the
hegemony
of the Western formulations of the cul
tural
program
of
modernity.
The
appropriation
of themes of
modernity
made it
possible
for these
groups
to
incorporate
Multiple
Modernities 15
some
of the Western universalistic elements of
modernity
in the
construction of their
own new
collective
identities,
without
necessarily giving
up
specific components
of their traditional
identities
(often couched,
like the themes of Western
modernity,
in
universalistic, especially religious
terms).
Nor did it abolish
their
negative
or at least ambivalent attitudes toward the West.
Modernity's
characteristic themes of
protest,
institution-build
ing,
and the redefinition of center and
periphery
served to
encourage
and accelerate the
transposition
of the modern
project
to
non-European,
non-Western
settings. Although initially
couched
in Western
terms, many
of these themes found
resonance in the
political
traditions of
many
of these societies.17
XI
The
appropriation by
non-Western societies of
specific
themes
and institutional
patterns
of the
original
Western modern civi
lization societies entailed the continuous
selection, reinterpre
tation,
and reformulation of these
imported
ideas. These
brought
about continual
innovation,
with
new
cultural and
political
programs emerging, exhibiting
novel
ideologies
and institu
tional
patterns.
The cultural and institutional
programs
that
unfolded in these societies were
characterized
particularly by
a
tension between
conceptions
of themselves
as
part
of the mod
ern
world and ambivalent attitudes toward
modernity
in
gen
eral and toward the West in
particular.
In all these
societies,
far-reaching
transformations took
place.
These
transformations, shaped
in each
society by
the combined
impact
of their
respective
historical traditions and the different
ways
in which
they
became
incorporated
into the
new
modern
world
system,
are
admirably interpreted
in
Sudipta Kaviraj's
essay.
He
analyzes
the
impact
of Indian
political
traditions and
of the colonial
imperial experience
in
shaping
the distinctive
features of
modernity
as
they crystallized
in India. Similar
analyses
of China
or
Vietnam would indicate the
specific
modes
allowing
for
"alternative," revolutionary
universalistic notions
of the modern
program
of
modernity
to
spring
forth from their
civilizational contexts. The
case
of
Japan
is
different; there,
the
conflation of state and civil
society,
the weakness of
Utopian
16 S. N. Eisenstadt
orientations,
the absence of
principled
confrontations with the
state
among
the
major
movements of
protest,
and the relative
significance
of universal and
particular components
all contrib
uted to the creation of
a
modern collective
identity
different
from that of all other societies.18
XII
The
multiple
and
divergent
instantiations of the "classical"
age
of
modernity crystallized during
the nineteenth
century
and
above all in the first six
or seven
decades of the twentieth into
very
different territorial nation- and
revolutionary
states and
social movements in
Europe,
the
Americas, and,
after World
War
II,
in Asia. The
institutional, symbolic,
and
ideological
contours of modern national and
revolutionary
states,
once
thought
to be the
epitome
of
modernity,
have
changed
dramati
cally
with the recent intensification of forces of
globalization.
These
trends,
manifested
especially
in the
growing autonomy
of
world financial and commercial
flows,
intensified international
migrations
and the concomitant
development
on an interna
tional scale of such social
problems
as the
spread
of
diseases,
prostitution, organized
crime,
and
youth
violence. All this has
served
to reduce the control of the nation-state over its own
economic and
political affairs, despite continuing
efforts to
strengthen technocratic,
rational secular
policies
in various
arenas. Nation-states have also lost
a
part
of their
monopoly
on
internal and international
violence,
which
was
always only
a
partial monopoly,
to local and international
groups
of
separat
ists or terrorists. Processes of
globalization
are
evident also in
the cultural
arena,
with the
hegemonic expansion, through
the
major
media in
many countries,
of what
are
seemingly
uniform
Western,
above all
American,
cultural
programs
or
visions.19
The
ideological
and
symbolic centrality
of the
nation-state,
its
position
as the charismatic locus of the
major components
of
the cultural
program
of
modernity
and collective
identity,
have
been
weakened;
new
political, social,
and civilizational
visions,
new visions of collective
identity,
are
being developed.
These
novel visions and identities
were
proclaimed by
a
variety
of
new social movements?all of
which,
however
different,
have
Multiple
Modernities 17
challenged
the
premises
of the classical modern nation and its
program
of
modernity,
which had hitherto
occupied
the unchal
lenged
center of
political
and cultural
thinking.
The first such movements that
developed
in most Western
countries?the women's movement and the
ecological
move
ment?were both
closely
related to or
rooted in the student and
anti-Vietnam War movements of the late 1960s and
early
1970s.
They
were
indicative of
a more
general
shift in
many countries,
whether
"capitalist"
or communist: a
shift
away
from move
ments oriented toward the state to movements with
a more
local
scope
and
agenda.
Instead of
focusing
on
the reconstitu
tion of
nation-states,
or
resolving
macroeconomic
conflicts,
these
new
forces?often
presenting
themselves
as
"postmodern"
and
"multicultural"?promulgated
a
cultural
politics
or a
poli
tics of
identity
often couched
as
multiculturalism and
were
oriented to the construction of
new autonomous
social, politi
cal,
and cultural
spaces.20
Fundamentalist movements
emerged
somewhat later within
Muslim, Jewish,
and Protestant Christian communities and have
managed
to
occupy
center
stage
in
many
national societies
and,
from time to
time,
on
the international scene. Communal reli
gious
movements have
similarly developed
within Hindu and
Buddhist
cultures, generally sharing strong
antimodern and/or
anti-Western themes.21
A third
major type
of new movement that has
gathered
momentum,
especially
in the last two decades of the twentieth
century,
has been the
particularistic
"ethnic" movement. Wit
nessed
initially
in the former
republics
of the Soviet
Union,
it
has
emerged
also in horrific
ways
in Africa and in
parts
of the
Balkans, especially
in former
Yugoslavia.
All these movements have
developed
in tandem
with,
and
indeed
accelerated,
social transformations of the most
impor
tant
kind, serving
to consolidate
new
social
settings
and frame
works. To mention
just
two of the most
important,
the world
now sees new
diasporas, especially
of
Muslims, Chinese,
and
Indians,
some
analyzed
in this issue
by Stanley J.
Tambiah.
Following
the
collapse
of the Soviet
empire,
Russian minorities
have
emerged
as
vocal forces in
many
of the successor states of
18 S. N. Eisenstadt
the Soviet Union and in the former communist East
European
countries.
In these and
many
other
settings,
new
types
of collective
identity emerged, going beyond
the models of the nation- and
revolutionary
state and
no
longer
focused
on
them.
Many
of
these hitherto "subdued"
identities?ethnic, local, regional,
and
transnational?moved, though
in a
highly
reconstructed
way,
into the centers of their
respective societies,
and often into the
international
arena as
well.
They
contested the
hegemony
of
the older
homogenizing
programs,
claiming
their
own autono
mous
place
in central institutional arenas?educational
pro
grams, public communications,
media outlets.
They
have been
increasingly
successful in
positing far-reaching
claims to the
redefinition of
citizenship
and the
rights
and entitlements
con
nected with it.
In these
settings,
local
concerns
and interests are
often
brought
together
in new
ways, going beyond
the model of the classical
nation-state, choosing
alliances with transnational
organiza
tions such
as the
European
Union
or
with broad
religious
frame
works rooted in the
great religions
of
Islam, Hinduism,
Bud
dhism,
or the Protestant branches of
Christianity.
Simulta
neously,
we see a
continuing decomposition
in the
relatively
compact image
offered
by
belief
systems concerning styles
of
life, defining
the "civilized man"?all connected with the
emer
gence
and
spread
of the
original program
of
modernity.22
No
one can
doubt that
significant
and
enduring
shifts
are
taking
place
in the relative
position
and influence of different centers
of
modernity?moving
back and forth between West and East.
This
can
only produce
increased contention between such
cen
ters over their
degree
of influence in a
globalizing
world.23
XIII
All these
developments
attest to the
decomposition
of the
major
structural characteristics and the
weakening
of the
ideological
hegemony
of
once-powerful
nation-states. But do
they signal
the "end of
history"
and the end of the modern
program,
epitomized
in the
development
of different so-called
postmodernities and,
above
all,
in a retreat from
modernity
in
Multiple
Modernities 19
the fundamentalist and the communal
religious
movements,
often
portrayed by
themselves
as
diametrically opposed
to the
modern
program?
A closer examination of these movements
presents
a
much
more
complex picture. First,
several of the extreme fundamen
talist movements evince distinct characteristics of modern
Jacobinism,
even
when combined with
very strong
anti-West
ern
and
anti-Enlightenment ideologies. Indeed,
the distinct vi
sions of fundamentalist movements have been formulated in
terms common to the discourse of
modernity; they
have at
tempted
to
appropriate modernity
on
their own terms. While
extreme fundamentalists
promulgate elaborate, seemingly
antimodern
(or
rather
anti-Enlightenment) themes, they
basi
cally
constitute modern
Jacobin revolutionary
movements, para
doxically sharing many
characteristics
(sometimes
in a sort of
mirror-image way)
with communist movements of
an
earlier
era.24
They
share with communist movements the
promulgation
of totalistic visions
entailing
the transformation both of man
and of
society.
Some claim to be concerned with the "cleans
ing"
of both. It is the total reconstruction of
personality,
of
individual and collective
identities, by
conscious human
action,
particularly political
action,
and the construction of new
per
sonal and collective identities
entailing
the total
submergence
of the individual in the
community
that
they
seek. Like commu
nist movements
they
seek to establish a new
social
order,
rooted
in
revolutionary,
universalistic
ideological
tenets,
in
principle
transcending
all
primordial, national,
or
ethnic units. In the
case
of earlier communist
regimes,
the
proclaimed goals
were
to
produce
collectivities of "workers" and "intellectuals" that
would embrace all
mankind;
in the
case
of Islamic fundamental
ist
regimes,
the realm of
Islam,
as a new
conception
of the
umtnah,
transcends
any
specific place, having
broad and con
tinually changing yet ideologically
closed boundaries. Both the
communist and the fundamentalist
movements?mostly,
but
not
only,
the Muslim
ones?are
transnational,
activated
by
intensive,
continually
reconstructed networks that facilitate the
expansion
of the social and cultural visions
proclaimed by
these
groups.
They
are at the
same time
constantly
confronted with
competing
visions. In all these
ways,
both their movements and
20 S. N. Eisenstadt
their
programs
constitute
part
and
parcel
of the modern
politi
cal
agenda.
There
are,
of
course,
radical differences in the
respective
visions of the two
types
of
Jacobin (the
communist and the
fundamentalist)
movements and
regimes,
above all in their
attitudes to
modernity
and in their criticism. In their
analysis
of
the basic antinomies of
modernity,
and in their
interpretation
and
rejection
of different
components
of the cultural and
politi
cal
programs
of classical
modernity,
Muslim fundamentalists
share,
as Nil?fer G?le's
essay shows,
a
preoccupation
with
modernity.
It is their
major
frame of reference.25
XIV
Attempts
to
appropriate
and
interpret modernity
in one's own
terms are
not, however,
confined to fundamentalist movements.
They
constitute
part
of a set of much wider
developments
that
have taken
place throughout
the
world,
as
Dale Eickelman's
essay
shows with
respect
to Muslim societies.
Continuing
the
contestations between earlier reformist and traditional reli
gious
movements that
developed
in these
communities,
the ten
sions inherent in the new modern
program,
especially
between
pluralistic
and universal
values,
are
played
out in new terms.
Between
Utopian
and
more
open
and
pragmatic attitudes,
be
tween multifaceted and closed
identities, they
all entail
an
important,
even
radical,
shift in the discourse about the
con
frontation with
modernity,
in
reframing
the
relationship
be
tween Western and non-Western
civilizations,
religions,
and
societies.26
It is
possible
to
identify significant parallels
between these
various
religious
movements,
including fundamentalism,
with
their
apparently
extreme
opposites?the
various
postmodern
movements with which
they
often
engage
in
contestation, argu
ing
about
hegemony
among
the different sectors of
society.
Thus,
within
many
of these
"postmodern"
or
"multicultural"
movements,
there have
developed highly
totalistic orientations
manifest for instance in different
programs
of
political
correct
ness.
Ironically,
because of their
great variety
and their
more
pluralistic
internal
dynamics
and
pragmatic
stance,
we
have
Multiple
Modernities 21
also
seen certain
"postmodern"
themes
emerge
within funda
mentalist movements.
Beyond
this
paradox,
these movements
share
an
overarching
concern about the
relationship
between
the identities
they promulgate
and the universalistic themes
promulgated by
other
hegemonic programs
of
modernity,
above
all the
relationship
between their
purportedly
authentic identi
ties and the
presumed
Western,
especially
American cultural
hegemony
on
the
contemporary
scene.
Significantly,
fear of the
erosion of local cultures from the
impact
of
globalization
has
led these movements to be
suspicious
of the
emerging
centers of
a
globalizing
world, giving
rise
yet again
to a continuous oscil
lation between
cosmopolitanism
and various
"particularistic"
tendencies.27
XV
The
continuing
salience of the tensions between
pluralist
and
universalist
programs,
between multifaceted
as
against
closed
identities,
and the continual ambivalence of new centers of
modernity
toward the
major
traditional centers of cultural
hegemony
attest to the fact
that,
while
going beyond
the model
of the
nation-state,
these
new movements have not
gone beyond
the basic
problems
of
modernity. They
are all
deeply reflexive,
aware
that
no answer to the tensions inherent in
modernity
is
final?even if each in its own
way
seeks to
provide final,
incontestable
answers to
modernity's
irreducible dilemmas.
They
have reconstituted the
problem
of
modernity
in new
historical
contexts,
in new
ways. They
aim for
a
worldwide reach and
diffusion
through
various media.
They
are
politicized,
formu
lating
their contestations in
highly political
and
ideological
terms. The
problems they face,
continually reconstructing
their
collective identities in reference to the
new
global
context,
are
challenges
of
unprecedented proportions.
The
very
pluraliza
tion of life
spaces
in the
global
framework endows them with
highly ideological absolutizing ideas,
and at the same time
brings
them into the central
political
arena. The debate in
which
they engage may
indeed be described in "civilizational"
terms,
but these
very
terms?indeed the
very
term "civiliza
tion" as
constructed in such
a
discourse?are
already
couched
22 S. N. Eisenstadt
in
modernity's
new
language, utilizing totalistic, essentialistic,
and
absolutizing
terms. When such clashes in cultural debates
intersect with
political, military,
or
economic
struggles, they
can
quickly
become violent.
The reconstructions of the various
political
and cultural vi
sions across
the
spectrum
of collective identities
on
the contem
porary
scene
entail
a
shift in the confrontation between West
ern
and non-Western
civilizations,
between
religions
and soci
eties,
and also in the
relationship
of these confrontations to the
Western cultural
program
of
modernity.
As
against
the
seeming
if
highly
ambivalent
acceptance
of
modernity's premises
and
their continual
reinterpretation
characteristic of the earlier
reformist
religious
and national
movements,
most
contempo
rary
religious movements?including
fundamentalist and most
communal
religious
movements?seem to
engage
in a
much
more intensive selective denial of at least
some
of these
pre
mises.
They
take
a
markedly
confrontational attitude to the
West,
indeed to
anything
conceived
as
Western,
seeking
to
appropriate modernity
and the
global system
on
their
own,
often
anti-Western,
terms. Their confrontation with the West
does not take the form of
wishing
to become
incorporated
into
a new
hegemonic civilization,
but to
appropriate
the
new inter
national
global
scene and the
modernity
for
themselves,
cel
ebrating
their traditions and "civilizations." These movements
have
attempted
to dissociate Westernization from
modernity,
denying
the Western
monopoly
on
modernity, rejecting
the
Western cultural
program
as
the
epitome
of
modernity. Signifi
cantly, many
of these
same themes are also
espoused, though
in
different
idioms, by
many
"postmodern"
movements.
XVI
The
preceding analysis
does not
imply
that the historical
expe
rience and cultural traditions of these societies are
of
no
impor
tance in the
unfolding
of their modern
dynamics.
The
signifi
cance of their earlier traditions is manifest not least in the fact
that
among
modern and
contemporary societies,
fundamental
ist movements
develop
above all within the societies that took
shape
in the
ecumene of monotheistic
religion?Muslim, Jew
Multiple
Modernities 23
ish,
and Christian civilizations. In these
contexts,
the
political
system
has been
perceived
as
the
major
arena for the
implemen
tation of transcendental
Utopian
visions. In contrast to
this,
the
ideological
reconstruction of the
political
center in a
Jacobin
mode has been much weaker in civilizations with
"other-worldly"
orientations?especially
in India
and,
to a
somewhat smaller
extent,
in Buddhist countries.
There,
the
political
order is not
perceived
as a
forum for the
implementation
of
a
transcenden
tal vision.28
It is a
commonplace
to observe that the distinct varieties of
modern
democracy
in India or
Japan,
for
example,
may
be
attributed to the encounter between Western
modernity
and the
cultural traditions and historical
experiences
of these societies.
This,
of
course,
was also true of different communist
regimes.
What is less well understood is that the same
happened
in the
first instance of
modernity?the European?deeply
rooted in
specific European
civilizational
premises
and historical
experi
ence.29
But,
as in the
case of
Europe,
all these "historical"
or
"civilizational" influences did not
simply perpetuate
an
old
pattern
of institutional life.
Nor is it
happening
on
the
contemporary
scene,
as if
nothing
more
than
a
continuation of
respective
historical
pasts
and
patterns
is
being perpetuated. Rather,
these
particular experi
ences influence the continual
emergence
of
new movements and
networks between different
actors?judges, experts, parliamen
tarians,
and
others?cutting
across
any
single society
or
civili
zation, maintaining
a flow between them. The
political dynam
ics in all these societies
are
closely
interwoven with
geopolitical
realities,
influenced
by history,
and
shaped mostly by
modern
developments
and confrontations.
They
make
impossible
any
effort to construct "closed" entities.30
Thus,
the
processes
of
globalization
on
the
contemporary
scene
entail neither the "end of
history"?in
the
sense
of
an
end
of
ideological
confrontational clashes between different cul
tural
programs
of
modernity?nor
a
"clash of civilizations"
engaging
a
secular West in confrontation with societies that
appear
to
opt
out
of,
or
deny,
the
program
of
modernity. They
do not even
constitute
a return to the
problems
of
premodern
axial
civilizations,
as
though
such a
thing
were
possible. Rather,
24 S. N. Eisenstadt
the trends of
globalization
show
nothing
so
clearly
as
the
continual
reinterpretation
of the cultural
program
of moder
nity;
the construction of
multiple modernities; attempts by
vari
ous
groups
and movements to
reappropriate
and redefine the
discourse of
modernity
in their
own new terms. At the same
time, they
are
bringing
about
a
repositioning
of the
major
arenas
of contestation in which
new
forms of
modernity
are
shaped,
away
from the traditional forum of the nation-state to
new areas in which different movements and societies continu
ally
interact.
Not
only
do
multiple
modernities continue to
emerge?by
now
going beyond
the
premises
of the nation-state?but within
all
societies,
new
questionings
and
reinterpretations
of different
dimensions of
modernity
are
emerging.
The undeniable trend at
the end of the twentieth
century
is the
growing
diversification
of the
understanding
of
modernity,
of the basic cultural
agen
das of different modern societies?far
beyond
the
homogenic
and
hegemonic
visions of
modernity prevalent
in the 1950s.
Moreover,
in all societies these
attempts
at
interpreting
moder
nity
are
continually changing
under the
impact
of
changing
historical
forces, giving
rise to new movements that will
come,
in
time,
to
reinterpret yet again
the
meaning
of
modernity.
While the
common
starting point
was once the cultural
pro
gram
of
modernity
as it
developed
in the
West,
more recent
developments
have
seen a
multiplicity
of cultural and social
formations
going
far
beyond
the
very
homogenizing aspects
of
the
original
version. All these
developments
do indeed attest to
the continual
development
of
multiple modernities,
or
of mul
tiple interpretations
of
modernity?and,
above
all,
to
attempts
at
"de-Westernization," depriving
the West of its
monopoly
on
modernity.
XVII
These considerations bear
closely
on
the
problems
raised in the
beginning
of this
essay,
which constitute the central foci of the
essays
gathered
in this issue of Dcedalus.
They
all
contend,
from
a
variety
of
perspectives
and
through
a
great range
of
cases,
with the
core characteristics of
modernity.
At the same
time,
Multiple
Modernities 25
the studies
presented
here attest to the
continually expanding
range
of
possibilities
in
ideological interpretations,
in construc
tions of the
meaning
of
modernity,
in institutional
patterns
of
political
and social life. All of this makes
plain,
as Nil?fer G?le
shows,
that
one
of the most
important
characteristics of moder
nity
is
simply,
but
profoundly,
its
potential
for
self-correction,
its
ability
to confront
problems
not even
imagined
in its
original
program.
The most
important
new
problems today
are
prob
ably
those
relating
to the
environment,
to
gender,
and to the
new
political
and international contestations discussed above.
In
coping
with these
problems,
different
contemporary
societies
can
draw in ever more
varied
ways,
as Tu
Weiming
notes,
on
the cultural
resources
of their
respective
civilizational tradi
tions.
At the
same time these
very
developments?above
all the
tendency
toward constant self-correction characteristic of
mo
dernity?make
all the
more
pressing
the
great difficulty
of how
to answer
the
question
about the limits of
modernity.
It is not
that such limits do not
exist,
but the
very
posing
of this
question
puts
the
question
within the discourse of
modernity.
Illuminating
and
describing
the
essentially
modern character
of
new movements and collective
identities, charting
courses
somewhere
beyond
the classical model of the
territorial,
na
tional,
or
revolutionary
state,
does not
necessarily
lead
us to
take
an
optimistic
view. On the
contrary;
the ramifications are
such
as to make evident the
fragility
and
changeability
of
different modernities
as
well
as
the destructive forces inherent
in certain of the modern
programs,
most
fully
in the
ideologization
of
violence, terror,
and war.
These destructive forces?the
"traumas" of
modernity
that
brought
into
question
its
great
promises?emerged clearly
after World War
I,
became
even
more
visible in World War II and in the
Holocaust,
and were
generally ignored
or set aside in the discourse of
modernity
in
the
1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s.
Lately, they
have
reemerged
in a
frightening way?in
the
new
"ethnic" conflict in
parts
of the
Balkans
(especially
in the former
Yugoslavia),
in
many
of the
former
republics
of the Soviet
Union,
in Sri
Lanka,
and in a
terrible
way
in such African countries as
Rwanda and Burundi.
These
are not outbursts of old "traditional"
forces,
but the
26 S. N. Eisenstadt
result of the
ongoing dialogue
between modern reconstruction
and
seemingly
"traditional" forces.
So, also,
fundamentalist
and
religious
communal movements
developed
within the frame
work of
modernity,
and cannot be
fully
understood
except
within this framework.
Thus, modernity?to paraphrase
Leszek
Kolakowski's felicitous and
sanguine expression?is
indeed "on
endless trial."31
ENDNOTES
Eugene Kamenka, ed.,
The Portable Karl Marx
(New
York:
Viking Press,
1983);
Max
Weber,
Die Protestantische Ethik: Kritiken und Antikritiken
(Guetersloh, Germany:
Guetersloher
Verlagshaus, 1978); Weber,
Politik als
Beruf (Berlin:
Dunker and
Humblot, 1968); Weber,
On Charisma and Insti
tution
Building:
Selected
Papers (Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1968);
Weber,
The Rational and Social Foundations
of
Music
(Carbondale:
South
ern Illinois
University Press, 1958);
W. G.
Runciman, ed.,
Max Weber: Selec
tions in Translation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978);
Robert
N.
Bellah, ed.,
Emile Durkheim
on
Morality
and
Society:
Selected
Writings
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1973);
Martin
Jay,
Adorno
(Cam
bridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1984).
2Francis
Fukuyama,
The End
of History
and the Last Man
(New
York: Free
Press, 1992).
3Samuel P.
Huntington,
The Clash
of
Civilizations
and the
Remaking of
World
Order
(New
York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996).
4James
D.
Faubion,
Modern Greek Lessons: A Primer in Historical
Constructivism
(Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1993),
113-115.
5On the axial
age civilizations,
see S. N.
Eisenstadt,
"The Axial
Age:
The Emer
gence
of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of
Clerics," European journal
of Sociology
23
(2) (1982): 294-314; Eisenstadt, ed.,
The
Origins
and Diver
sity of Axial-Age
Civilizations
(Albany,
N.Y.: SUNY
Press, 1986).
6Daniel
Lerner,
The
Passing of
Traditional
Society: Modernizing
the Middle East
(Glencoe,
111.: Free
Press, 1958);
Alex Inkeles and David H.
Smith, Becoming
Modern: Individual
Change
in Six
Developing
Countries
(Cambridge,
Mass.:
Harvard
University Press, 1974).
7S. N.
Eisenstadt,
"Frameworks of the Great Revolutions:
Culture,
Social Struc
ture,
History
and Human
Agency,"
International Social Science
Journal
133
(1992): 385-401; Eisenstadt,
Revolutions and the
Transformation of
Societ
ies
(New
York: Free
Press, 1978); Eisenstadt, "Comparative Liminality:
Liminality
and
Dynamics
of
Civilization," Religion
15
(1985): 315-338;
Eisenstadt,
"Cultural Traditions and Political
Dynamics,"
British
Journal of
Sociology
32
(1981): 155-181;
Eric
Voegelin, Enlightenment
and Revolu
tion^
ed.
John
H. Hallowell
(Durham,
N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1975);
Multiple
Modernities 27
Adam B.
Seligman,
"The
Comparative
Studies of
Utopias,"
"Christian Uto
pias
and Christian Salvation: A General
Introduction,"
and "The Eucharist
Sacrifice and the
Changing Utopian
Moment in Post Reformation Christian
ity,"
in Order and
Transcendence,
ed. Adam B.
Seligman (Leiden:
E.
J. Brill,
1989),
1-44.
8Bruce A.
Ackerman,
We The
People (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University
Press, 1991).
9S. N. Eisenstadt and B.
Giesen,
"The Construction of Collective
Identity,"
Euro
pean Journal of Sociology
36
(1) (1995): 72-102;
Edward
Shils, "Primordial,
Personal,
Sacred and Civil
Ties,"
in Center and
Periphery: Essays
in
Macrosociology,
ed. Edward Shils
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press,
1975),
111-126.
10Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis
(New
York: Free
Press, 1990).
1
Norbert
Elias,
The Court
Society (Oxford:
B.
Blackwell, 1983); Elias,
The Civi
lizing
Process
(New
York: Urizen
Books, 1978-1982);
Michel
Foucault,
The
Birth
of
the Clinic: An
Archaeology of
Medical
Perception (New
York: Vin
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the
Self:
A Seminar with Michel
Foucault
(Amherst,
Mass.:
University
of Massachusetts
Press, 1988);
Fou
cault,
Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison
(Paris: Gallimard, 1975);
Foucault,
Madness and Civilization:
A
History of Insanity
in the
Age of
Rea
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(New
York: Pantheon
Books, 1965);
Peter
Wagner,
A
Sociology of
Mo
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and
Discipline (London: Routledge, 1994).
12Shils, "Primordial, Personal,
Sacred and Civil
Ties,"
111-126.
13On the revolutions and
modernity,
see,
for
instance,
the
special
issue on "The
French Revolution and the Birth of
Modernity,"
Social Research
(1989).
On
the role of
groups
of heterodox intellectuals in some of the revolutions and in
the antecedent
periods,
see
Augustin Cochin,
La Revolution et la Libre Pens?e
(Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1924); Cochin, L'esprit
du
Jacobinisme (Paris:
Universitaires de
France, 1979); J. Baechler, "Preface,"
in
ibid., 7-33;
Fran?ois Furet, Rethinking
the French Revolution
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1982);
Vladimir C.
Nahirny,
The Russian
Intelligentsia:
From
Torment to Silence
(New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction
Books, 1981).
14Stephen
R.
Graubard, ed.,
Norden?The Passion
for Equality (Oslo:
Norwe
gian University Press, 1986);
Stein
Kuhnle,
Patterns
of
Social and Political
Mobilizations:
A Historical
Analysis of
the Nordic Countries
(Beverly
Hills:
Sage Productions, 1975);
Bo
Rothstein,
The Social Democratic State: The
Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem
of
Social
Reforms (Pittsburgh:
University
of
Pittsburgh
Press, 1996);
D.
Rustow, "Scandinavia,"
in Modern
Political
Parties,
ed.
Sigmund
Neumann
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press, 1956), 169-194;
K.
Thomas,
"The United
Kingdom,"
in Crises
of
Po
litical
Development
in
Europe
and the United
States,
ed.
Raymond
Grew
(Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton
University Press, 1978), 41-98;
E. P.
Thompson,
The
Making of
the
English Working Class,
rev. ed.
(Harmondsworth:
Pen
guin, 1968);
David
Thomson,
The Democratic Ideal in France and
England
(Cambridge:
The
University Press, 1940); Thomson, England
in the Nine
teenth
Century (London:
Pelican
Books, 1960);
Pieter
Geyl,
The Revolt
of
the
Netherlands
(New
York: Barnes and
Noble, 1958);
Max
Beloff,
The
Age of
28 S.N. Eisenstadt
Absolutism: 1660-1815
(London:
Hutchinson &
Co., 1954);
H.
Daalder,
"On
Building
Consociational Nations: The Case of the Netherlands and Swit
zerland,"
International Social Science
Journal
23
(1971): 355-370; Jean
Prancois
Bergier,
Naissance et croissance de la Suisse industrielle
(Bern:
Francke
Verlag, 1974);
Gerhard
Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie:
Politisches
System
und
politische
Kultur in der Schweiz und in Osterreich
(T?binger:
Mohr, 1972);
V.
Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism, Ideological Cleavage
and
Political Behavior in the Smaller
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Poli
tics 3
(1971): 141-175; Jurg Steiner,
Amicable
Agreement
Versus
Majority
Rule:
Conflict
Resolution in
Switzerland
(Chapel
Hill:
University
of North
Carolina
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15Johann
P.
Arnason,
"The
Theory
of
Modernity
and the Problematic of Democ
racy,"
Thesis Eleven 26
(1990): 20-46;
Heinz Sunker and Hans-Uwe
Otto,
eds.,
Education and Fascism: Political
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and Social Education in Nazi
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The Falmer
Press, 1997).
16Anthony
Giddens and David
Held, eds., Classes, Power,
and
Conflict:
Classical
and
Contemporary
Debates
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press, 1982);
Joseph
A.
Schumpeter, Imperialism
and Social Classes
(Philadelphia:
Orion
Editions, 1991); Furet, Rethinking
the French
Revolution-, Fran?ois
Furet and
Mona
Ozouf, eds.,
A Critical
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the French Revolution
(Cam
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H.
Joas,
"Die Modernit?t des
Krieges,"
Leviathan 24
(1996):
13-27.
17Eisenstadt,
"The Axial
Age:
The
Emergence
of Transcendental Visions and the
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