Kceniya Holmes

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Does Wollheim present a decisive objection to the Institutional theory of art?
ABSTRACT. In this essay, I focus on Richard Wollheims objection to
the Institutional theory of art as presented in his 1980 essay The
Institutional Theory of Art, where he explicitly targets the best
representative (1980, 159) of this view, namely George Dickies 1974
formulation in Art and the Aesthetic. After briefly summarizing Dickies
theory, focusing purely on features most pertinent to this discussion, I
present Wollheims objection as a two-horned dilemma. To elucidate,
I use an analogy from Platos Euthyphro concerning the definition of
piety and the functional-procedural debate regarding definitions. I
argue that Wollheims objection is not decisive since his criticisms are
misplaced, because he fails to recognise the specific purpose of
Dickies definition. On the one hand Wollheim demands an intrinsic-
exhibited property from a relational-unexhibited property. While on the
other hand he demands a functional definition from a procedural one.
Errors attributable to two senses of the word art: classificatory and
evaluative.
However it is important to note that due to the limits of this essay, I
am unable to further discuss (1) Dickies theory regarding further
flaws, which are not discussed by Wollheim (1980), such as
circularity, the case of the isolated artist, artifactuality, amongst
others. (2) Since Art and the Aesthetic Dickie has continued to modify
his theory in response to Wollheims and other criticisms, in an
attempt to reinforce the Institutional theory of art.

Dickie revives a necessary-and-sufficient-condition
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analysis for his
Institutional definition of art, as:
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a
set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the
status of candidate for appreciation by some person or
persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the
artworld). (1974, 34)


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A reaction against the influence of Wittgensteins family resemblance theory and Weitzs
open concept of art.
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Both (1) and (2) are necessary, and conjointly sufficient for something being
an artwork. Yet the pivotal feature of Dickies definition is expressed in the
second-clause, about conferring of status. It is this that fundamentally makes
an object be it a piece of driftwood or a Duchamp ready-made into an
artwork, as artifacts exist without being artworks: artifactuality is conferred on
the object rather than worked on it (45). This conferring denotes the
unexhibited, relational procedure or mechanism by which objects become
artworks
2
. In other words, what makes something an artwork is the way in
which it acquires status, rather than its intrinsic exhibited properties
3
.
Consequently, as a procedural definition it does not explain why someone
confers status. Instead, it explains how, without giving justificatory reasons.
This is due to Dickies intention to offer a classificatory, not an evaluative,
sense of art. For him the primary question is What is art?: a question of
categorization, and not What is good art?: a question of value
4
.
Ostensibly Dickies theory appears explanatorily vacuous
5
, as it gives
no account of the point of art. Intuitively, one wants reasons why something is
an artwork, and this is precisely the objection Wollheim raises:

Is it to be presumed that those who confer status upon some
artifact do so for good reasons, or is there no such
presumption? Might they have no reason, or bad reasons, and
yet their action be efficacious given they themselves have the
right status that is, they represent the artworld? (1980, 160)


2
Idea of unexhibited properties is procured from Mandelbaums criticism of Neo-
Wittgensteinians use of the notion of family resemblance. (Carroll, 2003, 226)
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Explained by Dickies motivation to accommodate for modern avant-garde art such as
conceptual and ready-made. These artworks altered, and even subverted, the rules that
governed traditional art definition theories.
4
(Hanfling, 1995, 21)
5
(Hagberg, 2002, 496)
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These two questions are used by Wollheim to generate a two-horned dilemma
for the Institutional theory. The first horn can be explained by considering a
parallelism with Euthyphros definition of piety: what all the gods hate is
impious, and what they all love is pious (Plato, 1997, 9d). Socrates replies: Is
the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it
is loved by the gods? (10a). Euthyphro prefers the latter which Socrates
refutes by explaining that when using a passive participial, such as being
carried, one is not characterizing the essence but only the external relations of
something. Therefore, concerning piety, its being loved by the gods does not
indicate what it is the gods love. Applied to Dickie, the passive participial
phrase conferring of status describes what an artworld member does to an
object, an extrinsic relationship, not what the object is. Therefore, Wollheim
criticizes Dickies theory for failing to define the intrinsic essence of artworks,
which could be given as justification for conferring art-status. Consequently,
just as Euthyphro ought to have recognised that the gods love pious acts
because those acts are, in themselves, pious. So, if an artworld member has
good reasons for conferring art-status, these reasons must antedate the act of
conferring and so the member is only confirming an objects antecedent art-
status. Hence it is the good reasons that make an object art, not the procedure
of conferring. Thus acknowledg[ing] that works of art are not after all,
institutional objects (McFee, 1985, 180).
The second-horn of the dilemma comes from denying that any reason is
required, and instead the only requisite is that artworld members have the right
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status
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. According to Wollheim this option violates two powerful intuitions that
we have (1980, 163); firstly, the link between being an artwork and a good
artwork, and secondly, art-status denoting a level of importance. Amounting to
the selfsame conviction that art-status minimally implies, and categorically
allows for, appraisal in virtue of merit. Yet Wollheim worries that if art-status
can be conferred for no good reason, then the importance of the status is
placed in serious doubt (164). This endangers the relationship to art, at least
as traditionally understood, by making the value of art-status trivial, for the
decision to confer art-status may be entirely arbitrary. Just as Socrates argues
that the love of the gods would be groundless if there were nothing in piety to
justify the gods love, Wollheim likewise argues that conferring of art-status is
entirely baseless and capricious if there is nothing intrinsic in the object to
justify this [conferring] (Rader, 1974, 424).
Although Wollheim presents a persuasive argument, both horns of his
dilemma are misguided. Concerning the first-horn, Wollheim misrepresents
Dickies second-clause as conferring of art-status, while Dickies actual
formulation was conferring status of candidacy for appreciation. Remarkably
Wollheim is aware of Dickies distinction between being a candidate for
appreciation and being an artwork, the status conferred is, more specifically,
that of being a candidate for appreciation (1980, 164), yet he continues to
argue as if conferral of status appertains directly to artworks
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. This
misunderstanding leads Wollheim to mistakenly demand an intrinsic essence
from the passive participial phrase, which can only portray an artworks
external properties. Thus Wollheim is inevitably unsatisfied as his demand is

6
The right status of artworld members touches on a genuine flaw in Dickies account,
however Wollheim disregarded this, despite alluding to it.
7
Dickie makes the same point (1998, 129)
Kceniya Holmes
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incongruous with the procedural nature and purpose of Dickies Institutional
theory. Essentially, this discrepancy can be accredited to Wollheims desire for
a theory of art to explain artworks in terms of their functional efficacy in
promoting the point of art
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: providing a functional definition, which obviously
Dickies theory does not.
This final point translates well into understanding the second-horn of
Wollheims dilemma. Wollheim mistakenly criticizes Dickies theory for its
failure to account for the value of art. Wollheim raises this criticism because of
his presumption that art is to be defined functionally, [thus] the act of
classification is itself evaluative, since only works that do not undermine the
point of art will qualify as such (Davies, 1994, 42). Therefore, Wollheim could
only judge a definition of art to be acceptable if it explains the point of
distinguishing art from non-art. However, Dickie explicitly states his intention to
use art in the classificatory sense, which is purely descriptive and not
evaluative.
Moreover, under Dickies theory, once artworks are classified as such,
they can then be evaluated with respect to their success or otherwise in
serving the point of art. In other words, Dickie need not deny the value of
artworks, or that artworld members have good reasons for conferring status;
for example, their being worthy candidates for appreciation by fulfilling the
function of art. Therefore, Wollheims dilemma is an unwarranted objection to
an Institutional theory of art, as his expectations from such a theory are
entirely unrealizable. His ultimate oversight is his failure to appreciate the
differences between two approaches of defining art.

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(Davies, 1994, 27)
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