Def Stan 00-970 P1 Issue-5 Sec-3

DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 3
1

Part 1
Section 3 - Structure

SECTION 3

2
AMENDMENTS ISSUED SINCE PUBLICATION

AMENDMENT
NUMBER
DATE OF
ISSUE
TEXT AFFECTED SIGNATURE & DATE

REVISION NOTE
This standard is raised to Issue 5 to update its content.
HISTORICAL RECORD
This standard supersedes the following:

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 4 dated J anuary 2006
Design Requirements for Service Aircraft

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 3 dated October 2003

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 2 dated 1 December 1999

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 1 dated 12 December 1983

Aviation Publication (AvP) 970 dated 1959

Air Publication (AP) 970 2
nd
Edition dated 1924
Handbook of Strength Calculations

Handbook (HB) 806 1
st
Edition dated 1918
Handbook of Strength Calculations
.
SECTION 3

3
CONTENTS
Description Page No

Content 3
Preface 4
Main Text 5

SECTION 3 - STRUCTURE

3.0 Introduction 5
3.1 Static Strength and Deformation 6
3.2 Fatigue 17
3.3 Symmetric Manoeuvres 29
3.4 Asymmetric Manoeuvres 33
3.5 Gust Loads 41
3.6 High Lift Devices and Airbrakes 45
3.7 Pressure Cabins 53
3.8 Spinning and Spin Recovery 65
3.9 Control Systems 68
3.10 Active Control Systems 82
3.11 Strength for Ground Handling 109
3.12 Picketing 113
3.13 Lightning Protection 117
Tables 118
Figures 122

SUPPLEMENTS

Leaflets 0 to 42
SECTION 3

4
PREFACE

Def Stan 00-970 Part 1 Section 3

Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft

a. This Standard provides requirements and guidance for the design of aircraft to meet
the airworthiness requirements for UK military operation. The requirements stated herein
shall be applied by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the contractor as agreed and defined
in the contract.

b. This document has been produced on behalf of the Defence Aviation Safety Board
(DASB) by Airworthiness Design Requirements and Procedures (ADRP), Air/Land
Technology Group (A/LTG), MoD Abbey Wood.

c. The standard has been agreed by the authorities concerned with its use and is intended
to be used whenever relevant in all future designs, contracts, orders etc. and whenever
practicable by amendment to those already in existence. If any difficulty arises which
prevents application of the Defence Standard, the Directorate of Standardization (DStan) shall
be informed so that a remedy may be sought.

d. Any enquiries regarding this standard in relation to an invitation to tender or a contract
in which it is incorporated are to be addressed to the responsible technical or supervising
authority named in the invitation to tender or contract.

e. Compliance with this Defence Standard shall not in itself relieve any person from any
legal obligations imposed upon them.

f. This standard has been devised solely for the use of the MoD and its contractors in the
execution of contracts for the MoD. To the extent permitted by law, the MoD hereby
excludes all liability whatsoever and howsoever arising (including, but without limitation,
liability resulting from negligence) for any loss or damage howsoever caused where the
Document is used for any other purpose.

WARNING

The Ministry of Defence (MOD), like its contractors is subject to both United Kingdom and
European laws regarding Health and Safety at Work, without exemption. All Defence
Standards either directly or indirectly invoke the use of processes and procedures that could
be injurious to health if adequate precautions are not taken. Defence Standards or their use in
no way absolves users from complying with statutory and legal requirements relating to
Health and Safety at Work.

SECTION 3

SECTION 3 - STRUCTURE

3.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0.1 This section specifies the requirements for structural strength of the aircraft. Requirements are provided to cover the following aspects:

3.1 Static Strength and Deformation
3.2 Fatigue
3.3 Symmetric Manoeuvres
3.4 Asymmetric Manoeuvres
3.5 Gust Loads
3.6 High Lift Devices and Airbrakes
3.7 Pressure Cabins
3.8 Spinning and Spin Recovery
3.9 Control Systems
3.10 Active Control Systems
3.11 Strength for Ground Handling
3.12 Picketing
3.13 Lightning Protection

3.0.2 The section comprises the content of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1 Chapters 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 308, 309, 604, 716, 732
and 1015 . It is intended to provided information similar to that contained in J AR 25 Section C.

3.0.3 In the electronic version of this document, this line provides a link to Part 0.
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SECTION 3

3.1 STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

3.1.1 This clause states the requirements for static strength and freedom from deformation which might adversely affect the airworthiness, handling or
maintenance. It was previously issued as Chapters 200 and 1015 and contains information similar to J AR 25.301 - 25.307. The requirements apply to
airframes and mechanical components, including undercarriages and systems. Advice on compliance with these requirements is given in Leaflets 1 to 4.
However, All compliance procedures and judgements are subject to the approval of the IPTL (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division, DERA (now
QinetiQ) Farnborough).

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE
3.1.2 Critical design cases, corresponding to the
most severe authorised use of the aeroplane, must
be identified and the loads associated with each
case must be traced through the structure.
Flight load measurements must be made at an
early stage to confirm design assumptions. In
service a programme of operational loads
measurement must be maintained to ensure that
any new critical loading actions, are identified so
that appropriate action can be taken.

3.1.3 All Grade A details must be identified and
for each of them an allowable stress or strength
must be determined. This would normally be the
appropriate allowable ultimate stress or strength
determined on a 'B' value basis.
Refer to Clause 4.1 for definition of Grade A
details.
3.1.4 The allowable ultimate stresses or loads must
not be exceeded at the design ultimate load,
normally 1.5 times the maximum load in the design
case (the design limit load). In addition, it must be
shown that no detrimental deformations occur at
loads of at least 75% of the design ultimate load.
The structure as a whole must be tested to the
design ultimate load and supplementary evidence
must be provided that 'B' values are not exceeded.

It must be shown that these proof and ultimate
requirements can be satisfied under the most
adverse loading and environmental conditions.
For composites these conditions apply with the
structure at the most adverse moisture level that is
expected to occur during the life.
It is, of course, for the designer to decide what
material allowables should be associated with his
own design procedure in order that this
requirement is satisfied.
DESIGN CASES
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SECTION 3

3.1.5 The loads associated with each case must be
traced through the structure far enough to ensure
that the requirements are satisfied everywhere.
For the purpose of design and of demonstration of
compliance with the design requirements, a
limited number of discrete design cases are
prescribed for which the loads and other
conditions are specified. They are defined in the
appropriate clauses of this publication.

Many of the cases overlap, and the whole
structure need not be analysed for every one.
When it can be shown that a particular case is
covered by other more stringent requirements, it
need not be considered any further.

There may be cases that are more demanding of
some designs than those defined in this
publication. When such a case is identified it
must be defined and then compliance with the
requirements must be demonstrated in that case
also.

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SECTION 3

THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS
3.1.6 Until the design proof load is reached, no
Grade A items shall sustain deformation
detrimental to safety, and moving parts essential to
safety shall function satisfactorily. After removal
of the design proof load no effects of loading shall
remain that might reasonably cause the aeroplane
to be deemed unserviceable.
In general the ultimate factor shall be 1.5 and the
proof factor shall be at least 1.125. In some
particular design cases different values are
required, and they are given in the appropriate
chapters of this publication.

3.1.7 Until the design ultimate load is exceeded, no
Grade A item shall collapse, and the stress, load or
strain at each detail shall not exceed the static
allowable value.

SUBSTANTIATION OF THE STATIC ALLOWABLE STRESS FOR GRADE A DETAILS
3.1.8. All static allowable values must be based on
nominal dimensions unless adverse tolerances
significantly affect the strength.

3.1.8a. The allowable must be determined under the
most adverse loading and environmental conditions
arising in the critical design case for the detail in
question.

3.1.9 The derivation must be based upon a strength
no greater than the 'B' value for the critical failure
mode of the material from which the detail is made,
using an acceptable method of structural analysis.
(a) In general the material 'B' value for each
mode of failure should be derived in accordance
with DEF STAN 00-932 (Cancelled - replaced by
ESDU 932 Metallic Materials Data Handbook).
Should this be impractical the value shall be based
upon at least 15 coupons. These must be tested
under the most adverse environmental conditions
if these conditions significantly affect the strength.

(b) When only 15 material coupons are used these

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SECTION 3

must comprise at least 5 samples from each source
of supply and at least 3 batches of material from
each source. Similar representative samples must
be used if larger numbers of coupons are tested.

(c) Exceptionally, it may be acceptable to allocate
allowable values to individual batches of material:
in circumstances where the mean strength of the
material varies from batch to batch, but the
coefficient of variation (cv) (based on individual
batches) remains reasonably constant, the 'B' value
for a detail in a given batch of material must be
reduced if the mean of the batch in question is
lower than that of the batch on which the
reference 'B' value is based in accordance with (a)
and (b). No increase in the reference 'B' value is
permissible unless it can be shown that other
failure modes do not thereby become significant.
METHOD OF STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
3.1.10 The method of structural analysis must be
substantiated by test for each class of structural
detail for which the method has not already been
verified.
To verify the analysis at least one specimen
representing the detail in question must be tested
under the most adverse loading and environmental
conditions specified for design. The value of
strength so obtained must be reduced in order to
obtain an acceptable estimate of the 'B' value for
the test specimen (Table 1), and where appropriate
a further allowance must be made for differences
between the test specimen and the structural detail
itself.
It is possible that the overall airframe static test
adequately exercises some of the Grade 'A'
details and a separate detail test may not be
necessary. Indeed it may be difficult to apply
the correct boundary conditions to the detail test.

The size of the reduction factor of Table 1
depends upon the failure mode that is observed,
the variability associated with this failure mode
and the number of coupons used in establishing
that variability (3.1.9). In general, the larger the
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SECTION 3

sample of coupons upon which the variability is
based the smaller the reduction factor.
DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH & PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLETE
STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS
3.1.11 To allow for the variability in strength
between nominally identical items, a test factor
appropriate to each test shall be determined from
Table 2.
(a) Usually compliance must be demonstrated by
testing a complete structure or component.
Exceptionally such a test may be deemed
unnecessary. In these circumstances an
appropriate allowance must be made for the added
uncertainties that are involved.

(b) The test programme and the results of the tests
must be discussed with the IPTL (in conjunction
with Airworthiness Division RAE).
The factors given in Table 2 correspond to a 'B'
level of assurance normalised to the variability
test factor of 1.0 that is customary for metal
structures.
MEASUREMENT OF LOADS ON AEROPLANE STRUCTURES
3.1.12 Measurements of the loads and temperatures
on the aeroplane structure during manoeuvres in
flight and on the ground, to an extent to be agreed
with the IPTL (in conjunction with Airworthiness
Division RAE), shall be made on one or more early
development aeroplanes and on Service aeroplanes
as required by the appropriate clauses of this
publication.

ENGINE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT MOUNTING LOADS
3.1.13 The mounting together with any other
structure liable to be critically affected shall have
sufficient strength and rigidity to withstand the
flight and ground loads prescribed for the aeroplane
as a whole together with the loads resulting from
the engine at all practical ranges of thrust and
Consideration shall be given to all forces imposed
on the airframe arising from causes which may
include the following:-

(a) thrust, forward and reverse.

(b) engine torque including the excess torque
This clause is applicable to all engine and
auxiliary power unit mountings, including
VTOL, VSTOL and STOVL installations.

Guidance on the interpretation of the
requirements of this paragraph is contained in
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SECTION 3

torque.

arising due to powerplant malfunction.

(c) gyroscope couples due to angular motion of
the aeroplane.

(d) inertia forces due to linear and angular
accelerating angular velocity including crash
cases.

(e) aerodynamic forces and moments on
propellers due to the inclination of the propeller
axis to the airstream.

(f) airloads on exposed nacelles.

(g) structural flexibility effects (airframe and
engine supports).

(h) thermal effects.
Leaflet 3.
REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE
3.1.14 The aeroplane structure should be designed to be
tolerant to Battle Damage and to be easily
repairable.
See Clause 9.9
3.1.15 Drain holes and drip fences should be provided
wherever needed.

CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES
3.1.16 The extent of the restriction that is imposed will
depend upon a number of considerations. These
are discussed in Leaflet 5.
FLIGHT TESTING
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SECTION 3

3.1.17 This clause from 3.1.17 to 3.1.31 was previously
published as Chapter 1015 and states the
requirements for:

(a) the measurement of loads and temperatures
on the aeroplane structure during manoeuvres in
flight and on the ground and the application of
the results to the static strength fatigue test, and

(b) the demonstration of structural strength by
flight tests up to the specified design conditions.
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
3.1.18 The scope of the load measurement
programme, including the conditions to be covered,
the measurements to be taken and the techniques to
be employed, shall be discussed and agreed with
the IPTL on the advice of the Airworthiness
Division, RAE. This shall be done at a sufficiently
early stage in the design to ensure adequate
planning of the test programme, both technical and
financial.
An indication of the conditions and measurements
to be considered is given in 3.1.21 - 3.1.26. The
scope of these conditions and measurements
should be carefully considered for each project
and may be increased or decreased, according to
the needs of the project concerned. The necessary
instrumentation and equipment should be built
into the aeroplane from the start.

3.1.19 The co-ordination of the load measurement
programme and the static and fatigue strength test
programmes shall also be agreed with the IPTL on
the advice of the Airworthiness Division, RAE.,
and discussion continued throughout the
programme.

APPLICABILITY
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SECTION 3

3.1.20 The tests agreed under 3.1.18 shall be carried out
on an early development aeroplane. Further tests
shall be made on later development aeroplanes, as
far as is considered necessary after discussion
with the IPTL on the advice of the Airworthiness
Division, RAE., if major structural alterations
have been made or flying limitations have been
raised.

TEST REQUIREMENTS
3.1.21
(a) The magnitude, distribution and time history of
the loads shall be determined in the agreed flight
conditions and appropriate aeroplane
configurations.
(b) In all manoeuvre cases, the loads, and their
distribution and time histories during the
manoeuvre, shall be determined over a range of
severity of the manoeuvre up to the design
conditions or to any lower limit set by safety or
other consideration
In selecting the flight conditions the following
cases shall be considered, and also any other static
or fatigue loading cases arising from the particular
role of the aeroplane:

(a) the symmetric manoeuvres of Clause 3.3 ,
(b) the asymmetric manoeuvres of Clause 3.4,
(c) manoeuvres developing the maximum
calculated gust loads for aeroplanes in which the
gust loads exceed the manoeuvre loads,
(d) continuous turbulence where practicable,
(e) special flight manoeuvres, such as in-flight
refuelling or supply dropping, and any other
unusual manoeuvres that are likely to be
performed during both operational and training
sorties at all the specified incidence angles, e.g.,
slow rolls, jinking and terrain following in still
and turbulent air, and
(f) the take-off and landing cases of Section 4 and
other specified ground manoeuvres.
The tests in 3.1.21 & 22 where applicable may
be combined with the relevant flight tests
required by Section 2.
3.1.22 The structural strength of the aeroplane shall Thorough inspection of the structure shall be
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SECTION 3

be demonstrated in particular manoeuvres by
flights to the limits of the design conditions or to
any lower limit set by safety or other consideration.

made after the flight and there shall be no signs of
proof failure.
MEASUREMENTS
3.1.23 Measurements shall be made at sufficient
stations to establish the loads in the relevant parts
of the structure with reasonable accuracy.

The number and position of the stations will
depend on the project concerned, on the quantities
being measured and on the practical aspect of
accessibility.
The following quantities should be considered
for measurement;

(a)shear, bending moment and torque at the wing
roots and at one or more other stations in the
wing,
(b)shear, bending moment and torque at the roots
of the fin and tailplane,
(c) shear and bending moment at one or more
fuselage sections,
(d) hinge moments of control surfaces,
(e) load distributions over particular surfaces
where special investigation (e.g., of buffet loads)
is required,
(f) undercarriage loads, and
(g) loads on external stores.

3.1.24 Where applicable, the temperature of the
structure shall be measured at sufficient points to
check the assumptions used in the calculation of
thermal stress and of the heat input applied in the
ground rig test.

3.1.25 Consideration shall be given to the
measurement of aeroelastic distortions and modes
of vibration.

3.1.26 A continuous record shall be made of the The following quantities shall be considered for
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SECTION 3

relevant flight parameters necessary to define the
particular manoeuvres in which the load
measurements are being taken.
measurement:
(a) airspeed and Mach Number,
(b) altitude,
(c) normal acceleration,
(d) pilot's forces on elevator, aileron and rudder
controls,
(e) position of elevator, aileron, rudder and other
relevant controls,
(f) rates of roll, pitch and yaw,
(g) angle of incidence, sideslip and roll,
(h) aeroplane weight and its distribution, and
(j) thrust conditions.
FLIGHT LIMITATIONS AND THE RELATION BETWEEN STATIC STRENGTH TESTS AND FLIGHT TESTS
3.1.27 As far as practicable, flight tests shall be
phased with the static strength tests so that the
measured loads on the structure in flight can be
used in the static strength tests.

3.1.28 The initial flight testing shall conform to the
limitations recommended in Section 2 Leaflet 9 for
development aeroplanes.
This limits flying, prior to completion of static
strength tests, to those manoeuvres in which the
loads do not exceed 80 per cent of the unfactored
design loads. In the case of new designs on
which there is less experience a lower figure
may be desirable. Refer to Leaflet 5.
3.1.29 As information on flight loads and
temperatures is obtained the ground test loading
and temperature conditions shall, if practicable, be
adjusted as considered necessary to conform to the
measured flight loads and temperatures
See Leaflet 2, Para. 3.3 (i) Note.
3.1.30 All structural alterations found necessary as
a result of the static tests should be incorporated in
the flight aeroplane as the tests proceed.

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SECTION 3

3.1.31 When the static strength tests have been
completed satisfactorily, the flight tests required by
3.1.22 shall be made

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SECTION 3

3.2 FATIGUE

3.2.1 This information was previously issued as Chapters 201 and 732 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1. However, Chapter 201 was reissued following work
by the J oint Airworthiness Committee so that the text herein is different to that published at Issue 1. It states the fatigue requirements that apply to all
structures and mechanical components which affect safety, operational capability and supportability (Grade A parts), including undercarriages and systems.
In some circumstances special requirements apply to fibre-composite components. These are summarised in Leaflet 40. Guidance on the additional
considerations which apply when service lives are extended is provided in Leaflet 39. Terms specific to this chapter are highlighted in bold at first use.
These terms are defined in Part 0.

APPROACH
3.2.2 Structures and mechanical components shall
have an acceptable tolerance to defects and
damage, see 3.2.8 - 10.
Compliance with the requirements shall be
demonstrated by the procedures recommended in
the accompanying leaflets unless prior agreement
has been obtained from the Project Authority.
During design, the aim should be to provide
inspectability, robustness, repairability and
replaceability in accordance with a Reliability-
Centred Maintenance (RCM) approach to be
agreed with the Project Authority.
3.2.3 The structure or mechanical system as a
whole shall have an acceptable Safe Life, see
3.2.11 - 14.

The advantage of the Safe Life approach is that it
minimises the need for in-service inspections.
3.2.4 A Safe Life approach shall always be used
for components where fatigue damage cannot be
identified readily. However, where a component is
exposed to impact damage during maintenance or
operations, it shall also be the subject of an
inspection-based substantiation, see 3.2.17 - 20.
Structures and mechanical components may
remain in service beyond their Safe Life (or
Equivalent Safe Life), when cleared by
inspection, provided that compliance is
demonstrated with the conditions and limitations
detailed in 3.2.17 - 20.

3.2.4 Structures and mechanical components shall
have adequate residual strength throughout their
service life, as detailed in 3.2.17 - 20.

3.2.5 Account shall be taken of the monotonic and
cyclic variations in service temperature where these
may have a significant deleterious effect on

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SECTION 3

performance.
3.2.6 Means shall be provided for determining the
fatigue life consumption of each individual aircraft
during service, as defined in 3.2.21 - 22.

3.2.7 A Fatigue Type Record shall be prepared and
maintained in accordance with the requirements of
DEF STAN 05-123, Chapter 333.
This shall contain a record of compliance with all
the requirements stated in this chapter and the
associated leaflets.

MATERIAL SELECTION
3.2.8 The variability of the manufacturing
processes, product forms and material fatigue
properties shall be accounted for in the fatigue
substantiation.
See Leaflet 34.
3.2.9 Materials, in the product forms chosen, shall
show:
(a) good fatigue performance;
(b) good resistance and tolerance to damage, in
particular, they shall have a high toughness to yield
strength ratio;
(c) good resistance to environmental degradation.
Exceptionally, materials and components which
have identified shortcomings in meeting these
criteria (for example, materials with a poor
toughness to yield strength ratio or materials with
a poor corrosion resistance) may be used with the
prior agreement of the Project Authority. Any
shortcomings shall be taken into account in the
design and maintenance philosophy.

3.2.10 Structural components and assemblies shall
also have:
(a) acceptable resistance and tolerance to fatigue
crack growth;
(b) protection from any effects of environmental
degradation, other than those effects which have
been accounted for in the substantiation;
(c) tolerance to accidental damage.

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SECTION 3

SAFE LIFE SUBSTANTIATION
3.2.11 The Safe Life of the structure shall be
demonstrated under the Design Spectrum.
Normally, the Safe Life shall be at least equal to
the Specified Life. Exceptionally, a Safe Life of
less than the Specified Life may be acceptable if
advantages from earlier replacement or
continuation under inspection-based support can
be demonstrated (see 3.2.17 - 20).

(b) Compliance shall normally be demonstrated by
test(s) supported by calculations. Normally, at
least one example of each component shall be
tested. However, if differences between
components and the loads they experience are
small, then the results from testing one may be
read across to substantiate another. Exceptionally,
the substantiation may be based on generic data
from representative structural elements if suitable
allowances are made to account for the added
uncertainty.
See Leaflet 35 and Leaflet 37.
3.2.12 Evidence supporting these considerations
shall be included in the Fatigue Type Record.
Consideration shall be given to the effects of
increases in the severity of service loading in the
design and qualification of components for which
the fatigue life is particularly sensitive to such
increases.
At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the
sensitivity of individual fatigue-critical features
to increases in loading severity so that those
features with exceptionally high sensitivity can
be identified and their stresses reduced so that
they do not limit the life of the structure as a
whole.
3.2.13 Structure, fully assembled wherever
possible, or otherwise in representative sub-
assemblies, shall be tested at a pre-production
standard. Account shall be taken of the monotonic
Pre-production testing must be timed so that any
consequent design changes can be introduced into
production with the minimum of retrospective
modifications and should be under a

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SECTION 3

and cyclic effects of service temperatures where
these may have a significant deleterious effect on
performance.
representation of the Design Spectrum which is
acceptable to the Project Authority..
3.2.14 Stabilised production standard structures
shall be tested using a load spectrum which is
representative of the Service Spectrum.
The Service Spectrum should be determined using
data from development flight testing and available
Operational Loads Measurement (OLM)
programmes. The load spectrum shall be
acceptable to the Project Authority.

RESIDUAL STRENGTH
3.2.15 Following completion of fatigue testing, a
satisfactory residual strength shall be demonstrated.
This shall be accomplished by analysis, supported,
where appropriate, by evidence from additional
testing and tear-down inspections.
Notwithstanding the ultimate strength capability
required by Clause 2.1, it is permissible to use a
residual strength of 1.2 Design Limit Load in
the determination of safe lives and critical crack
sizes, since, by definition, these terminal
conditions have a very low probability of
occurrence. It is noteworthy that this assumption
would be invalidated if an inspection-dependent
aircraft were permitted to remain in service
indefinitely. Exceptionally, the factor of 1.2 may
be reduced by agreement with the Project
Authority, but the factor shall never be less than
1.0, as might apply, for example, where loads are
naturally limited or Design Limit Load is
associated with a discrete case that is provided to
cover extreme circumstances that are independent
of fatigue loading.
See Leaflet 37.
For combat aeroplanes, the maximum flight
loads are often associated with deliberate and
quite frequent excursions towards the limits of
the flight envelope. Moreover, military
transports are often loaded more highly than
their civil counterparts and they too operate
towards the limits of the flight envelope. The
aim of residual strength testing should be to
demonstrate that the structure can sustain Limit
Load factored by the residual strength factor in
each of the principal static loading cases.
3.2.16 A tear-down inspection shall be done on
built-up structure. All major load paths shall be
carefully dismantled and inspected in order to
reveal any significant fatigue damage. Pending
It is desirable to retain for inspection the fatigue
test article during the service life of the type; this
will normally follow any residual strength testing
and the mandatory tear-down inspection. The

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SECTION 3

completion of the tear-down inspection, the test life
used for the substantiation of any components that
have not failed during the course of the test - and
which may therefore contain undetected damage -
must be limited to 90% of the life demonstrated by
test.
destruction of test evidence should also be
avoided. Test structures should be disposed of
only in exceptional circumstances and only with
agreement of the Project Authority.
INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION
3.2.17 Normally, the Safe Life of components
which are to be cleared by inspection shall be
demonstrated to be at least half of the Specified
Life under the Design Spectrum.
Inspectable components may remain in service
beyond their Equivalent Safe Life, subject to the
agreement of the Project Authority, if:
(a) the presence of fatigue cracks can be identified
with acceptable confidence;
(b) any crack that remains undetected after an
inspection will not grow, under the Service
Spectrum, to an unacceptable size before the next
inspection or before scheduled replacement or
retirement;
(c) in-service incident reports, if any, are taken
into account
(d) the inspection penalty is acceptable on
operational and economic grounds.
It is emphasised that the residual strength
assumptions would be invalidated if an inspection-
dependent aircraft were permitted to remain in
service indefinitely.
SeeLeaflet 36.
3.2.18 Evidence supporting these considerations
shall be included in the Fatigue Type Record.
Consideration shall be given to the effects of
increases in the severity of service loading in the
definition of the inspection intervals and
techniques for components for which fatigue crack
At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the
sensitivity of individual features to increases in
loading severity so that those features with
exceptionally high sensitivity can be identified
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SECTION 3

growth or residual strength are particularly
sensitive to such increases.
and their stresses reduced so that they do not
impose restrictions on inspection intervals for
the aircraft as a whole.
3.2.19 The inspection periodicity shall be
substantiated by calculations, supported by
evidence from relevant crack growth testing, tear-
down inspections and in-service inspections.
See Leaflet 37.
3.2.20 Cracks meeting the inspection-based
requirements in terms of crack growth and residual
strength shall not result in the rupture of vital
services such as control runs.

SERVICE MONITORING
3.2.21 Every aircraft in the fleet shall be provided
with instrumentation for the purpose of estimating
the fatigue life consumption of fatigue-critical
structure and validating the assumptions made
during substantiation. Provision shall be made for
this instrumentation during production.
For those components that are not individually
monitored by an advanced direct strain measuring
technique, a continuous or periodic Operational
Loads Measurement programme is a condition of
compliance with these requirements and shall be
agreed with the relevant Service Policy Authority.
See Leaflet 38.
3.2.22 Where the instrumentation referred to above
is insufficient to monitor all fatigue-critical
components, a representative sample of aircraft
shall be fitted with more extensive instrumentation
to overcome this deficiency. Provision shall be
made for this during production.

FATIGUE LOAD METER INSTALLATIONS
3.2.23
This information from 3.2.24 to 3.2.28 was
previously published as Chapter 732 of DEF
STAN 00-970 Issue 1.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.2.24 PROVISION SHALL BE MADE IN
(a) The type of meter to be installed will be stated
22
SECTION 3

EVERY AEROPLANE FOR THE
INSTALLATION OF AN RAE FATIGUE LOAD
METER, AND ONE OR MORE SWITCHES TO
START AND STOP THE METER
AUTOMATICALLY IN FLIGHT.

in the Aeroplane Specification. Other fatigue
monitoring systems may be used subject to
approval by the IPTL after consultation with
Director RAE.

(b) In prototype and development aeroplanes,
space shall be provided. In production aeroplanes,
full provision shall be made by furnishing all the
appropriate attachments, supplies and connections.
INSTALLATION OF RAE FATIGUE LOAD METERS
3.2.25 A composite meter, or the accelerometer
unit of a split system meter, shall be installed
within 1.5 metres of the centre of gravity of the
aeroplane and at least 0.5 metres (centre to centre)
from any magnetic compass installation.
(a) It shall be aligned so that its axis of
measurement is within five degrees or vertical
when the aeroplane is flying straight and level at
its normal operating speed and altitude. It shall be
secured rigidly to the wing centre section or to a
part of the structure that has an inflexible load
path to the wing centre section.

(b) Each unit of a split system meter shall be
fastened to the aeroplane by bolts through all the
attachment holes provided in the case. A
composite meter shall be fastened by bolts
through not less than four of the holes provided in
the case, and the bolts in the other holes shall not
be removed.
THE RAE FATIGUE LOAD METER
COMPRISES ESSENTIALLY AN
ACCELEROMETER AND ONE OR MORE
GROUPS OF COUNTERS. IN A SPLIT
SYSTEM METER THE ACCELEROMETER
AND THE COUNTERS ARE CONTAINED IN
SEPARATE CASES; A COMPOSITE METER
IS CONTAINED IN A SINGLE CASE.

3.2.26 The counter display shall be installed where
it may be read easily when the aeroplane is
standing on the ground.

SWITCHING ON AND OFF
3.2.27 The meter shall be started and stopped in The switch may be operated by changes in air
23
SECTION 3

flight by means of an automatic switch in the
electrical power supply.
speed or by the action of raising and lowering the
undercarriage, but it shall not be operated by
extension and compression of the undercarriage
legs.
RELIABILITY
3.2.28 THE FAILURE RATE OF THE
COMPLETE FATIGUE METER SYSTEM, FOR
ALL REASONS, SHALL NOT EXCEED ONE IN
1,000 FLIGHTS.
This shall be demonstrated by an approved
reliability demonstration technique.

Particular care shall be taken to ensure very high
reliability in the supplies and connections to the
meter, and in the devices that are used in flight to
switch the meter on and off and to switch from
one group of counters to another.

24
SECTION 3

STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS
USING NON-ADAPTIVE PREDICTION
METHODS
RELATED REQUIREMENTS
3.2.29. The MOD requirements for safety
management, appropriate for the safety criticality
of the structural monitoring system, defined in Def
Stan 00-56, shall be complied with.
See Leaflet 42, Section 3.
3.2.30 The MOD requirements for aircraft Service
Monitors, detailed in Def Stan 00-970 Part 1/2
Section 3.2 and Leaflet 38 Fatigue Service
Monitoring, shall be complied with.
EXCLUSIONS
3.2.31 Adaptive predictive techniques, where the
model continues to train or adapt itself in response
to new input data, whilst in service, shall not be
used as an aircraft structural monitor.
TASK DEFINITION
3.2.32 A task definition shall be produced in which
the aims of the structural monitor shall be clearly
documented.
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.2.33. The design of the non-adaptive predictive
structural monitor, including all methods for data
manipulation and identification of domain
knowledge shall be clearly documented.

The design shall be described clearly and
unambiguously. The document shall contain
sufficient detail for certification authorities to
comprehend the internal workings of the models
used.
TRAINING, TESTING AND VALIDATION
25
SECTION 3

DATA
3.2.34. A data collection strategy, for training, test
and validation data, shall be developed and
documented.
The data collection strategy shall include
identification of the data requirements, data
sources, estimated data quantities, data quality
requirements and data limitations.
3.2.35. The criteria for selection of training, testing
and validation data shall be documented.
3.2.36. Where practicable, training, testing and
validation data shall be captured over the whole of
the flight envelope.
3.2.37. Evidence of the coverage of training, testing
and validation data sets shall be documented.
3.2.38. Where practicable, training, testing and
validation data shall be captured from more than
one aircraft in the fleet.
3.2.39. Methods used to exclude data from
Evidence of the coverage of training, testing and
validation data sets shall be documented.
This document shall include details of all anomaly
detection routines and statistical techniques used.
3.2.40. The format of the training, testing and
validation data sets shall be identified and
documented.
3.2.41. All data collected for training, testing and
validation shall be catalogued and stored in its raw
form.
3.2.42. All processed training, testing and
validation data shall be catalogued and stored in its
final form.
3.2.43. All collateral information, relevant to the
captured training, testing and validation data, shall
be identified, catalogued and stored.
Collateral data may include data calibration files,
pilots notes, flight and fatigue data sheets and
equipment running logs.
MODEL TRAINING
26
SECTION 3

3.2.44. The algorithms used to train the non-
adaptive predictive structural monitor shall be
documented.
3.2.45. The performance of the trained non-
adaptive predictive structural monitor, with training
and test data shall be documented.
MODEL VALIDATION
3.2.46. Validation, using unseen data sets, shall be
undertaken to compute the structural monitors
performance metric.
3.2.47. The confidence intervals in the predictions
made by the structural monitor and their evaluation
methods shall be documented.
3.2.48. Evidence of the generalised solutions, with
reference to data limitations, for the structural
monitor shall be documented.
Sensitivity analysis of the structural monitors
response to variations in input parameters may be
one of the methods of providing evidence of
generalisation.
IN-SERVICE MAINTENANCE
3.2.49. An in-service performance assessment
mechanism and performance review plan for the
non-adaptive predictive structural monitor shall be
developed and published prior to the entry to
service of the system.
3.2.50. The in-service performance assessment
mechanism shall include detection and reporting of
anomalous input data.
3.2.51. The in-service performance assessment
mechanism shall include detection and reporting of
input data outside the experience of the training
data set (novel data).
3.2.52. The in-service performance assessment See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
27
SECTION 3

mechanism shall include performance-warning
levels.
3.2.53. The performance review plan shall include
periodic routine revalidation of the structural
monitor using OLM/ODR data.
3.2.54. The need to retrain the structural monitor
shall be reviewed if there is a significant change of
role of the aircraft (including revised stores and
tactics), or if a significant modification to the
aircraft is embodied, or if warning levels have been
triggered in the performance assessment
mechanism.
3.2.55. The training status of the structural monitor
shall be reviewed no less than annually at the
Structural Integrity Working Group / Type
Airworthiness Meeting

28
SECTION 3

3.3 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.3.1 The requirements of this clause apply to all aeroplane types and to the aeroplane as a whole in each case. The requirements are expressed in terms of a
flight envelope, the co-ordinates of which are the forward speed and normal acceleration. This clause was previously published as Chapter 202 of DEF
STAN 00-970 Issue 1. Refer to Part 0 for definitions

FACTORS
3.3.2 The structure shall have proof and ultimate
factors as specified in 3.1.6 & 7, unless otherwise
agreed with the IPTL in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE, under conditions
involving steady normal acceleration and forward
speed as represented by all points within and on the
boundary of the specified flight envelope, and
under specified manoeuvres involving pitching
acceleration within the envelope.

THE FLIGHT ENVELOPE
3.3.3 THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN FLIGHT
ENVELOPE IS DEFINED BY FIG 1 AND BY
THE VALUES OF N
1
AND V
D
WHICH WILL
BE GIVEN, WITH ANY NECESSARY
AMPLIFICATIONS FOR SPECIAL TYPES, IN
THE PARTICULAR AEROPLANE
SPECIFICATION. ALL ALTITUDES UP TO
THE MAXIMUM OPERATING ALTITUDE
SHALL BE CONSIDERED.
In this context level coordinated turns and wind up
turns shall be considered as symmetric
manoeuvres. Any rate of roll required to minimise
lateral acceleration on entering the turn shall be
allowed for.
See also Clause 3.4.14.
MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
STEADY PITCHING VELOCITY
3.3.4 The condition of a steady pitching velocity
shall be considered at all points within and on the
boundary of the flight envelope specified by Fig 1.

The pitching velocity shall be that associated with
the appropriate value of the normal acceleration
factor at a given speed. It shall be assumed that
the pitch control motivators are deflected at a

29
SECTION 3

sufficiently slow rate so that pitching acceleration
effects are negligible.
PITCHING ACCELERATION
3.3.5 The loads shall be considered which arise
when the aeroplane is initially in steady level flight
at the manoeuvre speed, V
A1
and the pitch
motivators are moved suddenly to cause the
extreme positive pitching acceleration (nose up),
except as limited by pilot or actuator effort or
control system design Guidance (a)

In evaluating the loads which arise in the
manoeuvres covered by 3.3.5 and 3.3.6
consideration shall be given to:

(a) The aeroplane trimmed to a zero inceptor
force condition.

(b) The aeroplane in any out of trim condition as
agreed in accordance with 2.1.20.
(a) When the flight control system of the
aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices the
combination of nominal accelerations and
pitching conditions described in 3.3.5 and 3.3.6
shall be determined in agreement with the IPTL.
See also Leaflet 8 and 3.10.54 - 62.

(b) When the flight control system of the
aeroplane is of conventional design such that
movement of the motivators is directly related to
the movement of the pilot's inceptors use shall be
made of a rational motivator motion versus time
profile when determining the loads which occur
in the manoeuvres described in 3.3.5 and 3.3.6.
See also Leaflet 7.
3.3.6 Consideration shall be given to the loads
arising from a movement of the pitch motivators to
cause a transition from steady level flight at a speed
within or on the boundary to the appropriate
extreme steady normal acceleration condition.
The speed shall be assumed constant until the
extreme value of the normal acceleration is
achieved.

SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
ENGINE POWER
3.3.7 All engine power conditions (including
"engine-off' and any capability for altering the
direction of the total thrust vector) likely to occur
in association with the particular manoeuvre under
investigation shall be considered.
See also Leaflet 8.
HIGH LIFT DEVICES, AIRBRAKES AND UNDERCARRIAGE
3.3.8 All positions of the high lift devices likely to See also 3.6.3 - 17.
30
SECTION 3

occur in association with the particular manoeuvre
and speed under investigation shall be considered.
3.3.9 When airbrakes are fitted all positions that
can be selected in flight shall be considered.
See also 3.6.18 - 21.
3.3.10 All positions of the undercarriage which can
occur in association with a particular condition
shall be considered
Refer also to 4.11.
PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT
3.3.11 The values of the pitching moment
coefficient C
mo
and the position of the
aerodynamic centre shall be determined by the
most accurate means available, and subsequently
checked by wind tunnel or flight tests.
(a) Appropriate allowance shall be made for the
effects of the following on the pitching moment
coefficient C
mo
and the position of the
aerodynamic centre:

(i) The limited accuracy of the method used
to determine the values of these data.

(ii) Tolerances in aileron setting, flap
setting, wingbody setting, wing twist, etc.,

(iii) Elastic deformation of the aeroplane
under aerodynamic and inertia loads.

(b) Allowance shall also be made for the effects of
propellers and slip-stream, or flow through jet
engines, on the pitching moment coefficient C
mo

and the position of the aerodynamic centre. This
allowance shall be based, whenever possible, on
the results of wind tunnel or other tests of the
particular design.

OTHER AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIONS
31
SECTION 3

3.3.12 The values of all relevant aerodynamic
coefficients and derivatives shall be based on the
best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test
results shall be used, wherever possible, to
determine or check these values.

MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION
3.3.13 Consideration shall be given to all masses
between:-

(a) The minimum flying mass

(b) The maximum mass at which the aeroplane can
reach the altitude considered.
See Part 0 for definition of Minimum Flying
Mass.
3.3.14 The design centre of gravity positions at
each mass and aerodynamic configuration shall
include a tolerance beyond the actual maximum
forward and actual maximum aft positions which
are attainable in that configuration.
This tolerance shall be 1.5% of the mean
aerodynamic chord unless otherwise agreed with
the IPTL.

32
SECTION 3

3.4 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.4.1 The requirements of this chapter are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the aeroplane as a whole unless otherwise specified. The asymmetric flight-
conditions associated with side-slipping and rolling are considered, spinning being dealt with in Clause 3.8. This clause was previously issued as Chapter
203 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1.

FACTORS
3.4.2 The structure shall have proof and ultimate
factors as specified in 3.1.6 & 7, unless otherwise
agreed with the IPTL (in conjunction with the
Airworthiness Division, RAE), under the loads
which arise in each of the following cases.

MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
3.4.3 When the flight control system of the
aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices the
appropriate combinations of asymmetric and
symmetric manoeuvre conditions to be considered
shall be agreed with the IPTL.
The cases stated in 3.4.5 - 14 shall be considered
in so far as they are applicable.
Reference shall be made to Clause 3.10 and
Leaflets 8, 10 and 28.
3.4.4 When the flight control system of the
aeroplane is of conventional design such that the
movement of the control motivators is directly
related to the movement of the pilot's inceptors the
asymmetric manoeuvres stated in 3.4.5 - 14 shall
apply.
Guidance on the application of the requirements
is given in Leaflet 9.
YAWING MANOEUVRES
DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.4.5 The manoeuvres shall be considered with the
aeroplane in initially unaccelerated flight at zero
sideslip at all attainable airspeeds up to the design
diving speed, V
D
, and at all altitudes up to the

33
SECTION 3

maximum operating altitude.
DESIGN CASES
3.4.6 The deflection(s) of the yaw motivator(s)
shall be determined by the following
considerations, whichever yields the critical cases
for a particular aeroplane:

(a) That corresponding to the maximum output
permitted by the flight control system for the power
unit of each control motivator.

(b) When the motivator(s) is(are) activated through
the deflection of pedals, the specified deflection(s)
shall be that corresponding to a total pedal force of
1344N (300 lbf) from the minimum control speed,
V
MC
, to the manoeuvre speed, V
A
and 89ON
(200lbf) from the cruise speed, V
C
, to the design
speed, V
D
, with linear variation between V
A
and
V
C
.
The following specific phases of the manoeuvre
shall be considered:

(a) The loads resulting from the prescribed
instantaneous deflection(s) of the yaw
motivator(s), before the aeroplane responds.

(b) The loads in the condition of maximum
sideslip angle resulting from the aeroplane to the
prescribed deflection of the yaw motivator(s).

(c) With the aeroplane yawed to the static
equilibrium angle corresponding to the prescribed
deflection of the yaw motivator(s), the loads
which arise when the deflection(s) is(are)
instantaneously returned to the neutral position.

The input from the pilot's inceptor shall be such
that, in the absence of response of the aeroplane,
it results in an effectively instantaneous
application of the yaw motivator(s).

(Refer to Clause 3.3.3 for the definition of
speeds V
A
, V
C
and V
D
).

Reference previously published in Leaflet 203/0:

RAE Report

Structures 76 - Dynamic fin and rudder loads in
yawing manoeuvres

3.4.7 For all aeroplanes, other than transport types,
consideration shall also be given to pilot input such
that the yaw motivator, or combination of
motivators, moves sinusoidally at the natural
frequency of the Dutch Roll Motion of the
aeroplane. The maximum value reached by the
deflection of the directional motivator(s) during
this process shall be two thirds of that specified in
3.4.6 and the input shall consist of one and half
cycles of the pilot's inceptor (that is left-central-
See Clause 2.22 and Section 2 Leaflet 47 for
Dutch Roll information.
34
SECTION 3

right-central-left-central).
3.4.8 Where appropriate, consideration shall also
be given to the deflection of the yaw motivator(s)
which will result from inceptor inputs from the
automatic control system
See Clause 3.10.
CROSS COUPLING CONSIDERATIONS
3.4.9 In those cases where inertial or aerodynamic
cross-coupling results in the aeroplane rolling or
pitching during the manoeuvres described by 3.4.5
- 7, unless the aeroplane flight control system
ensures that there are smaller limited values of
bank angle and normal acceleration increments,
corrective action shall be assumed as follows:

(a) Deflection of the roll motivator(s) to arrest the
rolling motion, but not until the angle of bank has
reached 15 or the maximum dynamic sideslip
angle, described in 3.4.6 (Compliance (b)), has
been achieved, whichever comes first.

(b) Deflection of the pitch motivator to reduce the
pitching response, but not until the increment in
normal acceleration has reached 0.25g.

LONGITUDINAL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE LOADS
3.4.10 Except when 3.4.3 and 3.4.9(b) apply it is
not necessary to superimpose a manoeuvre load
upon the load on the longitudinal stabiliser/control
required to trim the aeroplane in the initial
conditions specified in 3.4.5. However, in
calculating the loading on a longitudinal
Consideration shall also be given in the design to
the possible effects of asymmetrical longitudinal
stabiliser/control surface loads due to buffeting
which may occur near the minimum permissible
flight speed as defined in Part 0.
See Leaflet 9 Para 6.
35
SECTION 3

stabiliser/control surface the magnitude of the
pitching moment coefficient, C
MO
, shall be
increased and the resulting trim (balancing) load
shall be distributed asymmetrically so as to ensure
that the effect of sideslip angle is covered.
EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE
3.4.11 Multi engined aeroplanes shall be designed
to withstand the loads which arise from the sudden
failure of the critical engine.
(a) The aeroplane shall be considered to be in
level flight at any speed from the minimum
control speed, V
MC
, up to the design diving
speed, V
D
, at any attainable altitude. The
remaining engine(s) shall be assumed to be
delivering the maximum rated power appropriate
to the speed and altitude.

(b) When reverse thrust or propeller drag may
occur because of automatic features, consideration
shall also be given to these effects being present
on the failed engine.

(c) Corrective action by the pilot may be assumed
to be initiated at the time the aeroplane has
reached the maximum yawing velocity subsequent
to the engine failure, but not before two seconds
after the engine failure. The magnitude of the
corrective action shall be based on the control
forces stated in 3.9.6 & 7, unless it can be
demonstrated by analysis or test that lower values
can control the yaw and roll which result from the
prescribed engine failure conditions.
See 2.22.37 - 48 for definition of V
mc
ROLLING MANOEUVRES
36
SECTION 3

3.4.12

Clause 2.22.18 - 36 specifies minimum roll
performance for handling purposes and Section 2
Leaflet 49 gives acceptable criteria for meeting
these requirements. The loads which arise
during rolling manoeuvres are covered by the
Combined Rolling and Pitching cases specified
in 3.4.14. The roll control conditions which
contribute to these cases are specified in the
following clauses.
3.4.13 The maximum roll inceptor input to be used
for stressing purposes at a particular speed and
altitude shall be that which gives the largest steady-
state deflection, or set of deflections, of the roll
control motivator, or motivators, whichever is
applicable, defined by the most critical of the
following conditions:

(a) That deflection, or set of deflections, which
results in one and a third times the specified
minimum rolling performance at that speed and
altitude

(b) The following deflection, or set of deflections:

(i) At speed V
A
- the full available
deflection(s)

(ii) At speed V
C
- the deflection(s) required to
give the steady roll rate which occurs in
condition (i)

(iii) At speed V
D
- the deflection(s) required
to give one third of the steady roll rate which
occurs in condition (i)

(c) The deflection, or set of deflections, given by
(a) If the deflection (or any one deflection), so
defined, exceeds that for full travel, it shall be
replaced by the maximum available deflection.

(b) In applying the conditions of Requirement
(c)(ii) the accuracy with which the actual hinge
moments of each individual motivator may be
predicted may sometimes be such that doubts arise
as to the magnitude of the deflections so defined.
The assumed deflections shall be increased, in
such cases, by 30 per cent.

(c) For ailerons or spoilers having differential
motion, the actual angles shall be used for
stressing, but the mean of the actual angles shall
correspond to the angle given by Requirement (a),
(b) or (c) as appropriate.

(d) Regardless of which of the conditions
specified is critical the following specific phases
of the manoeuvre shall be considered:

(i) The loads which arise due to the rolling
The deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) shall be
assumed to be instantaneous unless otherwise
agreed with the IPTL, see also Leaflet 9, Para
7.2.4.

For transport aeroplanes, Requirement (iii) need
not be considered.
37
SECTION 3

whichever of the following is appropriate to the
particular design:

(i) that corresponding to the maximum output
permitted by the flight control system for the
power unit of the single roll motivator, or of
the individual power units for a number of roll
motivators used in combination.

(ii) where the motivators are driven solely by
the deflection of the pilot's stick or wheel, that
corresponding to a control force of 267N
(60lbf) for a stick control of 222N (50lbf)
applied to the rim of a wheel of diameter Dm
(Din), resulting in a couple of magnitude 222D
(Nm) or 50D (lbf in).

acceleration consequent upon the
deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) with
the aeroplane initially in steady level flight.

(ii) The loads when the rate of roll has
reached its steady value consequent upon
the prescribed deflection(s) of the roll
motivator(s).

(iii) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of
roll condition referred to in (b) above, the
loads which arise when the roll motivator(s)
are returned to the neutral position(s).

(iv) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of
roll condition referred to in (b) above, the
loads which arise when the roll motivator(s)
are moved to a deflected position of equal
magnitude of that in (a) above, but of
opposite direction.
COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING
3.4.14 The loads arising from the combined
application of the pitch and roll motivators shall be
considered for all speeds up to the design diving
speed, V
D
, and all altitudes up to the maximum
operating altitudes for the following conditions:

(a) The deflection, or set of deflections, of the roll
motivator shall be:

For the definition of normal acceleration see
Clause 3.3.3 and Part 0.
38
SECTION 3

(i) The critical value specified in 3.4.13 for
all values of normal acceleration from -1.0g
up to 0.67n
1
g except that for transport
aeroplanes the normal acceleration values
shall be from zero to 0.67n
1
g, and

(ii) One half of the critical value specified
in 3.4.13 associated with a normal
acceleration of 0.9n
1
g, and

(iii) Linear variation between the values
specified in (i) and (ii) with normal
accelerations between 0.67n
1
g and 0.9n
1
g

(b) The yaw motivator(s) shall be:

(i) Held fixed in the position(s) for trim
with the aeroplane in wings-level flight, and

(ii) Deflected to reduce the sideslip angle to
zero, or if this is not possible, to minimise
the sideslip angle

(c) Air brakes shall be either open or closed, as
appropriate to the speed - see 3.6.18 - 21.
BOMB BAY AND DOOR LOADS
3.4.15 The flight loading cases which arise from
the conditions specified in 3.4.5-11 and 3.4.14 are
applicable to bomb bays when the doors are open
and to bomb doors, their operating mechanisms and
supporting structure when the doors are in all
positions from fully open to fully closed and
locked.
The aerodynamic loads on the bomb doors, and
their distribution, shall be obtained from full scale
or wind tunnel tests. Consideration shall be given
to buffet effects.

MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION
39
SECTION 3

3.4.16 THE RANGE OF MASSES TO BE
CONSIDERED AND THE CORRESPONDING
POSITIONS OF THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY
SHALL BE AS SPECIFIED IN 3.3.13-14.

AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIVES
3.4.17 The values of relevant aerodynamic
coefficients and derivations shall be based on the
best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test
results shall be used wherever possible to
determine or check values.
See also Leaflet 9, Para 6.
40
SECTION 3

3.5 GUST LOADS

3.5.1 The requirements of this clause are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the strength of the complete structure, when the aeroplane encounters gusts
normal to the flight path both in the plane of symmetry (vertical gusts) and perpendicular to the plane of symmetry (lateral gusts). It was previously
published as Chapter 204 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1.

GENERAL
3.5.2 The aeroplane shall have adequate strength
for any gusts encountered from directions
intermediate between the vertical and horizontal
plane which provide critical loading conditions.

FACTORS
3.5.3 THE STRUCTURE SHALL HAVE
PROOF AND ULTIMATE FACTORS NOT LESS
THAN 1.125 AND 1.5 RESPECTIVELY ON
THE LOADS ARISING IN EACH CASE
SPECIFIED BELOW.

DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.5.4 THE REQUIRED STRENGTH SHALL BE
ACHIEVED AT ALL MASSES BETWEEN THE
MAXIMUM MASS AT WHICH THE
AEROPLANE CAN REACH THE ALTITUDE
CONSIDERED AND THE MINIMUM FLYING
MASS
All altitudes up to the maximum altitude
attainable shall be considered.
(a) The aeroplane is assumed to be in
unaccelerated flight when gusts are encountered.
The aeroplane speed, engine operating
conditions and the associated maximum
velocities of gusts are specified in 3.5.6 - 8.

(b) The trim of the aeroplane shall be assumed to
be unchanged by the pilot during the passage of
the aeroplane through the gust, unless it is
considered that flight control system inputs will
cause an additional adverse effect on the loading,
or an active alleviating system having a
sufficiently low probability of failure is fitted to
41
SECTION 3

the aeroplane.

See Part 0 for definition of minimum flying
mass.
3.5.5 IN THOSE CASES WHERE TERRAIN
FOLLOWING FLIGHT IS SPECIFIED THE
AEROPLANE SHALL BE DESIGNED FOR THE
CASE WHEN A VERTICAL GUST OF 7.6M/S
(25FT/SEC) IS ENCOUNTERED AT THE SAME
TIME AS IT IS PERFORMING A MANOEUVRE
OF 60% OF THE MAXIMUM LIMIT LOAD
FACTOR.

DISCRETE GUST CASES
3.5.6 The aeroplane shall be assumed to be
subjected to the gust velocities (EAS) stated below,
unless otherwise agreed with the IPTL, at the
aeroplane speeds as defined below.

SUBSONIC FLIGHT
3.5.7
(a) At speed V
G
: the gust velocity of 20.0 m/s
(66 ft/see) between sea level and 6100m (20,000 ft)
thereafter decreasing linearly to 11.6 m/s (38 ft/sec)
at 15200M (50,000 ft) being constant thereafter.

(b) At speed V
H
: the gust velocity of 15.20
m/s (50 ft/sec) between sea level and 6100m
(20,000 ft) and then decreasing linearly to 7.60 m/s
(25 ft/sec) at 15200m (50,000 ft), being constant
thereafter.

(c) At speed V
D
: the gust velocity of 7.60 m/s (25
See Part 0 for definition of speeds.
42
SECTION 3

ft/sec) between sea level and 6100m (20,000 ft) and
then decreasing linearly to 3.80 m/s (12.5 ft/sec) at
15200m (50,000 ft), being constant thereafter.
GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE
3.5.8 In addition to the loads at the Design
Aeroplane Speeds the aeroplane shall be subjected
to appropriate combinations of loads resulting from
both vertical, lateral and where relevant,
intermediate gusts at all speeds above the static
stall boundary. The total load factors for speeds
intermediate between the Design Aeroplane Speeds
shall be derived by assuming linear variations in
gust velocity between the design cases specified in
3.5.6. For speeds below V
G
the total normal load
factor shall be assumed to vary linearly between
unity at zero forward speed and the design value at
V
G
except for the static stall boundary cut off.
See Figure 2
DESIGN ANALYSIS
3.5.9 A dynamic analysis of the response of the
aeroplane to discrete gusts shall be undertaken
taking full account of the aeroelastic properties of
the structure, and varying gust gradients using an
assumed gust shape defined by:

U
U
de

s
K
=
2
1 cos

where U
de
is the design gust velocity as specified
in 3.5.6 & 7
In addition continuous turbulence analysis shall be
undertaken when this is considered to be
appropriate by the IPTL.

In evaluating the loading conditions on the
horizontal stabiliser the airload increment due to
the specified gust shall be added to that of the
initial stabiliser load required to trim the
aeroplane in a balanced condition in steady level
flight at the specified speed. For horizontal and,
where appropriate, intermediate gust conditions
the initial stabiliser load should be redistributed
symmetrically to an amount appropriate to the
effective sideslip produced by the gust.
43
SECTION 3

s is the distance the aeroplane has penetrated
into the gust

K is the gradient distance the minimum value of
which shall be 15.20m (50 ft)
3.5.10 An investigation shall be carried out to
estimate the dynamic amplification of stress in the
discrete gust cases resulting from the effect of
structural flexibility.
The shape of the gust defined in 3.5.9 shall be
used with the gradient distance varied to
establish the peak of response of the aeroplane.

44
SECTION 3

3.6 HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

3.6.1 The requirements of this clause are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the strength of high lift devices and airbrakes, their operating mechanisms and all
parts of the complete airframe affected by the load cases specified. This information was previously published as Chapter 205 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue
1.
Attention is drawn to the fatigue and damage tolerance requirements of 3.2 and to the aeroelasticity requirements of 4.8.

FACTORS
3.6.2 THE HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND
AIRBRAKES, THEIR OPERATING
MECHANISMS AND ASSOCIATED
ATTACHMENT STRUCTURE SHALL HAVE
PROOF AND ULTIMATE FACTORS OF NOT
LESS THAN 1.125 AND 1.5 RESPECTIVELY IN
EACH OF THE APPROPRIATE LOADING
CASES SPECIFIED BELOW UNLESS
OTHERWISE STATED

HIGH LIFT DEVICES
3.6.3 High Lift Devices are defined in Part 0.
OPERATION DURING TAKE-OFF, APPROACH AND LANDING
3.6.4 The operating mechanisms shall be capable
of lowering the flaps, and where used, the slats, to
the fully extended position at an appropriate design
speed.
The following specific extension positions shall,
where appropriate, be identified, with
corresponding limiting speeds as defined in 3.6.7:

(a) Take-off position at any flight speed up to and
including a limited speed for the take-off
condition.

(b) An intermediate position which shall be that
used during the approach to landing or that

45
SECTION 3

required immediately after a baulked landing,
whichever is more severe at any flight speed up to
and including the limiting speed for the
intermediate condition.

(c) A fully extended position at any flight speed
up to and including the limiting speed for the fully
extended condition.
OPERATION EN-ROUTE OR IN COMBAT
3.6.5 If required by the Aeroplane Specification,
the operating mechanism shall be capable of
lowering the high lift devices to any position
defined for use en-route or in combat, at all speeds
up to the maximum required by the Aeroplane
Specification, or as agreed with the IPTL.

RAISING SPEED
3.6.6 The rate at which flaps are retracted shall be
such that excessive sinking does not occur. This
requirement should be associated with a speed
of V
TO
, defined in 3.6.8 and maximum take off
power.
For Class II and Class III aeroplanes (as defined in
Section 2 Leaflet 1, Table 1) for time taken for the
flaps to move from the fully down position to the
retracted position shall not be less than 15
seconds; in general, 15-20 seconds is a
satisfactory period and quick travel during the
early stage of the movement is an advantage so
long as the rate of sink is never at any stage
excessive.

For Class I and Class IV aeroplanes the flaps
should retract as quickly as possible consistent
with no serious sinking or change of trim
incompatible with the handling requirements of

46
SECTION 3

Clause 4.10.

DESIGN AND LIMITING SPEEDS
3.6.7 The design speeds for each position of the
high lift devices as stated in 3.6.4 & 5 must be
sufficiently greater than the limiting speed quoted
in the Aircrew Manual for that position to allow
for probable variation in control of airspeed and
for transition from one high lift position to another.

3.6.8 The design speed shall not be less than the
following:-

(a) For the high lift devices in the take-off
position, V
TO
which shall be the greater of, 1.15
times the equivalent airspeed during take-off at the
maximum design mass before the devices can be
fully retracted, or 1.6 times the equivalent stalling
speed with the flaps in the take-off position, zero
engine power and maximum design mass.

(b) For the high lift devices in the intermediate
position, V
BL
, which shall be the greater of, the
equivalent airspeed attained in a baulked landing at
maximum design landing mass before the devices
can be retracted to the intermediate position, or 1.8
times the equivalent stalling speed with the devices
in the intermediate position, zero engine power and
maximum design landing mass.

(c) For the high lift devices in the fully extended
(a) If an automatic positioning or load limiting
system is used the speeds and corresponding
positions programmed or allowed by the system
may be used.

(b) When high lift devices are used en-route or in
combat condition appropriate design speeds shall
be established which are equivalent to speeds V
A
,
V
C
, V
D
, V
G
and V
H
as specified in Part 0 except
that allowance may be made for the position of the
high lift devices.

47
SECTION 3

positions, V
FL
, which shall be the greater of, 1.8
times the equivalent stalling speed with the devices
in the fully extended position, zero engine power
and maximum design landing mass, or 1.4 times
the equivalent stalling speed with the devices
retracted, zero engine power and the landing mass.
STRENGTH
3.6.9 When the high lift devices are in the retracted
position the strength of those parts of the airframe
specified in 3.6.1 shall be adequate to meet the
conditions stated in 3.3.8, throughout the flight
envelope.

3.6.10 When the high lift devices are used for take-
off, approach, and landing, the strength of those
parts of the airframe specified in 3.6.1 shall be
adequate to meet the load cases specified in 3.6.12
at each position and corresponding design speed,
for all appropriate configurations of the aeroplane
including the carriage of wing stores.

3.6.11 The engine conditions shall be appropriate
to the position of the high lift devices:-

(a) Take-off power for take-off and baulked
landing conditions (MAT or MT as appropriate -
see Section 2 Leaflet 6).

(b) Cruise power for intermediate positions (MCT
- see Section 2 Leaflet 6).

(c) Idling power for fully extended position.

48
SECTION 3


(d) Take-off power for en-route or combat
positions (MAT or MT as appropriate).
3.6.12 For all positions other than en-route or
combat positions:-

(a) The aeroplane shall be assumed to be subjected
to manoeuvres and gusts within the range:-

(i) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load factor
of 4.0 for Class IV, and 2.0 for other types.

(ii) Positive and negative gusts of 7.60 m/s (25
ft/see) (EAS) normal to the flight path
whilst the aeroplane is in level flight, up to
an altitude of 6100 m (20,000 ft).

(b) With the aeroplane in level flight the
separate effects of:-

(i) Propeller slipstream or fan/jet efflux where
appropriate, corresponding to both the
maximum continuous power at the design
speed and the take-off power appropriate to not
less than 1.4 times the stalling speed at the
relevant position of the high lift devices and
aeroplane mass.

(ii) A head-on gust of 7.60 m/s (25 ft/sec)
(EAS).

In the case of primary, intermediate and
advanced trainers only the proof and ultimate
factors in the baulked landing case shall be 1.5
and 2.0 respectively.
49
SECTION 3

(c) A baulked landing condition where the design
speed is V
BL
, as defined in 3.6.8, at the maximum
design landing mass and with the high lift devices
at any position between the fully extended and
intermediate position.

(d) The most severe load of cases (a), (b) and (c)
above on one side of the aeroplane with 80% of this
load on the other side.
3.6.13 When the high lift devices are used en-
route or in combat the design load cases at the
speeds specified in 3.6.8 Compliance (b) shall be
those of 3.6.12 unless otherwise agreed with the
IPTL.

MECHANICAL INTERCONNECTION
3.6.14 Unless the requirements of 4.10 can be met
when full asymmetric deployment of the high lift
devices occurs the motion of the individual section
on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry shall be
synchronised by a mechanical interconnection or
other approved means.

3.6.15 When mechanical interconnection is
provided to meet the requirement, proof and.
Ultimate factors of 1.0 and 1.33 shall be applied to
the loads which arise following a failure which
could result in any single surface becoming
incapable of movement or of attempting to move in
an uncontrolled manner.

3.6.16 The mechanical interconnection shall have
adequate strength to account for applicable
asymmetric loads including those which arise
during flight with one or more engines on one side
of the aeroplane inoperative and the remaining
engines at take-off power.

50
SECTION 3

CIRCUIT STIFFNESS
3.6.17 It shall be shown, by calculation or test, that
the angles of opening of corresponding port and
starboard sections of the high lift devices due to
circuit flexibility or distortion of the structure will
not differ by more than 5 degrees under the limit
loads of 3.6.15 & 16 or the maximum angle at
which the handling requirements of Section 2 can
be met, whichever is the lower.

AIRBRAKES
3.6.18 The time for full extension or retraction of
the airbrakes shall be as short as possible consistent
with the handling requirements of Section 2. In the
case of Class IV aeroplanes the time shall not
exceed 2 seconds at high altitude and 4 seconds at
the low altitude, except under baulked landing
conditions when the retraction time should not
exceed 2 seconds.
The requirements of 3.6.18 to3.6.21 apply to
airbrakes and other speed control devices
wherever they are fitted on the aeroplane.
3.6.19 The airbrakes shall be safely usable at all
speeds up to the maximum permissible speed
appropriate to any possible configuration of the
aeroplane, for example, high lift devices and
undercarriage extended where appropriate, external
stores carried, etc.

STRENGTH
3.6.20 The airbrakes shall be designed to have
adequate strength under those conditions specified
in 3.3.9 and Figure 1, at the appropriate design
speed defined as:-

51
SECTION 3

(a) When no limiting device is fitted; aeroplane
speed V
D
with the airbrake fully extended.
(b) When a limiting device is fitted to prevent full
extension above some predetermined speed, V
B
:-

(i) aeroplane speed V
D
with the airbrake
extended as far as permitted by the limiting
device, and

(ii) 1.15 V
B
or V
D
, whichever is less, with
the airbrake fully extended.
MECHANICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
3.6.21 When mechanical interconnection is
provided between separate sections of the airbrakes
and the requirements of Section 2 cannot be met if
the interconnection fails, the airbrake drive and
interconnecting system shall have proof and
ultimate factors not less than 1.0 and 1.33
respectively on the loads which arise following a
failure which could result in any single section
becoming incapable of movement or of attempting
to move in an uncontrolled manner.

52
SECTION 3

3.7 PRESSURE CABINS

3.7.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all pressurised cockpits or cabins designed to maintain an internal pressure in excess of the external
atmospheric pressure. This information was previously published as Chapter 716 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1.

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS
DEFINITIONS
3.7.2
The type of cabin pressurisation system required
will be stated in the Aeroplane Specification as
one of two basic types as follows:

(a) Low differential pressure system - normally
applicable to short duration aeroplanes with the
crew in fixed positions and using oxygen
routinely.

(b) High differential pressure system - normally
applicable to long duration multi-seat aeroplanes
where the crew do not use oxygen routinely and
are free to move around.
LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SYSTEMS
3.7.3 For aeroplanes with a low differential
pressure system, a cabin altitude not exceeding
6,700 m (22,000 ft) shall be maintained either at
the service ceiling or, for an aeroplane with a
primary operational role at low level, at the
maximum operational altitude stated in the
Aeroplane Specification. Pressurisation shall start
at 1,500 m (4,900 ft) and the maximum differential
pressure shall be reached at an altitude
corresponding to a cabin altitude of 5,000 m
(16,400 ft), between these altitudes, the cabin
In order to maintain the rate of change of cabin
pressure within acceptable limits during rapid
descent, the differential pressure shall be not less
that 28 kPa.

53
SECTION 3

absolute pressure shall vary linearly with
atmospheric pressure. Above the altitude
corresponding to a cabin altitude of 5,000 m
(16,400 ft) the differential pressure shall remain
constant (see Fig.3).
3.7.4 In level flight the cabin differential pressure
shall be maintained within -0 +1.5 kPa of the
nominal value.

HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SYSTEMS
3.7.5 For aeroplanes with high differential pressure
systems, the maximum cabin differential pressure
shall be as high as possible consistent with weight
and other considerations; at least it shall be such
that:

(a) a cabin altitude not exceeding 1,850 m (6,060
ft) is maintained at the maximum cruising altitude
stated in the Aeroplane Specification, and

(b) a cabin altitude not exceeding 2,500 m (8,200
ft) is maintained at the service ceiling .

3.7.6 The crew shall be able to select the desired
cabin altitude between sea level and 1,850 m (6,060
ft). The desired altitude shall be maintained until
the maximum differential pressure is reached.

3.7.7 In level flight, the cabin differential pressure
shall be maintained within 1.5 kPa of the nominal
value.

3.7.8 The rate of change of cabin pressure shall be
adjustable and shall not exceed 7 kPa per minute
for all other types of aeroplane.
Note: 2 kPa per minute for transport aeroplanes
54
SECTION 3

PRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.9 The cabin pressure and, where appropriate,
the rate of change shall be automatically controlled.

3.7.10 NO SINGLE FAILURE IN THE CABIN
PRESSURISATION SYSTEM SHALL LEAD TO
INABILITY TO USE ANY ITEM OF PRESSURE
CLOTHING SPECIFIED IN THE AIRCREW
EQUIPMENT ASSEMBLY (AEA) FOR THE
AEROPLANE
See Clause 9.12.
3.7.11 The pressurisation system shall be mounted
in the aeroplane so that as far as possible the effects
of vibration and flight loads are minimal.

3.7.12 No single failure of the pressure control
system, including the depressurisation control
3.7.14 - 17, shall be capable of causing a fall in
cabin pressure to a value below the ambient
pressure corresponding to the safe altitude, as
defined in 3.7.33, before descent to the safe
altitude, can be made (3.7.32(b)).
The use of suitable protective clothing, where this
is provided for other reasons, can be taken into
account in meeting this requirement.

3.7.13 Standard couplings in accordance with DEF
STAN 53-68(Cancelled)

shall be used in the duct
system.
See also STANAG 3312
DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.14 ON ALL AEROPLANES EXCEPT
STRATEGIC TRANSPORTS MEANS SHALL
BE PROVIDED WHEREBY THE PRESSURE
DIFFERENTIAL CAN BE REDUCED TO ZERO
AT ANY ALTITUDE.
The control shall be in accordance with Clause
4.19.
See also 3.7.26 - 30.
3.7.15 The time taken for the pressure to fall from
the maximum differential pressure to 0.3 kPa shall
be:

(a) for low differential pressure systems, not less

55
SECTION 3

than 5 seconds and not more than 10 seconds, and

(B) FOR HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
SYSTEMS, AS STATED IN THE AEROPLANE
SPECIFICATION.
3.7.16 IT SHALL BE POSSIBLE TO
REPRESSURISE THE CABIN FOLLOWING
DECOMPRESSION AT A RATE WHICH
SHOULD NOT EXCEED 7KPA PER MINUTE.

3.7.17 THE OPERATION OF THE
DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEM SHALL BE
INDEPENDENT OF ANY POWER SUPPLIES
OR SYSTEMS WHOSE FAILURE MIGHT
RESULT IN THE NEED TO ABANDON THE
AEROPLANE.

PRESSURE INDICATORS
ALTIMETERS
3.7.18 An altimeter to indicate the cabin altitude
shall be fitted in the cabin and be readily visible to
the appropriate crew member, as well as the pilot.

WARNING DEVICES
3.7.19 Means shall be provided at the pilot's or
flight engineer's station to indicate when the safe or
preset pressure differential or cabin altitude limits
are exceeded.
Appropriate warning markings on the cabin
differential pressure indicator meet this
requirement.
See also 4.19.59.
3.7.20 An aural or visual signal shall be provided
(ref 4.19.59 (b)) as the warning of pressurisation
failure or of exceeding the cabin altitude limits, in
addition to the cabin altitude indicator.
This warning need not function at operating
altitudes below 7,600m (25000ft)
See Leaflet 14..
PRESSURE CONTROLLING DEVICES
56
SECTION 3

DISCHARGE AND SAFETY VALVES
3.7.21 Valves shall be provided to prevent the
differential pressure exceeding the design
maximum by more than 7kPa under all conditions
of failure of the control system.

3.7.22 These valves shall be mounted so as to
prevent blockage of the protective guard by dirt or
litter and to facilitate servicing. The installation of
these valves and their associated pipelines shall be
such as to prevent the entry and accumulation of
water.
See also Leaflet 14.
INWARDS RELIEF VALVES
3.7.23 An inwards relief valve or valves shall be
provided to prevent the cabin pressure falling
below the pressure outside the cabin by more than
3.5 kPa in any circumstances.

NON-RETURN VALVES
3.7.24 Failure of the air supply to the cabin shall
cause minimal loss of pressure, preferably by the
use of non-return valves to prevent leakage back
through the pressurisation system.

ISOLATING VALVES
3.7.25 A valve or valves shall be provided, as near
as possible to the source of the air used for
pressurisation, for stopping the air supply to the
cabin in an emergency.

CONTAMINATION
3.7.26 THE FACILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED
TO PURGE THE CABIN WITH A FREE FLOW
OF UNCONTAMINATED AIR FROM A RAM
AIR OR OTHER SYSTEM.
This may be automatically operated upon
selection of cabin depressurisation or
independently selectable.
Every possible precaution shall be taken to avoid
contamination of the cabin air by exhaust gases
or other noxious fumes both in normal operation
and, as far as possible, after damage by enemy
action or a breakdown in any part of the
57
SECTION 3

pressurisation system, hydraulic piping, cabin
heating or other service. See also Leaflet 14.
3.7.27 Means shall be provided to isolate the
source of any contaminated air to the cabin.
Consideration shall be given to linking this
provision to the selection of the alternative supply
of air for purging the cabin.
Transport aeroplanes shall conform to the
requirements of J AR 25 para 1438 in this
respect.
VENTILATION
3.7.28 VENTILATION SHALL PROVIDE AT
LEAST 0.5 KG OF FRESH AIR PER PERSON
PER MINUTE UNDER THE MOST SEVERE
CLIMATIC AND ALTITUDE CONDITIONS OF
WHICH THE AEROPLANE IS CAPABLE WITH
ALL ENGINES FUNCTIONING.

3.7.29 On multi-engined aeroplanes, other than
transport types, multiplication of the sources of
supply of the cabin air shall be sufficient to ensure
that no combination of failure of one or more
engines will cause the cabin equivalent altitude to
be in excess of 10,000 m (32,800 ft), or the
ventilation rate to be less than 0.25 kg per person
per minute when the aeroplane is maintaining
maximum possible height on the remaining engines
at light load.

3.7.30 A system of ventilation shall be provided
for use at low altitudes when the cabin is not under
pressure, and shall be of adequate capacity to
ensure that satisfactory ventilation ensues, under
the climatic conditions for which the aeroplane is
designed.

LEAKAGE RATE
58
SECTION 3

3.7.31 FOLLOWING FAILURE OF THE CABIN
AIR SUPPLY (SEE 3.7.2) THE RATE OF FALL
IN CABIN PRESSURE SHALL BE SLOW
ENOUGH TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR
THE AEROPLANE TO DESCEND FROM THE
MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL ALTITUDE TO A
SAFE ALTITUDE (SEE 3.7.33) BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVE CABIN PRESSURE FALLS TO A
VALUE BELOW THE AMBIENT PRESSURE
CORRESPONDING TO THE SAFE ALTITUDE.

3.7.32 The following causes of failure of cabin air
supply shall be considered:

(a) Failure due to failure of all engines, in which
case it shall be assumed that a descent is started
immediately, and

(b) Failure due to other causes, in which case it
shall be assumed that a descent with engine power
is not started until after the warning of 3.7.19 -20
has operated.
(a) In each case, account shall be taken of the
pilot's reaction time (assumed to be 5 seconds) and
the time to retrim the aeroplane for the descent.

(b) In the case of aeroplanes for which a ballistic
climb is required by the Aeroplane Specification
as an operational manoeuvre, it shall be assumed
that in case (a) the failure occurs, and that in case
(b) the warning operates just after the aeroplane
has begun its ballistic climb.

3.7.33 The safe altitude shall be taken as 12,200 m
(40,000 ft) for all aeroplanes other than transports
and as 4,570 m (15,000 ft) for transports.

3.7.34 Each and every pressure cabin shall be
subjected to a ground leakage test to demonstrate
that the requirement of 3.7.31 - 33 is met. To cater
for deterioration of the pressure sealing
arrangements in service, this test shall demonstrate
that the initial equivalent leakage area of the

59
SECTION 3

pressure cabin is not greater than one half that
required to comply with 3.7.31 - 33.
TEST CONNECTIONS
3.7.35 STANDARD AIR PRESSURE
CONNECTIONS CONFORMING TO DEF STAN
16-17(Obsolescent)SHALL BE FITTED TO
ENABLE THE CABIN, DUCTING, SEALS,
ETC., TO BE TESTED ON THE GROUND.

STRENGTH OF PRESSURE CABIN
3.7.36 For the purposes of strength considerations
two differential pressures are considered as
follows:

(a) The maximum working differential pressure
DP
w
, i.e., the setting of the discharge valve plus
tolerance.

(b) The relief differential pressure DP
R
, i.e., the
maximum differential pressure attainable following
operation of the safety valve with the discharge
valve blocked.

Note: On aeroplanes which have a relief valve
with a fixed pressure setting as a safety device, as
opposed to a duplicate discharge valve (see
Leaflet 14), the use of DP
R
may result in
excessive loads for the high speed low level case.
On such aeroplanes, provided that the pilot is
given a secondary warning of overpressurisation
(see 4.19), the differential pressure at which the
warning operates may be used in place of DP
R
.
The use of the overpressure setting for stressing
purposes shall be restricted to those altitudes at
which the overpressure warning is designed to
operate.

3.7.37 The pressure cabin and local structures shall
have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125
and 1.5 respectively under the following loads at
any height H:

(a) All differential pressures up to 0.9 DP
R
or 1.0
DP
w
appropriate to height H, whichever is the
greater, combined with,

60
SECTION 3

(b) The critical combination of the most severe
inertia and flight loads and the loads arising from
the local external pressure distribution obtainable at
the height H and at any speed up to the design
diving speed V
D
.
3.7.38 The pressure cabin and local structure shall
and 1.5 respectively under the loads produced when
the cabin pressure falls below the external pressure
by the maximum amount permitted by the inwards
relief valve.

See 3.7.23
FATIGUE LIFE
3.7.39 A FATIGUE ANALYSIS SHALL BE
CARRIED OUT ON THE PRESSURE CABIN
AND THE LOCAL STRUCTURE TO A
LOADING SPECTRUM TO BE AGREED WITH
THE IPTL (IN CONJ UNCTION WITH
AIRWORTHINESS DIVISION, RAE). THE
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SHALL VARY
FROM 0 TO DP
W
AND THE RESULTING
LOADS SHALL BE COMBINED WITH THE
APPROPRIATE FLIGHT AND INERTIA LOADS
AND THE LOADS ARISING FROM THE
LOCAL EXTERNAL PRESSURE
DISTRIBUTION.
It shall be shown, using Leaflet 34 or other agreed
criteria, that the safe fatigue life for the specified
spectrum is at least equal to the specified life of
the aeroplane unless otherwise agreed.

STATIC STRENGTH OF PRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.40 ALL COMPONENTS, PIPES AND
DUCTING SHALL HAVE PROOF AND
ULTIMATE FACTORS NOT LESS THAN 1.125
AND 1.5 RESPECTIVELY ON THE
FOLLOWING COMBINED LOADS AT ANY

61
SECTION 3

HEIGHT H.
(a) The local pressure in the system when the cabin
is at the differential pressure appropriate to the
height H, and

(B) INERTIA LOADS AND GYROSCOPE
LOADS, WHERE APPLICABLE, DUE TO THE
MOST SEVERE CONDITIONS OBTAINABLE
AT THE HEIGHT H.
3.7.41 Unless it can be demonstrated that a
blockage in the system by component failure is
impossible, all components, pipes and ducting shall
and 1.5 respectively on:

(a) The maximum local working pressure in the
system, or

(b) The maximum possible pressure which can
occur in that part of the system when blockage has
occurred, or

(c) If a relief valve is fitted, the maximum relief
valve pressure.
The most adverse conditions of temperature of the
air and of the structure should be taken into
account in each case.

STRENGTH TESTS
PROVING TEST
3.7.42 EACH CABIN, WHEN INSTALLED IN
THE AEROPLANE AND WITH ALL
INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT FITTED,
SHALL BE SUBJ ECTED, BEFORE DELIVERY,

62
SECTION 3

TO AN INTERNAL PRESSURE OF 1.125 TIMES
THE MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
MAINTAINED FOR ONE MINUTE AND
SHALL NOT SUFFER ANY PERMANENT
DEFORMATION.
STATIC TEST
3.7.43 On all aeroplanes, strength calculations
shall be supported by static pressure tests. The
specimen shall be tested to the loads given in
3.7.37, as agreed with the IPTL.
These tests shall be made on a representative
specimen of the complete pressure cabin, or, if
this is not practicable, on one or more special test
specimens which include all the features known
to present design difficulties.
3.7.44 Where a component, pipe or ducting in the
pressurisation system is of welded construction or
of complicated shape, so that there is doubt about
the strength calculations, a test shall be made to
establish compliance with 3.7.41.

FATIGUE TEST
3.7.45 A representative specimen of the pressure
cabin, complete or represented by a number of
special test specimens, shall be subjected to a
fatigue test except where it can be shown by
calculation that the pressurisation loads are an
insignificant part of the loading spectrum and the
pressure cabin is included in the fatigue test of the
whole fuselage. The loading spectrum shall be that
given in 3.7.39 unless otherwise decided after
discussion with the IPTL.
criteria, that the safe fatigue life for the specified
spectrum is at least equal to the specified life of
the aeroplane unless otherwise agreed.

3.7.46 A representative pressurisation system shall
be subjected to a fatigue test in which the working
temperatures and pressures are reproduced.
criteria, that the fatigue life for the conditions
specified is at least equal to the specified life of

63
SECTION 3

Vibration and racking movements arising from the
flight conditions shall also be represented as far as
possible.
the aeroplane, unless otherwise agreed.
FLIGHT TESTS
TIME NEEDED FOR EMERGENCY DESCENT FOLLOWING LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE
3.7.47 As soon as practicable after the aeroplane
has been cleared for high altitude flying and has
reached a development stage where any results
obtained would be reasonable representative of
production aeroplanes, flight tests shall be made by
the Contractor to establish the time required for an
emergency descent from the maximum operating
altitude to a safe altitude under the most adverse
conditions likely in Service, taking into account all
probable loads of the aeroplane
Airbrakes, spoilers, throttles and other devices
which affect the rate of descent may be used,
provided the technique employed is sufficiently
simple for emergency use.
64
SECTION 3

3.8 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

3.8.1 This clause states design and strength requirements for spinning, including entry to and recovery from the steady condition. It is applicable only to
those aeroplanes where recovery from a post stall gyration or spin is called for in the Aeroplane Specification and it applies whether the entry to the post stall
gyration or spin is intentional or inadvertent If spin prevention devices having sufficiently low probability of failure are used the spinning requirements
which then apply shall be agreed with the IPTL. Clause 2.24, specifies the aeroplane handling requirements for post stall gyration and spins. This
information was previously published as Chapter 207 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1. Guidance on Design Criteria for Spin Resistance and Spin Recovery is
given in Leaflet 18.

STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS
FACTORS
3.8.2 The ultimate factor in Clause 3.1 of at least
1.5 shall apply to the whole aeroplane under the
loads arising during a spin and during entry and
recovery therefrom. The proof factor in Clause 3.1
of at least 1.125 shall also be met in the case of
aeroplanes in Class I and Class IV as defined in
Clause 2.1, but need not be met on other types.

DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.8.3 THE SPINNING CONDITIONS USED FOR
STRENGTH CALCULATIONS SHALL BE
THOSE WHICH GIVE THE MOST ADVERSE
COMBINATION OF THE YAW, PITCH AND
ROLL COMPONENTS OF THE ROTATION.
(a) The effect of unsteadiness shall be considered.

(b) Departure from controlled flight at point A on
the flight envelope as defined in Clause 2.3 with
the appropriate combination of angular rotations
shall be considered.

(c) To cover roll during recovery from a spin or
post stall gyration the most adverse rate of rotation
about a longitudinal axis, assumed to be vertical,
Leaflet 17 gives an acceptable means of
estimating the rate of rotation for design
purposes in the absence of other information.

65
SECTION 3

must be used.
3.8.4 FULL SCALE SPINNING TESTS SHALL
BE MADE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF 2.12.
The rates of roll, pitch and yaw, and the normal
and longitudinal accelerations measured during
these tests shall be checked against those used for
design, and if they are greater a report shall be
made to the IPTL so that appropriate action can be
taken.

ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS

3.8.5 In the departure phase of an inadvertent spin
the engine conditions in the range of engine off to
maximum power, including maximum rotational
speed, shall be assumed.

3.8.6 In other phases of the spin and recovery, the
engine condition assumed shall be that appropriate
to the manoeuvre.

3.8.7 When the aeroplane is designed to carry
external stores the most severe combinations of
mass, moments of inertia and aerodynamic drag
shall be considered at each phase of the manoeuvre.

RECOVERY STANDARD
WHEN AVAILABLE FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
WILL BE REGARDED AS THE FINAL
EVIDENCE OF THE AEROPLANES
CHARACTERISTICS AS REGARDS SPINNING
AND RECOVERY. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE A
REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF
SATISFACTORY FULL SCALE BEHAVIOUR
ADVANCE INFORMATION SHALL BE
DERIVED BY APPROPRIATE MODEL TESTS
AND/OR CALCULATIONS AS AGREED WITH

66
SECTION 3

THE IPTL.
67
SECTION 3

3.9 CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.9.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all control systems, including engine controls, in which the position of the motivators is determined solely by
the pilot through a direct connection from the inceptors. It also applies to those parts of the flight control system which are not covered by the requirements
of Clause 3.10 for active control systems, or of Clause 6.5 for autopilot systems. The information was previously published as Chapter 206 of DEF STAN
00-970 Issue 1.

The requirements relate mainly to mechanical components, but powered controls, power operated trimmers and devices such as Q-feel and variable stops are
also included. Autostabilizers, auto-trim and similar devices which can move the motivators independently of inceptor inputs are not included, but are
covered by Clauses 3.10 and 6.5.

The requirements shall be considered in conjunction with other relevant chapters including:

Clause 3.1 Static Strength and Deformation
Clause 3.2 Fatigue Damage Tolerance
Clause 3.10 Active Control Technology
Clause 4.8 Aero-elasticity
For piloting aspects, reference should be made to Clause 4.10.

GENERAL
3.9.2 The requirements shall be met over a range
of temperatures (as given in 3.2) from that at
ground level to the minimum value at the service
ceiling of the aeroplane when operating at the
lightest practicable weight, and for all design speed
and acceleration conditions.

STRENGTH
GENERAL
3.9.3 Each circuit shall have proof and ultimate
factors not less than 1.125 and 1.5 respectively
See3.1.
68
SECTION 3

under the given loading conditions, unless
otherwise stated.
3.9.4 The ultimate factor for cables shall be 2.0 and
for chains shall be 3.0.

3.9.5 The loads shall be applied in each case at the
point at which the pilot would normally apply them
and shall be reacted as appropriate:

(a) by the control system with the motivator
deflected to its stops, or

(b) by an intermediate component specifically
provided for the purpose of reacting the input
loads; such as an irreversible mechanism locked in
the most adverse position, or local system stops
used in conjunction with a load limiting device in
the circuit. When this is the case the strength
requirements for the remainder of the circuit shall
be agreed with the IPTL.

PRIMARY CIRCUIT DESIGN LOADS
3.9.6 Conventional Controls

(a) Pitch Inceptor

(i) Stick control column 800 N (180 lbf)
(two hands together on a single hand grip)

(ii) Wheel or W type 1000 N (225 lbf)
(two control column hands, 500 N (112 lbf)
at each hand grip)
For Yaw inceptor see also 4.12 and Section 4
Leaflet 56 Para. 10.
69
SECTION 3

(iii) Wheel or W type 500 N (112 lbf)
(one hand only) column

(b) Roll inceptor

(i) Stick type control 300 N (67.5 lbf)
column

(ii) Wheel or W type The torque
resulting from two control column
equal and opposite loads of 300 N
(67.5 lbf) applied tangentially at
diametrically opposed points of the
wheel of diameter D metres (inches).

(c) Yaw inceptor

(i) Rudder bar/pedals 1350 N (303 lbf) (on
one side only)

(ii) Rudder bar/pedals 800 N (180 lbf)
(simultaneously on each side in the same
direction) except where overridden
by brake loads.
3.9.7 Side Stick Inceptor 665 N (150 lbf) in any
direction in a horizontal plane

DUAL CONTROL
3.9.8 Dual control systems shall be designed to the
following conditions:

(a) Pilots acting together.
Note: For dual control aeroplanes which are
derived from a single pilot design of aeroplane
and are intended for operational conversion

70
SECTION 3

Each pilot applying simultaneously loads equal to
75% of those specified in 3.9.6 for each inceptor.

(b) Pilots acting in opposition.
Each pilot applying simultaneously the loads
specified in 3.9.6 for each inceptor.
training, the loading may be reduced, with the
prior agreement of the IPTL, to each pilot
applying simultaneously loads equal to 50% of the
loads specified in 3.9.6.

Note: This case provides a design condition
for the inter-connecting circuit between the two
sets of controls.
GROUND GUST CONDITIONS
3.9.9 The primary control circuits must be
designed to cater for control surface loads which
arise from gusts when the aeroplane is on the
ground and when taxiing downwind.

(a) That part of the control circuit between the
cockpit controls and the control stops nearest to the
surface shall be subjected to the loads arising from
a limit hinge moment, H, defined in Guidance but
not exceeding those of 3.9.6 or 3.9.8, as
appropriate.

(b) The control system locks and the stops nearest
to the surfaces and any parts of the control circuit
between these locks and stops and the control
surface final operating lever shall be subjected to
the loads arising from a limit hinge moment, H.

The limit hinge moment H is defined as:

H =qcSK Nm (lbf ft)

where q is the dynamic pressure based on a
speed of 41 m/s (135ft/sec) - N/m
2
(lbf/ft
2
)
c is the mean chord of the control
surface aft of the hingeline, metres (ft)
S is the control surface area aft of the
hingeline, m
2
(ft
2
)
K=0.50 for the ailerons at full
deflection.
=+0.75 for the ailerons with the
inceptor locked in the central position
=0.75 for the elevator at full
deflection, up and down
=+0.75 for the rudder at neutral and at
full deflection

(K is positive where the tendency is to depress
the surface).
71
SECTION 3

SECONDARY CIRCUIT DESIGN LOADS
3.9.10

(a) Crank, wheel or lever (applied only to flaps,
slats, tabs, stabiliser, spoiler or wing sweep
operation)

220 (1+40R) N [50 (1+R) lbf]
3 3

where R is the radius at which the load is applied
metres (inches) but not less than 220 N (50 lbf), nor
more than 660 N (150 lbf).

(b) Twist 15 Nm (133 lbf in)

(c) Push-pull controls. There are no specific loads.

CONTROL CIRCUITS - OVERALL DESIGN
EFFICIENCY AND MOVEMENT
3.9.11 Every effort shall be made to keep the
efficiency of the mechanical control circuits as high
as possible. Movement shall be smooth and
positive as appropriate to the function.

Within the limitations of the airframe design and
the overall requirements of the control system, the
routing of control circuits shall be as simple and
direct as possible and their length shall not change
during operation, or due to structural deformation
or flight accelerations, such as to affect the control
of the aeroplane

3.9.12 Control systems for essential services shall
be so designed that when a movement to one
position has been selected, a different position can
be selected without waiting for the completion of

72
SECTION 3

the initially selected movement, and the system
shall arrive at the finally selected position without
further attention. The movements which follow and
the time taken by the system to allow the required
sequence of selection shall not be such as to
adversely affect the airworthiness of the aeroplane.
3.9.13 Where practical, the sense of movement
involved in the operation of the inceptors shall
correspond with the sense of aeroplanes response.

3.9.14 Where appropriate the design shall be such
that each circuit will retain any given setting and
will not tend to creep under control loading or
vibration.

3.9.15 Each circuit shall possess adequate stiffness
to react to the operating loads without excess
deflection.
See also Section 4 Leaflet 28, Para. 4.
INCORRECT ASSEMBLY
3.9.16 Each element of each control system shall
be designed so as to minimise the probability of
incorrect assembly that could result in
malfunctioning of the system.

3.9.17 For control systems which, if incorrectly
assembled would hazard the aeroplane, the design
shall be such that at all reasonable break-down
points it is mechanically impossible to assemble
elements of the system to give out of phase action,
reverse sense of the control or unintended
interconnection between two systems.

FAILURE IMMUNITY, SAFETY
73
SECTION 3

3.9.18 It shall be shown by analysis, test or both
that the aeroplane is capable of continued safe
flight and landing after any of the following
failures of the flight control systems, (including
trim, lift, drag, feel and thrust systems) within the
permissible flight envelope (see Clause 2.1.31 - 33)
without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength,
unless it is agreed with the IPTL that such failures
are acceptably improbable:

(a) Any single failure, excluding jamming.

(b) Any combination of failures, excluding
jamming.

(c) Any jam in a control position normally
encountered during any phase of flight and any
manoeuvre appropriate to the role of the aeroplane.
All foreseeable kinds of failure shall be
considered.
See also Leaflet 24 and Section 4 Leaflet 36.
3.9.19 The design and location of the inceptors
shall be such as to minimise the risk of inadvertent
operation either by personnel entering or leaving
the aeroplane or by the flight crew during normal
movement in the cockpit.

3.9.20 Protection shall be provided to prevent any
control circuit components from being used as a
step or handhold and to prevent interference,
jamming or chafing from cargo, passengers or
loose objects. There shall be means, especially in
the cockpit area, to prevent foreign objects entering
locations where they would jam the system.
See also 1.1.29 - 30.
DURABILITY, WEAR AND BACKLASH
74
SECTION 3

3.9.21 The fatigue life of the control systems shall
not be less than that of the airframe primary
structure, consideration being given to all forms of
inputs expected during the design service life.
As far as possible control system elements subject
to wear shall have a wear life equal to the
specified life of the aeroplane as a whole.

3.9.22 The design of the control system shall be
such as to minimise backlash.

BREAKOUT FORCE
3.9.23 In the case of primary flight control circuits
the force required on the inceptor to overcome the
static friction in the relevant circuit, when
measured with a standard spring balance, shall be
as low as possible and shall not exceed the value
stated in Table 3.
See also Section 4 Leaflet 34.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, TEMPERATURE, MOISTURE, AND ICE
3.9.24 The control circuits shall be designed to
operate over the whole temperature range specified
in 3.9.1 and without any deleterious effects due to
tightening or slackening resulting from differential
expansion.
Sufficient clearance shall be provided to ensure
the efficient operation of all detail fittings, such as
jacks, bearings, guides, fairleads, etc., over the
temperature range of 3.9.1. It shall be
demonstrated in hot and cold temperature tests
that the clearances are sufficient.

3.9.25 Component design shall avoid pockets,
traps, wells, etc., into which water, condensed
moisture or other liquids would collect; or adequate
drain provision shall be made.
It shall be demonstrated that the clearances
provided are sufficient to ensure efficient
operation of the controls under all conditions of
humidity. Wherever possible materials which
expand appreciably with moisture should be
avoided for such parts as fairleads and washers.

3.9.26 Clearances shall be sufficient to avoid the
possibility of jamming due to the accretion of ice.

COMBAT VULNERABILITY, PRIMARY, TRIM, SERVO AND ENGINE CONTROLS
3.9.27 On all aeroplanes except trainers,
The aim shall be that the failure of any single part
75
SECTION 3

consideration shall be given to the reduction of the
vulnerability of all flight and engine controls vital
to the safety of the aeroplane.
of the flying control system shall not leave the
pilot without adequate control for a return flight
and safe landing.
3.9.28 Control circuits shall be run in those areas
of the airframe where combat damage is less
probable with respect to threat and the role of the
aeroplane.
Wherever practical the primary flight control
systems and their trim systems shall be so
arranged that in the event of a primary circuit
being rendered inoperative sufficient use of the
autopilot or trim circuit will be available to
provide a measure of control of the aeroplane.

3.9.29 Duplicated parts of control circuits shall be
located as far apart as possible.

3.9.30 When an aerodynamic servo control surface
is fitted the control system shall be arranged so
that, in the event of the servo surface being
rendered inoperative by enemy action or other
cause, it will be possible to retain some measure of
control over the aeroplane.

CONTROL CIRCUIT - DETAILS
COMPONENTS
3.9.31 The components used in control circuits
shall be compatible with one another and their
design and installation shall be such as to ensure
compliance with the requirements of 3.9.2 - 30.
STOPS
3.9.32 The range of movement of each flight
control surface, including trimming, lift and drag
devices and wing sweep shall be limited by stops.
Each stop shall be able to withstand any loads
corresponding to the design conditions for the
control system.
Each stop shall be located so that wear, slackness,
or take-up adjustments will not adversely affect
the control characteristics of the aeroplane as a
result of a change in the range of surface travel.

76
SECTION 3

GUST LOCKS
3.9.33 Where a device is used for locking a control
surface whilst the aeroplane is stationary, the
locking device shall:

(a) Automatically disengage when the primary
flight controls are operated in the normal manner,
or

(b) Limit the operation of the aeroplane so that the
pilot receives unmistakable warning at the start of
take-off.

3.9.34 Means shall be provided to preclude the
possibility of the locks becoming engaged in flight.

RUDDER PEDAL INTERCONNECT
3.9.35 Rudder pedals shall be interconnected to
ensure positive movement of each pedal in both
directions.

MOTIVATOR INTERCONNECTS
3.9.36 A connecting circuit shall be provided
between the port and starboard ailerons, unless
otherwise agreed with the IPTL.
Unless otherwise agreed with the IPTL, inter-
connecting circuits shall be provided for other
motivators which are duplicated port and
starboard, such as canard, elevator/tailplane and
wing sweep and for high lift and drag devices
See also 3.6.14 - 16 and 3.6.21.
3.9.37 The aileron connecting circuit shall have an
ultimate factor at least as great as that for the wings
as a whole in all stressing cases where the ailerons
share the total load on the wings.
See also the stiffness requirements of Section 4
Leaflet 25.
UNCONVENTIONAL CONTROLS
3.9.38 When other than conventional pilot controls
are used prior agreement shall be obtained from
the IPTL.

77
SECTION 3

TRIM CONTROL SYSTEMS
3.9.39 TRIM CONTROLS SHALL NORMALLY
BE PROVIDED FOR EACH OF THE THREE
PRINCIPAL CONTROL AXES.

3.9.40 TRIM CONTROLS SHALL BE
DESIGNED TO AVOID INADVERTENT
OPERATION OR ABRUPT EFFECT.

3.9.41 THE TRIM INCEPTORS SHALL
OPERATE IN THE PLANE AND WITH THE
SENSE OF MOTION OF THE AEROPLANE.
MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED, PREFERABLY
ADJ ACENT TO THE INCEPTOR, TO
INDICATE THE DIRECTION OR INCEPTOR
MOVEMENT RELATIVE TO THE
AEROPLANE MOTION.

3.9.42 Trim controls shall be designed to retain
any given setting and shall not creep under control
loading or vibration.

3.9.43 Unless the trim tab, if fitted, is
appropriately balanced and demonstrated to be free
from flutter the control shall be irreversible.

3.9.44 If, due to failure, a power operated trim
control can stop at such a position that the piloting
requirements of Part 6 cannot be satisfied then a
stand-by trim system shall be provided.
The inceptor for this stand-by system, and, if
applicable, the power supply for it shall be
separated from and independent of the main
system.

POWER CONTROL UNITS AND SYSTEMS
3.9.45 POWER OPERATED CONTROL
SYSTEMS SHALL COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THIS CLAUSE IN SO
FAR AS THEY ARE APPLICABLE.
See also Clause 3.10 and Leaflet 19.
78
SECTION 3

3.9.46 THE PROOF AND ULTIMATE
FACTORS SHALL BE 1.125 AND 1.5
RESPECTIVELY UNDER THE MAXIMUM
LOAD WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED IN THE
SYSTEM UNDER ALL PRACTICABLE
OPERATING CONDITIONS.
Where appropriate the strength requirements
shall be met with the system both operative and
inoperative.

TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL UNITS
3.9.47 FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST - ANY
NEW TYPE OF POWERED FLYING CONTROL
UNIT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A FLIGHT
CLEARANCE TEST BEFORE THE FIRST
FLIGHT TEST OF THE UNIT.
The tests required by 3.9.47 and 3.9.48 shall be
carried out in a ground test rig.
See also Leaflets 20, 21 and 23.
3.9.48 UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST -
ANY PROTOTYPE OF ANY NEW DESIGN OF
POWERED FLIGHT CONTROL UNIT SHALL
BE SUBMITTED TO A GROUND TEST FOR
DESIGN CLEARANCE.

TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL INSTALLATIONS
3.9.49 INSTALLATION FLIGHT CLEARANCE
TEST - ANY NEW INSTALLATION OF
POWERED CONTROL UNIT SHALL BE
SUBMITTED TO A GROUND TEST FOR
FLIGHT CLEARANCE BEFORE THE FIRST
FLIGHT OF THE INSTALLATION.
The tests required by 3.9.49 and 3.9.50 may be
made partly in a ground rig but shall include
adequate ground testing in the aeroplane.

3.9.50 INSTALLATION DESIGN CLEARANCE
- A PROTOTYPE OF ANY NEW
INSTALLATION OF A POWERED FLYING
CONTROL SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A
GROUND TEST FOR DESIGN CLEARANCE.

FATIGUE TESTS
79
SECTION 3

3.9.51 Each powered flying control system shall
have a safe life determined in accordance with
Clause 3.2 at least equal to the specified life of the
aeroplane, unless otherwise agreed. This shall be
demonstrated by a fatigue test.

MECHANICAL G-RESTRICTORS
3.9.52 WHEN IT IS PROPOSED TO FIT A
MECHANICAL G-RESTRICTOR, THE
CONTRACTOR SHALL DISCUSS THE
PROPOSAL WITH THE IPTL AT AN EARLY
STAGE OF THE DESIGN.
See Leaflet 22.
MAINTENANCE
ACCESSIBILITY
3.9.53 Components shall be designed, installed,
located and provided with access so that inspection,
rigging, repair, replacement and lubrication can be
easily accomplished, including visual inspection of
fairleads, pulleys, terminals and turnbuckles.
See also Clause 4.4.
SAFETY
3.9.54 Systems and components shall be designed
and installed to preclude injury of personnel doing
maintenance and testing. Where positive
protection cannot be provided adequate warning
and instructions shall be given.

RIGGING INFORMATION
3.9.55 The limiting breakout force established for
the design in accordance with 3.9.23, or preferably
some lower figure chosen by the designer as
appropriate to the type, shall be stated on the

80
SECTION 3

drawings for inspection purposes together with the
conditions of its measurements.
3.9.56 In the case of cable-operated systems, the
initial tensions at which, at normal hangar
temperatures, each primary control circuit should
be rigged shall be stated on the appropriate
drawings for inspection purposes.
The requirements of 3.9.23 for static friction shall
be met at the correct rigging tension.

3.9.57 The information on correct rigging
dimensions, rigging tensions and allowable static
friction limits shall be included in the relevant
Aeroplane Publications.

81
SECTION 3

3.10 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.10.1 This information was previously published as Chapter 208 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1. It contains the requirements relating to flight with active
controls. Active Control Systems (ACS) are systems in which commands to the motivators are computed from sensor inputs with or without inceptor inputs.
Thus, although the term is normally applied to systems which must operate continuously and without whose correct operation safe flight cannot be
maintained, it also includes all forms of autostabilizer and other systems which can command motivator position independently of inceptor units. Definitions
of terms are given in Part 0.

The requirements of this clause are concerned primarily with the most critical systems, those which operate continuously (full-time). The extent to which
they apply to other flight control systems will be stated in the Aeroplane Specification. All flight control systems, including ACS, must satisfy the
requirements of Clause 3.9. Requirements for autopilots are stated in Clause 6.5. For piloting aspects, handling qualities are dealt with in Section 2, and, in
particular, the reaction of the pilot to mode changes and failures, in Clause 4.10.

ACS may be provided for purposes other than flight control. In all cases the requirements of this chapter will apply if maintenance of safe flight is involved.
Fig 4 shows the fundamental features which constitute an ACS. The Categories A and B outlined define those functions which are respectively purely
automatic and those which involve manual inputs. Table 4 lists representative control functions in Categories A and B. See also Leaflet 25.

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
3.10.2 In determining the integrity of a Full-time
ACS all inputs to that system and the effects of
associated systems must be taken into account.
These effects and their influence upon integrity
must be identified during qualification.
If a full-time active flight control system is
required the aeroplane designer may elect to
integrate a number of other control functions, e.g.,
structural mode and secondary controls, thrust and
thrust vectoring, within that one system. Such an
integrated system would not necessarily replace
the need for, say, a dedicated engine control
system but could certainly perform the necessary
thrust command computations.
Further integration is possible and arises from
the fundamental high integrity implicit in the
Full-time ACS.
APPLICATIONS
3.10.3 Full-time Active Flight Control systems
They may also provide structural mode control, See also 3.10.94 - 107 and Leaflet 25.
82
SECTION 3

must provide vehicle control and where necessary
stability augmentation.
either through the conventional control surfaces or
by means of additional specially located surfaces
or other motivators. However some structural
mode control systems may be designed as discrete
autonomous active control systems and may even
not require to be full-time.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3.10.4 The designer must provide performance, to
the levels stated in the aeroplane specification.
An ACS may be required to provide performance
at the following levels of integrity:

(a) Full-time

(b) With reversion to equivalent performance.

(c) With reversion to degraded performance.

(d) Fail-safe (for systems other than primary
flight control).

For systems involving reversion, as in (b) and (c)
above, the integrity of the reversionary system and
the ability to make the essential transition to it
shall be considered to be flight safety critical.
REFERENCE TO OTHER AREAS

(Categories of Status, Performance, Flying
Qualities, Handling Qualities to be added later).
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
3.10.5
See also Leaflet 26. In considering the design of
an ACS it is important to understand that
effective operation will depend upon the
compatible interactions of pilot, airframe, ACS
and the total possible environment. A fully
integrated ACS will include some or all of the
following features:
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SECTION 3


- Pilot's inceptors, switches, and indicators
required for operating the ACS.
- Motion sensors, e.g., rate gyros,
accelerometers, airstream direction
sensors.
- Transducers and sensors required for
command and measurement of outputs.
- Structural strain sensors.
- Air data sensors.
- Computers and system management
logic.
- Status data storage.
- System power supply conditioning.
- Dedicated power supplies.
- Actuators.
- Environmental control system.
- Electrical power supply.
- Hydraulic power supply.
- Aerodynamic interfaces: control surfaces,
spoilers (motivators).
- Engine functions: thrust and vectoring
(motivators).
- Signalling elements: mechanical,
electrical, optical etc.
- Guidance sub-system.
- Intake controls.
- Software.

INTEGRITY
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SECTION 3

3.10.6The system shall be designed to meet the
specified levels of integrity to be agreed with the
IPTL.

3.10.7 A detailed analysis of the System Design in
respect of integrity shall be presented to show
the basis upon which the Aeroplane Specification
is to be met. In particular the philosophy for
treating common-mode failures shall be stated and
shall be to the approval of the IPTL.
Where redundancy is used to meet integrity
targets, care shall be taken that performance
after failure is acceptable. This may require
testing of simulated failure modes.

RELIABILITY
3.10.8 The system shall be designed to meet the
specified levels of reliability, to be agreed by the
IPTL.

3.10.9 A full reliability development plan shall be
prepared to show how the full reliability potential
of the design is to be realised, to establish
compliance with the requirements and to specify
how the reliability achievement will be maintained
throughout production and service.
See DEF STAN 00-40 (Part 1) (NATO ARMP-
1).
3.10.10 The ACS design shall take account of
maintenance requirements under all anticipated
environmental conditions.

INVULNERABILITY
3.10.11 The system shall be designed to survive all
threats defined in the specification.
(a) The system design shall take full account of its
installation in the airframe, variations in the
operating environment including the effects of
failures of and within other on-board systems, the
potential for maintenance error, flight crew error,
enemy action and flight in lightning conditions.

(b) The susceptibility levels for all environmental
influences shall be determined, and all practical
See also Clause 9.9.
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SECTION 3

limitations affecting effectiveness and
survivability shall be declared to the satisfaction
of the IPTL as early as possible in the design and
development process.

(c) Wherever possible survival shall be achieved
by providing inherent passive resistance to the
influencing factors.

(d) In the event of the aeroplane sustaining
damage, the probability of the ACS providing less
than Level 3 flying qualities shall be to the
satisfaction of the IPTL (Ref. 2.1.19).

(e) Exceptionally, where compliance with
requirements for invulnerability proves
impracticable, it shall, with the IPTL's approval,
be permissible to adopt such strategies as shut-
down and reinstatement to achieve survivability.
3.10.12 Where parallel processing or control paths
are provided to ensure redundancy, they should be
physically separated as far as possible, so that
minor accidental or battle damage does not cause
failure of the active control system.

3.10.13 The ACS and its installation, together with
all other installed equipments, shall be mutually
electromagnetically compatible when installed in
the aeroplane; and demonstration of their
satisfactory integration into the total aeroplane is
required.
In designing resistance to Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) consideration shall be given, in
particular, to the following:

(a) An Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMC) test and EMI avoidance
philosophy must be stated by the designer.

(b) Effects on performance, the physical
and operational effects, must be considered
during system design.

86
SECTION 3


(c) The designer must show that his design meets
the specified threats as part of an overall system
safety analysis (Ref. 3.10.7).

(d) The effect of the requirements on choice of
system must be clearly indicated to the IPTL early
in the design stages.

(e) Maintenance of essential screening and
bonding effectiveness must be considered and
means of in-service testing incorporated into the
design.
3.10.14 To avoid ACS failure due to maintenance
error, the system shall be designed so that it is
impossible to install or connect any component part
improperly.

POWER SUPPLIES
3.10.15 Hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical
power shall be provided for the system with
characteristics, levels of integrity and reliability
compatible with system requirements.

3.10.16 Power transients shall not degrade the
performance of the ACS.

3.10.17 Suitable means of sustaining sufficient
power to maintain control of the aeroplane for
recovery from engine failure shall be provided.

3.10.18 Essential flight controls shall be given
priority over non-flight phase essential controls in
apportioning the use of power supplies.

COMPUTERS
3.10.19 ACS computers shall be designed to
provide speed of operation and levels of
discrimination fully compatible with the intended
(a) The designer shall aim to ensure that all
functions embedded in a processor or computer
The response of the ACS to both pilot commands
and external disturbances will be determined by
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SECTION 3

performance of the control laws, and they shall
enable all management functions to be effective
without incurring significant penalties arising from
time delays.
are identified and fully understood with respect to
their possible influence upon correct functioning
of the ACS, whether or not these functions are
intentionally employed during normal ACS
operation.

(b) Each ACS computer, as an LRU and its
interface, shall be uniquely identified such that its
correct function when installed in an aeroplane
system is assured.

(c) The ACS computer design and its interfaces
shall have sufficient reserve or be capable of
growth, to meet later expansion requirements to be
agreed with the IPTL.
signal computation effected by computers.
Feedback signals from specially provided
sensors will enable the computers to take
account of the motion of the aeroplane, changes
in configuration and, where incurred, flexure of
its structure.
SENSORS
3.10.20 The locations of primary sensors in an
aeroplane shall be chosen making due allowance
for rigid and flexible body motions, and the
achievement of adequate protection from bird-
strike, accidental and battle damage. Furthermore,
the location of air-data sensors, and the processing
of their signals shall take account of normal
disturbances (eg sideslip, effect of asymmetric
manoeuvres).
(a) Any necessary compromise shall be to the
satisfaction of the IPTL.

(b) Where use is made of sensors already provided
for other systems any resulting compromise in the
ACS aeroplane performance shall be to the
satisfaction of the IPTL.

INCEPTORS
3.10.21 The design of inceptors shall meet the
performance, reliability and integrity requirements
specified for the system.
For novel inceptors, operating characteristics shall
be to the approval of the IPTL.

3.10.22 The operation of control switches etc.,
mounted on flight control inceptors shall be shown
to produce minimal interference with inceptor
output signals.

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SECTION 3

3.10.23 Where appropriate, upon failure of a feel
system, reversion shall be made to, at worst, the
least acceptable breakout force and gradient
defined in Section 2.

3.10.24 Dual Control Inceptors

(a) Where mechanical interconnection
between inceptors is impracticable, e.g.,
between force sensors, the designer shall
advise the IPTL, as early as possible of the
method of interfacing inceptors with the
control law computing.

(b) The interface logic shall whenever
possible avoid the use of manually
operated inhibiting switches.

(c) Inhibition of primary inceptors shall be
avoided, (for example the instructor's).

(d) The effects of dual command upon control law
authority and stability shall not lead to over
controlling or system instability.

3.10.25 The effects of pilot-coupled mass shall be
shown not to degrade precision control during rapid
manoeuvres and flight in turbulence.

ACTUATORS
3.10.26 The actuators shall meet the requirements
of the specification which should at an early stage
be amplified by an interface document to ensure
compatibility of all mechanical, hydraulic,
pneumatic, electrical and electronic interfaces.
(a) Demonstration of actuator performance shall
be carried out in a rig which is fully representative
of control and installation parameters.

(b) Particular attention shall be given to the
maintenance of performance with service life and
to the accommodation of the duty cycle expected
The requirements of 3.10.28 - 31, 3.10.39 and 40
shall also be noted.
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SECTION 3

to result from the control laws in use.
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
3.10.27 The forms of signalling adopted, e.g.,
electrical or optical, shall be shown to provide the
required integrity and invulnerability.
An ACS typically makes use of non-mechanical
signalling between inputs and outputs.
FAILURE MANAGEMENT
3.10.28 The effects of failures upon the motion of
the aeroplane shall be minimised and shall not
exceed the levels stated in the Aeroplane
Specification.
(a) It is important that first failures shall incur
minimum disturbance; subsequent failures may be
permitted to give rise to greater transients, but
these shall be to the satisfaction of the IPTL.

(b) Where degradation of performance due to
failures is unavoidable, the designer shall aim to
achieve regression in flying qualities between
normal and emergency characteristics.

(c) Consideration shall be given in the design and
in the failure analysis to air-data and other
sensors which may lack coherent physical input
and for which cross-monitoring is difficult.

See Leaflet 26, Para 3.

3.10.29 The designer shall ensure that nuisance
disconnects do not compromise system integrity
and performance.
The means whereby failures are detected and
isolated shall be designed so that the compromise
between failure transient level and nuisance
disconnect frequency is acceptable to the IPTL.

3.10.30 Where redundancy is employed special
care shall be taken to eliminate sources of
common-mode failure.
This provision does not prohibit the use of
interlane transfer of information, but it does
mean that devices implemented to achieve this
shall be designed and implemented to meet
identified integrity, reliability and performance
levels. See also Section 4 Leaflet 36.
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SECTION 3

3.10.31 Interlane tracking errors and voting
transients shall be kept to a minimum; in particular,
errors between sensors measuring the same
parameter shall not compromise required maximum
allowable failure transient levels.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
3.10.32 Any interaction with the ACS shall be
fully defined and restricted in respect of any data
imported by the ACS.
Data acquired by the ACS must be controlled by
the ACS to render its use fully compatible with
the ACS integrity requirements.
Interaction with other systems may form part of
the overall aeroplane avionics strategy.
CONTROL LAWS AND SOFTWARE
3.10.33 THE CONTROL LAWS
INCORPORATED IN AN ACS SHALL
PROVIDE THE LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE
STATED IN THE AEROPLANE
SPECIFICATION. IN RESPECT OF FLYING
QUALITIES AND OPERATIONAL
PERFORMANCE, WHEN OPERATING IN
TURBULENCE THESE SHALL BE AT LEAST
TO THE STANDARD OF SECTION 2.

3.10.34 WHERE CONTROL LAWS (MODE)
CAN COMPETE FOR CONTROL AUTHORITY
A CLEAR PROTOCOL SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED TO PREVENT ESSENTIAL
CONTROL LAWS SUFFERING PREMATURE
SATURATION.
See also 3.10.96.
3.10.35 THE DESIGNER MUST TREAT
CONTROL LAWS AND COMMON SOFTWARE
AS COMMON-MODE ELEMENTS IN DESIGN
AND PROVING.

CONTROL LAWS
3.10.36 THE CONTROL LAWS SHALL USE
THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF SENSOR
DERIVED FEEDBACKS, IN PARTICULAR THE

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SECTION 3

MOST RUGGED SENSORS SHALL BE
EMPLOYED FOR PRIMARY FEEDBACKS
ESSENTIAL TO CONTINUED SAFE FLIGHT.
3.10.37 CONTROL LAWS ESSENTIAL TO
INITIAL FLIGHTS OF ANY NEW
CONFIGURATION SHALL BE ROBUST IN
THAT THEY SHALL BE INSENSITIVE TO
THOSE AEROPLANE CHARACTERISTICS
WHICH MAY BE SUBJ ECT TO
UNCERTAINTY PRIOR TO FLIGHT
VALIDATION.

3.10.38 Gain and phase margins or equivalent
measures relating to all modes shall be maintained
at acceptable levels for all predictable variations in
system operating conditions and aeroplane
configurations throughout the specified life of the
system.

3.10.39 Residual oscillations and quantisation
effect shall not exceed levels which significantly
affect the piloting task or pilot subjective
acceptance, or which can result in significant wear
of the system and airframe components.

3.10.40 The probability of loss (if gain or phase
margins which results in an unrecoverable
aeroplane condition shall be significantly less than
the required probability for loss of the aeroplane
due to control system failure.

3.10.41 Mode compatibility logic shall provide
flexibility of ACS operation and ease of mode
selection by the pilot. Where changes of control
law (mode) can occur in flight, either
automatically or by pilot selection, they shall

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SECTION 3

incur minimum disturbance to controlled flight.
The need to manually re-trim following a mode
change shall be avoided by design.
3.10.42 The designer shall ensure that control
laws permit the aeroplane to make safe and
controlled entries into and departures from
conditions of full and partial constraint (e.g.,
undercarriage restraint).

3.10.43 Where control laws involve a trimming or
integral function, which can result in motivators
moving progressively towards authority limits
during nominal operations, such conditions shall
be fully identified and appropriate pilot warnings
introduced.

3.10.44 Recovery from unusual attitudes,
particularly beyond the stall, or from intentional
manoeuvres which involve transition through a
period of low or negative airspeed shall be
considered and appropriate control law strategies
implemented to ensure safe and controlled
behaviour.

3.10.45 The Flight Control Laws shall be defined
in an unambiguous Flight Requirements Document
(FRD) or Software Requirements Statement (SRS).

These documents shall be revised and corrected
throughout the ACS development.

3.10.46 The data describing the mathematical
model of the aeroplane and ACS shall be defined in
Master Data Sets which shall be revised and
corrected with the SRS.

SOFTWARE
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SECTION 3

3.10.47 The FRD or Software Requirements
Statement shall include definitions of system
redundancy and failure management algorithms,
built in test functions, pre-flight test, and all other
functions to be written in software terms.
A method by which the structure and algorithms
of Flight Safety Critical Software shall be
evaluated to eliminate design errors arising from
Control Law Specification ambiguity or lack of
definition shall be agreed with the IPTL.
The overall standards for software in Critical
Systems are given in Defence Standard 00-55.
The requirements of this chapter are not intended
as replacements for, nor do they invalidate, the
above DEF STAN. However, they shall be read
as enlargements which emphasise the needs of
this critical software application.
3.10.48 Every reasonable effort shall be made to
ensure that the software is free from errors and is
wholly compatible with Safety Critical function.

3.10.49 The Software shall be specified, designed,
verified and validated in a rigorous and controlled
process which shall be defined to the satisfaction of
the IPTL.

(a) The Software Design Process shall
facilitate software assessment and
Certification of the ACS.

(b) All Software associated with the ACS
development shall be identifiable, separately
deliverable, and appropriately documented.
(a) The software shall be structured so that its
functions are visible and discrete changes
permissible, without involving large areas of code.

(b) A Software Plan or Control Statement shall be
prepared and shall cover all aspects of the
software development life cycle.

(c) At least one completely independent software
audit shall be carried out to assess correct
functioning of the software. Independence may be
achieved by the employment of a separate and
different team for this purpose from that designing
the software.

(d) A listing of the techniques to be employed in
the software audit shall be submitted for the
approval of the IPTL.
(e) All software anomalies or related anomalies
which arise during software development and

94
SECTION 3

testing shall be recorded together with the details
of changes arising therefrom.
3.10.50 The Flight Resident Software (FRS) or In-
Flight Software, shall be tested on the CS rig.
(a) These FRS rig tests shall be carried out using
the ACS flight standard hardware.

(b) FRS rig tests shall cover all modes of
operation and shall explore the full context of
conditions to be met in the required flight
envelope.

(c) Where software other than the FRS is required
to facilitate testing the ACSD hardware, e.g.,
during environmental testing, such software shall
be rigorously tested to show that as far as is
possible it is free from anomalies which could
reduce the effectiveness of the hardware test.

(d) Automatic test software shall be shown to
be free as far as is possible from anomalies which
could hazard the ACS, and with which the
Automatic Test Equipment has been designed to
be used.
Ref. 3.10.87 and Leaflet 30.
3.10.51 Each FRS programme shall be clearly and
uniquely identifiable.

3.10.52 All changes to programmes during
development and service shall be rigorously
recorded and uniquely identified.

3.10.53 All changes shall be subject to the FRS
audit and rig test procedures, unless specifically
identified and excluded by agreement with the
IPTL.

AIRFRAME ASPECTS
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SECTION 3

GENERAL
3.10.54

INTERACTION WILL OCCUR BETWEEN
THE OVERALL AIRFRAME DESIGN AND
ACS DESIGN. THE RESULTING
PERFORMANCE, RELIABILITY AND
INTEGRITY WILL DEPEND UPON AN
OPTIMISATION OF SUCH FEATURES AS
MOTIVATORS, AIRFRAME
CONFIGURATION, AND ACS CONTROL
LAWS. SEE ALSO LEAFLET 28.
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS
3.10.55 IN THE ASSESSMENT OF
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY CONSIDERATION
SHALL BE GIVEN TO ALL ACS MODES,
INCLUDING THOSE DEGRADATIONS AND
FAILURES FROM WHICH THE AEROPLANE
CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO
RECOVER.
(a) In demonstrating compliance with the static
strength requirements of Clause 3.1 the designer
shall examine the sensitivity of the loads on
significant items to their dependent variables
(dependent variables could embrace
flight/aeroplane conditions, control surface inputs,
response parameters, gust velocities) to ensure
that sufficient safety margins exist.

(b) When assessing design loads consideration
shall be given to the loads due to manoeuvres,
gusts and combinations of manoeuvres and gusts.
It must be shown that sufficient control authority
is available for adequate ACS system performance
under all foreseen circumstances, and in particular
that the ACS system shall have the capability to
function throughout the duration of severe
turbulence encounters. The loading assessment
shall consider those loading conditions which
would exist following the occurrence of
reasonable combinations of structural damage and
The aim of these requirements is to ensure that
an aeroplane with an ACS system exhibits the
same level of structural integrity as an aeroplane
designed to fulfil a similar role without an ACS
system.

These requirements are subject to the agreement
of the IPTL, in consultation with Airworthiness
Division, RAE.
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SECTION 3

system degradation from which recovery is
expected, for example that which might be caused
by a birdstrike or minor battle damage.
3.10.56 Where recovery of the aeroplane
following failure of the ACS is possible the
load spectrum used to establish the Design
Limit Load (Clause 3.1) shall be reviewed
and limitations (Section 2 Leaflet 9)
defined, if necessary, to establish an
acceptable level of risk.

3.10.57 Where intervention on the part of
the pilot is required after the failure of an
active control system, in order to prevent a
potentially catastrophic situation from
developing, an unambiguous failure
warning shall be provided for the pilot in
accordance with Clause 4.15.

INTEGRITY OF THE ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM
3.10.58 In cases where there would be a
significant structural penalty, if the structure
was designed to sustain the critical loads
arising from a malfunction of the active
control system, attention shall be given to
the possibility of improving the integrity of
the ACS.

DESIGN CASES
3.10.59 The critical design cases for aeroplanes
incorporating ACS may be more difficult to
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SECTION 3

determine than those for conventional
aeroplanes, consequently many more flight
conditions must be investigated at the design
stage and in flight test.

Critical design cases will be dependent not only
on aeroplane category and role but also on the
actual application of ACS in a given aeroplane
design.

Non-linearity effects which arise due to system
dwells, motivator rate limits and system
authority limits must be accurately or
conservatively represented in the design loads
analysis.

The principles to be used in the derivation of
critical design cases for aeroplanes incorporating
ACS are given in Leaflets 27 and 28.
LOADS MEASUREMENT
3.10.60 Prototype, Development and
Preproduction Aeroplanes

A sufficient number of aeroplanes in these
categories engaged in either manufacturer's or
MOD(PE) flight trials shall, as required by the
IPTL, be fitted with comprehensive instrumentation
to enable fatigue and static loads to be measured
and critical loading actions to be defined.
The data so obtained must be analysed to assess
the validity of design loads and to determine
whether any additional critical loading actions
could occur if the relative phasing of manoeuvre
and gust loads was altered. When critical loading
actions are identified which have not been
envisaged by the designer early action must be
taken to ensure that the structure has sufficient
strength to sustain the new loads (for example: an
increase in structural strength, a control system re-

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SECTION 3

design, a structural integrity substantiation by
calculation, or the use of a static test airframe).
3.10.61 In-Service Aeroplanes

In-service aeroplanes incorporating ACS shall, as
required by the IPTL, be fitted with instrumentation
to enable defined critical fatigue loads (as defined
by actions taken to comply with 3.10.60 to be
measured and assessed, so that consumption of
structural life can be quantified. In addition, a
representative sample of in-service aeroplanes shall
be fitted with a comprehensive load measurement
system, which although not necessarily as
comprehensive as that fitted to prototype and
development aeroplanes, shall be sufficient to
enable defined critical static and fatigue loads to be
monitored and to allow any new critical loading
actions (caused for example by differences between
actual aeroplane usage and that assumed during
design and development flying) to be identified.
In cases where such new critical loading actions
are identified there must be a reassessment of the
structural substantiation for the aeroplane to
determine whether any remedial action is
required. If a re-design or development of in-
service ACS software is necessary, either to
ensure that the structure has sufficient strength to
sustain newly identified critical loading actions or
to modify aeroplane performance characteristics,
then flight trials must be repeated to reassess all
critical loading actions.

MODIFICATIONS TO SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE
3.10.62 Before approving any modifications to
either the ACS software or hardware the design
authority shall ensure that the proposed changes do
not alter the characteristics of the flying control
system sufficiently to invalidate the structural
substantiation of the aeroplane. In those cases
where the structural substantiation would be
invalidated by the proposed changes this must be
stated on DEF STAN 05-123 Form 714, and the
design authority must ensure that the necessary
resubstantiation of the structure is completed,
preferably before approving the associated
modification. Until the completion of the
resubstantiation, flying limitations shall be applied
which shall ensure that the loads applied to the

99
SECTION 3

structure do not exceed 80% of the unfactored limit
load.
OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS
GENERAL CONDITIONS
3.10.63 THE ACS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO
FUNCTION WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME, TO
INCLUDE GYRO RUN-UP, PRE-FLIGHT (PF)
TEST ETC., FOLLOWING THE APPLICATION
OF POWER. THIS TIME SHALL BE DEFINED
IN THE AEROPLANE SPECIFICATION.

SEE ALSO LEAFLET 29.

3.10.64 THE SYSTEM SHALL BE DESIGNED
SO THAT THE PILOT IS KEPT INFORMED OF
ANY CHANGE OF STATUS OR FAILURE
WHICH REQUIRES PILOT ACTION TO
MAINTAIN PERFORMANCE OR TO
SAFEGUARD AIRWORTHINESS.
3.10.65 The pilot shall be given clear indication of
any modes which are engaged whether by manual
or automatic selection.

3.10.66 All otherwise undisplayed status
information shall be made available on demand
during flight, wherever possible.

3.10.67 ALL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
ASPECTS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE
CONTEXT OF NORMAL SERVICE AND
BATTLE DAMAGE DETERIORATION OF
COMPONENTS AND DUE ALLOWANCE
MADE FOR THESE EFFECTS.
The method whereby the designer takes account
of these deteriorations must be to the satisfaction
of the IPTL.

3.10.68 INDICATION OF NORMAL ACS
FUNCTIONING AT THOSE TIMES WHERE NO
OPERATING LIMITATIONS ARE IMPLIED
SHALL NOT BE DISTRACTING TO THE
PILOT.

PREFLIGHT TEST
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SECTION 3

3.10.69 The installed ACS shall incorporate an
automatic, and where unavoidable pilot-interactive,
pre-flight test function to ensure that all redundant
elements, failure detection and signal selection
algorithms, etc., are correctly functioning.
Normally it shall be mandatory for the pre-flight
test to be satisfactorily completed before flight.
The actual fault status of the system shall
determine the ability to proceed to take-off.

The fault status for take-off under normal
conditions shall be specified by the aeroplane
designer. Special operational cases where take-off
will be required to be made at lower levels of
integrity will be defined by the IPTL.

3.10.70 The level of testing provided in the pre-
flight test shall be sufficient to determine whether
the ACS is flight-worthy.

3.10.71 System status, as detected by the pre-flight
test and interruptive and continuously operating
BIT, shall be presented to the pilot during preflight
tests.

IN-FLIGHT TEST
3.10.72 Any automatic In-flight system self-tests
incorporated as part of ACS failure detection and
management shall not give rise to levels of
disturbance which may affect the pilot's ability to
perform precision tasks.

3.10.73 Essential elements of an ACS which are
only required to operate in discrete parts of the
flight envelope (modes) shall be monitored to
ensure that they are fit for use.

3.10.74 Where an ACS includes a number of
subsystems or modes with significantly degraded
performance and handling levels, a training facility
shall be provided. This shall enable the pilot to

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SECTION 3

select the otherwise naturally occurring degraded
modes for training purposes. This provision must
not compromise the status of the failure detection
and monitoring of functions involved with these
modes. Selection of failed sub-systems or modes
shall not be possible.
FAILURE MONITORING
3.10.75 Status data derived from the system shall
be made available for fault diagnosis purposes.
These data shall be accessible after flight and shall
survive removal of main bus and external electrical
power from the system.
Where the design requires failed signals to be
automatically rejected by the system, these signals
shall be identified and their rejection recorded
with time and other appropriate context data for
maintenance purposes, in any appropriate
recorder.

3.10.76 If pilot action is required in response to a
failure, then an appropriate indication shall be
automatically generated in the cockpit.
Information regarding system status which may
affect flight management shall be accessible by the
pilot.
3.10.77 Fault location to at least Line
Replacement Unit (LRU) level shall be automatic
and to a confidence level to be agreed with the
Aeroplane Project Director.

COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS
3.10.78 All displays, indicators, selectors and
switches providing essential functions for an ACS,
shall be demonstrated to have the necessary levels
of integrity.

AEROPLANE AND SYSTEM PROVING
3.10.79 WHILE THE DESIGN IS BEING
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SECTION 3

DEVELOPED, AND ON COMPLETION, EVERY
EFFORT SHALL BE MADE TO IDENTIFY ALL
POSSIBLE FAULTS AND TO DETERMINE
THE CONSEQUENCES IN ORDER TO
ERADICATE ALL IDENTIFIABLE DESIGN
ERRORS, IN ORDER TO MEET THE DESIGN
SPECIFICATION. A RECORD OF THIS
PROVING PROCESS SHALL BE KEPT.
3.10.80 ALL FLIGHT RESIDENT SOFTWARE
(FRS) SHALL BE SUBJ ECT TO A FULL
INDEPENDENT AUDIT.

3.10.81 ALL FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS
SHALL, DURING DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT, BE SUBJ ECT TO PILOTED
SIMULATOR ASSESSMENT TO ESTABLISH
BOTH QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF
PERFORMANCE AND QUALITATIVE
ACCEPTABILITY.

3.10.82 AN ELECTROMAGNETIC
COMPATIBILITY (EMC) PHILOSOPHY
STATEMENT AND TEST PLAN SHALL BE
WRITTEN TO PRECEDE DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT.

3.10.83 A RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION
PLAN FOR SYSTEM AND LRU'S SHALL
BE PREPARED BEFORE TESTING
COMMENCES.

3.10.84 A COMMON-MODE ANALYSIS
SHALL BE MADE TO J USTIFY THE DESIGN.

3.10.85 ALL IDENTIFIABLE HARDWARE
FAULTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED
PROBABILITIES OF OCCURRENCE WHICH
TOGETHER WITH THE EFFECTS UPON
PERFORMANCE SHALL BE SHOWN TO BE
COMPATIBLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS.

3.10.86 A TOTAL SYSTEM SAFETY

103
SECTION 3

STATEMENT SHALL BE PREPARED BY THE
AEROPLANE DESIGNER.
RIG TESTING
3.10.87 THE COMPLETE ACS SHALL BE
TESTED IN A WORKING RIG IN WHICH ALL
THE FLIGHT HARDWARE IS INSTALLED
AND PROVIDED WITH SUITABLE POWER
SUPPLIES, COOLING AND MOTIVATOR
LOADS.
The inclusion of, or representation of, engine
based functions, e.g., bleed air servos, thrust
vectoring, etc., shall be to the satisfaction of the
IPTL.

3.10.88 Rig testing shall include measurement of
performance, both as a fault free system and for all
classes of failure.
A schedule of tests to be performed detailing all
performance and failure measurement shall be
prepared and agreed with the IPTL prior to the
commencement of rig testing.

3.10.89 The rig tests with hardware-in-loop shall
include piloted 'flight' testing.
These tests shall cover all aspects of flight and
ground operations.

3.10.90 A period of fault-free endurance testing of
the full system in the ACS rig with pilot in the
loop, shall precede first flight.
Testing time shall be kept ahead of flight time
during initial development. The duration of the
test shall be agreed with the IPTL.

AEROPLANE-ON-GROUND TESTING
3.10.91 The complete ACS shall be correctly
installed in the aeroplane for which it has been
designed and tested to prove correct functioning
and compatibility with the airframe (structural
coupling) and all other systems.
Special environmental compatibility tests shall
be performed on the installed system as may be
required by the IPTL.

FLIGHT TESTING
3.10.92 Flight tests shall be conducted to establish
verification of the performance of the ACS.
(a) Early flight tests shall be carried out to verify
the aerodynamic data used for the ACS design.

(b) Any special functions required for the
purposes of flight test (e.g., fault simulation) shall
be designed and tested in compliance with this

104
SECTION 3

chapter. Such functions must be identified early in
the system design and their provision made as part
of the overall ACS Design.
IN-SERVICE CHANGES
3.10.93 All changes which may affect an ACS
shall be scrutinised and implications identified.
All changes to an ACS which arise during
development and in service use shall be subject to
the requirement of this chapter unless specifically
excepted by the IPTL.

APPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
3.10.94 SYSTEMS WHOSE FAILURES COULD
LEAD TO IMMINENT LOSS OF THE
AEROPLANE SHALL BE SHOWN TO
PROVIDE SATURATION CHARACTERISTICS
WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE WITH
REASONABLE MARGINS OF EXCEEDANCE
OF THE MAXIMUM GUST OR MANOEUVRE
LEVELS STATED IN THE DESIGN
SPECIFICATION
Apart from those Active Control applications
directly affecting stability augmentation and
flight control, there are specific applications
which affect structural behaviour and aeroplane
configuration. These applications may be
discretely implemented or integrated within, for
example, a Full-Time Active Flight Control
System.

See also 3.10.54 - 62 and Leaflets 25 and 28.
3.10.95 ALL SUCH SYSTEMS MUST BE
MUTUALLY COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER
ACS FUNCTIONS, I.E., FLIGHT CONTROL
AND STABILITY, PRESENT IN THE SAME
AEROPLANE.

3.10.96 WHERE A CHOICE EXISTS OF
CONTROL MODE TO BE ENGAGED,
WHETHER BY AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL
SELECTION, THE DESIGNER SHALL ENSURE
THAT THE USE OF THE SELECTED MODE
DOES NOT CAUSE AN OTHERWISE
AVOIDABLE LOSS OF ESSENTIAL

105
SECTION 3

CONTROL. IF THE REJ ECTION, INHIBITION
OR LIMITATION IN THE AUTHORITY OF AN
ENGAGED MODE CAN LEAD TO A
SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FLYING QUALITIES
AND/OR MISSION PERFORMANCE THEN
SUITABLE MEANS OF WARNING THE PILOT
SHALL BE PROVIDED.
3.10.97 FOR ALL MODES AN ULTIMATE
SUBSERVIENCE TO PILOT DEMAND SHALL
BE ENSURED, UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN
THAT PRIORITY IS ESSENTIAL FOR A
SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVE MODE.
Where necessary for reasons of safety,
consideration shall be given to providing the
facility for the pilot to override specific ACS
modes (e. g. , 'g' limiting) whilst remaining within
structural limits to be agreed with the IPTL.

ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL (AFC)
3.10.98 The system shall provide stability with
the integrity and reliability levels specified in the
Aeroplane Specification.

OBJ ECTIVE: TO WIDEN THE
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE BY
AUTOMATIC ENHANCEMENT OF THE
STABILITY OF A PARTICULAR FLUTTER
MODE.
3.10.99 Where applicable the ability to recover
to a safe flight envelope following failure or
degradation of the AFC, shall be shown to be
compatible with the Integrity Requirements.
AFC may require the provision of specially
located motivators.
MANOEUVRE LOAD ALLEVIATION (MLA)
3.10.100 The system shall not compromise overall
structural integrity.
Objective: To redistribute absolute loads during
manoeuvres, to increase structural life, and to
permit more efficient structural design.

MLA may require the provision of specially
located motivators.
GUST LOAD ALLEVIATION (GLA)
3.10.101 Special Requirements. (To be completed). Objective: To enhance structural life.
WING CAMBER CONTROL (WCC)
106
SECTION 3

3.10.102 Reversion to recovery and landing
configuration must be achievable to specification.

Objective: To optimise lift and drag (especially
at high lift conditions) throughout manoeuvring
envelope, and to effect high drag for braking.
STALL AND SPIN PREVENTION (SSP)
3.10.103 If full-time operation is not involved and
departures expected, post departure and recovery
characteristics must be defined and an optimum
recovery mode provided where appropriate.
(a) Particular attention must be given to
establishing the required levels of manoeuvre and
gust to be met in combination.

(b) Consideration shall be given to implementing
SSP in such a manner that the pilot may choose to
exceed these conditions in an emergency.
Objective: To automatically deter the pilot and
airframe from initiating a departure from
controlled flight and to provide resistance to
post stall gyration and spins.
STRUCTURAL LOAD LIMITING (SLL)
3.10.104 SLL shall be implemented in such a
manner that the pilot may choose to exceed these
limits in emergency.
Objective: To prevent defined critical loads
exceeding specified limits. See 3.10.103
Compliance (a).
VARIABLE CONFIGURATION CONTROL (Wing sweep etc.) (VCC)
3.10.105 Fail-safe reversion to manual control for
recovery shall be provided for non full-time
systems.
Objective: To automatically configure airframe
to achieve most efficient performance for any
operational flight condition and/or mission phase
etc.
3.10.106 The pilot shall be presented with
configuration data at integrity levels compatible
with the maintenance of safe flight.

RIDE CONTROL (RC)
3.10.107 Particular attention shall be given to achieving
structural life compatibility.
Objectives: To provide ride characteristics
compatible with mission requirements.

107
SECTION 3

RC may need specially located motivators.
108
SECTION 3

3.11 STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING

3.11.1 This information was previously published as Chapter 308 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1. The requirements should be read in conjunction with the
design, operational and standardisation requirements for transport, handling and storage given in Clause 4.4.

SLINGING
3.11.2 PROOF AND ULTIMATE FACTORS OF
NOT LESS THAN 2.25 AND 3.0
RESPECTIVELY SHALL BE ACHIEVED
WHEN EITHER:

(a) the whole aeroplane at its maximum design
take-off mass less passengers and crew, if required
by the aeroplane specification, or

(b) any component of the aeroplane which is
required to be slung,

is hanging freely from the slinging gear.
See Specification AD2/SRD/902/P - Lifting
Tackle.
JACKING
3.11.3 PROOF AND ULTIMATE FACTORS OF
NOT LESS THAN 2.25 AND 3.0
RESPECTIVELY SHALL BE ACHIEVED AT
MAXIMUM DESIGN TAKE-OFF MASS LESS
PASSENGERS AND CREW WHEN
SUPPORTED ON THE J ACKING POINTS. TO
ALLOW FOR SOME GROUND SLOPE AND
SOME ABNORMAL AEROPLANE ATTITUDE,
THIS CONDITION SHALL BE MET AT
ANGLES UP TO 10
IN ANY PLANE
BETWEEN THE AEROPLANE VERTICAL
AXIS AND THE J ACKING AXIS.
Consideration shall be given to the horizontal
loads present at the jacking points in the following
conditions:

(a) On land at the conditions stated in the
requirement and at such greater angles but lesser
aeroplane masses as may be appropriate to effect
crash recovery.

(b) At sea in the sea conditions given in the

109
SECTION 3

Aeroplane Specification using appropriate ship
motion data and assuming standard naval trestling
and lashing practice whilst jacked.
TOWING
3.11.4 The aeroplane as a whole shall have
adequate strength to provide proof' and ultimate
factors of not less than 1.5 and 2.0 respectively
when towing in either direction in accordance with
the detailed requirements of 3.11.5 - 7.

(a) The requirement shall be met at maximum
design take-off mass.

(b) Consideration may be given to reducing these
factors to 1.125 and 1.5 respectively, if the towing
load designs the nose unit or any part of the
aeroplane structure, provided that failure in all
modes (including lateral bending against a rigidly
held wheel) is prevented by shear pins or
equivalent devices specified in the Operating
Manual.

TOWING STRESSING CASE - MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE UNITS
3.11.5 CASE 1. CONDITIONS SHALL BE AS
FOLLOWS:

(a) Towing load P = 0.15G.M
T
separately and
together at each main-unit towpoint balanced by a
side load S having a value of P sin and a drag
load D having a value of P cos at each mainwheel
axle.

(b) Appropriate nose-unit vertical reaction with
zero side and drag reactions.

(c) Appropriate main-unit vertical reactions at each
main-wheel.
Couples in the vertical plane caused by the loads
in these cases may be assumed to be balanced by
pitch and roll inertia, but this may be ignored so
far as stressing is concerned.
(see Fig.1) See Leaflet 32.
110
SECTION 3


(d) Balancing inertia loads at the aeroplane CG if
necessary.

(v) Tow load angle at any critical value from
zero to 30 unless limited by the geometry of the
aeroplane.

CASE 2. Conditions shall be as follows:

T
at each main-unit
towpoint balanced entirely by inertia forces.

(b) Appropriate nose-wheel vertical reaction with
zero side and drag reactions.

(c) Appropriate main-unit vertical reactions at each
main-wheel.

(d) Zero drag and side loads at each main-unit.

(e) Tow load angle at any critical value from
zero to 30 unless limited by the geometry of the
aeroplane.
TOWING STRESSING CASES - NOSE UNDERCARRIAGE UNITS
3.11.6 The conditions shall be:

T

(b) Nose-unit alignment angle A at any critical
SEE FIG 6
SEE SECTION 4 LEAFLET 42.

111
SECTION 3

value between zero and the maximum castoring
angle.

(C) TOW LOAD ANGLE B AT ANY
CRITICAL VALUE FROM ZERO TO THE
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE.
3.11.7 The applied loads shall be balanced by
either:

(a) aeroplane inertia alone, or

(b) by a combination of a force Q applied at the
axle equal and opposite to P together with such
inertia forces as are needed to balance the
aeroplane.

(a) Where a load-limiting device is incorporated
in the tow bar its value shall be chosen having
consideration to the torsional forces which could
be applied to the nose unit before the device
operates.

(b) For ship-borne aeroplanes a load limiting
device is not permitted. A dynamic analysis shall
therefore be done to check if applied loads greater
than 0.15G.M
T
could occur in the sea states
specified and if they do they shall be used. In
particular the case of sudden brake application on
a pitching, rolling deck shall be considered.

112
SECTION 3

3.12 PICKETING

3.12.1 This information was previously published as Chapter 309 of DEF STAN 00-970 Issue 1. The requirements aim to ensure that provision is made on
all aeroplanes for picketing. For aeroplanes which are designed to be picketed on board ship, the fittings shall be in accordance with STANAG 1095 or
DEF STAN 17-4(Superseded by STANAG 1095)).

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
GENERAL
3.12.2 Provision shall be made for picketing the
aeroplane from picketing points located on or near
each undercarriage unit.

(a) For aeroplanes which are designed to be
landborne only, the fittings shall be designed by
the Aeroplane Designer.

(b) If the aeroplane and the fittings are designed
such that the fittings are removable when not
required, stowage for the removed items shall be
provided on the aeroplane.

(c) When selecting picketing points consideration
shall be given to the need for securing jacked or
trestled aeroplanes in adverse wind and sea
conditions and the need to perform undercarriage
retraction tests with the aeroplane picketed.

(d) Additional picketing points may be provided at
the following positions as required by the IPTL:

(i) On each wing, at a position approximately
two-thirds of the distance from the main
undercarriage to the wing tip,
See also Leaflet 33 Para. 3.
113
SECTION 3


(ii) In the vicinity of the tailplane.
3.12.3 The picketing points shall accommodate
sufficient lashings to meet the strength requirement
of 3.12.10.
When designing for picketing no account shall be
taken of any forces provided by chocks or brakes.

PICKETING ON LAND
3.12.4 Aeroplanes picketed on land shall be safe in
wind speeds up to 80 kt horizontally from any
direction.

PICKETING ON BOARD SHIP
3.12.5 Aeroplanes shall be safe when picketed on a
ship according to the ship's picketing plan in the
sea states given by the IPTL. If no sea states are
available the following values of wind speeds and
ship motion are to be used:

(a) wind speeds up to 148 km/h (80 kt) from any
direction between dead ahead and 45 each side of
the ship's fore-and-aft axis, or 120 km/h (65 kt)
from any other quarter,

(b) angles of pitch and roll up to 5 and 15
respectively, together with flight deck vertical,
athwartships and fore-and-aft accelerations of
7.62m/s (25 ft/s), 1.52 m/s (5ft/s), 0.61m/s
(2ft/s) respectively.
The lashing configuration shall employ the
minimum practical number of lashings and occupy
the smallest spread compatible with the deck
securing points, spacings of which are to be
obtained from the IPTL.

LOCKING OF CONTROLS
3.12.6 All flying control systems shall be safe-
guarded against damage in wind speeds up to 148
km/h (80 kt) by locks built into the aeroplane or by
If this creates a design case for part of the
structure the problem should be discussed with the
IPTL.
See also Clause 4.19 for controls.

114
SECTION 3

irreversibility of the control operating mechanism.
3.12.7 All internal locking devices shall be
arranged so that the pilot cannot take-off, or
attempt to take-off, with any of the flying controls,
including trimmers, locked.

3.12.8 The locking devices shall be arranged so
that when not engaged they can neither hamper the
pilot nor obstruct the use of the controls.

3.12.9 The locking devices when engaged shall not
prevent the aeroplane being ground handled.

STRENGTH
STRENGTH FOR PICKETING
3.12.10 At all masses between the basic mass and
the maximum design take-off mass the picketing
points and the surrounding structure shall have
proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125 and
1.5 respectively under the conditions specified in
3.12.4 for picketing on land and 3.12.5 for
picketing on board ship.
Leaflet 33 gives acceptable assumptions for
assessing the aerodynamic forces.

STRENGTH OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
3.12.11 Control systems and surfaces shall have
proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125 and
1.5 respectively under the loads arising in the
conditions specified in 3.12.2 - 9.

3.12.12 When the pilot's control is moved to the
full extent allowed by the stops, control systems
and surfaces shall have proof and ultimate factors
not less than 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under the
loads arising in winds up to at least the following:

115
SECTION 3

(a) 65 km/h (35 kt) for basic trainers and

(b) 93 km/h (50 kt) for all other aeroplanes.

116
SECTION 3

3.13 LIGHTNING PROTECTION

3.13.1 All information currently under Clause 4.26

117
SECTION 3

TABLE 1
FACTORS BY WHICH THE MEAN STRENGTH OF DETAILS OR ELEMENTS MUST BE
REDUCED TO OBTAIN A 'B' ALLOWABLE VALUE:
WHERE APPROPRIATE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE TESTS:
THESE FACTORS APPLY TO ALL GRADE A DETAILS AND TO ALL MATERIALS

Estimated
population cv
Sample size of coupon tests n, used to estimate population cv in observed failure mode
from n coupon tests
15 30 100 or more
i.e
Number of element tests N

1* 2 3 5 10 1* 2 3 5 10 1* 2 3 5 10
Characteristic 3% or less 1.14 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06
cv in observed 5% 1.26 1.20 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.20 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.13 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.11
failure mode 7.5% 1.37 1.31 1.28 1.26 1.23 1.32 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.28 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.17
10% 1.53 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.32 1.45 1.37 1.34 1.31 1.27 1.39 1.32 1.29 1.27 1.24
15% 1.89 1.74 1.68 1.61 1.55 1.75 1.62 1.57 1.51 1.46 1.63 1.53 1.48 1.44 1.39

* Normally at least 2 tests must be done so that any gross inconstancy is likely to be revealed
118
SECTION 3

TABLE 2

TEST FACTORS BY WHICH THE MEASURED STRENGTH OF COMPLETE
STRUCTURES FOR COMPONENTS MUST EXCEED THE DESIGN ULTIMATE LOAD IN
ORDER TO ALLOW FOR THE INFLUENCE OF VARIABILITY: WHERE APPROPRIATE
A SEPARATE ALLOWANCE MUST BE MADE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION

Estimated
cv for type
of complete
Number of tests upon
which the mean value is
estimated
item under
test*
1
+

2
5% or less

1.00 1.00
8%

1.10 1.05
10%

1.15 1.10
15%

1.33 1.25

* To be agreed with the IPTL (in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division RAE). It is customary to use a figure of 5%
for conventional metal structures.
+ Wherever practical at least 2 tests must be done so that any gross inconsistency
is likely to be revealed.
119
SECTION 3

TABLE 3

CONTROL CIRCUITS - BREAKOUT FORCE

CLASS OF AEROPLANE MAXIMUM FORCE N (LBF)
PITCH ROLL YAW
ALL FIGHTERS, AND OTHER TYPES
UP TO 4,536 KG
(10,000LB)

18(4) 9(2) 27(6)
ALL TYPES BETWEEN 4,536 KG
(10,000 LB)
AND 22,680 KG (50,000 LB) EXCEPT
FIGHTERS
AND HEAVY BOMBERS

VALUES OBTAINED BY
LINEAR
INTERPOLATION
ALL HEAVY BOMBERS, AND
OTHER TYPES OVER
22,680 KG (50,000) LB

45(10) 36(8) 45(10)

120
SECTION 3

TABLE 4

ACTIVE CONTROLS

Categories of function

A Automatic Flight and Structural
control
B Augmented Flight Control

AFCS (Autopilots)
Yaw Dampers
Pitch Dampers
Terrain Following
Manoeuvre Load Control
Gust Load Alleviation
Structural Mode Control (Damping)
Flutter Mode Control (Damping)
External Store Stabilisation
Ride Control
'Auto Pilot' modes integrated
FCS

Integrated FBW/FBL Flight Control
CSAS (Control and Stability
Augmentation System)
Manoeuvre Demand
Manoeuvre Limitation
Stall Prevention
Spin/Departure Prevention
Post Stall control
Spin/Departure Recovery
Weapon aiming/fuselage pointing
Wing configuration control
(camber/sweep optimising)
Terrain Avoidance
VSTOL Control

Plus all functions category A

121
SECTION 3

FIG 1 THE BASIC FLIGHT ENVELOPE

VALUES SPECIFIED FOR PARTICULAR AEROPLANE TYPES (see Leaflet 202/2 for definitions).

V
D
.. .. Design diving speed (E A S)

n
1
.. .. Maximum normal acceleration coefficient
122
SECTION 3

DEPENDENT VALUES
(Unless otherwise specified in the Aeroplane Specification)

V
A
is the manoeuvring speed, that is that minimum flying speed at which n
1
can be achieved.

V
H
shall be the maximum speed attainable in level flight with the aeroplane flying at the basic design mass, with no external stores at the maximum
continuous cruise engine condition.

n
2
= 1-0.3n
1

n
3
= -0.6(n
1
-1)

NOTE:

On aeroplanes designed for dive bombing or ground attack duties:

V
H
will be equal to V
D1
which means that n
2
will be equal to n
3

123
SECTION 3

FIG 2 GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE
124
SECTION 3

125

FIGURE 3
SECTION 3

Categories:

A: Automatic Flight and Structural Control Functions

B: Flight Control (Augmented)

FIG. 4 ACTIVE CONTROLS
126
SECTION 3

FIG. 5 TOWING BY BRIDLE
127
SECTION 3

FIGS. 6a & 6b NOSE-WHEEL TOWING
128
SECTION 3

Page 1 of 6
LEAFLET 0
REFERENCES

This leaflet was previously issued as Leaflets 202/0, 204/0, 716/0, 207/0, 206/0 and 208/0 of
Defence Standard 00-970 Issue 1. Each set of references is divided according to the reference
number within Section 3.

3.1 STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

No additional references.

3.2 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

ARC Reports

R and M 3001 Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal
manoeuvres

R and M 3327 Simplified loading formulae for pull out manoeuvres of
tailed aircraft

3.3 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES


3.4 GUST LOADS

ARC Reports

R & M 2308 .. An analysis of the lift slope of aerofoils of
.. small aspect ratio, including fins, with design charts for
.. aerofoils and control surfaces

R & M 2970 .. Gust alleviation factor

CP324 .. The variation of gust frequency with gust velocity and
altitude

CP419 .. The distribution of gusts in the atmosphere. An
integration of UK and US data

CP498 .. Programme fatigue tests on notched bars to a
gust load spectrum

CP836 ..The chance of a rough flight

CP873 ..A review of information on the frequency of gusts
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 6
at low altitude

CP933 .. A review of counting accelerometer data on aircraft gust
loads

NACA Reports

1206 .. A revised gust-load formula and a re-evaluation of
V-G data taken on civil transport airplanes from 1933 to 1950.

3.5 HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES


3.6 PRESSURE CABINS

MOD Specifications

DTD/RDI 3716 .. Specification and schedule of tests on cold air
units
DTD/RDI 3750 .. Pressure-cabin equipment - General
requirements
DTD/RDI 3755 .. Cabin-pressure control valves
DTD/RDI 3763 .. Specification and schedule of tests for aircraft
filters for cabin air conditioning systems
DTD/RDI 3810 .. Specification and schedule of tests for airborne
heat exchangers

Defence Standards

16-17(Obsolescent).. .. Air supply and test connections for aircraft
53-68(Cancelled) V-Flange couplings for aircraft piping and ducting. (metric). ..

RAE Reports

Mech.Eng.13 .. .. Vulnerability aspect of aircraft design
SME3359 .. .. Memorandum on the construction and operation of
pressure-cabin aircraft
Structures 242 .. .. Some notes on pressure cabin design

RAE Technical Reports

65083 .. .. Ozone in aircraft cabins

RAE Technical Notes

Mech.Eng.330 .. .. An investigation of the vulnerability of aircraft
pressure cabin structures to battle damage
Structure 234 .. .. Importance of shape of stringer section in
pressure cabin design

ARC Reports

CP217 .. .. Stress considerations in the design of pressurised
shells
CP226 .. .. Pressure-cabin design - a discussion of some of
the structural problems involved, with
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 6
suggestions for their solution
CP239 .. .. Optimum designs for reinforced circular holes
CP286 .. .. A constructional method for minimising the hazard
of a catastrophic failure in a pressure cabin
CP357 .. .. An experimental verification of the theoretical
conclusions of RAE Technical Note Structures 156
(ARC CP286). A constructional method for
minimising the hazard of catastrophic failure in
a pressure cabin, with further comments on its
implications

3.7 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

ARC Reports

CP 195 .. A criterion for the prediction of the recovery
characteristics of spinning aircraft.

AGARD Proceedings

CP No. 199 .. Stall/spin problems of military aircraft
CP No. 235 .. Dynamic stability parameters
(Papers 19 and 29)

Other Papers

AIAA 80-1564 .. Spin Prediction Techniques (Bihrle J )
AIAA 80-1580 .. Overview of stall/spin technology (Chambers J R)
J ournal of Aircraft Vol.20,
No.2 .. Spin Prediction techniques (Bihrle J and Barnhart W)
J ournal of Aircraft Vol.21,
No.12 .. Estimation of Aerodynamic forces and moments on a
steadily spinning aeroplane (Pamadi BN and
Taylor LW)
British Standards

C10 .. .. Coupling dimensions for aircraft ground air-
conditioning connections
C11 .. .. Coupling dimensions for aircraft pressure cabin
ground test connections

3.8 CONTROL SYSTEMS

RAE Reports

Aero 1972 .. Spring tab controls - Notes on development to date, with
special reference to design aspects
Aero 2232 .. Papers and proceedings of a meeting to discuss powered
flying controls
Mech.Eng.12 .. Transitional friction effects in powered controls with
particular reference to hydraulic jacks
SECTION 3

Page 4 of 6
RAE Technical Reports

66304 .. .. An investigation into the problem of valve stiction
associated with the use of high temperature hydraulic
fluids

RAE Technical Notes

Aero 1173 .. .. Note on friction in control circuits
Aero 2026 .. .. The effect of control circuit friction on handling
characteristics of aircraft with artificial spring feel
Aero 2294 .. .. Notes on "g"-restriction
SME86 .. .. Alternative bearings for control circuits
SME247 .. .. High thermal expansion steel in aircraft control circuits
SME349 .. .. Theoretical analysis of the response of a servo controlled
aircraft fitted with a "g"-restrictor
SME367 .. .. The vulnerability of flying control systems in military
aircraft
Mech.Eng.2 .. .. The presence of air in oil and its probable effect on the
irreversibility of hydraulic transmission systems
Mech.Eng.10 .. .. Tests on servodyne hydraulic control assister
Mech.Eng.77 .. .. An electro-hydraulic-powered flying control system with
automatic safeguards and variable control
characteristics
Mech.Eng.98 .. .. A contribution to the theory of servo mechanisms:
dynamic rigidity of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng.100 .. .. Free oscillations of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng.108 .. .. Impedance of idealised hydraulic valve-controlled servos
Mech.Eng.110 .. .. Portable hinge moment simulator for powered control
circuits
Mech.Eng.129 .. .. Comparative rigidities of certain valve-controlled
hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng.132 .. .. Valve proportionality effects in aircraft hydraulic flying
control systems
Mech.Eng.144 .. .. Some notes on irreversible machines
Structures 58 .. .. Aircraft with automatic pilots and powered controls;
safety aspects

A & AEE Reports

Tech.105 .. .. Control system requirements for military aircraft in
relation to the task of the human operator
Tech.194 Iss.2 .. .. A further resume of pilots' experience with various
forms of feel and power control systems

RAE Specifications

AD115 .. .. Control column force indicator

Scientific and Technical Memoranda
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13/51 .. .. Some studies in hydraulic servo flying controls
15/51 .. .. An investigation of methods of duplicating
hydraulically-operated irreversible flying controls
8/53 .. .. On the stability of powered flying controls
2/54 .. .. Some problems of powered flying controls

ARC Papers

R & M 3001 .. .. Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal
manoeuvres
R & M 3094 .. .. A case of longitudinal stick-force dynamic instability of
an aircraft fitted with power-operated controls, of
"g"-restrictor and spring feel
CP273 .. .. Some advantages and disadvantages of variable and
non-linear gearing between the pilot's control and the
control surfaces (formerly AAEE Report Res 283)

RAeS J ournal

March, 1949 .. .. Some thoughts on the use of powered flying controls in
aircraft

3.9 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

MIL-F-9490D Flight control systems - design, installation and .. ..
test of piloted aircraft, general specification for

AFFDL-TR-74-116 .. .. J .L.Townsend and E.T.Raymond - Background
information and user guide for MIL-F-9490D J an. 1975

RTCA/DO-178A .. .. Software considerations in airborne systems and
equipment certification

Interim DEF STAN 00-31(Obsolescent) The development of safety critical software for
airborne systems.

3.10 STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING


3.11 PICKETING

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3.12 FATIGUE


3.13 LIGHTNING PROTECTION

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LEAFLET 01
STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to outline the basic principles underlying the strength and
deformation requirements in this publication and, in particular, to show why these requirements are
sometimes expressed in terms of proof loads, sometimes ultimate load, and sometimes both.

2 ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN STRENGTH

2.1 There are several causes of uncertainty that must be taken into account in designing
aircraft to operate within the required envelope.

2.2 One of these is the variability in the strength of materials and structural details. This is
accounted for in three separate ways.

2.2.1 First, the designer is required to use 'B' allowable values of stress in design (see
Clauses 4.1 and 4.5) because they are founded on a standardized test procedure and
give a uniform statistical assurance of the strength of materials. Exceptionally, however,
Specification 'S' values may be used where no 'B' value is available.
-
2.2.2 Second, any test of a structural detail or structural element is subject to a test
factor, as required by Table 1 of Clause 3.1. These are related to the measured
variability in the strength of the materials from which the details or elements are made;
data on the variability of metallic materials can be found in ESDU 00932 Metallic
Materials Handbook. The test factors are calculated to give assurance, with 95%
confidence, that 90% of similar items will reach or exceed the required strength. It is
emphasised that separate allowance must be made for any uncertainties arising from
differences between elements and the structural details they represent.

2.2.3 Finally, the designer must make separate allowance for environmental degradation
and demonstrate that the allowable values (or 'S' values) of ultimate stress are not
exceeded under the DUL. The most appropriate allowance for degradation can be
obtained by conducting tests on structural elements under the most adverse
combinations of moisture content and temperature to which they will be exposed in
service (see Leaflet 302). It should be noted that cold/dry conditions may also have an
adverse effect on the strength of the material, and should therefore be considered in
addition to 'hot/wet' conditions. Furthermore, the effects of exposure to ultra-violet
light and other non-ionising radiation should be considered.

3 CHECK STRESS CALCULATIONS

3.1 To perform a check stress is a condition of compliance with the static strength
requirements. A reference analysis shall be done, using definitive loads and masses, together
with a structural analysis model, all fully representative of the final design. The check stress
should ideally be completed by an independent team.

4 DESIGN LIMIT LOAD

4.1 Each aircraft is subject to an enormous variety of combinations of loads and other
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conditions, and it is obviously impracticable and unnecessary to consider them all. The most
adverse of these are identified in the form of design cases, which must be used in
demonstrating compliance with the requirements.

4.2 In the majority of design cases, the severity of the loads that may arise in service is not limited
naturally, and limiting conditions have to be chosen for design purposes. A classic example is
provided by the symmetric flight case. For aircraft without an active control system, there are
usually no means (other than the pilot) to prevent the exceedance of either the speeds or the normal
accelerations that are permissible for an aircraft in symmetrical flight. In choosing the limiting
conditions for design, use is made of past experience of the speeds and accelerations needed for the
operational duty of the type, of the predicted flight characteristics and performance of the aircraft,
and of the way structure mass is likely to depend on the severity of the chosen conditions.

4.3 Every aircraft in service is subject to flying limitations that prohibit its use beyond the
limiting conditions chosen for design (see Leaflet 209).

4.4 In some situations, limit load cases are defined-such that it is impossible (extremely
improbable, or so unlikely as not to occur during the entire operational life of all aircraft of one
type) or extremely remote (unlikely to occur during the entire operational life of all aircraft of one
type, but nonetheless still possible) for-the loads to be exceeded. These cases are normally chosen
either to reduce the number of combinations to be considered (ease of analysis), where there are
limiting mechanisms, or where the loads are difficult to define rationally.

5 THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Though the design ultimate strength defines the margin of strength that must be
provided, it is not sufficient on its own to ensure that there is also a margin of airworthiness. This
margin of airworthiness is defined by the design proof requirement.

5.2 The proof requirement defines the minimum conditions up to which the airworthiness
and serviceability of the aircraft can be depended upon. The designer should ensure, by
analysis and tests as appropriate, that loads up to the design proof load will neither impair
safety nor functionality nor necessitate inspection or rectification other than to predetermined and
defined schedules acceptable to the operator. Thus, under the design proof load and after its
removal there should be no loosening or pulling of fasteners, structural deformation which might
cause unacceptable redistribution of aerodynamic loads, jamming or undue slackness of controls, or
any other sign of structural distress which might cause the operator to have doubts about the
serviceability of the aircraft. Beyond the proof strength, catastrophe could result from structurally
induced causes such as jamming of controls or unstable aerodynamic loading.

5.3 There are several causes of uncertainty that must be taken into account in designing the aircraft
to withstand the pertinent limiting conditions. For example, the methods used in the evaluation of
the loads and in the stress analysis are inexact.

5.4 Furthermore, when the aircraft enters service, the most severe conditions under which it is
actually used may differ from the design cases. For all these reasons the aircraft must be designed to
have, in each design case, an ultimate strength that is more than would be needed just to sustain the
limit load.

6 REDUCTIONS IN FACTORS

6.1 In some circumstances, load factors may be reduced, where it can be shown that
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exceedances of limiting conditions are impossible (extremely improbable) or extremely
remote, as defined in paragraph 4.4. In these cases there is no proof requirement above limit
load.

6.2 A reduced ultimate factor of 1.4 may be used in conjunction with these cases, provided it can be
shown that all underlying rational cases, multiplied by the conventional ultimate factor of 1.5, are
covered. For example, this may apply to aircraft equipped with active flight control systems, where
it can be demonstrated that such systems are load-limiting and sufficiently reliable. Other examples
may include load limiting mechanisms, such as pressure relief valves, provided that the upper
tolerance is used.

6.3 To justify the use of a reduced ultimate load factor deterministic methods have
traditionally been used and the amount of the reduction has been based on engineering
judgement. However, such an approach does not rigorously account for systems effectiveness (in
limiting the loads) and reliability.

6.4 In order to take a probabilistic approach, it is necessary to define the structural factors of safety
as a function of systems reliability. Such an approach has been proposed for inclusion in J AR 25
(NPA 25C-199, dated 24 April 1996), and a similar methodology would be considered acceptable.

7 THE USE OF PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS

7.1 The traditional, semi-deterministic approach involves designing the structure to
withstand a factored maximum load to satisfy the required limit load criterion. In some cases,
however, it may be acceptable to use a probabilistic approach to estimate the required limit or proof
loads having an acceptably low probability of occurrence. In essence, this is achieved by modelling
the variables determining the loading envelope and then deriving a suitable value for the limit (or
proof) load, based on the distribution.

7.2 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF LIMIT LOAD

7.2.1 It is first necessary to establish exactly which probability of occurrence is to be
estimated. It will usually be required to estimate the probability of occurrence of failure
loads for the structure, over its planned life. For structures whose usage can vary
significantly from one example of the structure to another, it may be required to
consider only the most adverse conditions of use.

7.2.2 There may be different consequences of exceedance of the chosen limit load, with
consequences ranging from the catastrophic to the merely inconvenient, and this will be
reflected in the probability of failure which is considered acceptable. More information
on determining the level of risk that will be acceptable is given in Def Stan 00-56
(Part 2).

7.2.3 It should be remembered that the calculated probability of occurrence takes into
account stochastic variability only. It does not take into account the possibility of human
errors on the part of the user; in practice, failures due to non-quantifiable sources of
unreliability may well predominate.

7.2.4 It should also be noted that, as with deterministic analyses, changes in usage may
change the loading envelope. Thus any limit load definition, based on assumptions from
a probabilistic analysis, may be invalidated by changes in usage. Therefore, it is
essential that usage data are compared with any assumptions made, as part of the
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mandatory aircraft monitoring programmes.

7.3 UNCERTAINTY

7.3.1 It is important to distinguish between the two fundamentally different types of
statistical uncertainty which are involved in probabilistic design.

7.3.2 Firstly, there is the unavoidable uncertainty associated with the values of
quantities which exhibit scatter. It is this inherent stochastic variability which provides
the motivation for the probabilistic design method, and which must be modelled when
using this method. In the absence of such variability, the probability of failure associated
with a particular design of structure would always be either 0 or 1.

7.3.3 Secondly, there is the uncertainty that arises from incomplete knowledge of the
probability distributions of variables which affect structural integrity. Given complete
knowledge of the form and parameters of each such distribution (and the deterministic
relationships between them), the loading envelope could, in principle, be accurately
determined. However, uncertainty in the designer's knowledge of these distributions,
due to lack of data, leads to uncertainty in the calculated probability of occurrence. It is
essential that this be taken into account: this can be done by calculating confidence
limits. Determining loading distributions to the accuracy required to have sufficient
confidence in what may occur in at the extremes of the distribution is no easier than
defining strength distributions.

7.3.4 Finally, only as complex an analysis and test programme as will have a significant
effect on the resulting design should be undertaken. The degree to which the design of a
component can be optimized should depend on the overall contribution which it makes
to the reliability, performance and cost of a structure.

7.4 QUANTITIES TO BE MODELLED

7.4.1 The quantities whose inherent variability may have a significant effect on the
loads must be identified and modelled by probability distributions. These quantities
might include coefficients, of friction, temperature, manoeuvre acceleration, gust loads,
internal pressure, vibration and shock loads.

7.4.2 Ideally, the applied load (or stress) envelope would be modelled for each design
case, but in many cases this will not be feasible, especially at the initial design phase. In
these circumstances, a more indirect approach is necessary, involving the probabilistic
modelling of quantities on which loads depend. In such cases, an analytical solution it
unlikely to be obtainable and a simulation method should be used to sample from the
appropriate probability distributions.

7.4.3 It is the variability in the maximum load relevant to each critical design case
which should be modelled, not the variability of the loading over the life of the
structure.

7.4.4 A sensitivity analysis should be carried out at an early stage in the project to
identify, on the one hand, the variables whose scatter has no significant effect on the
failure probability, and which can therefore be treated as constants and, on the other
hand, the variables whose scatter is highly significant. Effort can then be concentrated
on more accurate modelling of the latter.
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7.5.1 The choice of a suitable form of probability distribution to model each of the
significant variables may involve:
- physical considerations
- previous experience
- examination of relevant test data.

7.5.2 Having chosen an appropriate form of probability distribution, the distribution
parameters must then be estimated (for example, mean and variance for a normal
distribution, shape and scale parameters for a two-parameter Weibull distribution,
minimum and maximum values for a uniform distribution). Where data are lacking, it is
often possible to read across from previous experience to some extent.

7.5.3 Alternatively, rather than estimating the form and parameters of the probability
distribution of a variable as described above, a non-parametric approach may be used to
analyse available data. This involves making no assumptions about the form of the
distribution, but instead constructing an empirical cumulative distribution from the data
themselves. This approach can be useful where there is a lack of previous relevant
experience to suggest a suitable form of probability distribution, and when the data do
not obviously come from one of the common-distributions. Its applicability is limited,
however, since it is frequently necessary to extrapolate- into the tails of a distribution
from data which all lie within a few standard deviations of the mean. In order to do this,
it is necessary to have knowledge of the distributional form (or to assume a form which
will result in an over-estimate of failure probability rather than an underestimate).

8 SPECIAL CASES

8.1 In most design cases both strength and deformation are regarded as important. It seldom
happens that both requirements can be satisfied exactly; usually a margin above the standard
required by one requirement must be provided in order to comply with the other. Nevertheless when
both requirements are imposed, the designer is expected to demonstrate compliance with them both.

8.2 In some exceptional design cases, deformation is all that matters and a design ultimate
requirement is superfluous. The principal example is that of ejection seats and their surrounding
structure. Under the worst possible combinations of flight loads and ejection gun thrust, the seats
and the airframe must not distort so much that they prevent an ejection, or cause a seat to eject too
slowly or in the wrong direction, or make the ejection of one seat interfere with the ejection of
another.

8.3 In a few other cases, strength is critical but deformation is not important, and a design
ultimate requirement is imposed without a design proof requirement. An example is that of seats
and harnesses at crash stations, and their supporting structures. In a crash landing that would do
serious damage to the aircraft, some distortion of the seat and harness attachments would be trivial,
(and may be beneficial in absorbing the energy of impact), but the crew must remain safely
restrained within reasonable physiological limits. Accordingly an ultimate factor of 1.0 is required
in the crash landing case but there is no proof requirement (see Clause 4.22).

8.4 There are a few other special cases in which the respective values of the proof and
ultimate factors are lower than the usual 1.125 and 1.5. These cases represent rare events such as
malfunctions of systems and operation of systems under exceptional conditions. Provision of the
full strength and stiffness that would be necessary to achieve the usual factors in these cases would
add mass to the aircraft that would penalise it in normal operations. In emergencies that are
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infrequent and of short duration, and in which the aircraft may be at additional risk for other
reasons, the higher risks to the aircraft and its crew that are associated with the lower factors are
regarded as acceptable. Examples are malfunctions of automatic flight control systems and the use
of anti-spin parachutes at exceptionally high speeds (Clause 9.7).

8.5 Finally there are several cases in which both the proof and ultimate factors are higher
than the usual values. They represent the normal operations of systems and installations in which
the loads are particularly difficult to estimate. The difficulties are caused principally by transient
pressures in hydraulic, pneumatic and fuel systems, by variability in the performance of pressure
relief devices, and by variability in the loading on air brakes, flaps and undercarriages. Since these
cases represent events that happen frequently, the greater risks associated with the greater
uncertainty in estimation of the loads must be compensated by higher factors. Examples are flap
systems (Clause 3.6), undercarriage retraction and lowering (Clause 4.11) and refuelling and
defuelling systems (Clause 5.2).
-
8.6 The foregoing paragraphs indicate the diverse nature of the strength requirements and
the reasons why emphasis is sometimes placed on a proof requirement, sometimes on an
ultimate strength requirement, and why often both are specified. It is clear that the same
factors, and the same ratio of proof factor to ultimate factor, cannot be used in all cases
without serious loss in structural integrity. This is a consideration that far outweighs the
convenience that uniform factors might bring.

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LEAFLET 2
STATIC STRUCTURAL STRENGTH TEST LOADING SEQUENCE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Experience has proved the value of testing representative examples of aeroplane
structures. This Leaflet sets out the aims which should be kept in view when the programme
of static tests is being planned and gives recommendations on some points of test procedure
which will help to ensure that these aims are achieved. It was previously issued as Leaflet
200/2.

2 TEST AIMS

2.1 The test procedure adopted should give the maximum practicable amount of
information on the structure. In particular, the tests should be conducted with the following
aims:

(i) to verify the structural analysis by means of strain measurements under all
test conditions and thereby to demonstrate, for each Grade A structural detail,
that the allowable values of stress or strain are not exceeded at the design
ultimate load,

(ii) to establish, for selected design cases, the highest load at which the proof
requirement is satisfied,

(iii) to demonstrate, in the critical design case established by earlier testing, a
strength that is sufficient to show, as far as practicable, that all Grade A
structural details have been identified.

3 RECOMMENDED TEST PROCEDURE

3.1 The test item must be fitted with such control runs and systems as are necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the proof requirement.

3.2 The test procedure should be phased in with any flight load measurement
programme (see Leaflet 6). Any environmental conditioning should meet with the approval
of the Integrated Project Team Leader (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE).

3.3 The following procedure is recommended:

(i) Load in increments up to the design proof load in each critical loading case.
Exceptionally, measured flight loads may be available. At the design proof
load, check that moving parts essential to safety, function satisfactorily and
that there is no structural deformation which might cause unacceptable
redistributions of aerodynamic loads. After removal of the load, examine and
report on the condition of the specimen noting, with photographs, all
structural distress which, if it occurred on an aeroplane in service, might
cause it to be declared unserviceable or not airworthy, (e.g. , skin distortion,
loose rivets, serious permanent deformation, etc).
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Note: The adjustment of the applied loads and temperatures to conform to the
prescribed values may not be practicable with some loading systems, if a
change in load distribution or in surface temperature is involved. In such
cases an estimate of the effect of the difference between the prescribed values
and the test values should be made and appropriate corrections applied to the
results.

(ii) Continue the loading above the specified design proof load in suitable
increments, each time checking that essential moving parts function
satisfactorily and there is no unacceptable deformation, before removing all
load and examining the condition of the specimen, until the real proof load
for that particular loading condition has been established.

(iii) Demonstrate an appropriate test factor from Table 2 of Clause 3.1 on the
design ultimate load for static tests and 80% of the design ultimate load for
residual strength tests. If during these tests, serious damage to the specimen
occurs unexpectedly or appears imminent, a decision should be made
whether to repair the specimen or proceed to (iv).

(iv) Repeat tests (iii) for each of the other selected loading cases.

4 NOTES

4.1 The aim of the proposed sequence is to secure as much factual information as
possible from each structural specimen tested; especially information needed for
determining Service clearances on permissible speed and normal acceleration.

4.2 The proposals in this Leaflet are not intended to cover any part of the fatigue test
programme (for fatigue testing, see Leaflet 34).

4.3 The meaning of structural distress is admittedly vague. Opinions differ, between
inspectors, Service engineer officers and the test engineer. Therefore the aim must be to
record facts so that, as experience accumulates, it will be possible to make the definition
more precise.

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LEAFLET 3
ENGINE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT MOUNTING LOADS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The requirements of Clause 3.1 demand that consideration shall be given to the
forces imposed by the engine unit on the aeroplane structure. The conditions of operation
involving engine loads for which the aeroplane and in particular the engine supporting
structure must be satisfactory are specified in the various Clauses and the engine operating
conditions to be assumed are specified in each case. These are chosen so that all cases in
which appreciable engine or auxiliary power unit loads occur are covered.

1.2 The purpose of this Leaflet is to describe how these loads arise, to give guidance on
their magnitude and direction under the various flight and ground conditions, and to give the
reasons for the chosen engine power conditions in each case. All types of loading, (e.g.,
thrust, torque, etc.), are considered and for any aeroplane manoeuvre, the resultant engine
mounting loads will be obtained by a combination of some or all of these loads. This leaflet
was previously issued as Leaflet 200/3.

2 ENGINE AND PROPELLER TYPES

2.1 The magnitude and direction of the forces imposed by the engine unit depend on the
type of engine and propeller. All types in current use are listed below and should be
considered where applicable:

ENGINE TYPES

(i) piston engine with propeller

(ii) turbine engine with propeller

(iii) turbofan

(iv) turbojet

PROPELLER TYPES

(i) single rotating (with or without reversible pitch)

(a) two bladed, and

(b) three or more bladed

(ii) counter-rotating concentric (with or without reversible pitch)

(a) two propellers directly coupled having three or more blades,

(b) two propellers independently driven having three or more blades, and

(c) two propellers, either directly coupled or independently driven, each
having two blades.
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3 ENGINE LOADS

3.1 THRUST
3.1.1 For all engines, the net thrust (forward or reverse) on the engine
mountings (i.e. gross thrust - intake drag) depends mainly on the
following variables:

(i) engine rotational speed.

(ii) engine power output.

(iii) aeroplane speed.

(iv) aeroplane altitude.

3.1.2 The first two, rotational speed and power output, are defined by the engine
power conditions and hence for a given altitude, engine conditions and aeroplane
speed specified for each manoeuvre, are those which result in the maximum thrust in
each case. The altitude will depend on the particular aeroplane and its role but that
giving the most severe conditions of thrust should be assumed.

3.2 TORQUE
3.2.1 For the purpose of the requirements 'torque' is defined as the maximum
occurring at any instant in the given condition. The normal limit torque for stressing
purposes should not be less than:-

(i) In the case of a piston engine, twice the mean torque for a four
cylinder engine or 1.5 times the mean torque for more than four
cylinders.

(ii) In the case of a turboprop or turbofan engine, 1.25 times the mean
torque.

(iii) In the case of a turbojet engine, the maximum accelerating torque.

3.2.2 For aeroplanes with propellers, the resultant engine mean torque depends
upon engine operating conditions, aeroplane speed and altitude and type of propeller.

(i) With a single rotating propeller, the mean torque is determined by the
power and engine rotational speed.

(ii) When directly coupled counter-rotating propellers are used, the
resultant mean torque from the two halves should be estimated. This
depends largely on the relative pitch setting and the pitch changing
mechanisms of the two propellers. If the pitch changing mechanisms
are directly coupled, the resultant mean torque may be small.
However, if they are independently controlled, a considerable
difference in the torque of the two propellers may occur. The
resultant mean torque should be estimated for the worst conditions
liable to occur and this torque used for stressing with an overriding
minimum value of one quarter of the torque which would arise from
one of the propellers acting alone and absorbing half the engine
power output.
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(iii) When there are two independently driven counter rotating propellers,
the greatest resultant mean torque will be obtained when one of the
propellers is stopped. Hence the torque to be used for stressing is that
which arises from either of the propellers operating alone.

3.2.3 In addition, a condition of 'excess torque' should be considered to allow for
the possibility of malfunction of the powerplant. This is defined as:-

(i) In the case of a propeller engine, 1.6 times the limit torque as defined
above to cover the situation of propeller control system failure,
including rapid propeller feathering.

(ii) That applicable to complete stoppage from maximum take off power
in a time appropriate to seizure for a turbojet. In the absence of better
information the run-down time of the main rotating system associated
with such a failure should be assumed to be not greater than 0.3
seconds, unless for the particular engine type concerned the evidence
can be produced, based on test or operating experience, to justify a
different time. When the engine incorporates more than one main
rotating system each system should be considered separately. This
applies to both turbo jet and turbofan engines. In turbo propeller
installations, in assessing the torque generated by the above sudden
engine stoppage condition, the inertia of the propeller may be
ignored. This is due to the fact that the run-down time of 0.3 seconds
is based on an analysis of observed internal damage in actual cases,
which have been on turbojet engines. It corresponds to the seizing
torque generated by internal damage only if the inertia of the
propeller is disregarded.

The excess torque condition should be applied to the flight condition of unit normal
acceleration at maximum climbing speed appropriate to maximum take off power
and with zero angular velocity.

3.3 GYROSCOPIC COUPLES
3.3.1 ENGINES WITH PROPELLERS -The mean gyroscopic couple of the
propeller alone should be added to that of the rotating components of the engine and
gearbox-

(i) SINGLE ROTATING PROPELLERS
When there are three or more blades, the propeller behaves as a
simple gyroscope and the resultant mean gyroscopic couple has a
steady value of I where

I = polar moment of inertia of one propeller

= angular velocity of propeller
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= angular velocity of the aeroplane as a whole
(given in the relevant chapter)

A two bladed propeller does not possess polar symmetry and gyroscopic couple
varies from zero to twice the mean value, I, and there is an associated couple in
the plane at right angles to the gyroscopic couple which fluctuates between - I
and +I.

(ii) COUNTER-ROTATING CONCENTRIC PROPELLERS - THREE
OR MORE BLADED - The actual value of the gyroscopic couple
depends on the grouping of the propellers thus:

(a) Directly coupled - This combination of propellers will behave
as two uniform discs rotating in opposite directions and the
gyroscopic couples will nearly balance out at the bearing of
the concentric torque shafts. Allowance should therefore be
made for any difference in speed or moment of inertia of the
two propellers. The net gyroscopic couple should be
estimated from the best available data and the estimated value
should be used for stressing purposes if it is greater than the
over-riding minimum of 1/8 I.

(b) Independently driven - In this case, the speeds of the two
propellers are liable to differ considerably and the extreme
case of one propeller stopped should be considered.

(iii) COUNTER-ROTATING CONCENTRIC PROPELLERS - TWO
BLADED - In the plane in which the steady gyroscopic couple would
act for a simple gyroscope, the couple arising in the worst case,
whether for a directly coupled or an independently drive combination,
will fluctuate between -2 I and +2 I. There is also a couple in
the plane at right angles to the above which also fluctuates, in the
worst case, between -2 I and +2 I. These couples are not less
than the couple of a two bladed propeller acting alone and the case of
one of the two propellers stopped will not therefore be critical.

3.3.2 TURBOJ ET ENGINES - The gyroscopic couples on the engine mounting
due to angular rotation of the aeroplane are very much less for an aeroplane fitted
with a pure jet or turbofan engine than for one having an engine of comparable
power driving a single disc propeller. However, due to the high rotational speed of
the gas turbine rotor, considerable loads may be produced on the spin, in the
recovery from a dive or other manoeuvres; these should, therefore, be considered.

3.4 INERTIA FORCES
3.4.1 Inertia forces on the engine mounting due to linear and angular accelerations
in pitching, yawing and rolling motion of the aeroplane should be investigated as
should those due to crash conditions.
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3.5 PROPELLER LOADS DUE TO ASYMMETRIC AIRFLOW
3.5.1 When the general direction of the airflow at entry to the propeller disc is not
perpendicular to the disc (see Section 5 Leaflet 1) the cyclic variation of blade air
loadings produces, in the case of a propeller with three or more blades, a steady
stationary force at the propeller shaft in the plane of the disc and a steady stationary
couple about an axis in the plane of the disc. For example, due to sideslip, a
propeller experiences a sideways force at its centre and a pitching couple about its
centre, and due to incidence in the pitching plane, a propeller experiences a vertical
force and a yawing couple.

3.5.2 On a two bladed propeller the force and couple fluctuate in magnitude and
direction, the magnitude becoming zero twice per revolution, and the direction
varying through 90 on either side of the direction corresponding to the maximum
magnitude.

3.5.3 The propeller designer should be consulted on the magnitudes of those forces
and couples, which depend on several factors including aeroplane geometry,
propeller diameter, blade planform and operating condition.

4 AEROPLANE MANOEUVRES

4.1 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES (see Clause 3.3)
4.1.1 Under the symmetric flight condition of Clause 3.3 an important condition to
be covered is one at the maximum normal acceleration n
1
g which corresponds to a
recovery from a dive. As the greatest thrust normally occurs at the lowest aeroplane
speed, the case which may be critical for the engine mounting is at the manoeuvre
speed, V
A
, with the engine at maximum power conditions. This case also involves
the highest pitching angular velocity for a given normal acceleration and therefore
covers the case of recovery from a dive. For a normal acceleration of n
1
g the
appropriate speed is V
s
n
1
and the angular velocity in pitch may be taken as g
n
1
V
s
where V
s
is the stalling speed in level flight.

4.1.2 The corresponding case of recovery from an inverted dive with a maximum
negative normal acceleration of n
3
g should also be considered. The associated
aircraft speed and angular velocity in pitch may be taken as V
sin
n
3
and -
g
n
3
V
sin
respectively where V
sin
is the stalling speed in inverted level flight.

4.1.3 Since these cases may occur when the engine is accelerating or running at
constant speed, the effect of both full accelerating torque or zero torque must be
examined.

4.1.4 The acceleration and corresponding inertia forces which arise during
transient manoeuvres including those from a rolling pull out should also be
investigated.
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4.2 GUST EFFECTS (see Clause 3.5)
4.2.1 The discrete gust cases of paragraph 4 of Clause 3.5 can be analysed to give a
maximum normal acceleration consequent upon the aeroplane encountering an up
gust. This may occur at any one of the three aircraft design speeds, V
G
, V
H
or V
D
.
Regardless of the speed at which the maximum vertical acceleration occurs, it is
appropriate to use the maximum continuous cruising engine conditions with the
associated thrust and torque. The normal acceleration due to a gust encounter is
inversely proportional to the mass of the aeroplane; and gust effects can therefore be
critical.

4.2.2 The corresponding case of the aeroplane encountering a down gust which
gives the most severe negative acceleration should also be considered.

4.3 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY (see Clause 3.8)
4.3.1 Maximum engine power and rotational speed are specified for trainers and
fighters to cover, in the former case, pupil's mishandling of the controls in a spin,
and in the latter case, the possibility of a spin developing inadvertently from a steep
turn at high power. This is consistent too with standard flying instructions for the
recovery from a spin of a twin engined aeroplane, which calls for the opening of the
throttle of the engine nearer the axis of the spin. The forward speed of the aeroplane
in the spin is low and the thrust will approximate closely to the static thrust.

4.3.2 For all other aeroplanes, spinning is unlikely to occur and a less severe case
is justified. Hence the use of the maximum continuous cruising rating is reasonable.

4.4 TAKE-OFF AT MAXIMUM THRUST
4.4.1 The maximum thrust produced by the engine during take-off should be
established by considering speeds from zero up to the take-off condition. The value
of the normal acceleration coefficient (n) should be based on the best available data
and in the absence of better information values ranging from zero to at least 1.5
should be considered. For ship borne aeroplanes, the roll and pitch of the ship will
give added acceleration both positive and negative, and the value of n should be
taken as at least 1.5.

4.5 YAWING MANOEUVRES (see Clause 3.4)
4.5.1 In the case of yawing manoeuvres at the maximum speed in level flight with
maximum engine power conditions, it is possible for considerable loads and couples
to be exerted on the engine mounting as a result of airloads on the yawed nacelle.
This is in addition to the normal thrust, torque and inertia loadings due to angular
velocity and acceleration in yaw.

4.5.2 Recommendations on the calculation of the angle of sideslip are given in
Leaflet 9.

4.6 PROPELLER REVERSE THRUST
4.6.1 It is usual practice to operate reverse thrust immediately after touch-down.
The loss of forward speed while the engines are being accelerated to full, negative
thrust conditions can be neglected and a case at the maximum touch-down speed
(which should be taken as not less than 1.2 times stalling speed with flaps in the
landing position) should be examined. This will be the worst case since reverse
thrust increases with aeroplane forward speed.
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4.7 LANDING (see Clause 4.11)
4.7.1 In all landing cases, engine idling speed is specified and hence the only
engine loads will be inertia loads. It is unlikely that the critical condition for side
and drag loading on the engine supporting structure is produced since the spin or
side load cases may well give greater loads than the landing case. With the
exception of VSTOL installations the thrust/weight ratio of modern jet engines
makes it usual for loading in the fore and aft direction to be determined by engine
performance rather than by inertia loading.

4.7.2 In many cases vertical loads in landing will be covered by the vertical loads
of symmetric flight. Serious dynamic loads however can occur at the engine
mounting in landing, particularly where there is appreciable overhang of the engine
mass. Estimation of these loads is usually stated in terms of a dynamic factor. In the
past a value of 1.5 was often used for this but there is evidence to suggest that a
value of 3.0 may be appropriate in some conditions. These high dynamic loads are
likely to arise due to the sudden reduction of the wheel spin up drag load at the end
of the spin up process when the vertical reaction is still very large.

4.7.3 Any estimate of dynamic engine loads should therefore be based on both
vertical reaction and drag loads with due account taken of the time relation between
the two. In those designs with overhanging engines some distance outboards on the
wings and in which a high drag moment is applied to the wing during spin up, a high
dynamic load factor may prove necessary.

4.8 SIDELOAD
4.8.1 The design load factor in the lateral direction may be determined by the
maximum value obtained in the specified flight or ground conditions. However an
overriding limit load factor of 1.33 or 0.33n
1
, which ever is the greater, is suggested.
This overriding limit load factor may be assumed to be independent of other flight or
ground loads.

4.9 EXCESS TORQUE
4.9.1 The excess torque case is intended to cover the case of powerplant
malfunction. The appropriate case is that of the aeroplane flying along a straight
path at the maximum climbing speed and maximum take off power.

4.10 ENGINE MOUNTING LOADS
4.10.1 When the engine is mounted on a relatively flexible structure, such as long
nacelle or pylon, the additional loads due to dynamic structural effects should be
investigated. These will include those arising during aeroplane manoeuvres and
gusts described in paras 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5 as well as those during landing, para
4.7.2.

5 SUMMARY

5.1 A tabular summary of the basic conditions of the stressing cases which may be
critical for the engine mounting is given in Table 1.
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TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF STRESSING CONDITIONS

Case Aeroplane
Operating
or Design
Conditions

Aeroplane
Forward
Speed
Aeroplane
Angular
Velocity
Normal
Acceleration
Coefficient
Engine
Conditions
1A

1B
Recovery from
dive

Recovery from
inverted dive

V
s
n
1
*

V
s
n
3
*
in

g
V
s
n
1

g
V
s
n
3
in

n
1

n
3

Maximum
power with
and without
the limit
torque
2 Flight
in gusts
Appropriate
to maximum
acceleration
factors
Zero Maximum
positive and
negative
values from
Clause 3.5
Maximum
continuous
cruising
with cor-
responding
thrust and
torque

3 Spinning
a) Transfers
& fighters
b) All other
aeroplanes
Zero

Zero
Rates of
yaw and
roll from
Clause 3.8
3.33) but not
) greater
2.67 ) than
) n
1
)
Maximum
power with
and with-
out the
limit
torque
and maximum
rotational
speed

4 Standing at
rest (take
off)
Zero Zero a) Land based
aircraft
1.0.
b) Ship based
aircraft
-1.5

Maximum
power with
and without
the limit
torque
5 Yawing
manoeuvres
Maximum
appropriate
speed
Zero but
maximum
sideslip
angle given
by Leaflet 9

1.0 Maximum
power and
limit
torque
6 Propeller
braking
1.2V
s
*

FL
Zero See note
below
Maximum
power
with reverse
pitch

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TABLE 1 (contd)

SUMMARY OF STRESSING CONDITIONS

Case Aeroplane
Operating
or Design
Condition

Aeroplane
Forward
Speed
Aeroplane
Angular
Velocity
Normal
Acceleration
Engine
Conditions
7 Landing 1.2V
s *
FL
Zero See note
below

Idling

8 Sideload
(see note
below)

Zero Zero Zero -
9 Excess
torque
Maximum
Climbing
Speed
Zero 1.0 Maximum
power
with excess
torque,
see Para.
3.2.3

Notes Case 1 V
s
is stalling speed in level flight, flaps retracted

V
s
is stalling speed in inverted flight, flaps retracted
in

Case 6, 7 V
s
is stalling speed in level flight with flaps at
FL landing setting.

The normal acceleration component in these cases should include dynamic effects
where appropriate, see para 4.7. Fore and aft and lateral deceleration effects should
be included.

Case 8 The overriding sideload limit load factor should not be less than the
lower of 1.33 or 0.33n
1
. No other loads need be considered.

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LEAFLET 4
STRENGTH OF STRUCTURES UNDER CONDITIONS OF HEATING AND COOLING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 When a structure is heated or cooled, the following effects need to be taken into
account:

(i) stresses and strains caused by differential expansion within the structure,

(ii) a temporary loss in strength in the material due to temperature rise,

(iii) permanent deterioration in material properties due to prolonged exposure to
high temperature, and

(iv) creep due to prolonged exposure to temperature and stress.

1.2 This Leaflet contains recommendations on the methods to be used in the design of
structures and in the application of safety factors to ensure that an adequate standard of
safety is maintained when thermal effects are significant. It was previously published as
Leaflet 200/4.

1.3 It will not generally be necessary to allow for temperature changes with altitude on
subsonic aeroplanes, but the effect of temperature changes on transparencies and of high
temperatures in structural parts arising from their proximity to the engines should be
considered.

2 THERMAL STRESS AND STRAIN

2.1 When a structure* is subjected to a change in temperature each element will tend to
change its dimensions by (where is the length in the direction being considered,
is the coefficient of thermal expansion and is the change in temperature). However if
either or has different values in different parts of the structure, the change in length of
each element may differ from or because of mutual constraints between the various
elements. The final length of each element will be such that the conditions of geometrical
compatibility and equilibrium of internal forces are satisfied. Thermal stresses and strains
are thus induced. The amount of thermal strain in each element is equal to the difference
between the actual change in length and l , divided by the length.
l l
l

3 CALCULATIONS

3.1 The process of calculating the magnitude of the thermal stresses and strains and their
effect on the ability of the structure to withstand the specified proof and ultimate loads
involves a knowledge of:

(i) the flight plan in terms of ambient conditions and of speeds and speed
changes,

* For the purpose of this definition, a structure can be either a single member or a number
of members joined to make a complete structure.
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(ii) the flow pattern over the surfaces of the aeroplane and the type of flow,
laminar or turbulent,

(iii) the heat transfer to the surface allowing for emission and the convective flow
from the boundary layer, and

(iv) the temperature distribution in the structure taking account of the heat flow
through complex paths and joints and the possible presence of other heat
sources and sinks.

From the temperature distribution, the thermal stresses and strains as defined above are
obtained.

3.2 Allowance should be made for the variability of thermal properties of materials and
structural elements, and it is preferable that design values and their variability be determined
by test wherever possible. Otherwise, reasonably conservative values of all properties
should be assumed in the calculations.

3.3 The conductivity of joints may depend on the temperature, the pressure between the
surface and the surface finish. The variability can be very large, but this does not
necessarily result in large variations in stress. In those cases where local stress is sensitive
to the conductivity of a particular joint, the variability should be investigated and then taken
into account when assessing the results of subsequent strength tests.

3.4 When external loads are present there are additional stresses and strains which
combined with the thermal stresses and strains must satisfy the overall conditions of loading
equilibrium and geometrical compatibility. If the total stress is below the elastic limit the
stresses and strains due to the two effects are independent, and can therefore be calculated
separately and superimposed. However, if the total stress exceeds the elastic limit the
stresses and strains due to the two effects are interdependent and should therefore be
calculated simultaneously.

3.5 The inaccuracies which arise in each stage of the calculation of thermal stresses and
strains are likely to be as great as those occurring when estimating the magnitude and
distribution of stress due to the external loads. Hence an equal safety factor on thermal
effects is necessary and it is recommended that factored conditions should be calculated as
described in para 4.

4 FACTORED CONDITIONS

4.1 When the stresses due to thermal effects and to the applied loads are of the same
sign, the combined factored conditions for an individual structural member may be obtained
by the method of either para 4.2 or 4.3. The case when stresses are opposite in sign is
discussed in para 4.5. When a designer wishes to use a different method he should consult
the Integrated Project Team Leader (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE).

4.2 In the first method, the factored thermal strain for a particular member is obtained
by calculating the unfactored thermal strain assuming no applied loads and multiplying it by
the same proof and ultimate factors as are used for the loads with which the thermal effects
are to be combined. This factored thermal strain is then added to the strain corresponding to
the factored loads, calculated assuming no thermal strain.
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This gives the total factored strain, and the corresponding factored stress is obtained from
the stress-strain curve for the particular member. Strains, not stresses, are added because
thermal strain cannot produce more stress than that corresponding to the plastic deformation
if the elastic limit is exceeded. It is permissible to neglect the effect on adjacent members of
factoring the loads and strains, but the combined effect obtained in this way should be
treated with reserve as it may result in lower stresses than those obtained if the total forces
are brought into equilibrium under factored conditions by the method of para 4.3.

4.3 In the second method the loading equilibrium and geometrical compatibility of the
structure are recalculated in the presence of the factored loads when the thermal expansion
coefficient(s) of the material(s) concerned is multiplied by the same proof and ultimate
factors as applied to the loads. This calculation will give the total factored strains due to the
factored loads and factored thermal effects which the member has to withstand. This
method is preferable to that stated in para 4.2 because it is a closer approximation to what
would happen in flight or in a laboratory test, but it is recognised that, for complex structure,
it may not be practicable.

4.4 In both methods the thermal strain, rather than the thermal stress, is factored, and
this means that the ratio of stress at limit conditions to that at ultimate conditions is usually
higher for thermal effects, and therefore also for combined loading and thermal effects, than
the usual values associated with loading only. This choice was made on the grounds that an
ultimate factor on thermal stress is not justified as far as static strength is concerned,
because thermal stresses are relieved when plastic deformation occurs. As a consequence, a
thorough investigation is necessary of all fatigue and creep aspects, including creep
buckling and progressive distortion under cyclic temperature and loading conditions.

4.5 Cases where the load and thermal effects are opposite in sign may not be critical
because the most severe cases may well be when either one or other of these affects is
absent. If there is a critical case when both are present and the load effect is the greater it
may be desirable to disregard any alleviating thermal effects. When the thermal effect is the
greater, it appears reasonable to combine it with the load effect using the appropriate factors.
In either case, care should be taken to ensure that an adequate net load is used for design
purposes, particularly when the opposing effects are comparable in magnitude.

5 DESIGN CASES

5.1 The clauses of Section 3 define the manoeuvres to be considered in design,
specifying aeroplane speeds in each case, but they do not define those conditions giving rise
to thermal stress or strain (i.e., rate of change of speed and time spent at any given speed).
For each type of aeroplane, therefore, it is necessary to examine all flight conditions in
which the combination of applied loads and thermal strains are likely to produce critical
structural loads. The following conditions should therefore be considered:
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(i) sustained steady flight at all speeds up to V
K
*, in each case at the most
adverse temperature and altitude conditions of Section 7, following the
appropriate manoeuvres or gusts of Section 3, taking account of any change
in temperature due to speed changes during the manoeuvre or gust, and

(ii) the most adverse practicable speed and altitude change between any two sets
of conditions within the speed range up to V
D
, and within the temperature
and altitude conditions of Section 7, immediately followed by, or combined
with, the appropriate manoeuvres or gusts of Section 3, including excursions
from any point within the envelope to V
D
and back.

Notes 1 When considering speed changes to or from VD, it may be necessary in
some cases to consider a longer period of time at V
D
than that implied by a
transient excursion. This will depend on the length of time the aeroplane is
capable of sustaining V
D
.

2 The above stressing cases call for the combination of full manoeuvre loads
with the most adverse thermal effects. Where such cases are thought to be
improbable, appropriate alternative cases should be formulated and these
should be discussed with the Integrated Project Team Leader in conjunction
with Airworthiness Division RAE).

6 THERMAL EFFECTS ON MATERIALS

6.1 Structural materials may suffer a temporary loss in strength while at high
temperature, and also permanent deterioration in properties due to prolonged exposure to
high temperature (see DEF STAN 00-932( Cancelled replaced by ESDU 932 Metallic
Materials Data Handbook). The material properties assumed in calculations should,
therefore, take account of the temperature that could occur in the case considered, the time
for which it is maintained, and also the temperature history. Both upper and lower limits of
the values of the various properties should be considered in cases where the thermal strains
may either aggravate or relieve the stress due to the applied loads. In any estimate of
structure life under conditions of thermal degradation and/or creep, an appropriate
allowance should be made for the variability of material properties, the variability, between
individual aeroplanes, of structural temperatures, and the variability of operational
conditions and also to cover other unknowns such as thermal cycling effects and the
interaction between these and fatigue.

* V
K
is the maximum permitted speed for continuous cruising, and may be based on
handling qualities, structural strength or engine limitations. For the purpose of these
stressing cases it should be chosen for the particular aeroplane and need not be greater than
the expected Service limiting speed for the type.

6.2 This Leaflet does not call for the provision of a safety margin by an arbitrary
increase in the structural temperature, either directly by factoring the temperature or
indirectly by factoring the design speed. Thus flight in excess of the design speed could
lead to a temperature higher than that considered in design. Although cases of exceeding
the design speed are rare, it is recommended that, as far as practicable, materials should be
used which do not suffer a substantial reduction in properties at a temperature slightly
higher than that corresponding to the design speed.
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7 GROUND TESTS

7.1 When strength tests including thermal effects are necessary to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements, the factored loads and, if practicable, the factored
thermal strains should be applied. The method of simulating the factors on thermal strain
should be discussed with the Integrated Project Team Leader (in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division RAE).

7.2 It should be noted that, in order to obtain realistic conditions in any structural
member, it will usually be necessary to test it as part of the complete structure so that all
balancing loads can be developed. When this is not done, results of the tests should be
interpreted bearing in mind any differences between the actual and the applied balancing
loads.

8 INSTABILITY FAILURES

8.1 For structures in which failure by instability is possible, thermal strain may cause
instability which could be followed by structural collapse under low external loads, whereas
neither the thermal strain nor even the design ultimate load would cause collapse when
applied separately. It is important, therefore, that this effect be taken into account in all
design cases when considering the combination of thermal strain and applied load.

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LEAFLET 5
CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR
EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Full structural certification of a new aeroplane project normally involves a
substantial programme of analysis, structural tests and flight loads measurement.

1.2 The total programme is costly and time-consuming and a reduced version is
commonly used to assess the structural strength of experimental aeroplanes. In consequence
the permissible flight loads are restricted.

1.3 Similarly, early prototypes of a design destined to go into production need to be
flown before the total programme is completed and permissible flight loads are again
restricted.

1.4 The extent of the restriction that is imposed will depend upon a number of
considerations, the main ones being listed in para 3.

1.5 The following guidelines indicate the levels of release that are likely to be
acceptable. This information was previously published as Leaflet 200/5.

2 GUIDELINES FOR SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS

2.1 For prototype aeroplanes it is customary to compare the data from flight
measurements and major structural tests. Flight loads are gradually increased to the extent
of those demonstrated on the major static test specimen.

2.2 Flight to 80% of the design limit load is usually permitted only after the static test
specimen has successfully sustained the design limit load and sufficient confirmation of
flight loads exists.

2.3 Exceptionally a ground proving test may be conducted on the flight aeroplane itself
and in these circumstances flight may be permitted to 87% of the load sustained on test
providing that no significant degradation is anticipated within the proposed flight
environment.

2.4 Flight beyond 80% of the design limit load, other than in accordance with para 2.3,
is normally permitted only after the static test specimen has demonstrated the higher loads
multiplied by the usual factor of safety of 1.5.

2.5 In the absence of an acceptable programme of flight loads measurement or structural
test the release conditions arising from the chosen method of substantiating the strength of
the structure would need to be reduced to allow for the added uncertainties. Exceptionally,
in the absence of both flight loads measurement and relevant test data flight should not be
permitted beyond 50% of the design limit load.
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2.6 Thus, there are 4 benchmarks to be considered in setting permissible flight loads:

(i) Test to design ultimate loads, accompanied by a substantial programme of
analysis and flight loads measurement; flight to 100% design limit load.

(ii) Test of flight aeroplane itself to design limit load, accompanied by an
acceptable programme of analysis and flight loads measurement: flight to
87% design limit load.

(iii) Test to design limit load, accompanied by an acceptable programme of
analysis and flight loads measurement; flight to 80% design limit load.

(iv) Analysis alone with no supporting tests and no flight loads measurement;
flight to 50% design limit load.

3 CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR
EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES

3.1 Are there satisfactory calculations for all significant structural parts, and are there
the calculations based on estimated, or measured loads?

3.2 Have there been ground tests of items relevant to strength determination, and with
what loading information?

3.3 Is the aeroplane instrumented for the direct or indirect measurement of flight loads?

3.4 Has there been any prior flight or test evidence of relevance on similar airframe
configurations, materials and methods of construction?

3.5 Are any special inspection, condition monitoring, or ground NDT procedures
(including proof testing) being adopted to ensure a high standard for construction or is there
frequent inspection throughout the flight programme coupled with higher standards of
maintenance, repair and replacement?

3.6 Can reduced standards be accepted by reason of flight in remote regions, unmanned
flight, or through reliable escape systems?

3.7 Does the flight programme itself impose a well disciplined procedure, with
progressive increase in clearance, avoidance of adverse flight conditions and weather, and
with better than average pilots?

3.8 Are the total flight hours required relatively small, and can account be taken of
statistically reduced load occurrence, or absence of fatigue considerations?

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3.1
3.2
LEAFLET 6
STRUCTURES
GENERAL INFORMATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet amplifies the requirements of Clause 3.1 and explains more fully the purpose of
the tests. It was previously issued as Leaflet 1015/1.

2 BASIC AIM

2.1 The basic aim of the tests, in conjunction with the static and fatigue strength tests, is to
ensure that the structure achieves the required strength factors both static and fatigue, under the
loads that are actually applied to it during flight and ground manoeuvres. This is particularly
important for novel designs for which there is no basis of comparison and on which calculated loads
could be seriously in error. Refer to Leaflet 5.

2.2 To this end the first objective of the tests is to obtain measured values of the loads in flight
and on the ground in various manoeuvres and thus check the accuracy of the calculated loads on
which the design of the aeroplane was based and also provide information on the magnitude and
variation of the loads to be applied in the fatigue tests. It may also bring to light any loading
condition not foreseen in the theoretical assessment. In particular cases where structural
temperatures are expected to be significant temperature measurements can also be made.

2.3 In some cases the design loads may be found to have been overestimated and an unexpected
reserve of strength becomes available or, alternatively, an alteration thought necessary because of a
failure during strength tests may be found to be unnecessary.

3 RELATION WITH STATIC STRENGTH TESTS

Any strength tests done before the flight measurements are available can only be based on
calculated loads and are therefore only a check on the internal load distribution and the structural
strength under these calculated loads. However such tests are valuable in that they show up any
unforeseen weakness in the structure and this is borne out by experience which has shown that in
many cases the first design of a structure has needed strengthening alternations in order to carry the
design loads. For this reason, until the static strength tests have shown that the structure has a
satisfactory level of strength, flying must be restricted as required by Clause 3.1. Refer to Leaflet 5.

When flight load measurements are available from the early restricted flight tests the early
strength tests can be re-assessed and the measured loads can be used in further static tests up to
factored conditions to ensure safety in flight tests up to higher loading conditions. An ideal
procedure is set out in para 4.

4 PROCEDURE

4.1 The flight load measurement programme and the static strength test programme should be
planned together early in the design stage of the aeroplane. The static strength test procedure of
Leaflet 2 should be used but it should be phased in with the flight load measurement programme.

4.2 The manoeuvres in which loads are to be measured in flight, as required by Clause 3.1,
cover a wide variety of loading conditions and it may not be practical to cover the corresponding
cases in the static strength tests in the time available. It may therefore be necessary to perform
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some manoeuvres in flight without having first done ground tests. This has always been standard
practice however and the measurement of the flight loads will itself contribute to safety since by
progressively increasing the severity of a particular manoeuvre and comparing the measured loads
with the design loads, precautions can be taken should the measured loads prematurely reach the
design values.

5 RELATION WITH FATIGUE TESTS

5.1 The response of the aeroplane in terms of the loads, their distribution and their time history
during a particular manoeuvre or gust can be used in determining the representative loading cycle to
be applied to the structure in the fatigue test. The frequency of application of this loading cycle at
any particular level of severity must be obtained from Service records. Reliance entirely on a
calculated load cycle may produce large errors in fatigue test results and life estimation.

6 METHODS OF LOAD MEASUREMENT

6.1 Two current methods of measuring loads in flight, which may be combined if required, are:

(a) strain gauging. A technique of flight load measurement using this method has been
developed in the United States and is described in Ref 1. This technique requires the interpretation
of the gauge responses in flight in terms of a static calibration on the ground,

(b) pressure plotting. This method has also been developed in the United States and requires
the installation of several hundred pressure points with corresponding pressure transducers either
for continuous plotting of pressure at each point or for use with a scanning mechanism by which a
number of points are scanned over a period of 2 or 3 seconds. A comprehensive system of
accelerometers is also necessary for the measurement of inertia loads.

REFERENCES

No AUTHORS TITLE

1

Skopinski, T.H
Huston, W. B
Aiken, J r. W.S

Calibration of strain gauge installation in aircraft structures for the
measurement of flight loads N.A.C.A. Report 1178, August 1952.

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Page 1 of 4
LEAFLET 7
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
THE CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF AN AEROPLANE TO
PITCH CONTROL INPUT AND ASSOCIATED LOADS WHEN A
CONVENTIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM IS USED

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.3 requires the use of a rational representation of the motion of the pitch
control motivator to be used to evaluate the loads which arise during a pitching manoeuvre.
The control systems of many aeroplanes are complex and it is not possible to present a
detailed analytical procedure for the load evaluation which will cover all cases. In the more
general case it is possible to give a broad outline of the stages of the analysis required to
derive the loads. For these cases see Leaflet 8.

1.2 Where there is effectively a direct link between the pilot's inceptor and the
deflections of the pitch motivator it is possible to give an analytical technique. Examples of
such closed algebraic forms may be found in R and M 3001 and 3327.

1.3 This leaflet was previously published as Leaflet 202/1.

2 MANOEUVRE CONDITIONS

2.1 The complete pitching manoeuvre involves the transition of the aeroplane from
steady level flight at a particular speed and altitude to a condition of steady normal
acceleration, usually at some point on the boundary of the flight envelope; and then a return
to level flight. As the manoeuvre is primarily the response of the aeroplane to control input
in the short period longitudinal mode it is rapid and it is adequate to assume that the forward
speed does not vary during the manoeuvre.

2.2 The aim of the analysis is to specify the control input which results in a maximum
increment in the normal acceleration corresponding to the desired value at the appropriate
point on the boundary of, or within, the flight envelope. It should be noted that unless the
short period response is overdamped the motion of the aeroplane will be oscillatory, in
which case the maximum incremental value of normal acceleration will exceed the steady
state value appropriate to that control input. Whilst the steady state value is simply related
to the dynamic characteristics of the aeroplane for a given motivator deflection, the
maximum value is a function of the shape of the motivator movement versus time profile.

2.3 The final phase of the manoeuvre is conventionally analysed by assuming that the
aeroplane has achieved the steady state value of the normal acceleration and then applying
the pitch inceptor input required to return it to level flight.

2.4 From the foregoing description it will be realised that the important parameter is the
way in which the movement of the pitch motivator varies with time rather than the motion
of the pilot's inceptor. In a complex control system, such as one using active control
techniques, it is necessary to consider the effect of all the inceptors which contribute inputs
to the longitudinal control system. Refer to Leaflet 8 and Clause 3.10.
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 4
3 PILOT INPUT

3.1 For those cases where the pilot's inceptor is either directly linked mechanically to the
longitudinal control motivator, or through a power control unit having no other inputs it is
possible to specify the motivator movement in terms of the input of the pilots inceptor. Two
separate forms of motion have been used, in the past:-

(i) Unchecked; where the inceptor is moved to the appropriate deflection and
held there whilst the aeroplane responds.

(ii) Checked; where after the initial movement of the inceptor, it is moved back
towards its initial setting, sometimes after a time delay.

3.2 The variation of the inceptor motion with respect to time generally takes a form
closely described by a ramp function, although for analytical purposes the unchecked
motion has often been represented by an exponential relationship.

3.3 The U.S. Mil-A-008861A (Inactive) para 3.19.2 identifies three specific movements
of the pitch inceptor, all based on ramp functions. In each case the inceptor is assumed to be
deflected through an angle, such as to give the desired normal acceleration at the end of
the aeroplane response time. The class of aeroplane effects the time, t
1
, assumed to achieve
the angle, , it varying from 0.2 seconds for highly manoeuvrable aeroplanes to 0.4 seconds
for transport types. The three conditions relate to the movement of the inceptor after the
angle, has been achieved.

(i) Movement of the inceptor back to the original position in the same time as
the application, unless inceptor angle limitation requires a dwell time, t
2
, at
angle to enable the specified normal acceleration to be achieved.

(ii) Dwell at the angle, , for a time t
3
determined so that the specified normal
acceleration is just achieved in a total time (2t
1
+t
3
), , being determined
accordingly.

(iii) Dwell at the angle, , for a time, t
4
, and then movement of the inceptor to an
angle, /2, in the reverse direction in a time 1.5t
1
. Both t
4
and are
determined to enable the specified normal acceleration to be just achieved in
a total time (2.5t
1
+t
4
).

4 CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF THE AEROPLANE

4.1 The first stage in the actual calculation of the loads which arise in a pitching
manoeuvre is to determine the response of the aeroplane to the specified pilot and/or other
inceptor inputs.

4.2 This involves setting up the equations of motion of the aeroplane. In accord with the
assumptions of para 2 these consist merely of the Z-force equation and the pitching moment
equation (as in the approximation to the short period motion of the aeroplane). This
completes the description of the dynamic system for the class of aeroplane, for which is a
prescribed function of time.

4.3 In the more general case, it is necessary to add all the equations governing the
dynamic behaviour of the control system.
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4.4 To proceed to the calculation of a control surface loading, the effective incremental
angle of incidence at the control position is required. One of the response quantities that can
be obtained from the response calculation is the incremental angle of incidence of the
aeroplane (i.e. at the cg). This quantity may then be used to determine the incremental angle
of incidence at the longitudinal control/stabiliser surface, making due allowance for pitching
velocity and rates of change of downwash with time and wing incidence where appropriate.

4.5 In addition the variation of motivator deflection during the manoeuvre will either
have been specified or will have to be determined as a response quantity.

5 CONTROL/STABILISER SURFACE LOADS

5.1 At any time during the manoeuvre the total load is the algebraic sum of the load on a
control/stabiliser surface due to its incidence at that time and the incremental load due to the
deflection of any part of it at that same time.

5.2 When the aeroplane having a conventional wing-tail layout is pitched from steady
level flight towards the positive normal acceleration boundary the total surface load will
pass through a maximum download in the early stages of the manoeuvre, then through a
maximum upload before reaching the steady circling flight value. It finally passes through
another maximum in the upload sense when during the second stage of manoeuvre the input
is reversed to return the aeroplane to steady level flight. In the case of an aeroplane having
a foreplane-wing layout the foreplane load passes through a maximum upload during the
first part of the manoeuvre as the steady circling flight value is approached. A maximum
download condition may result as the input is reversed to return the aeroplane to steady
level flight. It should be noted that in this second configuration the critical design loads
conditions are reversed. That is the critical foreplane load is likely to arise in a steady state
condition whilst the transient case is likely to give the wing design conditions.

6 CONTROL SURFACE HINGE MOMENTS

6.1 The moment about the hinge line of the aerodynamic load acting on a control surface
is also dependent on the incidence of the control/stabiliser where appropriate and the control
surface deflection. Again this passes through maximum positive and negative values as
does the load, when the aeroplane is of conventional wing-tall layout.

7 GENERAL REMARKS

7.1 As previously mentioned, it is possible to obtain an analytic solution in closed form
for certain aeroplanes. In such an approach it is usual to make the following assumptions
for initial analysis:

(i) variation of forward speed and the gravity component during the motion is
neglected, already mentioned.

(ii) the contribution of the control motivator force to the total lift is omitted.

(iii) the elastic distortion of the aeroplane structure is ignored, and

(iv) the equations of motion are linearised and the aerodynamic derivatives
assumed constant throughout the manoeuvre.
7.2 Should it be considered necessary in a given case to account for any of these effects,
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Page 4 of 4
the equations of motion of the aeroplane must be amended accordingly.

7.3 If the data required under Clause 3.3 are not forthcoming from wind-tunnel or other
tests, it is acceptable that the effects under Clause 3.3 shall be estimated using appropriate
theories, in combination with the best available structural data. Whenever possible, the
effects under Clause 3.3 shall be based on the data from model and full-scale tests of a
closely similar design.

7.4 For aeroplanes with unswept wings and of conventional structural design flying at
low Mach numbers, in the absence of data from any of the investigations detailed above,
some allowances should be made. Changes in C
mo
of 0.0075 and a shift of 2.5% of the
mean chord in the position of the aerodynamic centre should be considered.

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Page 1 of 3
LEAFLET 8
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH SYMMETRIC
MANOEUVRES FOR AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL SYSTEMS WITH
LOAD LIMITING DEVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 7 is inappropriate for those
aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices. In these
aeroplanes the automatic system can override pilot input and result in a so called "carefree"
manoeuvring situation. For the purposes of structural load evaluation it is usually necessary
to consider cases where motion of the aeroplane occurs in six degrees of freedom, although
constant forward speed may be assumed in some circumstances. The analysis may be
further complicated by the integration of flight and propulsion controls, as in the case of
vectored-thrust aeroplanes. Reference in all these cases should be made to Clause 3.10,
which deals with the airframe aspects of active control systems design.

1.2 The use of a simple expression to specify the movement of the control motivators is
not appropriate for advanced flight control systems. The specification of the flight envelope
itself is relevant since the implied accelerations are one of the common design features of
the airframe and control system.

1.3 This information was previously issued as Leaflet 202/3.

2 MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS

2.1 One way of proceeding with the design of both the airframe and control system is to
establish a set of "manoeuvre parameters". These include aeroplane velocities as well as
accelerations. They should be derived after consideration of the handling and agility
requirements of the aeroplane and in consultation with the Integrated Project Team Leader.

2.2 Design loads are calculated by balancing the aeroplane at selected points within and
on the boundaries using an assumed, appropriate control usage.

2.3 Subsequently, as the design of the flight control system becomes more fully defined
it is necessary to investigate the effect of control response on the manoeuvre parameters and
to check the load calculations in order to obtain flight clearance.

2.4 Reference should be made to Leaflet 28 for a further discussion of the structural
implications of active control systems.

3 NORMAL ACCELERATION/PITCHING ACCELERATION ENVELOPE

3.1 In the case of symmetric, or primarily symmetric, manoeuvres it is useful to consider
an envelope which describes the interaction of normal acceleration and pitching
acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' pitching acceleration which
includes a term consisting of the product of the roll rate, p and yaw rate, r, then:-
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 3
Modified pitching acceleration =( - pr) q
.

where is the pitching acceleration q
.

A typical form of the envelope for a supersonic aeroplane is shown at Fig 1. As would be
expected maximum negative, nose down, pitching acceleration coincides with all positive
values of normal acceleration. Equally there is a reduction in design positive, nose up,
pitching acceleration as the maximum normal acceleration is approached.

3.2 The value of maximum normal acceleration is defined in Clause 3.2 and the
maximum pitch acceleration by aeroplane handling and agility considerations.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 A further consideration is the combination of maximum angular acceleration, for
example, q in pitch, with angular rate, for example, q, and vice-versa. Fig 2 is an example
of an envelope which describes such a combination. In this case the maximum angular rate
applies with angular accelerations up to about 40% of the maximum and vice versa.

4.2 It is also necessary, to specify the combinations of pitching velocity, q, with normal
acceleration. The relationship shown in Leaflet 10, Fig 2 for asymmetric manoeuvre
parameters is also appropriate for combinations of q/q
MAX
and n/n
1
.

FIG. 1 COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL AND PITCHING ACCELERATIONS

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FIG. 2 COMBINATIONS OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS
SECTION 3

Page 1 of 6
LEAFLET 9
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
YAWING, SIDESLIPPING AND ROLLING MOTIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet gives explanatory notes on the requirements of Clause 3.3 and outlines
the methods of determining the critical stressing conditions arising in the course of the
manoeuvres specified therein. It is particularly applicable to those aeroplanes where the
movement of the control motivators is directly related to the movement of the pilot's
inceptors. It was previously issued as Leaflet 203/1.

1.2 As in the case of the symmetric manoeuvres of Clause 3.2 and Leaflet 7, present-day
developments in aeroplane control systems can render past practices inapplicable in the
general case. Whilst in the past there always existed a direct relationship between a given
manoeuvring task and a control device, this is no longer the case. The demands of improved
performance in a number of directions have resulted in an increasing trend to combine the
effects of a number of control devices for a given task. Simple examples of this trend are
provided by the use of ailerons supplemented by differentially deflected tail panels. When
this is coupled with the increased application of automatic control systems and unusual
aerodynamic configurations the consequence can be an extremely complex situation.
However, there does exist a class of conventional aeroplanes, namely those for which the
pilot's control is connected directly, or via a power unit only, to the rudder and aileron
control surfaces, that can be catered for by simplified methods as hitherto (RAE Report
Structures 76).

2 LATERAL MANOEUVRES ARISING FROM APPLIED YAWING MOMENTS

2.1 Whether a yawing moment arises from the application of the yaw motivator(s) or by
a sudden loss of engine thrust on one side of a multi-engined aeroplane, the resulting motion
has the same character, being primarily a combination of yawing, sideslipping and rolling.

2.2 For the simple class of aeroplane mentioned in Para. 1.2 above the first stage in
satisfying the requirements of Clause 3.4 is the calculation of the response of the aeroplane
as the solution of the lateral/directional equations of motion. In the more general case it is
necessary to include the equations which govern the dynamics of the control system when
determining the overall response.

2.3 The inputs referred to in para 2.1 above principally give rise to yawing moments but
in certain cases there may be significant induced rolling moments and sideforces.

2.4 It has been usual for the linearised equations of motion to be used in calculating the
response of the aeroplane. Often the effect of the sideforce may be neglected in the
calculation of the overall response of the aeroplane but it does have a significant effect upon
the lateral and yawing accelerations. If the wing of the aeroplane is unswept and of
moderate to high aspect ratio it may be acceptable to neglect the rolling content of the
lateral motion, at least over part of the range of operating conditions.
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Page 2 of 6
When this is so for the simple class of aeroplane referred to, the response of the aeroplane is
derived from a solution of the two equations which describe the lateral and yawing motions.

2.5 For the simple class of aeroplane it is adequate to assume that there is no input from
the roll or pitch motivators during the execution of the complete yawing described in Clause
3.4. However, when inertial or aerodynamic cross-coupling is present it is admissible to
introduce corrective action both in the rolling and longitudinal senses. In order to ensure
that adequate allowance is made for the loads which may arise before this corrective action
is effective, Clause 3.4 specifies minimum values of bank angle, coupled with dynamic
sideslip angle and nominal acceleration which must be catered for, unless it can be
demonstrated that the flight control system ensures lower limited values.

3 YAWING CONTROL INPUTS

3.1 The inputs into the yaw channel are generally specified such that the deflection(s) of
the appropriate motivator(s) may be derived. For the simple class of aeroplane with a more
direct link between the pilot and the yaw motivator the input may be specified directly or
indirectly in terms of applied pilot force or inceptor movement. See Clause 3.4.

3.2 When the yaw motivator(s) is(are) sensitive or powerful the application of a specific
deflection may result in unrealistically high loads for the directional stabilising/control
surface. It may then be desirable to change the characteristics of the motivator to reduce the
load. Alternatively there may be strong reasons for retaining the sensitivity or power of the
control, in which case some reduction of the severity of the loading case might be
reasonable if there is an aeroplane characteristic (such as high lateral acceleration on the
pilot) which would act as a natural deterrent against high pilot inceptor inputs. In such cases
the Integrated Project Team Leader should be consulted.

3.3 If calculations indicate that sudden loss of lift on the vertical stabilising/control
surface is likely to occur in the specified manoeuvres, then compliance with the requirement
of Clause 2.22 is in doubt. It may be found necessary to adjust the aeroplane characteristics
in order to satisfy this requirement.

4 EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE

4.1 The stressing case specified in Clause 3.4 to cover the loads arising following the
loss of thrust or power of an engine envisages that corrective action will be taken by the
pilot. The case therefore is concerned with the response of the aeroplane to the sudden
application of a constant yawing movement. It is usual for the loads which arise in a yawing
manoeuvre case, Clause 3.4, to be higher than those consequent upon an engine failure.
However, should the aeroplane characteristics be such that the engine failure case gives
more severe loads, then the implication of the corrective action specified in Clause 3.4 needs
to be carefully considered.
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Page 3 of 6
5 THE ESTIMATION OF LOADS ON THE DIRECTIONAL STABILISER/
CONTROL SURFACE

5.1 The solution of the overall equations which govern the motion of the aeroplane, as
described in para 2 above, yields the response parameters which are inquired to determine
the loads acting on the vertical (directional) stabiliser/control surface(s). These are:

(i) Sideslip angle

(ii) Sidewash angle

(iii) Rate of yaw

From these the effective angle of incidence of a location on the vertical surface(s) may be
calculated. The corresponding deflection of the yaw motivator(s) is(are) also required to
enable the total loads to be evaluated.

6 LOADS ON HORIZONTAL TAIL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE IN
YAWED FLIGHT

6.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the loading conditions to be applied to the longitudinal
stabiliser/control surface in yawed flight.

6.2 It is required that the magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient, C
mo
, be
increased to allow for the effect of sideslip angle. The required value should be derived by
the best available method and verified in the flight testing, but in the absence of more
precise information it should be assumed that the low speed value of C
mo
is increased by -
0.0015 per degree of sideslip.

6.3 It is also required that the resulting trim (balancing) load be distributed
asymmetrically. The effective rolling moment on the longitudinal stabiliser/control surface
is defined as:

p V
2
S
t
b
t
K
2

where p V
2
is the dynamic pressure
2

S
t
is the area of the surface

b
t
is the span of the surface

is the sideslip angle

K is the slope of the curve of longitudinal surface rolling moment coefficient versus
sideslip angle at the appropriate Mach number.

6.4 The value of the derivative K should, wherever possible, be verified by actual tests.
It depends upon the configuration of the aeroplane, and for instance in a conventional
aeroplane layout it is significantly affected by such factors as tailplane dihedral,
SECTION 3

Page 4 of 6
sweepback and the position of the tailplane on the fin and also to a lesser extent by other
aerodynamic components. However, experience has indicated that, for unswept, relatively
low down tailplanes having no dihedral, a value of K of -0.0025 per degree of sideslip is
conservative.

6.5 The provision of strength to meet the effects of asymmetric buffeting which may
occur near the minimum permissible flight speed has apparently been covered incidentally
on many past aeroplanes by the use of K =-0.0025 in the asymmetric flight cases. It is
important however to ensure adequate strength on aeroplanes which are designed for much
smaller numerical values of K. It will probably be satisfactory to cater for a difference in lift
coefficient between the two halves of the horizontal stabiliser of 1.0 or C
L
max, whichever
is smaller. As an overriding minimum it is suggested that the horizontal stabiliser shear
strength inboard of the pick-up points should not be less than the strength outboard.

6.6 During asymmetric flight the drag as well as the lift on the longitudinal surface will
usually be distributed asymmetrically. This asymmetry of drag loads should be considered
in the design, although the provision of extra structure to meet it should not normally be
necessary.

7 COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING MANOEUVRES

7.1 ROLL INPUTS FOR STRESSING
7.1.1 The roll input conditions to be used for stressing purposes are defined
according to the requirements of Clause 3.4. That is expressed indirectly in terms of
the specified minimum rate of roll. Since designers will usually ensure that this rate
of roll will be exceeded by some margin, a factor of one and a third has been applied.
To determine the deflection of single roll motivator (or the deflections of individual
motivators where a combination of these devices is used) that corresponds to the rate
of roll which results after the factor has been applied, it is sufficient to use a
modified single degree-of-freedom roll equation. For an aeroplane employing wing-
mounted flap-type motivators, such as ailerons, flaperons or segmented flaps, the
modification consists of a factor applied to the rolling moment due to the roll
motivator embodying the reversal speed, to account for the elasticity of the wing
structure. The one and a third factor takes some account of the indirect effect of the
yawing and sideslipping motions that must occur.

7.2 DETAILS OF THE MANOEUVRES
7.2.1 The following assumptions are acceptable as an interpretation of the
manoeuvres defined in general terms in Clause 3.4.

7.2.2 The aeroplane should be assumed to be flying in a steady pull-out or push-
over or a steady turn at the specified normal acceleration, when the specified roll
input is applied. Instantaneous application of roll input is an acceptable simplifying
assumption, but this will usually lead to higher loads in the structure than a more
realistic rate of application of the roll motivator(s). This roll input should in general
be maintained until the rate of roll has built up to its maximum, when the roll
motivator(s) is/are quickly returned to the neutral position. Again, instantaneous
motivator movement is an acceptable, though over-severe, simplification. The pitch
motivator deflection should be assumed constant throughout. Constant speed may
also be assumed.

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Page 5 of 6
7.2.3 In the foregoing conditions, the pilot is assumed to be applying sufficient pitch
motivator deflection to produce the specified amount of normal acceleration. When
inertia cross-coupling effects are present the same motivator deflection should be
considered but this may give rise to a normal acceleration in excess of that specified and
to sideslip angles in excess of those arising from the manoeuvres specified in Clause 3.4.
These increased values should be used in strength calculations. In the application of the
requirements, the pilot's input into the pitch plane is that which, in a steady pull-out, a
steady turn or a push-over, as the case may be, results in the specified level of normal
acceleration. It may happen that, in certain cases, inertia cross-coupling effects are
significant and the use of linearised equations of motion is no longer justified. In such
cases the same pilot input, that results in the specified level of normal acceleration during
pitching motion only, should be used.

7.2.4 The roll motivator power on some aeroplane designs may be so great that the
application of the requirements of Clause 3.4 results in unduly high values of the rate of
roll. In this case it is suggested that for the ground attack role, the maximum rate of roll
that need be considered to develop before the specified deflection of the roll motivator (or
the deflections of each roll-motivator, where a number of these are used in combination) is
removed, is the maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a steady pull-out with zero
bank into a 90 degree banked turn, when the specified roll input is applied as rapidly as
possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever is less. For air fighting and evasive manoeuvres,
the maximum rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the specified
deflection of the roll motivator (or the deflections of each roll motivator, where a number
of these are used in combination) is removed, is the maximum that can be achieved in
rolling from a 90 degree banked turn in one direction to a 90 degree banked turn in the
opposite direction when the specified roll input is applied as rapidly as possible, or 200
degrees/sec, whichever is less. The value of 200 degrees/sec is tentatively suggested as an
operationally usable maximum for fighters. Corresponding rates of roll for other
aeroplanes are not suggested as it is possible that on these aeroplanes the maximum rate of
roll corresponding to the specified roll input may be an adequate criterion.

7.2.5 Any of the four stages of the manoeuvre, specified in Clause 3.4 (i.e., the initiation,
the steady roll, the arresting of the rolling motion and reversed roll), may give critical
loads in some parts of the structure. If instantaneous roll motivator movement is assumed,
it will probably be satisfactory to consider only the four separate cases. If instantaneous
roll input is not assumed, or if the maximum rate of roll considered is less than the steady
rate of roll corresponding to the applied roll input, then examination of the response of the
aeroplane throughout the manoeuvre becomes advisable.

7.3 CALCULATION OF LOADS
7.3.1 Solution of the appropriate equations for the overall aeroplane system, yields
the response quantities necessary for the calculation of the loads acting on the wings,
their attachments to the fuselage and the directional stabiliser/control surface(s).
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Page 6 of 6
7.3.2 The load acting on the wings depends on the following:

(i) the angle of attack of the aeroplane,

(ii) the distributed effective angle of attack resulting from the rate of roll,

(iii) the corresponding quantity associated with the rate of pitch, and

(iv) the rate of change in the angle of attack of the aeroplane.

(v) the deflections of any auxiliary surfaces.

(vi) changes in effective angle of attack associated with any downwash
effects due to a lifting surface ahead of the wing.

Of these, the first two are the predominant effects.

7.3.3 The loads on the directional stabiliser/control surface follow from a
knowledge of the sideslip angle, sidewash derivative and angle and rate of yaw, see
para 5.1. They also depend upon loads on the longitudinal stabiliser/control surface
if this is mounted on the directional surface.

8 GENERAL REMARKS

8.1 Although the effects of the sideslip which occurs during asymmetric manoeuvres are
most easily calculated for the fin and rudder loads, there are noticeable effects on other parts
of the airframe which are not so amenable to calculation. Such items include undercarriage
doors, cabin hoods, radar scanning housings and externally carried stores, in general.
Special wind-tunnel tests to investigate the magnitude of these effects are recommended
whenever it is not possible to base an estimate on the results of previous tests of a closely
similar design.

8.2 The yawing velocities which occur during asymmetric manoeuvres cause a
gyroscopic pitching couple on the engine and propeller which should be considered in the
design of the engine mounting. The effect of rate of yaw on other rotating parts within the
aeroplane should not be overlooked. See Clause 3.1 and Leaflet 3.

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LEAFLET 10
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES FOR AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL
SYSTEMS WITH LOAD LIMITING DEVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 9 is inappropriate for those
aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices. This
different design situation is discussed in Leaflet 8 to which reference should be made, as
well as in Chapter 3.10 and Leaflet 28.

1.2 One way of dealing with the design is to make use of Manoeuvre Parameters, see
Leaflet 8, Para. 2. These should be determined after consideration of the handling and
agility requirements of the aeroplane and in conjunction with the Integrated Project Team
Leader.

1.3 This leaflet was previously issued as Leaflet 203/2.

2 LATERAL ACCELERATION/YAWING ACCELERATION ENVELOPE

2.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the yawing manoeuvre load cases for aeroplanes with
conventional controls. In the case of aeroplanes with active control systems it is useful to
consider an envelope which describes the interaction of lateral acceleration and yawing
acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' yawing acceleration defined as:
Modified yawing acceleration =( +pq) r
.
where is the yawing acceleration r
.
p is the rate of roll
q is the pitch rate

Such an envelope is illustrated in Fig 1. The maximum negative yawing acceleration applies
at all positive values of lateral acceleration and vice-versa. However, as would be expected
there is an alleviation of the value of negative yawing acceleration at higher negative values
of lateral acceleration, and vice-versa.

2.2 The maximum value of the yawing acceleration is determined by the control system
characteristics required to meet the aeroplane handling and agility requirements. The
maximum lateral acceleration is likely to be limited by consideration of crew tolerance.

3 COMBINED PITCHING AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the design load cases for an aeroplane with conventional
controls in combined pitching and rolling manoeuvres. The situation is more complex in the
case of aeroplanes designed to possess 'carefree' manoeuvring characteristics due to the need
to consider all six degrees of freedom at the same time.
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Page 2 of 3

3.2 Fig 2 is an example of an envelope which specifies the relative values of lateral
manoeuvre parameters in terms of the normal acceleration. The lateral manoeuvre
parameters covered are:-

roll rate, p as a function of the maximum value
roll acceleration, p, as a function of the maximum value
.

yaw rate r, as a function of the maximum value
yaw acceleration, r, as a function of the maximum value
.

lateral acceleration, ny, as a function of the maximum value

The diagram shows that for values of each of these parameters of up to 25% of the
maximum value there is coincidence with the maximum normal acceleration. There is then
a linear variation so that 80% of the maximum value coincides with 80% of the normal
acceleration. Further linear variation of the parameters occurs so that the maximum values
coincide with 50% of the normal acceleration.

3.3 The maximum values of the roll and yaw rates and acceleration are determined by
consideration of the handling and agility requirements of the aeroplane.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 The combination of maximum angular acceleration with angular rate for both the roll
and yaw motions is a further consideration. A typical diagram showing this relation can be
found in Leaflet 8, Para. 4.1 and Fig 2.
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 3

FIG 1. COMBINATION OF LATERAL AND YAW ACCELERATIONS

FIG 2. COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL ACCELERATION
AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS

SECTION 3

Page 1 of 4
LEAFLET 11
GUST LOADS SAFE SPEEDS FOR AEROPLANES FLYING IN TURBULENT WEATHER

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 To enable Service flying to be undertaken in all weather, pilots must be advised of
the best speed at which to fly in severe turbulence. This Leaflet outlines the type of
investigation which should be made to determine the conditions of speed and altitude at
which there is least risk of structural damage or loss of control resulting from excessive
incidence in a gust. The outcome of this investigation together with practical flying
experience will form the basis of advice given to pilots.

1.2 This information was previously published as Leaflet 204/1.

2 SAFE SPEED-ALTITUDE ENVELOPE

2.1 When an aeroplane meets a severe gust at low altitude, the upper limit of the safe
speed range is the speed at which the gust load can just be withstood without structural
damage. The lower limit is the speed at which the incidence during the passage of the gust
just reaches that at which loss of control would occur as a result of stalling or instability, or
at which severe buffeting would endanger the aeroplane. Within these limits lies the safest
speeds at which the severest gust can just be withstood without either structural damage or
loss of control. At high altitudes, the load developed in a gust may be insufficient to cause
structural damage throughout the speed range of the aeroplane, and loss of control or severe
buffeting is then the only danger.

2.2 Safe speed ranges at various altitudes can be shown on a speed-altitude envelope. A
safe speed-altitude envelope and the safest speeds within the envelope should be determined
for gusts of 20 m/s (66 ft/sec) EAS below 6100 in (20,000 ft) altitude thereafter decreasing
linearly to 11.6 m/s (38 ft/sec) at 15,200 in (50,000 ft) altitude, with the aeroplane at the
most adverse weight for the altitude considered. Fig 1 shows examples for hypothetical
subsonic and supersonic fighter aeroplanes.

3 STRENGTH BOUNDARY

3.1 The strength boundary should correspond to the achieved strength, unfactored,
resulting from the gust or manoeuvring strength requirements, and should be determined for
upward, downward and sideways gusts.

4 CONTROL AND BUFFET BOUNDARY

4.1 The loss of control boundary should be regarded only as an indication of the
conditions in which control difficulties might be expected to occur in severe turbulence.

4.2 On low speed, low altitude aeroplanes, the loss of control boundary should be
assumed to correspond to the stalling C
L
max. On high speed, high altitude aeroplanes,
flight tests will be necessary to establish the C
L
- Mach No. boundary that can be achieved
without loss of control, dangerous instability or severe buffeting. It will usually be
impracticable for this to be obtained from flight tests in severe turbulence, so the boundary
obtained in manoeuvring tests will have to be used.
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 4
4.3 It will generally be unnecessary to allow for the transient increase in C
L
max or
buffet C
L
that occurs during the rapid change in incidence produced by a gust, as this effect,
which is difficult to determine, provides additional safety from stalling or buffeting
beyond the boundary obtained assuming static C
L
max or C
L
max determined from
manoeuvring flight tests.

4.4 In addition to the effects of excessive incidence, control difficulties may arise in
continuous turbulence at high altitudes and supersonic speeds, as a result of deterioration in
damping and control effectiveness. Control difficulties may also arise in turbulence at low
altitudes and high subsonic speeds because of over-effectiveness of the elevator or aileron
control. These may be particularly dangerous when attempting to fly at high speed near the
ground. These effects cannot be determined from considerations of the aeroplane meeting
an isolated gust. Advice on the flight procedure to be adopted where they are present will
have to be based on experience gained during flight in turbulence.

5 VARIATION OF SAFE SPEED WITH ALTITUDE

5.1 LOW SPEED AEROPLANES
5.1.1 For aeroplanes on which compressibility effects can be neglected the safest
speed is a constant E.A.S. at low altitudes, and is limited at higher altitudes by the
maximum speed of the aeroplane.

5.2 HIGH SPEED SUBSONIC AEROPLANES
5.2.1 The variation of safest speed with altitude for a high speed subsonic
aeroplane can generally be represented by a constant E.A.S. at low altitudes where
the upper limit of the safe speed depends on strength, and a constant Mach No at
higher altitudes where the upper limit depends on the deterioration in maximum safe
C
L
as transonic speeds are approached.

5.3 SUPERSONIC AEROPLANES
5.3.1 Supersonic aeroplanes are safer both at subsonic and supersonic speeds than
in the transonic range, where the load produced by a gust reaches a maximum, and
the C
L
at which loss of control or buffeting occurs deteriorates to a minimum. The
conditions under which it is safer to fly supersonically than subsonically, and vice
versa, are an important consideration.

5.3.2 In supersonic flight, there is generally little to be gained in safety from
structural damage by flying at any particular speed up to a Mach No of about 2.0, as
gust loads vary little with speed due to the decrease in lift curve slope with increase
in Mach No, and strength is not appreciably reduced by kinetic heating. Altitude is
more important than speed in its effect on gust loads. Strength considerations will
determine a minimum altitude above which the aeroplane is safe from structural
damage over a wide range of speed.

5.3.3 Loss of control as a result of excessive incidence in a gust will set only a
lower limit to the safe speed in supersonic flight. At any given altitude an
aeroplane is safer in this respect at supersonic speeds, once it is through the
transonic range, than at the safest subsonic speed.
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 4
5.3.4 The safest flight procedure for a supersonic aeroplane will generally consist
of a constant subsonic E.A.S. up to a point A on Fig 1 corresponding to the altitude
above which the safest subsonic speed is determined entirely by control difficulties
or buffeting. This will be followed by transition to supersonic speed at a safe
altitude. On some aeroplanes with low gust or manoeuvre load factors the control
and strength boundaries may intersect in the transonic range, indicating no clearly
defined safe speed for the gust specified. In these circumstances the recommended
speeds should be chosen on the safe side of the strength boundary.

6 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 For operational reasons, it is not always practicable to fly at the safest speed
determined from the foregoing considerations, and a compromise between this and the
normal operating speeds for best rate of climb and descent, or maximum range then
becomes necessary. Consideration of the speed band within which 95% of the maximum
range could be obtained might assist in reaching a compromise. On high altitude aeroplanes,
particular attention should be given to climbing and descent where turbulence is most likely
to be met. Any special limitations which might arise from the use of flaps or airbrakes
during descent should be considered. For crew comfort and efficiency, a speed somewhat
lower than the safest speed may have to be chosen, particularly with supersonic aeroplanes
in which excessive pitching may be troublesome at supersonic speeds.

6.2 It is important that the speed finally recommended in Pilots' Notes should be in the
simplest terms, so that it is easily remembered. A range of speeds should be given
covering all stages of flight, and lying within the strength boundary of the safe speed-
altitude envelope as near as possible to the safest speed. If a single speed can be chosen
that is a reasonable compromise for all stages of flight, this should be quoted for
simplicity. Complicated variations of speed with altitude should be avoided as far as
possible.
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FIG. 1 SAFE SPEED - ALTITUDE ENVELOPE FOR FLIGHT IN SEVERE
TURBULENCE AS REPRESENTED BY GUSTS OF 20 m/s (66 ft/sec) TO
EAS BELOW 6100 m (20,000 ft) ALTITUDE THEREAFTER DECREASING
LINEARLY 11.6m/s (38 ft/sec) AT 15200 m (50,000 ft)

SECTION 3

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LEAFLET 12
GUST LOADSA METHOD OF CALCULATING GUST LOADS FOR PRELIMINARY
DESIGN PURPOSES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet presents a method of calculating gust loads for conventional
aeroplanes in the absence of a rational investigation of the aeroplanes response to gusts.
It applies only to aeroplanes with straight or sweptback wings and tailplane behind the
wings. It may be used as a preliminary design aid to more detailed full response
calculations. The full response calculations should always be undertaken for aeroplanes
of unconventional layout or abnormal stability or when structural flexibility is likely to
be significant. It was previously published as Leaflet 204/2.

2 GENERAL

2.1 The speed and attitude of the aeroplane should be assumed to be unchanged during
the passage of the gust.

2.2 The maximum change in load on an aerofoil produced by the gust should be
assumed to equal that resulting from a change in incidence of

tan
-1
FU
V

where: U is the design gust velocity (Clause 3.5)
V is the aeroplane speed
F is an alleviating factor (see para 3)

2.3 Allowance should be made for the extent to which the lift coefficient of an
aerofoil, where effective angle of incidence is increasing rapidly, may exceed the
maximum value at steady flow. In the absence of better information the maximum lift
coefficient assumed should be at least 1.25 times the maximum static value
corresponding to the appropriate Mach number.

2.4 In calculating the loads on the horizontal tail surface the conditions of
Clause 3.5 are to be applied. Allowance should be made for the change in downwash
produced by the gust on the mainplane.

2.5 Wing flexibility should be neglected.

3 GUST ALLEVIATING FACTORS

3.1 VERTICAL GUSTS
3.1.1 Mainplane. The alleviating factor for vertical gusts is given by

Subsonic flight:- F =
0.88
5.3

+

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Page 2 of 2
Supersonic flight:- F =
103
695
103
.
.
.
+

where is a mass parameter as: - =
2M
S a c

where M is the aeroplane mass (kg or slugs)

S is the wing area (m
2
or ft
2
)

c is the aerodynamic mean chord (m or ft)

a, is slope of the wing normal force coefficient/incidence curve at the
appropriate Mach number (per radian)

is the air density (kg/m
3
or slugs/ft
3
)

3.1.2 Horizontal tail service
The alleviating factor for vertical gusts acting on the horizontal tail surface in
subsonic flight should be that derived for the mainplane in para 3.1.1. In the case of
supersonic flight it should be taken as unity.

3.2 LATERAL GUSTS
The alleviating factor for lateral gusts is given by:-

Subsonic flight:-
088
53
.
.

L
L
+

Supersonic flight:- F = 1.0

where
L
is a lateral mass parameter defined as:-

L
=
2M
S
t
c
t
a,t
k
c
t
2
l

M is the aeroplane mass (kg or slugs)

S
t
is the reference area of the vertical tail surface (m or ft)

c
t
is the aerodynamic mean chord of the vertical tail surface (m or ft)

k
c
is the radius of gyration of the aeroplane in yaw (m or ft)

l
t
is the distance from the centre of gravity of the aeroplane to the
centre of lift of the vertical tail (m or ft)

a,
t
is the slope of the vertical tail lift coefficient/incidence curve at the
appropriate Mach number (per radian)

is the air density (kg/m
3
or slugs/ft
3
)
SECTION 3

Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 13
PRESSURE CABINS
STRENGTH TESTING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet amplifies the strength test requirements of Clause 3.6 and makes
recommendations on testing methods. It was previously published as Leaflet 716/1.

2 LOADING CONDITIONS

2.1 The requirements of Clause 3.7 call for tests of the pressure cabin under the loading
conditions either of para 11.2 or of para 11.3, or of both, as agreed with the Integrated
Project Team Leader. The loading cases and the method of testing to be used should be
discussed with the Integrated Project Team Leader.

3 METHOD OF TEST

3.1 The best method of testing a cabin under internal pressure, whether static or fatigue
loading is needed, is to use water as the pressurising medium and so avoid the risk of
explosive failure which can occur if air is used (see para 4). The specimen is placed in an
empty tank and both specimen and tank are filled with water until the specimen is
completely submerged; water pressure is then applied internally. During all filling and
emptying processes the water level in the specimen should be the same as that in the tank
thus avoiding any loading of the fuselage due to static head effect.

3.2 With this method it is possible to encounter a premature failure, identify a weak spot,
repair and strengthen, and then continue the test with the minimum of delay. In cases where
the failure occurs at or near the design pressure, it is possible to continue the tests to higher
pressures after repairing and strengthening the specimen so that data may be obtained for the
design of future projects.

4 DANGERS AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING AIR PRESSURE

4.1 Calculations of the energy stored in compressed air show that tests using air pressure
can be exceedingly dangerous since if failure occurs, the sudden release of energy may lead
to widespread destruction. This has been borne out by experience which has shown that
where failure originates in the metal structure violent explosion occurs with excessive
tearing and with bodily movement of the test specimen. Where the failure occurs in a
window the damage is usually limited to the window, but danger to personnel is still present
from flying fragments and from movement of the specimen.

4.2 Special precautions must therefore be taken to protect personnel and adjacent
equipment. There have been cases where protective steel netting and cables have been
broken and shelter doors sucked out of their frames by blast. Observers should therefore
remain at a safe distance and should not approach the specimen until the pressure is reduced
to a known safe value. The danger can be reduced if the quantity of air in the cabin is
reduced to a minimum by filling the cabin with some suitable material of low density, but
internal loading due to the weight of the material should be avoided.

4.3 Apart from the danger aspect, explosive failure causes so much secondary damage
that the determination of the primary cause of failure is extremely difficult and even if it can
be identified, repair and strengthening of the weak spot may be impossible. The structure
may then be useless for further tests, and in a case of premature failure it would be
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 2
necessary to build another specimen before the tests could be continued and, for a large
fuselage, this would mean great expense and long delay. The advantages of using water as
the pressurising medium are therefore overwhelming.

5 PROVING TESTS USING AIR PRESSURE

5.1 From the foregoing it is evident, in the interests of safety, that all tests in which the
use of air pressure cannot be avoided, (e.g., functioning tests, leakage tests and the proving
pressure test as required by Clause 3.7) should be deferred until the static test, as required
by Clause 3.7 has been satisfactorily completed.

5.2 There seems to be no practical way of avoiding the use of compressed air for these
proving tests and they will therefore be attended by some risk of explosion through failure
of the pressure shell. This risk will be reduced as much as possible by the previous strength
tests on the test specimen. However, it is not always practical to do the water pressure test
on the whole of the pressure shell. Hence although all known design difficulties may have
been represented, some risk may still arise from some unknown design weakness not
included in the strength test specimens, or through some design modification, works'
concession, bad workmanship, service defect or repair causing a reduction in the strength of
the pressure shell.

5.3 Although the risk of explosion may be slight it is recommended that during all air
pressure tests in which the maximum differential pressure for normal operation is to be
exceeded, the following safety precautions be taken:

(i) the test should be made in the open (the use of blast walls for tests made
within a building tends to increase the risk of roof damage and falling
fragments),

(ii) the test cabin should be well away from other aeroplanes or any other objects
which could be damaged, and

(iii) all personnel should remain at a safe distance and only approach for close
observations, such as leakage tracing, after the pressure has been reduced to
the normal working pressure.

6 ROUTINE TESTS IN SERVICE

6.1 In routine tests of the pressure cabin system on aeroplanes in service it will not be
necessary, and indeed is undesirable, that the maximum differential pressure for normal
operation (i.e., the pressure "p" of Clause 3.6) should be exceeded. No special precautions
are therefore needed.

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Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 14
PRESSURE CABINS
CABIN PRESSURISATION SYSTEMS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet gives recommendations amplifying the requirements for warning and
pressure controlling devices, for the prevention of damage due to discharge or leakage from
the pressure supply system, and for the operation of cockpit hood inflatable seals. It was
previously published as Leaflet 716/2.

2 WARNING DEVICES

2.1 It is essential that the warning device should operate only when the pressure loss is
sufficient to constitute a state of emergency, which the pilot must quickly do something
about; too frequently premature warnings seriously reduce the effectiveness of the warning.

2.2 To prevent unnecessary operation of the warning device due to the rapid change in
differential pressure during a dive, it is recommended that the warning device should
operate only when the differential pressure falls by more than 7 kPa below the value set by
the pressure control unit coupled to the discharge valve. There is, however, no need for the
warning to operate at altitudes below 7,600 m (25,000 ft), since even sudden pressure loss
would not be serious enough to warrant a warning.

3 PRESSURE CONTROLLING DEVICES

3.1 GENERAL
3.1.1 The requirements of Clause 3.6 have, for convenience, been presented in
terms of various types of valves but in each case any device which ensures
compliance with the basic requirement will be termed a valve for the purpose of the
requirement.

3.2 DISCHARGE AND SAFETY VALVES
3.2.1 The requirements call for a safety valve as a safeguard against failure of the
discharge valve. Acceptable means of meeting the requirement are to duplicate the
discharge valve (see also para 3.2.3) or to incorporate the safety valve and the
discharge valve in a single unit (see also para 3.2.4 and 3.2.5).

3.2.2 In any case, the inlet to the discharge and/or safety valves should not be
protected by a fine mesh filter as blockage of such a protective mesh has been the
direct cause of cabin failures.

3.2.3 If any part of the pressure control system should fail, this should cause the
discharge valve(s) actuated by the control system to maintain a safe differential
pressure in the cabin.

3.2.4 Although it is desirable to have the discharge and safety valves completely
separate, consideration of icing prevention, space, etc., may dictate that the valves be
incorporated in a single unit. The flow of warm air through the discharge valve
tends to keep the safety valve free from ice.
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 2
3.2.5 If the discharge and safety valves are mounted together with a common inlet,
one of the following alternative arrangements is recommended:

(i) a coarse mesh gapped debris guard should be provided to protect the
inlet from blockage by loose objects in the cabin; it should, however,
be mounted so that the full flow of air can pass to the valves through
the gap in the event of the guard being blocked, or

(ii) the flow of air to the common inlet should be ducted through more
than one inlet; each inlet in the ducting should be suitably protected
by a coarse mesh debris guard.

3.2.6 The safety valve should open when the cabin pressure exceeds the maximum
working differential pressure and be fully operative as soon as practicable, but in any
case before the pressure has reached 7 kPa above the maximum working differential
pressure (see Clause 3.7).

3.3 INWARDS RELIEF VALVES
3.3.1 In complying with the requirements for the inwards relief valve,
consideration should be given to the conditions arising when owing to enemy action
or to failure of the air supply, the cabin pressure drops to atmospheric while the
aeroplane is at its operational ceiling following which it dives steeply to a low
altitude.

4 DISCHARGE OR LEAKAGE FROM PRESSURE SUPPLY SYSTEMS

4.1 Ductings will contain air at high temperature and at high pressure and hence
adequate precautions should be taken to ensure that the discharge of air from relief valves or
leakage from components cannot damage adjacent structure, equipment or services.

5 COCKPIT HOOD INFLATABLE SEALS

5.1 On aeroplanes fitted with sliding hoods and inflatable seals, the last movement of the
hood in closing should cause the seal to inflate automatically and the first movement of the
control for opening the hood should cause the seal to deflate.

6 TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS

6.1 The maximum local working temperature and pressure should be measured at all
critical points in the prototype system to check that the temperature and pressures used in
the design are not exceeded. The same measured temperatures and pressures should be used
in the fatigue test of Clause 3.7.
SECTION 3

Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 15
PRESSURE CABINS
PREVENTION OF CABIN AIR CONTAMINATION BY FUMES FROM FUEL TANKS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The requirements of Clause 3.6 state that every possible precaution shall be taken to
avoid contamination of the air in the pilot's cabin. Experience has shown that serious
contamination, and a fire hazard, can readily arise when air tapped from the engine
compressor is used both for pressurising the fuel tanks and for air conditioning the cabin.
This Leaflet is concerned with the design precautions needed to prevent contamination in
such a case. It was previously issued as Leaflet 716/3.

2 BASIC PRINCIPLES

2.1 There are two main ways by which the possibility of contamination can be greatly
reduced. They are:

(i) by arranging that the tapping which supplies air for cabin conditioning is
positioned well above, and remote from, that which supplies air to the fuel
tanks, and

(ii) by using a reliable non-return valve in the air pipe from the engine to the fuel
tanks.

2.2 On many aeroplanes where only one of those two alternatives has been employed
cases of cabin air contamination have arisen, either due to the malfunctioning of the non-
return valve or because the two engine tappings, although separate and a few centimetres
apart, were nevertheless so placed that fuel coming back from the tanks into the engine
could enter the air pipe going to the cabin. It is therefore strongly recommended that both
courses of para 2.1(i) and (ii) should be adopted.

3 SEPARATION OF AIR TAPPINGS AT ENGINE

3.1 It is obviously desirable that the two tappings be as far apart as is reasonably
practicable, and that the tapping for the fuel tank air supply should be below that for the
cabin air, thus ensuring that any fuel coming back from the tanks cannot drip into the cabin
air supply tapping. The tapping for the fuel tank air supply, being the one where danger
arises, should be placed so that the flow of air through the engine will tend to carry fumes
away from the cabin air tapping when the engine is running. It will usually be satisfactory
to take any subsidiary air supplies, (e.g., for gun heating, equipment cooling or pilot's
ventilated suit), from the cabin air tapping. In other words, as the danger arises from the
pipe going to the fuel system, that is the one to keep apart from others.

4 NON-RETURN VALVES IN AIR SUPPLY LINE TO FUEL TANKS

4.1 Two points need study here - the kind of valve used and its location.
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Page 2 of 2
4.2 The valve should be one which is absolutely leakproof when in the nominally closed
position and which can be relied upon to function with the necessary reliability in a pipe
passing air, or air and fuel vapour mixed.

Note: Advice on non-return valves already under development for this purpose can
be obtained from the Integrated Project Team Leader.

4.3 As regards location of the non-return valve, the designer will probably wish to make
one valve serve for several fuel tanks, if not for the whole fuel system and will thus wish to
place the valve fairly close to the engine. A further advantage of doing this is that, by
incorporating a testing connection near this non-return valve, the whole of the fuel system
can be subjected to a pressure test as a convenient servicing operation when desired.
However this location of the non-return valve close to the engine may subject it to high
temperatures and the aeroplane designer should establish that the valve he chooses for the
job can withstand the temperatures to which it will be subjected in the particular installation.
Duplication of the non-return valve (i.e., two of them in series) may be justified in some
cases.

5 AEROPLANES WITH AIR SUPPLY FROM SOURCE INDEPENDENT OF ENGINE

5.1 Some aeroplanes do not take the cabin air from an engine tapping, but have a
separate blower or, possibly, bottled air supply. Even in such cases the fuel system needs
careful study as an air/fuel mixture might be a serious fire hazard if it passed into, say, an
electrical generator cooling system.

SECTION 3

Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 16
PRESSURE CABINSTIME NEEDED FOR EMERGENCY DESCENT FOLLOWING LOSS
OF CABIN PRESSURE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.6 requires that the time needed for an emergency descent from the
maximum operating altitude down to a safe altitude shall be established by flight tests so as
to confirm the calculations made in complying with the pressure cabin sealing requirements.
This Leaflet lays down the features which should be considered when making the design
calculations and flight tests. It was previously issued as Leaflet 716/4.

1.2 In addition, the flight tests are required to provide information on the adequacy of
the choice of the pressurised clothing and equipment specified in the Aircrew Equipment
Assembly (AEA).

2 STARTING CONDITIONS

2.1 The time required may vary markedly depending on the initial flight conditions. On
a fighter, for example, the time for descent from a given operating altitude will probably be
quite different for initial conditions of say M =0.7 and M =2.0. It may also vary
appreciably depending on whether the aeroplane is initially in a steep climb, in level flight
or in a dive. Other factors that will affect the time taken are initial engine conditions (e.g.,
throttle position, reheat on or off) and possibly the position of the air brake, nose flaps, etc.
External stores or weapons may affect the time required by imposing speed or handling
limitations. On a bomber, although there is likely to be less variation in initial conditions,
there can be a large variation in operating altitude due to the large change of weight during a
sortie.

2.2 It is impracticable to lay down as a general case, exactly what combination of
conditions will give the longest time required for an emergency descent. The Contractor
should therefore consider what combination of starting conditions that is reasonably likely
to arise in normal operational use of the aeroplane, gives the most adverse case and should
cover this in all estimates and tests made.

3 TEST TECHNIQUE

3.1 It is for the Contractor to propose for each aeroplane the conditions under which
descent measurements should be made. In this connection, it must be remembered that in a
real emergency, the pilot will probably have suffered sudden decompression immediately
prior to descending. Any descent procedure adopted should therefore be straightforward,
simple to do and not necessitate precise control of the aeroplane. For this reason, it is
suggested that the tests should be made at what are likely to be the normal Service limits for
the aeroplane. Obviously on a real emergency descent, it may be expected that normal
Service limits will on occasions be exceeded and this is acceptable provided that a condition
is not reached where the aeroplane would be seriously endangered. However if design
speeds are not to be grossly exceeded, this will probably mean that the recommended
technique for the descent should be the Normal Service limit and that tests should therefore
be made at this condition.
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 2
3.2 On aeroplanes where sudden decompression could be caused by complete loss of a
cockpit canopy or escape hatch, consideration should be given to any lower limitation on
speed that might be necessary as the result of such loss.

3.3 On an emergency descent, an appreciable part of the time may be spent in losing
engine thrust and reaching steady diving conditions with air brakes out. This time should be
included in the design estimates and in the measured times for descent.

3.4 The flight condition after reaching the safe altitude is unimportant provided the
flying limitations are not exceeded and it can be assumed that the aeroplane continues
through the safe altitude in the steady dive condition.

4 DEVELOPMENT STATE OF THE AEROPLANE WHEN TESTS ARE MADE

4.1 It is obviously desirable that the tests should be made as soon as practicable after the
aeroplane has been cleared for high altitude flying, so that the adequacy of the pressure
cabin sealing can be checked and the final decision on the type of pressurised clothing and
breathing equipment to be fitted can be made.

4.2 However, it is also important that the development state of the aeroplane should be
such that the results that will be obtained on a production aeroplane can be reliably
estimated, since too high a complexity of pressure clothing is as undesirable as too low a
standard of safety.

4.3 The following list gives examples of the development stage that should ideally have
been reached before making these tests:

(i) that the likely Service limiting speed and Mach Number are known and that
the aeroplane has been cleared for flight at those speeds with the appropriate
normal accelerations,

(ii) that the airbrake design has been finalised and any limitations on use have
been established,

(iii) that the engine and full system have been cleared for maximum 'g' push
overs, or alternatively if the dive is to be entered by a half roll and pull
through, that the aileron limitations have been established over the speed
range, and

(iv) that the engine idling thrust is representative of production engines and that
any engine handling difficulties have been resolved.

5 REPORTING

5.1 Copies of the flight test report should be sent, through the MOD(PE) Resident
Technical Officer (RTO) to the Integrated Project Team Leader.

5.2 The choice of pressurised clothing and equipment for service use in the aeroplane
will then be reviewed. If any changes are necessary, they will be conveyed to all concerned
by a re-issue of the AEA.
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Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 17
SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY
DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.8 prescribes that the spinning conditions used for strength calculations shall
be those which give the most adverse combination of the yaw, pitch and roll components of
the rotation, with adequate allowance for unsteadiness. This leaflet outlines the means
which may be used to derive the design rate of rotation in the spin. It was previously issued
as Leaflet 207/1.

2 DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

2.1 The design rate of rotation may be derived by one or more of the methods outlined
below.

2.2 Use of semi-empirical formula.

( )
S
V
K
Z
K
X
rads =
18 3
2 2
1
2
.
/ sec

where V is the tail volume coefficient

is the wing mean chord, m

K
Z
and K
X
are the radii of gyration about the Z and X aeroplane
axes of stability, respectively, m.

S
is the steady rate of rotation about a space vertical associated with an aeroplane
incidence of 60 as defined by the inclination of the aeroplane longitudinal axis to the space
vertical with the aeroplane lateral axis horizontal. The equation has been derived from a
consideration of the pitching moment equation in the steady spin. The value of the constant
was derived by consideration of measured rates of rotation on a series of models with a
standard yawing moment applied. Good agreement was obtained between the measured
model rates of rotation and the prediction of the formula and there was fairly good
agreement with the average rates of rotation measured full scale during incipient spinning
tests. The formula applies only to aeroplanes of conventional layout and moderate aspect
ratio. It is suggested that a factor of at least 1.15 be applied to
S
to allow for unsteadiness
during spin.

2.3 MODEL TESTS
2.3.1. Various model test techniques are available (see for example AGARD CP 199 Paper
13). Model scaling is extremely important and it is especially necessary for the model
Reynolds number to be as representative of full scale as possible. Where the steady rate of
rotation has been evaluated from model tests it is necessary to compare it with that given by
the formula of para 2.2 above and if less the procedure to be adopted shall be discussed with
the Integrated Project Team Leader. The factor of 1.15 should be applied to the agreed
steady rate of rotation to cover unsteadiness.
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 2
2.3.2 Model test techniques which will be acceptable for providing evidence of
spin characteristics include:-

(i) Wind tunnel free-flight techniques, which can provide valuable
information on spin entry.

(ii) Vertical wind tunnel tests which can be used to obtain data on the
steady developed spin and recovery, but usually require careful
interpretation because of the disparity in the Reynolds number.

(iii) Free-flight tests with model dropped from a helicopter, with either
pre-programmed control settings or radio control.

(iv) Wind tunnel rotary balance tests, which may be used to obtain the
basic aerodynamic characteristics of the aeroplane whilst in the
spinning mode and hence the rates of rotation by solving the
equations of motion of the aeroplane (see for example AIAA Paper
80-1564).

2.4 SIMULATOR STUDIES
2.4.1 Simulator studies demand the availability of a valid mathematical model of
the aeroplane and for this reason the application to the spin regime may be limited.
However, the technique has value in investigating the conditions from which a spin
may develop.

3 ROLL DURING RECOVERY

3.1 In the absence of other information a rate of rotation of 5rad/sec about the
longitudinal axis, assumed to be vertical, should be used to cover the condition of rolling
during recovery from a spin or post stall gyration.

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Page 1 of 8
LEAFLET 18
SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SPIN RESISTANCE AND SPIN RECOVERY

1 GENERAL

1.1 In the case of training aeroplanes in Class I and Class IV (see Clause 2.1) it is
necessary to establish the spinning and spin recovery characteristics of the aeroplane (see
Clause 2.24 and Section 2 Leaflet 53). This leaflet was previously issued as Leaflet 207/2.

1.2 The Aeroplane Specification may state that aeroplanes in other categories, especially
highly manoeuvrable combat types in Class IV, have to be designed to meet spin conditions,
although they should also be resistant to departure from controlled flight and to post stall
gyrations and spins in accordance with Clause 2.24. However, if an automatic spin
prevention device with a sufficiently low probability of failure is used Clause 3.8 states that
the spinning requirements to be applied must be agreed with the Integrated Project Team
Leader. If such a device is part of an automatic flight control system reference should be
made to Clause 3.9.

2 SPIN RESISTANCE
(see for example AGARD CP-199 Paper 5, and CP-235 Paper 19).

2.1 The aim of spin resistance is to incorporate characteristics in the aeroplane which
result in resistance to departure into spin type motions subsequent to a stall.

2.2 Design criteria suitable for use during the design stage have been developed, but
must be substantiated by subsequent model and full scale testing as prescribed by Chapter
207 para 3. The full attainable incidence range should be investigated.

(i) Directional Departure Parameter -
( )
N
v
DYN

The parameter is defined as:-

N
v N
v
I
z
I
x
L
v
DYN
=
cos sin

This is derived from a consideration of the lateral directional equation of motion of the
aeroplane. It is a measure of the stability of the aeroplane about the flight path and predicts
departure from longitudinal control inputs. Essentially
( )
N
v
DYN
should be greater than
zero in all conditions to avoid the possibility of departure in yaw.

(ii) Lateral Control Departure Parameter - LCDP.

Various versions of this criteria have been proposed. They have been developed from a
consideration of the simplified rolling and yawing moment equations assuming the
aeroplane to be laterally and directionally trimmed. Essentially the criterion predicts the
point where the rolling moment due to sideslip, resulting from adverse yaw, overcomes the
rolling effect of the ailerons and, where appropriate, rudder.

SECTION 3

Page 2 of 8
LCDP = N
v
- L
v
N KN
L KL

+
+

where K =
and represents the aileron/rudder interconnect

Again LCDP should be positive to avoid departure.

(ii) Combined yaw and roll criterion.

Criteria have been proposed which combine both
and LCDP.
(
N
v
DYN
)

One such is the (+) axis stability indicator

>
<

and L
v
o

where -
tan
1
N
v
L
v
I
x
I
z

=

+
+

tan
1
N KN
L KL
I
x
I
z

which implies that
(
has to be positive and LCDP
)
N
v
DYN
will be zero for
-
=

(iv) The damping of the lateral oscillation should be positive.

(v) Some evidence suggests that the value of the pitching moment due
to sideslip C
m v
should be zero or

slightly nose down to avoid undesirable directional-lateral coupling effects.
A method of predicting couple pitch-yaw departure has been suggested
which is based on analysis of the non-linear static equation of the aeroplane
in angle of attack and sideslip. (see AGARD CP235 Paper 29). However,
further substantiation of this technique is required and it is not recommended.

3 SPIN RECOVERY

3.1 The design of an aeroplane for spin recovery is complicated by the number of design
parameters which influence the problem. The most important of these are:-

(i) The relative moments of inertia of the aeroplane about its three reference
axes in all appropriate configurations including with stores.

(ii) The wing geometry, particularly on the outer parts of the mainplane.
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 8

(iii) The fuselage shape, especially in cross section and nose shape.

(iv) The relative position of the horizontal and vertical stabilising surfaces,
including the degree to which the fin and rudder are shielded by the tailplane
in spin attitudes.

(v) The effectiveness of the motivators and their cross axis effects.

(vi) Store configuration, especially when asymmetric.

3.2 A relatively simple criterion known as the Tail Damping Power Factor (TDPF) was
used for many years. This basically relates the product of a so called tail damping ratio and
the 'unshielded' rudder volume coefficient to the difference between the moments of inertia
in roll and yaw. More recent work has shown clearly that it is not a satisfactory criterion as
it does not describe either a necessary or sufficient characteristic for satisfactory spin
recovery. This is not surprising in view of the limited parameters covered.

3.3 A more comprehensive criterion is that given in ARC CP No. 195. This method
predicts an overall unbalanced (anti-spin) rolling moment coefficient (URMC) and relates it
to the moment of inertia parameter

( )
1I
y
I
x

The unbalanced rolling moment coefficient is the sum of three separate quantities:-

(i) that due to the body damping coefficient, L
B
, which makes allowance
for body shape - Fig 1a. The effect depends upon the width of the
strakes, if present, which are horizontal extensions to the fuselage
forward and in the plane of the tailplane.

(ii) that due to the unshielded rudder volume coefficient, L
RV
Fig 1b.
The elevator position used should be that which results in the
minimum unshielded rudder area.

(iii) that due to the mainplane, L
M
, Fig 2.

The boundaries for satisfactory spin recovery are shown in Fig 3. The technique has shown
good correlation with flight tests for aeroplanes of conventional layout with wings of
moderate aspect ratio. The parameter
( )
1I
y
I
x

represents a simplification which effectively assumes that the second moment of mass in the
z direction is negligible. This may introduce errors when I
x
is approximately equal to I
y
.
However, the method considers only fin/rudder recovery effect and is thus limited to
aeroplanes of conventional layout. AGARD CP 199 Paper 7, Fig 10 suggests a criterion for
roll control which may be dominant on slender configurations.

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Page 4 of 8

4 NOTATION

AR Wing aspect ratio

b Wing span

bl ( ) I
z
I
x
S
b
/ [
( )
,]
2

C
m v
pitching moment derivative due to sideslip

h local height of body (Fig 1a)

I
x
,I
y
,I
z
moments of inertia about body axes in roll, pitch and yaw respectively

K ratio of rudder deflection to aileron deflection

L
B
rolling moment coefficient due to body damping - Fig 1a

L
M
rolling moment coefficient due to wing effect - Fig 2

L
RV
rolling moment coefficient due to unshielded rudder volume
coefficient. Fig lb

L
v
dihedral effect derivatives - body axes

L aileron rolling moment derivative

L rudder rolling moment derivative

N
v
directional stability derivative - body axes

N
v
DYN
directional departure parameter

N aileron yawing moment derivative

N rudder yawing moment derivative

S Wing area

t/c wing thickness chord ratio (Fig 2)

V true rate of descent in spin

angle of attack

tan
1
N
v
L
v
I
x
I
z

+
+
tan
1
N KN
L KL
I
x
I
z

weighting factor in body damping coefficient (Fig 1a)
SECTION 3

Page 5 of 8

13
1
2
1
2
.
ARb
b
V
=

air density
rate of rotation about spin axis (rad/sec)
CDP lateral control departure parameter
DPF tail damping power factor
RMC unshielded rudder moment coefficient

L

T

U
SECTION 3

Page 6 of 8

BODY CROSS-SECTION at x -45
CIRCULAR
RECTANGULAR
ELLIPTICAL
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM +STRAKES
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP +STRAKES
(FREE
FIN (UNDER TAILPLANE
(ABOVE TAILPLANE
(FREE)
RUDDER (UNDER TAILPLANE
(IN TAILPLANE WAKE
+0.6
+1.5
+2.1
+1.1
+1.7*
+2.5
+3.5*
+1.5
+3.0
- 0.4
+1.5
+2.0
- 0.25

* Depends on the
width of strake.
The values quoted
are for a width
of 0.014 l
were l distance from
the c.g. to the
rudder post
FI
G 1 BODY DAMPING & UNSHIELDED RUDDER VOLUME COEFFICIENTS
SECTION 3

Page 7 of 8

FIG 2 AN ESTIMATION OF THE WING ROLLING MOMENT COEFFICIENTS
(WIND AXES) IN THE SPIN

SECTION 3

Page 8 of 8

FIG 3 THE CRITERION FOR THE PREDICTION OF THE RECOVERY
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPINNING AEROPLANES

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Page 1 of 2
LEAFLET 19
CONTROL SYSTEMSPOWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Basic safety requirements for powered flying controls are specified in Clause 4.10.
This Leaflet deals with the strength of the powered flying control circuit, mounting the
control unit into the aeroplane and the control characteristics when the controls are operated
in conjunction with an automatic stabilisation device. It was previously issued as Leaflet
206/1.

2 CONTROL CIRCUIT STRENGTH

2.1 The design load for a mechanical input circuit of a powered flying control system is
that applied by the pilot in the presence of a feed-back or artificial feel mechanism: the
powered control unit valve(s) input may, therefore, be loaded by the pilot's maximum effort,
less whatever is absorbed by the feel mechanism. Hence there is no significant difference
between a mechanical input circuit of a powered control and a manual control circuit. This
part of the circuit should meet the strength requirements of Clause 3.8 which call for an
ultimate factor of at least 1.5 on the maximum effort which a pilot is capable of applying,
with a jam of the powered control unit input. The pilot's nominal effort, however, is only a
small fraction of his attainable maximum and so this part of the circuit will usually meet the
fatigue strength requirements of Clause 3.12 (see para 2.4 below), when designed to the
strength requirements of Clause 3.8. Reaction of the maximum effort in both directions
should be assumed at all possible parts of the circuit including an extreme position at the
power unit. As this loading implies a failure of the powered control unit or its input valve to
respond to normal effort, its application must be considered in both directions.

2.2 Account should be taken of loads that may be induced in the parked condition when
surfaces may deflect downwards under weight or upwards and downwards due to wind
loads. Circuit loads will depend on the location of input circuit stops, possibly artificial
feel forces, and damping devices if fitted.

2.3 The design load for the output circuit should be the maximum load which the power
unit is capable of applying increased by the pilot's effort through the feed-back or artificial
feel mechanism where this is possible. The contribution of the powered control unit is,
however, much larger than that due to the pilot and in general the working load in this
circuit is much closer to the maximum attainable load than is the case in the input circuit.
Consideration should also be given to conditions arising in the circuit during and after
change-over to any emergency system of control. High transient peak loads may occur
when the system is brought to rest rapidly e.g., by sudden closure of a valve after movement
at maximum velocity, owing to the kinetic energy to be dissipated in a small displacement.
It is important therefore in hydraulic systems to stress for the loads then arising as these may
be greater than those due to the maximum working pressure.
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Page 2 of 2
Care should also be taken to avoid stress concentrations; testing to an approval schedule will
be necessary. The maximum load may be greater than that needed for aeroplane control: for
instance, each part of a duplicated power system may be capable of three quarters of all of
the necessary force.

2.4 The fatigue strength of mechanical powered flying control circuits should be
established in accordance with the principle outlined in Clause 3.12. (Account should be
taken of the loading actions referred to above).

3 POWERED FLYING CONTROLS IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUTOMATIC
FLIGHT CONTROL OR WITH AN AUTOMATIC STABILISATION DEVICE

3.1 When the powered flying controls are to be operated by an automatic flight control
or in conjunction with an auto-stabiliser the control characteristics under powered flying
controls should be satisfactory both with and without the automatic flight control and/or the
auto-stabiliser in operation (see Clause 4.10).

SECTION 3

Page 1 of 3
LEAFLET 20
CONTROL SYSTEMS
TESTING OF POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, information and explanation are given regarding the tests of powered
flying controls called for in Clause 3.9. The leaflet was previously issued as Leaflet 206/2.

1.2 The tests are divided into two stages:

(i) the powered control unit by itself - part of the Type Approval of the Unit, and

(ii) the powered control installation for a particular aeroplane covering the
complete system from pilot's input to the control surface.

2 GROUND TEST RIGS

2.1 The test rig for the powered control unit should be capable of applying loads to the
output member of the unit varying at the required relationship to the displacement and
should operate the input member through the required duty cycle at any required load,
speed, frequency, and for any desired endurance period. Means should be provided for
measuring all characteristics of the control such as loadings, friction, rates of operation,
elasticity, mass, inertia, resonance frequencies, stability, and temperatures and pressures,
where applicable, at critical points in the control. The need to apply assisting loading and
not merely resistive, when this may occur naturally in flight, should not be overlooked. A
chamber should be available for checking the operation of the unit at high and low
temperatures as required by Clause 7.1

2.2 In the case of the complete control system the test rig should represent, as closely as
possible, the conditions of the aeroplane in which the powered control is to be flight tested.
All loads should be applied to the actual control surface or its test rig equivalent and
operation of the input member should be through the pilot's input. For check testing of the
complete system when installed in the aeroplane, some form of control surface loading rig
should be available.

3 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL UNIT

3.1 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST
3.1.1 During the development stages of a new design of control unit some testing
of the prototype unit will be necessary before the unit reaches the test stage of para
3.2. In order to ensure a reasonable standard of safety in flight, before any flight
testing is done the prototype control unit should be submitted to a Flight Clearance
Test in a ground rig as required by Clause 3.8. This test may be either separate from,
or included in, the Flight Clearance Test of the installation in which the unit is to be
flight tested, described in para 4.1 below. An endurance test, followed by an
inspection and performance check, should be carried out before flight.

3.2 THE CONTROL UNIT - UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST
3.2.1 The development of a new design of control unit to the stage when it is ready
for production may involve much rig and flight testing. Before production is started,
however, approval of the type should be obtained and for this purpose a
SECTION 3

Page 2 of 3
prototype/typical production unit should be subjected to the Unit Design Clearance
Test called for in Clause 3.8. This should be an extended test covering all aspects of
performance, endurance, stability and functioning of safety devices under all
reasonably foreseeable types of simulated failures. During the test the unit should
demonstrate that it gives its declared performance, that it functions within its
declared temperature conditions and also when subjected to negative 'g' and
sustained inverted flight.

3.2.2 For endurance testing, the input member should be operated through a 'duty
cycle' repeating it continuously for an adequate total running time. The composition
of this duty cycle should be decided on before the start of the test to suit the
particular control and the type of aeroplane for which the control is intended, in
accordance with Leaflet 21.

3.2.3 The aim of the complete test should be to establish that the performance of
the unit is maintained over the specified flying hours between scheduled removals.
Should unit design clearance - testing be included in Installation Design Clearance
testing only sufficient testing to give confidence for development flying need be
done.

3.2.4 No modifications or major adjustments should be made during the test and on
completion there should be a complete strip and examination of the unit. The unit
will not be deemed to have passed the test unless the strip and examination is
satisfactory, the standard to be that its condition is such that the unit would still be
satisfactory for safe use in the aeroplane.

3.2.5 If it is necessary to modify an approved control unit to suit a particular
aeroplane type, a full test of the modified version is unlikely to be necessary but a
test to cover the revised design requirements and modifications to the unit should be
made.

4 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION

4.1 THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION - FLIGHT CLEARANCE
4.1.1 Before any powered control unit is flight tested either in an established type
of aeroplane or in a new prototype, the complete powered control system, including
control runs and/or circuitry and control surface actuators is required by Clause 3.8
to undergo a Flight Clearance Test, partly in a ground test rig and partly when
installed in the aeroplane in which flight tests are to be made.

4.1.2 The rig test should be carried out on a prototype of the complete system to a
test schedule which should be representative of the test flying intended. The test
schedule should call for an endurance period but this need not be extensive if the
unit is already cleared for flight since the aeroplane controls themselves do not
usually require long endurance testing. If the control unit is not already cleared for
flight by either of the tests at paras 3.1 or 3.2 adequate endurance testing should be
included in the schedule. All other characteristics of the system such as
performance, stability, resonance and functioning of safety devices under all
required conditions should be thoroughly investigated. (For resonance testing, see
Clause 4.8 and Section 4 Leaflet 30).

4.1.3 Tests should be made to demonstrate that the safety requirements of Clause
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Page 3 of 3
4.10 are met and that the operation or malfunctioning of other powered systems in
the aeroplane has no adverse effects on the powered control system under both
normal and emergency conditions.

4.1.4 The aeroplane ground test may be made on the actual installation which is to
be flight tested. This installation should be identical with that tested in the rig. If
both rig and aeroplane ground tests are satisfactory and meet the standards declared
in the pre-test declarations, flight testing may proceed.

4.1.5 It is possible that the rig test may reveal that flying time should be restricted
until further ground tests have proved the reliability of the system.

4.2 INSTALLATION - DESIGN CLEARANCE
4.2.1 Further development of the system involving modifications may prove
necessary as a result of ground and flight tests, and when the complete control
system has reached the stage when it is considered satisfactory for production it
should be submitted to its Final Installation Design Clearance Test as required by
Clause 3.8. This test should be carried out on the final version of the prototype
installation. It should be similar to the Flight Clearance Test except that the
endurance test should be sufficient to establish the satisfactory continued functioning
of all working parts not already tested and approved. It should be followed by a strip
and examination of all working parts, unless agreed by the Integrated Project Team
Leader that an extended endurance test be carried out to establish a satisfactory.
Functioning life without strip examination. This should be considered if it is
required to leave the test rig in a life consumed condition for further reliability or life
extension testing.

4.2.2 In cases where the control unit employed in the installation has not already
been tested and approved separately, the Installation Design Clearance Test may be
extended to cover the Control Unit Design Clearance Test of para 3.2.

SECTION 3

Page 1 of 7
LEAFLET 21
CONTROL SYSTEMS
TEST SCHEDULES FOR POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, specimen test schedules for the testing of powered flying controls, as
called for in Clause 3.8 and as described in Leaflet 20, are given in detail. These schedules
are intended to show the general form that the testing procedure should take and should be
modified where necessary to suit any particular design of control. This leaflet was
previously issued as Leaflet 206/3.

2 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, para 3.1)

2.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS
2.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the test:

(i) the composition of the "duty cycle" appropriate to each portion of the
test,

(ii) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the corresponding
maximum loads at the control unit output member, and the maximum
rate at zero load,

(iii) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations where applicable.

2.2 ENDURANCE TEST
2.2.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to
continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the appropriate
duty cycle for a total running time of 25 hours.

2.2.2 Every 5 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member (full
cycle comprises movement from the neutral to one extreme position, return through
neutral to opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:

(i) 10 full cycles at the declared maximum rate and corresponding
maximum load,

(ii) 10 full cycles at intermediate load and rate,

(iii) 10 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding
maximum rate, and
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Page 2 of 7
(iv) operate safety device and allow 10 full cycles in the emergency
condition. Where a means of change-over from emergency control
back to normal is provided, check that this operates satisfactorily.

Note: In special cases where the change-over from the duty cycle to the full
cycle involves undue time and labour, the total of 200 full cycles may
all be carried out at the end of the endurance test.

2.2.3 The temperature rise at critical points in the control unit, (e.g., electric motor
cooling air, fluid in hydraulic pumps, motors and jacks, etc.), should be recorded
during the test.

2.2.4 At some suitable time during the test, check under low temperature
conditions sufficient to clear the unit for the experimental flying intended and under
negative 'g' conditions sufficient to clear the unit for operation under negative 'g' or
inverted flight as applicable.

2.3 STRIP EXAMINATION
2.3.1 Strip and examine working parts.

Note: Performance testing is included in the Flight Clearance Test of the
installation at para 4.

3 CONTROL UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20 para 3-2)

3.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS
decided before commencement of the test:

(i) the composition of the "duty cycle" appropriate to each portion of the
test,

maximum loads at the control unit output member, and the maximum
rate at zero load,

(iii) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations where applicable.

3.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST
3.2.1 This test, comprising about 20 cycles at varying loads and rates, should
precede all performance and endurance testing. Checks on the operation of the
safety device should be made by simulating a failure in various positions of the
control output member allowing a number of cycles in the emergency condition in
each case. This should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure including
runaway, freeing or seizure of the control. Where a means of change-over from
emergency control back to normal is provided, this should be checked in each case.
The time to change over to the emergency condition, and back again, when
appropriate, should be measured in each case.

3.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK
3.3.1 This test should precede the endurance test in order to establish the
performance of the unit in the new condition. It should include the following:

(i) sensitivity tests, including backlash and overshoot measurements,

(ii) measurement of input friction,
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Page 3 of 7

(iii) measurement of maximum load developed by the output member,

(iv) measurement of maximum rate of operation at various loads from
zero to maximum, applied to the output member, and

(v) frequency response tests to establish stability criteria.

3.3.2 The above should be repeated over a range of power supply conditions from
the minimum emergency conditions to the maximum.

3.4 ENDURANCE TEST
3.4.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to
continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the appropriate
endurance duty cycle, for a total running time of approximately 200 hours (see
Leaflet 20 para 3.2.4).

3.4.2 Every 10 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member (full
cycle comprises movement from neutral to one extreme position, return through
neutral to the opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:

(i) 10 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding maximum
load,

(ii) 10 full cycles at intermediate load and rate,

maximum rate, and

(iv) operate safety device as at para 3.2 allowing 10 cycles in the
emergency condition.

Note: In special cases where the change-over from the duty cycle to the full
cycle involves undue time and labour, the 10 hour interval between
the sets of full cycles may be increased to not more than 50 hours
with the number of cycles at each interval adjusted to make the same
total of 800.

3.4.3 The running times should be arranged to include at least one continuous
endurance period equivalent to the endurance of the particular aeroplane for which
the unit is designed, or in the case of a unit not associated with a particular
aeroplane, a period of twelve hours.

3.4.4 The temperature rise at the critical points in the control unit, (e.g., electric
motor cooling air, fluid in hydraulic jacks, etc.), should be recorded during the test.
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3.4.5 At some suitable time during the test, check under the temperature conditions
of Clause 7.1, as appropriate to the particular case under consideration. Record time
taken to reach satisfactory functioning condition from starting. Check safety device.

3.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK
3.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check at para 3.3 and note changes.

3.6.1 Strip and examine working parts.

4 INSTALLATION FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, para 4.1)

4.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION
decided before commencement of the tests:

(i) the composition of the duty cycle appropriate to each portion of the
test,

maximum loads at the control surface, and the maximum rate at zero
load,

(iii) the maximum loads at the control surface and the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations, where applicable.

4.2.1 The complete powered control system should be installed in the ground test
rig under conditions similar to the installation in the test aeroplane. About 20 duty
cycles at varying loads and rates should be made. Checks on the operation of the
safety device should be made by simulating a failure in various positions of the
control surface allowing a number of cycles in the emergency condition of each case.
This should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure including runaway,
freeing or seizure of the control. Where a means of change-over from emergency
control back to normal is provided, this should be checked in each case. The time to
change over to the emergency condition and back again, when appropriate, should be
measured in each case.

4.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK
4.3.1 This test should be made with the complete control system in the test rig and
should precede the endurance test in order to establish the performance of the system
in the new condition. It should include:

(i) sensitivity tests, including backlash and overshoot measurements,

(ii) measurement of input friction,
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(iii) measurement of maximum torque developed at control surface,

(iv) measurement of maximum rate of operation at various loads from
zero to maximum, applied to the control surface, and

(v) resonance tests (see Leaflet 500/8) applied to the test rig.

4.3.2 The above should be repeated over a range of power supply conditions from
the minimum emergency conditions to the maximum, including that appropriate to
the all engine failure case. The tests using the emergency power supply appropriate
to the all engine failure case should check that the performance is adequate and that
the system will function for a sufficient length of time to meet the requirements of
Clause 1.1 appropriate to the particular aeroplane concerned.

4.3.3 Tests should be made to demonstrate that the safety requirements are met and
that operation of all other powered systems supplied from the same power source,
does not materially affect the performance of the powered control.

4.4 ENDURANCE TEST
4.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with the power supply, if engine driven, at
cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the declared endurance duty
cycle for a total running time of:

(i) 5 hours, if the control unit is already cleared for flight, or

(ii) 25 hours with the full cycles of para 2.2 if the control unit is not
already cleared for flight.

4.4.2 Carry out 600 full cycles of the pilot's control (full cycle defined at para
3.4.2) as follows:

(i) 200 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding
maximum load,

(ii) 200 full cycles at intermediate loads and rates, and

maximum rate.

4.4.3 After every 50 cycles and at same load and speed, operate safety device as in
para 4.2.1 and allow five cycles in the emergency conditions in each case.

4.4.4 Temperature and pressure measurement should be taken throughout as
applicable.

4.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK IN TEST RIG
4.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check at para 4.3 and note changes.
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4.6.1 Strip and examine all parts not already tested as part of the control unit.

4.7 AEROPLANE GROUND TEST
4.7.1 Install a complete powered control system identical to that tested as above, in
the test aeroplane, and carry out the performance tests of para 4.3 as far as
practicable on the ground using a control surface loading device.

4.7.2 Carry out the resonance tests (see Section 4 Leaflet 30).

5 INSTALLATION DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, para 4.2)

5.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION
5.1.1 As in Flight Clearance Test at para 4.1.


5.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE TEST

5.4 ENDURANCE TEST
5.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with power supply, if engine driven, at
cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the declared endurance duty
cycle for a total running time of:

(i) 50 hours if the control unit employed is a type tested and approved
unit, or

(ii) 200 hours if the control unit employed is not a type tested and
approved unit.

5.4.2 Every 10 hours carry out full cycles (full cycle defined at para 3.4.2) making
a total of 3000 cycles, as follows:

(i) in a 50 hour test:

(a) 200 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding
maximum load,

(b) 200 full cycles at intermediate loads and rates, and

(c) 200 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding
maximum rate, and

(ii) in a 200 hour test, the number of full cycles at (a), (b) and (c) above
should be reduced to 50 so that the same total of 3000 cycles is
achieved in the complete test. Alternatively, the time interval
between the sets of full cycles may be increased from 10 to a
maximum of 50 hours with the number of full cycles in each set
adjusted accordingly.

5.4.3 After every 50 full cycles and at same load and rate, operate safety device as
at para 4.2 and allow five cycles in the emergency condition in each case. When a
means of change-over from emergency control back to normal is provided, this
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should be operated in each case.

5.4.4 Temperature and pressure measurements should be taken throughout as
applicable.

5.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK
5.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check and note changes.

5.6.1 Strip and examine all working parts.

5.7 AEROPLANE GROUND TEST
5.7.1 Install the same prototype powered control system, or an identical one, in
either a prototype or a production version of the aeroplane for which the system is
intended, and carry out the performance tests of para 4.3 up to about 30% maximum
load, using a control surface loading device, and check results with the rig test
results.
5.7.2 Carry out resonance tests (see Section 4 Leaflet 30).

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LEAFLET 22
CONTROL SYSTEMS
USE OF MASS-SPRING UNITS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to draw attention to certain airworthiness aspects
which should be considered when bob-weights or similar mass elements are incorporated in
conjunction with springs in flying control systems. This information was previously issued
as Leaflet 206/4.

1.2 Cases have occurred in the past where such devices have been introduced into flying
control circuits in order to improve the stick force/g characteristics or to achieve some
measure of g restriction. A device of this type is sensitive to the normal acceleration, the
angular acceleration in pitch, the longitudinal acceleration or any other response quantity of
the disturbed longitudinal motion of the aeroplane, or to a combination of such quantities; in
turn it moves the pitch control surface and so controls the normal acceleration of the
aeroplane.

1.3 It may sometimes happen that an element such as an unbalanced link may be
unintentionally included in a control system in such a way as to act as a bob-weight and so
introduce a coupling between pitching of the aeroplane and motion of the control circuit.
Such a case should be treated as if the mass-spring unit had been deliberately included, and
the following recommendations should be taken as applicable.

2 RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 In all cases where a mass spring system of the general type described in para 1.2 is to
be installed, a full analytical investigation should be made of the stability of the aeroplane-
control system combination.

2.2 For such investigations the following points should be borne in mind:

(i) in cases where power units are incorporated in pitch control circuits, the
dynamic properties of these units (i.e., their transfer functions and time
constants) should be taken into account,

(ii) dry friction in the elevator control circuit may adversely affect the stability of
the g-restrictor-aeroplane combination, and should therefore be also taken
into account,

(iii) neither the numerical value of the ratio of the natural frequency of the g-
restrictor unit to that of the short period mode of the aeroplane, nor the
stability characteristics of the g-restrictor and the aeroplane taken separately
give any prior indication as to the behaviour of the combined system, and

(iv) the forward speed may be an important parameter, and its whole practical
range should be covered in the analytical investigation.
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2.3 The above recommendations apply also to any devices having dynamic properties
similar to those of the g-restrictors considered, and in particular to devices intended to
improve stick force/g characteristics.

2.4 Some g-restrictors of the general type considered, though efficient and otherwise
satisfactory, may induce excessive control surface loads. The magnitude of these loads
should be assessed by appropriate response calculations embracing both the initiation of an
unduly severe manoeuvre and the checking movement of the control surface as induced by
the g-restrictor. For this part of the investigation R.A.E. Technical Note No. SME 349 may
be of assistance.

2.5 The effect of accelerations on unbalanced control circuits controlling other axes
should also be considered.

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LEAFLET 23
CONTROL SYSTEMS
FATIGUE TESTING OF HYDRAULIC POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet contains details of the fatigue testing of hydraulic powered flying
controls required by Clause 3.8. The tests aim to ensure that hydraulic powered flying
controls have adequate fatigue life under conditions of varying pressure stress to which they
will be subjected in service. Included in the tests are screw jacks driven by hydraulic
motors and, where applicable, automatic flight control system actuators and artificial feel
simulators.


2 STANDARD DUTY CYCLE FOR CONTROL SURFACES

2.1 The duty cycle for the control surfaces should be specified by the airframe designer
who should state clearly whether the additional factor of Leaflet 34 Para. 6 has been taken
into account. In the absence of such a specification the standard duty cycle in Table 1
should be used, in which case the factor specified in Leaflet 34 Para. 6 is not required. Tests
should then be applied in accordance with paras 3 and 4 below.

2.2 Due to the wide variation between the performance characteristics of various types
of hydraulic powered flying control, standardisation of test conditions is based on flight duty
cycles as applied to the control surfaces rather than the fluid pressures in the hydraulic
powered control circuits. In the case of small amplitude high frequency control surface
movements, the internal jack pressures in a throttled valve servo will be entirely different
from the pressures in a variable delivery servo pump. Similarly, for identical output
conditions, the internal pressure will depend upon the precise nature of valve overlaps or
underlaps, and in duplicated jacks, upon the inter-jack mechanical stiffness.

2.3 In addition to the standard duty cycle, which is based on aerodynamic hinge
moment, fatigue loading on a powered control component may arise from other sources, and
in many cases these may constitute the heaviest fatigue loading. These sources include
ground testing cases, operation of other surfaces both on the ground and in flight, pump
ripple and parking locks. The conditions controlling the above factors must be given full
consideration in addition to the effects of the standard duty cycles.

3 CONVERSION OF DUTY CYCLE INTO TEST PRESSURE

3.1 Although the external loads applied to hydraulic powered flying control jacks will
be broadly similar to those applied to the local aeroplane structure, the internal jack
pressures will be determined by other considerations. In each case, therefore, it will be
necessary to determine experimentally the internal pressure fluctuations at critical points
throughout the powered flying control system resulting from the duty cycles. The test
should be carried out on a test rig representing as closely as possible the aeroplane
installation and special instrumentation may be necessary at this stage to ensure that local
peak pressures are recorded.
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3.2 Factors influencing the pressure variations are given below, but it is emphasised that
this list does not necessarily include all the parameters significant to the performance of a
powered flying control:

(i) inertia of the system,

(ii) stiffness of the system,

(iii) aerodynamic damping,

(iv) control valve damping characteristics,

(v) phasing of control valve ports (the smallest variation in port position can
cause large pressure differences particularly in duplicated jacks, thus the
magnitude of pressures applied in fatigue testing should be adjusted to
include the most adverse conditions),

(vi) peak pressures imposed on the system by resonant tendencies at a control
surface, and

(vii) actual control velocities and frequencies experienced in flight.

4 METHOD OF TEST

4.1 The tests should be carried out under any one or a combination of the following
conditions, or by any other approved method:

(i) By simple pressure pulse applications to units with output members locked or
unlocked according to whether or not the load is transferred through these
members during the particular duty cycle case. The jacks should be
stationary, externally restrained and the output member locked in the position
given in Table 1, and the relevant fluid pressures applied to the various
pressure chambers. This method offers the advantages of allowing greater
acceleration of the test cycle and reduction of test time (this can be lengthy
when, for instance, clearance for 1000 hours is being sought and a scatter
factor of 5 is to be applied).

(ii) By stroking the units in the normal manner (i.e., by an extension of the
normal endurance tests called for in Leaflet 20) with the jacks moving
against externally applied loads. In this condition the normal supply pressure
should be provided at the powered control inlet and the internal jack pressure
win be developed automatically. When using this method, any reduction in
the test time by acceleration of the flight duty cycle is liable to modify the
internal jack pressures and due allowance should be made for this.

(iii) With the jack and fittings uncoupled, in particular cases where the simulated
internal pressure conditions could impose loads on the external attachments
of the jacks in excess of those experienced in flight. In this condition,
pressures on opposite sides of the jack piston should be suitably balanced.

5 TEST FACTORS

5.1 Fatigue test factors should be derived in accordance with Chapter 3.12.

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TABLE 1

STANDARD FLIGHT DUTY CYCLE

(i) All aeroplanes other than transports:

Loading condition
Hinge Moment
(% of maximum)
Displacement
(% of maximum)
Number of
cycles per
hour

Extreme
Manoeuvre

100
100 approx.
(J ust clear of
jack stops)

20

Normal
Manoeuvre

30

30

200
Continuous
residual
displacement
(straight
and level)

10

2
(see Note)

3600
(see para
3.2(vi))

(ii) Transport aeroplanes:

Loading condition
Hinge Moment
(% of maximum)
Displacement
(% of maximum)
Number of
cycles per
hour

Extreme
Manoeuvre

100
100 approx.
(J ust clear of
jack stops)

10

Straight and
Level

10
2
(see Note)
1800
(see para
3.2(vi))

Note: For control systems without autostabilisation the jack stroke may be insignificant in
the standard duty cycle at 10% hinge moment.

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LEAFLET 24
CONTROL SYSTEMS
DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The leaflet presents supplementary information with respect to the design of mechanical
components in control systems. The aim is to amplify the requirements of Clause 3.8 for particular
detail design considerations. In many cases the adoption of the recommendations of this leaflet will
be found to be necessary to meet the specified requirements. This information was previously
issued as Leaflet 206/6.

2 DETAIL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 GENERAL
2.1.1 Chapter 3.9 requires that a control system shall be designed to tolerate the possibility of
jamming, chafing and interference from personnel, cargo, loose objects and freezing of moisture.
These overall considerations should be applied to each detail component.

2.2 PREVENTION OF J AMMING; CLEARANCES (see also Clause 1.1)
2.2.1 Each control run should be arranged with adequate local clearances to minimise the
possibility of jamming by loose objects. Control runs should not be too close to horizontal surfaces,
or have levers designed to operate in local pockets. Multiple levers on common spindles should not
have lightening holes, or inward facing flanges. Chains with sprockets having a horizontal pivot
are undesirable and pulley guards should be sufficiently close to prevent the ingress of small parts.

2.2.2 As a guide the minimum clearances should be:

(i) 3 mm between elements which move in relation to one another but
which are guided or connected to the same component.

(ii) 6 mm between elements which move in relation to one another and
which are guided or connected to separate components.

(iii) 12 mm between elements and aeroplane structure or equipment to
which they are not attached, unless structural flexibility requires a
greater clearance to be provided.

2.3 J OINTS
2.3.1 All adjoining parts should be secured in a manner that will prevent loosening when
subjected to internal, external and vibration loads. All pins, etc., subjected to load or motion should
be positively secured and locked using slotted nuts and split pins together with additional means of
retention where possible. Clevis pins retained only by split pins are not acceptable.

2.3.2 Control system joints in push-pull systems that are subjected to angular motion, except those
in ball and roller bearing systems, should have an ultimate factor of safety of not less than 3.33 with
respect to the ultimate bearing strength of the softest material used as a bearing. The approved
ratings of ball or roller bearings may not be exceeded.

2.4 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FAILURE OR DISCONNECTION
2.4.1 If it is assumed that any failure or disconnection is extremely remote then the design should
be such that no failure or disconnection could be foreseen under practical circumstances, including
errors of operation, assembly or maintenance, for such an assumption to be acceptable. The
following considerations should be given:
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(i) Choice of materials to avoid undue notch sensitivity or stress
corrosion cracking.

(ii) Adequate robustness to cater for all conditions arising, including
those due to errors in operation, assembly or maintenance.

(iii) Avoidance of design features which tend to give rise to fatigue
effects, including sensitivity to vibration.

2.5 CABLES AND CHAINS
2.5.1 The choice of pulley diameter for use with cables should be such as to preclude the
possibility of fatigue arising from bending of the cable and local rubbing together of individual
wires in the cable.

2.5.2 Pulleys should not be arranged so that a reverse bend in the cable arises as it
traverses from one pulley to another, and the pulleys should be in the plane of the cables so that
the cable does not rub against the pulley flange.

2.5.3 The wrap angle of the cable round the pulley should be adequate and pulleys and
sprocket should be guarded to prevent any cable or chain jamming or coming off when slack and
re-engaging correctly after slack has been taken up.

2.5.4 Each kind and size of pulley should correspond to the cable with which it is used, to
ensure that the minimum bend radius of the cable is squalled or exceeded.

2.5.5 Fairleads should be installed so that they do not cause a change in cable direction.

2.5.6 Where turnbuckles are attached to parts having angular motion they should be
arranged so that fouling is positively prevented throughout the range of travel.

2.6 ANTI-FRICTION BEARINGS
2.6.1 Bearing installations should be arranged in such a manner that failure of the rollers
or bags will not result in a complete separation of the control. Where direct axial control force
application cannot be avoided a failsafe feature should be provided.

2.7 PUSH-PULL AND TORQUE TUBES
2.7.1 The tubes used in push-pull and torque control systems should be adequately vented
and drained, or completely sealed, to prevent the accumulation of condensed vapours.

2.7.2 J oints incorporated in torque tube control systems to enable axial movement should
have sufficient engagement to ensure that disengagement will not occur and positive drive will
be retained under the most adverse set of manufacturing and installation tolerances and structural
flexibility. Minimum engagement should not be less than one diameter. A means for inspection
of the amount of engagement should be provided.

2.7.3 All torque tubes should be mounted on anti-friction bearings with supported couplers spaced
at close enough intervals with sufficient misalignment capability to prevent undesirable bending or
whipping of the tubes.

2.7.4 Each torque tube in a link system should be removable and re-installable in the aeroplane
without having to disturb the support, component, or other interfacing system elements at either end
of the tube.
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2.7.5 The rated operating speed of a torque tube system should be no greater than 75% of the
critical speed unless a supercritical design has been agreed with the Integrated Project Team
Leader.

2.7.6 Where a broken tube could cause damage to other components an adequate guard should be
provided.

3 CONSIDERATION OF FAILURES

3.1 The failures to be considered include those of mechanical, hydraulic and electrical devices
in the primary and secondary control systems. Failures of Q-actuated mechanisms (including
devices such as Mach-trim and Q-actuated gearing, if not covered by Clauses 3.9 & 6.5) are also to
be considered.

3.2 Failures in power operated trimming systems can be particularly serious. Creeping or
runaway can lead to a dangerous situation from which it may be difficult to recover once the failure
has been detected. Evidence that a pilot can override any out-of-trim force is not sufficient to
ensure safety under all conditions, in an instrument approach for example.

3.3 Any kind of interlock between main and standby trimmers should be avoided. Systems
which, when the console switch is used, automatically render the main system dead until it is reset,
should not be used.

3.4 When pitot and static pressures are used to operate mechanisms in the flight control system
the consequences of failure of the pitot-static system by blockage or breakage shall be considered.

3.5 Control system sensors such as probes, vanes and other mechanical devices should be
installed at locations which minimize exposure to conditions which could result in inaccurate output
signals or failures.

3.6 When pilot intervention is necessary to recover from a failure in the control system or to
change to a reversionary mode, a realistic time delay should be allowed for. See Section 4 Leaflet
36.
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LEAFLET 25
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMSGENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Where the aeroplane designer, in order to meet the performance requirements,
accepts reductions in the natural stability and control characteristics to an extent which
demands artificial augmentation in order to restore acceptable levels of airworthiness, then
he must provide such augmentation with integrity at least as high as that achieved with
previous generations of primary control systems.

1.2 Such an aeroplane design, which may be inherently unstable, demands restoration of
stability by means which are viable throughout the full flight envelope. To achieve this, full
control authorities may be required, indeed the absolute limits of control authority may well
need to be re-assessed in the light of the degree of instability.

1.3 To effect both stability augmentation and to provide full flight control to the pilot, it
is desirable to provide an efficient and airworthy integration of these functions in one
continuously active control system.

1.4 Having taken the decision to adopt active controls for a new aeroplane, the designer
is then free to develop interactively the airframe and active control system fully to optimise
performance.


2 APPLICATIONS

2.1 RELATED APPLICATIONS
2.1.1 An ACS can offer the potential for providing facilities to support a number of
other airframe systems.

2.1.2 If the ACS comprises dedicated motion sensors, then various computed data
may readily be made available for instrument display purposes and as reference data
for other systems.

2.2 Although it is not envisaged that inner-loop engine control is likely to be
incorporated in an ACS it is probable that in combat and V/STOL aeroplanes quite
complex thrust and thrust vector commands will be computed by the ACS. The need for
careful treatment of commands at the ACS/Engine CS interface is evident. The essential
engine protection and optimum performance controls may be assumed to be provided by the
engine control designer. However, he will require to be aware of any intended extension of
engine utilisation arising from its inclusion in ACS control loops. As a consequence some
protective shaping of thrust and vectoring commands may require to be incorporated within
the ACS.

2.3 Other systems which may be expected to interface with an ACS include:

- Fuel system; mass distribution/configuration.
- Weapon system ; special aiming/weapon modes.
- Radar ; terrain following/avoidance modes.
- Stores management ; configuration.
- Guidance.
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LEAFLET 26
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

1 INTEGRITY

1.1 Two of the most dominant problems in the development of an ACS are the selection
of the means to achieve a very low probability of catastrophic failure and to demonstrate
that this has been achieved. This leaflet was previously issued as Leaflet 208/2.

1.2 Designers may be asked to aim for a risk of loss of the aeroplane due to ACS failure
in the order of 10
-7
per flight hour. For this reason, systems employing redundancy are
necessary.

1.3 Single lanes using electronic control may exhibit failure rates exceeding 1 in 1000
flying hours, it follows that a simple cross-compared redundant system of this quality may
require four independent lanes of control.

1.4 Fewer lanes may be utilised if adequate methods of self-monitoring can be
satisfactorily demonstrated.

1.5 Use of redundancy introduces the prospect of having to transfer data between
otherwise isolated lanes.

1.6 Where such intercommunication is utilised great care should be taken to avoid all
sources of common-mode failure.

1.7 Use of similar redundancy is attractive to the designer because of the ability to
thereby secure good identity of data. It does, however, present another source of common-
mode failure.

1.8 The natural distribution of random defects or failures amongst similar hardware
components results in a low probability of simultaneous failure, but there nevertheless
remains the possibility of an unidentified common susceptibility to undefined influences
arising from the inherent commonality of design and manufacture. For this reason great
care should be exercised in the selection of components for use in redundant systems.

2 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS

2.1 Conventionally, in redundant systems, there are three choices of primary motion
feedback sensor configurations, which may be summarised as follows:

(i) Orthogonal, single axis packs.

Measuring axis close to aeroplane body axis and packaged in packs of redundant
similar sensors.

(ii) Orthogonal, multi-axis set.

Measuring axes close to body axes but with a group of, say three axis sensors in
each set, one set per lane.

(iii) Skewed axis, redundant sets.

This configuration permits a reduction in the total number of sensors needed to meet
the integrity and reliability requirements.
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2.2 The disadvantages of the skewed axis system lie in the extra computing required to
resolve the skewed sensor signals into the required axis and that necessary to handle the
failure management, together with the architectural complications associated with this
computing and its power supplies.

2.3 A trade-off exists between the minimum number of sensors and the magnitude of
failure transients and nuisance warnings.

2.4 There are inevitable compromises which arise from the co-located sensors and the
fact that there may need to be at least two redundant sets located apart.

2.5 Each sensor and each set may sense variable mixes of structural mode responses, the
eradication or resolving of which demands special attention.

2.6 The optimisation of management of a skewed axis sensor configuration can lead to
this being implemented as a discrete sub-system with a different level of redundancy to that
of the ACS proper. In this case the choice of method by which essential sensor data is
transferred to the control computers needs special care, in order to ensure that the required
levels of integrity are met.

3 AIR-DATA SENSORS

3.1 Air-data sensors (pitot-static probes and airstream direction sensors) present special
difficulties. The special separation needed to ensure that two or more sensors are not
damaged by the same event (eg bird strike) causes inevitable differences between their
signals, especially at low speeds or at extreme attitudes. To avoid unacceptably frequent
rejection of their signals when no fault has occurred, cross-monitoring has to be
compromised with the risk that some faults remain undetected.

3.2 In some systems (eg Q-feel) the air-data signal only affects the characteristics of the
inceptor in some way and does not affect the position of the motivator. In others the signal
is fed into the system and automatically applies motivator movement. Both cases should be
considered, but for the second type some form of "fail safe" in the design is essential.

4 CONTROL AUTHORITIES

4.1 Two levels of control displacement authority may exist in an ACS:-

(i) Motivator (or actuator) authority, which normally represents the maximum
usable geometric output.

(ii) Mode authority, or internal signal authority. This is a flexible parameter
which may be fixed or variable, and which is usually established with an
integrity of similar order to that of the system itself.

4.2 Finite motivator authorities have a profound effect upon the behaviour of an
aeroplane which relies upon an ACS to provide essential performance. The choice of
displacement and rate authority for a given function has to be made in the light of both
specified performance and malfunction requirements and the nature of circumstances
expected to be met at and beyond control saturation.

4.3 Other levels of displacement authority exist in an ACS in association with
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mechanical implementation and are concerned with the provision of a finite tolerance
between electrical transducer operating authority and mechanical, absolute, authority.
These authorities are not usually relevant to overall control performance.
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LEAFLET 27
CONTROL LAWS AND SOFTWARE

1 MATHEMATICAL MODEL

1.1 In order that the overall aeroplane performance objectives may be addressed, it is
necessary to acquire a thorough understanding of all the aeroplane and system dynamics.
From these a mathematical model of the total aeroplane and system should be built up.

1.2 This model should be as complete as possible. Airframe structural modes and the
effects of variable mass configuration such as disposable and consumable stores, fuel and its
dynamics should be considered together with detailed non-linearities and time dependent
phenomena such as transport and iteration delays and quantisation effects.

1.3 The efficient design of control laws will depend upon the accuracy of the model.


2 COMMONALITY OF SOFTWARE

2.1 If the designer chooses to utilise one common software interpretation of control laws
for use in all lanes of a redundant system, then he should recognise the implications of this
in respect of common-mode failure susceptibility.

2.2 This element of commonality is difficult to assess in terms of reliability and attention
is drawn to various methods of establishing confidence in the design of such software. Ref
Interim DEF STAN 00-31(Obsolescent).

2.3 Confidence is currently established by ensuring that all software paths and functional
elements are adequately exercised during rig testing.

2.4 There is however, to date, no practical method for establishing a quantitative
measure of software confidence.
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LEAFLET 28
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet provides guidance on acceptable means of compliance with the
structural requirements of Clause 3.9 and related requirements such as those for static
strength (Clause 3.1), fatigue and damage tolerance (Clause 3.12) and aero-elasticity
(Clause 4.8). It was previously issued as Leaflet 208/4.

1.2 The procedures used for static and fatigue design of aeroplanes incorporating ACS
are similar to those for conventional aeroplanes. However, critical design cases may be
more difficult to determine, and the design process will necessitate integration of the
procedures used for structural, aerodynamic and active control system design.

2 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 From a structural point of view Active Control Systems (ACS) may be
grouped into two categories;

(i) Those whose prime purpose is to enhance performance characteristics such
as agility and weapon platform stability and,

(ii) Those whose prime purpose is to alleviate loading actions so as to permit
reductions in structural weight, size or stiffness.

2.2 ACS in the first category might include, for example, carefree manoeuvring (to
prevent departure from controlled flight), ride improvement, weapon platform improvement,
relaxed stability. manoeuvre enhancement, direct lift control.

2.3 ACS in the second category might include, for example, gust load alleviation,
manoeuvre 'g' limiting, flutter margin improvement, flutter suppression.

2.4 For systems in the first category and, for those systems in the second category which
as a secondary effect enhance performance (e.g., flutter suppression), loading actions are
usually of a different form to those for conventional aeroplanes.

2.5 For ACS aeroplanes it is likely that design requirements alone are insufficient to
define all critical static loading cases. Therefore the intended aeroplane usage should be
probed for potentially critical or hazardous loading actions due to pilot input or particular
gust patterns, separately or in combination. The effects of augmentation system
disconnects, degrades and failures should be evaluated.

2.6 In particular, attention should be given to the flight and ground loads which arise
when the active control system is:

(i) Fully serviceable.

(ii) Transient between the serviceable and degraded state.

(iii) Degraded either actively (producing undemanded and/or excessive control
surface movements) or passively (producing either no control surface
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movement or control surface movements in the correct sense but of
inadequate authority) .

2.7 When identifying those loads which are likely to occur during flight in the degraded
state the designer should consider whether the pilot could, if he was aware of the
degradation, reduce the severity of the loads which are likely to be encountered by taking
appropriate measures such as:

(i) Limitation of maximum speed.

(ii) Limitation of maximum 'g'.

(iii) Reduction of adverse stresses by jettison of stores or fuel.

(iv) Restoration of flutter stability by jettison of stores.

If, to cope with a particular degradation of the ACS, the designer chooses to maintain the
structural integrity of the aeroplane by requiring the pilot to observe a flying limitation, then
the margin between the maximum load predicted to occur following the implementation of
the limitation and the limit load capability of the degraded aeroplane should comply with the
guidance given in Section 2 Leaflet 9.

2.8 An aeroplane structure possesses a safety margin in terms of load bearing capability
because a structure is required to withstand Design Ultimate Load (DUL), which is Design
Limit Load (DLL) multiplied by a factor of safety of 1.5, without collapse. In the case of an
ACS aeroplane control system saturation and other non-linearities may mean that operating
margins, such as the increment in input function required to generate an increase in load
from say DLL to DUL, may be smaller than for a similar conventional aeroplane of which
there is knowledge. Thus for an ACS aeroplane the designer should examine the variation
of structural loading with input function in respect of multi-axis input and gusts, separately
and in combination, and should establish that the loading gradients are not so severe that a
small increment in input function could produce such a large increment in load that there
would be a high probability, if Service Release conditions were slightly exceeded, of DUL
being approached and exceeded.

2.9 ACS aeroplanes which feature either carefree manoeuvring or manoeuvre 'g' limiting
may fly to the extremes of their flight envelope more frequently than conventional
aeroplanes. Providing the ACS is sufficiently reliable and DLL is adequately defined, it is
unlikely that an ACS aeroplane will exceed DLL more frequently than an equivalent
conventional aeroplane in which the pilot must observe flight limitations to prevent
exceedances of DLL- Nevertheless, the use of 'g' limiting system does not guarantee that
critical loads will not be exceeded as it may only limit one of the components of load in a
particular structural item. Consequently, to enable the Service Release levels in respect of
static loads to be assessed, the proposed aeroplane usage should be probed to identify
possible exceedance of DLL and the ease with which DLL can be approached.

2.10 Aeroplanes incorporating ACS are likely to exhibit increased control activity, in
particular more high frequency small amplitude motions, and the designer should pay
special attention to the fatigue design of the actuators, the motivators, the mechanical
interface between the motivators and the actuators, and the associated support structure.

2.11 The ACS should be designed to avoid inertia instability of the control system
occurring when the aeroplane is undergoing system testing on the ground.
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2.12 There can be no guarantee that the loads analysis can identify all critical
combination of possible loading actions. Consequently, Clause 3.10 contains requirements
for the in-service confirmation of the load levels deduced from the analysis.

2.13 Where an ACS is used to contain structural loads within limits, the system
capabilities and performance derived from calculation must be substantiated by direct strain
measurement during development flying.

2.14 Special structural implications arise from the application of Active Controls to
combat aeroplanes and transport aeroplanes and these are examined separately in the
following para.

3 COMBAT AEROPLANES

3.1 Aeroplanes which feature either a carefree manoeuvring or a manoeuvre 'g' limiting
facility will probably experience more frequent medium to high 'g' manoeuvre than
conventional aeroplanes. Therefore, special attention should be given to the definition of
fatigue load spectra.

3.2 The calculated flutter speed of an aeroplane with a fully serviceable ACS should be
at least 1.15V
D
at any point in its flight envelope for any authorised mass/stores
configuration. Also, an aeroplane with ACS inoperative should be flutter free to V
D
at any
point in its flight envelope for any store/mass configuration. However, it may be acceptable
to design an aeroplane employing an active flutter control system to be flutter free with that
system inoperative to a speed less than V
D
when carrying external stores if:

(i) Following a failure of the flutter suppression system an adequate flutter
margin can be restored safely by jettison of external stores or by a reduction
in airspeed, and

(ii) The pilot can be given the necessary warning to enable him to perform the
actions detailed in para 3.2(i).

Note: A requirement to be flutter free to V
D
gives a small margin on flutter speed
compared with requirement to be flutter free to the Service Limit Speed
V
max
, This margin allows for variations in those physical parameters which
affect flutter and which may change during the service life of the aeroplane.

4 TRANSPORT AEROPLANES

4.1 It is permissible, providing the requirements specified in Clause 3.10 are met, to
take full advantage of the amount of load alleviation provided by a Gust Alleviation System
when designing the structure to the loads corresponding to the gust cases specified in
Clause 3.4.

4.2 The use of load alleviation systems to achieve lighter and smaller structures may
result in reduced structural stiffness and reduced flutter stability. Consequently, ACS
aeroplanes may feature unconventional sizing of structural items, for example wing skin
thicknesses may be greater at the tip than at the root to achieve maximum torsional stiffness
or vary across the chord to achieve an optimum position of the flexural axis.
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4.3 Notwithstanding the use of flutter suppression systems, the flutter speed with the
flutter suppression system inoperative should never be less than V
D
.

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LEAFLET 29
OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Experience has shown that agile military aeroplanes equipped with ACS may be
subject to increased manoeuvre frequency and magnitude in service, compared with
conventionally controlled combat aeroplanes. It is recognised that if high levels of
manoeuvring are frequent then reduced airframe life will ensue, if not allowed for in the
design. This information was previously issued as Leaflet 208/5.

1.2 Two possible options which may be considered are:

(i) Design for maximum performance and allow for airframe life consumption
by investing in a more resistant airframe (at possible weight cost).

(ii) Design for two levels of performance; maximum performance which could
be termed 'Wartime' Performance and a lower level, perhaps termed 'Peace-
time' Performance, either of which could be selected for use by the pilot.
Carefully regulated service use of these alternatives could ensure a
reasonable rate of consumption of airframe life.

The latter option has system design and training implications in that a lower level
performance has to be defined and appropriate mode selection provided, with possibly
instinctive override available to the higher level of performance.

1.3 NUISANCE WARNINGS
1.3.1 Redundant Systems with voting incur a finite probability of nuisance failure
warnings, although with careful design these may be minimised. When
apparently 'nuisance' failures occur the conditions leading to the event can, if
known, enable confirmation and/or rectification to be carried out to avoid
repetition and investigatory loss of aeroplane availability. It is therefore
desirable for context data to be recorded for each 'failure' incident.

1.3.2 Experience has shown that incidents of this nature prove difficult to
resolve if no specific information, other than aircrew reports, is available.

1.3.3 Useful context data would include:

- Failed item
- Relative errors (redundant items)
- Control system status
- Dynamic data (3 axes)
- Flight case (speed, height, mach no.)
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LEAFLET 30
AIRFRAME AND SYSTEM PROVING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In order to develop the ACS to flight standard, a rig is required in which the
complete system hardware can be fully functioned. A comprehensive real-time flying
simulation which permits all operational performance to be assessed should form part of the
rig. This information was previously issued as Leaflet 208/6.

1.2 The rig simulation should also be utilised to enable test pilot assessments to be
carried out with particular reference to system management including the effects of failures.
The tests should also allow impromptu pilot investigations which explore off-design cases
and any other points of curiosity.

1.3 This facility should provide the basis for system performance proving prior to first
flight. A detailed schedule of failure cases should be assessed.

1.4 This testing should precede installed system testing in the aeroplane and enable
installed testing to be restricted to essential items.

1.5 Endurance testing on this rig may be restricted to whole system operating with a
pilot in the loop or may be in part automated. Sequences of start-up, pre take-off checks,
taxi, take-off, climb, through representative flight conditions and manoeuvres covering all
operational roles etc., to return to circuit, landing, post-flight checks and shut-down should
be included.

1.6 These tests are all to be completed to an agreed equivalent number of flying hours
before first flight.

1.7 The required number of hours before first flight are to be conducted with full flight
standard ACS equipment and are expected to exhibit defect free operation.

1.8 Subsequent to first flight, rig tests should continue to back-up flight development.

1.9 A separate life test programme is necessary for individual ACS items and these life
tests are conducted by the suppliers prior to delivery for installation in the aeroplane.
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LEAFLET 31
PART TIME SYSTEMS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The provisions of Clause 3.9 are specifically for those control systems where correct
operation of the system is essential for continued safe flight, so called 'full-time' systems.
(Refer to Part 0 Definitions). A 'full-time' system may be understood to include those
systems where there is automatic reversion to an alternative active mode in appropriate
circumstances. When an active control system is employed in such a way that continued
safe flight is possible after an incorrect operation of the system by reversion to some form of
direct control by the pilot it may be referred to as a 'part-time' active control system. The
extent to which the provisions of Clause 3.9 then apply will be related to the required flight
envelope and has to be defined in conjunction with the Integrated Project Team Leader.
This Leaflet is intended as a guide in making this definition and was previously issued as
Leaflet 208/7.

1.2 Examples of ACS which may be defined as part-time are:-

(i) Where there is provision for reversion to direct control input, the reversion
mode not being part of the full-time active control system, and resulting in
degraded performance.

(ii) An auto-stabilisation system used to improve handling, but where continued
safe flight is possible after ACS failure with a degradation in flying qualities
(see Clause 2.1).

(iii) A dual control aeroplane where the operation of the ACS is limited to the
inceptors of a single pilot station: the second 'safety pilot' being provided
with a means of controlling the aeroplane which is not affected by failures of
the ACS.

(iv) An aeroplane which employs an ACS mode to enhance the overall
performance, but where failure of that mode is not flight critical: e.g., some
applications of wing camber control (para 7.5) and gust load alleviation (para
7.4) where failure may result only in reduced fatigue life.

2 SAFE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY OF PART-TIME ACS

2.1 In the case of a part-time ACS system the application of the requirements of Clause
3.9 may be limited to those components of the system which affect overall safety of the
aeroplane.

2.2 In the event of an incorrect operation of the ACS being detected there should be an
automatic reversion to the back-up mode, and there should be an indication to the pilot(s)
of the reversion. The requirements of Clause 3.9 therefore apply to those components
which sense the failure condition and initiate reversion to the back-up mode.

2.3 Whilst the ACS system is in operation, including any incorrect operations and
reversion to the back-up mode, it should not introduce any situation which is likely to put
safety of the aeroplane in jeopardy.

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3 APPLICABILITY OF ACS REQUIREMENTS

3.1 In general, some aspects of all the main paragraphs of Clause 3.9 may be applicable
to part-time ACS.

3.2 Specific aspects of Clause 3.5 which may need to be considered are:

(i) Reversion.

(ii) All aspects of systems requirements which ensure safe flight.

(iii) Nuisance reversion to the back-up mode, and especially failure transients.

(iv) Interaction with other systems.

(v) Control laws and software generally insofar they affect safe flight whilst the
ACS is in operation, and during reversion to the back-up mode.

(vi) Airframe strength whilst the ACS is in operation, including limitations
automatically introduced by the ACS including reversion to the back-up
mode.

(vii) Operational and piloting aspects generally in as much as the continued safe
operation in the system is involved.

(viii) Aeroplane and system proving, again related to those components which
ensure continued safe flight.

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LEAFLET 32
STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING
TOWING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Minimum mandatory strength requirements for towing are given in Chapter 308.
This leaflet gives background information and recommendations relating to those
requirements. It was previously issued as Leaflet 308/1.

1.2 Design, operational, and standardisation requirements are given for towing in Clause
4.4. Note particularly that load-limiting devices are not allowed on tow bars provided for
use on board ship.

2 GENERAL

2.1 The extreme cases which have to be considered are:

(i) towing from a point at or near a main or nose unit which happens to be on a
surface where the co-efficient of friction is nearly zero (as for spilt fuel or
wet mud on a firm surface) and where the only reaction is supplied by the
inertia of the aeroplane,

(ii) extracting a wheel which is bogged down,

(iii) turning a nose wheel with zero forward speed.

2.2 The applied towing force would, in practice, be balanced by a combination of some
or all of the following:

(i) frictional forces at points of tyre contact with the ground,

(ii) gravitational forces due to inclined or uneven ground surfaces,

(iii) re-distribution of vertical reactions at wheels, and

(iv) linear and angular inertia forces.

2.3 So far as possible, the need for detailed consideration of all these possibilities on
every aeroplane has been eliminated by specifying detailed stressing cases which, while not
representing accurately any one particular condition, will normally cover all reasonable
conditions except where the aeroplane geometry is unconventional.

2.4 It is not intended that the requirements should be used to design major parts of the
undercarriage or structure of the aeroplane if satisfactory towing procedures can be devised
which will provide for all normal aeroplane movements and also the extreme cases
described in para 2.1. It is the Aeroplane Designer's responsibility to agree these procedures
with the Integrated Project Team Leader and include them in the Operating Manual.
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2.5 The tyre and shock absorber deflections may usually be assumed to be those for the
aeroplane standing on level ground at maximum design take-off mass (MT) and associated
CG position. However, appropriate allowances should be made if there are considerable
geometrical changes under towing loads.

2.6 Where towing backwards by attachment of a bridle to other strong points (eg the
arresting hook or tail bumper) is required the effect of snatch loads on the undercarriage
should be considered.

3 MAIN-UNIT ATTACHMENT LOADS

3.1 The design loads illustrated for the main-undercarriage towing points in Section 3
Fig.5 are arranged to provide for the use of a towing bridle on one main-undercarriage unit.

4 NOSE-UNIT ATTACHMENT LOADS

4.1 Two different nose-wheel towing attachment methods are represented in Section 3
Fig.6. Fig.6a illustrates the case when the towing arm, wire, chain, or rope, is attached to a
strong point on a castoring nose unit. Fig 6b illustrates the case when a towing arm is
attached to the nose wheel such that towing and steering occur at the same time. The
applied loads will be opposed by side, drag and torsional tyre forces.

4.2 Consideration should be given to variations in these loads and forces arising from:

(i) Geometry of the nose unit and wheel(s).

(ii) Frictional forces from the castoring system.

(iii) The displacement of the tyre(s) relative to the ground.

(iv) Practical combinations of towing speeds and swivel rates particularly the
case of swivelling with zero forward speed.

4.3 It is the designer's responsibility to ensure that the material chosen for the towing
points specified in Clause 4.4 is such that the strength requirements of Clause 3.10 are met.

5 SHIPBORNE AEROPLANES

5.1 Shipborne aeroplanes are not allowed to have a relief device in the tow bar (see
Clause 4.4) and must be stressed for the maximum loads expected in the worst sea state for
which towing is required. A dynamic analysis is therefore required

5.2 For preliminary stressing a tow force of 0.8G.M
T
should be used to represent sudden
braking of the aeroplane or tractor on a non-slip surface and the nose wheel vertical load
may be calculated from:

R
n
=M
T
.G (1
m
+1.6f) / (1
m
+1
n
)

where f is the moment arm of the braking force about the aeroplane centre of gravity. Then
f =h for tractor braking with nose-wheel tow at the nose-wheel axle and f =H for main-
wheel braking of the aeroplane with any form of towing.

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LEAFLET 33
PICKETING
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PICKETING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet gives recommendations relating to the requirements of Clause 3.11 and

1.2 Chocks are normally used during picketing but their effectiveness cannot be relied
on and so no account is to be taken of any contribution they may make. Brakes are not used
during picketing.

2 FORCES TO BE CONSIDERED

2.1 LIFT FORCES
2.1.1 Wherever possible test data is to be used for calculating the aerodynamic lift
on the aeroplane.

2.1.2 If no test data is available it is acceptable to use the normal aerodynamic lift
formula provided that the value of the angle of attack used is calculated as follows:

a =(a
d
+2
) x 1.5 where:

(i) a
d
=datum incidence in static attitude,

(ii) 2
is the allowance added for variation in wind direction caused by

ground contours,

2.1.3 If the calculated angle of attack exceeds the stalling angle then the stalling
angle is to be used instead.

2.1.4 The formula in para 2.1.2 assumes that any high-lift devices remain fully
retracted.

2.2 SIDE AND DRAG FORCES
2.2.1 During picketing, side and drag forces due to winds will be present on the
aeroplane. The effects of loads due to ship's motion must also be considered. For
calculations the basic mass of the aeroplane should be used together with a range of
co-efficients of friction from 0.1 to 0.8.

2.3 SHIP MOTION AND WIND FORCES
2.3.1 The most adverse combination of ship motion and wind forces should be
considered. It may be assumed that provided the flight deck securing requirements
are met, then the hangar case will be automatically met, since there are no wind
forces and generally less ship motion in the hangar. The values of ship motion and
wind forces contained in Clause 3.12 are considered to be acting in the most adverse
weather conditions. It is recommended that the force imposed on secured aeroplanes
by the relative wind-over-deck, be added to those resulting from ship motions.
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3 PICKETING POINTS

3.1 To meet the requirements of Clause 3.12, it is advisable to have picketing points on
the aeroplane structure immediately inboard and outboard of each main undercarriage unit.
Where this presents difficulties a single point at each main unit is acceptable provided that
picketing can still be achieved in accordance with the picketing plan. When the
undercarriage track is narrow, and if other considerations such as the direction of
undercarriage retraction permit, single points should be outboard of the main wheels.

3.2 Securing points should be either built in to the structure of the aeroplane or the
undercarriage or take the form of detachable screw-in or clamp-type fittings.

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LEAFLET 34
FATIGUE
MATERIAL SELECTION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on the selection of metallic materials for aircraft
structural components where fatigue life and residual strength are major considerations.
Guidance is given on fatigue performance, fracture toughness, resistance to impact and crack
growth behaviour. Special considerations relating to fibre-composite components are
discussed in Leaflet 40. This information was previously issued as Leaflet 201/1.
1.2 Sufficient material must have been tested to demonstrate that the properties used for
design reflect variability both within and between batches, see for example Def Stan
00-932(Cancelled replaced by EDSU 932 Metallic Materials Data Handbook). Otherwise a
programme of testing will be required to establish material behaviour or to confirm assumed
or estimated properties.
2 FATIGUE PERFORMANCE
2.1 Definition. Fatigue performance is a term defining the resistance of a structural
component to the development of cracking under fatigue loading. Under fatigue loading the
design allowable stress levels may be considerably lower than those acceptable for static
design.
2.2 General. The extent to which the intrinsic fatigue performance of a material can be
realised is strongly dependent upon the influence of stress-concentrating features such as
notches, cut-outs and fillet radii, and the extent to which crack initiation is accelerated by the
effects of fretting, such as may occur in joints. Fatigue performance is also affected in varying
degree by material quality, that is the presence in a material of inclusions, residual stresses
and discontinuities introduced by material processing and heat treatment, and the surface
quality, that is the introduction of imperfections into a surface during manufacturing
processes and subsequent surface processes and treatments. Material quality and surface
quality are unlikely to have a controlling effect on fatigue performance unless stress
concentration factors are low and there is no fretting.
2.3 Comparative testing. True comparison of materials for fatigue performance must be
done using coupons representative of component condition (including any significant batch
effects), loading and environment. Where changes are made to the material processing or
manufacturing route, comparative testing must be done under representative conditions to
ensure that fatigue performance has not been adversely affected.
2.4 Surface coatings and surface treatments. Surface layers of different structure or
properties to that of the bulk substrate may significantly affect fatigue performance. For
example, plating, cladding or thickened oxide layers may develop cracks which can then grow
into the substrate. Chemical surface treatments can produce surface pitting leading to reduced
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fatigue performance. Section 4 Leaflet 18 gives guidance on the effects of surface finishing
and protective treatments on fatigue properties.
2.5 Temper and tensile strength. At high applied stress levels, that is low-cycle fatigue,
the fatigue strength can be strongly influenced by material tensile strength. At low applied
stress levels under constant amplitude loading there is, in some materials, a clear fatigue limit,
which can be related directly to tensile strength and below which no significant fatigue
cracking develops. Under variable amplitude loading this fatigue limit is suppressed. Fatigue
limits determined under constant amplitude loading cannot be assumed to apply to the same
cycle applied during a variable amplitude sequence. Where the existence of a fatigue limit or
a shallow slope on the fatigue curve in the high cycle region are essential for aircraft life then
the design curve must be substantiated for each material by tests under realistic loading on
coupons representative of the structural details concerned. (see also para 2.3)
2.6 Operating stress levels. The selection of materials for high tensile strength to
minimise structural mass is seldom consistent with good fatigue performance. Lower strength
materials are often more suitable for structures in which tensile applied loading predominates,
for example lower wing skins, where it is often fatigue life rather than static strength
considerations that define allowable stress levels. In such cases the selection of a high tensile
strength material may offer little or no practical fatigue advantage; a lower yield strength
allows benefit to be obtained from residual compression stress fields produced by tensile
yielding at critical features, but can be detrimental in those cases where the predominant
loading is in compression; particular care must be taken in relation to fatigue-enhancing
systems (see Leaflet 35, para 7.9).
3 FRACTURE TOUGHNESS
3.1 Definition. The fracture toughness is a measure of the resistance of a material to failure
by rapid, unstable crack growth. Materials with a high fracture toughness can sustain a longer
crack for a given applied stress level than a material with a lower fracture toughness.
3.2 Section thickness. In thick sections the plane strain fracture toughness, K
Ic
, is most
commonly used to describe resistance to fracture; this is a material property independent of
geometry. In thin sections the toughness is influenced by component dimensions and cracks
may extend in a stable manner under high loads (particularly in low strength, high toughness
materials). In these cases a single value of toughness cannot adequately describe the fracture
resistance and a crack growth resistance curve (R curve) is required to define failure. Material
selection for sheet materials should be made on the basis of single-pull tests on identical
panels or using R curves.
3.3 Temper and tensile strength. For a given material type the toughness decreases with
increase in tensile strength. Peak age tempers (such as the T6 and T651 tempers in aluminium
alloys) usually have the lowest fracture toughness for a material and should be avoided where
possible. Relatively small reductions in tensile properties, for example by over-ageing, can
produce a significant increase in fracture toughness (and usually an increase in resistance to
environmental attack).
3.4 Product form and grain orientation. Toughness varies with product form and grain
orientation (i.e. with loading and cracking direction with respect to texture imparted by
material processing). In general, the fracture toughness is lowest if cracks are running parallel
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to the short transverse grain, that is in ST or SL orientations, and highest if cracks have to
cross the grain, that is in LT or LS orientations.
3.5 Toughness to yield ratio. To maintain a required level of damage tolerance, for example a
minimum acceptable critical crack size as employed in some aircraft design philosophies, the
ratio of fracture toughness to tensile strength must be maintained at an acceptable level
whereas the material property trend is for toughness to decrease with strength in a given
material. A measure of the damage tolerance capability of metallic materials is the ratio of
fracture toughness to yield strength (0.2% proof strength). This parameter is termed the
Toughness to Yield Ratio, TYR [1,2]. In fracture-critical components it is beneficial to use a
material with a high toughness to yield ratio. Experience on a range of military aircraft has
been used to define a rating, A - D, based on the TYR, which can be used for any aerospace
structural alloy for material selection, see Table 1 and Figure 1. Materials with 'A' or 'B' rating
should be selected where possible. Materials rated 'C' or 'D' must not be used without the prior
agreement of the Project Authority. Materials with a 'D' rating shall be used only in
exceptional circumstances.
3.6 Operating environment. For many materials the fracture toughness is largely unaffected
by environmental conditions. However, some material/environment combinations exhibit
rapid crack growth under stored or residual stress conditions due to stress corrosion
mechanisms, see Clause 4.3 and Section 4 Leaflet 7. For some materials, particularly high
strength steels, there exists a transition temperature below which toughness can be
dramatically reduced. It is important that materials do not exhibit such a transition within the
working temperature range of the component for which they are used.
4 IMPACT RESISTANCE
4.1 Definition. Impact resistance is defined as the energy required to cause cracking in a
given section thickness. Impact resistance cannot be determined solely by monotonic
toughness testing and ballistic tests. Where impact threats have been identified, confirmatory
tests of material performance should be done at appropriate impact energies with suitably
representative impactors and impact angles on coupons with representative restraint.
4.2 Problems arising from impact. Cracking occurring during impact can significantly reduce
residual strength and may subsequently extend due to fatigue loads. Materials should not be
used in product forms or section thicknesses which suffer significant cracking or damage
under the impact threats anticipated in component manufacture or peacetime service. Where
forward facing surfaces, particularly those ahead of intakes, are made of metal, it is preferable
to use ductile, high toughness materials. This increases the likelihood of denting and ductile
tearing rather than fragmentation. Materials with low impact resistance are likely to
experience cracking during manufacture.
4.3 Material properties. Materials with a low ductility and low toughness are likely to suffer
extensive damage from low speed - low energy impact. Some materials may exhibit a
variation in material properties through the section thickness. In such cases it is possible that a
low ductility region may be exposed by chemical or mechanical removal of material - leading
to a serious reduction in impact resistance [1].
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5 FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH RESISTANCE
5.1 Definition. Crack growth rate for a given material, stress ratio (R ratio) and environment
is closely linked to applied stress and crack length through the range of stress intensity factor,
K. It is usual for crack growth life calculations to be based on constant amplitude data which
are generally available in terms of growth rate, da/dN, against the applied stress intensity
factor range, K.
5.2 Temper, tensile properties and modulus. Growth rate is strongly dependent on modulus -
the higher the modulus the lower is the growth rate. Materials with similar modulus, for
example aluminium alloys, exhibit very similar growth rates except in the near-failure region;
see para 5.4.
5.3 Low crack growth rates and the crack growth threshold. Unless the use of a crack growth
threshold can be substantiated under realistic service conditions (loading, crack size and
configuration, environment, etc.) then the crack growth curve should be estimated by
extending the steady state growth region on a straight line basis to very low growth rates, see
also para 2.5.
5.4 Product form and grain orientation. Crack growth rates in aerospace structural alloys are
usually independent of product form and grain orientation except in the near-failure crack
growth region. The fracture toughness, on the other hand, is highly dependent on grain
orientation, product form and temper.
5.5 Operating environment. In some materials the growth rate shows a marked sensitivity to
the operating environment. The effect of operating environment on growth rate must be
considered in damage growth analysis; guidance is given in [1]. Where an adverse operating
environment is known, then confirmatory crack growth tests should be done in that
environment. The peak-aged tempers in high strength 7000 series (aluminium - zinc) alloys
are particularly prone to increases in growth rate with humidity.
REFERENCES
1 Dolphin, A.S. Damage tolerance (fatigue and impact) evaluation of materials,
BAe Report BAe-WSS-RP-GEN-SOR-000315, J anuary 1997
2 Sharp, R. Selection of metallic materials for damage-tolerance capability
using a rating system, BAe Report BAe-WSS-RP-GEN-SOR-
000222, Issue 1, December 1992
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TABLE 1 RATINGS FOR TOUGHNESS TO YIELD RATIO (PLANE STRAIN)
Rating Grain Orientation
L-T and L-S T-L and T-S S-L and S-T

A >0.088 >0.075 >0.067
B 0.07-0.088 0.06-0.075 0.053-0.067
C 0.056-0.07 0.048-0.06 0.042-0.053
D <0.056 <0.048 <0.042
Values in the table are TYR values (m). LT values illustrated in Figure 1. Values of TYR are
determined from consideration of scatter in strength and toughness [2].
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LEAFLET 35
FATIGUE
SAFE-LIFE SUBSTANTIATION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 For aeroplanes, the cornerstone of safe-life substantiation is a full-scale test of a
complete airframe to a factor of 5 times the service life. This factor consists of an allowance
of 3 1/3 for scatter in fatigue performance and a further factor of 1.5 which is applied to those
parts of the structure where the loads are not monitored on a continuous basis. Where only
one side of a component has been tested, for example a port or starboard taileron, the scatter
factor is increased to 4. Exceptionally, individual structural elements can be substantiated by
calculation alone; here it must be shown that the calculations are based upon conservative
assumptions and that the calculated safe life exceeds the service life by a factor of at least 2.0.
1.2 For helicopters, the emphasis is on the rotating (dynamic) components, where the
stress levels are relatively low and compliance is demonstrated using a factor on stress.
Several examples of each component are tested and in these circumstances a stress factor of
about 1.5 is required to allow for scatter. An additional stress factor of 1.2 is applied unless
the design loads are suitably conservative. A further stress factor may be used to accelerate
the test. Exceptionally, individual dynamic components can be substantiated by calculation
alone; here it must be shown that the calculations are based upon conservative assumptions
and that the calculated safe fatigue strength exceeds that which would be required by test by a
factor of at least 1.2.
1.3 The scatter factor of 3 1/3 is insufficient to substantiate the safe life of features with
relatively high variability and so, for these features, the test must be underpinned by
additional evidence.
1.4 Acceptable procedures for demonstrating compliance are summarised below and
described in the sections which follow:
(i) construction and use of Safe S-N curves;
(ii) derivation of usage spectra for design and substantiation;
(iii) adaptation of usage spectra for test purposes;
(iv) supplementary evidence for features with higher scatter than can be accommodated
in airframe tests;
(v) allowances for additional uncertainties when loads are unmonitored on individual
aircraft;
(vi) allowances for additional uncertainties when components have not been tested;
(vii) checking for sensitivity to increases in loading severity;
(viii) adjustment of lives under the Design Spectrum to equivalent lives under the
Service Spectrum.

It is noteworthy that consideration must also be given to the monotonic and cyclic
variations in service temperature where these may have a significant deleterious effect on
performance.
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1.5 Considerations underlying the test factors that are normally required to allow for
scatter in the fatigue performance of full-scale test specimens are discussed in Section 10.
1.6 The factors associated with the different aspects of safe-life compliance are
presented in Tables 1 to 4. It is emphasised that these factors will be judged to be sufficient
only in those circumstances where the Service Spectrum is confirmed by regular sampling of
the service loads by Operational Loads Measurement (OLM) or Operational Data Recording
(ODR) in compliance with the requirements of Clause 3.12.
1.7 Special considerations relating to the safe-life substantiation of fibre-composite
components are given in Leaflet 40. This information was previously issued as Leaflet 201/2.
2 CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF SAFE S-N CURVES
2.1 The Safe S-N approach is central to the assessment of compliance with the
requirements of Clause 3.12. This is because it enables allowance to be made for the increase
in scatter that occurs with increasing fatigue life. The method has enabled improvements to
be made in the procedures used for adapting usage spectra for test purposes, in identifying
where supplementary evidence is needed to underpin the compliance demonstrated by test
and in setting the S-N curves to be used in service loads monitoring. It is the constructors
prerogative to use other methods in sizing his structure, but the Safe S-N procedure must
remain central to compliance until such time as other methods make satisfactory allowance
for the variation in scatter with endurance.
2.2 Mean S-N curves obtained from representative element tests under constant
amplitude loading should be chosen to represent each of the features of the component at
which failure may occur. These mean S-N curves should normally have been located so that
Miners Rule gives a damage summation of unity for tests under realistic loading. Guidance
on the allowances that should be made when curves have not been located in this way is given
in Section 7. These mean curves are then factored by the life and stress factors of Table 2 in
accordance with the following procedure, to obtain Safe S-N curves from which safe lives
may be obtained.
2.3 The factors of Table 2 have been derived using the scatter observed when large
numbers of specimens representing structural features have been tested under realistic
(spectrum) loading [1, 2]. When used with the customary statistical technique [3], they
correspond to a probability of failure of 1 in 2000; this makes some provision for the
symmetry in geometry and loading of [aeroplane] airframes so that a probability of 1 in 1000
is achieved for individual pairs of features; the same factors are acceptable for helicopter
airframes and dynamic components.
2.4 If it is desired to have a single set of Safe S-N curves which incorporate the
additional factors that must be used for unmonitored structure, it will be convenient to
multiply the factors of Table 2 by the further factors of Table 3 before constructing the Safe
S-N curves. If, the Safe S-N curves are also to be used for clearance by calculation then the
further factors of Table 4 should be applied.
2.5 The safe curve must take much the same shape as the mean curve and retain the life
factor as long as possible, consistent with a smooth transition to the stress factor by an
endurance of about 5 10
6
cycles. More precise guidelines are unnecessary because no such
constraints apply in choosing the shape of the mean curve. However, the shape of the mean
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 15
curve must suit the feature under consideration. It must also be compatible with the material
static strength.
2.6 Figure 1 shows examples of Safe and mean S-N curves for an aluminium alloy
pinned-lug specimen. The curves were drawn using the basic factors of Table 2 and a
conventional four-parameter Weibull equation of the form
S = S
inf
(1 +A / (N +G)
m
)
where S = stress,
S
inf
= stress at infinite life,
A = numerical constant,
N = endurance,
G = numerical constant governing low endurances,
m = numerical exponent.
The parameters used for the curves of Figure 1 were:
m A S
inf
G
Mean 0.604701 7072.70 7.25900 2820.00
Life-factored 0.604701 3794.80 7.25900 1007.00
Stress-factored 0.604701 7072.70 4.87181 2820.00
Safe 0.604701 5831.13 4.87181 1156.50
2.7 It is emphasised that the Safe S-N curves which are obtained will be influenced much
more strongly by the choice of mean S-N curves than by the method used in their
construction. It is noteworthy that the curves of Figure 1 were constructed using a generic
numerical method. That the Safe S-N curve is below both the life-factored and stress-factored
curves of Figure 1 b) is a consequence of the compromise needed to retain the continuous
shape of the mean curve.
2.8 The factors of Table 2 are suitable for use in the design of components manufactured
from conventional aluminium alloys, titanium alloys and steels. The factors to be used for
structural features in advanced metallic materials should be agreed with the Project Authority.
Factors for the construction of Safe S-N curves for fibre-composite materials are given in
Leaflet 40.
2.9 The use of Safe S-N curves in constructing test spectra is described in Section 4.
3 DERIVATION OF USAGE SPECTRA FOR DESIGN AND SUBSTANTIATION
3.1 An overall usage spectrum must be specified for the aircraft as a whole so that the
Design Spectrum for each major component and mechanical system can be derived. The
interpretation of the usage spectrum for design and substantiation purposes must be agreed
with the Project Authority.
3.2 If the Design Spectrum for a particular component is to be based on a continuous
stress sequence, the sequence should be broken down into a number of occurrences of discrete
SECTION 3

Page 4 of 15
stress amplitudes and associated mean stresses using the range-mean-pairs (or similar)
counting method [4].
3.3 On those occasions where the Design Spectrum is based upon a stated cumulative
exceedance spectrum of peaks and troughs, this should be expressed as individual cycles by
first dividing the spectrum into a number of intervals of stress. Care must be taken that the
number of intervals is sufficient to avoid introducing appreciable inaccuracies into the
estimates of fatigue damage produced by the spectrum. It should then be assumed that the
stresses within each interval all have a range given by the difference between the average
maximum and the average minimum stresses in that interval.
4 ADAPTATION OF USAGE SPECTRA FOR TEST PURPOSES
4.1 Fatigue tests have three primary objectives:
(i) to demonstrate compliance with the Specification;
(ii) to reveal any features which have insufficient fatigue life and
(iii) to demonstrate crack growth characteristics for components which have an
inspection-based clearance

4.2 NATURE OF TEST LOADING
4.2.1 The loading used should simulate typical usage. Where the usage differs
appreciably between groups of aircraft and these are not rotated for fleet management
purposes, care should be taken to avoid using extreme loads which are higher than those
which will be experienced by most aircraft in the fleet.

4.2.2 Realistic loading should normally be applied in a flight-by-flight sequence in
which the sequence of loads within each flight is also represented. The flights contained
in the test spectrum should be representative in type and number of the usage of the
aircraft. For combat aeroplanes, for example, a test sequence of between 50 and 100
flights should be repeated no less than 100 times before the required test life is achieved.

4.3 CONFIRMATION OF LOADING SEVERITY FOR LIFE-FACTOR TESTS
4.3.1 Analysis using the Safe S-N procedure has shown that the severity of the loading
spectra used in association with the life factors of Table 1(a) has traditionally given life
factors of between about 3.0 and 4.0 for the most fatigue-sensitive features of an airframe
[5]. Future tests may be on structures which have been designed to higher agility or,
conversely to longer lives, and so confirmation is needed to show that this standard is
maintained

4.3.2 For tests to the customary factor of 3 1/3 or the other factors for monitored
structure given in Table 1(a), the Safe S-N curve of Figure 1 should be used, with
Miners rule, as a transfer function representing those features with the lowest ratio of
fatigue to static strength - in other words, those which are most likely to be the source of
any unexpected problems.

4.3.3 The Safe S-N curve should first be positioned, using a factor on stress, so that
Miners rule gives the Specified Life under the Design Spectrum or, where appropriate,
the Service Life that is to be demonstrated under the Service Spectrum.

4.3.4 When the test loading used to represent the Design (or Service) Spectrum is of
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Page 5 of 15
appropriate severity, the life calculated using the Safe and mean S-N curves of Figure 1
will usually differ by a factor of between 3.0 and 4.0. It is emphasised that the factor
should be calculated at the proposed spectrum severity without re-positioning the curves.

4.3.5 If the calculated life factor is too high, the severity of the spectrum can be
increased by using the Safe S-N curve to express some of the lower amplitudes as
a smaller number of higher amplitudes giving the same damage and then repeating
the procedure. However, the number of lower amplitudes must still be sufficient
to ensure that any effects of fretting are represented.
4.4 OMISSION OF NON-DAMAGING LOADS
4.4.1 It is obviously impractical to represent the entire Design Spectrum, but it is
essential to represent all the loads that would produce damage on a Safe S-N
curve for the most fatigue-critical features.
4.4.2 Those loads which are estimated to produce stresses of less than the fatigue
limit of this Safe S-N curve may be excluded from the test, with the proviso that
the number of cycles per flight must still be sufficient to ensure that any effects of
fretting are represented. For combat aircraft wing-bending spectra, for example,
the average number of cycles per flight should be about 100. Where large
numbers of low amplitude cycles still remain, as might be the case for buffet
loadings, the Safe S-N curve may be used to determine a smaller number of
higher stresses that will produce equivalent damage.
4.4.3 For life-factor tests, it should be confirmed that the test spectrum remains
compliant with the loading severity criterion of the previous paragraph.
5 SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE FOR FEATURES WITH HIGHER SCATTER THAN
CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN AIRFRAME TESTS
5.1 Having established that the test will provide adequate substantiation for those
structural features with the lowest mean lives, consideration must be given to the extent to
which supplementary information must be provided for those fatigue-critical features which
exhibit higher variability in fatigue life than is accommodated by the customary factor of 3
1/3 or the equivalent factors of Table 1(a).
5.2 A Safe S-N curve must first be constructed for each potentially-critical feature using
the factors of 2.8 on life and 1.49 on stress (it does not matter where the curve is located at
this stage). Then, using Miners rule, the Safe S-N curve must be scaled (using a factor on
stress) so that it gives the safe life required under the test loading (typically the Specified
Life). The mean life under the test loading must then be calculated using the mean S-N curve
(the mean curve having been dragged to the appropriate position in scaling the Safe curve).
The life factor corresponding to the test loading is then given by the ratio of the mean life to
the safe life that is required. This factor provides a useful measure of the effectiveness of the
test and should be recorded for inclusion in the Fatigue Type Record.
5.3 A calculation should also be made of the stress factor by which the actual mean S-
N curve for the feature (a best estimate - without the scaling referred to in the previous
paragraph) can be reduced before the safe life (calculated from the associated Safe S-N curve)
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Page 6 of 15
becomes less than that required under the test loading. This gives the fatigue reserve factor,
which should always be at least 1.0 and must also be included in the Fatigue Type Record.
5.4 Only those features which are calculated to require a life factor of up to 4.0 can be
judged to be substantiated by tests to the customary factors. However, if the calculated factor
under the test loading is between 4.0 and 6.0 and the loads on the feature are monitored on
individual aircraft, then the feature will be tested sufficiently when the customary life factor
of 5.0 is used to make provision for uncertainties in loading on unmonitored features.
5.5 Where the calculated life factor is more than 4.0, or more than 6.0 for monitored
features which are to be tested to a life factor of 5.0, supplementary evidence should be
provided in the form of a calculated allowable stress for the required safe life under the test
spectrum. The allowable stress should be associated with Limit Load or exceptionally with
the maximum load in the spectrum if this is lower. Structural analysis underpinned by strain
gauge measurements on the test specimen must be used to show that these allowables have
not been exceeded. Retrospective analysis introducing, the no-test factors of Table 4 will be
required in those cases where the calculations are not supported by relevant test data on
structural elements.
5.6 For unmonitored features, the test factors derived from the Safe S-N calculation must
be multiplied by 1.5. Thus, for structures tested to a life factor of 5.0, supplementary evidence
should be provided when the combined factor is greater than 6.0.
6 ALLOWANCES FOR ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES WHEN LOADS ARE
UNMONITORED ON INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT
6.1 It is emphasised that all aircraft must be fitted with basic instrumentation and that a
continuous or periodic OLM/ODR programme is a condition of compliance with the
requirements of Clause 3.12.
6.2 According to whether most fatigue damage is accumulated towards the top or bottom
of the S-N curve, a factor of 1.5 on life or 1.2 on stress must be applied to unmonitored
structure.
6.3 These factors also apply to monitored structure in circumstances where the
monitoring system has been removed or is unserviceable. In this case they should be
associated with the typical loading severity to which the unmonitored usage relates.
6.4 It is noteworthy that, for helicopters, the factor of 1.2 need not be applied in
circumstances where design is based on the maximum value recorded in a sample of
measurements which is sufficient to take into account scatter due to mechanical condition and
piloting technique.
7 ALLOWANCES FOR ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES WHEN COMPONENTS HAVE
NOT BEEN TESTED
7.1 This section presents the procedures that must be followed for clearance by
calculation.
7.2 Fatigue is an insidious process which searches out small design imperfections which
are not apparent from the most detailed calculations. For this reason, clearance by calculation
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Page 7 of 15
is normally acceptable only for simple components. Fatigue lives which are not underpinned
by component tests must include an allowance for the added uncertainty.
The following paragraphs provide guidance on the procedures to be followed and the additional
factors to be used when the substantiation is to be based on S-N data. The additional factors to be
used in conjunction with other methods of life estimation must be supported by relevant test
evidence and must be acceptable to the Project Authority.
7.3 When using Miners rule and S-N data, the principal additional uncertainties arise in:
(i) choosing those features of the component which must be examined;
(ii) choosing the most appropriate S-N curve for each of these features;
(iii) deriving the stresses and
(iv) choosing a suitable value of n/N to adjust the life estimated using Miner's rule
in those cases where the chosen S-N curve does not already include such an
allowance; most established design curves will contain a suitable allowance.
7.4 S-N curves should be chosen to represent each of the features of the component at
which failure may occur. At the one extreme, features such as lugs have relatively steep S-N
curves with a low ratio of fatigue to static strength, whereas the S-N curves for fillets are
much less steep and show a good ratio of fatigue to static strength. The working stresses will
determine which features must be examined in detail.
7.5 Fatigue life is strongly dependent upon the local stresses which are applied and for
this reason particular care is needed to ensure that local bending, such as occurs in single-
shear joints, is taken into account.
7.6 The value of n/N to be used to adjust Miner's rule should be determined as follows:
(i) If specimens of the type used to obtain the S-N curve have also been tested under
service-type loading, then a suitable value of n/N should be determined by
comparing the estimated lives (using the mean S-N curve) with those actually
obtained. Alternatively, the mean S-N curve may be scaled on stress, using a
factor on [linear] stress amplitude, to compensate for any shortcomings in Miner's
Rule (enabling n/N to be set to 1.0 when using the scaled S-N curve). Many of
the S-N curves used in Industry have been adjusted in this way and are suitable
for use with a value of n/N =1.0.
(ii) Exceptionally, if such a comparison is not possible, then the following
considerations apply:
In the case of fastened joints with high shear transfer through the fasteners,
Miner's rule is likely to underestimate the life under predominantly tensile
loading. This effect is associated with the beneficial effects of local plasticity [6].
In these circumstances failure should be assumed to occur when n/N =1.2.
When joints with clearance-fit fasteners are subjected to predominantly compressive
loadings any effects of local plasticity will be detrimental and failure should be
assumed to occur when n/N =0.8.
For fillet-type features, a further mechanism is involved - the detrimental interaction
effects that occur when the life of a component is occupied predominantly by the
formation of microcracks - and lives can be seriously overestimated even under
predominantly tensile loading [6]. In these circumstances failure should be assumed
to occur when n/N =0.2.
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Page 8 of 15
7.7 Having obtained an adjusted S-N curve, or a suitable value of n/N, a Safe S-N
curve can be constructed.
7.8 FACTORS FOR UNCERTAINTY
7.8.1 Where most fatigue damage is done where the S-N curve is relatively steep,
the safe life obtained using this curve should be divided by a factor of at least 2.0
to allow for the absence of confirmatory test evidence. It is emphasised that the
life factor of 2.0 is a minimum; a higher factor may be applicable in some
circumstances. Where there is particular uncertainty, the factor to be used should
be agreed with the Project Authority.
7.8.2 In other circumstances, the Safe S-N curve could simply be reduced by a
factor of 1.2 on stress to allow for the uncertainty in calculation or the life factor
of 2 could be used with the stress factor of 1.2 to construct a factored Safe S-N
curve.
7.8.3 For completeness, these factors are presented as Table 4.
7.9 Fatigue-enhancing systems: Particular care must be taken in assessing the benefits of
fatigue-enhancing systems such as fatigue-resistant fasteners and cold-working. The benefits
which are claimed must be supported by data from tests under realistic loading and it must be
shown that the scatter is not appreciably higher than that normally obtained.
8 CHECKING FOR SENSITIVITY TO INCREASES IN LOADING SEVERITY
8.1 In the longer term, the loading spectrum experienced in service seldom corresponds
to the Design Spectrum. For wing-bending, for example, increases in aircraft mass and in the
severity of the normal acceleration spectrum can increase the operational stresses by a factor
of 1.2 or more. For airframes, a factor of 1.2 on the most fatigue-damaging stresses would
approximately halve the safe life for many fatigue-critical features [7].
8.2 At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the sensitivity of individual fatigue-
critical features to increases in loading severity so that those features with exceptionally high
sensitivity can be identified and their stresses reduced so that they do not limit the life of the
structure as a whole. For this purpose, the safe life of individual components/assemblies must
be estimated with the stresses under the Design Spectrum elevated by a suitable factor. This
factor, which will typically be 1.2 for combat aircraft wing bending and nearer 1.1 for
helicopter dynamic components, must be agreed with the Project Authority.
8.3 The life under the enhanced loading will normally be estimated by a calculated
adjustment of the life established under the Design Spectrum. In making the calculation, the
extreme stresses under the elevated loading should be clipped/truncated to the extreme
stresses under the Design Spectrum (normally the Limit Loads) in order to avoid the influence
of any beneficial interaction effects which may not occur in service.
8.4 It is emphasised that the purpose is to identify where local re-design will provide life
enhancements that would otherwise be available only by reducing stresses in the structure as a
whole.
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Page 9 of 15
9 ADJUSTMENT OF LIVES UNDER THE DESIGN SPECTRUM TO EQUIVALENT
LIVES UNDER THE SERVICE SPECTRUM
9.1 Throughout the service life, the loading history of fatigue-critical features must be
reviewed (Leaflet 38) and the effect of deviations from the Design Spectrum must be
assessed.
9.2 The monitoring must be done using Safe S-N curves which have been chosen and
located using the procedures described in this leaflet.
9.3 Subject to compliance with these procedures, including the provision of
supplementary information for those features which are not adequately substantiated by test,
the Safe S-N curves can be located so that Miners rule gives the Specified Life under the
Design Spectrum. As the substantiation proceeds monitoring is unaffected, but components
can be cleared to a corresponding proportion of the anticipated life.
9.4 The Safe S-N curves for all features which fail during the test must be located so that
Miners rule gives the test result when used with the mean S-N curve.
9.5 In circumstances where life factors have been used and less than two examples of
each critical feature have been tested, an allowance must be made for the added uncertainty.
A suitable allowance can be made by reducing the life accredited to the test by the ratio of the
appropriate test factor of Table 1(a) to the factor of 3 1/3.
10 FACTORS TO ALLOW FOR SCATTER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF FULL-SCALE
TEST SPECIMENS
10.1 The purpose in testing structures and individual components is to estimate the mean
(typical) performance. For aeroplanes, both the airframe structure and the loading are largely
the same port and starboard and so in most cases an airframe test can be considered to have
exercised two examples of each component. The same is not true of helicopter airframes
which must be treated as a single test.
10.2 As a general rule, the scatter under variable-amplitude loading is lower than that
obtained under constant amplitude loading. The factors stated here reflect the fact that
airframes and other items which are sensitive to load interaction effects will be tested under
variable-amplitude loading.

10.3 LIFE FACTORS
10.3.1 For aeroplanes, the cornerstone of safe-life substantiation is a full-scale test
of a complete airframe to a factor of 5 times the service life. This factor consists
of an allowance of 3 1/3 for scatter in fatigue performance and a further factor of
1.5 which is applied to those parts of the structure where the loads are not
monitored on a continuous basis.
10.3.2 If only one half of an aeroplane structure is tested, for example, a port or
starboard taileron, then a scatter factor of 4, rather than 3 1/3, is required to
provide an equally searching examination of the structure.
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Page 10 of 15
10.3.3 For helicopter airframe tests, a scatter factor of 3.75 is used to maintain
this standard of testing. In this case, due to asymmetry, only one example of each
critical feature/loading combination is tested, but there is only one such example
on each airframe.
10.3.4 Where more than one result has been obtained, the test life of each feature
is adjusted to an effective value where the residual strength requirement is just
satisfied. The appropriate test factor is then applied to the log (geometric) mean of
the adjusted test lives.
10.3.5 The scatter factors for use in conjunction with the further factor of 1.5 for
unmonitored structure are summarised in Table 1(a).
10.3.6 It is emphasised that these test factors are insufficient to demonstrate that
an adequate safe life has been achieved for all fatigue-sensitive features and so the
test must be underpinned by evidence that suitable allowable stresses have been
achieved and that the test loading is of suitable severity.
10.4 STRESS FACTORS
10.4.1 For tests on mechanical components in which most fatigue damage is done
by large numbers of low-amplitude cycles, a life factor is inappropriate and it is
customary to use enhanced loads.
10.4.2 Several tests must be done and the results must be pooled, using an
appropriate S-N curve, to obtain a curve that is a best estimate of the mean
performance. In this pooling process it is usual to assume a normal distribution of
fatigue strength. The stress factor by which the mean curve must be reduced to
allow for the effects of scatter is dependent upon the number of tests. These
factors are given in Table 1(b).
10.4.3 The safe life is then calculated from a Safe S-N curve constructed as
described in Section 2.
10.4.4 For helicopters, it is usual to test 6 specimens, some of which are strain
gauged in the same manner as components which are fitted to the flight-test
aircraft. S-N curves for the observed failure mode and for other possible failure
modes are fitted through the test results, using Miners rule where appropriate, to
enable an estimate to be made of the mean fatigue strength expressed as an
equivalent endurance limit. A test endurance equivalent to at least 10
7
cycles is
required to avoid large extrapolations to the endurance limit (assumed to be 10
9

cycles).

REFERENCES
1 Perrett, B.H.E. Fatigue endurance of structural elements in various materials
under constant and variable amplitude loadings. Royal Aircraft
Establishment Technical Report 77162, November 1977
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2 Simpson, A. Fatigue data for the derivation of Safe S-N curves - low-load-
transfer joints and lug specimens. British Aerospace Report No
BAe-MSM-R-GEN-0683, March 1988
3 Bullen, N.I. A note on test factors. Aeronautical Research Council R & M
3166, September 1956
4 Ellis, S.D. A combined range-mean-pairs rainflow count of load time
histories for use in the formulation of structurally relevant cost
functions and fatigue analysis. Royal Aircraft Establishment
Technical Report 81122, October 1981
5 Cardrick, A.W.
Pike, Vera J .
On the use of Safe S-N procedures in the interpretation of fatigue
tests. (R) DERA/AS/ASD/TR97324/1.0, December 1997
6 Cardrick, A.W.
Meyer, M.L.
Elastic and Plastic Interactions - their influence on the validity of
the Palmgren-Miner hypothesis. Proc. IMechE Conference on
Designing against Fatigue, London, October 1974
7 Cardrick, A.W. Responding to the challenge - A short guide to the principles
underlying some recent changes to the design requirements for
British military aircraft. IMechE seminar on the Structural
Integrity of Civil and Military Aircraft, Univ. Bristol, September
1990
SECTION 3

Page 12 of 15
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
Life
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
n
g

s
t
r
e
s
s

(
n
e
t
)
,

M
P
a
Life-factored
Stress-factored
Mean stress (net) =55 MPa
Mean
Safe

FIG.1a SAFE AND MEAN S-N CURVES FOR AN ALUMINIUM ALLOY PINNED-LUG
SPECIMEN - SHOWING COMPATIBILITY WITH SAFE VALUE OF STATIC
STRENGTH
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10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
Life
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
n
g

s
t
r
e
s
s

(
n
e
t
)
,

M
P
a
Life-factored
Stress-factored
Mean stress (net) =55 MPa
Mean
Safe

FIG.1b SAFE AND MEAN S-N CURVES FOR AN ALUMINIUM ALLOY PINNED-LUG
SPECIMEN - SHOWING TRANSITION BETWEEN LIFE AND STRESS FACTORS IN
THE REGION OF MOST INTEREST
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TABLE 1 FACTORS NORMALLY APPLIED TO ALLOW FOR SCATTER IN
FULL-SCALE TESTS
(a) Factors on life
Test article Life factor
Aeroplane airframe - complete (both
port and starboard); the factor applies
to the fin and nose undercarriage
(providing these are symmetrical
about the centre line) and to the main
undercarriage when both examples
are tested. It also applies when two
tests are done on any individual
component, which is identically
loaded on port and starboard sides of
the aircraft
3.33 on the log (geometric)
mean of the port and
starboard failures
Helicopter airframe - complete (no
symmetry of loading) or one test on a
component that occurs on only one
side of the aircraft
3.75
Aeroplane airframe - one side only,
such as a single main undercarriage
or a port or starboard taileron
4.00
These life factors have been derived using the customary statistical procedure (Bullens method
2(iii) [3]), together with a standard deviation in Log
10
life of 0.1296; the figures of 3.75 and 4.00
have been slightly rounded. The factors correspond to a probability of failure of 1 in 1000. This
same procedure may be used to calculate the corresponding factors for other numbers of tests.
(b) Factors on stress - to be used in lieu of factors on life in circumstances where most fatigue
damage is done by large numbers of low-amplitude cycles
Number of items tested Factor on mean fatigue limit
1 1.54
2 1.49
3 1.47
4 1.45
6 1.44
TABLE 2 FACTORS FOR CONSTRUCTING SAFE S-N CURVES
Factor on geometric mean life
where the curve is steep
Factor on mean fatigue limit
2.8 1.49
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TABLE 3 ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO BE USED WHEN LOADS ARE
UNMONITORED
These factors must be used in calculating safe lives when loads are unmonitored on individual
aircraft, and the loading spectrum is a best estimate confirmed by regular sampling of service loads
(see Section 6).

Factor on life at low service lives Factor on stress at high service lives
1.5 1.2
TABLE 4 ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO ALLOW FOR THE ADDED UNCERTAINTY
WHEN INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED
These factors are applicable only when the life has been estimated using S-N data in accordance
with the recommendations of Section 7. The additional factors to be used in conjunction with other
methods of life estimation must be supported by relevant test evidence and must be acceptable to
the Project Authority.
Factor on life at low service lives Factor on stress at high service lives
2.0 1.2

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Page 1 of 8
LEAFLET 36
FATIGUE
INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet describes acceptable procedures for demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of Clause 3.2. It was previously issued as Leaflet 201/3. It covers:
(i) conditions governing the use of inspection-based substantiation;
(ii) detection of cracks;
(iii) time to first inspection;
(iv) conditions governing the determination of crack-growth curves;
(v) allowances for uncertainties in estimates of inspectable life;
(vi) derivation of inspection intervals;
(vii) check for the sensitivity of inspection intervals to increases in loading severity.

It is noteworthy that consideration must also be given to the monotonic and cyclic
variations in service temperature where these may have a significant deleterious effect on
performance.
Terms shown in bold type when they first occur are defined in Section 9.
1.2 This leaflet deals primarily with the use of directed fatigue-related inspections to
support structural integrity in service. It is generally assumed that inspections will be defined
using a deterministic approach using fixed mean or design data with factors applied to
calculated life to reflect the known variability in input parameters. This approach centres on
the use of a factor of 3 to allow for scatter in crack propagation as well as the uncertainty in
estimating the crack size that is very unlikely to be missed under service conditions. As such,
it makes provision for inspection intervals to be increased by improvements in inspection
technique, but leaves no room for the wider benefits that could be obtained if sufficient data
could be provided to justify a probabilistic approach [1]; the application of such an approach
would require, in addition, the probability distributions of load, crack length at a given time
and detection capability (probability of detection).
1.3 It is emphasised that cracks meeting the inspection-based requirements in terms of
crack growth and residual strength must not result in the rupture of vital services such as
control runs.
1.4 The leaflet is aimed primarily at metallic structure; special considerations relating to
fibre-composite components are discussed in Leaflet 40.
2 CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF INSPECTION-BASED SUB-STANTIATION
2.1 As a general rule, inspection-based substantiation should not be used for compact
and inaccessible structure or for any structure in which fatigue damage is difficult to detect. It
must be used, however, for any component which is susceptible to defects or to damage in
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manufacture or service. It may also provide a means for extending the life of selected safe-life
components for which the inspection penalties are acceptable.
2.2 Inspection-based approaches are permissible only if the materials concerned behave
in a predictable manner (for example in terms of crack path and failure mode) and where
variability in material properties is known and is acceptably low.
2.3 In some structures the adoption of an inspection-based approach may not be
practicable, for example where growth rates are high and critical crack lengths short, which is
often the case for undercarriage components.
2.4 An inspection-based approach is not usually considered practicable unless the
critical crack size is at least twice the detectable crack size.
2.5 Normally the critical crack size should be at least 2.0 mm.
2.6 Multiple-site damage (MSD) can present a serious threat to the integrity of structures
and mechanical components that are the subject of inspection-based substantiation. MSD can
occur where nominally-identical features are uniformly loaded so that simultaneous cracking
occurs from adjacent sites, such as rivet holes. Small cracks can suddenly link up to form a
crack of critical size; the small size of cracks at the point at which they link up is often at the
limit of practical detectability. The problem is largely associated with pressure-cabin lap
joints on large transport aircraft. Normally the safety of components can be assured without
fatigue-related inspections by withdrawing them from service upon completion of a safe life;
this would need to be established by test in the case of components susceptible to MSD.
However, experience suggests that it may be impractical to protect pressure-cabin lap-joints
from a degree of local degradation due to corrosion and/or disbonding/loss-of-friction -
thereby invalidating the safe life. In such circumstances it must be shown that any MSD
arising from local degradation will be safely contained until it is detected by the agreed
programme of RCM inspections.
3 DETECTION OF CRACKS
3.1 The cornerstone of inspection-based compliance is the crack size that will be
detected reliably by inspection - the detectable crack size. If too large a crack size is chosen,
inspection intervals will be unnecessarily short. On the other hand, if the crack size is too
small the inspection interval could be much too long (the relationship is exponential) and
safety could be undermined.
3.2 As a general rule, the aim should be to choose a detectable crack size that is very
unlikely to be missed at the given location under service conditions. This choice must be
guided by experienced NDI operators using accumulated evidence for the technique in
question and taking account of the standards that have been achieved when special trials have
been done. Detection capability must be demonstrated on test articles representing the
component geometry, cracking, surface condition and structural configuration of the
component in question, with consideration given to lighting and access restrictions which may
apply in service.
3.3 Inspections must be carried out by trained operators using techniques that have been
demonstrated on representative test articles with representative defects. Consideration must
be given to the need for regular calibration and replacement of NDI probes.
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3.4 Attention is drawn to the need to avoid exposing operators to the risk of missing
cracks because they are accustomed to finding nothing.
3.5 If a possible crack is indicated during an inspection then, wherever practicable,
alternative methods of inspection should be used to confirm the presence of a crack before
embarking on repair options.
3.6 Loads acting to force crack faces together or surface treatments such as machining or
shot peening can mask surface-breaking cracks. Where practicable the aircraft should be
loaded such that anticipated cracks will be open during an inspection.
3.7 Evidence of cracking from service inspections and data available from test and tear-
downs should be collated to increase confidence in the specified inspection regime.
3.8 It may be necessary to remove protective treatments or surface coatings to inspect for
fatigue cracks. These should be restored following inspection to the original build level of
surface protection. If this is not practicable then appropriate allowance must be made in
definition of inspection periods for possible environmental degradation.
3.9 Where limited disassembly is required for crack detection, for example fastener
removal, then the structure must afterwards be restored to the pre inspection condition,
including any fatigue enhancements previously incorporated. Disassembly and re-assembly
must not in themselves introduce damage atypical of the original build quality.
3.10 The method of inspection must reflect the position, orientation and mode of cracking
most likely to occur, taking into consideration processes such as cold working that can
transfer the crack initiation location away from that expected in untreated structures.
4 TIME TO FIRST INSPECTION
4.1 The time to the first inspection must be the safe life (Leaflet 35) except where an
item is made from a material which is susceptible to defects or to damage in manufacture or
service, including impact from runway debris, environmental degradation or may still contain
cracking or damage following a repair. In such cases the time to first inspection shall be equal
to the normal inspection interval.
4.2 Following fatigue arisings in service, the time to first inspection (safe life) for
unrepaired aircraft in the fleet must be assessed by recognised statistical techniques, such as a
maximum likelihood approach [2]. It cannot be assumed that a particular arising is typical of
fleet status.
4.3 Normally, the safe life of inspection-dependent structure shall be at least half the
Specified Life under the Design Spectrum. Exceptionally, a lower safe life may be acceptable
for easily-inspectable structure. Conversely, a higher safe life may be needed for buried
structure in order to meet the requirement for the inspection penalty to be acceptable on
operational and economic grounds.
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5 CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE DETERMINATION OF CRACK-GROWTH
CURVES
5.1 By definition, inspection-based substantiation must be based only upon that part of
the crack-growth curve that is detectable in service with NDI equipment that is acceptable to
the Project Authority.
5.2 A calculated crack growth curve for the detail in question is central to the definition
of inspection intervals. A best estimate of the mean crack growth curve must be produced as
described below. Appropriate allowance must be made for the uncertainties examined in
Section 6.
5.3 The following are examples of the considerations which may influence the
maximum acceptable crack size:
the onset of rapid, unstable crack growth
net section failure (tension or compression) including any allowance for loss of
area due to corrosion
unacceptable leakage or loss of pressure
maximum crack size that can be removed - this may be governed, for example, by
maximum bush or oversize-fastener dimensions
maximum size allowing practical or economic repair
any other failure mode, such as buckling, induced by crack growth.
5.4 Mean growth rate data, determined from constant amplitude tests, are normally used
in growth rate calculations. These data must include environmental and temperature effects
where appropriate. If the crack growth characteristics of the material are not known then test
data sufficient to define the growth behaviour, including environmental effects, variability in
growth rates within and between batches, etc., must be obtained.
5.5 It is usual to calculate crack growth using linear summation methods, making no
allowance for retardation of crack growth occurring as a result of peak loads in the spectrum.
However, as non-linear prediction routines are generally available and can afford a significant
increase in predicted life over linear summation predictions, which are inherently
conservative for tension dominated loading spectra, then consideration must be given to their
use. Any benefits over and above linear summation predictions must be shown to be
appropriate for the in-service loading, confirmed by representative tests and agreed by the
Project Authority.
5.6 The crack growth threshold observed in coupon tests with long, through-section
cracks under constant amplitude loading in laboratory air may not be observed under variable
amplitude loading in realistic service environments; much shorter cracks may propagate under
these conditions. It is usually conservative to assume a zero threshold and extrapolate the
steady-state growth rate behaviour down to very low stress intensities. Any inspection period
relying on the existence of a crack growth threshold must be substantiated by appropriate
representative testing.
5.7 The variation of stress intensity factor coefficient during crack development may be
estimated from standard texts, from finite element analysis or from observations of crack
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behaviour made in tests and tear-downs. A record of solutions used must be included in the
Fatigue Type Record.
5.8 Cracks should be considered to exist at the most unfavourable location in a load path.
Where adjacent load paths or details are equally loaded then identical cracks should be
considered in each.
5.9 Where cracking reaches a boundary (an edge, cut-out or adjacent hole) a secondary
crack must be assumed to exist at the most unfavourable position in relation to this boundary
to allow consideration of continuing damage.
5.10 Inspection-based approaches must take no account of the life following arrest of
rapid, unstable crack growth unless arrest capability has been demonstrated in representative
tests and the damage will be evident in service.
6 ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN ESTIMATES OF INSPECTABLE LIFE
6.1 The following uncertainties must be taken into account in estimating the mean crack
growth curve which determines the inspectable life. The calculations should be supported,
where practicable, by test evidence from element tests or the structure itself.
6.2 The geometrical correction factor used in the stress intensity factor solution, the
assumed loading spectrum and the data used in the crack growth analysis should err on the
side of conservatism.
6.3 Uncertainties in calculated growth behaviour: Where there is no full-scale test
evidence to support the growth behaviour of cracks under realistic conditions, for example as
observed on tests or read-back from cracks found during tests or in tear-downs, then a
reduction factor of 2.0 should be applied to allow for uncertainties in the calculated crack
growth life. It is noteworthy that a factor of 2.0 is also used to allow for corresponding
uncertainties in safe-life calculations (See Leaflet 35). As with safe-life substantiation, this
factor may be waived if the validity of the calculations can be confirmed by relevant data for
similar details and loadings.
6.4 Uncertainties in fracture toughness: The inspectable life is terminated when the
crack reaches the maximum acceptable size. Where the maximum size is governed by fracture
toughness, the critical crack length should be based upon Minimum Specification or B
allowable values of fracture toughness. Where only mean toughness data are available these
should be reduced by a factor of 1.3.
7 DERIVATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS
7.1 The inspection interval is obtained by dividing the inspectable life by a factor of 3.0
to allow for scatter in crack propagation and uncertainty in estimating the detectable crack
size. The derivation of inspection intervals is shown schematically in Figure 1. It is
noteworthy that the factor of 3.0 is in addition to the factor of 2.0 that is applied to estimates
of inspectable life which are unsupported by relevant test evidence (para 6.3).
7.2 The inspectable life must be divided by a further factor of 1.5 when loads are
unmonitored (Leaflet 35). Higher factors may be required for helicopter dynamic components
and other items which experience large numbers of damaging low-amplitude stresses.
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7.3 The smaller the detectable crack size the longer will be the inspectable life and,
potentially, the inspection interval. However, to find smaller cracks a more sensitive
inspection technique will be required which may incur economic and downtime penalties that
can offset any benefits from an increased inspection interval.
7.4 Flexibility is needed to allow combinations of inspections at different locations in a
practicable maintenance plan (inspections timed to coincide with other planned maintenance
activities, for example scheduled inspections). An inspection may be carried out at any time
within the defined inspection interval provided that the period between inspections never
exceeds the defined inspection interval.
7.5 Where inspection intervals have been specified in terms of flying hours under the
Design Spectrum, they must be expressed as equivalent flying hours under the Service
Spectrum. This complication is avoided in those cases where it is appropriate to specify
intervals in terms of Fatigue Index or some other appropriate parameter.
7.6 If there are any significant changes in usage or in the aircraft structure itself then the
inspection periods of those items which are affected must be re-assessed.
7.7 It may sometimes be practicable to permit continued operation after a crack has been
found. In these circumstances the desired maximum crack size to be left in the structure after
inspection would be balanced against the desired inspection interval. Specifically, the
maximum crack size to be left in the structure would be treated as if it were the detectable
crack size and the inspection interval would be obtained in the usual way.
8 CHECK FOR SENSITIVITY OF INSPECTION INTERVALS TO LOADING SEVERITY
8.1 As noted in Leaflet 35, in the longer term, the loading spectrum experienced in
service seldom corresponds to the Design Spectrum. For wing-bending, for example,
increases in aircraft mass and in the severity of the normal acceleration spectrum can increase
the severity of the loading spectrum by a factor of 1.2 or more.
8.2 At the design stage, those features with exceptionally high sensitivity to increases in
loading severity must be identified and their stresses reduced so that they do not impose
restrictions on inspection intervals for the aircraft as a whole.
8.3 The inspection intervals of individual structural features must be estimated with the
stresses under the Design Spectrum elevated by a suitable factor. This factor, which will
typically be 1.2, must be agreed with the Project Authority. The inspection interval under the
enhanced loading will normally be estimated by a calculated adjustment of the interval
established under the Design Spectrum. In making the calculation, the extreme stresses under
the elevated loading should be clipped/truncated to the extreme stresses under the Design
Spectrum (normally the Limit Loads).
8.4 The inspection interval required under the elevated Design Spectrum must be
acceptable to the Project Authority and reported in the Fatigue Type Record.
9 DEFINITIONS
9.1 Detectable crack size: The size of crack that is very unlikely to be missed by a
given technique for a particular combination of material, component, access and environment.
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9.2 Inspectable life: The average period of usage throughout which a crack is of
detectable size. The period begins when the crack reaches the detectable size and terminates
when the crack reaches the maximum acceptable size.
9.3 Time to first inspection: The period from entry into service to the point at which the
first inspection must be made.
9.4 Inspection interval: The maximum interval between inspections under the Design
Spectrum.
9.5 Equivalent inspection interval: The maximum interval between inspections under
the Service Spectrum.
9.6 Critical crack size: The crack size associated with the onset of rapid, unstable crack
growth under the load corresponding to the residual strength requirement.
9.7 Maximum acceptable crack size: The Critical crack size or a lesser size associated
with other constraints such as those listed in para 5.3.
REFERENCES
1 Spence, S. H. Fatigue-related inspections: the trade-off between effectiveness and inspection
interval, BAe Report No. BAe-WSS-RP-RES-SOR-000317, 1997
2 Sweeting, T. J . Parameter estimation for failure time distributions when data contain both
failed and unfailed items, Department of Mathematics, University of Surrey,
Guildford, J uly 1988

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FIG. 1 DERIVATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS

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LEAFLET 37
FATIGUE
TESTING

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet describes the scope of testing which must be done to satisfy the safe-life
substantiation requirements of Clause 3.12. It was previously issued as Leaflet 201/4. It
covers:
(i) development tests;
(ii) airframe fatigue tests;
(iii) representation of high-frequency loading;
(iv) test accuracy;
(v) documentation of tests;
(vi) residual strength tests and tear-down inspections.
1.2 For components which experience significant fatigue loads at high cycles, such as
rotating components on helicopters, fatigue testing should be designed to substantiate both the
low and high frequency load cycles and to establish accurately the endurance limit.
2 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
2.1 Where appropriate, design development tests must be done to support the selection
of materials, to establish basic data for design and to support the methods of analysis to be
used in substantiation.
2.2 Generic data on fatigue performance and crack growth may need to be supplemented
by tests on specimens representing particular features of the structure. In general, these
specimens should be tested under constant amplitude loading and under spectra which will
reveal any interaction effects that may need to be taken into account. Where it is necessary to
use a specimen representing a major sub-assembly, it will usually be sufficient to test this
under realistic loading.
2.3 Supplementary tests may be necessary to investigate the effects of increases in
loading severity.
2.4 Due to the complications of applying aero-acoustic-vibratory loadings during major
tests, the methods used to address these effects may also need to be substantiated by
supplementary testing.
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3 AIRFRAME FATIGUE TESTS
3.1 GENERAL PROCEDURE
3.1.1 The main load-carrying structure must be tested, together with sufficient of
the remaining structure, control runs and systems to ensure that the loads can be
applied and reacted in a representative manner. All significant flight and ground
loads must be represented, including, for example, loads from pressurisation, the
undercarriage and such features as arrester hooks, pylons and brake parachutes.
3.1.2 Airframes are normally tested to a factor of at least 5 on life. The
generation of test spectra is described in Leaflet 35. The sequences of test
loadings should be noted, particularly the positions of the highest (infrequent)
loads in the spectrum. Any very infrequent high loads should be applied in a
randomised, but known, pattern to assist in this identification.
3.1.3 The structure should be strain-gauged in suitable locations to enable the
strains produced under the fatigue loading to be correlated with those measured in
static strength tests, flight trials and Operational Loads Measurement (OLM)
programmes (Leaflet 38). In general, strain gauges should be located away from
appreciable stress gradients.
3.1.4 At suitable intervals the structure should be inspected for fatigue cracks. In
these inspections, full advantage should be taken of advanced inspection
equipment such as articulated video probes; particular attention should be given to
those locations which are known to be fatigue-critical. Early warning of damage is
essential in order to devise repair solutions, enable alternative repair schemes to
be evaluated and, where possible, to confine the damage.
3.1.5 Crack-growth characteristics should be recorded where appropriate.
3.1.6 The aim must be to continue the test to the required duration or until the
structure is no longer representative through reasons of repair, production changes
or a major failure.
3.1.7 The fatigue lives and crack-growth periods observed on test must be
reduced to allow for scatter and adjusted to equivalent lives under the service
spectrum using the procedures described in Leaflets 35 and 36.
3.1.8 It may be appropriate to do separate tests on major components or sub-
assemblies such as undercarriages, flying control surfaces, airbrakes and pylons.
3.2 PRE-PRODUCTION FATIGUE TESTS
3.2.1 The pre-production airframe tests is termed the Development Major
Airframe Fatigue Test (DMAFT). It is emphasised that this test must be
complemented by a test on a production structure or equivalent representative
assemblies. The objectives of the DMAFT cannot be met without this assurance.
3.2.2 In cases where the fatigue performance of the primary load-carrying
members is likely to be significantly influenced by high frequency loadings, the
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successful completion of the early part of the DMAFT will be a prerequisite for
test-flight clearance.
3.2.3 The test must proceed at a brisk pace to enable any necessary design
changes to be incorporated into production airframes with a minimum of
retrospective modifications.
3.2.4 Within the constraints of early manufacture and testing, the quality of
materials and manufacture, including influences such as surface treatment, should
be as representative as possible.
3.2.5 In principle, the airframe could be tested as a series of major assemblies
and this would offer the obvious advantage of minimising the effects of discrete
failures. However, for airframe tests, this advantage would be offset by the
difficulty of producing representative end-conditions.
3.2.6 On completion of the fatigue testing, it is desirable to demonstrate that the
Design Limit Load factored by the residual strength factor (Clause 3.2) can be
sustained in each of the principal static loading cases.
3.2.7 When all testing is complete, it is essential that those main load paths that
are still representative of the production structure should be subjected to a tear-
down inspection in order to reveal any significant fatigue damage that has not
been observed during the test.
3.3 PRODUCTION FATIGUE TESTS
3.2.8 Structures of safe-life design and any major safe-life assemblies of
inspection-based designs must be tested to confirm the effectiveness of any
modifications arising from the test of pre-production structures and to show that
changes arising from production considerations have not adversely affected
fatigue performance.
3.2.9 The Production Major Airframe Fatigue Test (PMAFT) must be done on a
structure, or equivalent representative components, manufactured to the mature
production standard. The PMAFT should be timed to extend the clearance
obtained from the DMAFT and maintain a clearance that, for the bulk of the life,
is at least 10% ahead of the life consumed by the fleet leaders.
3.2.10 The loading used should simulate typical usage. Where the usage differs
appreciably between groups of aircraft and these are not rotated for fleet
management purposes, care should be taken to avoid using extreme loads which
are higher than those which will be experienced by most aircraft in the fleet
(Leaflet 35).
3.2.11 As the PMAFT proceeds, all structural modifications which have been, or
are to be, embodied on service aircraft should be incorporated on the specimen.
The test life at which each modification is done should exceed the life chosen for
service-embodiment by the appropriate test factor (Leaflet 35). Exceptionally,
earlier modification may be necessary to prevent the cracking in the test specimen
from becoming unrepresentative.
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3.2.12 When all testing is complete, the specimen must be subjected to a tear-
down inspection in which the main load paths are carefully dismantled and
inspected in order to reveal any significant fatigue damage that has not been
observed during the test (Section 8). The timing of residual strength testing and
the tear-down inspection will be dependent on the life of the type and should be
balanced against the need to retain the test article for further testing, as would be
necessary if a life extension programme were required.
3.4 LIFE EXTENSION TESTS
3.4.1 Life extension fatigue tests must be done where the service life of the type is
to be extended. Ideally, production fatigue test articles, including the PMAFT,
should be used. Where this is not possible, tests may be done on new articles or
examples taken from service. When a service airframe is to be used, it is
acceptable to employ one with a high utilisation in terms of Fatigue Index or
flying hours. This acknowledges the fact that the service life is a small proportion
of the test life, maximises operational utilisation and, in the case of flying hours,
provides maximum exposure to the service environment. A best estimate should
be made of the damage associated with periods of unmonitored usage. Therefore,
the unmonitored factor of 1.5 should be removed and, where possible, the
estimate should be underpinned by OLM data.
3.4.2 The Life Extension Fatigue Test (LEFT) must be done on a structure, or an
equivalent assembly of components, which is representative of the fleet, including
any fleet-wide modifications. Supplementary testing may be necessary to
substantiate the life extension of build concessions or other modifications, or
where existing data are inadequate.
3.4.3 The LEFT must proceed at a sufficient rate to ensure that the test retains an
adequate lead over the fleet. This lead should be sufficient to allow for the design
and implementation of repairs to the LEFT article.
3.4.4 The test spectrum applied in the LEFT should be an acceptable
representation of the usage spectrum.
3.4.5 Where appropriate, additional tests may be required to substantiate
inspection-based clearances.
4 COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO HIGH FREQUENCY LOADING
4.1 Components which suffer significant fatigue damage at high cycles may need to be
tested separately using a factor on stress.
4.2 For example, the fatigue substantiation of helicopter dynamic components is
normally achieved by testing 4 to 6 specimens. A block load programme, representing high
and low frequency cycles is normally used, and a test achievement equivalent to an endurance
of at least 10
7
cycles on the appropriate mean S-N curve is required to avoid large
extrapolations to the endurance limit (10
9
cycles). The required test factor on load must be
applied to the load amplitude, but where possible, the test should use the same stress ratios as
seen in flight.
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4.3 In tests on airframes, it is important to apply the high frequency loading so that the
structure is excited in a realistic way. This means that loading frequency becomes an
important parameter. Successful tests have been done on helicopter airframes using bursts of
severe, but otherwise unfactored, loading interspersed between the low frequency loads.
Aeroplane structures tend to have been tested by applying lesser numbers of higher-amplitude
loads that produce equivalent damage (whilst retaining sufficient lower amplitude cycles to
ensure that any effects of fretting are represented), but here too there are moves to apply more
realistic loading.
5 LOADING ACCURACY IN MAJOR FATIGUE TESTS
5.1 Close control, recording and monitoring of loading is necessary in fatigue tests
because small changes in loads can cause large changes in fatigue life. In tests on complete
structures or systems, or on major components, the accuracy of the applied loads should be
within 3% of the maximum demanded load.
5.2 All applied loads should be measured periodically during the test to check that the
repeatability is within 2% of the particular applied load or 0.5% of the maximum demanded
load, whichever is the greater. This should be done by checking the applied jack loads rather
than the measured loads in the test article.
5.3 Test systems which provide perfect control of applied loads at discrete monitoring
points may produce excessive strains at other locations due to dynamic effects. The aim
should be to achieve the required accuracy and repeatability throughout the structure.
6 FATIGUE TEST DOCUMENTATION
6.1 Fatigue test summaries must be provided in order to meet the requirements of the
Fatigue Type Record (see DEF STAN 05-123 Chapter 333).
6.2 In addition, records of test calibration procedures and frequencies, damage
documents and records of repairs and modifications must be maintained; references to these
must be provided with the fatigue test summaries.
7 RESIDUAL STRENGTH TESTS FOLLOWING MAJOR FATIGUE TESTS
7.1 Where practicable, the test specimen should be used to provide evidence to support
the Critical Crack Lengths which have been used in the interpretation of the test result. This
might be done by removing selected repairs in turn and observing the behaviour of the cracks
under loads of up to the Design Limit Load the residual strength factor. Areas where repairs
have been effected by means of blending or use of oversize holes may also be tested in this
way. At this early stage in the residual strength testing the aim should be to obtain useful
measurements at a number of locations and so the loads should be limited to avoid premature
failure.
7.2 Subsequently the tests should probe the specimen for any debilitating cracks not
detected during the fatigue test. On-line inspection or monitoring techniques should be used
where possible to minimise the chance of premature failure.
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8 TEAR-DOWN INSPECTIONS
8.1 The purpose of a tear-down inspection is to identify any significant cracking that has
not been revealed by inspections during the fatigue test and any residual strength tests.
8.2 The inspection also provides a valuable pointer to those further damage sites that will
need to be considered if the life is extended on the basis of inspections.
8.3 The main load-carrying structure must first be completely dismantled. Extreme care
is needed in order to avoid masking or destroying fatigue damage.
8.4 The structure should then be examined using appropriate non-destructive inspection
techniques, paying particular attention to fastener holes, cut-outs and changes of section.
Structure loaded primarily in compression should be included.
8.5 Each damage site should be examined fractographically and, where appropriate,
crack growth characteristics should be determined.
8.6 Where significant damage is discovered in load paths which may not have been
subjected to a residual strength test, calculations must be done to determine the size of the
Critical Crack. Where this is less than the crack size at the end of the fatigue test, the test life
must be reduced. Supplementary testing may be necessary to support this adjustment.
8.7 Data obtained during the tear-down inspection may be used to validate or develop
inspection techniques.

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LEAFLET 38
FATIGUE
SERVICE MONITORING

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet describes the scope of in-service monitoring which must be done in order
to comply with the requirements of Clause 3.12. It was previously issued as Leaflet 201/5. It
covers:
(i) Statements of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU);
(ii) Fixed-Wing Structural Monitoring and
(iii) Rotary-Wing Structural Monitoring.
1.2 Comparison of in-service usage with design assumptions is fundamental to
airworthiness in determining equivalent safe lives and inspection criteria. Fleetwide structural
monitoring, including monitoring by simple usage parameters is underwritten by Operational
Loads Measurement (OLM) on fixed-wing aircraft or by Operational Data Recording (ODR)
programmes on helicopters. Continuous or periodic OLM/ODR programmes are mandatory to
comply with MoD airworthiness policy.
1.3 Although this leaflet is primarily concerned with fatigue damage arising from
manoeuvres and gusts, it is equally important to make provision for recording other usage
data which will impact on airframe and component fatigue lives; for example, pressurisations,
landings, undercarriage cycles and engine acoustics in flight and during ground runs can all
affect lives. Therefore all parameters necessary to monitor in-service usage are to be
identified by the Design Authority to the Project Authority during the design process.
2 STATEMENTS OF OPERATING INTENT AND USAGE
2.1 The Design Spectrum is the best estimate of the typical loading that an aircraft is
expected to experience when it enters service. In collaborative projects, this spectrum may
represent an agreed compromise between the various national authorities. Since in-service or
national usage can vary from the Design Spectrum and long-term changes may occur to
national flying patterns, it is essential to monitor the operation of most types of military
aircraft throughout their service life. This monitoring enables the changes in operating
patterns to be assessed by the aircraft Design Authority for their impact on structural
component lives and inspection intervals.
2.2 An overview of the way in which an aircraft is being operated is recorded in a
Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). This document contains information and
assumptions relating both to the original design, preferably the Design Spectrum and the
operating intent, and to the current usage. For fixed-wing aircraft, sortie profile codes are
used to describe the characteristic flying patterns in the fleet. For helicopters, the flying
patterns are derived from manual data recording exercises (MDRE) carried out to establish
typical flight conditions, including duration and frequency.
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2.3 SOIUs are published and reviewed by the Service Authorities. However, after each
periodic review, the aircraft Design Authority should be tasked to assess the significance of
any changes highlighted in the latest operational usage data.
3 FIXED-WING STRUCTURAL MONITORING
3.1 For fixed-wing fleets, every aircraft must be provided with basic instrumentation to
enable the fatigue life consumption to be tracked. Furthermore, it is preferable to have a
single range of equipment to undertake both fleetwide structural monitoring and OLM
programmes, configured to suit specific type requirements. The airborne hardware should use
configurable data acquisition systems which can be downloaded to the appropriate ground
support station (GSS) for processing and analysis. This will also assist the investigation of in-
service engineering problems. For fleetwide monitoring, the scope of the sensor fit will
depend on the type of aircraft, ranging from a comprehensive suite on highly manoeuvrable
combat types to a basic fit on aircraft being used exclusively in a passenger role. However,
Limit Load exceedance monitoring is considered essential for all types.
3.2 An OLM capability is an essential requirement for all military fleets because of the
demanding and diverse nature of military operations; the only exception is civilian aircraft
derivatives for which the use is the same as civilian operations. A selected number of aircraft
in a fleet are to be permanently modified for loads measurement and, when required,
comprehensive instrumentation is to be fitted to record the loads on the major structural
components of the airframe, together with other relevant parameters. The number of aircraft
requiring this modification will depend on the range of fleet flying patterns, the number of
roles and theatres of operation; the requirement for back-up aircraft must be considered.
3.3 OLM recording must be undertaken on a permanent basis for combat aircraft and, for
non-combat aircraft, at a periodicity defined by the Project Authority. The requirement to
carry out a periodic OLM must be reviewed every 2 years, taking account of usage changes,
but the interval between OLM programmes must not normally exceed 5 years. The
benchmark for any OLM programme is to capture a sufficient proportion of the fleets usage
across all types and roles to enable an accurate assessment to be made of the total usage. The
Project Authority has the overall responsibility for running the OLM programme but the
specific requirements of the OLM system, the equipment interfaces and analysis routines
should be agreed between the Design Authority, the Service specialists and their advisors.
4 ROTARY-WING STRUCTURAL MONITORING
4.1 The complexity of rotary wing loading makes it difficult to identify and monitor the
fatigue damaging manoeuvres using basic instrumentation. Although helicopter health and
usage monitoring systems (HUMS) will provide comprehensive operational usage data for
most fleets, ODR programmes are still required to record structural loads and other
parameters since ODR results are used to underwrite the clearance of fatigue-critical
components. Therefore, each helicopter fleet must have an ODR capability comprising
sufficient airframes modified with sensors and recording equipment to cover typical fleet
operations and to enable in-service engineering problems to be investigated in a timely
manner. The only exception is civilian helicopter derivatives for which the usage is the same
as civilian operations.
4.2 An ODR programme is required on introduction into service. For helicopters with a
fleetwide HUMS fit, repeat ODR programmes are required when there is a significant change
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in the operational usage, or the life of the helicopter is planned to be extended beyond the
original design life. For those fleets without HUMS, ODRs should be carried out at intervals
defined by the Aircraft Project Authority. The requirement to carry out a periodic ODR must
be reviewed every 2 years but the period must not normally exceed 5 years. The Aircraft
Project Authority has the overall responsibility for running the ODR programmes; the specific
requirements for the ODR system, the equipment interfaces and analysis routines should be
agreed between the DA, the Service specialists and their advisors.
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LEAFLET 39
FATIGUE
LIFE EXTENSION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on the additional considerations which apply to ensure
that the customary standard of compliance is maintained when service lives are extended. It
1.2 The need for life extension should be kept under constant review in order to give
adequate time for preparations to be made.
1.3 The period of extended service life must be clearly defined in terms of loading
spectra and appropriate parameters including, flying hours, landings, Fatigue Index and
numbers of pressurisation cycles.
2 LIFE EXTENSION ASSESSMENT
2.1 All fatigue-critical airframe and mechanical components must be assessed to
determine their life extension capability. This assessment should include features for which an
unlimited safe life was originally declared.
2.2 They must be categorised in the following manner:
(i) those features where the safe life may be extended on the basis of existing design
data, test evidence or in-service monitoring data;
(ii) those features where the safe life may be extended, subject to substantiation by
additional testing and/or analysis, or by in-service monitoring;
(iii) those components which must be retired at their original design life;
(iv) those components where the life may be extended beyond the safe-life by the
adoption of an inspection-based methodology;
(v) those components already subject to a substantiated inspection-based clearance.
2.3 The assessment should consider the methods and assumptions used in the original
substantiation, together with any design modifications and relevant operational experience
including any instances of cracking, repair, corrosion, wear or accidental damage.
2.4 The presence and consequences of multiple-site damage should also be considered.
2.5 All airframe and mechanical components considered in the life extension assessment
should be checked against the build standard to identify components which have been
superseded or are obsolescent.
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2.6 Reference must be made to all concessions which have been permitted during the
manufacture of the aircraft. If it cannot be shown that items with concessions have the
necessary additional life, then they must be identified and either modified or withdrawn from
service.
3 LIFE EXTENSION DOCUMENT
3.1 A supplement to the Fatigue Type Record must be prepared in accordance with the
requirements of Def Stan 05-123, Chapter 333.
3.2 This supplement must record the evidence provided to demonstrate compliance with
all the requirements of Clause 3.12 and its associated leaflets, for the period of the life
extension.
3.3 If no Fatigue Type Record is available, a life extension document must be prepared
to record the evidence provided to demonstrate compliance with all the requirements of
Clause 3.12 and its associated leaflets, for the period of the life extension.

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LEAFLET 40
FATIGUE
FIBRE-COMPOSITE COMPONENTS

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on methods of substantiating the fatigue life of
polymer-matrix fibre-composite components
1
. It was previously issued as Leaflet 201/7. In
order to minimise the need for in-service inspections compliance is normally demonstrated
using a safe-life approach. However, the most common failure mode in fatigue-sensitive
composites is delamination growth and this can sometimes be exploited to provide an
acceptable inspection-based substantiation.
1.2 The performance of composite components manufactured from a given fibre/matrix
system is affected to varying degrees by factors such as fibre orientation and volume fraction,
component geometry and loading and the method by which components are manufactured. It
is essential, therefore, that these conditions are represented in the test specimens upon which
the fatigue substantiation is based.
1.3 The performance is also influenced by the hygrothermal properties of the matrix - the
matrix tending to soften after prolonged exposure to moisture and under elevated
temperature. Slight softening of the matrix can have a small beneficial effect on notched-
tensile strength, but can produce a marked reduction in compressive strength. Any such
effects must be taken into account in planning the fatigue test programme.
1.4 The fatigue strength of composite materials may be reduced by impact damage and
this must also be accounted for in the fatigue substantiation.
1.5 The leaflet draws largely upon experience gained in the Helicopter Industry, where
composites are used for the manufacture of dynamic components such as rotor blades and
control systems. In these applications the fatigue environment is more challenging than is
normally found in applications to airframes. Most helicopter dynamic components are of safe-
life design and are substantiated using a factor on stress (see Leaflet 35). This same procedure
has been applied to composite components and is reproduced here for more general
application.
1.6 In aeroplane airframe applications, the relatively high static notch-sensitivity and
modest impact resistance of high-modulus composites, together with the relatively low
gradient of their S-N curves, means that most components are unlikely to experience
significant fatigue problems [1]. The reserves of fatigue strength are normally sufficient to
permit substantiation using a conservative adaptation of the safe-life procedure described in
the following sections, but using static testing to locate the mean S-N curve and drawing upon
library data for S-N curve shape and scatter in fatigue strength. Fatigue substantiation
obtained in this way must be underpinned by the extensive building-block programme of

1
Hereafter termed composite components
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hygrothermal-mechanical tests on coupons, structural elements and components that
accompanies static certification. The next generation of advanced composites for airframe
applications is expected to be less notch-sensitive and to have improved resistance to impact
damage. As these restrictions are eased, then fatigue can be expected to become a more
significant consideration in the design of composite airframe structures [2].
1.7 Composite materials may have higher coefficients of variation of fatigue strength
than metals. It is important that this variability is not underestimated when determining the
appropriate test factor on stress to be used in constructing a Safe S-N curve.
2 S-N CURVE SHAPES FOR STRUCTURAL FEATURES
2.1 A structure or mechanical component can sometimes have more than one critical
feature according to influences such as loading complexity and severity, together with
environmental effects.
2.2 It is normally impracticable to test sufficient components to establish an S-N curve
shape - indeed this would not necessarily be effective because critical features might change
with stress level. Therefore curve shapes are obtained by testing structural elements
representing individual fatigue-critical features.
2.3 The structural elements used to obtain these S-N curves must be made from the same
materials and by the same processes as the features themselves. They should generally be of
the same size as the feature and be loaded so that the conditions at the test section represent
those in the component.
2.4 These structural elements are normally found to have shallow S-N curves which may
not exhibit a distinct endurance limit. The endurance limit, S
inf
, should be taken to be the
alternating stress a component can sustain for 10
9
cycles; for practical purposes S
inf
may be
associated with a lower endurance providing this does not increase the value by more than
about 1%.
3 EFFECTS OF BARELY-VISIBLE IMPACT DAMAGE
3.1 Clause 3.12 specifies that components which are exposed to impact damage must be
the subject of an inspection-based substantiation. However, the structural performance of
composite components can be degraded by an insidious form of impact damage which is
neither apparent nor readily detectable by inspection. This is termed Barely-Visible Impact
Damage (BVID); it is believed to correspond to the term Undetectable Damage used by the
US military authorities.
3.2 The nature of the BVID threat and how it is to be represented for compliance
purposes must be agreed with the Project Authority. The appropriate energy level will
normally be applied using a blunt impactor.
3.3 In order to demonstrate tolerance to BVID arising from a defined threat, all full-scale
composite fatigue test specimens, other than the structural elements used to define S-N
curves, must be subjected to the appropriate impact conditions before they are fatigue tested.
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4 ESTIMATION OF COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF FATIGUE STRENGTH
4.1 The coefficient of variation of fatigue strength, which is needed to determine the
appropriate test factor on fatigue stress, can be estimated from tests on representative
structural elements. Lower scatter is likely to be obtained if the tests are done using variable
amplitude loading.
4.2 At least 20 specimens should be tested. For most purposes tests on four specimens at
each of five stress levels will be suitable. The lowest stress level should be chosen so that
most specimens fail during the test.
4.3 A mean S-N curve should be determined from the test data using, for example, a
four-parameter Weibull equation (see Leaflet 35) and taking due account of any run-outs
(non-failures). Run-outs must not be treated as failures, as this can seriously distort the shape
of the curve.
4.4 When the test data do not include run-outs, an estimate of the coefficient of variation
can be determined as below. If run-outs are present, the estimate will normally be an integral
part of the optimisation procedure used in fitting the S-N curve (see, for example, [3]).
However, the procedure given below can also be used, providing the proportion of run-outs is
low and that the results from the unfailed specimens are discarded. Static results must not be
included in the analysis.
4.5 An unbiased estimate of the coefficient of variation, , is given by:
=
1
2
1
n p
S S
S
i Mi
Mi i
n

where S
i
is the stress (amplitude for constant amplitude tests) at test point i, and S
Mi
the
corresponding stress on the mean curve at the same life, n is the number of test points
corresponding to failures and p is the number of unknown parameters whose values
have been determined in the curve-fitting process (i.e. four in the case of a four-
parameter Weibull equation).
4.6 Allowance for batch effects:
(i) The test specimens should be made from each of at least three batches of each
material.
(ii) Alternatively, if the failure modes in static and fatigue tests are similar, the
coefficient of variation in fatigue strength obtained from a single batch can be adjusted
using variability data from static tests on coupon specimens, such as may be used for
batch acceptance purposes [4]:
Population coefficient of variation = ( ) ( )
se b
2 2
+
where
se
=coefficient of variation from structural element tests
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b
= coefficient of variation for material batch to batch variability
and
b
=
sb

ft
/
st
where
sb
=coefficient of variation for static strength batch-to-batch variability

ft
= coefficient of variation for fatigue strength variability from coupon tests

st
= coefficient of variation for static strength variability from coupon tests
5 ESTABLISHING THE MEAN S-N CURVE FOR A COMPONENT
5.1 The mean S-N curve for a component must be positioned using test results from full-
size specimens.
5.2 In the simplest case, where only a single failure mode need be considered, an
appropriate mean S-N curve (obtained from structural element tests and normally a library
curve) must first be fitted to each test result in turn so that a family of S-N curves is obtained -
each curve corresponding to a Miner damage summation of unity.
5.3 The mean S-N curve for the component must then be positioned to correspond to the
mean fatigue strength given by these curves. It is often convenient to obtain the mean fatigue
strength at the fatigue limit, but by the nature of their construction the relative fatigue strength
given by the curves does not vary with endurance.
5.4 It is usual to substantiate those potentially critical features which do not fail on test
by repeating the above procedure assuming they were about to fail. However, in principle,
these other features could be substantiated using supplementary evidence as described in
Leaflet 35.
5.5 The mean S-N curve for the component is taken to be that of the failure mode which
gives the lowest safe life (see following section) under the service loading.
6 FATIGUE STRENGTH SCATTER FACTORS
6.1 The factors, given in Table 1 are to be used to reduce the mean S-N curve to obtain
the Safe S-N curve.
6.2 As can be seen, the factors depend upon the population coefficient of variation and
the number of components tested. If high scatter in fatigue strength (coefficient of variation >
15%) has been demonstrated, then appropriate factors must be agreed with the Project
Authority.
6.3 The factors have been calculated to correspond to a nominal probability of failure of
1 in 1000, assuming a normal distribution of fatigue strength. However, unlike the factors
used for metallic materials, they have been calculated to provide 95% confidence that this
probability will be achieved (i.e. that it will be achieved on approximately 19 occasions out of
20 rather than on average) and no account has been taken of the notional number of
[identical/identically loaded] components per aircraft [5]. As it happens, in this application,
the factors are closely similar to those that would have been obtained using the procedure
described in Leaflet 35 and so there is no reason for them to be changed.
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7 FATIGUE LIFE SCATTER FACTORS
7.1 As is the case for metallic materials, fatigue life scatter factors depend on the
coefficient of variation of fatigue life which, unlike the coefficient of variation of fatigue
strength, varies significantly with endurance. It follows that life factors cannot be established
directly without extensive testing and so a form of Safe S-N procedure is used.
7.2 It is inappropriate to use a life factor of 2.8 (Leaflet 35) in constructing Safe S-N
curves for composite materials. This is because the factor is based on the scatter observed at
low endurances when structural elements made from conventional metallic materials are
tested under variable amplitude loading. Composite materials generally exhibit higher life
factors.
7.3 Appropriate life factors for test purposes can be determined by constructing a Safe S-
N curve from the mean [constant amplitude] S-N curve using an appropriate stress factor
(only) from Table 1. Where appropriate, a further stress factor of 1.2 may be required to allow
for uncertainties in loading (see Leaflet 201/2).
7.4 The life factor corresponding to any [variable amplitude] test severity can then be
obtained by calculating the life at that severity, using Miners rule and the mean S-N curve,
and dividing by the corresponding life obtained from the Safe S-N curve. It is emphasised that
factors obtained in this way will not necessarily be achievable on test for all potentially-
critical features. Guidance on their interpretation is provided in Leaflet 201/2.
7.5 Where a life factor is required for discrete (constant amplitude) stress amplitudes (as
might be interspersed between stress-factored loading in tests on some helicopter dynamic
components), this can be obtained directly from the S-N curves by dividing the mean life by
the safe life at the test amplitude concerned.
8 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION FACTORS
8.1 The static and fatigue strengths of polymer-matrix composites are affected by
moisture uptake and temperature. If the operating temperature is close to the resin glass-
transition temperature a significant drop in strength can be expected; moisture uptake lowers
the glass-transition temperature.
8.2 The moisture distribution associated with prolonged operation in the most adverse
environment world-wide can be represented by the equilibrium condition corresponding to a
relative humidity of about 85% [6].
8.3 Often it is impractical to degrade thick components to the equilibrium condition prior
to testing because of the time required to obtain a representative moisture content and
distribution. Instead superfactors (sometimes termed knock-down factors) can be applied.
These superfactors can be determined from fatigue tests on coupons and structural elements
with artificial degradation and without. During degradation, travellers should be used to
monitor moisture uptake and specimens should reach at least 95% of the target equilibrium
condition. The factors so obtained can be refined in due course by reference to tests on
naturally-aged full-size specimens, or at least coupons and/or elements cut from them.
8.4 The effect of cyclic and prolonged exposure to both hot/dry and cold/dry conditions
must be considered.
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8.5 Consideration must also be given to any deleterious effects of aircraft fluids which
may come into contact with the structure.
9 INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION
9.1 Whilst delamination growth can sometimes be exploited to provide an inspection-
based substantiation, growth rates can sometimes accelerate rapidly and render the approach
impractical. In consequence, the detection of damage is commonly followed by repairs which
are underpinned by generic or specific test data.
9.2 Special techniques may need to be developed to detect the occurrence of BVID or to
register potentially-damaging impacts.
9.3 There is a body of evidence showing that airframe structures containing BVID and
designed to the reduced-strain allowables currently employed do not exhibit significant
damage growth under gust and manoeuvre-dominated spectra. Test substantiation has focused
on demonstrating that damage of an agreed size does not grow under service conditions.
Arguably, such damage should represent defects/damage of detectable size (see Leaflet 36)
that would be unlikely to be missed in manufacture, or in service in the case of components
exposed to impact damage. Furthermore, since the damage is intended to represent defects
that might be present throughout the life, the damaged structure would need to be capable of
sustaining the Design Ultimate Load; some alleviation of this requirement would be obtained
if sufficient data could be provided to justify a probabilistic approach, but this would require
information on the probability distributions of crack detection, residual strength and service
loading.
REFERENCES
1 Cardrick, A. W.,
Curtis, P.T.
Certification of composite structures for military aircraft, IMechE/RAeS
AeroTech 92 Symposium, Birmingham, J anuary 1992
2 Curtis, P. T. Designing for fatigue and environmental effects in polymer composites, IMechE
International Conference on Designing Cost-Effective Composites, London, 15-
16 September 1998
3 ESDU Derivation of endurance curves from fatigue test data including run-outs,
Engineering Sciences Data Unit Item 97024
4 DoD MIL-HDBK-17B, United States Department of Defense
5 Cansdale, R. A Note on the Derivation of Fatigue Scatter Factors, Airworthiness Division,
Materials and Structures Dept., RAE Farnborough, September 1984.
6 Collings, T.A. Moisture Management and Artificial Ageing of Fibre Reinforced Epoxy Resins:
T A Collings, RAE Farnborough, Tech. Memo. Mat/Str. 1093, 1987.

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TABLE 1 FATIGUE STRENGTH SCATTER FACTORS FOR FIBRE-COMPOSITE
COMPONENTS
Coefficient of
Variation
NUMBER OF COMPONENT TESTS
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.08 or less 1.50 1.45 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.40
0.09 1.59 1.53 1.50 1.49 1.48 1.47
0.10 1.69 1.62 1.58 1.57 1.55 1.54
0.11 1.79 1.71 1.67 1.65 1.64 1.63
0.12 1.90 1.81 1.77 1.75 1.73 1.72
0.13 2.03 1.92 1.88 1.85 1.83 1.82
0.14 2.17 2.05 2.00 1.97 1.94 1.93
0.15 2.32 2.19 2.13 2.09 2.07 2.05

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LEAFLET 41
FATIGUE LOAD METER INSTALLATIONS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1 PURPOSE

1.1 The RAE fatigue load meter is intended to provide information that will enable the
consumption of the fatigue life of an aeroplane to be monitored, and to give immediate
warning when the aeroplane may have been overstressed. This leaflet was previously issued
as Leaflet 732/1.

2 THE RAE FATIGUE LOAD METER

2.1 The RAE fatigue load meter operates by counting the peaks of normal acceleration,
at the centre of gravity of the aeroplane, that are caused by external forces in flight.

2.2 The Meter comprises essentially an accelerometer and a group of counters to record
the numbers of times that eight or more predetermined accelerations are exceeded. For
variable geometry aeroplanes, the meter must separately record the number of times the
predetermined accelerations are exceeded at each of several structurally significant
configurations or flight conditions. It should be installed so that, as nearly as possible, the
axis of the accelerometer lies in the plane of symmetry of the aeroplane and is normal to the
flight path. An automatic switch in the 24 volt electrical power supply is employed to start
the meter when the aeroplane has become airborne and to stop it before the aeroplane lands,
so that accelerations caused by contact with the ground are not counted.

2.3 The accelerometer is a double spring-mass system with eddy-current damping,
designed to respond faithfully to oscillations up to a certain frequency and to attenuate
oscillations of higher frequencies. It has a good transient response (i.e., a 5% to 10%
overshoot after an applied step function). The meter records absolute accelerations; thus
straight and level flight corresponds to 1.0 g. The meter will not be damaged by
accelerations of 12 g.

3 INSTALLATION

3.1 The fatigue meter should always be installed as close as possible to the centre of
gravity of the aeroplane in order to minimise errors in the measured accelerations. The
distance of 1.5 metres, stated in the chapter, is the maximum that is tolerable; usually the
distance should not exceed one metre.

3.2 Any flexibility in the connection between the meter and the centre of gravity of the
aeroplane has an adverse effect on the accuracy of measurement. Therefore the meter
should not only be attached firmly to rigid aeroplane structure but it should be placed where
structural modes of vibration will not cause spurious inputs. For example, in a high-wing
transport aeroplane the meter should not be fixed to the cabin floor unless it can be put close
to a bulkhead. The fuselage frames behave as springs between the wing and the floor and,
in the absence of the bulkhead, may allow the floor to oscillate at frequencies low enough to
affect the meter.
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4 SWITCHING ON AND OFF

4.1 GENERAL
4.1.2 The switch should start the meter as soon as possible after the aeroplane
leaves the ground and should stop it in as short a time as possible before the
aeroplane lands. Unfortunately the switch cannot be operated successfully by the
extension and compression of the undercarriage legs. During take-off the wheels
remain briefly in contact with the ground after the legs have extended completely,
and the full leg extension persists for a short time after the initial landing contact.

4.2 COMBAT AND TRAINER AEROPLANES WITH RETRACTABLE
UNDERCARRIAGE
4.2.1 It is recommended that combat and training aeroplanes with retractable
undercarriage be provided with a switch that closes when the undercarriage is
retracted and opens when it is lowered. These aeroplanes spend little time flying
with their undercarriage extended, and this kind of switch has the merit of simplicity.

4.3 AEROPLANES WITH FIXED UNDERCARRIAGES
4.3.1 A switch operated by changes in indicated air speed is recommended for
aeroplanes that have fixed undercarriages. However, an aeroplane loses mass during
every sortie by consuming fuel, and it may shed more mass by dropping supplies or
paratroops. As a result it may often be able to fly at speeds below its take-off speed.
If it does so its Fatigue Load Meter should continue to function. Therefore, an air
speed switch should operate at two speeds a higher one at which the meter is started
and a lower one, reached as late as possible in the landing approach, at which the
meter is stopped. Both speeds should be selected to match the performance of the
aeroplane. Usually the higher figure is 10 knots above the speed recommended for
take-off at the maximum permitted mass, and the lower one is 10 knots above the
threshold speed recommended for the maximum permitted landing mass. In any
case the 2 speeds should differ by at least 10 knots, to obviate the risk that small
variations in speed will cause intermittent operation of the meter.

4.4 TRANSPORT AEROPLANES
4.4.1 An air speed switch is recommended for transport aeroplanes because their
undercarriages are usually lowered early in the landing sequence. Gust loads are the
principal cause of consumption of the fatigue lives of transport aeroplanes (in
contrast to combat and training aeroplanes) and gusts are likely to be encountered
during the landing approach. In a transport aeroplane, a switch operated by the
undercarriage would generally stop the meter too soon.

4.4.2 If the aeroplane is designed to operate at speeds below the threshold speed
for the maximum landing (e.g., to drop supplies or paratroops) an undercarriage
switch should be installed in parallel with the air speed switch so that the meter
continues to operate at low flying speeds while the undercarriage is retracted. If an
aeroplane is to be deliberately stalled or spun, the same technique of parallel
switching will ensure continuity of metering. Other special situations will demand
special solutions to the problem of automatic switching. These should always be
sought, because manual switching of the meter is not acceptable as it adds to the
work of the crew during two busy and critical periods in every flight.

5 VARIATIONS IN LOADING ACTION

5.1 In some aeroplanes, the loading actions associated with different phases of flight, or
with different configurations of the aeroplane, may differ sufficiently to cause significant
variations in wing stress per g. For example, changes may occur when the wing sweep
SECTION 3

Page 3 of 3
angle is altered in flight or when vectored thrust is used. They can be accommodated by
using more than one set of counters, and switching automatically from one to another by
means of a potentiometer, microswitch or voltage source.

5.2 When a potentiometer is used, spark suppression must be incorporated in order to
ensure an adequate operational life and to alleviate the effects of contact bounce. Usually
this consists of a capacitor across the output terminals and a resistor in series with the wiper
lead. These components should be installed with extremely short leads, preferably inside
the potentiometer case; they will then suppress the microsparks in the potentiometer which
decompose hydrocarbon vapour and thereby cause pollution of the potentiometer track or
slip ring.

6 RELIABILITY

6.1 The need for reliability is stated in the requirements of the chapter because
unmetered flying carries a heavy penalty. The life consumed during an unmetered flight is
estimated from the records of other flights, and then increased by a factor of 1.5 to allow for
the uncertainty of the estimate. Thus unmetered flying consumes the safe life of the
aeroplane 50% faster than metered flying; hence the reliability of the meter system has a
direct effect on the utilisation of the aeroplane.

SECTION 3

LEAFLET 42
STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS
USING NON-ADAPTIVE PREDICTION METHODS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Within this leaflet guidance is provided to support of the requirements identified in Section
3.2.29 to 3.2.55 - Structural Monitoring using Non-Adaptive Prediction Methods. The
following topics are addressed:
(i) Definitions;
(ii) Related Requirements;
(iii) Exclusions;
(iv) Task Definition;
(v) System Design;
(vi) Training, Testing and Validation Data;
(vii) Model Training;
(viii) Model Validation;
(ix) In-Service Maintenance.
2 DEFINITIONS
2.1 Non-Adaptive Prediction Method
A prediction method is defined as a set of coefficients/weights and a set of transformation
equations that operate on a set of inputs (such as flight parameters e.g. normal acceleration,
roll rate etc) to produce outputs that approximate a target value (e.g. stress, strain, load or
fatigue damage). Prediction techniques use a range of mathematical or statistical methods
that may include neural networks, model-based analysis, linear or non-linear regression,
clustering algorithms etc. Non-adaptive prediction methods use a fixed set of weights,
which are evaluated through calibration/training using target data that contains examples of
inputs and target outputs. After training, the coefficients of non-adaptive methods are
fixed until the commencement of any further training.

2.2 Supervised Learning
Supervised learning is a technique where the model is presented with input data and
examples of the required output data, or target. The relationships within the model are
adjusted, for example by iteration, to reduce an error function. This error function is based
upon the difference between the desired output and that predicted by the model. There is a
plethora of training algorithms used to minimise the error by converging as quickly as
possible while ensuring that the model does not over fit the solution to the training data.
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Well-known examples of supervised learning include Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) and
Radial Basis Function (RBF) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).
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2.3 Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning techniques allow the model to determine the characteristic
relationships within the data without reference to output or target examples. Information
about the characteristic features of input data is created during the learning process and
stored in the model. Output signals describe relationships between the current input signals
and the model internal relationships. Well-known unsupervised techniques include
Clustering Algorithms, Kohonen Networks and Learning Vector Quantisation (which
incorporates both unsupervised and supervised architecture).

2.4 Domain Knowledge
Domain knowledge is the specialist or a priori knowledge about the system. The
application of domain knowledge to select and combine the system input parameters can
be explained by a simple example. The loads introduced into an aircraft structure due to
the deployment of a control surface will be a function of the degree of deployment (e.g.
angle) and the dynamic pressure (v
2
) around the aircraft at the time. Therefore,
appropriate domain knowledge would be that the control surface deployment angle should
be conditioned by dynamic pressure before input into the prediction model. Hence the
prediction model can be used to determine the unknown relationships in the system rather
than learning a relationship already known. For an aircraft fatigue monitoring system,
domain knowledge could be obtained from a variety of sources including aircraft loads
models, from equations of motion, or previous aircraft parametric monitor inputs.

2.5 Numeric Data
Numeric data vary along a continuous scale, such as strain output.

2.6 Categorical Data
Categorical data are discrete and are not represented by a continuous scale. A weight-on-
wheels micro switch that occupies 2 states (true and false or 1 and 0) is an example of
categorical data.

2.7 Training Data
Training data are inputs and the target values to be predicted. The training data are used to
evaluate the coefficients/weights.

2.8 Test Data
Test data are inputs and target values used to test the accuracy of the trained prediction
methods. The test data are not used to change the coefficients/weights, but may be used to
judge one prediction method against another.
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2.9 Validation Data
Validation data are inputs and target values not included in the training or test data.
Validation data are used to compute the performance metric of the final prediction method
after it has been trained and tested.

3 RELATED REQUIREMENTS (Section 3.2.29 & 30)
3.1 This leaflet and the corresponding regulations detailed in Section 3.2 cover the specific use
of non-adaptive prediction methods within an aircraft structural monitoring system. These
regulations are subordinate to and should be read in conjunction with Section 3.2 and
Leaflet 38 - Service Monitoring, as well as Def Stan 00-56 Safety Management
Requirements for Defence Systems.
3.2 It cannot be overemphasised how important it is that those involved in the design,
development and certification of an aircraft structural monitor are familiar with these
standards.
3.3 It is not appropriate to include directly extracts from high-level standards within specific
lower-level requirements or guidance, as this increases the risk of contradictory regulation
with future amendment. Rather, it is more appropriate to call up these standards directly
and hence this leaflet relates only to issues specific to non-adaptive prediction methods.
4 EXCLUSIONS (Section 3.2.31)
4.1 Adaptive prediction methods are excluded from this regulation. Adaptive prediction
methods are defined here as models where the system continues to train itself when it is in
service use rather than just during designated training runs, within a formal training
environment. Without formal control over the training data set, certification of such a
mechanism for a safety related or safety critical application would be highly unlikely and
hence these adaptive networks are not considered suitable as the basis of a structural
monitoring system.
5 TASK DEFINITION (Section 3.2.32)
5.1 All projects require a clear task definition at the outset and a non-adaptive prediction
structural monitor is no different. Hence, the task definition should be clear and concise
and should include the identification of the structural monitoring locations, the monitoring
method (e.g. stress-life, strain-life or damage-tolerance), the required performance metric
for the system (refer to Def Stan 00-970 Part 1/2, Section 3.2 and Leaflet 38 Service
Monitoring), the data coverage required and any constraints on the system. These
constraints might include: limitations on the parametric data available for training, testing
and validation, high-frequency structurally significant loads in monitor locations or
airborne and off board processing speeds and storage limitations.
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6 SYSTEM DESIGN (Section 3.2.33)
6.1 Domain knowledge is the specialist or a priori knowledge about the system. The
incorporation of domain knowledge into the system can greatly improve the capability of
the structural monitor.
6.2 Domain knowledge may also be applied to identify the system input parameters that could
improve the accuracy of the prediction method. For example, if a vertical fin monitor was
being developed, domain knowledge may indicate that sideslip angle, lateral acceleration
at the tail, yaw rate and yaw acceleration are important parameters to include. Many of
these parameters have not routinely been included within an OLM programme parameter
data set. Therefore, early identification and documentation of this type of domain
knowledge for the structural monitor will assist in ensuring that necessary data are
captured within training, testing and validation data sets.
6.3 Each input or output to a model will be either numeric or categorical and thought needs to
be given to the data type and its proposed treatment. This is particularly significant for
categorical data where poor treatment can lead to non-sense outputs. For example, weight-
on-wheels can only be true or false (1 or 0). Therefore, a value of 0.8 is meaningless. In
such cases, spread encoding should be considered, where a single numeric value is
transformed into a set of category variables. This can be envisaged as a large array of
pigeonholes, each of which represents a category. This is particularly useful when the
variable is an output and a number of categories can be chosen. A spread encoding
technique can be used to identify the probability that the answer is in each of the given
possible categories. Examples of this technique could be helicopter flight condition
recognition algorithms.
6.4 Data normalisation methods used for example to match data to non-linear activation
functions and to prevent scale error effects and methods used to reduce the dimensionality
of the input data need to be documented. It is often desirable to reduce the number of input
variables to a minimum to reduce the size of the training data set needed to produce a
suitable solution. This process is termed dimensionality reduction as each input or output
parameter provides an additional dimension to the input space. Dimensionality reduction
can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, input variables can be removed that
carry the least predictive power. However, in practice identification of the least predictive
variables in a multidimensional space can be problematic. Input parameter significances
can be determined by using methods such as Automatic Relevance Determination (ARD).
This method uses a Bayesian framework to identify the relative significance of an input to
the network output based upon the overall variance in the weights relating to each input
parameter. Alternatively, methods whereby high-dimensional input data are projected onto
a lower dimensional space are often used. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a well-
known tool used for this process. The input data are resolved into principal components or
directions. Those components that contribute most significantly to the variance of the data
are preserved. Another method is to use an Auto-Associative network as a feature
extractor. This method involves constructing a MLP ANN where the target output is the
same as the input. The hidden layer that contains the least number of neurons (less than
the number of inputs), acts as feature extractors. The inputs to the prediction method are
then generated by entering the full input vector into the Auto-Associative network and
extracting the outputs of the hidden layer with the least number of neurons.
6.5 It is noteworthy that differences in flight phase or state of the aircraft may necessitate
several different models, if the underlying relationships within these phases or states are
different. For example, the change in state between aircraft on ground and aircraft
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airborne or subsonic flight and supersonic flight can generate significant changes in the
parametric to strain relationships. Hence, it may be more appropriate to incorporate
several models and use deterministic methods, or selection models, to identify which
model is appropriate for each phase of flight.
6.6 It is not appropriate for the design of the structural monitor to be prescribed in the
regulations, as this should be the prerogative of the system designer. Furthermore, this
would inhibit progress and it is highly likely that a combination of tools would be used as a
structural monitor. It is essential however that the design, architecture and all data
manipulation methods of the predictive structural monitor be unambiguously documented.
7 TRAINING, TESTING AND VALIDATION DATA (Section 3.2.34 to 43)

7.1 The data collection strategy will include identification of the data requirements, data
sources, estimated data quantity and data limitations.. A predictive structural monitor will
require large quantities of data for training, testing and validation, throughout every stage
of its development. For most models input data (such as aircraft flight parameters) and
output, or target, data (such as strains, stresses or loads), will be required for training,
testing and validation.
7.2 As part of this strategy it is important to consider the requirements of the monitor.
Ultimately, the success criteria of the monitor will be identified by comparison with
representative data obtained from an OLM/ODR programme. For example, fatigue
damage is usually approximated to somewhere between the 3
rd
power and 5
th
power of
stress range. Therefore, accuracy in predicting extremes of stress is far more significant, in
fatigue damage terms, than predicting steady-state values.
7.3 In addition, the accuracy requirements for the monitor need to be appropriate to the input
and target data accuracy. Hence, the designer will need to be familiar with the input and
target sensor behaviour and accuracy.
7.4 The data collection strategy needs to populate adequately the training, testing and
validation data sets. In addition, care should be taken to ensure that the various aircraft
configurations are covered in the data sets. Stores carriage and aircraft configurations are
likely to affect significantly the relationships between flight parameters and strains for
combat aircraft. For fighter aircraft, combat flap scheduling may have a significant affect
on wing root bending loads. For large aircraft types, fuel management and load alleviation
devices are likely to have effects. For helicopters, weight and centre of gravity
management are likely to be significant. This information should have been highlighted
during the domain knowledge capture exercise and should be reviewed to ensure adequate
domain knowledge capture. Specialist knowledge, particularly from the aircraft Design
Authority, is important for understanding type-specific information.
7.5 The training, testing and validation data sets need to be captured from all practicable areas
of the flight envelope. This is to ensure the models can provide coverage for all flight
regimes and to ensure that any significant changes in the relationships between the model
inputs (eg flight parameters) and the model outputs (e.g. strains) are captured. This
requirement is identified as all practicable areas because it may not be possible to obtain
flight loads data from every location in the flight envelope and hence it is essential that
evidence of the coverage of the training, testing and validation data is also provided.
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7.6 Furthermore, where practicable, data from a number of aircraft should be captured and
used within the training, testing and validation process. These data should be used to
demonstrate that the models can provide a generalised solution across more than one
individual aircraft.
7.7 The possible sources of flight data to train, test and validate structural models are largely
restricted to data from Flight Loads Measurement (FLM), Operational Loads Measurement
(OLM) or Operational Data Recording (ODR) programmes. However, additional data
could be obtained from Ground Resonance Testing (GRT), analytical loads models or
Finite Element Models (FEM). FLM data can exercise areas of the flight envelope not
routinely visited during in-Service operations. Therefore, FLM data could be used to train
initial models to predict the underlying data relationships required for the monitor and once
OLM data becomes available additional training could be undertaken as required.
7.8 The statistics of the training, testing and validation data need to be identified and
documented. For numeric data this may include the mean, standard deviation, minimum
and maximum values and for categorical data this may include the range of different
categories and the population densities. Basic statistical data, such as mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values provides the first indication that the training,
testing and validation data are consistent with each other.
7.9 There is no straightforward method of determining how many data are required to train and
test a predictive structural model. In general, the quantity of data required is governed by
the number of training cases that will be needed to ensure the network performs
adequately. A training case, for supervised learning, is defined as one input vector and one
output vector. In turn, the number of training cases is defined by the nature of the
application, the intrinsic dimensionality of the data, the resolution required and the
frequency distribution of the data. Additionally, the quality of the data and presence of
ambiguous inputs also needs to be considered. Most importantly, evidence of the coverage
of the structural monitor from training data needs to be provided.
7.10 For a complex system in which there is a significant variation between nearby points
within the input or output space, data that are significantly different to smooth
interpolation may not be modelled correctly. More complex problems may require more
complex models and more data to train with to provide adequate generalisation capability.
7.11 Analysis of the frequency distribution of input and output data is a useful tool in
identifying the range and density of the training, test and validation sets. These
distributions can be used to select the most appropriate data for training, testing and
validation. For example, high strain variations are more significant in fatigue damage
terms than steady-state strains. Therefore, it would be ill-advised for benign flying to
dominate the training sets.
7.12 Methods used to check the integrity of the data, including anomaly detection routines and
statistical techniques, need to be applied across training, testing and validation data sets
and documented accordingly. Assessment of the quality of the data to be presented to the
model is essential. Data anomalies, such as range exceedences, dropouts, sensor failures,
datum shifts and bad blocks should be identified and removed. All raw data should be
stored and a record of all data anomalies should be retained (detailed in next section).
Flight data will not be perfect and where there is noise in the data then a larger quantity of
data will be required to train the model.
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8 MODEL TRAINING (Section 3.2.44 & 45)
8.1 The function of the training algorithm is to minimise the error between the predicted
output and the required output. Generally, the smaller the error, the better the performance
of the model. This error is calculated either each time a new data set is presented to the
model (on-line mode), or at each pass (epoch) through the training data (batch mode).
These errors are used to update the internal relationships within the model. During or after
training, the model(s) is/are tested on a data set (test set) to indicate the performance on
unseen data (to confirm generalisation) or to choose an optimal model.
8.2 For some techniques, such as ANNs, a randomisation function may be used to set the
initial weights for training. In this case, a number of models are required as some may get
stuck in local minima on the error surface and the risk of using a model in this condition is
reduced if several models are trained and the model best performing on the test data is
selected. Thereafter, only the best performing model would be used to compute the
performance metric using the validation data.
8.3 There are numerous training algorithms used for non-adaptive prediction methods.
Broadly, these training algorithms work by presenting each pattern of data to the network
and either at each data presentation of after the entire set (epoch) has been presented the
model is updated based upon the error criteria used. The most appropriate method will
depend on the application. Whichever method is chosen by the designer, it needs to be
documented clearly and unambiguously together with supporting material including the
performance of the selected non-adaptive prediction method on training and testing data.
As well as the algorithm itself, the methods used to prevent effects such as over fitting to
the training data need to be documented clearly.
9 MODEL VALIDATION (Section 3.2.46 & 47)
9.1 The independent validation using unseen data (validation set) is undertaken to compute the
performance metric (e.g. fatigue damage). Use of a validation data set is required because
this data set has not been used within the training process. Although the test set is
independent of the training set, it may have been used to select the best performing models
during development. Hence, an element of the independence of the test data has been
eroded. The validation requirements for the models should be set with an understanding of
the accuracy of the input and target data. Where possible, validation data shall be obtained
from a number of aircraft to confirm that a generalised solution has been obtained.
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9.2 For a predictive structural monitor to be deployed, it is essential that the models provide an
indication of the confidence interval in the prediction or the likely error in the output.
There are a variety of methods published in the literature for identifying confidence
intervals. These include using statistical approaches based upon the variance of the output
and the correlation coefficients between the network output and the required output.
Alternative methods include generating confidence intervals by training a second model to
predict the errors in the first model. Also, methods of producing error bars within a
Bayesian training method are frequently used. In this situation, the size of the error bars,
and hence confidence, vary with the inverse of the training data density: larger bars are
produced where data densities are low (i.e. sparse data). Therefore, evidence of the
coverage of the structural monitor from validation data needs to be clearly identified and
documented.
9.3 Although anomaly detection and data novelty detection processes will be in place it is still
necessary to have an appreciation of the sensitivity of the non-adaptive prediction
structural monitor to input variations. The output from this sensitivity analysis can be used
as part of the knowledge base for trend analysis in Service
10 IN-SERVICE MAINTENANCE (Section 3.2.49 to 55)
10.1 Before the monitor enters service it is essential that a performance assessment mechanism
and a performance review plan be identified. Processes for software anomaly reporting are
well established. However, these mechanisms have to be extended to cater for situations
where the software is operating correctly but the output is questionable. A continued
monitoring plan is therefore required. Within this plan the measures for detecting and
reporting input data anomalies, novel input data (i.e. data outside the experience of the
training set) and confidence intervals need to be detailed and methods for undertaking
trend analysis and setting warning levels need to be specified.
10.2 One of the key issues for in-service support will be to identify when structural monitoring
models require retraining. Until a system enters service it is not possible to identify how
often retraining will be needed. This will largely depend on how good the model was in
the first place and the implication of changes in Service usage. However, if measures are
in place to undertake a review then it should be possible to identify when retraining is
required. The main challenge will be identifying erroneous but credible results and here
comparison with conventional statistical methods and trend analysis will be useful tools.

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DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5

and represents the aileron/rudder interconnect

is the allowance added for variation in wind direction caused by

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