Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12990 January 21, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G. N. Trinidad for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J .:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at
P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of
Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the
gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the
Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now
deceased, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw
the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary
found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa
Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the
one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied
to cases of this character is that, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain
carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown,
nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the
commission of the crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they
may be properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In the
present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the Constabulary
soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of
error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as
evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose
signature was identified, before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine
Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall
be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day
said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it
"intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses
are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It
was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits,
and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in
the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential
because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying. (
U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has
applied this constitutional provisions on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases.
(See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil.,
526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the
present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts
fall under some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances
which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the
Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement
again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the
same parties relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section
298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower
court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa a dying declaration or a deposition
in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under these
circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can
rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring
in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol under
oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant
had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the
Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts that these deposition should not be
given in evidence, the defendant not being present when they were taken before the Mayor
and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the
alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet if
there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the case is not one coming within
one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting the statement will not suffice. In
fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further
find this to be reversible error and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced,
however, that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the
owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable
evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the
Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years,
two months, and one day of presidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay one-third part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to
Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, and Avancea, JJ., concur.





















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-75511-14 March 16, 1987
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony
therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was
not able to cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent
court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with
estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud
the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed
to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government
vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal
payments.
2
Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the
accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed.
3
They then presented their evidence at
such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which
one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in
the questioned transactions.
4
In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases
finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now
challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the separate trial:
The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon
their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in deciding these
cases as against them, the evidence for the, prosecution as wen as their own
evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused can not be taken up.
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because
the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other
accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio,
Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not
cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required
to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the
latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused.
We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story
related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and
put him on he stand as part f its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done,
there would have been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's testimony
against all the accused.
5

The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of
right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of
the evidence of the prosecution.
6
While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does
not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should
be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the
motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an
antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused.
7
In such an event, the evidence in chief of the
prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in
the separate trial of the other accused.
8

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in
granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the
claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as
the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the
right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution
9
to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers
are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to
be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud
their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is
presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
... With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted,
Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. 119111, 221
U.S. 325) that it intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far
as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence,
and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended
to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination.' In
other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have
before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S.
v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a
number of cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374;
U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) ...
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court
did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that
decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the
petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the
plot to swindle the government. Thus:
If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in
the conspiracy to defraud, he would have questioned this obvious irregularity.
He would have asked whoever was following up the vouchers why two
biddings were conducted, why the awards to "D" Alfenor' were cancelled,
when the latter were cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.
The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his
duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may
have been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear
evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy.
Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers (including
three made out in favor of "D" Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to him for
his certificate as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all the four
vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were also
presented to him for certification as to funds these three were in substitution
of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" which he had earlier signed but which, according
to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled, Talino claims that he had examined
the supporting documents of the last three vouchers the RIV, the bids signed
by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at
least the abstract of bids submitted in the morning, where "D" Alfenor Motor
Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must have been different from the
ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have
raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was only that
morning that the abstracts containing the name of "D"; Alfenor Motor Shop'
were submitted. The fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers
with the substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was
facilitating an irregular transaction.
It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond doubt the
participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the
four felonies charged in the informations. 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could
be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but
that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said
testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the
latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate
trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it was not
done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other
than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to
invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the
trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
Teehankee, CJ., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
Alampay, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 People v. Tanso (unreported) 105 Phil. 1289; U.S. v. Raymundo, 14 Phil.
416,442.
2 Annexes "A " to "D ", Petition, Rollo, pp. 12-23.
3 Annex "F", Petition; Ibid, pp. 70-72.
4 Decision, pp. 12-16; Id, pp. 35-39.
* Third Division: Molina, Quimbo and Vera Cruz, JJ.
5 Ibid, p. 32; Id, p. 55.
6 People v. Cruz (CA) 46 O.G. 1658; People v. Oplado, 12 SCRA 147; U.S.
v. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289; 88 Phil. 203; Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324.
7 U.S. v. Morales, 8 Phil. 300; People v. Bermejo, 46 Phil. 252; People v.
Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148; People v. Torres, 62 Phil. 942; Joseph v. Villaluz,
supra.
8 Joseph v. Villaluz, supra.
9 Sec. 14(2), Article 111, 1987 Constitution.
10 People v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312, citing People v. Rodulfo Sabio, 102
SCRA 232, People v. Pacala, 58 SCRA 370, and People v. Tan, et al., 89
Phil. 337, 34 1.
11 Secs. 30, 31-41, Rule l30, Revised Rules of Court.
12 237 Phil. 449.
13 Decision, pp. 38-39; Rollo, pp. 61-62.
14 Reply, p. 3, quoting, p. 21, Comment.