1

PI-02-06
!"#$%&'! )*+$",- .'&$/"+ '01 23&"'3#&'#*4
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lllorts to amend the l987 Consttuton have
dstnctvey marked the natona agenda snce the
eary 90s. Years ol potca nstabty and economc
downturns have prompted key sectors ol socety,
and the consttuency t has spawned, to propose
changes n the post-Marcos charter. Speclcay,
they want a shlt to a paramentary system ol
government. Accordng to them, ths lorm ol
government w correct the structura delcences
nherent n the country's potca system that nhbt
sustaned stabty and growth.
However, the proposa s staed by a ack ol
consensus on the process or mode ol amendng the
country's lundamenta aw. \he ndeed
agreement on a process s mportant, the dvsve
nature ol arrvng at ths consensus has sdestepped
the substantve eements ol the debate.
1he Phppnes s no stranger to charter change
havng amended or dralted ts consttuton many
tmes n ts hstory. 1he current ellort s the thrd
wave ol charter change ellorts n the post-lDSA
revouton. Durng the term ol Presdent lde
Ramos, charter change was pushed by a peope's
ntatve odged by a cv socety organzaton.
However, t was stopped by a Supreme Court
decson statng that there was no enabng aw on
the sad ntatve. 1he second wave was n the
tme ol Presdent oseph lstrada when he created
a commsson that studed possbe changes n the
economc provsons ol the consttuton. 1he resut
ol the study was sheved as Presdent lstrada was
deposed belore hs term expred. Meanwhe, the
Cora Macapaga-Arroyo admnstraton ntroduced
charter change n the Presdent's 2004 State ol the
Naton Address (SCNA). Snce then, the Presdent
has made a strong ptch to revse the Consttuton
n her two succeedng SCNAs. lven the Medum-
1erm Phppne Deveopment Pan (M1PDP) 2004-
20l0 mentons charter change as an mportant
relorm measure ol the Arroyo admnstraton. 1hese
pocy statements depart lrom past ntatves to
change the charter n that lor the lrst tme, a post-
lDSA revouton presdent has nsstenty and
openy advocated charter change.
1he present drve aso comes at the hees ol
the wordwde trend n the ast two decades ol
consttutona engneerng. lrom l990-2004, a tota
ol l22 consttutons have been adopted wordwde
(AD 2005), maorty ol whch are n Alrca and
Asa. 1hs s sad to have been trggered by
democratzaton that has swept the word snce the
l970s (Lphart l992:l) and the renewed academc
locus on the nk between economc growth and
nsttutons (Adsera and ox 2004:2).
However, despt e the constt uency and
advocacy lor a paramentary system, ths paper
argues that nsttutona arrangements reated to a
shlt n the lorm ol government have receved tte
attenton lrom key advocates. Speclcay, t
September 2006
Senate Economic Planning Office
Region
Number of Constitution
Adopted
Asia 38
Africa 54
Europe 17
Americas 13
Total 122
Source: Asi an Devel opment Bank
1990-2004
Table 1. Constitutions Adopted by Region
PI-02-06
2
contends that the nterpay or dynamcs ol the
e ectora syst em, po t ca part y and t he
bureaucracy s elt out n the dscourse on charter
change. ln short, ths paper suggests that these
matters shoud be addressed and gven enough
space n the debate so as to deepen and generate
nlormed anayss ol nsttutona choces the
country can take. lmpct n the paper s the noton
that consttutona engneerng s a process that
relects a country's vson ol ts goas and how to
reach them.
1he paper begns by ntroducng the nature and
basc leatures ol a paramentary system, ts types,
advantages and dsadvantages and proceeds wth
a brel narratve ol the Phppne experence n
consttutona desgn. lt then dscusses the roe ol
the eectora system, potca partes and the
bureaucracy n any potca system and presents
persstent probems that hound these nsttutons.
ased on ths, the paper provdes ssues that need
to be deat wth l the country's potca system w
tread the path ol change. 1he dscusson s mted
to ssues dscussed n the context ol the shlt to a
paramentary system. lt does not ncude concerns
rased reatve to proposas lor a ledera lorm ol
government and those that pertan to the mode ol
amendments.
8%1"&0 =",%#&'#/"+ '01 $7" .'&!/',"0$'&*
)*+$",
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Modern democraces can be grouped nto
paramentary, hybrd or presdenta, sem-
paramentary (1abe 2). 1he pont ol dvergence ol
modern democraces
l
es many n the reatons
between the executve and the egsatve branches
(NDl 2000: 4-6).
Presdenta systems are characterzed by
separaton ol powers,
2
whe paramentary lorms'
man leature s the luson ol powers between the
execut ve and the eg s at ve branches ol
government. Hybrd systems, whch are sometmes
caed sem-presdenta or sem-paramentary, are
caed as such snce t combnes the leatures ol both
par amentary and presdent a l orms ol
government. 1he mode and prototype ol
paramentary system s the Lnted Kngdom (LK)
mode aso known as the \estmnster mode, whe
the pr mary mode s ol pres dent a , sem-
paramentary, and hybrd systems are the Lnted
St at es (LS), Cerman, and lrench mode s,
respectvey (NDl 2000:6). 1he hybrd mode was
ntroduced n lrance durng ts 5
th
Repubc where
t has dua executves' wth a presdent that shares
power wth a prme mnster and hs cabnet. 1hey
are accountabe to the egsatve assemby lrom
whom ther power emanates (Heywood 2002:3l5).
Par ament ary syst ems usua y have t he
loowng basc leatures: (l) governments are
lormed as a resut ol assemby eectons, based on
strength ol party representaton, there s no
separatey eected executve, (2) the personne ol
government are drawn lrom the assemby, usuay
lrom the eaders ol the party or partes that have
maorty contro, (3) the government s responsbe
to the assemby n the sense that t rests on the
assemby's conldence and can be removed
(generay by the ower chamber) l t oses that
conldence, (4) the government can, n most cases,
dssove' the assemby, meanng that eectora
terms are usuay lexbe wthn a maxmum mt,
and, (5) the head ol government (usuay a prme
mnster) s a paramentary ollcer, there s a
separate head ol state: a consttutona monarch or
a non-executve presdent (lbd.:3l3).
1here are olten two msconceptons about
paramentary systems. lrst, they are sometmes
equated wth a uncamera egsature. However,
ths s not the case as there are paramentary
systems, whch have bcamera egsatures such
as Canada, Austraa, lnda, Maaysa and apan.
1he \estmnster mode s, n lact, bcamera as the
LK parament s composed ol the House ol Lords
and the House ol Commons. However, n
paramentary systems, t s usuay the case that
the Lower house s more powerlu than the upper
l
Notaby, democraces cannot be cassled accordng to the
nomencature they attach to ther eaders. lndeed, some presdenta
systems do not have presdents' whe some paramentary and
hybrd modes have presdents' (Lphartl992:5).

2
1here are some schoars who descrbe presdenta systems as
havng separaton ol nsttutons, rather than separaton ol powers
(labrn 2000).
Characteristics Parliamentary Hybrid Presidential
Executive/
Selected by:
Prime Minister/
Legislature
President/
Prime Minister
Voters/
Legislature
President/Voters
or via an electoral
college
Role of Cabinet Collegial/
Collectively
Collegial/
Collectively
Advisory
Cabinet is drawn
from
Legislature Legislature Executive
Sample Countries United Kingdom,
Australia, New
Zealand
France, Finland United States,
most Latin
American
countries,
Philippines
Table 2. Modern Democracies and Form of Governments
Sources: NDI 2000 and Heywood 2002
3
house. lt s actuay rare to see a paramentary
system wth both Houses ol Congress havng co-
equa powers.
3
1here are two reasons lor ths. ln
paramentary bcamera systems, t s the ower
house that s the loca pont ol potcs and
governance as t s where the executve s drawn.
Another reason s to prevent the cabnet lrom beng
subected to contradctory pressures, unabe to
command the conldence ol one or other chamber'
(\heatre n Hague and Harrop 200l:22l).
lt s aso nterestng to note that a countres
wth ledera systems have bcamera egsatures
(Heywood 2002:32l). 1he terature cams that a
second chamber or the Lpper House s especay
mportant n ledera states because they tend to
baance tensons that may arse between natona
and oca governments as a resut ol ther shared
soveregnty (lbd.). 1hs argument shoud therelore
nlorm charter change advocates who wsh to
combne paramentary and ledera systems wth a
uncamera egsature.
,-(.*+./)$ .*- 01$.-(.*+./)$ !& +2)
3."41.#)*+."5 65$+)#
1he paramentary system draws ts advantages
and dsadvantages n reaton to ts leatures. y ts
desgn, paramentary system s sad to loster
)&&)7+1() /!()"*.*7) as t avods the egsatve-
executve grdock that so olten occurs n a
presdenta lorm ol government. Cven that the
executve and the egsature are usuay controed
by the same maorty party, t s camed that t s
easer and expedent to pass egsaton n a
paramentary system. ln reaton to ths, the
paramentary system loows the prncpe ol
87!44)7+1() ")$:!*$1;141+5<9 ln comng up wth
decsons on government rues and poces, a
consensus shoud be reached, est the government
break down l a mnster or some mnsters pubcy
artcuate antagonsm towards a certan proposed
egsaton (NDl 2000: 6). ln addton, paramentary
systems pave the way lor $+"!*/ :."+5 -1$71:41*)
because devaton lrom the party ne coud resut
n the dssouton ol the government. 1o ensure the
potca system's survva and the ellcacous and
el l cent lormuaton, enact ment, and
mp ementat on ol government poces,
cooperaton and coord nat on between t he
executve and the egsature are mperatve.
lt s argued that a paramentary system s #!")
&4)=1;4) because eectora terms are not rgd and a
vote ol no conldence can depose the prme
mnster. lt aows a more predctabe and ellcent
eadershp change and ensures stabe governance.
1hs accordngy prevents extra-consttutona
eadershp change such as mtary coups (Abad n
Abueva et a. 2002: 7) and the ke. However, ths
lexbty can become a dsadvantage l the party
system s poarzed such as the case ol ltay whch
had 59 governments lrom l945 to 200l (Heywood
2002:3l4-3l5). 1he marrage ol hghy proportona
eectora system and a lractured party system s
olten the cuprt n ths case whch eads to
1*$+.;141+5 .*- . &"./14) /!()"*#)*+ (lbd.).
Paramentary systems are sad to be 4)$$
7!"">:+ accordng to a recent cross-country study
(Lederman et a. 2005). ecause natonwde
popuarty-based eectons w no onger be hed,
corrupton and patronage potcs are dmnshed.
However, a common crtque ol paramentary
systems s the tendency lor -!#1*.*7) !& +2)
)=)7>+1() branch (Heywood 2002:3l4). Accordng
to a report by the Lnted Natons Deveopment
Programme (LNDP), the executve generay
contros the egsatve agenda because t ntates
egsaton, whe the egsature's roe, n most
modes ncudng the \estmnster mode, s mted
ony to amendng egsaton. ln addton, because
too much power can be concentrated and vested
n the executve, the egsature has tte or no
power at a to admnster checks and baances n
the government.
ln recent years, studes show mxed resuts
regard ng the mert s and demert s ol both
presdenta and paramentary systems based on
such varabes as $+.;141+5? -)#!7".+17 $>"(1(.4 and
.77!>*+.;141+5. Speclcay, the argument rased
by those who advocate the paramentary system
s ts advantage n terms ol democratc survva
(Stepan and Skach n Abueva et a. 2002).
However, t h s t hess has been accused ol
methodoogca gaps and case seecton bas, thus
undermnng ts vadty.
4
lndeed the terature on
paramentary systems and lorms ol government s
st evovng gven the current academc locus on
nsttutons and governance. Nonetheess, what s
cear s that the decson to translorm nsttutons
rarey occurs n a vacuum, t s guded by a
3
ltay s the excepton.
4
lor a compete dscusson on the counter-arguments to the Stepan
and Skach's study that argues the superorty ol paramentary
systems n terms ol democratc survva, see Crsne C. 1orres'
Democratc Survvabty and the Paramentary Crtque ol the
Presdenta lorm ol Covernment n the Phppnes n Iublic Iolicy,
Volume Vll, !umbet 2 (/ulyOecembet 200J).
4
country's hstorca experence, potca cuture
and the goas agreed upon by key stakehoders n
the relorm process.
67" .7/!/@@/0" A@"&/"0#"
lt can be sad that shoud charter change push
through, ths s the lrst tme n Phppne hstory
that the country s wrtng ts consttuton under what
s generay perceved as norma' tmes. 1he
Maoos Consttuton was dralted under duress
when the Phppnes was barey out ol the Spansh
Regme and was about to be coonzed by the
Amercans. 1he l935 Consttut on and ts
subsequent amendments were wrtten durng the
Commonweath Perod, under the auspces ol the
Amercans. ln the same manner, the country was
under dctatorshp when the l973 Consttuton was
lnay dralted. Lasty, the l987 charter was made
n the atmosphere ol a revoutonary government
wantng to nsttutonaze ts authorty and de-
Marcosly' the post-lDSA potca system.
Lnderst andaby, t hese varyng perods
nlormed the character ol the dllerent consttutons
under whch the Phppnes operated. lssentay,
they provded the ratonae lor the knd ol powers
the dralters gave the egsatve and executve
branches.
1he ma n leature ol the l899 Ma o os
Constt ut on was ts provs on lor a st rong
uncamera egsature. lt was vested not ony wth
egsatve lunctons but aso wth the eecton ol a
Presdent who w come lrom among ts members
(Cato and 1apaes l988:l38). Lnder ts system,
the Presdent woud serve lor a term ol lour years.
However, the executve (the Presdent ncudng
cabnet members who were aso members ol the
assemby) woud aso share power wth the
Assemb y, hav ng the rght t o n t ate t he
ntroducton ol bs (lbd.). 1he luson ol executve
and egsatve powers techncay makes the
Maoos Consttuton, paramentary n lorm.
However, the onset ol Amercan rue eventuay
rendered the Maoos Consttuton noperatve.
Lnke the perod ol the draltng ol the Maoos
Consttuton, there aready were many lpnos
versed n the l ner po nts ol Amercan
consttutonasm. 1he experence under the
lnstructon ol Phppne Mc Kney and under the
Phppne Autonomy Act had prepared lpnos lor
the task ol wrtng a consttuton. \hat came out
ol the l934 Consttutona Conventon was a
repubcan lorm ol government wth a presdenta
system and a uncamera Natona Assemby
patterned alter the Amercan system (ernas 2005).
ln l94l, the l935 charter was amended and
made the Legsature bcamera. St, the Presdent
was very powerlu under ths set up because ol the
threat ol war and the ntent ol the Amercans to
prepare a coony lor ndependence. Vast powers
were g ven to the Presdent, ncudng t he
suspenson ol the wrt ol habeas corpus and the
decarat on ol Mart a Law n t he event ol
nsurrecton and rebeon.
Lnder the auspces ol Marta Law, the l973
Consttuton was ratled. lntay, t provded a
paramentary lorm ol government wth the
presdent as the symboc head ol state. 1he Prme
Mnster had a the powers ol the presdent under
the l935 Consttuton, except he was no onger the
Chel ol State. 1he Prme Mnster was the head ol
Covernment n the Natona Assemby and together
wth the Cabnet, was responsbe to the Natona
Assemby lor the program ol government and
natona pocy.
However, belore the sad Consttuton was to
be mpemented t was amended n l976 gvng the
presdent the powers ol the execut ve and
egsatve. lt was lurther amended n l98l whch
made the presdent eected by the drect vote ol
the peope lor a lxed term ol sx years. 1he
amendments vested the exercse ol potca power,
the makng ol aws and the executon ol aws on a
very powerlu Presdent and t he 8a|asang
Iambansa became a weak egsature negatng the
prncpe ol separaton ol powers. 1he l98l
amendment stated that the Pres dent sha
Constitutions Form of
Government
Type of
Parliament
Manner of
Electing the
Head of State
Malolos Constitution Parliamentary
in form
Unicameral Appointed by the
National
Assembly
1935 Constitution Presidential Unicameral Voted directly by
the people
1935 Constitution
as amended in
1941
Presidential Bicameral Voted directly by
the people
1973 Constitution Parliamentary Unicameral Voted directly by
the people (after
the 1980
amendment)
1987 Constitution Presidential Bicameral Voted directly by
the people
Table 3. Philippine Constitutions, Form of Government,
Type of Parliament and Manner of Electing the Head of State
5
lormuate the gudenes ol natona pocy. 1he
Prme Mnster s eected by the maorty ol a the
Members ol the 8a|asang Iambansa, but he s
eected ony upon nomnaton ol the Presdent lrom
among the Members ol the 8a|asang Iambansa.
1hus, the l973 Consttuton morphed lrom a sem-
paramentary government nto a Consttutona
Dctatorshp.
ln l986, when Marcos was deposed, Corazon
Aquno decared a Revoutonary Covernment
under the lreedom Consttuton. Subsequenty, she
appont ed members ol t he Const t ut ona
Commsson to dralt the l987 Consttuton. Ratled
n lebruary 2, l987, t adopted the presdenta lorm
ol government wth a bcamera egsature.
However, t has adopted some characterstcs ol a
paramentary government such as the provson on
the queston hour and the mut-party system,
among others.
lt s evdent lrom ths brel hstorca background
that Phppne presdents have aways been gven
vast powers, even the two occasons that the
government was supposed to be paramentary n
lorm. Couped wth the absence ol genune potca
partes, and the extra consttutona powers and
resources avaabe to the Presdent, the domnance
ol the Presdent s an nherent characterstc ol
Phppne potcs (Rocamora 2002).
ln ts dea lorm, t s the Legsature whch s
the center ol power n paramentary systems.
1ranslerrng the power lrom the lxecutve to the
Legsatve branch s therelor an nsttutona
paradgm shlt lor the country. As such, shoud the
charter change push through, there are nsttutona
arrangement s requred to ensure t he
Parament's authorty and ellectveness.
67" 8/++/09 :/0;+4 <7'!!"09"+ '01 ?0+$/$3$/%0'!
<7%/#"+
As argued n the begnnng ol ths paper, the other
equay mportant nsttutons that are nked to a
change n the lorm ol government s recevng ess
attenton. 1he dscusson that loows brngs to ght
mportant ssues that shoud be addressed.
@4)7+!".4 65$+)#
1he eectora system s a set ol rues and
reguatons governng the votng process. lt s a vta
par ol democracy as t shapes the nature ol
representaton n any system ol government and
structure the arena ol potca competton. lts lar-
reachng mpcaton to governance has been
recognzed (lDlA, 2002:l0). Speclcay, t
translorms the votes cast n eectons nto seats won
by partes and canddates. ln a paramentary
system, eectons usuay serve as a mechansm lor
stabt y and egt macy snce a vote ol no
conldence may render a government shakedown.
Moreover the choce ol the eectora system has
an nluence on the way dstrct boundares are
drawn, how voters are regstered, the desgn ol
baot papers, and how votes are counted, etc.
(Arugay 2003). Aso, the type ol party system that
deveops (reatve szes ol potca partes n
parament) s aso heavy nluenced by the choce
ol eectora system. lor nstance, t s sad that
maortaran eectora systems encourage the
lormaton ol two-party systems n the sense that ts
wnner takes a aspect pave the way lor a rung
and an opposton party
5
(Duverger n Hague and
Harrop, 200l:l37) whe proportona eectora
systems produce mutparty systems.
1here are three broad types ol eectora systems
that are adopted wordwde. 1he #.A!"1+."1.*?
:"!:!"+1!*.4 and #1=)- 25;"1- $5$+)#$. 1here are
three subcategores that la under maortaran
systems: the snge member puraty ()8.), the two-
round or the second baot system and the
aternatve vote. Lnder the )8., the country s
dvded nto snge-member dstrcts wheren a
snge canddate s chosen by the eectorate. 1he
canddate who garners a puraty ol votes wns the
eecton. 1he two-round system s smar to the )8.
except that a second round ol votng or a run-oll s
hed between two eadng canddates l no overa
maorty wnner emerges n the lrst round. 1he
aternatve or suppementary vote retans the snge
member dstrcts, but canddates are voted n order
ol prelerences such that l relers to the voter's lrst
prelerence, 2 lor ther second prelerence. ll no
canddate garners at east 50 percent ol the votes,
the votes ol the canddate wth the east number ol
votes cast w be redstrbuted to the subsequent
prelerences. Lnder ths system canddates are
emnated unt there are ony two remanng n
the ne-up and the process contnues unt one
canddate gans a maorty (Heywood 2002:235).
Proportona eectora systems have two types:
the snge translerabe vote ()6B) and the party-st.
5
1hough a cassc theory n potcs, Duverger's theory has been
crtczed by Rokkan (l970) and Lphart (l994). 1hey contend that
other lactors nluence the emergence ol party systems other than
the eectora system.
6
1he )6BC+ verson ol proportona representaton s
prmary desgned to avod the wastage ol votes
such as that ol the aternatve vote system.
However, under ths system, mutmember dstrcts
are created wheren partes are aowed to led as
many canddates as there are vacant seats.
Canddates are then voted prelerentay and are
eected l they acheve a certan quota (Droop
lormua). )6B ntay counts a canddate's vote
accordng to the most prelerred canddate. Alter
the countng, l seats are unled, the votes ol the
bottom canddate are translerred to the second
prelerence and so on, unt a the seats are led.
Lnder a pure party-st, partes draw up a st
ol canddates accordng to order ol prelerence, the
lrst beng the most prelerred. Partes are eected
and not the canddates, and they gan seats that
are proportona to the percentage ol votes they
garnered n the eecton. 1he canddates lrom the
st ol the wnnng party are those that woud occupy
the seats. Lsuay, there s a threshod mposed so
as to avod sma extremst partes lrom beng
represented n parament. 1he Phppnes,
however, adopted another verson ol party-st as t
merey a ocat ed 50 seat s ol the House ol
Representatves to members ol the party-st. lt has
aso mposed a two percent threshod.
\he the above-cted eectora systems present
a menu ol optons avaabe to consttutona
engneers, desgnng an eectora system shoud
aso consder a country's potca cuture and the
soco-economc context ol potcs (Heywood
2002:237). lven l the range ol choces are dverse,
there reay s no best eectora system (Hague and
Harrop 200l:l37). 1hus, ssues and probems that
characterze the Phppne eectora system shoud

Type of Electoral
System
Subcategories Examples Advantages Disadvantages

UK

France




MAJORITARIAN



Plurality or
SMP (Single
Member
Plurality or
first-past-the
post)

Two-Round
System

Alternative
Vote

Australia

clear democratic
accountability
strong constituency
representation
governability and
stability
decisive nature of
elections
tendency to
produce two-party
systems
simplicity


elections are zero-
sum
exclusion of other
interests and sectors
(multiple cleavages
societies)
presence of wasted
votes
open to
gerrymandering
creation of regional
fiefdoms

Netherlands


PROPORTIONAL

Party List

STV

Ireland

facilitative of
deliberative and
collaborative
governance
inclusion of minor
parties
maximizing
electoral
participation/propor
tionality
parliamentary
diversity


indecisive election
results
propensity for weak,
ineffective and
unstable governing
coalitions
open spaces for
extremist parties
reduced
accountability


MIXED/HYBRID
Additional
Member
System (AMS)


Germany

can combine
positive features of
majoritarian and
proportional
systems


can combine defects
of majoritarian and
proportional systems
6'>!" D5 6*@" %E !"#$%&'! )*+$", '01 67"/& )3> #'$"9%&/"+- F1G'09"+ '01 =/+H'1G'0$'9"+
Soutces: Jhe ln|etna|ional lOI Handbool o| Ilec|otal Sys|em Oesign in tugay, unpublished
7
be the loundaton ol any move to redesgn the
eectora system. lxperts have sted down severa
crtera lor desgnng eectora systems (1abe 5)
dependng on whch best addresses the partcuar
eectora probems ol countres.
1hough the st s not exhaustve, t s argued
that a certan degree ol prortzaton must be done
to accommodate some ol the crtera and an
assessment ol whch opton best lts the country's
goas (lDlA 2002:9). lndeed some crtera may
overap and may even compete wth each other
(lbd). 1hs then underscores the need lor consensus-
budng among key stakehoders n the charter
change ssue.
Cven these crtera, t s worthwhe to ook
nto the Phppne case and assess whether some
ol them may answer the naton's partcuar
probems.
1he l987 Consttuton provdes a maortaran/
puraty type ol an eectora system. y ths, t
means that the country's natona and oca eectve
ol l cas w n through a p ura ty ol votes.
lnterestngy, whe the country has undergone
severa consttutona revsons, tte has changed
snce l935 when the Phppnes adopted ths type
ol an eectora system.
Much ol the probems assocated wth the
eectora system can be traced to the above-
mentoned nsttutona desgn (Hutchcrolt and
Rocamora 2003). 1hs desgn, as schoars noted, s
st a cone ol the pre-Marta aw nsttutons
borrowed lrom the Amercans that lavored the ete
and nhbted the entry ol margnazed sectors n
potcs (Hutchcrolt and Rocamora 2003:278). Prool
ol ths are reports ol the Phppne Center lor
lnvestgatve ournasm (PCl) that show that
eectora potcs n the country s st a monares
cub, domnated by lames wth nks to vta
busness nterests (2004). Ltte has changed n the
potca power base whch n turn renlorces
assessments that ndeed the country can be
descrbed as a weak state' that s vunerabe to
predatory nterests (Hutchcrolt l998, McCoy l994).
ln terms ol gender, women st comprse a
mnorty n Phppne potcs even l they comprse
hal ol the eectorate and the country's popuaton.
More than seven decades snce they ganed the
rght to sullrage, ony about two ol l0 eectora
postons are hed by women (1abe 6). 1hs s way
beow the nternatona benchmark ol at east 30
percent potca partcpaton ol women set by the
Lnted Natons.
6
lt s aso worth notng that women
are bet ter represent ed n syst ems t hat use
proportona representaton rather than n puraty-
maortaran types (Daherup 2005:26).
1he eecton ol the presdent under a lrst-Past-
the Post (lPP) or smpe maorty under an open
party system s another case n pont. ecause
there are many canddates vyng lor the presdenta
post, mnorty presdents get to be eected alter the
lDSA revouton (1abe 7).
Criteria Indicators
Ensuring a Representative
Parliament

Geographical representation
Functional representation
Descriptive representation
Making Elections Accessible
and Meaningful
Ease of Voting: ballot box,
polling place
Lesser number of
wasted/invalid votes
The relative influence of
parliament

Providing Incentives for
Conciliation
Political parties are more
inclusive
Facilitating Stable and Efficient
Government

The electoral system is
perceived to be fair
The electoral system is neutral
The government can do its job
Holding the Government and
Representatives Accountable
The electoral system has
mechanisms for holding
governments accountable to
the constituents
Encouraging Cross-Cutting
Political Parties
Parties represent broad-based
constituencies
Promoting a Parliamentary
Opposition
The electoral system does not
foster a winner-take-all
environment
Cost and Administrative
Capacity
The cost outweighs the
benefits to the country in terms
of stability and democratic
consolidation

6'>!" I5<&/$"&/' E%& ="+/90/09 !"#$%&'! )*+$",+ '01
$7"/& ?01/#'$%&+
Soutce: Jhe ln|etna|ional lOI Handbool o| Ilec|otal Sys|em
Oesign
Position Women Men
President 1 0
Vice President 0 1
Senators 3 20
Congressmen 32 178
Governors 15 62
Vice Governors 7 70
Board Members 124 616
Mayors 244 1,354
Vice-Mayors 222 1,377
Councilors 2,253 10,895
TOTAL 2,902 14,585
Percent Total 16.6 83.4
Source: NSCB
Table 6. Women in Elective Positions, 2004
6
ln l990, the Lnted Naton's lconomc and Soca Counc set a
goba target ol 30% women n decson-makng postons by l995.
1oday, women paramentarans comprse an average ol l6% ol
the egsature a over the word (Daherup 2005:l7).
8
As such, ths means that snce l987, Phppne
presdents hardy represented a bg maorty ol the
eectorate. Consequenty, ths stuaton weakens the
eecton's vabty as a mechansm lor democratc
representaton.
lor one thng, the synchronzed eectons ol
natona and oca potcans have been crtczed
as beng a crcus and too compcated lor the
eectorate to make an nlormed decson on (Rood
2002). 1he wrte-n system whch s sad to be
unknown' n the word (Montnoa l999:l35) s aso
parta to canddates wth easy name reca rather
than the party. 1hs then lavors the ncumbent,
meda personates and the moneyed n enterng
the potca lray, to the detrment ol other sectors
who ack machnery.
1o add to ths, the CCMlLlC's pubc mage
has sullered a beatng n recent years. Mutatera
nsttutons bame ths on the weak nsttutona
structure ol the pong body whch hampers ts
capacty to hande eecton admnstraton (AD
2005). Moreover, whe consstent hgh voter-
turnout s one ol the hamarks ol Phppne
democracy, surveys show that lpnos have
expressed (1abe 8) decreasng trust n the eectora
system. lt s aso worth notng that percepton data
n March l995 and n Apr 2004 ndcate that t s
the upper to mdde casses that have regstered
the hghest decne n satslacton compared to other
sectors ol socety.
Cven these probems ol the Phppne eectora
system, t s ncumbent upon those who advocate a
paramentary lorm ol government to desgn an
eectora system that w address these ssues and
n whch there s consstency and compatbty ol
rues. lndng the centures-od domnance ol the
ete n potcs and makng the eectora system
more accessbe to other sectors shoud be a vta
e ement ol t hese rel orms. Po t ca party
nsttutonazaton s a step n the rght drecton.
Ioli|ical Iat|y and |he Iat|y Sys|em
Potca partes pay mportant roes n modern
democraces. ldeay, they aggregate nterest
demands and educate the poty on the vta ssues
ol the day. 1hey serve as vehces lor stabty and
good governance as they hep n resovng soceta
conlcts (Rey 2003:2). \he they have essenta
lunctons n both presdenta and paramentary
systems, there s emprca evdence that suggest
the mperatve need lor program-based partes n
par ament ary systems. \eak part es make
paramentary systems unstabe. 1hs happened n
lrance (l945-l958) whch had 25 governments n
l2 years, and n ltay whch had 59 governments
lrom l945-200l (Heywood 2002:3l5). Moreover,
the luson ol the egsatve and executve branches
makes party dynamcs very mportant n terms ol
egsatve-executve reatons n paramentary
systems.
Patronage-rdden and personaty-orented
part es characterze t he country's po t cs
(Lande':l965). 1hus, they are unabe to aggregate
demands ol the eectorate and la to serve as a
mechan sm to educate the pub c on vt a
deveopment ssues. 1hs then eads to a potca
system domnated by the ete. Schoars bame ths
on the nsttutona desgn transported by the
Amercans at the turn ol the l9
th
century (Hutchcrolt
and Rocamora 2003) that prveges the anded and
educated. Consequenty, potca partes have
olten been used by the ete to lurther ther nterests
and bud bg one-party coatons even alter the
Marcos eadershp (lbd.).
Candidate Party Votes Total
Number of
Voters
%
Fidel V.
Ramos
Lakas - NUCD-
UMDP
5,342,521 22,654,195 23.60%
Joseph E.
Estrada
Partido ng
Masang Pilipino
10,722,295 21,841,760 39.90%
Gloria
Macapagal-
Arroyo
Lakas -
Christian and
Muslim
Democrats /
Koalisyon ng
Katapatan at
Karanasan sa
Kinabukasan
12,905,808 32,269,100 40.00%
Table 7. Total Percentage of in Votes Garnered By Winning
Presidential Candidates 1992,1998, 2004
Philippines Metro
Manila
Balance
Luzon
Visayas Mindanao ABC D E
Mar-95 +63 +75 +63 +63 +54 +78 +63 +53
Nov-97 +65 +71 +61 +61 +71 +85 +63 +60
Apr-01 +63 +73 +63 +69 +52 +79 +63 +55
Jan-04 +54 +56 +57 +47 +52 +64 +56 +44
Apr-04 +48 +55 +51 +36 +46 +54 +50 +42
Soutce: S\S 2004 as ci|ed in Holmes and Jeehanlee, 200S (Jes| S|a|emen|: |oge|het ui|h |he vo|e o| o|het ci|izens, my vo|e
has a big im|luence in de|etmining uha| lind o| govetnmen| Iilipinos uill have.
Oi||etence be|ueen tesponden|s uho agtee and |hose uho disagtee.
6'>!" J5 K"$ F9&"","0$L %0 .%!/$/#'! EE/#'#* %E !"#$/%0+
9
\he a system ol party-st representaton was
ntroduced n l995, admnstratve constrants,
nadequate nlormaton and oophoes n the aw
such as the threshod and the three-seat mt
(1angka and Habaradas, 200l) render t unabe to
brng more access to the potcay weak sectors
ol socety (\urle l997, 1eehankee 200l, Rey
2003). More than a decade snce the enactment ol
the party-st aw tte has changed n the structure
ol ete domnance n the egsatve branch.
Moreover, the l987 Consttuton seems to have
laed to make a connecton between the eectora
system and the party system. 1he atter delnes the
nterreatonshp between and among partes. As
dscussed above, the open party system mandated
by t he Const tut on does not exact y l t a
maortaran type ol an eectora system as t resuts
n mnorty presdents. Schoars usuay assocate
t wth presdenta systems that have reatvey
stabe two-party systems such as that ol the Lnted
States. 1herelore, the combnaton ol an open or
mut-party system wth a maortaran eectora
system n the Phppnes, resuts n many partes
competng lor the presdency. ecause party
deooges are not present, the common post-
eecton scenaro shows partes consodatng nto
coatons wth the wnnng presdenta canddate.
ln terms ol governance, these shltng coatons
yed an unstabe potca cmate, vunerabe to
breakdowns and crses.
Cven ths stuaton, the desgn ol party systems
(1abe 9) s as mportant as the need lor stabe and
programmatc partes. lssentay, the success ol
partes to ellectvey perlorm ts roe s a luncton
ol the party system (Rey 2003:2). Rey observed
three ways that some countres have adopted to
desgn potca partes and party systems: (a) the
deveopment ol a natona party system that hamper
the growth ol oca, regona and secessonst partes,
(b) the attempt to contro, nluence, or restrct the
number ol partes, and (c) strengthenng party
organzatons by budng stronger party systems
lrom the top down (lbd.). Nonetheess, potca
scent st s agree that a sma number ol
programmatc partes s prelerabe to severa weak
and patronage-based ones (lbd. 2003:2). Cther
lactors shoud aso be consdered n desgnng and
n determnng the number ol partes such as
cuture, hstory, and soca ceavages (ackson and
ackson l997:374). 1hs s mportant lor the
Phppnes n whch the lormaton ol potca
partes has been essentay engneered by the
Amercan coonzers to encourage ete democracy
(Hutchcrolt and Rocamora 2003).
lor paramentary systems, another mportant
lactor to consder s to have an nsttutonazed roe
lor the Cpposton so as to contrbute to the stabty
ol the government. 1he osng party or coaton must
have a delnte roe that s nsttutonay present n
the rues ol the parament.
B>").>7".75
1he absence ol a lxed term ol ollce and the
perenna threat ol government shake-up make a
prolessona, competent and ellectve bureaucracy
cruca n a paramentary system. lt not ony
provdes contnuty and stabty n tmes ol crses
but aso makes the devery ol vta servces possbe
n perods ol conlct. Despte ts cruca roe, t s
surprsng that t s not part ol the dscussons on the
move to amend the charter. 1he roe ol the
bureaucracy n a paramentary system s
especay sgnlcant n the ght ol parae attempts
to aso change the economc provsons ol the l987
Constt ut on t o make t more att uned to
berazaton. Any state that seeks to lurther
beraze ts economy needs the proper reguatory
lramework so that t can manage the rsks and
voattes that ncreased competton brngs.
However, a proper roe ol the bureaucracy n a
paramentary set-up must consder ts endemc and
structura probems such as the spos system,
Type Definition Examples
Dominant Party System One party is constantly in office,
either governing alone or in
coalition
Historic: Japan (Liberal
Democrats), India (Congress)

Current: South Africa (African
National Congress)
Two-Party System Two major parties compete to
form single-party governments
Great Britain (Conservative and
Labour), United States
(Democratic and Republican)
Multiparty System The assembly is composed of
several minority parties, leading to
coalition government
Belgium, Netherlands,
Scandinavia

Table 9. Party Systems in Democracies
Source: Hague and Harrop 2001, p.173
10
overappng agences and the huge number ol
potca appontments (AD 2005).
lor nstance, the nature ol potca appontments
s worthy ol examnaton. 1he Cv Servce
Commsson estmates that the Presdent ol the
Phppnes apponts ll,000
7
ollcas n the
bureaucracy as a resut ol the consttutona
provson aowng the presdent to appont heads
ol agences, nava captans, and other personne
provded by aw. As such, ths must be gven
attenton by those advocatng charter change
precsey because the luture Prme Mnster cannot
appont ths many ollcas. lrequent eadershp
change w render the cv servce noperatve l
these ollcas need to be changed every tme there
s a vote ol no conldence.
ecause the crtcsm olten hured aganst a
paramentary system s the tendency ol the
executve to consodate power, the nature ol
egsatve oversght ol the bureaucracy shoud aso
be an mportant ssue. Some toos that can be
expored are the creaton ol Pubc Account
Commttees (PAC) and the nsttuton ol a set ol
paramentary audtors' such as the one n Sweden,
excusvey lor oversght (NDl 2000). However,
ths must be compemented by greater pubc and
meda access to nlormaton to enhance externa
oversght mechansms and aso ntra-chamber
dscpne. Alter a, guardng the guardans' s aso
an mportant eement ol democratc accountabty.
Lasty, there s aso a need to prolessonaze
and nsttut onaze t he bureaucracy ol the
Parament. A career system smar to the one
nsttuted n the lxecutve ranch shoud be
matched by the egsature. Legsators' capacty
to perlorm oversght s reated to the capabty and
competence ol ts permanent stall. 1hs s especay
mportant n a paramentary system where
theoretcay the power s odged n the parament
more than the executve.
<%0#!3+/%0
Consttutons are not ony ega documents, they
are lrst and loremost products ol potca strugge
about competng goas. 1he ntatve to make
revsons n the l987 Consttuton may have ts
merts and demerts but t shoud be wdey
d ssem nated t o t he peope. Shl t ng to a
paramentary lorm ol government or revsng ts
economc provsons s a compex process that
requres an nlormed dscusson ol ssues. Notaby,
the success ol consttutons as a lramework lor
naton-budng and deveopment rests not ony on
egaty but aso on egtmacy that s lounded on
the nlormed consent ol the peope.
1he loregong dscusson rases key ssues that
advocates ol charter change must expore and
study n redesgnng the country's potca system.
lt presents nsttutona probems as we as a menu
ol nsttutona choces that lramers must address.
lndng an eectora system and nsttutng genune
potca partes and a prolessona bureaucracy that
seek to address age-od probems s no easy task.
\he the eaders ol our country contnue to debate
on the means ol revsng our consttuton, these
basc ssues shoud be thoroughy presented to the
pubc.
Ceary, the paper mpes that shltng to a
paramentary system s not as smpe as t s
presented to the pubc. lt s an ntrcate weave ol
nsttutona desgn based on a consensus ol goas
ol t he d llerent st akehoders. \t hout an
understandng ol these, the purported benelts ol a
paramentary system stand on shaky ground.
7
1estmony ol Cv Servce Commsson Charperson Karna Davd
belore the Senate Commttee on Cv Servce and Covernment
Reorganzaton durng a pubc hearng on S l889 lstabshng
the Career lxecutve System on une 2, 2005.
11
M"E"&"0#"+
ooks and ournas
Adsera, Aca and ox, Cares. 2004. Consttutona
lngneerng and Stabty ol Democraces, A Paper
Presented lor the Annua Conlerence lor New
lnsttutona lconomcs (lSNll), 1Lczon, Arzona, 30
September-3 Cctober 2004. http://www.sne.org/
lSNll04/Papers/ Retreved uy 23, 2006.
Abueva, ose et.a. eds. 2002. Jouatds a Iedetal Republic
o| |he Ihilippines \i|h a Iatliamen|aty Covetnmen|:
Readet. Mana: Kaayaan Center lor Soca Pocy and
Covernance and the Loca Covernment Deveopment
loundaton.
Arugay, Ares. Lnpubshed. Consttutona Relorm and
the lectora System: Reshapng Representaton n the
Phppnes lnsttute lor Popuar Democracy (lPD).
ernas, oaqun. 2005. Consttuton-makng n Hstorca
Perspectve: the l898, l935, l973 and l987
Consttutons. Paper Presented n a \orkshop on
Potca Relorm and Charter Change n the Phppnes:
Perspectves lrom the Naton and the Regon, lugeno
Lopez Center, Antpoo Cty, 8-9 uy 2005.
Cato, Aurora and 1apaes, Proserpna. l998. Jhe
Iegisla|ute n Covernment and Potcs ol the
Phppnes, eds. Rau de Cuzman and Ma Relorma,
pp.l33-l63. Sngapore: Cxlord Lnversty Press.
Corone, Shea et.a. 2004. 1he Ruemakers: How the
\eathy and \e-orn Domnate Congress. uezon
Cty: Phppne Center lor lnvestgatve ournasm
(PCl).
Daherup, D. 2005. S|ta|egies |o Inhance \omens
Ioli|ical Reptesen|a|ion in Oi||eten| Ilec|otal Sys|ems
n Cender, Covernance and Democracy: \omen n
Potcs, lSlS Monograph Seres, lssue Nol.Voume l.
Dresse, orn. 2005. S|teng|hening Covetnance Jhtough
Cons|i|u|ional Re|otm n 1he Covernance rel. Asan
Deveopment ank (AD). http://www.adb.org/
Documents/Perodcas/C/ Retreved une l,2006.
Hague. Rod and Harrop, Martn. 200l. Comparatve
Covernment and Potcs: An lntroducton. New York:
Pagrave.
Heywood, Andrew. 2002. Potcs. New York: Pagrave.
Hutchcrolt, Pau. l998. 1he Potcs ol ankng n the
Phppnes. uezon Cty: Ateneo de Mana Lnversty
Press.
Hutchcrolt, Pau and Rocamora, oe. 2003. S|tong
Oemands and \eal lns|i|u|ions: Jhe Ctigins and
Ivolu|ion o| |he Oemocta|ic Oe|ici| in |he Ihilippines
n ourna ol last Asan Studes 3, no. 2: 259-292.
Lande, Car. l965.Leaders, lactons and Partes, the
Structure ol Phppne Potcs. Yae Lnversty
Southeast Asa Studes Monograph Seres, Number 6.
New Haven: Yae Lnversty.
Lederman, Dane et.a. 2005. ccoun|abili|y and
Cottup|ion: Ioli|ical lns|i|u|ions Ma||et n lconomcs
and Potcs, Voume l7, Number l: l-35. http://
wbn00l8.wordbank.org/ac/acnlocent.nsl/
Retreved September 5,2006.
Lphart, Arend, ed.l992. Iatliamen|aty vetsus Itesiden|ial
Covetnmen|. n Cxlord Readngs n Potcs and
Covernment. Cxlord: Cxlord Lnversty Press.
McCoy, Alred, ed.l994.An Anarchy ol lames: State
and lamy n the Phppnes. uezon Cty: Ateneo
Lnversty Press.
Montnoa, Cabrea. l999. Partes and Accountabty
n the Phppnes. /outnal o| Oemoctacy l0(l).
Rey, enamn. 2003. Ioli|ical Iat|ies and Ioli|ical
Ingineeting in |he siaIaci|ic Region n.last-\est
Center Asa-Paclc lssues, Number 7l.
Rood, Steven. 2002. lectons as Compcated and
lmportant lvents n the Phppnes. Pp. l47-l64 n
Hou sia Vo|es, ohn luh-Sheng Hseh and Davd
Newman, eds. New York: Chatham House Pubshers.
1angka, lrtze and Habaradas, Ma. Race. 200l. Party-
Lst System: 1he Phppne lxperence. lredrch lbert
Stltung Cnne Papers. http://www.les.org.ph/
papers_partyst.htm Retreved on September 5,2006.
1eehankee, uo. 2002. lectora Potcs n the
Phppnes. Pp. l49-202 n Ilec|otal Ioli|ics in
Sou|heas| and Ias| sia, Aure Crossant, Cabree
runs, and Mare ohn, eds. Sngapore: lredrch lbert
Stltung.
1eehankee, uo and Homes, Ronad. 2005. lectora
Admnstraton and Natona lectora Relorm. Paper
Presented n a \orkshop on Potca Relorm and
Charter Change n the Phppnes: Perspectves lrom
the Naton and the Regon, lugeno Lopez Center,
Antpoo Cty, 8-9 uy 2005.
1orres, Crsne 2003. Oemocta|ic Sutvivabili|y and |he
Iatliamen|aty Cti|ique o| |he Itesiden|ial Iotm o|
Covetnmen| in |he Ihilippines n Pubc Pocy Voume
Vll. Number 2: l-36.
\urle, Davd. l997. 1he Party-Lst lectons: Sectora
or Natona: Success or laure: ln Kasarnan, Voume
l3. Number 2: 6-l9.
12
Cther Documents
Asan Deveopment ank (AD). 2005. Country
Covernance Assessment: Phppnes.http://
www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/CCA/ Retreved
September 5 2006.
Natona Democratc lnsttute (NDl). 2000. Strengthenng
Legsatve Capacty n Legsatve-lxecutve Reatons
n Legsatve Paper Seres Number 6. http://
www. u n d p. o r g / g o v e r n a n c e / e v e n t s t e s /
Legsature1echnques200l/ Retreved May 5, 2006.
lnternatona lnsttute lor Democracy and lectora As-
sstance. 2002. lnternatona lDlA Handbook
ollectora System Desgn. http://www.upd.oas.org/ab/
Documents/lapp/ Retreved August 24.
1ranscrpt ol the Pubc Hearng ol the Senate Commttee
on Cv Servce and Covernment Reorganzaton on
Senate l889 lstabshng the Career lxecutve
System on une 2, 2005.
Lnted Natons Deveopment Program.l999. Covetning
Sys|ems and Ixecu|iveIegisla|ive Rela|ions. http://
m a g n e t . u n d p . o r g / D o c s / p a r a m e n t s /
governng%20system.htm. Retreved on May l2, 2006
Covernment \ebstes
Commsson on lectons (CCMlLlC)
Natona Statstca Coordnatng oard (NSC)
1he vews and opnons expressed heren
are those ol the SlPC and do not necessary
relect those ol the Senate, ol ts eadershp, or
ol ts ndvdua members.
1hs paper was prncpay prepared by Dr.
ean lncnas-lranco and Aan 1abzo ol the
Covernance Sector wth research asstance lrom
Cerad ryan Dmacuangan (student ntern)
under the supervson t he SlPC D rector
Cenera.