CHAPTER

4
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was rst pub-
lished by the ASME in 1915 as the Rules for the Construction of
Stationary Boiler and for Allowable Working Pressures in the
Report of the Committee to Formulate Standard Specications for
the Construction of Steam Boilers and Other Pressure Vessels and
their Care in Service. The Committee was ofcially known as the
Boiler Code Committee. The document was 114 pages ,
and the scope was identied as follows:
These Rules do not apply to boilers which are subject to
federal inspection and control, including marine boilers,
boilers of steam locomotive and other self-propelled rail-
road apparatus.
The Rules are divided into two parts. PART I applies to new
installations (Section I, Power Boilers; Section II, Heating
Boilers). PART II applies to existing installations.
The purpose of the Code was to address the needs of the indus-
try with regard to safety of red steam boilers. The problem the
Code was intended to address was that explosions of steam boil-
ers were killing hundreds of people each year and causing great
damage. From the turn of the century to 1915, thousands of
deaths were caused by boiler explosions. The ASME addressed
the issue by requesting engineers from industry to volunteer their
time to write a set of engineering rules that could be adopted into
state laws to ensure the proper construction of steam boilers [1].
In the 50 years after the Code was rst published, the number of
deaths caused by explosions of properly operated boilers and
pressure vessels was reduced to essentially zero when the con-
struction rules of the ASME Code were met. Subsequently, this
outstanding record of safety has remained intact. No other indus-
try has a better safety record.
Over the years, there have been many changes to the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code. All the changes to the
(5 * 8)
Code are suggested and approved by volunteers from industry,
including designers, manufacturers, inspectors, users, material
manufacturers, regulators, state jurisdictions, and consultants. All
proposed changes are recorded in the ASME Minutes and are
voted on by the BPV Committee members. However, permanent
records of meetings are only maintained for a limited period of
time, and unfortunately most of the old ASME Minutes are no
longer available. Because of this, people often forget the intent
behind the changes made to the Code, or the reason the change
was felt to be necessary. As a consequence, in todays litigious
society, the written words are often misunderstood or taken out of
context by well-meaning but unknowledgeable personnel, and
sometimes the misinterpreted words become more important than
the engineering principles embedded in the Code. When common
sense and good engineering judgment are lost, costs are unneces-
sarily increased. Another consequence of these types of misunder-
standings is that the subsequent design of pressure vessels or
piping may be less safe.
One purpose of this commentary is to help Code users apply
common sense when using the Code, and to provide some guid-
ance for understanding Code requirements as they should be
applied in practice. Fundamentally, the ASME Code is an engi-
neering document written by engineers, to be understood by
engineers and others thoroughly familiar with the construction
practices required for building pressure-retaining components.
When there are questions about the requirements in the Code, the
proper authority for resolving issues is the engineering group
responsible for the design, not the quality group that monitors
construction activities or quality control inspectors. This is obvi-
ous to those who understand that the Code is based on the
application of engineering principles. If personnel who are not
qualied engineers try to interpret engineering provisions of the
Code, the result may be equipment-cost overruns, component
failures, injuries, or even deaths. Inappropriate interpretation of
Code requirements by nonengineering personnel in the nuclear
industry has resulted in an excessive number of unnecessary
A COMMENTARY FOR
UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ASME
BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE
Roger F. Reedy
4-2 Chapter 4
repairs, delays in construction, and huge cost increases. Often,
the cost of equipment was double or triple what it should have
been. It is hoped that this commentary will provide the basis for
engineers to understand the Code requirements through the proper
use of engineering judgment.
The Foreword to the ASME Code was revised in the 1992
Addenda to emphasize that the Code is not a handbook and can-
not substitute for the use of engineering judgment. This revision
to the Foreword also included deletion of all references to the
words minimum requirements as pertain to the Code. The rea-
son for the deletion is to clarify that once Code requirements have
been met, everything necessary to meet safety standards has been
accomplished. There are no other provisions that must supple-
ment Code requirements to assure a safe structure.
Another purpose of this commentary is to provide engineers,
owners, inspectors, regulatory institutions, and other Code users
with a better understanding of the basic principles of the Code.
Many people interpret Code requirements without understanding
the engineering principles involved. Experience has shown that
regulators, users, inspectors, quality assurance personnel, and oth-
ers often base their interpretations of requirements by reading
statements that are taken completely out of context. In one case, a
federal judge, with no engineering background, ruled that only he
could interpret the engineering requirements in the Code, because
the Code was part of Federal Law. Based on this, he read the
design requirements in the Code book, then tried to interpret how
thermal stress was to be categorized. He based his decision on the
placement of a comma in a sentence. Fortunately, the comma was
in the right place, and thus he agreed with the opinion of the
expert witness. Although the outcome was correct, the legal
process was completely awed.
Interpretations of Code requirements by other than the
responsible engineers were a large contributor to the devastating
cost escalations that resulted in stopping of construction of
nuclear power plants in the United States.
Often, quality assurance personnel, company inspectors, and
regulators would interpret the ASME Code incorrectly, and then
force knowledgeable personnel to make changes that unneces-
sarily increased costs, and in some cases reduced the structural
safety of the item. For example, they could reject welds that
were acceptable, thus requiring weld repairs that increased
residual stresses in the component.
At one nuclear plant more than 10,000 welds were rejected,
rewelded, rejected again, and repaired again. Hundreds of ques-
tionable but structurally adequate welds were rejected and
repaired. Then the company inspectors were trained to understand
the claried visual weld acceptance criteria that included appro-
priate tolerances. The criteria had been reviewed and accepted by
the United States Regulatory Commission. Using these criteria, it
was determined that all of the welds had been acceptable from the
start. All of the supplementary inspections, nonconformance
reports (NCRs), and re-welding had been a complete waste of
time and energy. All of the work expended did nothing to improve
the structures. Proper training of inspectors before the start of any
inspections would have prevented the problem.
In countries outside the United States, this problem does not
tend to occur. As a result, nuclear power plants are being built on
schedule and within budget outside the United States, even
though the same ASME Code is used for construction of these
plants.
In the United States, the owners or operators of pressure retain-
ing equipment often do not understand their responsibilities to
properly train personnel and provide proper written instructions in
the language that the workers can understand. Use of pictures and
visual presentations is often appropriate for workers who have
problems understanding English.
The manufacturer of pressure retaining equipment depends on
the owner or user to identify the appropriate loads for which the
equipment must be designed. The owner or his agent (a system
engineer) understands how the equipment will be used in service,
and must identify the loadings and design conditions for the
equipment. The specied design conditions must encompass the
loadings expected during all service conditions. Given that infor-
mation, the manufacturer can then design and construct the equip-
ment to meet the requirements of the ASME Code. When Code
requirements have been met, the equipment will be capable of
operating under the conditions specied by the owner, the user, or
his designated agent. If the equipment is operated outside of the
specied conditions, the fault lies with the owner, not with the
manufacturer of the equipment.
Another responsibility of the owner is to ensure that the cong-
uration of pressure retaining equipment is properly maintained in
service. For example, the equipment should be routinely exam-
ined to assure that the thickness of the wall or shell is not reduced
below the minimum design thickness. The equipment should not
be subjected to loads that signicantly exceed the specied design
loads, unless an engineering evaluation shows that the new loads
are acceptable.
The ASME BPV Code is a Code for the design and construc-
tion of new pressure-retaining equipment, which is used in thou-
sands of different applications. Once the Code rules have been
met and the equipment has been certied and stamped as being in
compliance with the Code, the safe operation of the equipment is
the responsibility of the Owner or user, not the manufacturer of
the equipment. The state or federal government may inspect the
installation of the equipment, but it is the responsibility of the
Owner or user to establish procedures and training programs for
employees and ensure that the proper procedures are being fol-
lowed. When not operated properly, pressure-retaining equipment
can be very dangerous.
This commentary addresses some of the issues that have caused
problems in the past. Many of the issues identied originated in
the application of the Section III Nuclear Code, but the same
issues are also occurring in other industries using other sections
of the ASME Code. Because there is little difference in philoso-
phy between the various Code Sections, this commentary is
applicable to all Sections of the ASME Code.
It is important to understand that the Section III requirements
for construction of nuclear components were written only for
components in light-water reactor plants. They do not address
heavy-water reactors, gas reactors, and the other new types of
reactors that are being considered for new plants. For example,
Section III is not appropriate for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
that was reported on in the February 2008 issue of Mechanical
Engineering magazine. It is possible that the appropriate require-
ments for these pebble bed modular reactors may eventually be
added to Section III. An appropriate existing ASME Code for the
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor is Section VIII, Division 2, prior to
the 2007 Addenda. (See part 4.25 of this chapter.) For this type of
reactor, the radiation and thermal shock issues are completely dif-
ferent from light water reactors.
Questions have been raised as to whether or not the Code
requires pressure vessels and piping, other than components for
light water reactors, to be constructed to the requirements of
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-3
Section III. Responses to these questions have been published as
follows:
Section III
File: BC06-1444
Date: November 26, 2006
Subject: ASME Section III, Division 1, Scope
Question: Does Section III of the ASME Code contain
requirements for determining the Code Section to be used for
construction of nuclear power plant components?
Reply: No. In the United States, it is the responsibility of the
regulator or the jurisdictional authority at the nuclear power
plant site to determine the Code Section to be used.
Section VIII
File: BC06-1272
Date: February 6, 2007
Subject: Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2 (2004 Edition,
2006 Addenda); U-1(c)(2) and AG-121:
Question: Is it prohibited by the rules of Section VIII,
Division 1 or Division 2 for a vessel to be constructed to the
rules of either Division 1 or Division 2 that is used to contain
a gas that is heated by use of a nuclear fuel?
Reply: No. However, see U-1(c)(1) or Footnote 1 of AG-100.
B31.1 Power Piping Code
File: 06-1173
Date: February 14, 2007
Subject: Applicability of ASME B31.1 for Piping in a
Gas-Cooled Nuclear Power Plant
Question: With consideration of limitations of the Code
Section; jurisdictional requirements; and the applicability of
other codes and standards, does B31.1 prohibit the owner
from selecting B31.1 as the applicable code section for design
and construction of primary heat transfer piping in a gas-
cooled nuclear power plant?
Reply: No. Refer to the Introduction for additional information.
These Interpretations conrm that the Owner of the plant must
decide which ASME Code is appropriate for construction. The
Interpretations also conrm that the Section III Code for construc-
tion of Nuclear Components is not appropriate for use at all
nuclear power plant sites. In Canada, many of the safety-related
pressure-retaining components used in the heavy-water reactor
nuclear power plants were not required to be Code Stamped to the
provisions of Section III, even when Section III had been adopted
by the Province.
It should be pointed out that Section VIII, Division 1 of the
ASME Code, for Pressure Vessels, requires designers to consider
the effects of cyclic loading on pressure vessels, but has not
included requirements for cyclic design. It is the responsibility of
the Owner or User to identify if the pressure vessels are to be
used in cyclic service. If so identied, the requirements in Section
VIII, Division 2 may be used to evaluate cyclic pressure loads,
provided the allowable stresses in Division 1 are used. In this
case, it is best to use the Division 2 requirements prior to the 2007
Edition.
This chapter makes references to Section VIII, Division 2.
These references are only valid for Section VIII, Division 2
Editions and Addenda published prior to the 2007 Edition. The
reason for this is that, in 2007, the Division 2 Code was completely
changed with regard to design philosophy, design factors, fabrica-
tion, examination, and testing requirements. This topic is discussed
further in part 4.25 of this Chapter.
4.2 DESIGN FACTORS USED IN THE
ASME CODE
When the Boiler Code was written in 1915, the designs for
boilers used allowable stresses based on one-fth the specied
tensile strength of the material. In 1925, the Rules for
Construction of Unred Pressure Vessels (Section VIII) was writ-
ten using this design factor of 5. In fact, the rules for boilers
(Section I) and pressure vessels (Section VIII) were almost identi-
cal. The only differences in requirements were to account for the
different service applications. Steam boilers are red, whereas
pressure vessels are unred. Steam and water are the primary u-
ids in boilers addressed in the Section I Code, while petroleum,
chemicals, and other substances are the primary uids contained
in Section VIII pressure vessels.
The design factor used by the ASME Committee to determine
allowable stress has sometimes been referred to as a safety factor.
However, the term safety factor is both incorrect and misleading,
because a reduction in the factor would seem to indicate a reduc-
tion in safety. In fact, when the Code Committee has considered a
reduction in design factor, it has been allowed only after the Code
Committee determines that other changes to Code requirements
have compensated for the reduction.
A design factor is intended to account for unknowns associated
with the design and construction of the component. In other words,
design formulas and stress-analysis methods are approximate and
have built-in assumptions to cover unknown quantities. Material is
assumed to be homogeneous, but it is not. All materials have some
unseen aws and discontinuities, even though these may be very
small. As material manufacturing processes are improved to
reduce these aws to microscopic dimensions, the number and
extent of unknowns are reduced. Nondestructive examination can
also be used as a tool to reduce the size and number of unknowns.
Therefore, reducing the design factor after reducing the number of
unknowns does not reduce the safety of the item. It is for this rea-
son that the term design factor is appropriate and safety factor
is misleading.
The ASME Code is a design and construction Code, not a safety
Code. Whether or not the pressure vessel or other component is
safe depends on how it is operated by the owner of the equip-
ment. Building to ASME Code rules ensures that the pressure
vessel or component can be operated safely, but only the owner of
the equipment can ensure that the item will be operated safely.
Most accidents associated with Code components are caused by
improper maintenance, improper in-service inspection, and inap-
propriate operation of the equipment, often due to improper train-
ing of operators.
In 1942, in the midst of World War II, a Code Case was written
for Sections I and VIII that allowed the design factor for the
allowable stresses used in the design of boilers and pressure ves-
sels to be reduced from 5 to 4 in order to help conserve steel. This
was because of the severe shortage of steel during World War II.
The ASME Code Committee felt that improved design tech-
niques, better materials, restricted fabrication details, and
improved nondestructive examination techniques allowed this
decrease in the design factor. The Committee was convinced there
4-4 Chapter 4
would be no reduction in safety for the operating equipment
because of the compensating changes that had already been made
in the Code.
In 1945, the Code Case was incorporated into Sections I and
VIII of the Code. In 1955, new processes in the petrochemical
industry were requiring signicantly higher design pressures. This
resulted in designs requiring pressure vessel thicknesses of 6 to
8 inches. The Committee decided to form a task group to write a
new Section VIII Pressure Vessel Code with allowable stresses
based on a design factor of 3. The purpose of the new Code was
to reduce fabrication costs by reducing the required thickness of
the pressure vessel while maintaining the same level of safety.
The task group determined they could justify the design factor
reduction from 4 to 3 if materials were limited, fracture toughness
rules were added, design rules for fatigue service were added,
stress analysis was used for most loading conditions, and more
extensive nondestructive examination was required. When consid-
ering these new (in 1963) requirements, extensive research and
testing was conducted to justify the 25% reduction in the basic
design factor. The research addressed materials, weld joint cong-
uration, reinforcement of openings, design requirements, and non-
destructive examination. The research and testing demonstrated
that the design factor reduction from 4 to 3 was justied with a
smooth-shell conguration and full volumetric examination of all
main-seam weld joints. Based on this, it was determined that use of
a weld joint efciency factor (E), which is used in Section VIII,
Division 1 for weld joints that are not fully radiographed, were
inappropriate for Section VIII, Division 2 and were consequently
not permitted. Further, a more formal Design Specication and
Design Report certied by Registered Professional Engineers was
felt to be required. However, before the new Section VIII Code
was completed, the nuclear power industry was requiring heavy-
wall reactor vessels. By coincidence, both the nuclear industry and
the petrochemical industry wanted an ASME Code that would
allow thinner pressure vessels, with reduced costs and thinner
shells.
The Committee felt the nuclear Code for pressure vessels
would be easier to write than the Code for pressure vessels used
in petrochemical processes. This is because the nuclear pressure
vessels only contained steam and water, and the maximum tem-
perature was only 800F. The goal for the task group was to write
a Code that could be considered equivalent to or as safe as
the Section VIII Code, but with a reduced design factor. It was not
the purpose of the Committee to write a Code to be used for the
construction of safer pressure vessels, because the ASME Code
already had an outstanding safety record. The goal was to develop
a set of rules for the construction of heavy-wall pressure vessels
that would reduce costs, but maintain the same level of safety.
Therefore, it was decided that the proper course of action
would be to write the more simple Nuclear Code (Section III)
rst. After this was accomplished, the task group could work on
the more complex Code for the petrochemical industry Code
(Section VIII, Division 2). Section III was published in 1963.
Section VIII, Division 2 was published ve years later. Except for
the fact that the two Codes address different service industries,
the provisions are almost identical. A nuclear reactor vessel con-
structed to the Rules of Section VIII, Division 2 would be identi-
cal to one built to the requirements of Section III. The reason for
this is that the design philosophy for the two Codes is the same,
because the same Main Committee approves the rules for both
Codes. The ASME published a common Commentary for both
Codes in 1968 [2]. No body who understands the ASME Code
would ever suggest that the Nuclear Code produces safer vessels
than either Section VIII, Division 1, or Section VIII, Division 2.
The safety of equipment constructed to any of these Codes
depends on how they are operated, because all three Codes allow
for the construction of pressure vessels that can be operated safely
within the design conditions.
In spite of the above facts, some people have concluded that
Section III Nuclear Code must be the best Code written by the
ASME, for it provides the most safety in operation and this
increased safety was instituted because of the nuclear-service con-
ditions. However, the rst nuclear reactors were built to the
requirements of the Section I Boiler Code and later to the rules of
Section VIII, Division 1 of the Code. These old reactor pressure
vessels have had no safety problems in service because of the use
of the old Codes.
For the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to accept the new
Section III Nuclear Vessels Code published in 1963, the ASME
had to convince the AEC that the pressure vessels built to the pro-
visions of Section III Nuclear Code would be as safe as those
older reactor vessels constructed to the rules of Section I and
Section VIII. The fact is that the design and construction rules in
all Sections and Divisions of the ASME Code are considered to
provide the basis for equally safe pressure vessels.
In the 1999 Addenda, the design factor for Section I, Section III,
Classes 2, 3, and MC, and Section VIII, Division 1 pressure ves-
sels and other components was reduced from 4 to 3.5 [3]. This is a
reduction of 12
1
2% for the basic design factor at room temperature.
The basic design factors only apply to allowable stresses that are
based on tensile strength. The design factor is unchanged for
allowable stresses that are based on yield strength. The purpose of
the change was to reduce the cost of construction to be more con-
sistent with European designs that have had a good safety record,
and to take advantage of all the improvements in the Code that have
been added since the 1960s. Recently, Section VIII, Division 3 was
published with design factors less than 3. Section VIII, Division 3
is not a better Code or a safer Code; it just addresses the needs of
an industry that works with pressures exceeding 50,000 psi while
maintaining the same level of safety as the other Sections of the
Code. The different Code Sections and Divisions address service
applications, not different levels of safety. Although one Section or
Division may be more appropriate for a specic service than
another, all provide rules for the construction of pressure vessels
that can be operated in a manner that ensures the safety of person-
nel, equipment, and the public.
When the Code does not address a particular service applica-
tion, the appropriate Code Section or Division to use may not be
clear. For example, Section III does not address nuclear processing
and storage facilities, and it is really an inappropriate Code to use
at these facilities because the service conditions are completely
different from those at nuclear power plant sites. The appropriate
Codes are probably the current Section VIII Code for pressure ves-
sels and the B31.3 Code for process piping. Some supplementary
provisions for the construction of the equipment might possibly be
added, but this should be addressed in the Design Specications.
Another example is that Subsection NG of Section III is appropri-
ate for internal supports of nuclear reactor vessel, but is completely
inappropriate for other applications, such as internal supports for
nuclear transportation casks or internal supports for nuclear-waste
storage canisters. For these applications, the AISC Specication is
more appropriate, and may be supplemented as necessary to meet
the needs of the user. The point is that even the selection of the
appropriate Code Section or Division is a decision to be made by a
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-5
responsible, knowledgeable engineer. Selection of the appropriate
Code should be based on Code content and the users needs, not
on the title of the Code book. Selection of the wrong Code Section
has cost the industry millions of dollars and has not improved
plant safety.
In the 2000 Addenda to Section III, the title was changed from
Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components to
Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components. The
change was made to allow for the expansion of the Code to
address components for other facilities. As of 2012, no changes
have been made to the Code to address the new title.
A basic difference between Section III and Section VIII of the
Code is that the Nuclear Code is simpler to use and understand.
The reason is that the product contained is either water or steam
and the service temperature is limited to 800F, with design pres-
sures less than 5000 psi. Section VIII pressure vessels and their
associated piping contain petrochemical products of all types:
poisonous gasses, explosives, and lethal substances. Also, the ser-
vice temperatures may be as high as 1800F, and pressures may
exceed 100,000 psi. In general, Section III is not appropriate for
conditions in which the design temperatures exceed 800F or in
which the design pressure exceeds 10,000 psi. Subsection NH
may be used for Class 1 components designed for temperatures
exceeding 800F. Code Cases N-253, N-254, and N-257 may be
used for Class 2 and Class 3 applications in which this tempera-
ture limit is exceeded.
4.3 DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS AND
DESIGN REPORTS
When Section III and Section VIII, Division 2 were written, the
requirement for a Design Specication and a Stress Report, certi-
ed by a Registered Professional Engineer (RPE), was included.
Although not specically mentioned by name, Section I and
Section VIII have always required a Design Specication, which
is a document that identies the conditions for which the boiler or
pressure vessel must be designed and fabricated. This is the only
means by which to specify loads to the designer of the equipment.
Section I is a Code that addresses the whole boiler system, and
the boiler manufacturer usually identies the loads. Sections III
and VIII are Codes that address the individual components, and
therefore the user must identify the design loads to the manufac-
turer of the component, because only the user or the system engi-
neer understands the service applications for each component. In
the 2008 Addenda to Section VIII, Appendix KK was added to
address the specic requirements for a Design Specication.
Every Section III component requires a Design Specication
certied by an RPE qualied to the provisions of the Code. Each
component also requires a Design Report, and if a stress analysis
is required, the Report must be certied by an RPE. The purpose
of this is to ensure that the designer engineers are all qualied. If
the RPE is not qualied, he or she could lose his/her license to
practice engineering and could also be ned.
The Design Specication includes the technical requirements
for the pressure vessel, such as size, conguration, design pres-
sure, cyclic data, seismic loads, impact-test requirements, design
temperature, and other loads and conditions. The only new
requirement for the Design Specication was the addition of the
certication by an RPE. The certication was intended to ensure
participation by a knowledgeable engineer who could understand
the service conditions, the stress analysis required for the loading
conditions, and the meaning of the different classications of
stresses. Participation by an engineer knowledgeable of the Code
requirements was considered essential; hence the requirements
that an RPE certify the Design Specication.
The writer of the Design Specication cannot know all loads that
will occur during the life of the equipment, but the system engineer
responsible for identifying design conditions, is capable of using
good engineering judgment so that the probable loads can be en-
veloped. It is probable that some loads may occur in operation that
exceed the specied loadings stated in the Design Specication.
This is not a concern as long as the equipment does not signicantly
yield in response to those loadings. These higher-than-specied loads
usually are easily accommodated by the large design factor used for
the equipment. Service loadings that exceed the loads identied in
the Design Specication do not invalidate the Code Stamp. How-
ever, the user should determine the cause of the higher loads and
possibly take actions to mitigate them.
An RPE is also required for the Design Report (originally des-
ignated a Stress Report). The Committee felt it was essential for a
professional engineer to work with and understand the Code
design and fabrication requirements. Nonprofessionals cannot be
allowed to perform the duties of the RPE. Prior to the publication
of Section III and Section VIII, Division 2, the Design Report was
referred to as calculations. When Section III was rst published,
the Design Report was called a Stress Report and was so named
because of the stress analysis required. The term was changed in
1978 to Design Report to convey the requirement that the engi-
neer is responsible for more than just stress analysis. The engineer
is responsible for all aspects of the design as they may relate to
fabrication. The Design Report must address the application of
materials, fabrication, and nondestructive examination. In other
words, the construction of the pressure vessel or other component
must be considered an engineering task, and the calculations or
stress analysis are only one part of that task.
The Design Report is developed to ensure that the equipment
can resist all specied design loads within the allowable stress
limits. The RPE should also review drawings and other docu-
ments to ensure that the requirements of the Code design, speci-
cations, and the Design Report are met. Any nonconformances
affecting the structure should also be reviewed and evaluated by
the RPE. The RPEs job is not complete until the component is
Code stamped.
The RPE is responsible for correctly using the specied design
loads in the calculations or stress analysis. The engineer must
fully understand any computer programs used, including all
assumptions in the program, and the accuracy of the output. The
engineer is fully responsible for all computer output accepted as
part of the design. This fact is now identied in the Foreword to
all Sections of the ASME Code.
4.4 SECTION III VERSUS SECTION VIII
The Section III rules for Class 1 pressure vessels are almost
identical to the design and construction rules of the Section VIII,
Division 2 Pressure Vessel Code published prior to the 2007
Edition. This is logical because the same Committee prepared
both sets of rules, and the rules for both were based on the provi-
sions of Section VIII, Division 1, with a reduced design factor.
The reduced design factor was justied by increased nondestruc-
tive examination and by restrictions on materials and fabrication
details [2].
4-6 Chapter 4
Although the rules of the Section III Nuclear Code for Class 1
vessels and the requirements for Section VIII, Division 2 published
prior to the 2007 Edition are almost identical for the construction of
pressure vessels, a signicant difference is that Section III
(Nuclear Components) provides rules for evaluation of upset,
emergency, and faulted plant conditions, whereas Section VIII,
Division 2 does not. Consequently, the Section III provisions can
be and sometimes are used for evaluating postulated conditions for
Section VIII pressure vessels. Furthermore, although the material
impact toughness rules are different, the two sets of rules both
ensure adequate protection from brittle fracture. Another slight dif-
ference is that Section VIII, Division 2 rules provide generic
exemptions from fatigue evaluations that Section III, Class 1 rules
do not.
The Section III, Class 2 rules for pressure vessels are almost
identical to Section VIII, Division 1 rules, but materials are limited
and radiography of main seams is mandatory. The rules for Class
3 pressure vessels are basically the same as Section VIII, Division
1 rules. A weld joint efciency factor is determined from the type
and extent of radiography used on the main seams [4].
For Section III piping, Class 1 rules were upgraded from the
1967 edition of B31.1 to be consistent with the rules in Section III,
Class 1 pressure vessels. That means that the design factor is 3,
materials and fabrication details are restricted, and nondestructive
examination (NDE) is increased. The design rules are similar to
B31.3 which uses a design factor of 3, but the NDE provisions are
completely different [5]. For Section III, Class 2 piping, the rules
are almost identical to those in B31.1, but full radiography is
required, material selection is restricted, and impact testing is dif-
ferent [6].
Class 3 piping rules are almost identical to those in B31.1; in
fact, they were copied from B31.1. The most important difference
between Section III and B31.1 is that Section III requires an
Authorized Nuclear Inspector, whereas B31.1 and B31.3 do not
have requirements for Authorized Inspectors, except for Section I
boiler external piping, and also requires Data Reports and Code
Stamping. These differences are very important, but there are
many more similarities than differences.
4.5 DESIGN LIFE AND COMMUTATIVE-
USAGE FACTORS
Most nuclear plant Design Specications identied that the
design cycles for fatigue evaluation should be based on a 40 year
life expectancy for the use of the plant. The 40 years was an arbi-
trary number based on nuclear plants being able to last twice as
long as fossil plants (which usually lasted 20 years). The design
for cyclic conditions was then based on the estimated cycles for
40 years. The severity of the cycles was based on the estimated
worst conditions. Using the Code fatigue charts, a cumulative-
usage factor (CUF) was calculated that was arbitrarily required to
be equal to or less than 1, based on the estimated number of
cycles for the postulated 40-year period. This method of design
was a rough attempt to ensure freedom from fatigue cracking dur-
ing the 40-year period. The methodology has many conservative
design factors in it, including a factor of 2 on stress magnitude
and a factor of 20 on number of cycles. When the arbitrary CUF 1
was adopted as the cyclic limit, the Committee felt that CUF val-
ues up to 5 may be more appropriate. This fact is recorded in the
1969 ASME publication, Criteria of the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code for Design by Analysis in Sections III and
VIII, Division 2. There is nothing magic about the CUF value of 1
or the 40-year design life commonly specied. As long as the
Code components are periodically inspected and repaired or
replaced, as necessary, plants will be able to operate safely.
Further, neither Section III nor Section XI of the Code require
equipment to be monitored while in service to determine the num-
ber or magnitude of cycles during the operation of the plant. The
purpose of the fatigue evaluation is to prevent fatigue cracking. In
fatigue service, cracks will occur before the material fails.
Because monitoring cycles will do absolutely nothing to deter-
mine when fatigue cracking will begin, monitoring is not practi-
cal, but it is very expensive and may raise questions that have
nothing to do with successful service.
Section XI of the Code requires equipment to be periodically
inspected for cracks. If no cracks occur, fatigue is not a problem,
regardless of the CUF value. If cracks occur and are repaired, the
fatigue cycle effectively starts anew. Therefore, the Code does not
prohibit equipment from being used longer than the number of
years identied in the Design Specication. As long as cracks are
repaired when found, the equipment is acceptable for continued
service. Regulators may require a new operating license after the
40 years of service has been met, but this is an issue that does not
involve the use of the ASME Code, nor the fact that a 40-year life
was assumed for the design of the equipment. The corollary is an
automobile designed for 10 years of service. If the auto is main-
tained and worn out parts are replaced, it may last 50 years or
more. There is no requirement to scrap the car after the 10 years,
or to replace the engine simply because the number of engine
cycles exceeds that assumed in the design.
4.6 SERVICE-LEVEL LOADINGS
Section III identies Service Levels A, B, C, and D to provide
increased allowable stresses for upset, emergency, and faulted
plant conditions as appropriate. The reason for using different
terms than the plant-operating conditions is to acknowledge that
some components may have to be limited to the design condition
for function to be maintained during an emergency, upset, or
faulted plant condition. For example, a containment vessel is
designed to accommodate loadings that would occur should the
reactor vessel be subjected to a faulted condition. In like manner,
the emergency core cooling system must operate normally during
a plant emergency condition. The use of Service Levels A, B, C,
and D was intended to help engineers understand the difference
between plant conditions and the requirements for component
design [7].
4.7 SEISMIC EVALUATIONS
When components are to be designed for seismic conditions,
the Code does not require that a dynamic stress analysis be used
[8]. The use of static mass-moment evaluations is acceptable, but
it is now common practice to perform the more sophisticated
dynamic analyses, using computers.
During the construction of most nuclear plants, snubbers were
commonly used to restrain piping and components. This resulted
in very stiff piping systems with many snubbers. These snubbers
have been a continual maintenance problem at all operating
nuclear plants. A signicant issue was that the methods of dynamic
seismic analysis used to design these plants had never been con-
rmed as either adequate or reliable. Therefore, the Electric
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-7
Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated a testing program to
determine how piping and associated components should be ana-
lyzed for safe construction. The testing showed that piping and
components will withstand seismic events better if the design of
the support permits adequate exibility.
In 1994, the Section III Code rules were modied to allow the
appropriate exibility for dynamic analysis [9]. The use of these
new rules allows plants to be designed without the use of snub-
bers and heavy restraints. The removal of the snubbers results in
very signicant cost savings and safer plants. The rules could also
be used to re-evaluate older plants, to remove the old snubbers.
Extensive testing has also been performed in Japan to verify the
adequacy of the new rules. The Japanese tests have conrmed that
the new Section III Code rules for dynamic service design are
more appropriate than the rules that were previously used for the
design of most nuclear plants.
4.8 ENGINEERS, DESIGN, AND
COMPUTERS
When working with Section III and Section VIII, Division 2, it
is necessary to classify stresses such as primary membrane and
primary bending, as well as secondary, thermal, and peak stresses.
Unfortunately, nite-element computer programs cannot classify
the computed stresses. Therefore, supplementary manual calcula-
tions, partial-design inputs, and supplementary computer pro-
grams may be required. Added to this complication is the fact that
two computer programs solving the same problem may produce
answers that vary by a factor of as much as two at some points.
Complete agreement between two different computer programs
will never occur. Good engineering judgment by knowledgeable
professional engineers is essential for understanding which com-
puter output should be used or how the output must be modied.
The engineer may be questioned or challenged, but not overruled
on Code engineering issues. Failure to understand this can result
in unsafe design and construction, as well as increased costs and
schedules.
Unfortunately, in the past, some engineers (not understanding
the limitations of computers) have classied all stresses deter-
mined by nite element programs as primary stresses. This
approach is bad engineering and defeats the purpose of classify-
ing stresses as provided by the Code. Engineers who use this
approach show their lack of knowledge of Code requirements,
and all their work should be questioned, because their approach
demonstrates they are not qualied to certify the ASME Code
Design Reports.
The ASME Code does not require the use of computers. Although
using computers to determine whether stresses are within Code-
allowable values may be helpful, computers are never required and,
when used, must be used in a judicious manner. In the past, many
engineers have used computers not because they were necessary, but
because they were available. Even though Section III, Class 1 rules
and Section VIII, Division 2 rules prior to the 2007 Edition, require
a stress analysis to be performed as part of the design process, it is
both possible and permitted to perform the stress analysis using
hand calculations. Of course, when stress analysis is required, the
computer may be a practical tool, but its capabilities are very limit-
ed. For example, there are no computer programs that can classify
stresses as primary or secondary, membrane or bending, thermal or
peak. Yet proper classication is necessary in order to determine that
the calculated stresses are within the allowable limits. If the stresses
are not properly classied, the resulting design may be inadequate or
it may be overly conservative and costly. Therefore, if the engineer
is to use the results of the computer analysis, it will probably be nec-
essary to supplement the work with other tools, techniques, or stress
analyses. Section III, Class 1 and Section VIII, Division 2, prior to
the 2007 Edition, design requirements for stress analysis are based
on the Tresca theory of failure. The calculation methodology for
determining and classifying stresses is shells of revolution theory.
This methodology is shown in Section III, Appendix X and in
Section VIII, Division 2, Appendix 1, prior to the 2007 Edition.
It is common practice for the engineer to fully document the
basis on which he or she makes a signicant engineering judg-
ment, such as when modifying the results of a stress analysis pro-
duced by computers in order to take into account the results of
other analyses or evaluations. The RPE must be able to under-
stand when computer programs results can be modied. This is an
obvious reason the RPE is required.
In his book, To Engineer is Human (The Role of Failure in
Successful Design), Henry Petroski wrote [10]:
The computer is both blessing and curse, for it makes possi-
ble calculations once beyond the reach of human endurance,
while at the same time also making them virtually beyond the
hope of human verication.
The responsible engineer must take the necessary precautions
to verify engineering designs in as many ways as is reasonably
possible. If engineers do not do this, they will be failing their
responsibility to the public and the basics of engineering ethics.
To emphasize this point, the Foreword to the Code was revised in
the 1995 Addenda to state:
The Committee recognizes that tools and techniques used for
design and analysis change as technology progresses and
expects engineers to use good judgment in the application of
these tools. The designer is responsible for complying with
Code rules and demonstrating compliance with Code equa-
tions when such equations are mandatory. The Code neither
requires nor prohibits the use of computers for the design or
analysis of components constructed to the requirements of the
Code. However, designers and engineers using computer pro-
grams for design or analysis are cautioned that they are
responsible for all technical assumptions inherent in the pro-
grams they use and they are responsible for the application of
these programs to their designs.
The engineer must fully understand the ramications of this
statement. The responsibilities, duties, background and experi-
ence required of the RPE were rst published in ASME N 626.3
and subsequently moved to Appendix XXIII of the Section III
Code [11]. The purpose of Appendix XXIII is to clearly identify
that the RPE must understand all aspects of the ASME Code and
be capable of using good engineering judgment in the application
of Code requirements.
4.9 CONTAINMENT VESSELS
Section III provides rules for one very unique pressure vessel.
It is the containment vessel that surrounds most of the Class 1 and
2 components in the nuclear plant. The purpose of this vessel is to
contain any radioactive steam released by the rupture of the pri-
mary steam lines or other incidents. During normal operation, the
containment vessel is never pressurized. The design pressure is
4-8 Chapter 4
determined by the volume, temperature of the postulated released
steam, and the steam pressure prior to release.
The Code requires postweld heat treatment for welds in materi-
als with thicknesses exceeding 1
1
2 inches. (Two containment ves-
sels were built with 2-inch-thick shells and were post weld heat
treated in the eld, in spite of their size.)
In order to reduce residual welding stresses at points of discon-
tinuity, openings and structural frames are postweld heat treated
as subassemblies prior to being installed. This is a provision
unique to containment vessel-construction. This unique require-
ment was added to Section III when it was rst published in 1963.
The requirement was added because the rules of Section VIII at
the time required postweld heat treatment for pressure vessels that
contained lethal substances. This rule could probably be removed
without any reduction in safety.
Also unique is the increase in allowable stress of 10% over
the allowable stress for Class 2 components. This increase
was made to account for the fact that containment vessels do
not have pressure-relief devices. (Vessels with pressure-relief
devices may be pressurized 10% above the design pressure prior
to full opening of the device.) This provision demonstrates how
the Code Committee takes a practical approach to accommodate
needs [12].
Chapter 9 contains more information regarding steel contain-
ment vessels.
4.10 TOLERANCES, SIGNIFICANT
FIGURES, AND NOMINAL
DIMENSIONS
The Foreword to the ASME Code was revised in the 1992
Addenda to read:
The Code does not fully address tolerances. When dimen-
sions, sizes, or other parameters are not specied with toler-
ances, the values of these parameters are considered nominal
and allowable tolerances or local variances may be consid-
ered acceptable when based on engineering judgment and
standard practice as determined by the engineer.
The reason for this change was to specify that engineering
dimensions require tolerances and that Code-specied dimensions
are based on nominal sizes. The most common problem that led to
this revision was related to the issue of weld sizes. The problem
rst occurred when Inspectors started using llet weld gages to
measure welds to an accuracy of 0.001 inch. Because of this mis-
use of measuring devices in the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars were spent on trivial weld repairs. The subsequent
weld repairs created only higher residual stresses in the welds and
did not improve quality. National news services and television
commentators described the issue as bad welding at nuclear
power plant sites. However, when QC inspectors were retrained to
properly inspect welds in accordance with Code requirements, the
issue suddenly disappeared, and it has never been raised again.
The real issue was bad inspections, not bad welding.
Welds commonly have high and low spots in prole. If the
nominal (average) thickness meets the specied size, the weld is
acceptable. Weld sizes should be evaluated with rulers, not by l-
let weld gages, unless the gages are used merely for convenience
to establish the nominal size. The weld can be measured at a con-
venient spot, and then visually examined to assure the nominal
size is maintained. If specic tolerances are required, the engineer
should identify them. If not identied, standard industry toler-
ances are applicable, as determined by the engineer.
The issue of bad welding was addressed by the Nuclear
Construction Issues Group in 1987 when it published the Visual
Weld Acceptance Criteria (VWAC), which was immediately
accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [13]. This
document identified how welds should be accepted. It was really
a training course for QC inspectors. After publication and train-
ing of inspectors, the issue of bad welding completely disap-
peared. Also included with the VWAC document is a sampling
plan for determining how many welds should be examined if
one under-sized weld is found. This sampling plan can be used
for other types of sampling because it is based on generic consid-
erations.
The provisions of the VWAC document were published as
ASME Code Case N-430, Alternative Requirements for Welding
Workmanship and Visual Acceptance Criteria for Class 1, 2, 3, and
MC Linear Type and Standard Supports, Section III, Division 1,
and as a revision to Subsection NF of Section IV in 1992. If the
principles of these documents had been followed during the con-
struction of the nuclear plants in the United States, the cost savings
for construction would have been greater than $250,000,000.
These are huge losses caused by trivial concerns based on misun-
derstandings of engineering philosophy.
Another problem with engineers using computers is that some-
times the resulting output is shown with more than three signi-
cant gures. This problem was considered in the 1991 Addenda to
Section VIII, when the sample calculations in the Code were
changed to demonstrate that Code calculations are to be limited to
three signicant gures. This is logical, because our knowledge of
material strength which is an essential part of the designis
only accurate to three signicant gures [14]. Also, all the engi-
neering assumptions used in the stress analysis are limited in
accuracy. For example, the stress analysis is based on the assump-
tion that the material is homogeneous, even though none of our
engineering materials have that unique property. Engineering
design calculations that use more than three signicant gures are
a demonstration of lack of understanding of the ASME Code
design process and basic engineering principles.
The issue of tolerances for piping was addressed in 1988, after
more than $100,000,000 was spent reconsidering the as-built
conditions for piping congurations and support locations. The
issue was raised by QC inspectors because piping congurations
and support locations were not exactly as shown on the con-
struction drawings. The result was that most piping installations
at nuclear plants were reanalyzed to reect the as-built condi-
tions. The reanalyses did not require any physical changes to the
piping systems, but the calculated stresses were modied. It
was all an exercise in futility that enriched engineering rms and
consultants.
The problem was solved by the Nuclear Construction Issue
Group by preparing a report that was approved by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and later added as an Appendix to the
ASME Code [15]. The report was based on taking the largest toler-
ance used by the participating engineering rms for each measure-
ment or weight considered. Then sample congurations were cal-
culated using the largest tolerances. The results showed that within
the tolerances, calculated stresses raised only slightly. If these tol-
erances had been used during the construction of the nuclear
plants, construction costs could have been signicantly reduced.
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-9
The issue of tolerances is very signicant and must be addressed
for the new nuclear plants to be constructed in the immediate future.
If the lessons learned from the past are forgotten, problems asso-
ciated with tolerances will be repeated, and the resulting cost
increases could halt or delay new construction. However, the issue
of tolerances applies to all Sections of the ASME Code. In general,
engineers have not been conscientious about specifying toler-
ances. The standard tolerances identied in Section III are equally
applicable to all Sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, as well as the B31 Piping Codes and should solve most toler-
ance problems. The appropriate tolerances are given in Appendix T
of Section III.
4.11 CORROSION AND EROSION
Corrosion and erosion are caused by service conditions. The
identication of signicant service conditions is the responsibility
of the Owner or his agent who is the writer of the Design
Specication. This is the system engineer who identies the mate-
rials to be used, establishes the conguration of the component,
and who knows and understands the uids to be used in service
and their effects on the material, the service pressure and temper-
atures, and the environmental conditions. The Code requires the
Design Specication to identify erosion and corrosion require-
ments. The usual way to accommodate this is to increase
the thickness of the material by an amount based on knowledge of
the system conditions and the susceptibility of materials to corro-
sion or erosion.
Identication of the proper allowance for erosion and corrosion
is not a simple task. The chemistry of steel required for conditions
involving erosion may be far different from the required chemistry
for a material in a very corrosive environment. The RPE writing
the Design Specication does not have to be a font of all knowl-
edge, but the engineer does have to have the sense to know where
to obtain information from the appropriate experts so that the
Design Specication will be adequate for the anticipated service.
The Code Committee was concerned enough about the issue of
service environment that a new Appendix W was added to the
Section III Code in the 1999 Addenda. This Appendix provides
information regarding the different forms of corrosion and other
environmental conditions not explicitly addressed by Section III.
The Appendix will be helpful to engineers preparing Design
Specications. Topics addressed in this Appendix are stress-
corrosion cracking, general corrosion and wastage, pitting, crevice
corrosion and denting, intergranular-corrosion cracking, microbio-
logically induced corrosion and fouling, corrosion fatigue and
crack growth, ow-accelerated corrosion, corrosion and erosion-
corrosion, irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking, normal-
aging embrittlement, hydrogen-damage embrittlement and delayed
cracking, fretting and wear, and creep. Extensive references are
also provided in Appendix W. It is necessary for engineers work-
ing with the Code to be familiar with Appendix W.
4.12 FORMING OPERATIONS
There are two ways to form plate used for pressure vessels.
One method is to form the plates at temperatures less than 800F.
Although the plate material is difcult to form below 800F, once
it has yielded to the desired shape, the operation is complete and
the plate holds its shape. Another way to form the plate is to hot
form it at temperatures from 1200F to 1600F. The plate is easier
to form at these temperatures, but when the forming operation is
completed and the plate cools, the plate often moves to a shape
that is outside the desired tolerances. Consequently, a sizing oper-
ation is often required after the plate has been welded. Also, it
may be necessary to heat treat the plate after the forming opera-
tion in order to restore the required tensile and yield strength of
the material. The engineer should understand the impact on mate-
rial properties associated with each of the two forming methods.
When the cold-forming method is used, impact properties of the
plate are reduced. When the plate is hot formed, the impact prop-
erties may have to be restored after the forming operation is com-
pleted, and the tensile and yield strength may have to be increased
by further heat treatment. Each of these methods has an impact on
design and costs. Rules for using qualied procedures for cold-
forming were added to Section III, Division in 1972 [16].
4.13 POSTWELD HEAT TREATMENT
Welded joints develop high residual stresses after the weld is
completed. These stresses cannot be calculated, and are not con-
sidered in the design or stress analysis of the component. However,
they are not ignored. The ASME rules attempt to reduce the effect
of the residual stresses when necessary. This is done by requiring
postweld heat treatment (PWHT) of some welded congurations.
The rules are based on the type of materials used and the thickness
of the weld. The Code rules are based more on experience than on
scientic experimentation and testing.
PWHT requirements have been in the ASME Code since 1927.
At that time, the heat treatment was identied as stress relief.
The PWHT requirements regarding thickness and temperature
have been modied over the years, but the basic philosophy that
PWHT is always good for carbon and low-alloy steels is now
changing. There are a number of steels, primarily those whose
properties are enhanced by quenching and tempering (Q&T),
whose strength and impact toughness are severely degraded by
PWHT. Research has shown that these steels and associated welds
have better strength and toughness when not subjected to PWHT.
This fact is recognized in Case N-71, which permits welding
without PWHT for S-number 11 materials up to 4 inches thick. In
the 2009 Addenda to Section IX, all S-Numbers were changed
to P-Numbers. The fact that quenched and tempered materials
should not be subject to PWHT has yet to be recognized in the
body of the Code, but the subject is now being investigated. It is
also being applied to a high-strength steel for nuclear containment
vessel liners and structural attachments in Code Case N-763,
which is expected to be published at about the same time as this
edition of the Companion Guide.
Besides the benecial effect of PWHT, there are some detri-
mental aspects to the operation. For example, extended PWHT
can reduce material strength and impact toughness. There is even
the possibility of other detrimental side effects. Research is cur-
rently being conducted to determine the nature and scope of these
effects.
As more is learned about PWHT, the ASME Committee will
modify the fabrication rules. However, the important points are
that
The current rules have been effective and have not been found
to be seriously detrimental to the equipment with the excep-
tion of quenched and tempered materials.
4-10 Chapter 4
Code rules are adjusted as knowledge increases.
Code rules are the same for the different types of Code
components.
4.14 NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION
As components are built, it is important to examine them to
determine the adequacy of the fabrication methods used. For
welded components, nondestructive examination (NDE) methods
include radiography and ultrasonic examination, which are help-
ful in providing an understanding of the volumetric condition of
the weld. The purpose of the volumetric examination is to make
sure that the weld does not have cracks, lack of penetration, lack
of fusion, or other signicant detrimental internal conditions.
The NDE methods required by the ASME Code to nd surface
defects are magnetic particle and liquid penetrant examinations.
These NDE methods are not all equivalent. Radiography and
ultrasonic examination will not always nd the same defect
because the methodologies are completely different. Even differ-
ent radiographic equipment will not nd the same indications of
potential weaknesses. The same is true for the different surface-
examination methods. The engineer is not expected to be an
expert in NDE, but he or she should understand the basics and the
differences in the methodologies.
Often, the amount and type of NDE is a factor in the design
of a pressure vessel or piping. This is true for Section I boilers,
Section VIII, Division 1 pressure vessels, B31.1 and B31.3 piping,
and Section III, Class 3 components. All use joint-efficiency
factors, which are dependent on the amount of radiography of
the main seams. In other words, full radiography allows for a
joint-efficiency factor (E) of 1.00, spot radiography permits an
E of 0.85, and without radiography, the factor E is 0.70. The
lower the value of E, the thicker the component wall thickness
must be. The factor to be used is dependent on the Owners
Design Specification.
Once the amount of radiography is specied, the design is
made and fabrication is completed, along with the required NDE.
If for some reason the Owner then decides to perform more radi-
ography, it is a contractual matter outside the scope of Code
requirements. For example, if no radiography is required by the
design but the Owner decides to radiograph some of the weld
seams and thereby nds some indications of detrimental condi-
tions, the removal or repair of the indications is a contractual mat-
ter and is outside the scope of the Code. If everything else is
acceptable, but the radiographic indications of aws or disconti-
nuities are not repaired, the vessel is still fully compliant with
Code requirements. Any indication of a aw or discontinuity
found by an examination not required by the Code is outside the
scope of the Code.
If weld seams are not fully radiographed, the chances are high
that some part of the main-seam welds will have aws or disconti-
nuities. This is the reason for the use of the full radiography. If
full radiography is specied as part of the design, the vessel or
pipe wall thickness will be permitted to be thinner than when no
radiography is required.
The philosophy of using joint efciencies goes back to the orig-
inal ASME Code published in 1915, when it was used for riveted
joints; it was subsequently applied to welded joints in the early
1930s. The approach of using efciency factors to account for
potential aws or discontinuities has been successful, as noted by
the safety record of pressure vessels constructed to the rules of the
ASME Codes, if the design factor is 3.5 or greater.
4.15 HYDROSTATIC TEST
Every pressure vessel is subject to a hydrostatic test (or an alter-
native pneumatic test) prior to the application of the Code Stamp.
The original test was intended as a demonstration that the vessel
could be overloaded by a pressure 50% greater than the design
pressure with no cause for concern. As the allowable stresses were
increased, this pressure has been reduced. (As an historical note,
the test at one time included hitting the vessel, under pressure,
with a hammer. This was later determined to be an impractical test,
for obvious reasons.)
When it is impractical to perform a hydrostatic test, it is permis-
sible to substitute a pneumatic test at a lower pressure. The reason
for the lower pressure is concern about the danger posed by the
potential energy stored when a vessel is lled with pressurized air.
Perhaps some day the Committee will eliminate both the
hydrostatic and pneumatic tests for components that are fully
radiographed. The reason for such a change is that the only bene-
t of the current hydrostatic test is to nd where weld seams
leakan extremely rare occurrence.
4.16 QUALITY ASSURANCE
An administrative difference between Section III and Section VIII
is that the Section III Quality Assurance program requires more
detailed documentation than the Section VIII Quality Control
System. The ASME Committee members deliberately selected the
term Quality Control System for Sections I, IV, and VIII pre-
cisely because they wanted to use a control system that relied
more heavily on product control than on extensive documentation.
This is because more documentation never assures better con-
struction, and if documentation is relied upon rather than an eval-
uation of the product, the result may be that the product may not
meet the necessary Code requirements. Code requirements will be
met when the Authorized Inspector monitors construction activi-
ties where the work is being performed. However, Code work
performed to the requirements of a Quality Assurance Program
without the presence of an Authorized Inspector does not assure
the work was or will be performed properly, correctly, or at all.
The use of an Authorized (Nuclear) Inspector for ASME Code
construction has been essential to the success of the ASME Code.
Where the Code requires the use of the Authorized Inspector,
there is little, if any, question that Code requirements will be met.
With no Authorized Inspector, even with a Quality Assurance
Program, there is no real assurance that the Code requirements
have been met.
For example, NCA-3800 of Section III requires that material be
produced and supplied to the requirements of a Quality Assurance
Program. However, merely having documentation for the material
does not and has not assured that the material received is the
material identied in the documentation. Organizations fabricat-
ing and installing Code material have found that upon using
Positive Material Identication (PMI) methods to verify the mate-
rial, a signicant amount of the material received (about 5%) is
not the material ordered. The same is true for materials furnished
under a Section III Quality Assurance Program. With PMI, the
certainty of using the correct material is 100%. Section III permits
the use of a PMI Code Case (N-483) to increase the reliability of
material supply. The material supplier is not required to have a
quality assurance program when the PMI Code Case is used. This
is good, because the cost of implementing and maintaining quality
assurance programs has resulted in suppliers increasing the price
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-11
of their material anywhere from 20% to 50,000%. Unfortunately,
even these prices dont guarantee that the material supplied is the
material ordered.
Fortunately, most mismarked materials tend to be small items
whose failure has not caused signicant problems. However, any
failure has the potential to cause signicant consequences. Mis-
marking of material is a problem that most frequently occurs when
material is stored or cut into pieces. The errors occur when the
marking ID is transferred to the smaller cut-off pieces. Studies
have shown that steel mills are able to control material with no
signicant traceability problem. When identication problems
occur, they happen after the material leaves the producing mill and
is stored in, or moved from, the material suppliers warehouses.
Section VIII does not require a QA program to be used by the
material supplier, but the manufacturer of the pressure vessel is
responsible for assuring that the material used in the pressure ves-
sel fully meets Code requirements. As a result, many vessel man-
ufacturers use a PMI program to ensure that the proper materials
are received and used in the construction of the pressure vessels.
Initially, all records at nuclear plants were considered to be nec-
essary and were therefore kept. Seeing the need for injecting com-
mon sense to the process, the NCIG published guidelines for
record keeping at nuclear power facilities [17]. One utility has esti-
mated that the use of these guidelines has reduced the cost of
record keeping at that facility by more than $10,000,000 annually.
This seemingly would indicate that record keeping must be a sig-
nicant ongoing problem.
The issue of quality assurance is very important for the future,
because inappropriate application of quality assurance programs
in the past has caused unnecessary escalations of cost. The escala-
tions amounted to untold millions of dollars in the construction of
nuclear power plants, and, unfortunately, the excess cost did
almost nothing to increase the safety or quality of the equipment
in the plants. The new equipment in the plants is safe and meets
quality requirements because the provisions of the ASME Code
were met.
The basic criteria of the quality assurance rules currently in the
ASME Code are good management tools for controlling work
activities. However, merely following these management rules
does not ensure the quality of the product. The quality of the
product is determined by the work performed on the product. To
ensure the quality, the work must be examined (nondestructive-
ly), veried, inspected, and tested as appropriate. Verication of
paperwork does not achieve this goal, but that has been the main
thrust of quality assurance programs in the past. The concentra-
tion on paperwork, and the related inappropriate application and
interpretation of technical criteria by quality program reviewers,
caused the problem of increased costs. The purpose of quality
assurance is to ensure that equipment is constructed to the speci-
cations, Codes, Standards, and regulations. Some paperwork is
important but, by itself, it cannot ensure the quality of the product.
An example of how wasted effort substantially increased the
cost of the plant occurred around 1985. At that time, it was found
that about 2000 nonconformance reports (NCRs) were written
during a one-year period of construction time at one nuclear
power plant. Of these 2000 NCRs reviewed, 1995 of them had
nothing to do with quality of the equipment, because they all
addressed documentation issues. Of the remaining 5 reports that
questioned equipment quality, only 1 NCR identied that a prod-
uct repair was required.
Sixteen different nuclear utilities estimated that the adminis-
trative cost, in the 1980s, associated with each NCR, was
between $3,500 and $7,000. That means that for one plant under
construction in one year, the cost was between $7,000,000 and
$14,000,000 to x one item that was nonconforming. The admin-
istrative time lost and the unnecessary cost involved was shame-
ful. Ask yourself how that time and money could have been
spent more effectively! With ination, that cost would be over
$30,000,000 per year today
The solution to this problem is to develop quality assurance
programs that use the basic criteria for management to work with,
but evaluate equipment by verifying hardware, not paper. In other
words, ensure that the products meet the technical requirements
of specications, Codes, Standards, and regulations, by using
qualied technical personnel to evaluate the hardware. This is
called a performance-based quality assurance program.
Because this issue is so important, quality assurance programs
in the near future should be based on performance-based criteria,
rather than a strict compliance (paperwork) approach, which is
costly and ineffective.
The ASME Code should have one basic Quality Assurance or
Quality Control Program that is the same for all Sections of the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, as well as all ASME Nuclear
Codes and Standards. This would simplify the accreditation
process for manufacturers and suppliers and reduce costs. Quality
Assurance Programs are administrative tools to be used by man-
agement to assure that products are built to specications, Code
requirements, and company standards. There is no practical rea-
son that the Code requirements for QA Programs should be differ-
ent in each Section of the ASME Code. If ASME developed one
common QA program for accreditation of all manufacturers of
boilers, pressure vessels, and other components, the associated
costs would be reduced considerably.
It is obvious from the last series of nuclear power plants con-
structed in the United States, that the quality assurance methods
used concentrated on strict compliance with procedures, no matter
how poorly written, rather than being concerned about the quality
of the product. The accent was on the documentation, rather than
assuring the quality of the product.
For example, at one plant, 2000 nonconformance reports (NCRs)
generated during one year of construction by one company were
reviewed by an independent organization.
Another issue is the extensive use of checklists. When used too
often, checklists are often lled out before the work is performed.
At other times, checklists discourage individuals from thinking
about the work they are performing. In some cases, checklists
have helped to develop poor working habits. The proper substitute
for checklists is effective management.
For Section III, steps are under way to publish a nonmandatory
appendix to explain details of how the QA programs should be
implemented. The nonmandatory appendix being planned will
address how Quality Assurance Programs can be more effective,
based on the many lessons learned.
4.17 DESIGN LOADINGS AND
STRESSES COMPARED TO
ACTUAL CONDITIONS
The Design Specication loading conditions are an engineers
best estimate of what is expected to occur in service. Often the
expected loads are increased by a small factor, maybe 10%, to
account for unknowns. The Code-required Design Report must
then show that the stresses due to Design Loads do not exceed the
4-12 Chapter 4
Code-allowable stresses. When placed in service, occasional loads
may occur that exceed the specied Design Loads. Although these
loads may produce stresses that exceed Code-allowable stresses,
this is not a violation of the Code because the Code governs con-
struction, not evaluation of loads in service. The proper action to
take is for a knowledgeable engineer to evaluate the condition and
determine whether the load is signicant and likely to occur again
and if so, how to preclude its recurrence. For a signicant load, the
designer should determine how the load can be mitigated or how
to modify the equipment. Should the engineer determine that the
occasional overstress due to the load is not signicant, state laws
and other regulations should be checked to ensure compliance.
However, the laws and regulations only require compliance with
the ASME Code for construction, and the issue of overstress dur-
ing operation is not a Code issue.
4.18 POST-CONSTRUCTION
POSTULATED LOADINGS
AND STRESSES
Although the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code has established
an excellent record of safety, it is not a safety Code, because it
does not address or provide rules for the safe operation of the
pressure system in which the boilers or pressure vessels are used.
Pressure vessels still explode due to inappropriate operation, lack
of maintenance, poor training, ignorance of procedures, and other
related causes that result in injuries, deaths, and physical damage.
However, these failures have not been caused by poor construc-
tion when the Code rules were fully implemented. The Code rules
are written to assure proper construction of pressure-containing
components so they can be safely used in service. The manufac-
turer meets this obligation by constructing the component to the
rules of the Code. The ASME considers the Code rules to be fully
complied with when the Authorized Inspector permits the manu-
facturer to apply the ASME Code Stamp to the component. After
the component has been Code stamped, it is the Owners respon-
sibility to ensure that the component is operated safely. It is obvi-
ous that the manufacturer of the vessel cannot be responsible for
the safe operation of the pressure vessel or other Code component
after it is placed in service.
A number of people are injured each year due to the use of
quick-actuating closures. Records show that the primary cause
of the injuries stems from conditions at the site where the equip-
ment is located. The ASME Code provides adequate design and
fabrication rules, but the required training for the operation of the
closures is the responsibility of the equipment Owners or users.
Investigations of accidents with quick-actuating closures in the
last 50 years have not shown any instance in which the manufac-
turer failed to comply with ASME Code rules. However, these
investigations have shown that the primary cause of the accidents
is lack of maintenance and supervision by the user, and inade-
quate training of the operators of the equipment.
Some engineers and others feel that the Design Specication is
a document that cannot be violated when the pressure vessel or
piping is in service. In reality, the Design Specication is only a
document that species loadings and other conditions based on the
best engineering judgment available at the time the Specication
was written. The authors of the Code understood that during oper-
ation of the component, the specied loadings may be exceeded
from time to time. This is why the Code has a design factor. Cases
of over-stress in service are not a concern if the evaluation shows
that the condition produced no permanent yield of the material. If
engineers were able to anticipate all loadings in a completely accu-
rate manner, the design factor could be much lower than currently
used to determine allowable stress values.
The Code is an engineering document for constructing the
equipment so it will be safe in service. After the equipment is
placed in service, evaluations must be based on the knowledge that
stresses evaluated after construction are not limited to the allow-
able stress values specied in the Code. This is because there is
no accurate method for determining actual stresses of the compo-
nent when it is operating in service.
After equipment has been constructed to Code requirements,
someone may postulate that a loading condition may occur that is
greater then the Design Conditions. Obviously, this postulated
load has absolutely no impact on the Code certication of the
equipment. The Code was met when the item was Code Stamped.
Even if the postulated load were to occur, it would have no impact
on Code compliance. One of the reasons for the design factor in
the Code is to account for unknown loads. If it is possible that the
previously unknown load may occur, an engineer should evaluate
it. However, the Code gives no allowable stress values to be used
for such evaluations, and it is appropriate to use engineering judg-
ment. Guidance for doing this is found in ASME Interpretation
III-1-92-45, issued on January 7, 1993. The subject is Section III,
Division 1, NB-3620/NC-3620/ND-3620 Design Considerations.
Interpretation III-1-92-45 states the following:
Question (1): Does Section III require that nuclear plant
components or piping systems originally designed for seis-
mic loadings using static methodologies be reevaluated
using dynamic seismic analysis techniques?
Reply (1): No.
Question (2): If such reevaluations are made on existing
components using new dynamic methodologies, must the cur-
rent Section III provisions be met in lieu of the provisions of
the original code of record?
Reply (2): No.
Question (3): Are Code Cases, such as Cases N-122, N-318,
N-319, and N-392 regarding evaluations of loads on lugs
and attachments, required for the evaluation of Code compo-
nents constructed and installed prior to their publication?
Reply (3): No.
Question (4): If the design methodologies of such Code Cases
are used for evaluation of components constructed and com-
pleted to earlier Code Editions, does the Code require that
the acceptance criteria of the Code Cases be met?
Reply (4): No. Code Cases are not mandatory.
Question (5): After the original design basis and criteria
have been met, does Section III prohibit an engineer from
determining appropriate limits for new evaluations based on
the design philosophy of the ASME Code?
Reply (5): No.
Question (6): If a plant operating load occurs which was not
identied in the original Design Specication, does Section
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-13
III require the affected components or piping systems to be
reevaluated to determine that Code stress values were not
exceeded?
Reply (6): No. Reevaluation of components in operating
plants for new loads is not addressed by Section III.
The evaluation is not required by the Code, but the
Interpretation provides a reasonable engineering approach for
evaluating postconstruction postulated loads.
4.19 MAINTENANCE OF DESIGN
MARGINS
It sometimes happens that loads occur during plant operation
that are larger than the original Design Loads specied.
Regulators have questioned whether or not the original Design
margins have been maintained after these loads occurred. The
correct answer is that if the actual loads do not cause yielding in
any part of the components, the original Design margins have
been maintained because the components can still accommodate
the original Design Loads within Code-allowable stresses. As
long as the component did not change conguration by permanent
yielding, the component is still capable of handling the same
specied loadings. No stress analysis is required to determine
whether permanent yielding occurred. To determine whether
yielding has occurred, it is only necessary to visually inspect the
affected component by looking for leuder lines (stretch marks).
If the stretch marks are not apparent, there has been no signicant
yielding, and the conguration can be considered as unchanged
with regard to Design margins.
If the component has yielded, the component can be evaluated
by using the new dimensions to determine the new stress condi-
tions. As long as the calculated stresses are within about 10% of
the original allowable stresses, there should be no concern regard-
ing the Design margins.
4.20 THERMAL RELIEF DEVICES
Sometimes engineers feel that pressure vessels or piping should
be protected against pressure that results from heating of the uid
contained in the component. If the component is heated and there
is air or gas to allow for expansion, the pressure will not be
increased signicantly. If, however, the uid lls the vessel or
the piping system with no room for expansion, increasing the
temperature of the uid will increase the pressure. The pressure
rise due to the expansion of the uid produces a thermal stress. If
the increasing pressure is large enough to cause yielding of the
component, this yielding or expansion of the component itself
may be adequate to reduce the thermal stress to acceptable limits.
It is possible, however, that the increasing pressure may be great
enough to cause failure in the piping or the pressure vessel. In
order to prevent the failure, it may be necessary to use thermal
relief devices.
However, it is also possible that the thermal loading will not
cause any signicant yielding of the pressure vessel or piping. It
there is a limit to the maximum temperature that causes the ther-
mal loading, the expansion of the uid will be limited, and the
stress will be self-limiting at that temperature. This means that the
thermal stress is a self-limiting secondary stress that does not
need to be evaluated.
Thermal relief devices often leak in service. Therefore, if the
thermal stress is not great enough to cause failure of the pressure
vessel or piping, thermal relief valves should not be used. The
problem with these valves is that they cause environmental prob-
lems when installed, and often they must be removed in order to
eliminate the problems. Except when required to prevent failure
of the component, the Code never requires the use of thermal
relief devices, regardless of the value of the calculated stress.
4.21 CODE CASES
Sometimes the rules of the Code cannot be met, or it may be
desirable to do things differently than required by the Code. One
way of doing this is to request the use of a Code Case. Code Cases
are part of the Code, but are not mandatory, and are only used to
provide alternative provisions to what is in the Code. Code Cases
may provide new design rules, new materials, provide for an alter-
native nondestructive examination, modify administrative provi-
sions of the Code, or provide means of quickly implementing
Code changes that have not yet been published in an Addenda. In
order to use a Code Case, it is necessary to have the permission of
the Owner, the Manufacturer, and the regulator. Most Code Cases
are written with the intent that they will be made part of the Code
at a later date. Requests for Code Cases are usually originated by
users of the Code, although the ASME Committee may decide that
a Case is needed to provide early implementation of a Code
change before the Addenda is published.
4.22 ASME INTERPRETATIONS
Sometimes the Code is not clear, or Code requirements are
interpreted in such a way as to raise questions. Ofcial ASME
Interpretations are used to explain current requirements in the
Code. These Interpretations do not present new rules, but must be
followed. Anyone may obtain an Interpretation from ASME mere-
ly by writing a letter, using the format outlined in the Code. It is
necessary to identify the situation that requires interpretation, and
to propose a question and reply. The reason for this is so that the
Committee will be able to understand the situation fully and pro-
vide the appropriate Interpretation. The fact that only the ASME
can provide ofcial Interpretations of Code requirements is identi-
ed in the Foreword of the Code [18]. ASME Interpretation III-
1-92-67 identies that this has always been the policy of the
ASME [19].
4.23 CODE SIMPLIFICATION
As identied in 4.1, the original ASME Code published in
1915 was pages, which is the equivalent of about
pages today. The current ASME Code is
now more than 12,500 pages long. In other words, in 90 years, the
ASME Code has grown by a factor of more than 200. Much of
this growth is nothing more than duplication. However, it is still
obvious that simplication of the ASME Code is required.
The rst step in the simplication process would be to eliminate
duplication. The rules in Section III, Subsections NC, ND, and NE
55 (8 - 1>2 * 11)
114 (5 * 8)
4-14 Chapter 4
were copied from Section VIII, Division 1. The rules for Section
VIII, Division 2 were based on the provisions in Section III, for
Class 1 pressure vessels. Many of the rules for Section VIII,
Division 3 were based on Section VIII, Division 2. Section XII
uses many of the provisions from Section VIII, Division 1. The
Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping rules were copied from the
ASME B31.1 Piping Code. The design rules for Subsection NF of
Section III were copied from the American Institute of Steel
Construction (AISC) Specication. About 80% of the rules for
materials, fabrication, examination, testing, and pressure relief are
the same for Sections I, III, IV, VIII, and XII (commonly referred
to as the Code Books). The duplication is obvious.
Many users of the Code feel that each of the ASME Code books
are different, and are required to stay different for some mysterious
reason. They dont seem to understand that all the ASME Code
books are written by the same Committee.
The key to simplication of the ASME Code is to eliminate as
much duplication as possible, then make all the technical provi-
sions as consistent as possible. Even now, the formulas for shells,
heads, covers, and other parts are identical, regardless of which
Code Book they are in. Allowable stresses have been moved from
the Code Books to Section II, Part D (except for Section IV), to
simplify the data, make it more easily accessible, and provide
consistency.
Further, the ASME Code could be simplied by making the
administrative rules for the Book Sections consistent. That means
that the accreditation process for Manufacturers of Code compo-
nents should be made uniform, including the quality control
process.
The way to simplify the ASME Code would be to have a
Master Code Book that contains all the common rules. Each of
the Book Sections could then refer to the Master Code Book
and then supplement those rules as necessary. If this were done,
the size of the Code (total number of pages) could easily be cut it
half.
Then the technical differences, such as the rules for impact test-
ing, could be made the same. There is no real technical justication
for having different methods of evaluating material tough-ness.
This type of consolidation would make the ASME Code more
understandable and easier to work with.
The idea that the Code must be simplied and consolidated is
now very obvious to many members of the ASME Boiler and
Presser Vessel Code Committee. It has been suggested that the
consolidation effort should start with a new Code Section to
address design and analysis provisions as given in the 2007
Edition of Section VIII, Division 2. Because of the problems
associated with the new Section VIII, Division 2 Code, which are
addressed in part 4.25 of this chapter, it seems appropriate to start
a new Design and Analysis Section of the Code beginning with
the common design formulas currently used in Section I, Section
III, for Classes 2 and 3, Section IV, and Section VIII, Division 1.
The design formulas in the Code books are identical, so the publi-
cation of such a design book would signicantly reduce the number
of pages of each of the above Sections. Then the stress analysis
requirements for Sections III, Class 1 and Section VIII, Divisions
2 and 3 could be added. The stress analysis requirements and
methodologies are far more complicated and will take much more
time to write. However, starting with the common design formu-
las the Code Committee could get the simplication effort started
with minimum effort.
The common requirements for materials can be placed in a sec-
ond book, and the process continued with other common books
for fabrication, examination, testing, and pressure relief. The pri-
mary Code books Section I, Section III, Section IV, and
Section VIII, would then reference the common requirements in
these common books. When completed, there would be very little
duplication of requirements, and the volume of each of the primary
Code books would be reduced by a factor of at least 2. This
changes made would be editorial, with no technical changes to
any primary Code book.
Many people believe that each Code Section is an independent
set of Code requirements. This is not true. Many of the require-
ments in Section VIII came from Section I. The requirements for
Section III, Classes 2 and 3 were copied from Section VIII,
Division 1. Section VIII, Division 2 requirements were taken
from the requirements in Section III for Class 1 pressure vessels.
Because of this, consolidation makes perfect sense. The consoli-
dation of the ASME Code is an idea whose time has come. It will
happen in the near future.
4.24 FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
FOR CYCLIC SERVICE
Evaluating and designing pressure vessels for cyclic loading
will be a problem in the near future, should hydrogen become one
of the primary fuels for the future. Should this happen, there will
probably be a need for thousands of pressure vessels called
Pressure Swing Absorption (PSA) units. These units are used to
purify hydrogen and are subjected to a full pressure cycle, 0 psi to
the design pressure and back every 10 to 15 minutes every day.
That amounts to 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 full pressure cycles dur-
ing the life of the pressure vessel. These pressure vessels are often
manufactured to the rules of Section VIII, Division 1. Section
VIII, Division 1 has required pressure vessels to be designed for
cyclic loading conditions when identied by the User, but has
never provided any rules to be used in design. Section VIII,
Division 2 provides design rules for cyclic service, but it also
requires use of the more restrictive rules for materials, examina-
tion, and fabrication. Obviously, the use of the more restrictive
rules for materials, examination, and fabrication would increase
costs. The Section VIII, Division 2 cyclic rules are based on low-
cycle fatigue, which is between 10,000 and 100,000 full pressure
cycles.
The 2007 Section VIII, Division 2 requirements for cyclic ser-
vice have been extensively modied and appear to be more com-
plicated. For Section VIII, Division 1 pressure vessels in cyclic
service, it is recommended that fatigue evaluations be made using
the requirements of the 2004 Edition with the 2006 Addenda of
Section VIII, Division 2. The primary reasons for avoiding the
use of the 2007 Edition of Section VIII, Division 2 are identied
in part 4.25 below.
Some PSA units have been in service for about 20 years.
Experience has shown that some of these pressure vessels, welded
primarily by submerged welding, have micro-cracks that grow by
stair-step tearing at a 45 angle. Unfortunately, neither the
micro-cracks nor the 45 stair-step tearing can be found by
Code-required nondestructive examination, because of their size
and orientation. The stair-step tearing can be found by a properly
oriented and extra sensitive ultrasonic examination. The stair-
step tearing can propagate to failure when the micro-cracks are
subject to severe cyclic service. When not subjected to severe
cyclic service, the micro-cracks dont cause any harm. This means
that the stair-step tearing is usually found only after the pres-
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE 4-15
sure vessels have been in service for a number of years.
Depending on the service conditions, this can be a short time.
Experiences has shown that the PSA units will develop cracks
in service that will require repairs. Unfortunately, even the repairs
may be subject to further repairs at a later time.
Heat recovery steam generators (HRSG) are also subject to
severe cyclic service, but are usually constructed to the rules of
Section I, which has never addressed cyclic loading. These vessels
also have a potential for developing cracks during cyclic services.
One solution is to develop a set of rules for all Sections of the
Code that properly address these cyclic loading issues.
Another solution is to perform periodic ultrasonic examinations
of the welds after the vessels are placed in service. However, this
solution is outside the scope of the current ASME Code.
4.25 NEW ASME CODE2007 EDITION
OF SECTION VIII, DIVISION 2
The 2007 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code includes a new Section VIII, Division 2, Alternative Rules -
Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels. Although the title is
the same as the 2004 Edition of Section VIII, Division 2, the simi-
larity between the two documents ends there. The number of
pages has increased from 415 to 930. The new Edition is meant to
be attractive to European users and thus follows the European for-
mat. The reduction in design factor from 3 to 2.4 was made to be
competitive with the European Pressure Equipment Directive.
Some of the changes are indicated below.
(1) Paragraph identication has been changed from letter plus
number to decimal numbers, except for the appendices,
which are now identied as annexes. Each annex is identi-
ed as normative or informative, instead of mandatory or
nonmandatory. Each annex is included in the Part to which
it is applicable, rather than presented as a set of appendices
at the back of the book.
(2) The separate sections of the book are identied as Parts.
Part 1- General Requirements
Part 2 - Responsibilities and Duties
Part 3 - Materials Requirements
Part 4 - Design by Rule Requirements
Part 5 - Design by Analysis Requirements
Part 6 - Fabrication Requirements
Part 7 - Inspection and Examination Requirements
Part 8 - Pressure Testing Requirements
Part 9 - Pressure Vessel Overpressure Protection
(3) All charts that were in Division 2 have been replaced by
equations. The design provisions of the new Division 2 are
based on use of a computer, rather than hand calculations
of any kind.
(4) Design provisions (Article AD plus Design Appendices)
have been increased from 176 pages to 598 pages (Part 4
plus Part 5). This does not seem to be Code Simplication!
(5) The design factor has been reduced from 3 to 2.4 for deter-
mining allowable stress based on tensile strength. The
design factor for allowable stress based on yield is
unchanged.
(6) Section VIII, Division 1 permits weld joint efciencies (E)
that range from 0.45 to 1.0, depending on the type of weld
and the extent of nondestructive examination. Until 2007,
Division 2 required all main weld seams to be fully radi-
ographed, and no weld efciency factor other than 1.0 was
permitted, because it was determined to be unsafe, because
of the design factor being reduced from 4 to 3 when
Division 2 was rst published.
Table 2.7 of the new Division 2 identies the weld joint
efciency factors that may be used. For P-Number 1 mate-
rials, with 100% radiography of longitudinal weld joints,
the value of E is 1.0. However, with only 10% radiogra-
phy, these same welds will have a value of E equal to 0.85.
That is a penalty of only 15% on required thickness.
However, the new Division 2 allows a 20% reduction in
thickness from the old Division 2. Therefore, a new
Division 2 pressure vessel made of P-Number 1 material
with only 10% of the main seam weld joints radiographed
will be thinner than the old Division 2 pressure vessels that
were 100% radiographed. This change appears to be illogi-
cal, because there was no research performed to justify this
change, and in some cases 90% of the main weld seams
will have no volumetric examination.
The purpose of spot or partial radiography in Division 1
was intended to verify the qualications of the welders,
not the integrity of the welds. If welds are not 100% radi-
ographed or 100% ultrasonically examined, it is almost
certain that there will be undetected, unacceptable aws in
those welds. In the new Division 2, even if the volumetric
examination is increased to 25% of the welds, there will
still be undetected aws in the pressure vessels. There has
been no research or testing performed that correlates the
weld joint efciency factor with the amount of nondestruc-
tive examination. How are the joint efciencies correlated
to the extent of volumetric examination? Also, why are
joint efciencies different for different materials, when the
extent of examination is identical? Is there any technical
justication for these differences that is based on research
or testing?
(7) The allowable stress values in the pre-2007 Division 2
were based on the Tresca theory of failure. In the 2007
Edition, the von Mises theory of failure is used. Stress
intensity has been changed to equivalent stress. It
should be noted that in Part 4, Design by Rule, the
allowable value of stress is called allowable stress,
which is confusing, because the Stress Tables refer to the
allowable stresses as equivalent stresses. Allowable
stress is used in Division 1, but it was never used in
Division 2 before the 2007 Edition.
(8) Almost every design formula from the 2004 Edition with
the 2006 Addenda has been changed in format. For exam-
ple, the formula for determining the thickness of a cylin-
drical shell,
has been changed to
This is the change for a simple formula. Some of the
other formulas are far more complicated. Was this change
really necessary?
(9) A new weld joint Category E has been added for attach-
ment welds.
(10) The 2007 Edition of Section VIII, Division 2 requires a
hydrostatic test pressure that is signicantly higher than
t = D/2[exp (P/SE) - 1].
t = PR/(S - 0.5P)
4-16 Chapter 4
the old Division 2. The test pressure has been increased
from 1.25 times the Design Pressure to 1.43 times the
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP). This is a
very signicant difference, especially when considering
that a pressure vessel fabricated to the 2007 Edition of
Section VIII, Division 2, may be 20% thinner than
required by the 2006 Addenda. Also, consider the risk
when 90% of the main weld seams have not been volumet-
rically examined!
(11) The 2007 Edition of Section VIII, Division 2 has many
typographical errors that must be corrected. There are
many references to paragraphs that do not exist. Anyone
contemplating use of Section VIII, Division 2 should care-
fully evaluate the risks associated with use of this new and
untested Code. Users should understand that most manu-
factures will have no experience with it, and Authorized
Inspectors will not be familiar with it, because it is so radi-
cally different from the earlier editions and addenda of
Division 2. The question to evaluate is whether or not there
are enough controls and nondestructive examinations to
justify the 20% reduction in thickness. This is especially
true if less than 100% volumetric examination is specied
by the user.
(12) The allowable stress values for the 2007 Edition of Section
VIII, Division 2 were never published in Section II, Part D.
They were published only in electronic format. The allow-
able stresses were published in the Section II, Part D, in
2008.
(13) Code Case 2575, Use of 2004 Edition Through 2006
Addenda for Pressure Vessel Construction, has been pub-
lished and is permitted to be used if the contract for the
pressure vessel is dated prior to July 1, 2009. The Case
gives people time to review the 2007 Edition. It also pro-
vides time for the ASME to correct all of the errors.
There are many other issues with the 2007 Section VIII,
Division 2 Code that should be carefully reviewed. Any owner or
manufacturer that intends to use the new Code should carefully
study the document beforehand. The 2007 Edition is much more
than a routine update. The risks associated with using the docu-
ment are signicant if the main weld seams are not 100% volu-
metrically examined.
4.26 SUMMARY
In order to understand the ASME Code, it is necessary to
work with it, and communicate with people who have had some
years of experience using it. The Code cannot be understood by
just reading sentences, paragraphs, or chapters. Experience,
training, and application are the best teachers. Engineers working
with the Code must also understand materials, design, welding,
forming of materials, impact testing, nondestructive examina-
tion, and stress analysis, as well as the design formulas in the
Code. It must also be understood that interpretation of Code
requirements by inexperienced personnel can be dangerous and
very costly.
4.27 REFERENCES
1. Canonico, Domenic A. The Origin of ASMEs Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 122, No. 2, February
2000.
2. Criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Design
by Analysis in Sections III and VIII, Division 2, ASME Press,
New York, 1969.
3. Canonico, Domenic A. Adjusting the Boiler Code, Mechanical
Engineering Magazine, New York, Vol. 122, No. 2, February 2000.
4. ASME Code Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power
Plant Components, 1971 Edition, New York. NC-3310 and NC-3350
for design of Class 2 Vessels, and ND-3310 for design of Class 3
Vessels. Rules for materials, fabrication, examination, and testing
extesively refer to Section VIII, Division 1.
5. Nuclear Power Piping, USAS B31.7-1969, ASME, New York,
Subsection I for Class I Piping.
6. Nuclear Power Piping, USAS B31.7-1969, ASME, New York,
Subsections II and III for Class II and Class III Piping.
7. ASME Section III Code, ASME, New York, Winter 1976 Addenda.
8. ASME Section III Code, ASME, New York, 1992 Addenda, Appendix
N, N-1100.
9. ASME Section III Code, ASME, New York, 1994 Addenda, NB-3200,
NB-3600, NC-3600, ND-3600.
10. Petroski, Henry. To Engineer Is Human (the Role of Failure in
Successful Design), St. Martins Press, New York, 1985.
11. ASME Code Section III, ASME, New York, Appendix XXIII, 1996
Addenda.
12. ASME Code Section III, ASME, New York, 1971 Edition, NE-3310.
13. Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria, Prepared by Reedy Engineering,
Inc., and Nuclear Construction Issues Group, published by EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA, September 1987 (EPRI NP-5380), and Section III,
Subsection NF, NF-4400, NF-5114, and NF-5360, 1992 Addenda.
14. ASME SECTION VIII CODE, ASME, New York, UG-41(b), UW
15(b), and L-7, 1991 Addenda.
15. Guidelines for Piping System Reconciliation, published by EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA, (NCIG-05, Revision 1), EPRI NP-5639, May 1988,
Prepared by Reedy Engineering, Inc., and ASME Section III Code,
Appendix T, Recommended Tolerances for Construction and Recon
ciliation of Piping Systems, 1991 Addenda.
16. ASME Section III Code, ASME, New York, NB/NC/ND/NE-4212,
and NB/NC/ND/NE-4213, Winter 1972 Addenda.
17. Guidelines for the Content of Records to Support Nuclear Power
Plant Operation, Maintenance and Modication (NCIG-08), pub-
lished by EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, Prepared by Reedy Engineering, Inc.,
EPRI NP-5653, November 1988.
18. ASME BPV Code, Foreword, ASME, New York, 1993 Addenda.
19. Interpretation: III-1-92-67, All Sections of the Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code; Mandatory Requirements, Specic Prohibitions, and
Nonmandatory Guidance for Construction Activities All Editions and
Addenda, February 11, 1994, File NI94-009, III-1, ASME, New York.
20. 2007 Edition of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII,
Division 2, ASME, New York.