Third World Quarterly, Vol 19, No 3, pp 339348, 1998
Third World studies, development
studies and post-communist studies: denitions, distance and dynamism SHU-YUN MA ABSTRACT The collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s has had contrary impacts on Third World studies and development studies. On the one hand, the disintegration of the former Soviet bloc has made the spirit of `non-alignment of the Third World no longer relevant. On the other hand, the nature of post-communist transformation has led many scholars to study transition in terms of development. This article will examine the recent trend of decline in Third World studies and the penetration of development studies into post-communist studies. It will argue that the employment of development perspectives in transitology will widen our eld of vision of post-communist transformation. The emergence of the concept of the Third World in the 1950s called forth a generation of political scientists, economists, sociologists, and scholars of several other disciplines to investigate into the past, present and future of the `new world that was largely unknown to the West before the 15th century. One of the rst paradigms employed in Third World studies was moderni sation theory, which analyses social changes in terms of unilinear movement from tradition to moderni ty. Criticised as being Eurocentric, moderni sation theory gradually gave way to development studies, which in principle dropped the assumption of single destiny. 1 Yet, as the idea of development is still a Western one, the notion of the Third World is preferred by those countries striving for a non-Western identity. In any case, Third World studies and development studies share similar basic academic concerns and research targets, and the difference between the two elds is often ideological rather than real. However, the collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s has had contrary impacts on Third World studies and development studies. On the one hand, the disintegration of the former Soviet bloc has made the spirit of `non-alignment, `independence between capitalism and socialism, and the `third way of the Third World no longer relevant. Third World studies, along with the concept of the Third World itself, are in crisis. On the other hand, the nature of post-communist transformation has Shu-Yun Ma is Assistant Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong. 339 0143-6597/98/030339-20 $7.00 1998 Third World Quarterly SHU-YUN MA led many to situate transition in development perspectives. While post-commu- nist studies are still searching for an inheritance from the outdated communist studies, 2 development studies have the potential of handling at least part of the vast issues brought up by post-communist changes. In short, the end of socialism has tended to impoveri sh Third World studies, but enrich development studies. This article will examine in detail the above trend. After a brief review of our standard perception of the formation of the Third World, we will show how the three-world taxonomy is in fact based on a set of inconsistent criteria. We will then address the issue of whether the former Second World is (re)joining the Third World or transiting to the less-developed world. This will be followed by a discussion on the relevance of development studies to post-communist trans- formation. Our conclusion is that, although the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe may not welcome a development model based on the East Asian experience, the employment of development perspectives in transitol- ogy will widen our eld of vision of post-communist transformation. Making of the Third World A major mission of the Third World is to achieve an identity that is clearly differentiable from the type of moderni ty originated in Europe. Ironically, however, the notion of the Third World is not itself an indigenous Third World idea, but a European concept. The term `Third World originated from the system of three estates, which is an early form of functional representation commonly adopted in Europe in the Middle Ages and the early modern period. In France, there were three estates: lords spiritual, lords temporal and the `third estate comprising the common people. 3 In 1952 the French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the term `Third World to refer to the `third estate before the French Revolution. It has economic (`poor ), political (`powerless), and social (`marginalised) connot ations. 4 In the 1960s some scholars began to use the term `Third World to describe the conditions of `under developed or `developing countries. It gained increasing currency in the early 1970s and has gradually passed from academic circles into popular daily use. 5 In recent years, however, the notion of the Third World has been challenged. Doubts have been cast about the current validity of the three-world taxonomy: the Second World has disappeared following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc; the newly industrialising countries have left, or are about to leave, the Third World; the NorthSouth gap has narrowed signicantly; the idea of Third World solidarity has been eroded by persistent nationalism; and the condition of internal colonialism has blurred the boundary between the First World and the Third World. 6 On the other hand, the concept of the Third World has been defended on the basis that the NorthSouth gap is in fact widening rather than narrowing; 7 that the Third World continues to be a powerful international actor in a number of arenas; 8 that the term Third World remains `manageable, functional, and forceful; 9 and that the Third World is still a distinct group clearly identiable by its `tenuous, impermanent, fragmented political culture. 10 Before presenting our view on this debate, we need briey to review our standard perception of how the Third World is formed. This is essential to our 340 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES later argument about the outdatedness of the idea of the Third World. The following account on the making of the Third World will be based on L S Stavrainos denitive work Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age. 11 Basically this is a dependency interpretation of the history of the Third World. The central thesis of the dependency school is that the `under development of the Third World is the result of the economic exploitation of the `periphery by the `centre, rather than of any internal impediments to moderni sation and development. 12 According to this perspective, the Third World is seen as a complex historicalpolitical product of the global expansion of European capital- ism. The whole process began in the early 15th century with the emergence of commercial capitalism in Western Europe. This advanced mode of production established the economic and thus political and military primacy of Western Europe over other parts of the world. Capitalism emphasised trade; but given the unequal power structure, much of the trade was conducted on unequal terms. Stavrianos thus dened Third World as `those countries or regions that partici- pated on unequal terms in what eventually became the global market econ- omy. 13 The Third World, in the sense dened above, was born in Eastern Europe in the 15th century. Being adjacent to Western Europe, Eastern Europe was the rst to face the challenge of capitalist trade. At the outset, the two parts of the continent were at similar starting points of development. However, during the 16th and 17th centuries Western Europe grew rapidly into a producer of manufactured goods, whereas Eastern Europe remained a supplier of raw materials. Through unequal exchanges Eastern Europe was gradually captured by Western Europe as an economic appendage. Initially, the capitalist system was unable to stretch into Russia thanks to the existence of a vast and seemingly ever expandable eastern territory. Flat terrains, navigable rivers, and the lack of strong local resistance allowed Russia to extend into Siberia, transforming the country from an East European nation into a cross-continent, relatively self- sufcient empire with regional specialisation and inter-regional trade. A massive industrialisation drive was launched in the 18th century, under the leadership of Peter the Great. Nevertheless, these factors did not save Russia from the eventual fate of membership of the Third World. After its defeat in the Crimean War (185456), Russia was forced to open up the country to Western capitalism. Key sectors of the national economy fell into foreign hands, and agricultural re- sources were export ed on unfavourable terms. Latin America was brought into the Third World by the Spanish and Portuguese conquest at the end of the 15th century. The long isolation of the American Indians from other parts of the world made them biologically, technologically and psychologically too weak to resist European colonisation. The large, relatively docile Indian labour force was used to mine gold and silver; they also worked on haciendas to provide the mining communities with wheat, corn and meat. In the coastal areas where the Indian population was sparse, African slaves were imported to plant single cash crops such as sugar, tobacco and cotton, mainly for export to Europe. During the 17th century bullion output declined, and the importance of haciendas diminished accordingly. Plantations thus became the mainstay of the Latin American economy. The monocul tural 341 SHU-YUN MA nature of the plantations prevented the emergence of local horizontal linkages, making Latin America a dependent economy of Europe. In contrast, the much poorer natural endowment in Anglo-America forced the British and French settlers to develop broad-based, well integrated and thus self-generating econom- ies. As a result, the originally rich Latin America became part of the poor Third World, whereas the initially poor Anglo-America grew into the leader of the developed world. Unlike the American Indians, the African people had a long history of interaction with the peoples, cultures and technologies of Europe and Asia. This reduced the vulnerability of the African people to external threat. Moreover the Europeans were discouraged from entering Africa by the inaccessible geograph- ical conditions, hot and humid climate, tropical diseases, and the lack of readily available sources of wealth in the hinterland. Consequently, when North and South America were opened up and colonised, Africa could still keep the Europeans out of the continent. However, instead of penetrating the interior for wealth, the Europeans found it protable to capture slaves along the African coast and sell them to the New World. With the growth of sugar plantations in Latin America in the 17th century, the trans-Atlantic slave trade prosper ed. A slave trade existed in Africa long before the arrival of the Europeans but the internationalisation of this business had the impact of subordi nating domestic slave trade to the emerging global capitalist economy, thereby obstructing the emergence of local horizontal economic ties. During the early 19th century, the slave trade was gradually replaced by export s of West African resources, such as palm oil, groundnuts, ivory and cotton. Growing conict between European and local traders, and the balance-of-power among the European powers resulted in a scramble for African lands. By 1914 the entire continent had been partitioned (except for Ethiopia and Liberia). In the Middle East the Ottoman Empire was originally strong and self- sufcient. But its proximity to Europe made it the rst Asian civilisation to face a challenge from the West. A decline relative to the West began in the 17th century, two centuries before similar process occurred in China and Japan. Internally, the primacy of religious afliation over national allegiance prevented the Ottoman Empire from achieving political integration comparable to that of Western Europe s nation-state system. The Empire also lagged behind the West in terms of science, technology and productivity. Externally, changing the AsiaEurope trade route from one which went through the Middle East to one which went round the Cape damaged the economies of the Ottoman Empire. Trade with Western Europe was dominated by Levantine companies, the large joint-stock companies organised by the French, English and Dutch to exploit the resources of the Ottoman Empire. The Levantine companies paid for the foodst uffs and raw materials they obtained from the Middle East in part with the bullion that owed into Europe from the New World, a process which transmit- ted ination from the West to the Middle East. In the 19th century, the Western powers annexed the Ottoman Empires land in North Africa and established colonies in this area. The remaining territories, which escaped partition only because of disagreement among the European invaders, became quasi-colonies economically controlled by Western capital. 342 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES Asia was the last entrant to the Third World. When other parts of the globe were integrated one after another into Western capitalism, Asia remained external to the system. Trade between Asia and Europe was limited, as the West produced little of interest to Asians, while Asian goods were too expensive for European buyers. But Asias independence ended with the British colonisation of India in the 19th century. European consumers who formerly could not afford Indian goods now exchanged jute, cotton, hides and oilseeds for tea. Millions of Indian coolies were shipped to work in plantations and mines in Southeast Asia, Fiji, East Africa and the Caribbean. More importantly, Indian opium was traded for Chinese tea. When China refused to take in opium, the British resorted to military force, leading to the defeat of China in the Opium War of 183942. Although subsequent struggles among the European powers saved China from outright conquest and direct foreign rule, the country was forced to accept a series of unequal treaties which subjected China to the world capitalist system. Treaty ports were opened; coolies were exported; spheres of inuence were established; and native industries were ruined. While the European powers approached Asia from the west, the USA intruded from the east. The Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) opened up Japan to the Americans and similar pacts were signed subsequently with other Western powers. However, for a number of reasonsthe preoccupation of the Western powers with the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny; a high degree of cultural and racial homogeneity; the tradition of borrowing from foreign experience; internal social tensions that produced forces of change; and outstanding leadershipJapan became the only part of the world that was able to maintain political and economic independence from the West. By the end of the 19th century, instead of becoming a Third World country, Japan had emerged as an imperialist power. In brief, from the 15th to the 19th century, the global expansion of capitalism from Europe created a Third World that included Eastern Europe and Russia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (except Japan). Decolonisation, which began in the 19th century in Latin America and after the Second World War in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, gave rise to a number of new states. However, political independence was not followed by economic independence, as indicated by the devastating impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s on Latin America, the Western control of oil production in the Middle East until the 1970s, the specialisation in export able cash crops at the expense of traditional food production in Africa, and the strong presence of multinationals in many Asian countries. On the other hand, the emergence of the socialist bloc and its separation from the capitalist world economy detached Russia and Eastern Europe from the Third World. `The Third World, then, comprises at present the following portions of the globe: all of Latin America, all of Africa except South Africa, and all of Asia except Japan and Israel. 14 Two-dimensionalisation of the concept of the Third World As mentioned at the beginning of the last section, the concept of the Third World originated from the term `third estate. The numeric meaning of the `third estate (common people) was that it was next to the `rst estate (lords spiritual) and 343 SHU-YUN MA `second estate (lords temporal). However, when the term `third estate was modied into Third World, the word `third became an adjective without numeric meaning. In other words, the original notion of the Third World is not based upon the prior existence of the First and Second World. However, as the word `third inevitably leads to numeric association, people encountering the term are naturally induced to ask what the other two worlds are. It is this question that the dependency approach fails to answer. As evident in Stavrianos work summarised above, in the dependency framework there are only two worlds, the centre and the periphery. In a strict numeric sense, therefore, there is no such thing as the Third World in the dependency analysis. Dependency theory is predominantly a study of economic relations. If econ- omic relations is substituted for degree of economic development as the criterion of classication, a greater number of worlds can be identied. But this may lead to the other extreme of having too many worlds. For example, the World Banks classication of countries into `low-income, `lower-middle-income, `upper - middle-income and `high-income economies suggests the existence of four worlds. 15 Also working from an economic standard, Newsweek magazine pro- posed the category of the Fourth World, referring to `the worst economic hardship cases; and Time added the Fifth World to designate `the globes true basket cases. 16 More recently, it has been suggested that the world be classied into seven categories based mainly on changes in per capita income. 17 This kind of exercise can result in endless and meaningless multiplications of worlds and in this case, the concept of worlds may better be replaced by a `purely linear list of countries ranked in order of level of development. 18 Yet, among the various taxonomies, the notion of the Third World has been most popular. This has been the result of the addition of a political dimension to the economic criterion, thanks to the emergence of communist regimes. The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the socialist transformation in Eastern Europe after the Second World War represented efforts to achieve rapid industrialisation without resort to capitalism. The initial success seemed to suggest the viability of socialism as an alternative path of development. 19 This was followed by the Cold War, characterised by political, military and ideological confrontation between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. The clear division between the two camps gave rise to the notion of the First World, referring to the advanced capitalist countries led by the USA, in contrast with the Second World consisting of the Soviet bloc countries. 20 In such an antagonistic atmosphere, those countries which wanted to keep a neutral position between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp were attracted by the notion of the Third World, which implied the possibility of a third way. In this manner, to the concept of the Third World was added the meaning of non-al ignment. 21 The term Third World in its current usage, then, can only be underst ood from two dimensions: the economic and the political. The economic dimension divides countries into centre and periphery and the political dimension into the capitalist camp, the socialist camp and the non-al igned countries. These two dimensions form the matrix shown in Table 1. 22 In the economic dimension, we follow Stavrianos dependency division of the world into centre and periphery. However, in addition to the capitalist centre 344 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES TABLE 1 Economic and political dimensions of the three worlds Political Economic Centre Periphery Capitalist camp 1. North America 4. Southern Europe Western Europe Socialist camp 2. Soviet Union 5. Eastern Europe Non-Aligned countries 3. Nil 6. Asia (except Japan), Latin America, the Middle East (except Israel), Africa (except South Africa) comprising North America and Western Europe, we add the socialist centre represented by the Soviet Union and the corresponding periphery consisting of Eastern Europe. This is to recognise the `socialist dependency of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. 23 In the political dimension, the division of capitalist camp, socialist camp and non-al igned refers to the presence or absence of a formal political alliance, but not to the nature of the socio-economic system. Hence socialist countries like China and Ethiopia are not included in the socialist camp, but are classied as non-al igned. The term `non-aligned came from the Non-Aligned Movement initiated in the 1960s by a group of countries striving for political and military neutrality between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp. Although the Non-Aligned Movement itself might be regarded as a `non-military, anti-colonial, alliance, it did not form any formal political alliance. 24 In terms of Table 1, the First World is represented by cells 1 and 4, the Second World by cells 2 and 5, and the Third World by cell 6. Cell 3 is empty, as basically no developed country has joined the Non-Aligned Movement. 25 What Table 1 shows is that the three-world taxonomy is in fact based on a set of inconsistent, two-dimensional criteria. The difference between the First World (cells 1 and 4) and the Second World (cells 2 and 5) is political; but the developed part of the First World (cell 1) and the developed part of the Second World (cell 2) is lumped together to make an economic contrast with the Third World (cell 6). Between the political and economic criteria, the former often has primacy over the latter. Thus Eastern European countries (cell 5) have been included in the Second World for political reasons, although their economic dependency on the Soviet Union should classify them as part of the Third World. Similarly, by the late-15th century Southern European countries (cell 4) had declined to the status of Third World economies; 26 yet they are regarded as part of the First World because of their political alliance with the West. According to this three-world taxonomy, the First World produced the most output with the least land and labour, as shown in Table 2. As mentioned above, according to the dependency schools interpretation, the Third World as a historical product was formed between the 15th and 19th century, before the formation of the First and Second World in the cold war 345 SHU-YUN MA TABLE 2 Relative economic, geographic and demographic size of the three worlds Share in world gross Share in Share in world national product (%) world area (%) population (%) First World 63 23 15 Second World 19 26 33 Third World 18 51 52 Source: Rod Hague, Martin Harrop & Shaun Breslin, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, London: Macmillan, 1992, pp. 4546. Note: According to the source, the First World consists of around 30 economically advanced liberal democracies; the Second World around 30 industrialized communist party states and the Third World a large number of less-developed countries. This is thus only a rough approximation of our three-world taxonomy. period, implying that the concept of the Third World can exist independently of the First and Second World. It is only through the two-dimensionalisation of the concept of the Third World that the First, Second and Third World were given numeric sense. But this process involves changing and inconsistent criteria. The Second World: joining the Third World or transiting to the less developed world? The domino-type collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe that began in 1989 precipitated the Soviet bloc into a collapse and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on 1 July 1991 marked the ofcial end of the Second World. 27 For Third World countries, this meant the loss of a socialist alternative in terms of development model, political support and economic assistance. Moreover, Western interest in them is expected to diminish with the decline of their strategic importance. 28 From an academic point of view, perhaps the most signicant impact is an identity crisis for the Third World. As discussed in the last section, if the term Third World is to make any numeric sense, it must be based on a two-dimensional taxonomy with the political criterion given primacy over the economic criterion. Now with the disintegration of the socialist bloc, it is no longer meaningful to speak of a capitalist camp and a non-aligned group. The political dimension of the concept of the Third World thus collapses and, as mentioned above, the economic dimension alone is not adequate to give full numeric meaning to the term Third World. In this sense, the Third World has disappeared. This reinforces the arguments against the current validity of the notion of the Third World summarised at the beginning of the rst section. Our view favour s abandoning the notion of the Third World. From the very beginning, the term has been problematic as it misleads people over questions such as what the three worlds are. Convent ional dependency analysis can name only two worlds, whereas economic development approach suggests arbitrary numbers of worlds. The current conception of the Third World is based on 346 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES shifting two-dimensional (economic and political) criteria. The problem of inconsistency aside, the disappearance of the political dimension in the post-cold war period makes the Third World no longer identiable. Although originally the concept of the Third World does not imply the existence of two other worlds, the term itself inevitably leads to questions about its numeric meaning. More importantly, the Third World has disappeared not just as a category of countries, but also as an idea. Third Worldism, if it is to mean the goal to `chart a political and economic path between the liberal capitalism of the First World and the state socialism of the Second World; 29 is no longer relevant in the post-cold war era. Third Worldism `as a critique of an unequal world, a programme for economic development and justice, a type of national reformism dedicated to the creation of new societies and a new world 30 is also dead, as revolutionary romanticism has proved unsustainable. To abandon the notion of the Third World does not mean that the Third World conditions of being `poor, powerless and marginalised have disappeared from the globe. Poverty and injustice continue to prevail on our planet. More importantly, the collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe has drawn the former Second World countries into the Third World arena. This has led to the argument that `while East Asia may be leaving the Third World much of the former Soviet Bloc can be said to have (re)joined it; 31 or that `it might be better to look to third world countries for Russias likely destiny. 32 However, such a characterisation of the conditions of the former Soviet bloc countries is wrong if we stick to the political criterion of the Third World, as none of the former Second World countries have `(re)joined the Non-Aligned Movement of the Third World. To the contrary, many of them have been seeking political as well as an economic alliance with the First World. The statement that some members of the former Second World have `(re)joined the Third World makes sense only if it refers to the decline in the level of development of post-communist countries. But this situation can better be conceptualised in terms of `de-development, rather than as (re)joining the Third World. Table 3 shows changes in the Human Development Index (HDI) of countries undergoing post-communist transformation. Though not a perfect design, the HDI constructed by the United Nations Development Programme contains measure- ments for different aspects of development, including income, health and education. From 199094, the HDI dropped throughout the entire former Second World (except in Poland and Romania), reecting a general decline in the level of development in the region. Nine countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation and Ukraine) even fell from the category of `high human development to `medium human development. They provide clear cases of `de-development. In Russia, the `centre of the former Second World, the HDI dropped by 8.1%. A closer look at the trade, consumption and welfare conditions of the country led Petras & Vieux to the conclusion that Russia is in `transition to underdevelopment. 33 Focusing on the brain drain problem, Kuznetsov found that Russia is on the verge of `becoming a developing country. 34 In short, we nd it more appropriate to describe changes in Russia and Eastern Europe as a transition to the less developed world, rather than as a switch from 347 SHU-YUN MA TABLE 3. Human Development Index 1990 1994 Change (%) High human development: Armenia 0.831 Fell to medium human development Belarus 0.861 0.806 26.4 Bulgaria 0.854 Fell to medium human development Czechoslovakia a 0.892 0.872 22.2 Estonia 0.872 Fell to medium human development Georgia 0.829 Fell to medium human development Hungary 0.887 0.857 23.4 Kazakhstan 0.802 Fell to medium human development Latvia 0.868 Fell to medium human development Lithuania 0.881 Fell to medium human development Poland 0.831 0.834 0.4 Russian Federation 0.862 Fell to medium human development Ukraine 0.844 Fell to medium human development Medium human development: Albania 0.699 0.655 26.3 Armenia Fell from high human 0.651 2 21.7 development Azerbaijan 0.770 0.636 2 17.4 Bulgaria Fell from high human 0.780 28.7 development Estonia Fell from high human 0.776 2 ll.0 development Georgia Fell from high human 0.637 2 23.2 development Kazakhstan Fell from high human 0.709 2 12.0 development Kyrgzstan 0.689 0.635 27.8 Latvia Fell from high human 0.711 2 18.1 development Lithuania Fell from high human 0.762 2 13.5 development Moldova 0.758 0.612 2 19.3 Romania 0.709 0.748 5.5 Russian Federation Fell from high human 0.792 28.1 development Tajikistan 0.657 0.580 2 11.7 Turkmenistan 0.746 0.723 23.1 Ukraine Fell from high human 0.689 2 18.4 development Uzbekistan 0.695 0.662 24.7 Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 1994, 1997. a The data on Czechoslovakia covered only the period from 199092, because by the end of 1992 the country had broken up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. the Second to the Third World. To be sure, the concept of development is controversial. It rests on a belief in human progress; 35 it tends to be Eurocen- tric; 36 and the term `less developed carries negative connot ations. 37 However, 348 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES disagreements over the idea of development could be dealt with by recognising indigenous development models, 38 and by adding new content to the meaning of development. 39 Comparing the notion of development with that of the Third World, the former has the advantage that it avoids all the numeric confusions of the latter. Moreover, we have a variety of quantitative indicatorsper capita gross national product, human development index, physical quality of life index, index of social progress and socioeconomic development index 40 to measure and rank different levels of development, whereas the notion of the Third World provides only a broad categorisation of countries. Finally, by including depen- dency as a feature of underdevelopment, the concept of development is able to incorporate the centreperiphery dimension of the Third World emphasised by the dependency school. Relevance of development studies to post-communist studies Post-communist countries are committed to development, but not to reviving the ailing Third Worldism. What then is the relationship between development studies and post-communist studies? What insight do development studies have for post-communist transformation? Can post-communist studies be incorporated into development studies? Samuel Huntington identied ve major goals of development: economic growth, equity, democracy, political order and stability, and national autonomy. 41 Are these not also the goals of post-communist transformation? To achieve these goals, former Second World countries has been engaged in different forms and degrees of liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisa- tion and democratisation. These are also common themes of reform in the developing world. Such commonalities have led to a trend of analysing post- communist issues in the eld of development studies. The present authors survey of four major journals in development studies (Journal of Developing Societies, Journal of Development Studies, Third World Quarterly and World Development) from 198996 found at least 21 pieces on post-communist transformation. Issues discussed range from the ArmenianAzerbaijani conict, pastoralism in post-socialist Mongoli a, mass privatisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics, local government reform in Poland, to statemarketcivil institutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics. 42 Apart from journal articles, chapters on post-communist transition have appeared in books shelved under development studies. 43 The publication of the World Development Report 1966 perhaps marked the most ofcial attempt to include post-communist transformation into development studies. This annual text of the World Bank, which `dene[s] the conventional paradigm of development, 44 is highly inuential in the setting of development agenda. The 1996 report, entitled From Plan to Market, is devoted `to the transition of countries with centrally planned economiesto a market orien- tation. 45 According to this report The long-term goal of transition is the same as that of economic reforms elsewhere: to build a thriving market economy capable of delivering long-term growth in living standards. What distinguishes transition from reforms in other countries is the 349 SHU-YUN MA systemic change involved: reform must penetrate to the fundamental rules of the game, to the institutions that shape behavior and guide organizations. This makes it a profound social transition as well as an economic one. Similar changes have been needed in many other countries and the transition experience is therefore of interest to them as well. But most of their reform programs pale in comparison to the scale and intensity of the transition from plan to market. 46 Most of the worlds economies, at one time or another, have lifted price controls, opened trade, or privatized state enterpriseswith varying degrees of success. But as noted above, transition is different. It is not simply the adoption or modication of a few policies or programs but a passage from one mode of economic organization to a thoroughly different one. The underlying habits and rules of an economic system are often so pervasive and ingrained that they are taken for granted. 47 In other words, in the World Banks view, post-communist transformation is different from the reforms in the developing world only in the intensity but not the nature of the change. Post-communist transition is regarded as a highly complicated development issue. Does this mean that former socialist countries in general nd it more difcult than developing countries to achieve development? Anne Krueger found that, in terms of starting income levels, social indicators, savings rates and human capital stock, post-communist countries in Eastern Europe are in a more advantageous position than most middle-income develop- ing countries. 48 But, on the other hand, the East European countries lack the commercial codes, laws of contract, clear proper ty rights arrangements and entrepreneurial tradition that are essential for development As such, post- communist countries have to face the unique problem of creating those institu- tions and incentives. A World Bank researcher, Mary Shirley, also noted that, unlike Latin American countries, post-communist economies in Eastern Europe lack a large private sector and functioning nancial systems that are essential for successful privatisations. 49 Nevertheless, she found that both Eastern Europe and Latin America share similar problems such as poorly performing state enterprises, varied commitment to privatisation, technical difculties and adverse macroeco- nomic conditions. There are therefore, important lessons from Latin America that are relevant to post-communist transformation. Focusing on the political dimension, Joan Nelson observed some important parallels between Eastern Europe and developing countries: commitment to fundamental changes because of the failure of limited reforms; disagreements over the design, speed and sequencing of reform; nationalistic sentiment against economic and political liberalisation; and the existence of organised opposit ion but absence of organi sed support for reform. However, there are problems that seems to be more serious in Eastern Europe than in developing countries: the presence of a larger public sector; a lower degree of tolerance towards inequality and insecurity; opposit ion from the more organi sed labour; greater reliance on state agencies and ofcials to reform the state itself (the so-called `orthodox paradox of reform in developing countries); and a lack of the features that produced strong centralised executive authority in developing countries. Overall, Nelson concluded that, notwithstanding important contrasts between the settings 350 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES of reform in post-communist Eastern Europe and the developing world, there are `striking parallels in the issues confronting the two groups of countries. Therefore, `[developing] countries] experience may enrich underst anding and thereby contribute to Eastern Europe efforts to design ways to cope with the inherent tensions of the [economic and political] transition. 50 From a different angle but in a similar tone, Roger Markwick wrote: `many parallels can be drawn between the political problems facing erstwhile Soviet republ ics and those in the [developing world] attempting to make the transition from authoritarian regimes. 51 In short, there is a growing trend of incorporating post-communist transform- ation into development studies. De Kadt et al. have made perhaps the most explicit statement in this regard. In dening the issues for developmentalists in the 1990s, they noted that: The boundaries of development studies have become more blurred. Greater atten- tion is now being paid to the global changes that are affecting the world as a wholeIf the study of structural adjustment in Africa has taught us certain lessons about the way state institutions adjust (or do not adjust!) to policy changes in situations that require a major transformation, then those lessons may well be of relevance to what is occurring in Eastern Europe today, and vice versa. 52 In most attempts to link post-communist studies with development studies, differences between former Second World countries and developing countries are noted. But sufcient similarities are found to justify use of development perspectives to analyse post-communist changes. The next question, then, is what development model is most relevant to post-communist countries? What is the central message that development studies has for post-communist leaders? Conclusion: an Asian model for post-communist transformation? Notwithstanding the recent Asian nancial crisis, among the less developed countries, it is those in East AsiaJapan, South Korea, Taiwanwhich have achieved the most remarkable development in the postwar period. This has given rise to the notion of an East Asian model which highlights such features as high saving and investment rates, attention to education, an emphasis on exports and, above all, pervasive state intervention. 53 Ha-Joon Chang examined the appli- cability of the East Asian development model to post-communist countries and concluded that, although some institutions in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are idiosyncratic, this should not lead us to the conclusion that the East Asian development experience is strictly non-transferable. 54 Following the notion of an East Asian developmental state. 55 Chang argued that the most important lesson that post-communist countries could draw from East Asia was the important role played by the state. The real issue is thus not to destroy the central planning legacy in the former socialist countries, but to modify it to produce effective state intervention. This is in direct contrast to the Western neoliberal prescrip- tion, which emphasises the importance of a minimal state and a maximal market. Within the context of post-communist transformation, there is also an `Asian approach that has been regarded as more successful than the method of changes 351 SHU-YUN MA adopted in Russia and Eastern Europe. Compared to the `big bang reforms (consisting of rapid liberalisation, stringent stabilisation and wholesale privatisa- tion) in the former Soviet bloc countries, changes in transitional economies in Asia (including China, Mongolia, the Lao PDR, Burma and Vietnam) have been much more gradual and evolutionary. Although there are many important differences between transitional economies in Asia and Europe in terms of initial conditions and external circumstances, advocates of the Asian approach hold that the Asian transition experiences contain valuable lessons for post-communist transformation worldwide. 56 However, although the East Asian model has been popular among developing countries and an Asian approach is emerging in the context of post-communist transformation, the current mood in Eastern Europe is to `return to Europe, rather than to learn from Asia. As Chang observed, `most studies on the reform in Eastern Europe seem to accept that [Anglo-Saxon capitalism] is the best of all possible models, and discuss how best to transform the Eastern European economies into (highly idealised versions of) Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Of those studies which try to draw lessons from experience of non-Anglo-Saxon coun- tries, only a minority look at the East Asian experience. 57 Apart from the aspiration for a European identity, such an atmosphere also reects a strategic consideration for East European countries. For them, to `return to Europe to join such important West European organi sations as the European Union the Council of Europe, NATO and the European Conference on Security and Cooper- ationis a means to guarantee their security. 58 The situation in Russia is more complicated. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, `the European or Western orientation of the early days of Russian independencehas been replaced by a growing awareness that Russia is not merely the eastern part of Europe, but also the northern and western part of Asia. 59 For national security and unity reasons, the Russian state needs to maintain a careful balance between the countrys European and Asian identity. Any development policy that claims to `return to Europe or to learn from Asia may jeopardise this effort. The Eastern European countries resistance to the East Asian development model and the Asian transition approach is reminiscent of developing countries rejection of the Eurocentric development formula. Before long, the West was accused of imposing its own history and value onto the less developed world; now East Asia has its own development lessons to offer. Nevertheless, at present it is still the West that has the upper hand in the export of development prescription. Through international lending agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the West has been attempting to translate the neoliberal doctrine into actual policies in both the developing world and post-communist world, resulting in similar economic liberalisations in the two worlds. In this sense, `the parallels [between developing countries and post-com- munist countries] reect shared pressures from the larger international setting. 60 In any event, the employment of development perspectives in post-communist studies widens our eld of vision of post-communist transformation. Just as in its earlier contribution in breaking the belief that tradition would move along a single path to reach modernity, development studies tells us that post-communist transformation may take different forms towards different directions. The very 352 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES basic idea of development suggests that there is no end of history. It is too early to say whether development studies and post-communist studies will converge or not; but it is now time for transitologists to make more reference to development studies, and for developmentalists to pay greater attention to post-communist transformation. Notes 1 Robert C Bartlett, `On the decline of contemporary political development studies, Review of Politics, 58, 1996, pp 272278. 2 For an effort in this direction, see Frederic J Fleron, Jr & Erik P Hoffmann (eds), Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. 3 R J W Evans, `Estates, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopaidia of Political Science, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p 297. 4 Ted C Lewellen, Dependency and Development: An Introduction to the Third World, Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1995, p 3. 5 Leslie Wolf-Phillips, `Why Third World?: origin, denition and usage, Third World Quarterly, 9(4), 1987, pp 13111327. 6 Mark T Berger, `The end of the Third World?, Third World Quarterly, 15(2), 1994, pp 257275; Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology, London: Penguin, 1987; and Vicky Randall, `Third World: rejected or rediscovered?, Third World Quarterly, 13(4), 1992, pp 727730. 7 Robin Broad & Christina Melhorn Landi, `Wither the NorthSouth gap?, Third World Quarterly, 17(1), 1996, pp 717. 8 Hans-Henrik Holm, `The end of the Third World?, Journal of Peace Research, 27(1), 1990, pp l7. 9 Allen H Merriam, `What does Third World mean?, in Jim Norwine & Alfonso Gonzales (eds), The Third World: States of Mind and Being, Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp 1522. 10 Mehran Kamrava, `Political culture and a new denition of the Third World, Third World Quarterly, 16(4), 1995, pp 691701. 11 L S Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age, New York: William Morrow, 1981. 12 There is a vast literature on dependency theory; a recent comprehensive survey can be found in Robert A Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. 13 Stavrianos, Global Rift, pp 3132. 14 Ibid, p 34. South Africa and Israel are not included in the Third World as these white-settler economies enjoy special connections with the `centre. Ibid, pp 755790. 15 Wolf-Philips, `Why Third World?, pp 13131314. 16 Merriam, `What does Third World mean?, pp 1718. 17 The seven categories are: the industrialized First World: the newly industrialising Third World countries: the major surplus oil producers: Third World countries with growing per capita income: Third World countries with constant per capita income; Third World countries with declining per capita income; and transitional economies. See Karl P Magyar, `Classifying the international political economy: a Third World proto-the- ory, Third World Quarterly, 16(4), 1995, pp 703716. 18 Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984, p 321 (emphasis in the original). 19 It should be noted that according to the world-system theory of the dependency school, there is only a capitalist world, and the emergence of the socialist system did not change this situation. As the world-system theorist Wallerstein argued, the socialist countries do not constitute a separable world, and there is still only a single world-system. The communist state is merely a `collective capitalist rm as long as it remainsa participant in the market of the capitalist world-economy. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World- Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp 6869. 20 Paul Cammack, David Pool & William Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1993; Lewellen, Dependency and Development, p 4; Tony Spybey, Social Change, Development and Dependency: Modernity, Colonialism and the Development of the West, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp 143157 and Worsley, The Three Worlds, p 308. 21 Cammack et al, pp 56; Lewellen, Dependency and Development, p 3; and Stavrianos, p 33. 353 SHU-YUN MA 22 Worsely, The Three Worlds, pp 310, 312 used similar economicpolitical matrices to illustrate different meanings of the Third World. But the factor of non-alignment is absent in his framework. 23 Cal Clark & Donna Bahry, `Dependent development: a socialist variant, International Studies Quarterly, 27(3), 1983, pp 271293. Apart from this external dependency, a kind of socialist internal dependency has also been found in the relationship between the Asian republics in the Soviet Union and the Soviet centre. See Gregory Gleason, `The political economy of dependency under socialism: the Asian republics in the USSR, Studies in Comparative Communism, 24(4), 1991, pp 335353. 24 Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance, London: Frances Pinter, 1978, pp 224225. 25 France under de Gaulle may be considered as a marginal case of cell 3 in Table 1 as the French president attempted to pursue a foreign policy that was independent of the USA. In 1968 de Gaulle was invited to attend a Non-Aligned Movement meeting. But he did not respond, and later moved his neutral position towards renewed adhesion to NATO, see Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: the Ruler 19451970, New York: WW Norton, 1992, pp 411412. 26 Stavrianos, Global Lift, pp 8687. 27 For an overview of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, see Minton F Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Armonk, ME: Sharpe, 1997; and for a brief history of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, see Raymond L Garthoff, `Warsaw Treaty Organization, in Joel Krieger, (ed), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 969970. 28 For the impact of the collapse of socialism on the Third World, see Fred Halliday, `The Third World and the end of the Cold War, in Barbara Stallings (ed), Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp 3366; Franz J Hinkelammert, `The crisis of socialism and the Third World, Monthly Review, 45, 1993, pp 105114; Colin Legum, `The Post-communist Third World: focus on Africa, Problems of Communism, 41(12), 1992, pp 195206; Shahid M Shahidullah, `The Third World after the Cold War: global imperatives and local pecularities, Journal of Developing Societies, 12, 1996, pp 119135; Carlos M Vilas, `Is socialism still an alternative for the Third World?, Monthly Review, 42, 1990, pp 93109; Mark Webber, `The Third World and the dissolution of the USSR, Third World Quarterly, 13(4), 1993, pp 691712. See also the special issue of Third World Quarterly, 13(2), 1992, devoted to `rethinking socialism. 29 Berger, `The end of the Third World?, p 259. 30 Harris, The End of the Third World, p 200. 31 Berger, `The end of the Third World?, p 257. 32 Michael Burawoy, `From Sovietology to comparative political economy, in Daniel Orlovsky (ed), Beyond Soviet Studies, Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, l995, pp 72102, see p 90. 33 James Petras & Steve Vieux, `Russia: the transition to underdevelopment, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 25(1), 1995, pp 109118. 34 Evgenii Kuznetsov, `Is Russia becoming a developing country? Brain drain and allocation of talent in the post-socialist transition, Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 7(4), 1995, pp 485497. 35 P W Preston, Theories of Development, London: Routledge, 1982, pp 1820. 36 John Brohman, `Universalism, eurocentrism and ideological bias in development studies: from modernis- ation to neoliberalism, Third World Quarterly, 16(1), 1995, pp 121140; and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, `The development of development theory: towards critical globalism, Review of International Political Economy, 3(4), 1996, pp 541564, see pp 543547. 37 Merriam, `What does Third World mean?, p 19. 38 Howard J Wiarda, `Toward a nonethnocentric theory of development: alternative conceptions from the Third World, Journal of Developing Areas, 17, 1983, pp 433452. 39 Barbara Ingham, `The meaning of development: interactions between `New and `Old Ideas, World Development, 21(11), 1993, pp l8031821. 40 David Drakakis-Smith, `Human development indicators, in Tim Unwin (ed), Atlas of World Development, New York: John Wiley, 1994, pp 3438. 41 Samuel P Huntington, `The goals of development, in Myron Weiner & Samuel P Huntington (eds), Understanding Political Development, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1987, pp 331. 42 The 21 articles found were John B Allcock, `In praise of chauvinism: rhetorics of nationalism in Yugoslav politics, Third World Quarterly, 10(4), 1989, pp 208222; Michael Burawoy, `The state and economic involution: Russia through a China lens, World Development, 24(6), 1996, pp 11051117; Klaus Deininger, `Collective agricultural production: a solution for transition economies?, World Development, 23(8), 1995, pp 13171334; Tamara Dragadze, `The ArmenianAzerbaijani conict: structure and sentiment, Third World Quarterly, 11, 1989, pp 5571; Andre Gunder Frank, `Revolution in Eastern Europe: lessons for democratic social movements (and socialists?, Third World Quarterly, 12(2), 1990, pp 3652; Kiaras Gharabaghi, `Development strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s: in search of alternatives, Third World Quarterly, 15(1), 1994, pp 103119; James F Hicks & Bartlomiej Kaminski, `Local government reform and 354 THIRD WORLD STUDIES, DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES transition from communism: the case of Poland, Journal of Developing Societies, 11(1), 1995, pp 120; Jude Howell, `Coping with transition: insights from Kyrgyzstan, Third World Quarterly, 17(1), 1996, pp 5368; Ross Levine & David Scott, `Old debts and new beginnings: a policy choice in transitional socialist economies, World Development, 21(3), 1993, pp 319330; Nick Manning, `TH Marshall & Jurgen Habermas, `Citizenship and transition in Eastern Europe, World Development, 21(8), 1993, pp l3131328; Robin Mearns, `Community, collective action and common grazing: the case of post-socialist Mongolia, Journal of Development Studies, 32(3), 1996, pp 297339; Gordon C Rausser & S R Johnson, `Statemar- ketcivil institutions: the case of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics, World Development, 21(4), 1993, pp 675689; Nemat Shak, `Making a market: mass privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics, World Development, 23(7), 1995, pp 11431156; Mary Shirley, `Privatization in Latin America: lessons for transitional Europe, World Development, 22(9), 1994, pp l3131323; Guy Standing, `Employment restruc- turing in Russian industry, World Development, 22(2), 1994a, pp 253260; Guy Standing, `Labour market implications of Privatization in Russian industry in 1992, World Development, 22(2), 1994, pp 261270; Guy Standing, `The changing position of women in Russian industry: prospects of marginalization, World Deve1opment, 22(2), 1994, pp 271283; Andres Solimano, `The post-socialist transitions in comparative perspective: policy issues and recent experience, World Development, 21(1), 1993, pp 18231835; Valerii Tishkov, `Glasnost and the nationalities within the Soviet Union, Third World Quarterly, 11, 1989, pp 191207; S David Young, `Going to market: economic organization and transformation in a Hungarian rm, World Development, 12(6), 1993, pp 883899; and Ryszard Zukowski, `Stabilization and recession in a transitional economy: the case of Poland, World Development, 21(7), 1993, pp 11631178. Articles on China are not included in this list, because before post-communist transition began in Eastern Europe, China had already been studied as a developing country. 43 Examples include Ru diger Dornbusch, Stablilization, Debt, and Reform: Policy Analysis for Developing Countries, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993; Maya Koteva, `Trade policy reform in Central and Eastern Europe: early experience and lessons, in Oliver Morrissey & Frances Stewart (eds), Economic and Political Reform in Developing Countries, London: St Martins Press, 1995, pp 3957; and David Seddon, `Reform and popular protest in Eastern Europe, in Oliver Morrissey & Frances Stewart (eds), Economic and Political Reform in Developing Countries, London: St Martins Press, 1995, pp 1138. 44 Broad and Landi, `Wither the NorthSouth gap?, p 8. 45 World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, Washington DC; Oxford University Press, 1996, p. iii. 46 Ibid, p 1. 47 Ibid, p 3. 48 Anne Krueger, `Appendix: policy reform in Eastern Europe, in Krueger, Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp 162176. 49 Shirley, `Privatization in Latin America. 50 Joan M Nelson, `The politics of economic transformation: is Third World experience relevant in Eastern Europe?, World Politics, 45(3), 1993, pp 433463, see p. 463, 51 Roger D Markwick, `A discipline in transition? From Sovietology to transitology , Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12(3), 1996, pp 255276, see p 272. In both Nelsons and Markwicks articles, the term `Third World was used to refer to Asian, African and Latin American countries. To be consistent with our line of argument, we have changed it into `developing countries. This does not constitute any distortion of Nelsons and Markwicks analyses. 52 Emanuel de Kadt, Zoe Mars & Gordon White, `State and development into the 1990s: the issues for researchers, in Claude Auroi (ed), The Role of the State in Development Processes, London: Frank Cass, 1992, pp 185200, see p 187. 53 There is a blooming literature on the East Asian development model. It includes Alice Amsden (ed), special section on `The World Banks East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy, World Development, 22(4), 1994, pp 615670; Peter L Berger & Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds), In Search of an East Asian Development Model, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988; William R Cline, `Can the East Asian model of development be generalized?. World Development, 10(2), 1982, pp 8190; Frederic C Deyo (ed), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; Paul W Kuznets, `An East Asian model of economic development: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36, 1988, supplement, pp S1143; and Gustav Ranis, `Can the East Asian model of development be generalized?, World Development, 13(4), 1985, pp 543545. 54 Ha-Joon Chang, `Return to Europe? Is there anything for Eastern Europe to learn from East Asia?, in Ha-Joon Chang & Peter Nolan (eds), The Transformation of the Communist Economies: Against the Mainstream, London: St Martins Press, 1995, pp 382399. 55 For discussion of the developmental state in East Asia, see M Douglass, `The developmental state and the newly industrialised economies of Asia, Environment and Planning A, 26, 1994, pp 543566; Richard Grabowski, `The successful developmental state: where does it come from?, World Development, 22(2), 1994, pp 413422; Chalmers A Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, New 355 Religion State & Society EDITOR Dr Philip Walters, Keston Research, Oxford, UK Religion, State & Society is a unique source of information and analysis for individuals and institutions involved in a wide variety of ways with communist and formerly communist countries. It is still the only English-language academic publication devoted to issues of church, state and society in these countries. Responding to the new situation in Russia and Eastern Europe, the journal explores its conviction that the experiences of religious communities in their encounter with communism will be central to the evolution of the new Europe and of the Western world in general in the next century. Tackling social, cultural, ethnic, political and ecclesiological problems is in future going to be a cooperative effort, in a way hitherto impossible, involving the religious communities of both East and West. Religious communities in Western Europe, the USA, Australasia and Latin America will have much to learn from the way in which their counterparts in the East have tackled such problems in the past, and vice versa Volume 26, 1998, 4 issues. ISSN 0963-7494. Carfax Publishing Limited PO Box 25 Abingdon Oxfordshire OX14 3UE UK Tel: +44 (0)1235 521154 Fax: +44 (0)1235 401550 E-mail: sales@carfax.co.uk WWW: http://www.carfax.co.uk SHU-YUN MA York: Norton, 1995; Ziya Onis, `The logic of the developmental state, Comparative Politics, 24, 1991, pp l09126; and Ding-Xin Zhao, `State power and patterns of late development: resolving the crisis of the sociology of development, Sociology, 28, 1994, pp 211229. 56 Pradumna B Rana & Naved Hamid (eds), From Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian Approach, Vol 1, An Overview; Vol 2, Peoples Republic of China and Mongolia and Vol 3, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1996). 57 Chang, `Return to Europe?, p 387. 58 Robert Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994, pp 153154. 59 S Neil MacFarlance, `Russian conceptions of Europe, Post-Soviet Affairs, 10(3), 1994, pp 234269, see p 235. 60 Nelson, `The politics of economic transformation, p 447. 356