COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ARNOLDUS CARPENTRY SHOP, INC. and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent is a domestic corporation. For this business venture, private respondent kept samples or models of its woodwork on display from where its customers may refer to when placing their orders. These furniture, cabinets and other woodwork were sold locally and exported abroad. The examiners of the petitioner CIR conducted an investigation of the business tax liabilities of private respondent. As a result thereof, the examiners assessed private respondent for deficiency tax. Later, on,private respondent received a letter/notice of tax deficiency assessment inclusive of charges and interest for the year 1977. This tax deficiency was a consequence of the 3% tax imposed on private respondent's gross export sales which, in turn, resulted from the examiners' finding that categorized private respondent as a contractor . Private respondent filed, a protest with the petitioner CIR contending that the carpentry shop is a manufacturer and therefor entitled to tax exemption on its gross export sales under Section 202 (e) of the National Internal Revenue Code. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is a manufacturer and entitled to tax exemption? HELD: YES. . Private respondent is a "manufacturer" as defined in the Tax Code. Sec. 187 (x) [now Sec. 157 (x)] of the Tax Code defines a manufacturer' as follows: "Manufacturer" includes every person who by physical or chemical process alters the exterior texture or form or inner substance of any raw material or manufactured or partially manufactured product in such manner as to prepare it for a special use or uses to which it could not have been in its original condition, or who by any such process alters the quality or any such raw material or manufactured or partially manufactured product so as to reduce it to marketable shape or prepare it for any of the uses of industry, or who by any such process combines any such raw material or manufactured or partially manufactured products with other materials or products of the same or different kinds and in such manner that the finished product of such process or manufacture can be put to a special use or uses to which such raw material or manufactured or partially manufactured products in their original condition would not have been put, and who in addition alters such raw material or manufactured or partially manufactured products, or combines the same to produce such finished products for the purpose of their sale or distribution to others and not for his own use or consumption. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. As the Court of Tax Appeals did not err in holding that private respondent is a "manufacturer," then private respondent is entitled to the tax exemption under See. 202 (d) and (e) mow Sec. 167 (d) and (e)] of the Tax Code which states: Sec. 202. Articles not subject to percentage tax on sales. The following shall be exempt from the percentage taxes imposed in Sections 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, and 201: xxx xxx xxx (d) Articles shipped or exported by the manufacturer or producer, irrespective of any shipping arrangement that may be agreed upon which may influence or determine the transfer of ownership of the articles so exported. (e) Articles sold by "registered export producers" to (1) other" registered export producers" (2) "registered export traders' or (3) foreign tourists or travelers, which are considered as "export sales." Conversely therefore, if there is an express mention or if the taxpayer falls within the purview of the exemption by clear legislative intent, then the rule on strict construction will not apply. In the present case the respondent Tax Court did not err in classifying private respondent as a "manufacturer". Clearly, the 'latter falls with the term 'manufacturer' mentioned in Art. 202 (d) and (e) of the Tax Code. As the only question raised by petitioner in relation to this tax exemption claim by private respondent is the classification of the latter as a manufacturer, this Court affirms the holding of respondent Tax Court that private respondent is entitled to the percentage tax exemption on its export sales.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY,respondents. FACTS: Private respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. One such auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private respondent.. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international organizations, private foundations and government agencies. Private respondent received from petitioner CIR a demand letter, assessing private respondent for alleged deficiency in contractor's tax and for alleged deficiency income tax, both for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1978. Petitioner CIR contends that Private respondent ADMU "falls within the definition" of an independent contractor and "is not one of those mentioned as excepted"; hence, it is properly a subject of the 3% contractor's tax levied by the foregoing provision of law. Petitioner states that the "term 'independent contractor' is not specifically defined so as to delimit the scope thereof, so much so that any person who . . . renders physical and mental service for a fee, is now indubitably considered an independent contractor liable to 3% contractor's tax." According to petitioner, Ateneo has the burden of proof to show its exemption from the coverage of the law. ISSUE:WON Ateneo de Manila University, through its auxiliary unit or branch the Institute of Philippine Culture performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus, subject to the three percent contractor's tax levied by then Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code? HELD:NO. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and impractical to determine who are exempted without first determining who are covered by the aforesaid provision. The Commissioner should have determined first if private respondent was covered by Section 205, applying the rule of strict interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on the populace, before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom. The Court takes this occasion to reiterate the hornbook doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws that "(a) statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously . . . (A) tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication." 8 Parenthetically, in answering the question of who is subject to tax statutes, it is basic that "in case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import." 9
The plain and simple answer is that private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for a fee but an academic institution conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and, ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued operating for so long despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals that "education and not profit is [IPC's] motive for undertaking the research projects." 25