Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of

Euroscepticism
Bernhard Weels
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, Berlin D-10785, Germany.
E-mail: wessels@wz-berlin.de
In the last decade, support for European integration has declined and euroscepti-
cism has risen. Using Eastons concept of political support, this paper studies the
interrelationship between euroscepticism and European identity. Starting from the
hypothesis that identity as a central element of political community serves as a
buffer against system-threatening euroscepticism, I develop a hierarchical model of
euroscepticism. My results demonstrate that there are three types of eurosceptics,
two of which hold opposite implications for European integration demand for
improvement vs a halt to or even an abolishment of European integration. The
difference between both types is that the first group has a European identity, while
the other does not. I conclude that the large size of the eurosceptic camp challenges
European integration.
Acta Politica (2007) 42, 287306. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500188
Keywords: European integration; European identity; political support
Introduction
For decades, opinion research on European integration focused on the
evolution of and support for the developing polity.
1
However, the last decade
marked a change in the dynamics of public support and put euroscepticism on
the agenda. Since the early 1990s, it seemed that the European Union was
institutionally on course for further integration deepening and widening at
the same time. This trend accelerated in two ways during recent years: first, the
EU enlarged by adding 10 new members states, crossing the so-called iron
curtain and taking on board eight new democracies in Central and East
Europe; second, the EU began work on an EU constitution. However, the
European Elections of 2004 the founding elections of a European Union
crossing the borders between West and East sounded alarm bells in three
aspects regarding public support that were ignored. First, although the
elections after the democratic transformation in Central and East Europe
marked a second critical juncture in postwar European history, turnout was
lower than ever before and the proportion of votes gained by eurosceptical
parties higher than ever. Second, the European constitution failed to gain
Acta Politica, 2007, 42, (287306)
r 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0001-6810/07 $30.00
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support, with the majority of the people in France and the Netherlands
rejecting it. In the worst-case scenario, this would mean that the constitution is
dead. In a more optimistic view, the process of ratifying the EU constitution is
put on hold on pause for reflection as Tony Blair has said. Third, in mid-
June 2005, the EU-budget talks broke down and the president of the EU, Jean
Claude Juncker, concluded that the EU is in deep crisis. Meanwhile, the
European Parliament has blocked the budget. Public support for European
integration has been on the decline since the signing of the Maastricht treaty in
1992 a phenomenon called post-Maastricht blues (Eichenberg and Dalton,
2003; Netjes and Edwards, 2005). Today, European integration seems to be in
crisis at the levels of both the people and the politicians. Declining public
support and the disaster with the ratification of the EU constitution certainly
have been catalysts for elite dissent. European integration would be even more
in crisis if this elite dissent would lead to an increase in euroscepticism.
In this paper, I address the question of whether there are buffers preventing a
total questioning of European integration. Using Eastons concept of political
support, I argue that European identity as a core element of political
community could serve as such a buffer against scepticism. This theoretical
perspective suggests that euroscepticism is hierarchical and cumulative. I then
test these hypotheses using data from the EOS Gallup Europe Post European
elections 2004 survey, Flash Eurobarometer 162.
2
In the next section, I analyze
the characteristics of people with European identity and eurosceptics, and, in
combining the measures for European identity and euroscepticism, differenti-
ate three types of scepticism: the adamant eurosceptics, the eurosceptics, and
the critical Europeans. Finally, I investigate their distribution among countries
and their social characteristics.
Concept and Main Hypotheses
Only recently, research on support for European integration returned to the
old question of the role of identity in European integration (Inglehart, 1970).
Former research on support for European integration was oriented towards a
utilitarian framework, analyzing the costs and benefits for individuals or the
society as a whole. Research results suggest that both positive macro-level
performance and positive microeconomic perspectives generate support for
European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995;
Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998). However, as Marks and Hooghe
have argued lately, emotional or gut commitments can be extremely
powerful in shaping views towards political objects (2003, 6). While reflecting
on allegiance at both the national and the European levels, research on identity
and support for European integration has mostly examined national identity
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(Marks and Hooghe, 2003; Netjes and Kersbergen, 2005). I propose instead to
investigate European identity.
Considering identity is in line with the conception of political support
proposed by Easton (1965). According to Easton, orientations towards
political objects must be conceptualized hierarchically. He differentiates
between three object levels and two modes of orientation. Object levels are
the authorities, the regime, and the community. Modes of orientations are
either specific or diffuse (see Figure 1).
Political authorities are defined as the occupants of authority roles,
individual or collective: Authorities include, of course, all public officials
from chief executives, legislators, judges and administrators down to local city
clerks and policemen, as well as the institutions, such as legislatures or courts,
of which they are part (Easton, 1975, 438). The regime is characterized by its
political values, norms, and structure. The political community is the collection
of persons bound together by a political division of labor (Easton, 1965, 177).
Specific orientations concern output-directed evaluations. The uniqueness of
specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfaction that members of a
system feel they obtain from the perceived output and performance of the
political authorities (Easton, 1975, 437). Diffuse orientations refer to what an
object is or represents, not what it does.
The theory of political support suggests that positive experience with
concrete political objects may spill over to positive orientations toward
political objects at a more abstract level. Thus, positive experience with
political authorities results in their specific support. If this positive experience is
not challenged, specific support of authorities transforms to diffuse support,
first, of the authorities, then, of the regime. Such attachment may be a product
of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and performances
over a long period of time (Easton, 1975, 446). This is a typical process of
generalization which indicates that the term diffuse may be misleading, since it
denotes generalized evaluations. This is why Fuchs (1993) has proposed to
differentiate between specific and generalized orientations. Easton himself
speaks of a generalized attachment to political objects (Easton, 1975, 444).
Political community plays a special role in the orientations towards political
objects. Support for a political community is support of the first order. It
conveys the necessity of some cohesive cement a sense or feeling of
Political objects
Regime Modes of orientation Authorities Community
X Specific
X X X Diffuse
Figure 1 Orientations towards political objects. Constructed from Easton (1965).
Bernhard Weels
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community among its members (Easton, 1965, 176). One may argue that the
political system is embedded within the political community (Juviler and
Stroschein, 1999, 438). In contrast to authorities and regimes, community
contains an element of self-ascription, membership, and identification.
These considerations on support could be applied to political scepticism. The
other side of support is discontent, although neither discontent nor scepticism
is an exact opposite of support because non-support may also include
indifference.
3
However, the theoretical reasoning with regard to political
scepticism is similar to the one for support. Turning the hypothesis on support
around, one may suggest that the more general or abstract levels of
orientations could provide a buffer against the erosion of support at lower
levels. General evaluations are more stable over time than specific evaluations.
The buffer should be especially strong with regard to the most fundamental
first-order level of support, the political community. Easton argues that
disillusionment with the political community would lead to withdrawal of
support from the authorities and the regime. Conversely, one might argue that
full identification with the political community could prevent or buffer
discontent. This can be stated and qualified as follows:
Buffer hypothesis
Identification with the political community creates a buffer against political
scepticism or discontent. The buffering effect is strongest at the most generalized
level of discontent, and weakens the more specific the object of discontent.
The framework of political support assumes generalization and suggests the
accumulation of support from the specific to the general, as long as positive
experience and evaluations persist. Similarly, one may hypothesize that also
discontent or scepticism may accumulate. This second hypothesis can be stated
as follows:
Cumulation hypothesis
Political scepticism is likely to cumulate, in that, specific discontent over a
longer period should translate into generalized discontent, and should spill
over from authorities to regime.
A Model of euroscepticism
According to the buffer hypothesis formulated above, those with a strong
European identity should develop less discontent than those with a weaker or
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no European identity. Furthermore, the difference in discontent between those
with and without European identity should be greatest at the most abstract level
of orientations (generalized support for the regime) and lowest at the most
concrete level (the specific evaluation of the authorities). The cumulation
hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that one should observe spillover effects
from specific discontent with authorities to generalized discontent, and from
there spillover to discontent with the regime culminating in a decline in
European identity. The best test for this hypothesis is the examination of
longitudinal trends; however, this is beyond the scope of the data available, and
so we restrict our analysis to a static perspective. Thus, evidence can only be
achieved indirectly and causality or process characteristics can only be
theoretically assumed, as long as empirical evidence does not suggest otherwise.
The data set we have provides recent evidence for all current 25 member states.
Let us first establish that orientations toward Europe are structured
according to the framework used here. That is, are distinct orientations held
towards authorities, regime, and community? The EOS Gallup Europe Post
European elections 2004 survey contains questions that, from a conceptual
standpoint, fit the proposed differentiation nicely:
For each of the following propositions, please tell me if it rather
corresponds or rather does not correspond to your attitude or your opinion:
(a) It is very important for you which particular political party gained the most
seats in the European Parliament elections
(b) It is very important for you which particular candidates win seats and
become MEPs in the European Parliament elections
(c) The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of
European citizens
(d) You trust the institutions of the European Union
(e) The membership of [COUNTRY] in the European Union is a good thing
(f) You feel you are a citizen of the European Union
(g) You feel attached to Europe.
Possible answers: Yes, rather; No, rather not; [DK/NA].
Conceptually, items (a)(d) contain stimuli suggesting orientations toward
political authorities, that is, candidates, parties, the European Parliament, and
possibly at the borderline of regime European institutions. However,
Easton suggests that both individual and collective actors and institutions can
be regarded as authorities. A positive evaluation on items (a) and (b) implies
that candidates or parties are effective that it matters that they are in
parliament. This seems at least implicitly related to expected outcomes, that is,
the effectiveness of authorities. Thus, the expectation is that these orientations
capture specific orientations toward authorities. Items (c) and (d) also relate to
authorities, but concern more generalized attitudes. The membership question
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(item (e)) is often used as an indicator of support for the regime (Niedermayer
and Westle, 1995). Items (f) and (g) very clearly capture orientations toward
the political community of Europe, namely European identity. So these seven
indicators appear to tap four dimensions of orientations: specific support for
the authorities (effectiveness), generalized support for the authorities
(responsiveness), political regime support (membership support), and
orientation toward the EU political community (European identity).
An exploratory factor analysis helps to clarify whether this kind of
differentiation of political objects and modes of orientation is present in
public opinion. For the analysis, all 25 country surveys have been pooled.
Positive answers (Yes, rather) have been coded 1; negative (No, rather
not) 1; and no answer and dont know 0. The results support the proposed
differentiation (Table 1). The dimensional differentiation is very distinct for all
items except for trust in European institutions. As expected, this is a
borderline issue to orientations to the political regime and, consequently, it
shows quite a high loading on the regime dimension. However, the loading on
the factor responsiveness (generalized support for the authorities) is almost
0.2 higher, justifying classifying the item as primarily orientated toward the
authorities.
A second question is whether the relationship between the dimensions is
structured as suggested by the buffer hypothesis. To keep the direction of the
sign in line with the causality for euroscepticism assumed by the hypothesis,
item coding for the orientations toward authorities and regime has been
reversed.
The model to be tested is a latent variable path model, which suits the
purpose here very well. In a cross-section analysis, this allows a modeling of
process causality that otherwise can only be tested empirically in a time-series
design. The buffer hypothesis claims that orientations toward the political
community European identity, in this case prevent discontent. It is
assumed that this is most strongly the case for the most general level of
euroscepticism, that is orientations toward the regime a negative evaluation
of EU membership in this case. This implies that the association between
European identity and membership scepticism (membership support) should be
the strongest, between European identity and generalized orientations toward
authorities (irresponsiveness) the second strongest, and the effect on specific
orientations toward authorities (ineffectiveness) the weakest. The model also
enables us to check whether the hypothesized political objects are truly distinct:
a large residual covariance would indicate that the three objects are not truly
distinct.
Figure 2 presents the model. The low outer residual covariance indicates that
the separation of orientations towards different objects holds up. The inner
residual covariance is somewhat higher, which suggests that there may be
Bernhard Weels
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Table 1 Dimensions of attitudes toward Europe: effectiveness, responsiveness, diffuse support, and identity
Object Political community Political regime Political authorities
Mode of orientation Generalized Generalized Generalized Specific
Indicator European identity Membership support Responsiveness Effectiveness
You feel attached to Europe 0.8812 0.1019 0.1055 0.0878
You feel you are a citizen of the European Union 0.7785 0.2429 0.2005 0.0831
The membership of [COUNTRY] in the
European Union is a good thing
0.2496 0.9076 0.1639 0.0827
The European Parliament takes into consideration
the concerns of European citizens
0.1581 0.0504 0.9162 0.0705
You trust the institutions of the European Union 0.1856 0.4539 0.6361 0.1271
It is very important for you which particular candidates win
seats and become MEPs in the European Parliament elections
0.0759 0.0505 0.1120 0.8542
It is very important for you which particular political party gained
the most seats in the European Parliament elections
0.0806 0.0711 0.0369 0.8636
Explained variance (in %) 18.4 8.8 12.2 38.9
Pooled data, 25 countries; 24,063 respondents; samples of almost equal size. Bold figures indicate attribution to the factor (comparatively highest
loading).
Source: Eurobarometer Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004.
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relevant paths missing in the inner model. This finding leaves room for testing
the cumulation hypothesis. With regard to the buffer hypothesis, the model
is quite in line with the expectations. European identity has a negative impact
on the three levels of discontent or euroscepticism. Furthermore, the negative
impact is strongest with regard to membership, and lowest with regard to
ineffectiveness. However, the difference between membership scepticism and
irresponsiveness is marginal at best.
The buffer hypothesis can also be addressed in a more direct way. The
hypothesis is that the difference in euroscepticism or support between those
who identify with Europe and those who do not should be largest at the most
general level of orientations and lowest at the most specific level. In other
words, one would not expect those that identify themselves as Europeans to be
uncritical at a concrete level, but one would expect them to refrain from
developing scepticism at the more fundamental levels of orientations. When
one compares the differences in means for the three scales of scepticism, that is,
ineffectiveness, irresponsiveness, and membership scepticism, this is indeed the
case. The mean difference between those who have a European identity and
those who havent is almost half the size for ineffectiveness compared with
membership scepticism. Furthermore, differences are twice as meaningful
R
2
R
2
R
2
membership: .20
irresponsiveness: .19
European
identity
EU membership
not good
Irresponsiveness
EP
irresponsive
No trust in
EU-
institutions
EU "attachment"
Citizen of Europe
.45
.69
Candidate
election
irrelevant
Party
election
irrelevant
.43
.74
.53
.62
-.45
-.44
-.21
Ineffectiveness
ineffectiveness: .05
Figure 2 European identity and three levels of euroscepticism the buffer hypothesis. Latent
variable path model (LVPLS), LVPLSC (Lohmo ller, 1984). Inner residual co-variance: 0.12; outer
residual co-variance: 0.09; BentlerBonett Reliability 0.41; Communality 0.77. Eurobarometer
Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004; pooled analysis, 25 countries, 24,063
respondents.
Bernhard Weels
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Acta Politica 2007 42
(as expressed by coefficient Eta) for membership orientations as they are for
ineffectiveness. Irresponsiveness ranges in-between the two, but is closer to
membership scepticism. This should not surprise us, since both orientations are
generalized (Table 2).
The results leave room for testing the cumulation hypothesis. Are there
spillover effects from concrete experience, that is, from specific evaluations to
more generalized attitudes? More precisely, the hypothesis implies that
negative experience with the effectiveness of the authorities eventually
translates into increasingly negative generalized orientations toward autho-
rities and, when such experiences persist, into increasing scepticism about the
regime. Technically, this assumes that one should note a directed relationship
between the latent variables of levels of euroscepticism.
Results show that this is indeed the case (Figure 3). The perception of
ineffectiveness translates into higher levels of perception of irresponsiveness,
which in turn translate into higher levels of EU membership scepticism. The
transition from specific to generalized orientations toward authorities is less
pronounced than the transition between the generalized orientations toward
authorities to generalized orientations toward the regime. This is in line with
Eastons concept of political support that assumes that generalized orientations
are relatively persistent and not easily affected by concrete experience.
European Identity and euroscepticism: Who, Where, and Which Types
Finding support for both the buffer and the cumulation hypothesis has
implications for further analysis. First, support for the buffer hypothesis
suggests there may be different types of euroscepticism: those who concur with
Table 2 Difference in euroscepticism between respondents with and without a European identity
Level of orientation No European
identity (Mean)
European
identity (Mean)
Difference
EU identityno
EU identity
Eta
Ineffectiveness 0.54 0.33 0.87 0.21
Irresponsiveness 0.78 0.79 1.59 0.42
EU membership scepticism 0.15 1.58 1.73 0.44
Ineffectiveness and irresponsiveness are additive scales, built from the respective items (see Table 1),
coding reversed. Scale range: 2 (positive evaluation of both items) to +2 (negative evaluation of
both items).
EU membership scepticism: contains only the membership item, reversed coding. To facilitate
comparison, the original scale (1 to +1) has been weighted by 2 resulting in a scale from 2 to
+2. Pooled data, 25 countries; 24,063 respondents; samples of almost equal size.
Source: Eurobarometer Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004.
Bernhard Weels
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one or more of the three elements of euroscepticism, but are attached to
Europe at the same time and those who feel discontent and are not attached to
Europe. euroscepticism of the first kind may have totally different implications
for European integration and its support than the latter. Second, the
cumulation hypothesis suggests that the perception of political objects is
differentiated, but related. Forty-one percent of those being skeptical at the
lowest level (effectiveness of the authorities) also show discontent at the next
highest level (responsiveness), and 88% of those feeling discontent at these two
levels also feel discontent at the highest level (i.e., are EU membership sceptics).
The proportion of non-cumulative discontent at only the second level is 17%.
It is only 6% at the third level. All this suggests that it should be possible to
sum up the three degrees or levels of euroscepticism into an overall score of
euroscepticism.
I construct two scales as follows:
European identity scale
The scores of the two items for European identity have been added resulting in
a scale with a minimum of 2 (no identification) and a maximum of 2 (full
European
identity
EU membership
not good
Irresponsiveness
EP
irresponsive
No trust in
EU-
Institutions
EU "attachment"
Citizen of Europe
.45
.70
Candidate
election
irrelevant
Party
election
irrelevant
.43
.74
.49
.66
-.31
-.40
-.21
.32
.15
Ineffectiveness
R
2
R
2
R
2
membership: .28
irresponsiveness: .21
ineffectiveness: .05
Figure 3 European identity and three levels of euroscepticism the cumulation hypothesis.
Latent variable path model (LVPLS), LVPLSC (Lohmo ller, 1984). Inner residual co-variance: 0.02;
outer residual co-variance: 0.09; BentlerBonett Reliability 0.42; Communality 0.77. Eurobarom-
eter Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004; pooled analysis, 25 countries,
24,063 respondents.
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identification). The scale has a mean of 0.76, which indicates that the
distribution is skewed in the direction of European identity. The standard
deviation is 1.56.
Euroscepticism scale
The coding of the items relating to effectiveness, responsiveness, and
membership support has been reversed and the items summed up. Since EU
membership scepticism consists of one item only, it was double-weighted. The
scale has a minimum of 6 (full content), a maximum of 6 (full discontent),
and a mean of 1.37. This indicates that the distribution is skewed in the
direction of a positive evaluation of EU political objects. The standard
deviation is 3.49.
A crucial question is which other sources of European identity and
euroscepticism exist beside experiences with and evaluations of the perfor-
mance of authorities and the regime. Research on attitudes toward European
integration has offered one major explanation: the role of political elites and
political parties in mobilizing orientations and providing cues to deal with the
somewhat distant political objects at the European level (Weels, 1995;
Carrubba, 2001; Marks et al., 2002; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Netjes and
Edwards, 2005). This approach has high explanatory power, but cannot be
directly pursued here. The indirect approach is cognitive mobilization,
introduced by Inglehart in the late 1960s. According to Inglehart (1970, 47),
cognitive mobilization increases the individuals capacity to receive and
interpret messages relating to a remote political community. As such, cognitive
mobilization is a necessary but not sufficient condition y. It depends on
messages in the mass media, school, and of opinion leaders (Ibid., 48). This
points back to the cues explanation, as long as one can assume that messages
are on average positive. This is still the case in Europe, although eurosceptical
voices and parties are on the rise. However, the implication is that education,
political information, and political interest can be regarded as possible sources
for developing positive orientations toward the EU. For European identity,
however, one may assume that exposure to the political community also plays
a major role. Indeed, a simple regression shows that the more informed, the
more politically interested, and the better educated have a stronger European
identity. Besides that, the strongest effect is due to the length of EU
membership of the respondents country (Table 3a).
It does not come as a surprise that cognitive mobilization is negatively
related to euroscepticism. The length of membership has a much smaller effect
(Table 3b). Introducing European identity (Table 3c) demonstrates the strong
buffering power of positive orientations toward the community. It is by far the
strongest factor for the reduction of scepticism.
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The implication of these findings is clear: as long as political information,
political interest, and education go hand in hand with primarily positive
messages about European integration, these factors will provide a buffer
Table 3a European identity regressed on political information, political interest, education, and
length of EU membership
B SE B Beta T Sig. T
EU informed 0.22 0.01 0.13 20.72 0.00
Political interest 0.16 0.01 0.10 16.28 0.00
Education 0.08 0.01 0.04 6.11 0.00
Length of EU membership (log) 0.13 0.00 0.17 26.85 0.00
(Constant) 0.32 0.03 11.20 0.00
Adjusted R
2
0.07
Table 3b Euroscepticism regressed on political information, political interest, education, and
length of EU membership
B SE B Beta T Sig. T
EU informed 0.76 0.02 0.20 33.07 0.00
Political interest 0.78 0.02 0.22 35.68 0.00
Education 0.16 0.02 0.04 5.91 0.00
Length of EU membership (log) 0.07 0.01 0.04 7.01 0.00
(Constant) 0.67 0.06 10.72 0.00
Adjusted R
2
0.08
Table 3c Euroscepticism regressed on political information, political interest, education, and
European identity
B SE B Beta T Sig. T
EU informed 0.53 0.02 0.14 26.08 0.00
Political interest 0.61 0.02 0.17 31.49 0.00
Education 0.08 0.02 0.02 3.16 0.00
European identity 1.01 0.01 0.45 81.83 0.00
(Constant) 0.27 0.05 5.00 0.00
Adjusted R
2
0.30
Eurobarometer Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004; pooled analysis, 25
countries, 24,063 respondents.
EU informed, political interest 1 (No) to +1 (Yes).
Education: 0 through 5 low to high.
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against euroscepticism. If, however, the content of the messages becomes
negative, even the most receptive, politically active, and politically capable
citizens may turn their backs to European integration. Only their European
identity may prevent this for a while. At the moment, there is no reason to
assume that the public discourse about European integration will change into
dominantly negative evaluations. Nevertheless, the tendency of some political
elites and parties to increasingly articulate scepticism and sometimes actually
opposition to European integration cannot be overlooked.
How strongly European identity may buffer against discontent and
euroscepticism is also indicated by the distribution of identification with and
scepticism toward the EU within a country. Plotting the proportions of those
having a positive value on the two scales in a country against each other shows
that in those countries where the share of European identity is high, the share
of euroscepticism is low and vice versa. Since it seems that the development of a
European identity is contingent on the length of time citizens have been
confronted with the symbols of the community, the obvious expectation is that
identity should be lower in the new member states and higher in the old ones.
This is on average supported by Figure 4. However, some new members,
GB
AU
SW
FI
DK
FR NL
GE
IT
SP
GR
PO
BE
IR LU
CZ
SK
LV
PL
ES
LT
SL
ZY
MT
HU
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0%
% European Identity
%

E
u
r
o
s
c
e
p
t
i
c
s
Figure 4 European identity and euroscepticism in 25 EU member states. K Old EU members.
J New EU members (joiner in 2004). % European identity: % positive values on the European
identity scale (range 2 to 2). % eurosceptics: % positive values on the eurosceptic scale (range
6 to 6). Aggregate correlation identity and scepticism 0.63; old EU members 0.66; new EU
members 0.50.
Bernhard Weels
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299
Acta Politica 2007 42
Slovenia, Malta, and Hungary in particular, show more identification and less
scepticism than some older ones. Indeed, euroscepticism is widespread in Great
Britain, Sweden, and Austria.
This raises the question of whether there are different types of euroscepti-
cism. There must be people with a positive European identity who are
nevertheless sceptical. This type of euroscepticism is certainly different from
that showing no attachment to Europe. This combination is reminiscent of
concepts like the dissatisfied democrats (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001)
or the critical citizens (Norris, 1999). Similar to the notion of critical citizens
convinced democrats showing discontent with how their democracy works
one may talk of critical Europeans to characterize those who are strongly
attached to the European community but feel discontent at the same time. One
may assume that they associate a different goal with their scepticism than those
who do not have a sense of European identity. Critical Europeans are
discontented, but not against the European community. They may have a
variety of reasons for criticism, but this criticism is oriented toward
improvement not abolishment. In contrast, critics without a European
identity are better labeled adamant eurosceptics since they may even consider a
stop or abolishment of European integration.
In order to differentiate types of euroscepticism, I have constructed a
typology on the basis of European identity and euroscepticism. I have recoded
the scales into three categories: positive/indifferent/negative. The result is a
three-by-three typology producing nine types. Those on the negative side of
euroscepticism (i.e., those positive about the performance of the authorities
and the regime) are not of interest here, though it is worth noting that allegiant
Europeans (those showing a European identity and being content with the
performance) fall short of being the absolute majority of citizens in the
European Union. In all, 54% of the EU citizens appear to be satisfied with
the regime and authorities, though not all of these have a European identity.
On the other side are the eurosceptics. Altogether 32.2% of the citizens feel
discontented with the performance of the EU. The two groups of most interest
here are the adamant eurosceptics and the critical Europeans, comprising 14.2
and 9.3% of the citizenry, respectively (Table 4).
In 16 of the 25 member states, there are more adamant eurosceptics than
critical Europeans. In those countries one may expect to find criticism against
European integration to be dominated by strong opposition to European
integration. In contrast, where critical Europeans outweigh adamant sceptics,
one would expect the critical discourse about Europe to be directed toward
improvements of the EU system barring intense and vocal minorities of
adamant eurosceptics.
There are six countries in which the proportion of adamant eurosceptics is
about 20% or higher: Great Britain followed by Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the
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Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Since all those countries except Great Britain
are new members, it is possible that further exposure to the European
community could socialize these relatively new EU citizens into critical
Europeans. However, the same cannot be said for the countries that follow
after the top bracket with about 15% of adamant sceptics: Sweden, the
Netherlands, and France. These countries show that severe euroscepticism can
be found even in core countries of the old European Union after all, the
referenda for the EU constitution failed in France and the Netherlands.
With regard to critical Europeans, Austria is a true outlier. Here, the
proportion of critical Europeans is extremely high (22%). Normally, the
proportion of critical Europeans is highest (about 10%) in countries where
the proportion of adamant eurosceptics is about average (Figure 5).
Are demographics distinctive for the different types of eurosceptics? The
general expectation is that euroscepticism goes along with less political
information, less interest in politics, and lower education. However, it is also
possible that some types of euroscepticism diverge in these categories. Criticism
of European integration and the European Union seems to be often inspired by
dissatisfaction with EU democracy (Rohrschneider, 2002; Fuchs, 2003), and
actually demonstrates a relatively high level of information as well as a high
level of European commitment. Thus, it could well be that critical Europeans
are well informed, politically interested, and better educated.
Data supports the general expectation but not the specific one on critical
Europeans. Eurosceptics of all types tend to be considerably less informed, less
interested in politics, and somewhat lower educated than average. Critical
Europeans are somewhat better off in all three regards compared to the
adamant eurosceptics. This appears to indicate that critical Europeans are not
the ones to be able to forcefully fight for improvement at least not on a basis
of characteristics, such as knowledge, interest, or education, traditionally
regarded as resources for political action. The same, for even stronger reasons,
applies to adamant eurosceptics who do not command the resources to make
Table 4 A typology of EU orientations three types of euroscepticism
Euroscepticism scale EU identity scale
Negative Neutral/indifferent Positive
Negative (EU performance
positive)
Non-allegiant
instrumentalists (3.7%)
Instrumentalists
(8.0%)
Allegiant
Europeans (42.3 %)
Neutral/indifferent (2.7%) Indifferents (3.5%) (7.6%)
positive (EU performance
negative)
Adamant
eurosceptics (14.2%)
Eurosceptics (8.7%) Critical Europeans
(9.3%)
Countries weighted by population size.
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them a strong force in political action. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude
that they are irrelevant. Eurosceptics make up a considerable proportion of
5%
6%
3%
5%
9%
22%
12%
6%
8%
3%
10%
4%
9%
13%
3%
8%
6%
11%
12%
9%
3%
4%
5%
6%
3%
4%
4%
5%
5%
5%
5%
7%
8%
9%
9%
10%
10%
11%
12%
13%
13%
13%
15%
15%
19%
20%
22%
23%
28%
29%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
LU: 10
HU: 16
IR: 10
PO: 15
BE: 14
SP: 18
AU: 41
GE: 27
IT: 20
SL: 23
GR: 17
DK: 30
MT: 19
FI: 30
PL: 41
ZY: 20
FR: 28
NL: 28
SW: 39
SK: 43
CZ: 43
LT: 30
ES: 35
LV: 41
GB: 46
Adamant eurosceptics
Critical Europeans
Country:
% Eurosceptics total
Figure 5 Euroscepticism in 25 EU member states, rank-ordered by the proportion of adamant
eurosceptics. Critical Europeans: positive values on identity scale and euroscepticism scale.
Adamant eurosceptics: negative values on identity scale and positive values on eurosceptic scale.
Difference in euroscepticism total and the sum of critical Europeans and adamant eurosceptics:
neutral/indifferent on identity scale, positive values on eurosceptic scale.
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citizens: over 40% of eurosceptics in six member countries. Moreover, in
particular the adamant eurosceptics constitute a potential recruiting ground for
eurocritical parties, populist demagogues, or nationalists (Table 5).
Conclusion
In recent years, support for European integration has declined and the signs of
rising euroscepticism have become numerous. I have utilized Eastons well-
known concept of political support to conceptualize euroscepticism and its
barriers. I argued that euroscepticism is a multi-level attitudinal phenomenon
like political support. It addresses different levels of political objects:
authorities, the regime, and the community. Orientations toward the political
community have a special position in the hierarchy of political objects. They
are the first-order level of support; the necessary basis for any political system.
They encompass the political system in two ways: because the political system
is embedded in the political community, and because they contain an element
of self-ascription, membership, and identification going beyond the formal
citizen role.
Because orientations toward the political community have this particular
status, I argue that self-identification as a European can serve as a buffer
against discontent. Conversely, discontent may cumulate from one level to
another. I tested these hypotheses with an attitudinal latent variable path
model and found empirical confirmation. The results show that European
identity is a strong buffer against euroscepticism, strongest at the level of
Table 5 Characteristics of types of eurosceptics: political information, interest in politics, and
education
Critical
europeans
Eurosceptics
%
Adamant
eurosceptics
Difference
criticaladamant
% % %
EU informed (avg. 63.7%) 51.8 50.1 47.1 4.7
Very interested in politics (avg. 49.9%) 37.3 35.8 32.9 4.4
Years finished full time education:
1519 (avg. 19.7%) 22.1 21.7 21.5 0.6
20 (avg. 49.3%) 51.5 53.0 56.3 4.8
21 and more (avg. 28.1%) 22.9 21.9 18.7 4.2
N100% 1,805 1,775 2,994
Critical Europeans: positive values on identity scale and eurosceptic scale. Eurosceptics: neutral/
indifferent on identity scale, positive values on eurosceptic scale. Adamant eurosceptics: negative
values on identity scale and positive values on eurosceptic scale.
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higher generalization of attitudes (generalized support for the regime and the
authorities) but not as effective against specific scepticism about the
authorities.
Research on the sources of identification is still scarce. However, cognitive
mobilization and, in particular, the length of time citizens were confronted with
the symbols, institutions, and actions of the EU political system (i.e., the
duration of EU membership) play an important role as a basis for identity.
Consequently, these factors are negatively related to euroscepticism. Most
important is the observation that European identity is the strongest factor
preventing scepticism. This holds true at the individual level as well as at the
country level provided the proportion of citizens with a European identity is
high. However, this does not imply that those that identify themselves with the
EU cannot be eurosceptics. There are different types of eurosceptics: critical
Europeans can combine EU identity with scepticism, while adamant
eurosceptics combine scepticism with no attachment to the European political
community. Critical Europeans demand for improvements of the EU, while
adamant eurosceptics demand for a stop of or end to European integration.
Eurosceptics are no negligible group: they amount to about 32% of European
citizens (14% adamant eurosceptics, 9% critical Europeans and another 9% of
eurosceptics with indifferent feelings about the community). However, there is
great variation across countries, ranging from as much as 46% of eurosceptics
in Britain (among them 29% adamant) to 10% in Luxembourg. Overall,
eurosceptics of any type are less politically informed, less interested in politics,
and less educated than the average citizen. Neither the critical Europeans nor
the adamant eurosceptics have the resources required for accomplishing the
goals of their scepticism. However, given the sizeable group of eurosceptics,
they may be a potential target for eurosceptical collective actors or leaders. The
results show that the European Union has a long way to go to convince the
European people.
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Notes
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference on Euroscepticism Causes and
Consequences, organized by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 12 July 2005, Vrije Universiteit,
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Amsterdam. The author wants to thank the participants for constructive comments and, in
particular, Liesbet Hooghe for extensive comments.
2 The early data use has been made possible by the director of EOS Gallup, M. Pascal Chelala.
3 This is not a trivial difference. Empirical results on support cannot be transformed into results on
political scepticism by merely reversing the interpretations. Both support and scepticism imply
explicit attitudes while indifference implies none. One may find little support, but also little
scepticism so long as indifference is very high.
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