On Contract Limitsr Wer Wer

On Libertarian Argument Limits to Social Contract Bargaining
David R. Hollady
DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
DRAFT
This dissertation is submitted in part requirement for the Degree of M.A. (Honours
with International Relations at the !niversity of "t Andrews# "$otland# and is solely
the wor% of the above named &andidate
'n (ibertarian (imits to "o$ial &ontra$t )argaining
******************************************************** +
*******,*******,*******
David R. Hollady
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ 2
ABBREVATONS ................................................................................................................. !
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ "
NTROD#CTON .................................................................................................................. $
C%A&TER ' ON T%E NAT#RE OF (AN ........................................................................ )
REVE* OF %#(AN R+%TS DOC#(ENTS.............................................................................,-
T%AT T%E NAT#RE OF (AN S C%OCE.................................................................................,"
T%E NAT#RE OF NDVD#AL OBL+ATON...........................................................................,.
C%A&TER ' ON T%E NAT#RE OF CONSENT ........................................................... 2,
DEFNN+ CONTRACT..............................................................................................................22
&ERCEVED NECESST/ OF CONTRACT..................................................................................2$
L(TATONS ON CONTRACT..................................................................................................20
C%A&TER ' ON T%E &RACTCAL (&LCATONS OF CONTRACT FLA*S . . !!
ENVRON(ENT.........................................................................................................................!"
CONSCR&TON.........................................................................................................................!$
DEBT.........................................................................................................................................!.
CONCL#SON ..................................................................................................................... ",
BBLO+RA&%/ ................................................................................................................. ""
Hollady# D-DRA.T /
Abbre1iations

Do De$laration of Independen$e
NL 0atural (aw
NNL 0ew 0atural (aw
&D 1ubli$ Debt
SoV "$ale of 2alues
T+D Trans+generational Debt
#D%R !niversal De$laration of Human Rights
#N !nited 0ations
#S !nited "tates
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3
Abstract
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4
ntro2uction
&urrent modes of $onstitutional pro$ess afford ultimate power to the state to
$reate a do$ument to be approved by its $iti5ens in some form. The do$ument suffers
additional $onsideration from the international $ommunity# whi$h must re$ogni5e the
tenets of the new do$ument as prote$ting the rights that have $ome to be valued in the
$ourse of 6estern philosophy7 however# the modern $onstitutional pro$ess is sub8e$t
to numerous normative flaws and does not ne$essarily produ$e a governing do$ument
that $an logi$ally stand up to ob8e$tive analysis.
A$ademi$s disagree over all matters of rights# from their substan$e# to their
sour$e and appli$ation. 6hether $iti5ens en8oy rights# su$h as equality# based on
membership in a group or as sovereign individuals that e9ist prior to the state is an
important $onsideration when ma%ing a $onstitution. 6here governments submit
$onstitutions to be approved by a ma8ority and still sub8e$t those who disagree to the
provisions voted for by the ma8ority# a faulty assumption is allowed to persist-that
rights e9ist for groups# not for the individuals that $reate a state. The views of one
$onstituen$y# those that lose are potentially ignored.
This error in 8udgment is best viewed through the lens of the failed state-the
"omali $onstitution of :;<= promised its $iti5ens the >right to liberty#?
:
but this did
not guarantee the safety of the individual in an environment where >serious# brutal
and often fatal $rimes are very $ommon.?
/
In a world where states $annot se$ure the
promises made# individuals must be able to guarantee their own rights or be said to
have no rights.
The failure of states to se$ure the promise of their $reed and the failure to truly
:
>The &onstitution?
/
>"omalia Travel "pe$ifi$ Information?
Hollady# D-DRA.T @
represent the needs of the people ma%es it ne$essary to re$onsider the $onstitutional
pro$ess# espe$ially what rights the individual has when engaging in the $onstitutional
pro$ess with a potential government. As individuals# it is $ommonly a$$epted that he
or she has rights# whether based on "hueAs
3
$on$eption of human dignity or the older
Thomist $on$eptions of natural rights.
4

This paper will argue that individuals e9ist prior to the states with rights based
on their unique and elevated $apa$ity for $hoi$e7 the right to $hoi$e# as the defining
$hara$teristi$ may not be abridged at any point during the $ontra$tual pro$ess# nor at
any point thereafter. Additionally# individuals must not ma%e de$isions that will limit
the $hoi$e of future generations who are entitled to the same range of $hoi$e#
in$luding the $hoi$e to a$$ept or re8e$t the so$ial $ontra$t $urrently in effe$t. In the
$urrent $limate where it not pra$ti$al to $onstantly devise a new $onstitution for ea$h
subsequent generation# $onstitutions should enumerate limited government powers in
order to allow ma9imum $apa$ity for $hoi$e at the level of the individual.
The argument will pro$eed in three $hapters. .irst# a dis$ussion of human
nature# emphasi5ing how the ability for $hoi$e differentiates humans from other
animals# in$luding a review of past rights do$uments# the unique $apa$ity for $hoi$e
and a $onsideration of the idea of obligation# whi$h is $entral to a dis$ussion of
$onstitutional pro$esses. In a dis$ussion where rights are e9tended in the name of
>human dignity#?
@
it is sensible to dis$uss what it is to be human and why this is
signifi$ant. 6hile it is $ir$ular to suggest that humans should en8oy rights due to
human dignity with no further support# it is logi$al to surmise that individuals should
be allowed or entitled to maintain whatever it is that defines what they are. In the $ase
of humans# this paper will argue that the >what? is the $omple9 $apa$ity for $hoi$e#
3
"ee "hue for a basi$ overview of BtraditionalA human rights.
4
"ee Alford for a dis$ussion of 0(.
@
"hue# :4
Hollady# D-DRA.T <
whi$h must be maintained in order to maintain humanity. This finding will dire$tly
impa$t the pro$ess of so$ial $ontra$t in that the governing apparatus should ma%e no
de$ision that would adversely affe$t an individualAs humanity.
The se$ond $hapter will dis$uss the basi$ pro$ess of so$ial $ontra$t# first
defining the so$ial $ontra$t before dis$ussing its ne$essity and the pra$ti$al limitations
that the previous dis$ussion of human nature requires in order to maintain an
individualAs humanity. A$ademi$s li%e &arole 1ateman suggest that in the $ontra$t
pro$ess# one party must ne$essarily have an e9pli$it or impli$it advantage over the
other#
<
using this as reasoning that there $an be no legitimate $onstitution be$ause
parties $annot negotiate as equals7 while her point is worthwhile in $onsidering the
enormous power the governing institution holds in the so$ial $ontra$t pro$ess#
C
and
further shows why it is ne$essary to pla$e predetermined limits on the bargaining
position of the state in order to preserve the rights of the individual# her $on$eption
fails to re$ogni5e that a $onstitution is a mutually profitable arrangement for state and
$iti5en. It must be re$ogni5ed that anar$hy is a possibility
D
and that there is no
ob8e$tive ne$essity for a $onstitution to be formed7 however# by $onsidering
appropriate limitations and ensuring that a $apa$ity for $hoi$e is maintained# even the
disadvantages 1ateman notes in the $ontra$t pro$ess $an be a worthwhile pri$e to pay
in order to $ome out of HobbesA anar$hi$al state of nature in pra$ti$e.
;
The third $hapter will view the pra$ti$al impli$ations and failure of $ontra$t in
preserving the rights of individuals# espe$ially the rights of future generations. The
problems of environmental degradation# trans+generational debt (TED and
<
"ee 'A0eil et alAs dis$ussion of 1ateman# /< on bargaining position
C
>The powers of states are in$omparably greater than those of an individual publi$
possession is also# in fa$t# more se$ure and more irrevo$ably# without being more
legitimate? Rousseau# /:.
D
0o5i$%# 4
;
"ee Hobbes on state of nature.
Hollady# D-DRA.T C
mandatory $ons$ription represent three potential failures of so$ial $ontra$t theory-
ea$h s$enario represents a situation whereby the range of $hoi$e proffered to future
generations has been limited through failed $onstitutional pro$esses. )y reviewing the
effe$tiveness of so$ial $ontra$t in ea$h of these three areas# it is possible to re$ogni5e
the pra$ti$al appli$ation of the normative arguments e9pressed throughout this paper.
)efore $ontinuing# it is worthwhile to note $ertain assumptions on whi$h this
paper will be based. .irstly# this is a largely normative analysis of the problem of
so$ial $ontra$t7 however# it will depart from this normative tra$% in an effort to
$onfront the problems presented in a more realisti$ manner so that the solutions
offered may be applied. It should be $lear to the reader when the paper has departed
from its normative methodology in order to offer more pra$ti$al solutions. "e$ondly#
while the terms $onstitution and $ontra$t will appear to be used inter$hangeably# the
term B$ontra$tA will appear in referen$e to normative dis$ussion while B$onstitutionA
will appear in pra$ti$al dis$ussion7 there will be some ne$essary overlap where these
two methods of analysis meet. Thirdly# this paper will assume that an effe$tive
$ontra$t pro$ess is a means of $reating legitimate authority in government7 in this
way# it will be desirable for governments to enter su$h a pro$ess to 8ustify their
authority. (astly# this paper will assume that an advan$ed $apa$ity for $hoi$e is what
ma%es individuals human.
Hollady# D-DRA.T D
C3a4ter ' On t3e Nature of (an
In a dis$ussion of what Bhuman rightsA must be afforded to an individual# it is
important to understand what it means to be human7 without understanding this# it is
impossible to determine any sort of enumeration of for humans. 'riginally# human
rights were natural rights or natural laws (0(-norms found in nature that $ould be
dis$overed through reason.
:=
Modern interpretations of rights generally pigeonhole
natural rights in their Thomist or (o$%ean form
::
without $onsidering the wider view#
opening 0( to )enthamAs >nonsense upon stilts?
:/
$ritique. More modern
interpretations have fo$used on the idea of human dignity without giving mu$h
$onsideration to the idea of what it is to be human# or why it is that humans are
entitled to dignity7 the human rights tradition in this regard has built itself on an
emotional rea$tion of human e9$eptionally.
Despite these faults# s$ien$e has regarded the human spe$ies as different from
others# and has $ome up with reasons to support this differen$e. As Alasdair
Ma$intyre notes in Dependant and Rational Animals,
13
dolphins have proved to be
so$iable animals with goals and means of $ommuni$ation7 dolphins have even
managed to learn simple forms of languages taught to them by trainers.
:4
In a$$epting
that there are other forms of intelligent life in the world# it $annot simply be
intelligen$e that sets humans apart# but rather a $ombination of ob8e$tive and
sub8e$tive rationality that allows humans to ma%e $hoi$es based on $riteria they
determine for themselves. Haye% notes the sub8e$tive nature of human interests where
individuals possess >s$ales of valueFwhi$h are inevitably different and in$onsistent
:=
)la$%# C:3
::
"ee Alford $hapter two on 0(.
:/
)entham# <
:3
Ma$intyreAs uses biology to $reate values that $annot be substantiated.
:4
Ma$intyre# /3
Hollady# D-DRA.T ;
with ea$h other.?
:@
This $hapter will e9plore the history of human rights do$uments to show the
progression of the thoughts of rights and level of independen$e granted to $iti5ens
throughout history. (oo%ing at these do$uments is worthwhile in 8udging the degree
of freedom individuals en8oyed in the past and the 8ustifi$ations used for the balan$e
of duty and freedom pres$ribed by ea$h do$ument. It will $ontinue by dis$ussing the
nature of man as $hoi$e and the importan$e of maintaining $hoi$e through the
$ontra$t pro$ess# suggesting a new form of 0( based on biology rather than intuition.
)y loo%ing at the biologi$al $apabilities of humans and determining what it is that
ma%es humans unique# it is then possible to determine what rights should be
asso$iated with humans to maintain humanity as opposed to other animals to whi$h
no rights are traditionally as$ribed.
:<
A biologi$al form of 0( used to understand
humanity rather than pres$ribe moral norms for humanity is a first step towards
ob8e$tive understanding of what must be prote$ted in the $ontra$tual pro$ess. (astly#
this $hapter will $onsider the nature of individual obligation and the problems that it
poses for $hoi$e and the $ontra$t pro$ess. If $hoi$e is to be preserved# it would stand
to reason that an individual $annot promise to adhere to the tenets determined through
the $onstitutional pro$ess# or that the individual $ould de$ide to stop following the
provisions at any point# ma%ing the e9pe$tation of $omplian$e wea%er. It is important
to $onsider what sort of obligation an individual may ta%e on through the $ontra$t
pro$ess while still maintaining the $apa$ity for $hoi$e.
Review of Human Rights Documents
&onstitutional do$uments on$e served as a means to $ontrol the populous by
removing sub8e$tive governan$e in favour of a well+ordered so$iety where all players
:@
Haye%# 44
:<
"ee Regan on animal rights.
Hollady# D-DRA.T :=
%new the rules. It is useful to loo% at these histori$al do$uments in groups by the
$hara$teristi$s that defined them# or rather what new system of rights they offered to
the people to whi$h they applied. &onstitutions $an be viewed in four basi$
$ategoriesG personal property# 0(# representative governan$e and modern.
1roperty rights are the oldest a$$epted right found in an e9amination of
$onstitutional do$uments# and for good reason-Ma$hiavelli# %nown for his brutal
ta$ti$s# best des$ribes the reasoning for affording men a right to property when he
says that >above all# Hthe 1rin$eI must abstain from ta%ing the property of others# for
men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.?
:C
At the
time of Hammurabi# and later in the Magna &arta#
:D
respe$ting a right to property was
less about re$ogni5ing an inherent human right and more about redu$ing the ris% of
threat that Ma$hiavelli notes in his warning to the 1rin$e. Through the progression of
time# right to property evolved from a defensive $al$ulation on the part of the
potentate to re$ognition of property as a physi$al manifestation of the $hoi$es a man
has made and the liberty that requires.
:;
0( made its first substantive appearan$e in $onstitutional do$uments under
Justinian in @3@ &K# where he des$ribed 0( as >that law whi$h nature tea$hes to all
animals.?
/=
JustinianAs less pervasive idea of 0( was 8ustified with simple ane$dotes
li%e >a younger person $annot adopt an older?
/:
be$ause it is unnatural to do so. 6hile
0( gained subsequent popularity# espe$ially through the reinterpretations of Aquinas
and (o$%e# JustinianAs basi$ $ode provides an initial glimpse at the idea that rights are
:C
Ma$hiavelli# C/
:D
Magna &arta# >no sheriff or bailiff of ours# or other person# shall ta%e the horses or
$arts of any freeman for transport duty against the will of said freedman.?
:;
"ee Ma$han (/==@->private rights are also the $on$rete e9pression-the pra$ti$al
manifestation-of the rights to life and liberty#? defending the ob8e$tive right to
private property.
/=
Justinian# 3
/:
Justinian# ;
Hollady# D-DRA.T ::
ob8e$tive and innate properties that are $annot granted by the state# only re$ogni5ed.
0( in itself did not appear again in JustinianAs form# but did reappear through the
$onstitutions of the .ren$h in the De$laration of the Rights of Man and the !nited
"tates (!" De$laration of Independen$e (DoI

that de$lared# >all menFare endowed
with $ertain unalienable Rights.?
//
6hile 0( has sin$e $ome under fire from $riti$s
for relying on mysti$al origins and $ir$ular logi$#
/3
it does mar% the beginning of the
human rights tradition. Additionally# as Hayden notes# >$riti$s of 0( struggle to $riti$
positive law if there is no basis of moral authority#?
/4
whi$h 0( in its traditional form
provides. Regardless# re+$on$eptuali5ing 0( in a neo+Justinian sense provides a
possible tool in analy5ing the unique nature of humanity# an idea that will be
$onsidered in the ne9t se$tion.
The most re$ent addition to the $onstitutional pro$ess is representation# as
manifested in the Mayflower &ompa$t# whi$h di$tated that the settlers would >submit
to su$h government and governors as we should by $ommon $onsent agree to ma%e
and $hoose.?
/@
"imilar to the early manifestation of 0( under Justinian# representative
government had previously e9isted in Eree$e where Aristotle des$ribed a system
where offi$ials were >ele$ted by lot7?
/<
however after the Mayflower &ompa$t# the
idea of a government that represented the people gained popularity# eventually
be$oming a ne$essary $omponent in the 6estern $on$eption of a legitimate
$onstitution.
The ideals espoused in previous do$uments-right to property# ob8e$tive
nature of rights# and right to government that represents the interests of the populous
-found its first $omprehensive manifestation in the !" &onstitution# in$luding ea$h
//
0ote the $apitali5ation of >Rights#? defining an ob8e$tive entity.
/3
Hayden# 4<
/4
Ibid
/@
Mayflower &ompa$t
/<
Aristotle# Athenian &onstitution# 1t. @3
Hollady# D-DRA.T :/
of the provisions dis$ussed above# but built on the (o$%ean 0( ideas espoused in the
DoI. The su$$ess of the do$ument is largely related to its vague guidelines# where
individuals are granted large amounts of freedom in order to avoid the >long train of
abuses?
/C
that led to the founding of the !". The 6eimar &onstitution# whi$h would
later allow the rise of 0a5i Eermany# had similarly progressive provisions# but
wea%ened its power with provisions that would initially de$lare >the rights of the
individual are inviolable#?
/D
but $ontinue to allow >deprivation of individual libertyF
if based on laws.?
/;
The progress of the previous millennia has sin$e resulted in a
number of do$uments by the !nited 0ations (!0# li%e the !niversal De$laration of
Human Rights (!DHR# whi$h in$ludes the most e9pansive enumeration of rights#
going so far as to afford individuals >periodi$ holidays with pay.?
3=
The !DHR does
overrea$h on a number of its arti$les while providing no vehi$le or suggested pro$ess
to legitimi5e intervention to se$ure rights7 however reading through its arti$les one
re$ogni5es both an a$$urate depi$tion of the attitude in human rights dis$ourse as well
as a formidable attempt to $odify the rights required to allow $hoi$e.
The progression of rights do$uments does not provide a pi$ture of what the
$onstitutional pro$ess ought to prote$t or how it ought to fun$tion7 however it is a
useful means of seeing how the pro$ess has fun$tioned and what it has valued in the
past. Ka$h do$ument did represent a su$$ess at the time# primarily due to its superior
nature to previous do$uments-the penalties for death in HammurabiAs &ode be$ame
milder by the time of Justinian-but progress is not the same as su$$ess. The progress
of ea$h do$ument was that it deferred more responsibility to the individual# failures
o$$urred when governments as$ribed more responsibility to themselves# as is seen
/C
DoI# :
/D
6eimar &onstitution
/;
Ibid
3=
!DHR# /4
Hollady# D-DRA.T :3
through the failure of implementation of the !DHR where a duty bearer is required
for an arti$le to su$$eed. 0o5i$%As argues that the only way to $reate utopia is to
$reate
>a framewor% for utopias# a pla$e where people are at liberty to 8oin
together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to reali5e their own vision of
the good life in the ideal $ommunity but where no one $an impose his
utopian vision upon others.?
3:
As the do$uments move to allow more individual autonomy to utili5e the human
$apa$ity for $hoi$e# 0o5i$%As vision be$omes more viable.
That the Nature of Man is Choice
The notion of 0( espoused by Justinian->that law whi$h nature tea$hes to all
animals?
3/
-represents the $on$eption $losest to the true form of 0(. JustinianAs
observation that $ertain things are natural is $orre$t7 $ertain things are a matter of
nature-of biology-and do not require intuition to re$ogni5e# but rather are obvious
to an observant individual. Humans feel pain when they are hurt7 pain is not
something that one must %now intuitively# but rather something ob8e$tive in the world
that $an be a$%nowledged by all individuals who have felt it. 1ain requires no
religious $onfirmation# nor rational sequen$ing to dis$over# only a stubbed toe or a
paper $ut. The human response to avoid pain is a natural one# and from this# one $an
a$%nowledge a 0( that individuals will tend to avoid pain when possible.
0( has histori$ally been a means to find an ob8e$tive form of morality in the
world. "$holars have used it to 8ustify positive law# 8ustify a$tion or 8ustify rights7 but
ea$h of these requires one use 0( in a way that $annot be supported. 6hen Justinian
3:
0o5i$%# 3:/-see 0o5i$%As part three for further dis$ussions on the impli$ations of
utopia and $ritiques on generali5ed $on$eptions.
3/
Justinian# 3
Hollady# D-DRA.T :4
notes >by the law of nature these things are $ommon to man%ind-the air# running
water#?
33
it is to suggest that air e9ists# so humans are li%ely to use it. 0( $annot be
used to determine ends without suffering >the epistemologi$al diffi$ulty of
determining norms that are dedu$ed in some other way from an ob8e$tive#
independent moral reality.?
34
0( is a tool to des$ribe the means-what $apa$ity e9ists
in living things and the surrounding world that would $ause an e9pe$tation for $ertain
a$tion. This $on$eption of 0( will be termed 0ew 0atural (aw (00(.
In terms of the human biologi$al $apa$ity# the human brain is built to ma%e
$hoi$es based on a $omple9 set of $riteria# determined by the brain. Humans have
e9tensive amounts of Bwhite matter#A a substan$e that allows for more $onne$tivity
between brain tissue and enhan$ed $ommuni$ation throughout different parts of the
brain.
3@
6hen a human $onfronts a $ertain e9perien$e# the information enters through
the thalamus# into the sensory pro$ess area and then to the frontal $orte97 however it
may also enter through the thalamus and pro$eed to the amygdala# a primitive part of
the brain that is home to the fear $entre and responsible for more impulsive and
emotional rea$tions.
3<
The $omple9ity of the human brain allows for different
pro$essing for different sort of rea$tions# but also demonstrates the $omple9
fun$tioning of the brain. 6hile some of these are automati$ pro$esses-traditionally
feared e9perien$es will $ause the a$tivation of the amygdala-fMRI s$ans show that
different sorts of de$isions result in a$tivation of different parts of the brain that
represent emotion and rational de$ision pro$esses.
3C

Humans pro$ess information both rationally and emotionally7 however this is not
to say that emotional pro$essing is not rational. 1art of the human e9perien$e
33
Ibid# /=
34
Hayden# 4<
3@
Ea55aniga# /:
3<
Ibid# :/3
3C
Ibid# :/@
Hollady# D-DRA.T :@
identified by Haye% is the >s$ale of valuesFwhi$h are inevitably different.?
3D
As an
individualAs emotional atta$hment to $ertain values shift# so will their pro$ess of
reasoning. 6hile it may not seem sensible to give up all of ones possessions and live
a life of poverty# some individuals may feel a strong emotional atta$hment to a
parti$ular religious persuasion that advo$ates they ta%e a vow of poverty-this
personAs pro$ess of sub8e$tive reasoning will determine that giving up his possessions#
based on his s$ale of values ("o2# will lead to the greatest personal happiness for
him. &hoi$e is defined as the de$isions that result from this sub8e$tive "o2.
The true nature of humanity is the unique $omple9ity of $hoi$e7 while other
animals a$t on instin$t to ta%e $are of their young# female humans may re8e$t their
instin$t to bear a $hild in favour of a rewarding $areer7 alternatively the same female
may embra$e the biologi$al instin$t that $ompels her to bear and $are for $hildren.
'b8e$tive rationality may view the $areer that provides the greatest degree of wealth
as the right $ourse for a prospe$tive university graduate# but the graduate may prefer a
$areer in a sub8e$t about whi$h they feel passionate# or in a $areer that will allow them
to spend more time with family. 0o5i$%As dis$ussion of utopia a$$urately portrays this
point7 however# 0o5i$% does not draw the obvious $on$lusion-the sub8e$tive
differen$es between humans are not only ne$essary to allow for an individual to
ma9imi5e their own personal "o2# but is the $hara$teristi$ that ma%es the individual
human.
"tates already re$ogni5e the ability to $hoose as the primary trait of the human
e9perien$e-in 6estern legal systems# a defendant may $laim inno$en$e by reason of
insanity# where they argue that the defendant >la$%ed the $apa$ity to have intended to
$ommit the $rime.?
3;
Defendants to whi$h this defense applies are in$ar$erated in
3D
Haye%# 44
3;
>not guilty by reason of insanity?
Hollady# D-DRA.T :<
spe$ial fa$ilities and denied the rights given to other $iti5ens as so$iety re$ogni5es the
ability to ma%e $hoi$es as an integral part of the human e9perien$e. Humans have
$ertain biologi$al $apa$ities that indu$e them to a$t in $ertain ways# but these
biologi$al tenden$ies do not require humans to a$t in any parti$ular manner. In this
way# $hoi$e is the primary human right# and the $apa$ity that must be established and
maintained for an individual to retain their humanity.
The Nature of Individual Obligation
Modern 6estern philosophy assumes that liberal demo$rati$ forms of
government are the best way to afford rights to individuals7 however the method of
$reating the bond between $iti5en and state suffers from flaws in terms of the nature
of $onsent. &arole 1ateman is $riti$al of the idea of $onsent as a whole# but also notes
that >it is frequently argued that even if $iti5ens $annot# with any plausibility# be said
to have promised or $onsented# they are nevertheless# politi$ally obligated in the
liberal demo$rati$ state.?
4=
(iberal demo$ra$ies have $ome to assume that the
privileges they offer will be better than an alternative# or least that individuals $onsent
merely by >$arryHingI out their daily lives in a $ertain way.?
4:

In analy5ing the nature of individual obligation# it is best to start with what the
$ontra$t pro$ess requires-a promise. )y agreeing to be a $iti5en of a state# the
individual has be$ome sub8e$t to a power that is >in$omparably greater than those of
an individual.?
4/
1romising provides a problem if one a$$epts the arguments from the
previous se$tions that di$tate the primary human trait to be $hoi$e be$ause promises
limit $hoi$e. A parado9 seems to e9ist-if a human must be allowed a $omplete range
of $hoi$e# they must be able to promise themselves in any $onte9t they $hoose7
4=
1ateman# 3
4:
Ibid# 33
4/
Rousseau# /:
Hollady# D-DRA.T :C
however# this promise will ne$essarily limit their future range of $hoi$e if it is truly
binding. 1ateman argues# >there $ould be no su$h pra$ti$e as promising if any single
promise did not presuppose that promises oblige#?
43
or that promises made must bind
the future range of $hoi$es available to the individual. If one a$$epts 1atemanAs
analysis of the impli$ations of promising# Tibor Ma$hanAs argument that >no
assuran$e that one who sees nothing wrong with brea%ing oneAs $ommitment to
various rules will be $onvin$ed about sti$%ing with the $ontra$t?
44
indi$ates that no
promises $an be made sin$e there is no absolute means to bind an individual to their
promise. .or Ma$han# $ontra$t theoryAs inability to >defend itself in terms di$tated by
its own tenets?
4@
represents a serious flaw.
It is true that individual $hoi$e must be ma9imi5ed in the so$ial $ontra$t
pro$ess in order to maintain humanity and satisfy the only true human rights
requirement7 however it is also possible to maintain $hoi$e while promising.
1atemanAs definition does not $onsider why one would promiseG a promise is given so
others may %now the intention of the individual. In this way# a promise is an outward
manifestation of a personAs intention to a$t in a $ertain way. If it is true that it is not
possible to %now the $omplete range of an individualAs "o2# it is natural that an
individual would a$t based on whatever intention was related to him by another. The
promise only binds the individual so long as they have not publi$ally e9pressed a new
intention# whi$h will dissolve the preferen$e indi$ated in the previous promise. "in$e
the a$t of promising gives others an indi$ation on how they should a$t relative to the
intentions of others# an individualAs $hoi$e to a$t in a new manner that is
$ommuni$ated publi$ally will not violate the promise# as it is natural to e9pe$t
someone to preserve their own "o2# nor will it oblige an individual in a manner that
43
1ateman# /C
44
Ma$han (/==@# @
4@
Ibid
Hollady# D-DRA.T :D
will limit the $apa$ity for $hoi$e in the future. During the $ourse of the promise# one
may suggest that an individualAs $apa$ity for $hoi$e is limited by the outward
e9pression they have given in the form of the promise7 however this $ritique does not
apply sin$e the individual will only maintain their $ommitment to the promise so long
as it fits their "o2# during whi$h time they would not $hoose to ta%e any other a$tion.
1ateman is $orre$t that >politi$al obligation poses a general problemFbe$ause
it always requires aFvolunteerist 8ustifi$ation.?
4<
In a system where individuals $an
disavow themselves of their obligation at any time# there will e9ist a degree of
un$ertainty7 however this un$ertainty is unavoidable and ne$essary to maintain
individual $hoi$e. 1atemanAs observation that >$onsent theory has long been
embarrassed by the fa$t that it always runs into diffi$ulties by the demand to show
who has# and when# and how# a$tually and e9pli$itly $onsented?
4C
is a problem7
however# in a pra$ti$al sense# it will li%ely be ne$essary to overloo% this flaw. The
writers of the DoI a$%nowledged the diffi$ulty of $onsent in saying#
>1ruden$e# indeed# will di$tate that Eovernments long established should
not be $hanged for light and transient $auses7 and a$$ordingly all
e9perien$e hath shewn# that man%ind are more disposed to suffer# while
evils are sufferable# than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to
whi$h they are a$$ustomed#?
4D
suggesting that while the $urrent government may not be the favoured one#
individuals usually prefer# in their "o2# to suffer rather ris% de$laring an intention
$ontrary to their promise to adhere to the tenets of the $ontra$t. It is not that
individuals do not have the right at any time to $hange their mind# but rather that their
"o2 di$tates that it is more worthwhile to $ontinue under the guise of the $urrent
4<
1ateman# :4
4C
Ibid# :@
4D
DoI
Hollady# D-DRA.T :;
$ontra$t than ta%e the ris%s inherent in establishing a new $ontra$t. The importan$e of
the DoI is that it shows the ne$essary method of removing oneself from a $ontra$t by
de$laring a publi$ intention# allowing others to ma%e de$isions based upon the
de$laration of a new intent.
'bligation does pose problems for $hoi$e# but this problem is not
insurmountable in normative terms. As one moves to the pra$ti$al appli$ation of
obligation# it be$omes $lear that the "o2 e9hibited by ea$h individual-the same "o2
that ma%es them unique as a human being-is also what allows the normative flaws of
obligation to fun$tion in a pra$ti$al world# where individuals give ta$it $onsent
instead of de$laring a new intention $ontrary to the promise assumed through their
silen$e. As is seen in the $ase of the De$laration of Independen$e# or in the $ase of
individuals who $hoose to renoun$e $iti5enship to a nation# a publi$ announ$ement of
a new intention allows an individual to both ma%e a promise to establish an intention#
and then $ontinue to en8oy a $omplete range of $hoi$e by de$laring a new intention at
some point in the future.
Hollady# D-DRA.T /=
C3a4ter ' On t3e Nature of Consent
The first $hapter too% a great deal of $are to $onsider the nature of man in a
paper about so$ial $ontra$t for three spe$ifi$ reasonsG the human e9perien$e# the
human element# and the human restri$tions. .irst# the individual human e9perien$e is
what matters when $onsidering the su$$ess of the so$ial $ontra$t pro$ess7 while
normative and logi$al analysis $an 8ustify $ertain a$tions# the logi$ must a$$ount for
the sub8e$tive "o2 of the a$tors. A so$ial $ontra$t is not ne$essary-as will be
dis$ussed in the se$ond se$tion of this $hapter-it is a de$ision made by individuals
after $onsidering their "o2. Individuals loo% to ma9imi5e personal utility based on
their own "o2-a su$$essful arrangement must be logi$al# but must also a$$ount for
the human e9perien$e as the means by whi$h su$$ess is evaluated.
The se$ond reason for the previous $hapter is the human element in the
$ontra$t pro$ess. 6hile normative theories should see% to argue based on logi$al
prin$iples# this logi$ must a$$ept that the a$tors# on whose e9perien$e the su$$ess of
the $ontra$t will be measured# will not ma%e de$isions based on ob8e$tive rationality.
Humans are rational $reatures that have a $apa$ity for rationality7 however the
individual human e9perien$e di$tates that ea$h person will have their own sub8e$tive
"o2# whi$h is responsible for the pervasive use of sub8e$tive rationality. 6hen
$onsidering the so$ial $ontra$t# a logi$al ar$hite$t will build a theory that will wor%
with a$tors that employ sub8e$tive rationality.
The third reason for the previous $hapter-and the purpose of this a$ademi$
endeavor-is to re$ogni5e what must be preserved in the $ontra$t pro$ess. It seems
prudent that humans be allowed to maintain their humanity# but without %nowing
what it is to be human# this is not possible. The idea that the $apa$ity for $hoi$e based
Hollady# D-DRA.T /:
on an individualAs own unique "o2 is what ma%es an individual human means that a
$onstitution $annot ta%e any part of this away without ta%ing away part of the
individualAs humanity. Additionally# the $ontra$t pro$ess# nor resulting $ontra$t# $an
be allowed to abridge this right. A government is the $onglomeration of individuals
with a $ommon purpose# whatever that purpose may be.
4;

This se$tion will see% to apply these three ideas dire$tly to the idea of so$ial
$ontra$t. It will pro$eed by first defining so$ial $ontra$t and the normative method by
whi$h it o$$urs. This se$tion will also dis$uss $ommon $ritiques of so$ial $ontra$t and
note the ways in whi$h traditional dis$ourse limits the $apa$ity for $hoi$e. The se$ond
se$tion will dis$uss the ne$essity of so$ial $ontra$t-not that $ontra$t is ob8e$tively
ne$essary# but rather how it be$omes $learly preferred by most after a$%nowledging
the sub8e$tive "o2 held by individuals. The last se$tion will dis$uss in $lear terms the
pra$ti$al limits that must be pla$ed on the state in order to preserve $hoi$e for
individuals.
Defining Contract
"o$ial $ontra$t is similar to a promise-one party pledges to live under the
authority of another# generally with some balan$e of duties pledged and privileges.
1atemanAs definition of so$ial $ontra$t as a $onstru$t where >free and equal
individualsFrationally and 8ustifiably 8oin together in a politi$al $ommunity and put
themselves under politi$al authority?
@=
is a useful pla$e to start. Her definition
re$ogni5es individuals as prior to the state who ma%e a $hoi$e to 8oin based on a
shared "o2. There is nothing in her definition that requires individuals to 8oin# but
rather individuals are $onvin$ed by the merit of the arrangement that the $ontra$t is
4;
Rousseau# :4 notes that >men $annot $reate any new for$es# but only $ombine and
dire$t those that e9ist.?
@=
1ateman# //
Hollady# D-DRA.T //
worth engaging. This definition fits the basi$# yet $omprehensive model of so$ial
$ontra$t offered by Rousseau.
RousseauAs model offers an opportunity to e9amine the normative pro$ess in its
simplest form7 in this model# all individuals e9ist prior to the state# 8oining together in
an effort to e9er$ise $ommon interests. The vote to a$$ept the initial $ontra$t must be
unanimous.
@:
As the $ontra$t is not pres$ribed for$ibly on the people# the state that is
$reated as a result of the $ommon interest should be $onsidered >the e9er$ise of the
general will.?
@/
6hat Rousseau proposes is simply a balan$e of duties and privileges
where
> what man loses by the so$ial $ontra$t is his natural liberty and an
unlimited right to anything# whi$h tempts him and whi$h he is able to
attain7 what he gains is $ivil liberty and property in all that he possesses.?
@3
This basi$ understanding does not in$orporate a $omprehensive dis$ussion of all the
different sorts of variations in so$ial $ontra$t# but it does serve as a valuable starting
point in a dis$ussion of the short$omings inherent in the $ontra$tual pro$ess.
Kven this simple version of so$ial $ontra$t e9hibits flaws that many have tried
to solve over the years7 this paper re$ogni5es two basi$ problems. The first of these
problems is ta$it $onsent-$onsent of future generations raised under the guise of a
$ertain $onstitution# but that have not e9pli$itly promised to follow its provisions. The
se$ond problem is the binding nature of so$ial $ontra$t as eviden$ed through
1atemanAs staun$h definition of promising dis$ussed in the previous $hapter. 'ther
problems do e9ist# su$h as the relative bargaining power of different a$tors dis$ussed
by 1ateman7
@4
however these will not be treated here.
@:
Rousseau# :=D
@/
Ibid# /@
@3
Ibid# :;
@4
"ee 1ateman for dis$ussion on relative power of a$tors in bargaining.
Hollady# D-DRA.T /3
The idea of ta$it $onsent is not e9pli$itly noted by Rousseau# who requires that
all individuals submit to the $ontra$t initially before they sub8e$t themselves to the
will of the ma8ority in $on$ert with the $ontra$t. To understand the of the idea of ta$it
$onsent# ne$essary to $onsider (o$%e. (o$%e# who notes >0o body doubts but an
e9press $onsent# of any man entering into any so$iety# ma%es him aFsub8e$t of that
government#?
@@
poses the question of >how far any one shall be loo%ed on to have
$onsented?
@<
in the $ase of ta$it $onsent. In answer to his own question# (o$%e
suggests that anyone has ta$itly $onsented where he >hath any possessions# or
en8oyment# of any part of the dominions of any government?
@C
and >is as far forth
obliged to obedien$e to the laws of that government# during su$h en8oyment.?
@D

(o$%eAs $on$lusion is $orre$t# however his means of analysis in this regard are
fundamentally flawed. The individual e9ists prior to the state# as do all of his
possessions7 while these possessions have benefitted from the so$iety $reated by the
government under whi$h they then e9ist# the so$iety and government have gained
re$ipro$al advantage through their inter$ourse. This re$ipro$al advantage amounts to
debt paid-(o$%eAs ne$essity that they $ontinue to be used under the guise of the
$urrent government is faulty. At the end of the first $hapter# the idea of a promise as
an outward e9pression of intention that gives others an e9pe$tation upon whi$h to
base their own a$tion was dis$ussed-it is for this reason that ta$it $onsent $an be
supported. An individual who lives and operates under the laws of the lo$al
government has given no reason for others to believe he has not $onsented to the
$ompa$t. As is the $ase of any promise# at any time the individual deems the so$ial
$ontra$t to no longer be in his best interest# he may publi$ally de$lare himself to no
@@
(o$%e# @@
@<
Ibid
@C
Ibid# see 1ateman# DD
@D
Ibid
Hollady# D-DRA.T /4
longer be a member of the $ontra$t.
The binding nature of so$ial $ontra$t is a se$ond problem that merits dire$t
$onsideration. (o$%e gives a series of $ir$umstan$es where the $ontra$t would be
void# generally in$luding some failure of government to provide as promised7
however (o$%e $on$ludes that >the power that every individual gave the so$iety#
when he entered into it# $an never revert to the individuals again as long as the so$iety
lasts# but will always remain in the $ommunity#?
@;
a sentiment similar to RousseauAs
de$laration that >the powers of the states are in$omparably greater than those of an
individual publi$ possession is also# in fa$t# more se$ure and irrevo$able.?
<=
In the $ase of both (o$%e and Rousseau# the position of the state after
allegian$e has been e9pli$itly given is unassailable7 however this $reates $onsiderable
problems for the prospe$t of freedom. In (o$%eAs dis$ussion of ways by whi$h
government may be dissolved#
<:
he a$%nowledges the possibility of a system where
the ruler no longer serves the interests of the people7 however in this he does not fully
a$$ept that an individualAs "o2 may shift in the $ourse of his life in su$h a way that
he will $ome to regret his earlier de$ision. "o long as an individual is held to be a
member of a state to whi$h he no longer pledges allegian$e# he will be$ome a tool of
the state rather than a $iti5en. The elimination of $hoi$e eliminates humanity.
Perceived Necessity of Contract
There are no ob8e$tive fa$ts that require so$ial $ontra$t7 while philosophers
see% to solve problems to improve the e9perien$e of individual# >the whole gala9y of
politi$al philosophers from 1lato to HegelFassumed that the fundamental politi$al
problem is sus$eptible of a final solution#?
</
even where no solution is ne$essarily
@;
(o$%e# :::
<=
Rousseau# /:
<:
"ee (o$%e# ::: for dis$ussion of dissolving $ontra$t.
</
&ranston# 3< on rights.
Hollady# D-DRA.T /@
possible. 0o5i$%As analysis agrees# suggesting anar$hy may be a viable alternative#
<3

and it is only the "o2 in ea$h individual that will determine an alternate $ourse7
however it is undoubtedly true that a so$ial $ontra$t and a well ordered so$iety is
generally preferable. This paper will $onsider the predile$tion towards so$ial $ontra$t
from two different perspe$tives-individual utility and individual so$iability. .irstly#
an individualAs "o2 will differ from those around him in ways that $annot be
predi$ted7 however# it is natural that individuals will value an organi5ed so$iety as a
means to ma9imi5e utility. "e$ondly# humans are so$ial animals-though they may
$hoose not to be-who tend to see% the $ompany of others. 6hen $oming together in
groups# a set of so$ial norms and e9pe$tations is ne$essary to maintain an orderly
so$iety. 6hile it is not possible to say that $ontra$t is ne$essary# individual s$ales of
values have repeatedly suggested it is desirable.
All $hoi$es are a matter of utility-the sub8e$tive "o2 by whi$h individuals
8udge their interests will determine the sorts of $hoi$es an individual ma%es to
ma9imi5e this utility. 00( suggests that people tend to be so$ial animals despite their
varied values.
<4
"o long as theorists $an e9pe$t most to share some values in $ommon#
this may form an effe$tive basis for $reating normative theories on so$iety. Most will
want to live in so$iety to a$$omplish those goals that rate highest on their "o2-love#
friendship# money-these goals require groups of people $ome together to a$$omplish
these ends.
'n$e it is a$$epted that individuals will tend towards groups# it is ne$essary to
understand why a so$ial $ontra$t be$omes ne$essary. Resear$h suggests that an
individual so$iety $an hold no more that two hundred members before it be$omes
ne$essary to impose norms by whi$h the so$iety will live and retain order7
<@
while a
<3
0o5i$%# 4
<4
"ee AristotleAs Politics I for dis$ussion of man as a politi$al animal.
<@
Ea55aniga# ;4
Hollady# D-DRA.T /<
so$iety remains under two hundred individuals# it is still possible to use >personal
loyalties and man+to+man $onta$t to %eep order.?
<<
6hen living in small $ommunities
where all individuals are a$quainted with one another# these norms are unne$essary-
%eeping order and maintaining relationships between individuals be$ome a part of
ea$h individuals "o2# where sa$rifi$e is a$$epted rather then produ$e the turmoil
asso$iated with e9er$ising the full measure of freedom. 6hile there is no ob8e$tive
reason why a so$iety must begin to impose rules after passing two hundred $iti5ens# it
will li%ely be benefi$ial for individuals to $odify norms in order to maintain the pea$e
they e9perien$ed previously. .or the same reasons des$ribed in the DoI->man%ind
are more disposed to suffer# while evils are sufferable#?
<C
individuals will a$$ept an
arrangement that restri$ts freedom on the basis that it is preferable to the alternative-
a $hoi$e that is theirs to ma%e.
Ereat efforts have been made in this paper# and espe$ially this se$tion# to
suggest that there is nothing ob8e$tive about the range of $hoi$es available# only that
the range of $hoi$e is available to every individual and $annot be limited without
limiting their humanity. In the $ase of individuals as so$ial animals# it is not that they
must be# it is that they generally $hoose to be-when a man de$ides he wants to
marry# it is ne$essary their be another individual there to marry-some measures that
fall on the "o2 simply ne$essitate the $ompany of others. This does not mean that
so$ieties must be so large that they require a $onstitution to maintain order7 however
with greater numbers of individuals $omes a larger range of possibilities. The man
sear$hing for a wife in a so$iety of one thousand will have a $hoi$e tenfold larger than
the man sear$hing for a wife in a so$iety of one hundred. 'ther $hoi$es be$ome
possible as well-$areer spe$iali5ation# a$$ess to different religions and ideas-the
<<
Ibid
<C
DoI# :
Hollady# D-DRA.T /C
larger the so$iety# the larger the $apa$ity for $hoi$e.
There is nothing about the human e9perien$e that requires the range of $hoi$es
for an individual be e9panded# and this is where the idea of $hoi$e departs from the
idea of pure utility. 6hile arranging so$iety may $ause more utility to e9ist in the
world# raising the level of utility e9perien$ed by ea$h individual# this is not ne$essary.
6hen a human individual be$omes an adult prior to the state# they have a number of
$hoi$es-it is these $hoi$es that $annot be abridged. The individual in question may
see% to ma9imi5e this by e9er$ising his interests in the $onte9t of so$iety# he may
even re$ogni5e the in$reased utility by be$oming a $iti5en of a state# but it is his or her
$hoi$e to ma9imi5e utility in this way. "tates that see% to improve utility for all
individuals under the guise of the government assume that all individuals will
re$ogni5e utility in the same way. 6hile 00( suggests that humans will see% the
$ompany of others# pro$reate# see% opportunities for leisure# et$.# this does not
ne$essarily represent the interests of all people. An individual may $hoose a
government that see%s to ma9imi5e his utility in this way# but it must be a $hoi$e on
his part to do so.
"o$ial $ontra$t is not a ne$essary entity# simply a desirable one. 00( gives a
firm basis for analy5ing the e9pe$ted wants of individuals# and through this it is
possible to see why so$ial $ontra$t is desirable7 however# as is the $ase in any
revolution# not all individuals will agree to the same terms# or agree that a so$ial
$ontra$t is desirable based on their sub8e$tive "o2-this ability to $hose what might
ob8e$tively seems to be an irrational $ourse of a$tion is essential in maintaining
humanity.
imitations on Contract
This paper has sought to $hara$teri5e $hoi$e as the $entral $omponent in
Hollady# D-DRA.T /D
humans in order to understand the so$ial $ontra$t pro$ess. If all parts of the previous
dis$ussions are implemented# then no restri$tions are ne$essary-ea$h individual will
agree to live by whatever is valuable to them at the time and leave when that no
longer $arries the same value that it did previously7 however in pra$ti$al terms# this is
not entirely possible. 6hen a state $reates a $onstitution# it is unli%ely to en8oy
unanimous support# it is unli%ely to be e9pli$itly approved by ea$h individual of ea$h
future generation# and it is unli%ely to in$lude provisions that will allow those that did
not agree to its tenets to live in a way that is $ompatible with their own "o2 in spite
of the $onstitution to whi$h they are bound.
As this paper promised to ma%e some pra$ti$al suggestions alongside the
normative arguments that have formed its foundation# this se$tion will e9amine those
areas of the individual e9perien$e that may not be affe$ted by the government. As
ea$h of the provisions here apply to the individual prior to the state and# it $an be
suggested that they form the basis for a sort of impli$it global $onstitutionalism-
values that must be preserved to maintain humanity. 6hile traditional 0( and human
rights theorists offer wea% support as to why their rights are ne$essary# maintaining
what ma%es an individual human and allowing individuals to a$t to pro$ure rights on
their own behalf is not only theoreti$ally supported by the $on$eption of human
nature submitted at the beginning of this paper# but also empowers the individual to
obtain rights for themselves in the absen$e of effe$tive governments and without
undue burden on a duty bearer. In pra$ti$e# governments must do four thingsG
maintain basi$ freedoms# a$$ept ta$it $onsent# allow for amendments# and allow
individuals to abolish or leave the $ontra$t.
6estern $onstitutions tend to re$ogni5e basi$ freedoms# to the point that the
international $ommunity $onsiders those new $onstitutions that do not in$lude a
Hollady# D-DRA.T /;
spe$ifi$ enumeration of basi$ freedoms as illegitimate. )asi$ freedoms-freedom of
religion# spee$h# et$-are the simplest manifestation of $hoi$e in a $onstitution. 0one
of these basi$ freedoms require positive a$tions from others# only a negative
$ommitment to not infringe on an individualAs freedom to $hoose for themselves.
6hile# in pra$ti$e# a right to use whatever $urren$y may not be sustainable and wre$%
havo$ in so$iety# the right to a free press allows individuals to $hoose to share ideas.
!ndoubtedly a $onstitution will eliminate some degree of freedom# formali5ing norms
in su$h a way that one must pay for items in dollars or weigh goods in %ilos# but so
long as the basi$ freedoms are prote$ted and one may leave the $ontra$t# an
individualAs "o2 is li%ely to prefer those menial sa$rifi$es over a Hobbesian state of
nature and maintain $hoi$e through this preferen$e.
Allowing for ta$it $onsent seems simple-the state would want individuals to
have a seamless means by whi$h they will be$ome ta9paying $iti5ens of the state7
however it is not so simple. An individual who has be$ome a member of a state
without e9pli$it $onsent to the $ontra$t is an individual who has not agreed to the
do$ument as a whole# only the norms under whi$h he lives. 6hile living the day+to+
day lifestyle that the $ontra$t $reates may be satisfa$tory in their "o2# this does not
mean that they will a$$ept more o$$asional parts of the $ontra$t li%e $ons$ription. The
$onstitution must be written in su$h a way that there are no provisions that will redu$e
the $hoi$e of a $iti5en that has not e9pli$itly agreed to a $ourse of a$tion-if someone
is a pa$ifist# ta$it $onsent should not obligate them into military servi$e. &onstitutions
must be stru$tured in su$h a way that duties imposed on individuals-those that affe$t
$hoi$e-require e9pli$it $onsent. 6hile 8oining the military may be a $hoi$e offered#
one $annot be $ons$ripted without e9pli$it $onsent# as it will restri$t their ability to
$hoose and adversely affe$t their humanity.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3=
The Ameri$an .ounding .athers $reated a broad $onstitution that allowed it to
remain relevant for hundreds of years7 however the original te9t was not perfe$t. In
the &onstitution# two basi$ prin$iples are displayedG versatility and the $apa$ity for
$hange. )y ma%ing a vague do$ument with few absolute provisions# the .ounding
.athers allowed the &onstitution to persist through generations of $hanging
$onditions. The $learly defined amendment pro$ess $reated a system to $hange the
do$ument a$$ording to the $hanging norms of the future so$iety. A so$ial $ontra$t
$annot foresee the "o2 that will be e9er$ised by su$$essive generations7 however#
maintaining the $apa$ity for $hoi$e through the enumeration of a few very spe$ifi$
freedoms within a broad system and $reating a pro$ess whereby future generations
$an $hange the do$ument to meet their needs is an effe$tive solution to the problem
that $iti5ens will not want to >$hange HgovernmentI for light and transient $auses.?
<D
Above all# an individual must be able to leave the $ontra$t. 6hile 1atemanAs
definition suggests that a promise must ne$essarily e9ist# it has been shown that
promises are a sign of intention# not of binding resolution# and as su$h# it must be
ne$essary for an individual to e9press a new intention. Kven (o$%e# who suggests that
the rights given up in the $ontra$t pro$ess $an never revert ba$% to the individual#
a$$epts that in e9traordinary $onditions# the individual may leave the $ontra$t.
<;
The
$onditions need not be e9traordinary7 (o$%eAs $on$eption requires that the ruler no
longer serves the interests of the people# but does not $onsider the prospe$t that the
individualAs interests may no longer be served by the ruler. Kven in the $ase of a 8ust
ruler that does not $hange poli$y over the years# the values that inform an individualAs
de$ision+ma%ing pro$ess are malleable. 6hile >man%ind are disposed to suffer#?
C=
that
does not mean that previous $onsent requires them to $ontinue to suffer if their "o2
<D
DoI# :
<;
(o$%e# :::
C=
DoI# :
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3:
determines an alternative to be preferable.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3/
C3a4ter ' On T3e &ractical m4lications of Contract Fla5s
The flaws presented in the so$ial $ontra$t pro$ess $reate ne$essary problems
for the legitima$y of $ontra$t# espe$ially as these flaws apply to future generations. It
is not un$ommon for politi$al theorists to overrea$h# $reating a burden of duty where
none should e9ist7 however the flaws of so$ial $ontra$t $reate a burden unli%e any that
has previously e9isted as legitimate-pla$ing it on future generations. (o$%e notes
that individuals $an $ommit themselves to a $ourse# but >$annot by any $ompa$t
whatsoever bind his $hildren or posterity.?
C:

The flaws of so$ial $ontra$t are best seen through the lens of three
$ontemporary issuesG the environment# $ons$ription and debt. The environment poses
an interesting dilemma in that its maintenan$e requires restraint by those that
$urrently use it-this restraint is tantamount to a restri$tion of $hoi$e. The apparent
parado9 between $hoi$e now and range of $hoi$e later is an ideal pla$e to start in a
$onsideration of the potential flaws of $ontra$t. &ons$ription presents a problem that
seems slightly dated# but still e9ists today. 6hile some states require military servi$e
as a duty# $ommitting the lives of unborn generations to dangerous wor% poses a
serious threat to the sovereignty of individual $hoi$e. The last issue is trans+
generational debt (TED. It has be$ome a$$eptable for politi$ians to spend on $redit#
leaving future generations to pay the bill for servi$es in$urred by previous
generations. &urrent generations have no $laim against their $hildren# a population
that is not even guaranteed to a$$ept the so$ial $ontra$t nor had any part in de$iding
what $onstitutes a worthy e9penditure.
C:
(o$%e# @4
Hollady# D-DRA.T 33
En1ironment
In :;;D# the average individual living in the !" used the equivalent of D.D
metri$ tons of oil.
C/
&onsumerism is on the rise with the worldAs ri$hest twenty
per$ent of individuals using over three quarters of the available resour$es.
C3
In real
terms# every drop of oil used is oil that $annot be a$$essed by future generations7 as
this paper has argued that individual $hoi$e must be maintained and this se$tion has
suggested that imposing limits on future $hoi$e is a violation of these prin$iples# it is
worthwhile to $onsider whether the use of resour$es or degradation of the
environment now will adversely affe$t $hoi$e later.
The environment poses an interesting starting point $on$eptually be$ause it
requires one measure the range of $hoi$e offered to the $urrent generation against the
range of $hoi$e offered to future generations-the $hoi$e to mine $oal on a par$el of
land now means that future individuals will not be able to mine that same property7
however this apparent flaw $an be re$on$iled. Re$on$iling this apparent parado9
requires a normative $onsideration of what $hoi$es must be passed on to a future
generation# or whether a $urrent generation really $an have $omplete freedom.
As has been shown# $hoi$e defines human nature# that ea$h of us has a unique
$apa$ity for sub8e$tive rationality based on our own "o2 that informs our de$ision
pro$ess. As an individualAs "o2 will be ne$essarily sub8e$tive# it is reasonable to
suggest that sub8e$tive reasoning will be based on a sub8e$tive interpretation of the
options presented# or that an individual will ma%e de$isions about what they feel will
best serve their "o2 based on what they believe to be true.
If individuals ma%e $hoi$es based on a range of opportunities available that
would suggest that they $ould ma%e any $hoi$e $on$erning the environment and that
C/
>1opulation and 0atural Resour$es?
C3
>&onsumption and &onsumerism?
Hollady# D-DRA.T 34
there is no duty owed to future generations. The future generations may inherit an
environment that is signifi$antly degraded by the a$tions of the past generations# but
this $annot be viewed as having limited their range of $hoi$e. Just as the previous
generations did# they will $ome into a world with an unlimited range of $hoi$es based
on the environment that is presented to them-individuals living in the dessert who
would li%e to be$ome farmers will not be able to be$ome farmers7 while they have an
unlimited range of $hoi$e available to them# these $hoi$es are based on environment
to whi$h they have a$$ess. In the $ase of one wishing to farm in the dessert# it is not
the $hoi$es of individuals in the past that have restri$ted their ability to farm# but
rather naturally o$$urring environmental pro$esses that have made the land on whi$h
they live unsuitable for $ertain a$tivities.
The true range of $hoi$e will ne$essarily be limited by the $ir$umstan$es that
e9ist. An individual should be able to $omport themselves in a way that serves their
own interests and be able to thin% or do anything that they have the means to thin% or
do7 however the right to thin%# feel or do any parti$ular thing of interest does not
impose duty on others to a$t in su$h a way as to ma9imi5e the range of $hoi$es
available to another. )efore moving on# it is worth noting that this dis$ussion does not
pre$lude the possibility that an individual may value passing on a more healthy
environment to future generations-this se$tion is not an argument of how an
individual should feel or the moral norms of so$iety that may determine behaviour#
simply that environmental degradation does not affe$t $hoi$e.
Conscri4tion
&ons$ription# or mandatory military servi$e# poses obvious problems for
individual $hoi$e. 6hile an individual who has e9pli$itly $onsented to a $ontra$t in
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3@
whi$h $ons$ription e9ists may pledge themselves to military servi$e# as (o$%e
C4
notes#
the initial members of the $ontra$t have no $laim over future generations. In a
normative sense# there should be no problem-individuals who do not a$$ept the
$ontra$t by simply refusing to serve7 those who do not ob8e$t a$$ept the provision as a
duty worth giving in e9$hange for the benefits gained through $ontra$t. 1ra$ti$al
$onstitutional pro$esses do not require e9pli$it $onsent# and sometimes even obligate
in $ases where an individual has e9pli$itly not $onsented by voting against a
$onstitutional referendum# ma%ing $ons$ription a pra$ti$al problem for $hoi$e.
'ver fifty states have a >$ompulsory $ons$ription?
C@
poli$y where at least
some part of the population will be required to 8oin and over seventy states have some
$ons$ription requirement that may in$lude mandatory servi$e or >sele$tive
$ons$ription.?
C<
6hile the !" abandoned its a$tive $ons$ription poli$y in :;C3#
CC
it is
one of a handful of nations that have eliminated its $ons$ription poli$ies but
maintained the ability to re$all the draft. In the $ase of the !"# individuals are
required to register for the draft on their eighteenth birthday.
!nfortunately# $ons$ription is still very mu$h a politi$al reality. Jordan
eliminated $ons$ription# 8ust to bring it ba$% years later in order to >provide youth
training ne$essary for 8ob mar%et needs.?
CD
JordanAs $ons$ription poli$y is meant to be
in the best interest of itAs people7 however $ompelling individuals to 8oin and
$ontrolling the sort of training they re$eive in order to stimulate desirable po$%ets of
the mar%et assumes the government %nows an individualAs "o2 best# or that the
government has the privilege of determining what is best for an individual.
The ta$it $onsent required for pra$ti$al $onstitutional pro$esses will
C4
(o$%e# @4
C@
>Military "ervi$e Age?
C<
Ibid
CC
>!" raises spe$tre of $ons$ription?
CD
>Military "ervi$e Age?
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3<
ne$essarily obligate individuals to military servi$e# possibly against their will# in any
state that still requires $ons$ription. During the 2ietnam 6ar# the !" deployed a
for$e# one quarter of whi$h was draftee based. 'f this twenty five per$ent# this $ore of
draftees were responsible for over thirty per$ent of the $asualties. Individuals were
and still are $ompelled to 8oin a for$e to whi$h they never e9pli$itly $onsented#
$ausing the death of over seventeen thousand individuals in the $ase of the 2ietnam
6ar-a $onfli$t that did not dire$tly affe$t the se$urity of the !". Military servi$e is
not a harmless $hoi$e-not to say it is a wrong $hoi$e-but $arries signifi$ant ris%s
that $ombat will always present. .or$ing individuals into servi$e introdu$es a
signifi$ant ris% of mortality into their lives.
True freedom# and the real manifestation of $hoi$e# requires an individual
e9er$ise their own "o2 independent of government $ontrol. In pra$ti$al terms# a
$onstitution that allows $ons$ription poses a ne$essary threat to future generations
who are required to ta$itly $onsent to the government that e9ists prior to them and yet
serve the tenets to whi$h they may have never intended to agree. &ons$ription is not a
harmless imposition# but rather a dangerous requirement that e9ists in some form in
over seventy states. 6hile ma8or 6estern powers have abandoned an a$tive
$ons$ription poli$y# ma%ing it seem li%e a distant issue# several Kuropean states still
require $ons$ription in some form and the !" has reserved the right to re$all the
draft.
C;
"o long as $ons$ription $ontinues to e9ist# it will impose una$$eptable limits
on individual $hoi$e in pra$ti$e.
Debt
In a normative sense# there is no problem with debt within $ontra$t as it is-
individuals borrow money to pay for servi$es that they will pay ba$% in the future7
C;
Ibid
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3C
however in pra$ti$e# and when new $iti5ens are $onstantly added to a state through the
means of ta$it $onsent# large amounts of standing debt $reate a system where benefits
en8oyed today are paid for by $iti5ens of tomorrow. In pra$ti$e# there is over forty
trillion dollars of global publi$ debt (1D.
D=
It is important to $onsider that#
theoreti$ally# there is no guarantee that future generations will a$$ept the $ontra$t and
pay this debt-this possibility is more realisti$ than it seems.
In Afri$an or Middle Kastern states where $onsistent government is not always
viable# there is no guarantee that a new generation will maintain the previous
government. During the Arab "pring# $iti5ens demanded new leadership-essentially
new government-in states li%e Tunisia# whi$h held over twenty billion dollars of
1D.
D:
&onsidering this volatility# there e9ist two basi$ problems in pra$ti$e for large
TEDG those times when individuals ta$itly a$$ept the $onstitution to whi$h they are
naturally obliged and times when they do not a$$ept the $onstitution to whi$h they are
naturally obliged.
.or those individuals that are said to have ta$itly $onsented to the government
that e9ists# whi$h is to say they have made no publi$ de$laration of an intention to not
follow the tenets of the $onstitution $urrently in e9isten$e# TED pla$es a burden on
them from whi$h they re$eive no benefit. Ta$it $onsent is a parti$ular problem
be$ause it $an only be suggested that an individual has impli$itly $onsented to the
$ontra$t at hand# not given e9pli$it $onsent to live under the pre$epts of the
$onstitution7 their $ommitment is to the norms established by the do$ument# not the
do$ument itself. .or those who are naturali5ed or that e9pli$itly a$$ept the $ontra$t# it
would stand to reason that they have also a$$epted the debt that $omes with that7
however# those who have not e9pli$itly $onsented are required to pay for goods and
D=
>The global debt $lo$%?
D:
Ibid
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3D
servi$es that they did not authori5e or determine ne$essary. In Eree$e# the 1D is
equivalent to one hundred and thirty nine per$ent of its gross domesti$ produ$t
D/
while
the its e$onomy $ontinues to de$line-this debt is so large that it has threatened to
ta%e down the Kuro7 in the !"# the 1D is appro9imately fifteen trillion dollars#
D3
while
only a fra$tion of the population was naturali5ed in a way that they $hoose to a$$ept
the debt. .or these $iti5ens# the debt passed is an entity to whi$h they did not approve#
but is normatively a$$eptable sin$e they e9pli$itly a$$epted the debt through
naturali5ation.
(iving in the 6estern world predisposes individuals to believe that
government institutions e9ist with a degree of $ontinuity7 however# as previously
noted# the Arab "pring and the $onstant turmoil in Afri$a suggests that ta$it $onsent is
not a given. (ebanon holds over fifty+five billion dollars worth of 1D#
D4
yet is unable
to maintain effe$tive governan$e as it $ompetes with He5bollah for $ontrol of the
national government. After the fall of Mubara%# Kgypt is saddled with nearly two
hundred billion dollars of debt
D@
and a non+des$ript governing stru$ture. "tates that
abandon their past $onstitutions through revolution or pro$edure may either de$ide to
$arry the debt forward and pay it ba$% under the guise of a new government or dis$ard
it as a remnant of the previous administration# but ea$h $ase presents problems. .or
those that $arry it forward# the publi$ $onfirmation that the government did not
represent the interests of the people means that the people will $ontinue to be
responsible for something they already 8udged to be outside their "o27 for those who
re8e$t it with the previous government# $reditors will be spurned-a potential ris% of
doing business. It must be re$ogni5ed that politi$al entities are not so stable as to
D/
>1ubli$ Eross Debt?
D3
>Eross K9ternal Debt?
D4
>Elobal debt $lo$%?
D@
Ibid
Hollady# D-DRA.T 3;
re8e$t the possibility that governments will fall# and the debts they in$urred will not be
a$$epted by the ne9t generation.
.or all the Leynesian theories on debt spending as a means by whi$h states
$an regulate and maintain the e$onomy# the logi$al impli$ations of these a$tions must
be $onsidered. In terms of so$ietal norms# it is generally a$$epted that one should only
pay for what they re$eive7 in a normative sense# there is no guarantee that the
$iti5enry will maintain the $urrent government and agree to pay at all. Instead of
be$oming an adult with a $omplete range of $hoi$e# individuals are limited by debt
imposed on them# requiring them to either disavow themselves of the debt and their
state# or $ontinue in a state of ta$it $onsent and unmerited servitude.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4=
Conclusion
The post+6estphalian era has a$$epted the state as the primary instrument in
politi$s7 however this assumption that the state must ne$essarily e9ist is
fundamentally flawed. Theorists suggest the state as the primary unit# and then
suggest that governments $an only be legitimi5ed through the support of the $iti5enry#
but do not $onsider the possibility that no parti$ular government will garner the
widespread support ne$essary to instill the legitima$y needed by the state to a$t on
ea$h $onstituentAs behalf. 1ra$ti$e bears this out-failed states li%e "omalia and Haiti
have proven unable to form lasting government# in some $ases leading to pervasive
violen$e as $ompeting interests drive a$tors to $onfli$t. The inability for these fa$tions
to mediate their interests# instead turning to violent means by whi$h they hope to
serve their interests# presents a physi$al manifestation of the different "o2 present in
humans# but also provides an e9ample where individuals must prote$t themselves in
the absen$e of some overar$hing authority.
It is ne$essary to start with the question of what it means to be human-for all
those who argue that human dignity is a basis by whi$h rights may be logi$ally
supplied# they assume two things with no supportG that humans are in fa$t different
from other animals and that humans are entitled to dignity. The se$ond assumption is
dependant on the first in that one first must define what it is to be human before one
$an understand why humans deserve dignity. Assuming something is entitled to
dignity without %nowing what it is provides no logi$al basis by whi$h the $laim of
deserved dignity may be substantiated.
Humans are in fa$t different. 6hile many animals may be $apable of learning#
$ommuni$ating or even planning# humans $ombine these abilities-these instin$ts-
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4:
with the $apa$ity for sub8e$tive rationality. Humans develop and use a sub8e$tive "o2
that is not only unique to humans as a spe$ies# but also unique to ea$h individual
human. This reali5ation allows the theorist to do two thingsG determine what it means
to be human# from whi$h one $an start to understands what rights are required# and
$reate effe$tive normative models that a$$ount for the human element in their
analysis.
6hat it means to be human is the most important $onsideration in that all
future de$isions $on$erning rights must be 8ustified by this $on$eption. This paper has
suggested the idea of 00(# or a form of 0( that uses biology as a means by whi$h
one $an understand human nature# is a useful tool for analysis. That humans $an
$hoose has no $lear lin% to the idea of morality# other than to suggest that a $olle$tion
of individuals may $ome to value $ertain prin$iples# from whi$h one $an surmise that
groups of individuals so$iali5ed together may develop a similar sub8e$tive range of
prin$iples whi$h they $all morals.
00( also suggests that humans are so$ial $reatures and will $hoose to 8oin
together in so$iety. At this point one must dis$uss how this may ta%e effe$t. That
humans have the $apa$ity and the right to ma%e the de$ision to 8oin is $ertain# but
moving from the normative dis$ussion to the pra$ti$al dis$ussion# it is ne$essary to
$onsider whether the human $apa$ity for $hoi$e is preserved# and what measures must
be ta%en to ensure that the new government does not infringe upon individual $hoi$e.
In pra$ti$e# this means limiting the power of the state to a$t $ontrary to $ertain
liberties-basi$ freedoms# ta$it $onsent# amending $ontra$t and leaving $ontra$t-in
order to maintain the humanity that is manifested through $hoi$e. 1ra$ti$al appli$ation
requires theorists a$$ept some degree of normative flaw in the %nowledge that the
human element will allow near seamless appli$ation of $ontra$t7 while a $onstitution
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4/
may not be perfe$t# the "o2 e9er$ised by most will allow the government to $ontinue
as individuals $hoose that whi$h they %now over that whi$h they do not %now.
1ra$ti$al flaws do still e9ist# and generally o$$ur when the government has
sought to in$rease its own power over the $iti5enry. 6hile# as dis$ussed before#
environmental issues do not pose a threat to the logi$ of so$ial $ontra$t# $ons$ription
and debt do threaten the $hoi$e of future generations. Individuals may pass debt onto
themselves# or obligate themselves into servi$e until whi$h time it no longer suits
their needs7 however the government or past generations may not hamper any present
or future individualAs right too $hoose without adversely affe$ting their humanity.
Individuals are $apable of ma%ing $hoi$es that affe$t their lives and must be
allowed to do so. It is an individualAs $hoi$es that ma%e him different from other
animals and other humans. If it were true that all humans were ob8e$tively rational
and shared the same values# there would be no need for $ontra$t sin$e all individuals
would share the same "o27 however this is not the $ase. Eovernments are not
ne$essary# they are desired and only $ome into being through the $olle$tive a$tion of
individuals-it is essential that a $onstitution satisfy the needs of the people that it
represents in order to maintain logi$al legitima$y.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 43
Bibliogra436
Alford# .red &. Narrative, Nature and the Natural Law: From Auinas to
International !uman Ri"hts. 0ew Mor%G 1algrave M$Millan# /=:=.
Arendt# Hannah. #ichmann In $urusalem. 0ew Mor%G 2i%ing 1ress In$.# :;<@.
Arendt# Hannah. %he !uman &ondition. &hi$agoG !niversity of &hi$ago 1ress# :;@;.
Aridas# Tina. >1ubli$ Eross Debt as 1er$ent of ED1 by &ountry.? Elobal .inan$e. D
0ovember /=::. Nwww.gfmag.$omO
Aristotle. %he Athenian &onstitution. Lindle Kd.
Aristotle. Politics' Lit$henerG )ato$he )oo%sG :;;;.
)eit5# &harles. %he Idea o( !uman Ri"hts. '9fordG '9ford !niversity 1ress# /==;.
)entham# Jeremy. >Anar$hi$al .alla$ies.? Eeorgetown (aw "$hool.
Nwww.law.georgetown.eduO
)la$%# Henry7 0olan# Joseph et al. )lac*s Law Dictionary. "t 1aulG 6est 1ublishing#
:;;:.
)radford# 6illiam. >Mayflower &ompa$t.? %he &onstitution +ociety. :; July /=::.
Nwww.$onstitution.orgO
>The &onstitution.? "omali (aw. 3: De$ember# :;<3. www.somalilaw.org
>The &onstitution of the !nited "tates.? National &onstitution &enter. :; July /=::.
Nwww.$onstitution$enter.orgO
>&onsumption and &onsumerism.? Elobal Issues. < Mar$h /=::. D 0ovember /=::.
Nwww.globalissues.orgO
&ranston# Mauri$e. !uman Ri"hts %oday. (ondonG Ampersand (td# :;</.
>De$laration of Independen$e.? &onstitution +ociety' 4 July :CC<. :; July /=::.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 44
>The De$laration of the Rights of Man and of the &iti5en.? ,niversity o( &olum-ia.
:CD;. :; July /=::. Nwww.$olumbia.eduO
.innis# John. Natural Law and Natural Ri"hts. '9fordG '9ford !niversity 1ress#
/==@.
Ea55aniga# Mi$hael. !uman. 0ew Mor%G Harper &ollins# /==D.
>The global debt $lo$%.? The K$onomist. D 0ovember /=::. Nwww.e$onomist.$omO
>Eross K9ternal DebtG !nited "tates.? The 6orld )an%. D 0ovember /=::.
Nwww.worldban%.orgO
Hammurabi. %he &ode o( !ammura-i. Ama5on Digital "ervi$es# Lindle Kd. Hayden#
1atri$%. &osmopolitan .lo-al Politics. AldershotG Ashgate# /==@.
Haye%# .riedri$h. %he Road to +er(dom. (ondonG Eeorge Routledge and "ons (td#
:;44.
Justinian. %he Institutes. .ordham !niversity. /edieval +ource-oo*. .ordham
!niversity. @3@ &.K. :4 July /=::. Nwww.fordham.eduO
(o$%e# John. %he +econd %reatise o( .overnment and A Letter &oncernin"
%oleration. MineolaG Dover 1uli$ations# /==/.
Ma$han# Tibor. &lassic Individualism. (ondonG Routledge# /==@.
Ma$han# Tibor. Individuals and %heir Ri"hts. (a "alleG 'pen &ourt# :;D;.
Ma$han# Tibor. !uman Ri"hts and !uman Li-erties: A Radical Reconsideration o(
the American Political %ransition. (anhamG !niversity 1ress of Ameri$a# /=::.
Ma$hiavelli# 0i$$olo. %he Prince and 0ther 1ritin"s. 0ew Mor%G )arnes and 0oble
)oo%s# /==4.
Ma$Inyre# Alasidair. Dependant Rational Animals' &hi$agoG 'pen &ourt# :;;;.
/a"na &arta 2%he .reat &harter3. %he &onstitution +ociety. := July /=::.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4@
Mar9# Larl. >'n the Jewish Puestion.? Deutsch4Fran5osische $ahr-ucher. .ebruary#
:D44.
Mar9# Larl and .redri$% Kngels. /ani(esto o( the &ommunist Party. /ar6ist Internet
Archive. /==:. :: July /=::. Nwww.mar9ists.orgO
Mill# John "tewart. 0n Li-erty. Lit$henerG )ato$he )oo%s# /==:.
>MoodyAs $uts JapanAs debt rating on defi$it $on$erns.? ))& 0ews. /4 August /=::.
D 0ovember /=::.
>not guilty by reason of insanity.? The 1eoples (aw Di$tionary. 3= '$tober /=::.
Nwww.law.$omO
0o5i$%# Robert. Anarchy, +tate and ,topia. '9fordG )la$%well 1ublishers (td# :;;;.
0ussbaum# Martha. >Human Rights and Human &apabilities.? !arvard !uman
Ri"hts $ournal. (/= /==C. /:+/4
'A0eill# Daniel7 Mary (yndon7 Iris Moung. Illusion o( &onsent: #n"a"in" with
&arole Pateman. !niversity 1ar%G !niversity of 1ennsylvania 1ress# /==D.
1agden# Anthony. >Human Rights# 0atural Rights# and KuropeAs Imperial (ega$y.?
Political %heory# /==3G :C:+:;@.
1ateman# &arole. %he Pro-lem o( Political 0-li"ation. )er%leyG !niversity of
&alifornia 1ress# :;D@.
>1opulation and natural resour$es.? Atlas of 1opulation and Knvironment. Ameri$an
Asso$iation for the Advan$ement of "$ien$e. D 0ovember /=::.
NhttpG,,atlas.aaas.orgO
Rawls# John. A %heory o( $ustice. &ambridgeG Harvard !niversity 1ress# :;C:.
Regan# Tom. Animal Ri"hts, !uman 1ron"s: An Introduction to /oral Philosophy.
(anhamG Rowman and (ittlefield# /==3.
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4<
Rousseau# Jean Ja$ques. %he +ocial &ontract. ,niversity &olle"e o( &or*.
Nwww.u$$.ieO
"en# Amatya. >Human Rights and &apabilities.? $ournal o( !uman Development. <
(/ /==@. :@:+:<<.
"hue# Henry. )asic Ri"hts: +ustenance, A((luence and ,+ Forei"n Policy. 1rin$etonG
1rin$eton !niversity 1ress# :;D=.
>"omalia Travel "pe$ifi$ Information.? !" Department of "tate. / "eptember# /=::.
NhttpG,,travel.state.govO
"trauss# (eo. Natural Ri"ht and !istory. &hi$agoG !niversity of &hi$ago 1ress# :;@3.
Thoreau# Henry David. >'n the Duty of &ivil Disobedien$e.? &onstitution +ociety.
:D4;. Nwww.$onstitution.orgO
>!niversal De$laration of Human Rights.? ,nited Nations. := De$ember# :;4D. :
.ebruary /==:.
>!" raises spe$tre of $ons$ription.? ))& 0ews. @ 0ovember /==3. C 0ovember
/=::. Nwww.bb$.$o.u%O
>2ietnam 6ar "tatisti$s.? Mobile Riverine .or$e Asso$iation. C 0ovember /=::.
Nwww.mrfa.orgO
>6eimar &onstitution.? .eschichte: P+/4DA%A. :4 August# :;:;. Nwww.5um.deO
Hollady# D-DRA.T 4C

On Contract Limitsr Wer Wer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

On Contract Limitsr Wer Wer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

On Libertarian Argument Limits to Social Contract Bargaining

You might also like