Mind Association

Reply to Goetz
Author(s): Thomas Pink
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 107, No. 425 (Jan., 1998), pp. 215-218
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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Reply to Goetz
THOMAS PINK
According to Goetz, I oppose an Identity thesis about decision and inten-
tion rationality-and I do so by claiming that decisions and intentions are
both means-end justifiable and purposive. Goetz's account of my work is
misleading. He conflates two distinct Identity theses: one about what
rationallyjustifies
forming a particular intention to act, and the other about
how our psychological states motivate us to form a particular intention to
act (see Pink 1996, Ch. 5 and especially p. 142).
The thesis about
justifications,
J-Identity, says that justifications for
now deciding or intending to do A are identical with justifications for
doing A, which consist in turn in the likelihood that doing A would further
desirable ends E. This thesis is opposed to the claim that decisions and
intentions are
means-endjustifiable,
or justified as means to ends, that is,
to the claim that decisions or intentions to do A are justified by the likeli-
hood that now deciding or intending to do A would further desirable ends
E.
The thesis about motives or, as I also term them in the book, reasons,
R-Identity, says that the psychological states that motivate one to intend
to do A are identical with those that would later motivate one to do A,
which consist in turn in desires for ends E and beliefs that doing A would
or might further E. This thesis is opposed to the claim that decisions and
intentions are purposive, or motivated as means to ends, that is, to the
claim that decisions or intentions to doA are motivated by desires for ends
E combined with beliefs that now deciding or intending to do A would or
might further those ends E.
I now claim that, with some important exceptions, decisions and inten-
tions are generally motivated non-purposively. But I do claim that never-
theless decisions and intentions are in every case means-end justifiable. R-
Identity is in most cases true, but J-Identity is in every case false (see Pink
1996, Ch. 8 and especially pp. 231-44; also Pink 1997, pp. 270-75).
Goetz wants to claim that decisions are not means-end justifiable; but
that they are still generally purposive. Let us consider these two claims in
turn.
It is in fact unclear that Goetz really does think that decisions are pur-
posive as I understand purposiveness. For what, in Goetz's view, shows
that decisions are purposive is the fact that:
Mind, Vol. 107. 425 . January 1998 t Oxford University Press 1998
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216 Thomas Pink
[a]s I indicated in the previous paragraph, decisions are made for
reasons. (p. 212)
But this is to fail to understand the term "purposiveness" as I use it: to pick
out those occurrences in our lives which are not only motivated for
which we not only have our reasons-but which are motivated as means
to ends, by beliefs as to what ends those occurrences themselves would or
might further. Someone who thinks, as I do, that R-Identity is generally
true, can accept that decisions and intentions are motivated, and so that we
have our reasons for the decisions we take. But they can consistently deny
that decisions or intentions are generally purposive.
A parallel: desires to do A can be formed for reasons, such as on the
basis of desires for ends E and beliefs about how doing A would further E.
But that doesn't make desires purposive. We don't form desires as means
to ends, on the basis of beliefs about what ends forming those desires
would further.
I argued that decisions and intentions are means-end justifiable, by
appealing to their use as action-coordinators. By deciding and forming
intentions in advance about which actions we shall perform, we settle and
so leave ourselves knowing in advance which actions we shall be perform-
ing in the future. That means that we can coordinate our present actions
with those future actions. Decision making thereby helps ensure that the
actions which we perform in the present and nearer future are justified
given, and so match or are appropriate to, the actions which we will be
performing in the more distant future.
Decisions to act enable us to coordinate our agency through time by set-
tling in advance how we shall be acting. But they only do that if they do
ensure a continuing motivation to act as decided-a motivation which will
persist up to the time for action. Now if the decision to perform a particu-
lar action is not likely enough to ensure a continuing motivation to act as
decided-if for example there's a risk that we might abandon that partic-
ular decision through some subsequent change of mind-then no matter
how desirable the ends furthered by the action in question, it might still
not be rational to decide to perform it. Action-coordinatory justifications
for taking a particular decision depend on that particular decision's effi-
cacy as a reliable motivator of the action decided upon-a consideration
that has to do with ends furthered by taking that particular decision, and
not simply with ends furthered by the action decided upon. So deciding to
perform a particular action A is a means-end justifiable occurrence.
What is Goetz's argument against me? In his view, action-coordinatory
needs justify at best taking a decision one way or the other about whether
to do A. They can never justify particular decisions, such as deciding spe-
cifically to do A. Why so? Suppose it seems that action-coordinatory con-
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Reply to Goetz 217
siderations support deciding to do A in
particular,
on the
grounds that
deciding not to do A is an unreliable action-motivator: there's a risk that
a
decision not to do A might be abandoned
through
a
subsequent change of
mind, so that now deciding not to do A won't of itself settle
very definitely
whether or not the agent will end
up doing
A. In such a
case,
Goetz
claims,
it is always possible to supplement the
inadequate action-determining
powers of a decision not to do A with various forms of self
restraint, such
as getting your friends to prevent you from ever
doing
A: one's
friends
could tie one Ulysses-like to a mast, or otherwise immobilise one. In
which case, each of deciding to do A or-when thus
supplemented-
deciding not to do A, is an equally reliable means of settling future
action,
and so an equally reliable action-coordinator. The question of which deci-
sion is rational can then be settled simply by comparing the justifications
for the actions to be decided between: that is, doing A compared with
restraining-oneself-and-not-doing-A. So the rationality of particular deci-
sions to act can after all be explained in terms of the rationality of the
actions to be decided between, and something like J-Identity is true.
There is a very easy reply to Goetz's argument. There need be no avail-
able supplementary means of self-restraint to render a decision not to do
A as reliable an action-coordinator as its alternative. Pace Goetz, in my
discussion of Dan's case, I didn't "fail to realise" that such means could
be available. I just supposed they weren't available, as they might well not
be. We don't always have friends able and willing to tie us to masts, or oth-
erwise immobilise us against acting on some future change of motivation.
In which case, action-coordinatory considerations will provide some jus-
tification, albeit not necessarily conclusive, for taking the decision which
is the more reliable action-motivator, and so the more reliable action-coor-
dinator.
There is another argument which I produce against J-Identity, and
which Goetz claims to refute. The argument is this. If J-Identity is true,
then any increase in justifications for later doing A-that is, any increase
in the likelihood that doing A would further desirable ends- constitutes
a corresponding increase in one's justification for now intending to do A.
Ex hypothesi, the two sets of justifications are identical. But there are
many cases where the increase in justification for later doing A comes
from the fact that an intention to do A has now been formed. Given that I
now intend to do A, my doing ofA is preplanned and so will likely be pre-
ceded by preparations that will enhance the benefit from doing A. On the
other hand, since my intention is likely to lead to all these preparations,
that increases the likely cost of not doing A (lost deposits, disappointment
etc.). Yet, in such cases, this added justification for doing A surelypresup-
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218 Thomas Pink
poses the fact that the intention to do A is now being held: it doesn't add
to one's justification for now holding it.
Goetz thinks that in such a case there is an increase in my justification
for now intending to do A, just as J-Identity would predict. Granted, he
concedes, I may not have added justification for having by now formed an
intention to do A; but then that's to do with the past, something I've
already done and no longer have the option of not doing, and so not within
the scope of J-Identity as Goetz understands it. But, in Goetz's view, there
is still added justification for my now continuing to intend to do A-some-
thing I do still have the option of not doing.
But suppose, as Goetz suggests, we do clearly understand my "now
intending to do A" as what I still have an option of not doing: my going
on intending, right now, in the wholly immediate future, to do A. Then, I
maintain, it is still false that added justification for later doing A implies
added justification for (in this exact sense) now intending to do A. Given
that I have fonned the intention to do A, and intentions are relatively sta-
ble, I am likely to retain my intention some way into the future and so
sooner or later begin preparing for the doing of A. Hence, as already
explained, my having formed the intention produces an increase in the
likely desirability of doing A. But this increase in my justification for
doing A still presupposes, and so doesn't additionally justify, that right
now, in the immediate future and before I have yet made any preparations,
I do go on intending to do A. Goetz has done nothing to defuse this argu-
ment against J-Identity.
Department of Philosophy THOMAS PINK
King s College London
Strand
London
WC2R 2LS
UK
REFERENCES
Goetz, S. 1998: "Reasons for Forming an Intention: A Reply to Pink".
Mind, 106, pp. 205-13.
Pink, T. 1991: "Purposive intending". Mind, 100, pp 343-59.
Pink, T. 1996: The Psychology of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Pink, T. 1997: "Reason and agency". Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, (please insert volume
number), pp. 263-80.
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