Private Equity Special Report June 2014

SPECIAL COMMENT
CORPORATES JUNE 17, 2014

Table of Contents:
PRIVATE EQUITY DEALS DEFAULT AT A
SIMILAR PACE 2
MEGA-DEALS PERFORMED MUCH
WORSE 4
DEFAULT RATES VARY AMONG PE FIRMS 5
BETTER-PERFORMING COMPANIES
LEVER UP AGAIN VIA DIVIDENDS 8
IPOS AUGUR HIGHER RATINGS 9
PRIVATE EQUITY DEALS GET MORE
DOWNGRADES AND FEWER UPGRADES
IN THE RECOVERY 9
PRIVATE EQUITY DEFAULTS HAVE
SIMILAR FIRM-WIDE ULTIMATE
RECOVERY RATES 12
DEFAULTS LIKELY AHEAD FOR A CORE
GROUP OF WEAK COMPANIES 13
COVENANT-LITE LOANS AND BONDS
WITH WEAK PROTECTIONS 13
EXITS FROM PRE-CRISIS DEALS HAVE
BEEN SLOW 14
APPENDIX A: COMPANIES OWNED BY
THE TOP 14 PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 15
ABBREVIATIONS: 21
MOODYS RELATED RESEARCH 22

Analyst Contacts:
NEW YORK +1.212.553.1653
John Rogers +1.212.553.4481
Senior Vice President
john.rogers@moodys.com
David Keisman +1.212.553.1487
david.keisman@moodys.com
Tom Marshella +1.212.553.4668
Managing Director - US and Amer Corporate Fin
tom.marshella@moodys.com
contacts continued on the last page

US Private Equity - Tracking the Largest Sponsors
Defaults Contained in the Recession
but Downgrades Continue Long After
Ratings trends suggest a modest weakening of credit quality
Private equity deals default at nearly the same rate as a benchmark portfolio of other
US speculative-grade companies. The high leverage common in big US private equity-
backed buyouts prior to the credit crisis did not translate into disproportionately high
default rates over the past six years. From 2008-13, the average annual default rate for
companies backed by the 14 largest private equity firms was 6.0%, compared with 6.4%
for a benchmark portfolio.
1

Mega-deals performed much worse. The average annual default rate for the 10 mega-
deals from the top 14 firms deals involving more than $10 billion of debt was
17.8%
2
from 2008-13, compared with 6.4% for the benchmark portfolio.
Default rates vary among private equity (PE) firms. Portfolio companies of Cerberus
and Apollo had the highest average annual default rates among the top 14 PE firms from
2008-13, while those of Madison Dearborn, KKR, Blackstone and Providence Equity
Partners had the lowest. Although TPG and Providence had low default rates, a large
number of their companies are currently rated B3 with a negative outlook or below, so
their default rates could ultimately increase.
Top 14 private equity firm deals experienced more downgrades than upgrades during
the recovery. Due to the combination of a weak economic recovery and a lax credit
environment, companies owned by the top 14 sponsors received more downgrades than
upgrades from 2010-13. Almost 25% of the firms owned by these sponsors have
underperformed expectations, resulting in downgrades. Others have increased leverage
to finance dividends or acquisitions, limiting any upside to their ratings and leaving
them at greater risk of default in the event of a future tightening of market liquidity.
Private equity defaulters have firm-wide recovery rates similar to those of non-
sponsored defaulters. The high leverage of LBOs, on average, does not translate into
lower investor recoveries in the event of default. We plan to publish more detailed
research on this topic in the near future.

1
All US speculative-grade nonfinancial companies with an estimated senior unsecured rating of B1 or lower, excluding companies owned by the top 14 private equity
firms. The estimated senior unsecured rating is typically one notch below the corporate family rating.
2
This default rate is not controlled for ratings relative to the benchmark portfolio; the differences in default rates are not statistically significant largely due to sample size.
See additional comments in the About this report box on page 2.

CORPORATES
2 JUNE 17, 2014

SPECIAL COMMENT: US PRIVATE EQUITY - TRACKING THE LARGEST SPONSORS
DEFAULTS CONTAINED IN THE RECESSION BUT DOWNGRADES CONTINUE LONG AFTER

About this report
As part of our continuing effort to provide transparency on the behavior of 14 of the largest private
equity firms
3
and the performance of the companies they own, we have analyzed 336 companies from
2008-13. One hundred eighty eight of these deals were structured in the bubble years prior to the
financial crisis (2004-07) and were still owned by private equity sponsors at the start of 2008. The
remaining 148 transactions were initially rated over the past six years. Our analysis focuses on the
default and ratings performance of these deals and compares them to a benchmark portfolio
4
.We also
comment on how the low interest rate environment and investors willingness to accept minimal
covenants in the debt they purchase has affected ratings and defaults over this timeframe. In this
report, we outline the major conclusions from our analysis. Appendix A contains a list of the
companies included in this analysis.
On average, each of the of the top 14 private equity firms has 24 companies in this study. Given the
small sample size, differences in each companys initial rating, differences in the time span of each deal,
as well as the studys short time frame (2008-13), it is extremely difficult to generate data that can be
deemed statistically significant to any reasonably high threshold (a 95% confidence interval or a t-
statistic of 2.0 or greater). This is especially true for smaller groupings like the mega-deals, where even
an 11 percentage point differential in the default rate versus the benchmark portfolio is not statistically
significant. To determine statistical significance, we used a standard regression analysis using monthly
data and controlled for the companys rating. (This is important because the average rating of the
companies in this study is lower than the average rating for high yield companies.)
Nevertheless, differences between the performance of these firms and the benchmark portfolio appear
to be reasonable and consistent with the behaviors we have observed. We also place greater emphasis
on the performance of these firms relative to each other, as each firm is responsible for structuring the
deals it participates in, irrespective of the ratings we assign.
Private equity deals default at a similar pace
Despite the high leverage associated with private equity-backed US corporate buyouts prior to the
credit crisis, companies owned by the top 14 private equity firms have defaulted at nearly the same
pace as a benchmark portfolio over the past six years. During 2008-13, the annual default rate
5
for
companies backed by these top 14 private equity firms was 6.0%, compared with 6.4% for the
benchmark portfolio. There were 55 defaults among companies owned by the top 14 firms, of which
37, or 67%, occurred during 2008-09, while the remaining 18 occurred during 2010-13. Nearly all of
the defaults (53 of 55) occurred among the 188 companies structured during the bubble years prior to
the financial crisis.

3
In 2008, we examined companies that were financed during 2004-07 and were owned by private equity sponsors. We then ranked the private equity firms by the
amount of their Moodys-rated debt. These 14 firms were the largest and there was a substantial drop-off in the rated debt for next largest sponsor. As a result, we
limited our analysis to the 14 largest firms.
4
The benchmark portfolio consists of all US speculative-grade nonfinancial companies with an estimated senior unsecured rating of B1 or lower, excluding companies
owned by the top 14 private equity firms. The estimated senior unsecured rating is typically one notch below the corporate family rating. Companies owned by these 14
firms comprise roughly 15% of all companies rated B1 or below.
5
Unless noted otherwise, average annual default rates refer to trailing 12-month default rates calculated using monthly ratings data and adjusted for rating withdrawals.
See Measuring Corporate Default Rates, November 2006.
This publication does not announce
a credit rating action. For any
credit ratings referenced in this
publication, please see the ratings
tab on the issuer/entity page on
www.moodys.com for the most
updated credit rating action
information and rating history.

CORPORATES
3 JUNE 17, 2014


Covenant-lite loan structures, low interest rates and the availability of credit enabled these private
equity sponsors to delay bankruptcy or out-of-court restructuring for some of their sponsored
companies during the recession, which pushed some of the defaults into the subsequent years. Of the
18 companies that defaulted during 2010-13, only two were initially rated after 2009.
Taking a closer look at the recession period 2008-09, it would have been reasonable to assume a high
default rate for LBO companies owing to their high leverage. Were it not for covenant-lite loans, we
believe the default rate for companies owned by the top 14 private equity sponsors likely would have
been higher. But among companies owned by these private equity sponsors, the average annual default
rate in 2008-09 was 12.8%. This was slightly better than the 13.9% default rate for the benchmark
portfolio. While these default rates are high by historical standards for US non-financial companies,
the similarity between the two default rates suggests that private equity involvement has not put
sponsored companies at greater risk of default relative to similarly rated companies.
When we calculated the default rates by whole-letter rating category for the period 2008-09, the
differences were larger, with the benchmark portfolio having a lower default rate than companies
owned by the top 14 PE firms in the B-category and higher rates for the Caa-category (see Exhibit 1,
below). However, regression analysis indicates that these differences in default rates are not statistically
significant. Nevertheless, a higher default rate in the B-category for companies owned by these top 14
PE firms would be consistent with more aggressive use of distressed exchanges, while the lower default
rate in the Caa-category would be consistent with greater use of covenant-lite loans by the PE firms to
help their lower-rated companies survive through the recession. We are undertaking additional
research on LBO defaults to determine if the empirical data supports these suppositions.
During the recovery period, 2010-13, the average annual default rate for companies owned by these 14
firms and rated B1 or below declined to 3.1%, which is equivalent to the 3.3% rate for the benchmark
portfolio. Again, we believe that these large firms have taken advantage of the lax credit environment
to keep all but the weakest companies afloat. The market has been searching for yield over the past
three years, which has allowed these companies to refinance maturing obligations despite, in some
cases, extremely weak credit metrics. For example, Momentive Performance Materials LLC (ratings
withdrawn) was able to refinance its entire capital structure in 2012 and 2013, despite total
debt/EBITDA of over 12x throughout that period. Momentive filed for bankruptcy protection in
April 2014. The same is true for Energy Future Holdings Corp. (ratings withdrawn), which also filed
for bankruptcy in April 2014. Other companies owned by these 14 PE firms have been able to
refinance their debt and avoid default despite being rated Caa1 or below.
During the six-year period 2008-13, the annualized and cumulative default rates for companies owned
by the top 14 PE firms are very similar to those for the benchmark portfolio. Larger differences in the
default rate by rating category are also noted. This data is summarized in Exhibit 1.
EXHIBIT 1
Average Annual Default Rates*
Top 14 PE Firms versus Benchmark**
2008-09 2010-13 2008-13
Rating*** Benchmark Top 14 Benchmark Top 14 Benchmark Top 14
B 5.5% 8.7% 0.5% 0.1% 1.8% 2.6%
Caa-C 31.9% 18.3% 9.8% 6.5% 16.4% 9.9%
B1 or below 13.9% 12.8% 3.3% 3.1% 6.4% 6.0%
Notes:
*Average annual default rates using monthly data for ratings and withdrawals; **All US speculative grade nonfinancial issues rated B1 and below
excluding companies owned by the top 14 PE firms;**Estimated senior unsecured rating, typically one notch below the corporate family rating.
Source: Moodys Investors Service

CORPORATES
4 JUNE 17, 2014


What is a default?
Moodys declaration of a default for a corporate issuer can be triggered by one of three events:
a. a failure to make an interest or principal payment within the grace period allowed under the
debt agreement or indenture;
b. a bankruptcy filing or legal receivership by the obligor that will likely cause an interruption
or delay in future interest or principal payments; or
c. a distressed exchange where creditors are offered restructured debt, new debt or a package of
securities (combination of cash, debt or assets) that materially diminishes the value of the
original obligation, and where the execution of this exchange allows the obligor to avoid a
bankruptcy or a future payment default.

In addition, companies can have several defaults (missed payments or distressed exchanges) before
eventually filing for or winding up in bankruptcy, liquidation or in an out-of-court restructuring. We
use the first such event as the default date for that company. For example, if a company has a payment
default or distressed exchange in 2009 and files for bankruptcy in 2010, we would define it as having
defaulted in 2009 and only include it with companies that have defaulted in 2009 and not with those
that defaulted in 2010.
Mega-deals performed much worse
While default rates for companies owned by the top 14 sponsors have been in line with those of
similarly rated companies, they have been higher for the larger top 14 PE-backed deals that were
initiated prior to the financial crisis when valuations were elevated and leverage in the capital structure
was high. Specifically, we examined 10 mega-deals, each involving more than $10 billion of debt and
whose ownership typically included more than one of the largest 14 PE firms. These mega-deals have
defaulted at an average annual rate of 17.8% (50% cumulative rate), compared with 6.4% for the
benchmark portfolio, over the past six years. Of the five mega-deal companies that defaulted, Chrysler
went through bankruptcy, Energy Future Holdings Corp. recently filed for bankruptcy, Caesars
Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. (Caa3 negative) is executing internal asset sales so that one
or more parts may survive, Clear Channel Communications Inc. (Caa3 negative) remains highly
leveraged and we believe its capital structure is unsustainable and Freescale Semiconductor Inc. (B2
stable) has recovered after a distressed exchange that eliminated a significant portion of its debt. We
have not found a similar relationship between size and default frequency for non-LBO companies.
During the recovery (2010-13), only four rated LBO transactions exceeded $5 billion in debt. These
deals Charter Communications Inc. (Ba3 stable; 2010), Hilton Worldwide Finance LLC (B1 stable;
2013), Samson Investment Company (B1 stable; 2011) and BMC Software Finance Inc. (B3 stable;
2013) continue to perform well. However, we note that BMC was recently downgraded to B3 after
its sponsor took a large debt financed dividend in April 2014.
Several of the 10 pre-crisis mega-deals performed quite well during the recession, despite their leverage.
Alltel Communications Inc. (ratings withdrawn) and HCA Holdings Inc. (B1 positive) were not
downgraded in 2008 or 2009. Alltel was sold to a strategic buyer in 2009 and HCA was upgraded to
B1 a few months after its IPO in 2011. Hertz Corp. (B1 stable), First Data Corp. (B3 stable) and
Univision Communications Inc. (B3 stable) were negatively affected during the recession, but avoided
falling into distress. Univision and First Data continue to be rated B3 due to high leverage.

CORPORATES
5 JUNE 17, 2014


Default rates vary among PE firms
Not all of the 14 private equity firms exhibited similar default rates. In 2008-13, portfolio companies
of Cerberus, Apollo and TH Lee had the highest average annual default rates among the 14 firms,
while those of Madison Dearborn, KKR, Providence Equity Partners and Blackstone had the lowest.
During the recession, Apollo and TH Lee had the highest default rate by a wide margin, while
Cerberus and Welsh Carson had the highest default rate by far during the recovery.
EXHIBIT 2
Average annual Default Rate for The Top 14 Firms
Ranked by 2008-13 Default Rate
Top 14 Sponsors 2008-09 2010-13 2008-13
Cerberus 18.7% 16.4% 15.9%
Apollo 32.0% 4.5% 12.9%
TH Lee 26.6% 0.0% 7.8%
Warburg 8.1% 2.6% 6.6%
Welsh Carson 0.0% 11.4% 6.2%
Bain 15.3% 2.8% 6.1%
Average 12.8% 3.1% 6.0%
Goldman Sachs 17.6% 1.4% 5.6%
Carlyle 9.9% 3.1% 5.3%
JPMorgan 0.0% 8.7% 5.0%
TPG 10.1% 1.8% 3.8%
Blackstone 8.8% 1.3% 3.1%
Providence 10.7% 0.0% 3.1%
KKR 3.0% 2.6% 2.9%
Madison Dearborn 4.8% 0.0% 1.5%

The vast majority of defaults (53 of 55) occurred among the deals structured prior to the financial
crisis. Therefore, in Exhibit 3 on the next page, we focus on the default rate for these firms, including
only the 188 companies they bought before the crisis. The table shows the number of transactions for
each firm, the number of defaults and the number of companies still rated B3 negative or lower.
We expect that some of these low-rated companies may eventually default, raising the sponsors
ultimate default rate. This analysis does not factor in ratings, because we wanted to focus on the
behavior of each sponsor. We believe these large sponsors establish the capital structures of their
companies based on what the markets will bear, not on the ratings we assign. Hence, this analysis is
a better indicator of the aggressiveness of each firm.
Apollo and Cerberus have the highest percentage of companies that have had a default, well above the
other 12 firms. For Apollo, when you include the low-rated companies, the rate rises above 85%. TH
Lee, Bain and Warburg Pincus are also above the average. However, including low-rated companies
does not change their relative ranking. TPG and Providence are the only firms below the average
where including low-rated companies significantly changes their rankings. KKR and Madison
Dearborn are the firms with the lowest percentage of companies that have had a default by a wide
margin.

CORPORATES
6 JUNE 17, 2014


EXHIBIT 3
Rates of Default and Low-Rated Companies by PE Firm
Deals Structured Prior to the Financial Crisis
PE Firm Deals Defaults Low Rated Defaults
Defaults &
Low Rated
Apollo 21 12 6 57% 86%
Cerberus 6 3 0 50% 50%
TH Lee 13 5 1 38% 46%
Bain 23 7 2 30% 39%
Warburg Pincus 14 4 1 29% 36%
JP Morgan 8 2 1 25% 38%
Goldman Sachs 21 5 2 24% 33%
Welsh Carson 13 3 0 23% 23%
Carlyle 32 7 0 22% 22%
TPG 20 4 4 20% 40%
Providence Equity 11 2 2 18% 36%
Blackstone 23 4 1 17% 22%
Madison Dearborn 9 1 0 11% 11%
KKR & Co 20 2 1 10% 15%
Eliminations* (46) (8) (4)
Total 188 53 17 28% 37%
*Eliminations due to multiple firms involved in the same transaction

Included in the defaults above are some distressed exchanges that involved a small portion of the
outstanding debt (less than 10%), and the companys rating has subsequently gone above B3 (i.e., the
chance of default is now much lower). These small distressed exchanges resulted in unusually high
recovery rates (greater than 95%) for debtholders and were excluded from the Ultimate Recovery
Database (URD).
6
Of the 53 defaults among the top 14 firms, seven companies had distressed
exchanges with very high recoveries and their ratings subsequently improved. These seven companies
were concentrated among three firms: Apollo had four (Berry Plastics, Noranda Aluminum, Quality
Distribution and RBS Global); Bain had two (Bloomin Brands and Sensata Technologies); and Welsh
Carson had one (Ozburn-Hessey Holding Company).
Exhibit 4, below, adjusts the default rates in the prior chart to exclude these seven companies. While
Apollos ranking falls, it remains among the top three firms in terms of percentage of defaults. Bains
drops below the average, while JP Morgans and Goldman Sachs rise above as the average is lower
(24% versus 29% previously). Finally, Welsh Carson falls much closer to Madison Dearborn and
KKR.

6
Moodys Ultimate Recovery Database includes more than 1,000 defaults from 1988 through the present, but only includes companies for which there is sufficient public
information to estimate a recovery rate for debtholders.

CORPORATES
7 JUNE 17, 2014


EXHIBIT 4
Adjusted Defaults and Low-Rated Companies by Private Equity Firm
Deals Structured Prior to the Financial Crisis
Private Equity Firm Deals Defaults
High Recovery
DEs
Adj.
Defaults
Defaults
(%)
Low
Rated
Defaults &
Low Rated (%)
Cerberus 6 3 0 3 50% 0 50%
TH Lee 13 5 0 5 38% 1 46%
Apollo 21 12 (4) 8 38% 6 67%
Warburg Pincus 14 4 0 4 29% 1 36%
JP Morgan 8 2 0 2 25% 1 38%
Goldman Sachs 21 5 0 5 24% 2 33%
Carlyle 32 7 0 7 22% 0 22%
Bain 23 7 (2) 5 22% 2 30%
TPG 20 4 0 4 20% 4 40%
Providence Equity 11 2 0 2 18% 2 36%
Blackstone 23 4 0 4 17% 1 22%
Welsh Carson 13 3 (1) 2 15% 0 15%
Madison Dearborn 9 1 0 1 11% 0 11%
KKR & Co 20 2 0 2 10% 1 15%
Eliminations* (46) (8) 0 (8) (4)
Total 188 53 (7) 46 24% 17 34%

We also note that these 14 firms were very active in pursuing distressed exchanges from 2008-13,
accounting for 20 of the 30 LBO distressed exchanges that occurred. During the recession, LBO
defaults showed a large increase in the percentage of pre-packaged bankruptcies and distressed
exchanges. However, when you exclude the top 14 firms, the remaining LBOs did not exhibit any
increase in the percentage of distressed exchanges, as shown in Exhibit 5. These top 14 firms have
continued to pursue distressed exchanges during the recovery; distressed exchanges have accounted for
a third of all their defaults. Distressed exchanges enabled these firms to reduce debt while retaining all,
or the majority of, their equity in a company. We note that the URD includes only 44 of the 55
defaults in our study, as it excludes high recovery distressed exchanges and other defaults where there
was insufficient public information to determine a recovery value for all debtholders.
EXHIBIT 5
Default by Type for Top 14, LBOs and Non-LBOs

1988 - Present
All LBOs except Top 14 Sponsors

Top 14 Sponsors

2008-09

2010-13

2008-09

2010-13
LBOs

Non
LBO's

Defaults

% of
Total

Defaults

% of
Total

Defaults

% of
Total

Defaults

% of
Total
Regular Bankruptcy 44% 64% 17 37% 8 38% 7 22% 3 25%
Prepackaged Bankruptcy 35% 20% 21 46% 11 52% 9 28% 5 42%
Distressed Exchange 21% 16% 8 17% 2 10% 16 50% 4 33%
Total 46 21 32 12

Notes: Data taken from the Ultimate Recovery Database, which includes information on over 1,000 defaults from 1988 to the present. The URD only
includes companies for which there is sufficient public information to assess a recovery value for all debtholders and excludes distressed exchanges
where there is greater than a 95% recovery value.

CORPORATES
8 JUNE 17, 2014


Better-performing companies lever up again via dividends
The lax credit environment during 2010-13 resulted in a large number of dividends by companies
owned by the top 14 PE firms. Thirty-seven, or 27%, of the 135 companies owned by these firms that
we initially rated after the recession (2010-13) have since taken dividends. This is higher than during
the bubble era of 2004-07, when less than 24% of the companies owned by these PE firms issued
dividends. When the analysis is expanded to include all 303 companies owned by these firms during
2010-13, 69 of these companies issued dividends.
Among the top 14 PE firms, five took dividends in a third or more of their deals: Goldman Sachs,
Bain, TH Lee, Welsh Carson and Warburg Pincus. Prior to the financial crisis, the top five firms that
took the highest percentage of dividends were Welsh Carson, Providence Equity, TH Lee, Cerberus
and Apollo. While some names remain the same, Apollo had the biggest change in ranking, falling
from the top five pre-crisis to the most conservative with regard to dividends during 2010-13. While
this may be partly due to the large number of low-rated companies Apollo was managing in the post-
crisis timeframe, clearly the firm was being less aggressive in terms of dividends. However, when Apollo
did take dividends, in three of the four deals it did so within one year of the initial rating.
Bain and TH Lee had the most aggressive dividend policies during the recovery, as they had the largest
percentage of dividend deals and a large number of deals where at least 75% of the initial equity was
taken out. Of course, the ability to extract dividends is affected by the underlying performance of the
sponsored issuers, so a higher dividend rate may be indicative of strong performance at certain
sponsored companies.
EXHIBIT 6
Dividends by PE Firm from 2010-13
PE Firm Deals Dividends
(1)

Dividend
Deals (%)
Large
Dividends
(2)

Large
Dividends (%)
Dividends
< 1 yr
(3)

Dividends
< 1 yr (%)
Goldman Sachs 28 11 39% 2 18% 2 18%
Bain 35 13 37% 5 38% 1 8%
TH Lee 19 7 37% 2 29% 0 0%
Welsh Carson 15 5 33% 1 20% 0 0%
Warburg Pincus 24 8 33% 0 0% 2 25%
TPG 40 10 25% 3 30% 1 10%
Carlyle 43 10 23% 5 50% 3 30%
Cerberus 9 2 22% 1 50% 1 50%
Blackstone 34 7 21% 2 29% 1 14%
Madison Dearborn 16 3 19% 1 33% 1 33%
JP Morgan 12 2 17% 1 50% 0 0%
Providence Equity 18 3 17% 0 0% 1 33%
KKR & Co 31 5 16% 2 40% 0 0%
Apollo 36 4 11% 1 25% 3 75%
Eliminations
(4)
(57) (21) (5) (2)
Total 303 69 23% 21 30% 14 20%
Notes: 1. Refers to the number of deals where dividends were financed with additional debt; several of these firms took more than one dividend;
2. Cumulative dividends amounted to more than 75% of the initial equity used to finance the deal; 3. Debt-financed dividend within 1 year of the
initial rating; 4. Eliminations due to multiple firms involved in the same transaction

CORPORATES
9 JUNE 17, 2014


Since most dividends were paid following the recession when default rates were low and companies
were performing well, the top 14 private equity-backed companies that took out dividends had a
relatively low cumulative default rate over the past six years. PE-backed companies that provided
dividends to their sponsors defaulted at a 6% cumulative rate over the past six years, much lower than
the 35% rate for the benchmark portfolio. Even including companies that issued dividends prior to the
financial crisis, only five have defaulted.
This lower default rate makes sense. Companies that are capable of paying dividends to equity holders
typically have performed well and these dividends were paid when default rates were low. However,
these dividends are usually funded with debt, increasing leverage, which could put the company at
greater risk of default in the event of an economic downturn or other exogenous event that negatively
affects its performance for a sustained period.
Another possible contributor to the high rate of debt-financed dividends is an increase in private
equity ownership periods, which is the time that a PE firm holds a portfolio company before exiting
through a sale or IPO. In lieu of realizing a return through an exit, many PE firms extracted returns
through dividends, perhaps waiting for higher exit valuations.
There were more than a dozen debt-financed dividends after the sponsor had sold off a portion of the
company via an IPO. In the past, this type of dividend was unusual due to the leakage, or the
proportion of cash that did not go to the PE firm or its associates in the initial deal.
IPOs augur higher ratings
IPOs are typically considered credit positive for LBOs, but they do not often result in a rating change
because proceeds can bypass the company and go directly to the sponsor or sponsors. In some
instances, IPO proceeds are used to repay debt, which can result in an upgrade. In 2010-13, only 11 of
63 upgrades of PE-owned companies, or 17%, were the direct result of an IPO or had an IPO cited as
a factor contributing to the upgrade.
Nevertheless, of the 78 PE-backed companies in our sample that have had IPOs, more than 60% are
rated more highly today than they were prior to their IPOs. The majority of these upgrades occurred
within a year or two after the IPO, as the company continued to perform well and repaid debt.
These 78 companies also exhibited a lower probability of default after completing their IPOs. Of the
78, only one defaulted after its IPO: SemGroup L.P. (rating withdrawn). However, two of the 78 are
rated B3 negative or lower, indicating an elevated probability of default: Caesars Entertainment
Operating Company, Inc. (Caa3 negative) and Education Management LLC (Caa1 stable).
Private equity deals get more downgrades
7
and fewer upgrades in the recovery
While private equity firms have managed to keep default rates for sponsored companies in line with
those of the benchmark portfolio, rating trends for these sponsored companies suggest a modest
weakening of credit quality during the recovery. In the weak economic recovery and lax credit
environment of the past few years, a number of sponsor-owned companies have underperformed
expectations or increased leverage to finance dividends or acquisitions, limiting any upside to their

7
Downgrades and upgrades refer to changes in the corporate family rating only.

CORPORATES
10 JUNE 17, 2014


ratings and leaving them at greater risk of default in the event of a future tightening of market
liquidity.
When we examine all the companies owned by the top 14 PE firms that were rated during 2010-13,
the number of downgrades is actually greater than the number of upgrades. The vast majority of these
downgrades were due to sponsored companies failing to meet expectations for improving financial
performance. This increase in the number of downgrades mostly affected deals initially rated in the
2010-12 period, as deals rated prior to 2010 actually saw more upgrades than downgrades (see analysis
versus the benchmark portfolio, below). None of the deals initially rated in 2013 were upgraded or
downgraded.
The table below shows the number of upgrades and downgrades for each PE firm in 2010-13 and for
the earlier 2008-09 period. We think this is more helpful as the data for 2010-13 shows a greater
variation in performance by firm. In the 2008-09 period, the downgrade rates are consistent with the
firms showing the highest default rates in the first section of this report. Some firms like Apollo,
Carlyle and Bain, whose companies had a large number of downgrades during the recession, received a
large number of upgrades in the recovery; others, like Cerberus, Goldman Sachs and TPG, did not.
PE firms that did not get a large number of downgrades in the recession also saw fewer upgrades
during the recovery.
Apollo saw almost three times more upgrades than downgrades (its up/down ratio was 2.8x) and
Madison Dearborn saw two times more upgrades than downgrades. These two firms ratios were
substantially higher than those of Providence, Goldman, Cerberus, KKR and TPG, which had the
lowest upgrade to downgrade ratios. The downgrades of companies owned by these firms were for the
most part triggered by weaker-than-anticipated performance during the recovery (Providence and
Cerberus, 100%; KKR, 85%; Goldman, 80%; TPG; 69%). TPG saw the highest number of
downgrades related to dividends (3). For all 14 firms, the reasons for downgrades during the recovery
were as follows: 81% due to performance, 16% due to dividends and 3% related to acquisitions.
During the recession, the firms that had the majority of their companies downgraded were Apollo,
Cerberus and Carlyle. Three of the four firms with the highest percentage of downgrades also had the
highest percentage of defaults.
8
Carlyle, along with TPG and Madison Dearborn, were unusual in that
they had a relatively high percentage of downgrades, but much lower percentages of defaults.

8
Per Exhibit 3

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EXHIBIT 7
Ratings Migration by PE Firm
From 2010-13 and From 2008-09
PE Firm
Ratings Movement 2010-13
Deals UP DOWN Up/Down Ratio
Apollo 36 14 5 2.8
Madison Dearborn 16 2 1 2.0
Bain 35 11 6 1.8
TH Lee 19 3 2 1.5
Warburg Pincus 24 7 5 1.4
Carlyle 43 13 10 1.3
Blackstone 34 8 7 1.1
JP Morgan 12 3 4 0.8
Welsh Carson 15 2 3 0.7
TPG 40 7 12 0.6
KKR & Co 31 4 7 0.6
Cerberus 9 1 2 0.5
Goldman Sachs 28 5 10 0.5
Providence Equity 18 2 5 0.4
Total 303 64 73 0.9
PE Firm
Ratings Movement 2008-09
Deals UP DOWN % Down
Apollo 22 - 16 73%
Cerberus 6 2 4 67%
Carlyle 33 2 18 55%
Bain 25 3 12 48%
Goldman Sachs 22 2 10 45%
TPG 20 1 9 45%
Madison Dearborn 9 - 4 44%
TH Lee 14 - 6 43%
JP Morgan 9 - 3 33%
Providence Equity 12 2 4 33%
Warburg Pincus 15 - 5 33%
Blackstone 27 1 7 26%
KKR & Co 21 3 5 24%
Welsh Carson 13 - 3 23%
Total 200 14 86 43%

We also examined the performance of these sponsored companies against the benchmark portfolio. For
this analysis, we had to examine how the ratings of a specific set of companies evolved from 1 January
2010 through the end of 2013. Of the 337 companies in our study, 150 were rated on 1 January
2010; in the benchmark portfolio, 784 companies were rated on that date. As shown in Exhibit 8,

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12 JUNE 17, 2014


below, the downgrade rate for the sponsored companies was 27%, slightly higher
9
than the 23% rate
for the benchmark portfolio. Similarly, 29% of sponsored companies were upgraded during 2010-13,
compared with 34%
9
for the benchmark portfolio. Consequently, sponsored firms have had a much
lower measured net upgrade rate (11% versus 2%). One reason upgrades are limited among sponsored
companies is that the potential for acquisitions or dividend payouts to shareholders tends to cap our
ratings on companies owned by these firms at B1 or Ba3 until there is an IPO.
A similar comparison during the recession showed that the rates for these sponsors firms and the
benchmark portfolio were very close,
9
with a 44% downgrade rate for the sponsored firms versus 43%
for the benchmark portfolio, and an upgrade rate of just 8% for these sponsored firms compared with
12% for the benchmark portfolio. During both periods (2008-09 and 2010-13), the majority of the
upgrades and downgrades were due to changes in financial performance and not events such as
dividends, acquisitions or IPOs.
EXHIBIT 8
Ratings Migrations for Top 14 PE Firms Versus the Benchmark Portfolio

2008-09

No. of
Companies
Downgrades

Upgrades

Up/Down Ratio

Number

%

Number

%

Benchmark Portfolio 985

423

42.9%

115

11.7%

0.3
Top 14 PE Firms 181

79

43.6%

15

8.3%

0.2

2010-13

No. of
Companies
Downgrades

Upgrades

Up/Down Ratio

Number

%

Number

%

Benchmark Portfolio 784

183

23.3%

263

33.5%

1.4
Top 14 PE Firms 150

40

26.7%

43

28.7%

1.1
Private equity defaults have similar firm-wide ultimate recovery rates
As we have shown in prior research,
10
there is no correlation between firm-wide ultimate recovery rates
and a firms leverage prior to default. Our research shows that the high leverage of LBOs, on average,
does not translate into significantly lower investor recoveries in the event of default. LBOs have
exhibited a greater use of prepackaged bankruptcies and a slightly higher use of distressed exchanges.
Prepackaged bankruptcies have a slightly higher firm-wide recovery rate than do regular bankruptcies,
which offsets the slightly lower firm-wide recoveries for LBOs in regular bankruptcies. Distressed
exchanges have higher firm-wide recovery rates than do prepackaged or regular bankruptcies; however,
companies may experience multiple distressed exchanges before ultimately filing for bankruptcy (e.g.,
Energy Futures Holding Corp.). In these cases, firm-wide recoveries may actually end up significantly
lower.

9
While these rates are different, the differences are not statistically significant using a 95% confidence interval (t-statistic of over 2.0).
10
See Lessons from 200 LBO Defaults, June 2012.

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Moodys follows these subsequent defaults and has published prior research on this topic.
11
According
to an updated data-set of defaulted LBOs, which we will discuss in more detail in an upcoming special
comment, 224 defaulted LBOs had an average firm-wide recovery rate of 55.2%, compared with
54.7% for 822 defaulted non-LBOs from 1988 through the first quarter of 2014.
Defaults likely ahead for a core group of weak companies
For some sponsored companies, distressed exchanges bought time to strengthen balance sheets and
boost credit quality enough to receive rating upgrades, and they remain on solid ground. Others that
completed a distressed exchange during the financial crisis eventually filed for bankruptcy or had a
follow-on distressed exchange. A smaller group of companies continue to operate with very weak credit
metrics and many have capital structures that we view as unsustainable. We expect most of these
companies to file for bankruptcy or restructure over the next two to four years, barring a major
economic upturn that would allow them to generate meaningful organic growth.
To date, these weaker companies have been unable to generate sustainable positive earnings or cash
flow. However, they have stayed afloat through covenant-lite structures that have limited creditors
ability to intervene and with the aid of liquidity that yield-hungry investors have poured into the high-
yield bond and loan markets. These conditions will not remain in place indefinitely.
These companies have spent most of the past five years with deeply speculative-grade corporate family
ratings of Caa1 or below. Companies in this category include mega-deals Clear Channel and Caesars,
as well as Builders FirstSource Inc. (Caa1 stable). We note that EFH and Momentive Performance
Materials, which were part of this group, both filed for bankruptcy protection in April. Two of these
companies (Caesars and Clear Channel) have undertaken distressed exchanges that have lowered their
outstanding debt. We treated these distressed exchanges as default events, but the private equity
sponsor remains in control of the company. Travelport (Caa1 stable) and Guitar Center (B3, stable)
were also part of this group, but in 2014, they both had distressed exchanges that greatly reduced the
sponsors ownership and resulted in a ratings upgrade.
In some cases, sponsors have provided meaningful capital infusions that have been used to facilitate
acquisitions (Expert Global Solutions, McJunkin Red Man, Packaging Dynamics Corp. and Lorado
Petroleum) or reduce debt (Trinseo and Frontier Drilling), but most capital infusions have been made
to avoid covenant violations.
Covenant-lite loans and bonds with weak protections
Covenant-lite loans enabled many sponsored firms to survive the recession because they could greatly
underperform projections without financial penalty or intervention by creditors. The larger buyout
deals were more likely to include covenant-lite loans in their financing, leaving creditors with fewer
protections for their investments in highly leveraged companies. Apollo and TPG had the largest
number of covenant-lite loans in our study.
Similarly, many of the sponsored companies issued bonds with weak investor protections. Our
covenant quality (CQ) scores, which assess the strength of bond covenants, tend to be weaker for
bonds issued by the portfolio companies of the larger PE firms, compared with those issued by
companies owned by the smaller PE firms. Goldman and TH Lee tended to have the strongest CQ

11
See Lessons from 25 Years of Chapter 22 LBO Defaults, November 2012.

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scores during the 2011-2013 period with average scores below 3.5, whereas Cerberus, Bain, KKR,
Blackstone and TPG had the weakest, with average scores above 4.0. The CQ scores are presented on a
five-point scale, with 5.0 denoting the weakest investor protections and 1.0, the strongest.
EXHIBIT 9
Average CQ Scores by Top 14 Private Equity Sponsors
PE Firm 2011 2012 2013
Historical Avg
(Jan. '11 to date)
Cerberus NA 4.31 NA 4.31
Bain 4.14 4.24 3.86 4.10
KKR 3.99 4.19 3.94 4.03
Blackstone 3.79 3.96 4.33 4.01
TPG 3.86 3.93 4.19 4.00
Carlyle 4.15 4.01 3.88 3.99
Apollo 3.95 3.87 3.90 3.90
Welsh Carson NA NA 3.83 3.83
Providence Equity Partners 3.38 NA 3.85 3.77
JP Morgan 3.88 3.65 3.82 3.76
Warburg Pincus 3.38 3.32 3.86 3.63
Madison Dearborn 3.46 3.73 NA 3.62
Average for All PE Sponsored Deals 3.41 3.59 3.79 3.61
Goldman Sachs 3.25 3.58 3.30 3.45
TH Lee 3.25 3.37 3.45 3.37
"NA" indicates that there are no CQ scores for that particular PE Sponsor and year.
Source: Moody's High-Yield Covenant Database
Exits from pre-crisis deals have been slow
Of the 190 pre-crisis deals in our study, roughly 40% are still owned by their original sponsor. This
reflects many deals that experienced some distress during the recession and have been slow to recover,
limiting options for an IPO or sale. For deals where the private equity firm was able to exit, roughly
half were sold to a strategic buyer, roughly 30% had initial public offerings and 20% were sold to
another PE firm in a secondary buyout. The number of exits via secondary buyouts has increased
significantly in the past two years. This is also true for newly-rated deals. In 2012 and 2013, more than
40% of the newly-rated deals sponsored by the top 14 PE firms were secondary buyouts (SBOs). This
is up from less than 20% in 2010 and 2011.

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Appendix A: Companies Owned by the Top 14 Private Equity Firms

Company Name Sponsor(s) Date
Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
Pre Crisis Deals (Deals structured prior to 1/1/2008)
1 3217920 Nova Scotia Co. GS Capital, EdgeStone Capital 7/07 B2 Caa2 12/08 D E (12/08)
2 Accellent Inc. KKR, Bain Capital 11/05 B2 B3 10/10 Still Owned
3 Aeroflex Inc Golden Gate; GS Capital; Veritas 9/07 B3 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
4 Affinion Group, Inc Apollo 10/05 B2 Caa2 12/13 Still Owned; DE (12/13)
5 AGA Medical Welsh Carson 4/06 B2 B3 11/10 Sold to Strategic
6 Aleris International, Inc. TPG 12/06 B2 Caa3 2/09 Chapter 11 (2/09)
7 Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc. KKR 10/99 B1 B1 11/09 Sold to PE
8 Allison Transmission, Inc Carlyle, Onex 7/07 B2 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
9 Alltel Communications TPG Inc., GS Capital 11/07 B2 B2 1/09 Sold to Strategic
10 Altegrity Providence Equity 9/07 B3 Caa2 12/13 Still Owned
11 ARAMARK Corp. GS Cap. , JP Morgan, TH Lee, Warburg Pincus 1/07 B1 B1 9/13 Exiting via IPO
12 Arinc Inc. Carlyle 11/07 B3 B2 8/13 Sold to Strategic
13 Astoria Generating Co. Madison Dearborn, US Power Generating Co 2/06 B1 B2 12/13 Still Owned
14 Avago Technologies Finance Pte. Ltd. KKR, Silver Lake 11/05 B2 Baa3 10/11 Exited via IPO
15 Avaya, Inc. Silver Lake, TPG 10/07 B2 B3 12/13 Exiting via IPO
16 AxleTech International Carlyle 10/05 B2 B2 1/09 Sold to Strategic
17 Bausch & Lomb Inc. Warburg Pincus 10/07 B2 B2 11/13 Debt Repaid
18 Berry Plastics Corp. Apollo, Graham Partners 6/06 B1 B2 12/13 Exiting via IPO; high recovery DE (4/09)
19 Biomet Inc Blackstone, GS Capital, KKR, TPG 5/07 B2 B2 12/12 Still Owned
20 Bloomin Brands/OSI Restaurants Bain , Catterton Partners 6/07 B2 B1 5/13 Exiting via IPO; high recovery DE (3/09)
21 Boise Cascade Holdings LLC Madison Dearborn, OfficeMax 10/04 Ba3 B1 11/13 Exited via IPO
22 Bombardier Rec Products, Inc. Bain, Bombardier Family 12/03 B1 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
23 Bresnan Communications Providence, Quadrangle 3/06 B2 B1 6/10 Sold to Strategic
24 Broder Brothers Bain 9/03 B1 Ca 5/09 DE (5/09)
25 Builders FirstSource Inc Warburg Pincus, JLL Partners 1/05 B1 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned; DE (9/09)
26 Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Bain 3/06 B2 B3 12/13 Exiting via IPO
27 Caesar's Entertainment Co. Apollo, TPG 2/08 B2 Caa2 9/13 Still Owned; DEs (1/09 & 4/09)
28 Caribe Media Welsh Carson 3/06 B2 Ca 5/11 Chapter 11 (5/11)
29 Catalent Pharma Solutions Blackstone 4/07 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
30 CCS Medical Warburg Pincus 11/05 B3 Caa1 12/08 Chapter 11 (7/09)
31 CDW Corporation Madison Dearborn , Providence Equity 10/07 B3 B1 11/13 Exiting via IPO
32 Centennial Communications Corp. Blackstone, Welsh Carson 1/99 B2 B2 11/09 Sold to Strategic
33 Cequel Communications, LLC GS Capital, Oaktree 4/06 B2 B1 10/12 Sold to PE
34 Ceridian Corp. TH Lee, Fidelity National 10/07 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
35 Ceva Group PLC Apollo 11/06 B1 Caa3 5/13 DEs (7/09 & 5/13)
36 Chrysler Automotive, LLC Cerberus 7/07 B3 Ca 4/09 Chapter 11 (4/09)
37 Cinemark USA Inc Madison Dearborn 9/06 B1 B1 3/11 Exited via IPO
38 Claire's Stores, Inc. Apollo 5/07 B3 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned
39 Clear Channel Communications Bain Capital, TH Lee 6/08 B2 Caa2 12/13 Still Owned; DE (3/09)
40 Clondalkin Industries B.V. Warburg Pincus 3/04 B1 B3 12/13 Still Owned
41 CMP Susquehanna Corp. Bain , Blackstone, TH Lee 4/06 B1 Caa1 4/11 Sold to Strategic; DE (4/09)
42 Colt Defense LLC Sciens, Blackstone 8/07 B2 Caa1 3/13 Sold to PE
43 Concentra inc. Welsh Carson 5/07 B1 B2 11/10 Sold to Strategic
44 Cooper Standard Automotive Inc. GS Capital, Cypress 12/04 B1 Ca 7/09 Chapter 11 (7/09)
45 CRC Health Corp. Bain 1/06 B2 B3 12/13 Still Owned
46 CVR Energy Inc . GS Capital, Kelso 6/05 B2 B2 6/08 Exited via IPO
47 CW Media Holdings Inc. GS Capital, CanWest Media 7/07 B1 Ba2 12/10 Sold to Strategic
48 DJO Finance LLC Blackstone 10/06 B2 B3 3/13 Still Owned
49 Dollar General Corp. KKR 6/07 B3 Ba1 2/13 Exited via IPO
50 Dollarama Group Holdings L.P. Bain 8/05 B1 Ba2 12/11 Exited via IPO
51 Dunkin' Brands, Inc Bain, Carlyle, TH Lee 2/06 B3 B2 8/12 Exited via IPO
52 Education Management LLC GS Capital, Leeds Equity, Providence Equity 5/06 B2 Caa1 3/13 Exiting via IPO
53 Energy Future Holding Corp. KKR, TPG 2/07 B2 Caa3 8/13 Still Owned; DEs (8/10 & 12/12)
54 Euramax International, Inc. GS Capital 6/05 B1 Ca 7/09 DE (7/09)
continued on next page

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continued from previous page

Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
55 Expert Global Solutions, Inc. JP Morgan (One Equity Partners) 7/06 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
56 First Data Corp GS Capital, KKR, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, HSBC
9/07 B2 B3 10/13 Still Owned
57 Foamex International Inc GS Capital, DE Shaw, Sigma 12/06 B2 Ca 2/09 Chapter 11 (2/09)
58 Freedom Communications, Inc. Blackstone, Providence Equity 2/04 Ba3 Caa3 7/09 DE (9/09)
59 Freedom Group, Inc. Cerberus 5/07 B2 B1 12/13 Still Owned
60 Freescale Semiconductor Inc Blackstone, Carlyle, Permira Funds, TPG 11/06 Ba3 B2 10/13 Exiting via IPO; DE (3/09)
61 Frontier Drilling Carlyle/ Riverstone, DLJ Merchant Banking 5/05 B3 Caa2 10/10 Sold to Strategic
62 Gabriel Communications Finance Co. KKR 10/05 B3 B2 2/10 Sold to Strategic
63 Genoa Healthcare Group, LLC Warburg Pincus 7/05 B2 B2 2/12 Sold to PE
64 Global A&T Electronics Ltd. TPG, Affinity Equity 10/07 B1 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned
65 Global Tel*Link Corp. GS Capital 12/06 B1 B2 12/11 Sold to PE
66 Gold Toe Moretz Holdings, Corp. Blackstone 10/06 B2 Caa2 4/11 Sold to Strategic
67 Graham Packaging Company, L.P. Blackstone 1/98 B1 B2 4/11 Sold to Strategic
68 Graphics Packaging International Inc. TPG , Coors Family, CD&R, Old Town, Public 6/06 B1 Ba2 8/13 Exited via IPO
69 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Madison Dearborn 12/03 B1 B3 8/09 Exited via IPO
70 Grohe Holding GmbH TPG, DLJ Merchant Banking 9/04 B1 B2 9/13 Sold to Strategic
71 Guitar Center Holdings, Inc. Bain 10/07 B3 Caa2 12/13 Still owned; high recovery DE( 2/11); DE
(3/14)
72 Hanley-Wood LLC JP Morgan, Wasserstein & Co 8/05 B2 Ca 1/12 DE (1/12)
73 Hawaiian Telcom Communications, Inc. Carlyle 4/05 B1 Caa3 9/08 Chapter 11 (9/08)
74 Hawker Beechcraft Acq. Co. LLC GS Capital, Onex 3/07 B2 Ca 5/12 DE (4/09); Chapter 11 (5/12)
75 HCA Inc Bain , KKR, Merrill Lynch 11/06 B2 B1 11/13 Exited via IPO
76 HCR Healthcare LLC Carlyle 7/07 B2 B3 12/13 Still Owned
77 HD Supply, Inc. Carlyle, Bain, and CD& R 9/07 B2 B3 6/13 Exiting via IPO
78 Hertz Corp, Carlyle, CD&R, Merrill Lynch 12/05 Ba3 B1 12/11 Exited via IPO
79 Hughes Network Systems, LLC Apollo 5/05 B1 B1 6/11 Sold to Strategic
80 IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. Cerberus 3/05 B1 Caa3 7/08 DE (7/08)
81 IASIS Healthcare Corp. TPG , JLL, Trimaran 6/04 B1 B2 12/13 Still Owned
82 Innophos Holdings Inc Bain 8/04 B1 Ba3 12/08 Exited via IPO
83 Insight Midwest Holdings, LLC Carlyle 12/05 B1 B1 2/12 Sold to Strategic
84 Integra Telecom, Inc. Warburg Pincus 7/07 B3 Caa1 11/09 Pmt Default (5/09); DE (11/09)
85 Intergraph Corp. TPG , Hellman & Friedman, JMI Equity 11/06 B2 B2 12/10 Sold to Strategic
86 ITC^DeltaCom, Inc. Welsh Carson 7/07 B3 B3 10/10 Sold to Strategic
87 J. Crew Group, Inc. TPG 10/97 B2 Ba1 9/10 Exited via IPO
88 Jacuzzi Brands Corp. Apollo 2/07 B2 Ca 8/13 DEs (1/10 & 7/13)
89 John Maneely Co Carlyle 3/06 B1 B2 2/11 Sold to Strategic
90 KAR Auction Services, Inc. GS Capital, Kelso, Parthenon, ValueAct 3/07 B2 B1 11/13 Exited via IPO
91 Kerasotes Showplace Theatres LLC Providence Equity 10/04 B1 B2 7/10 Sold to Strategic
92 Keystone Automotive Operations Inc. Bain 10/03 B1 Ca 1/12 DE (1/12)
93 Kraton Polymers LLC TPG, JP Morgan 12/03 B1 B1 4/11 Exited via IPO
94 Laureate Education, Inc KKR 6/07 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
95 LifeCare Holdings Carlyle 8/05 B2 Caa3 12/12 DE (12/08); Chapter 11 (12/12)
96 Linens 'n Things Inc. Apollo, NRDC Real Estate 1/06 B3 Ca 5/08 Chapter 11 (5/08)
97 Local Insight Regatta Holdings, Inc Welsh Carson 11/07 B1 Ca 11/10 Chapter 11 (11/10)
98 Marquee Holdings Apollo, Bain, Carlyle, Spectrum 7/04 B1 B2 5/12 Sold to Strategic
99 Masonite Corp. KKR 2/05 B2 Ca 3/09 Chapter 11 (11/08)
100 McJunkin Red Man Corp. GS Capital 1/07 B1 B1 10/12 Exiting via IPO
101 Metals USA, Inc. Apollo 11/05 B1 B1 5/13 Sold to Strategic
102 MetoKote JP Morgan 7/02 B1 B3 7/12 Debt Repaid
103 Michaels Stores Inc. Bain Capital, Blackstone 9/06 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
104 Mobile Mini Welsh Carson 7/06 B2 B2 6/08 Sold to Strategic
105 Momentive Performance Materials Inc. Apollo 12/06 B3 Caa2 12/13 Still Owned at 12/13; DE (4/09); Chapter 11
(4/14)
106 Momentive Specialty Chemicals Inc. Apollo 8/04 B2 B3 12/13 Still Owned; high recovery DE (4/09)
107 Multiplan, Inc. Carlyle 3/06 B2 B2 7/10 Sold to PE

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Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
108 Neiman Marcus Group Inc TPG , Warburg Pincus 9/05 B1 B2 9/13 Sold to PE
109 NewPage Corp, / Escanaba Timber LLC Cerberus 4/05 B2/B3 Caa3 9/11 Chapter 11 (9/11)
110 Newport Television Holdings Providence Equity 4/08 B2 Caa1 7/12 Sold to Strategic; DEs (6/09 & 2/10)
111 Nielsen Holdings N.V. AlpInvest, Blackstone, Carlyle, H&F, KKR, TH Lee 5/06 B1 Ba3 2/11 Exited via IPO
112 Niska Gas Storage Carlyle/Riverstone 4/06 Ba3 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
113 Noranda Aluminum Holding Corp. Apollo 4/07 B1 B2 12/13 Exiting via IPO; high recovery DE (4/09)
114 NTK Holdings, Inc. TH Lee 8/04 B1 Ca 10/09 Chapter 11 (12/08)
115 Oceana Cruises Inc. Apollo 4/07 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
116 Open Solutions Inc Carlyle, Providence Equity 12/06 B2 Caa2 1/13 Sold to Strategic
117 Orbitz Worldwide, Inc Blackstone 7/07 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned 12/13; 49% Owned by
Travelport, PE exited with 3/14 DE at
Travelport
118 Oriental Trading Co Carlyle 7/06 B3 Ca 8/10 Chapter 11 (6/10)
119 Ozburn-Hessey Holding Company, LLC Welsh Carson 8/05 B2 B3 5/13 Still owned; high recovery DE (12/11)
120 Packaging Dynamics Corp. (ThilmanyLLC) KKR 5/05 B1 B2 5/13 Still Owned
121 Petco Animal Supplies Inc. Leonard Green, TPG, Freeman Spogli 10/06 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
122 Philosophy Acquisition Company, Inc. Carlyle 2/07 B2 B2 12/10 Sold to Strategic
123 Pierre Foods, Inc. Madison Dearborn 6/04 B1 Ca 7/08 Chapter 11 (7/08)
124 Pinnacle Foods Finance LLC Blackstone 3/07 B3 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
125 Polypore Warburg Pincus 4/04 B2 B2 3/11 Exited via IPO
126 PQ Corp Carlyle 6/07 B1 B3 12/13 Still Owned
127 PRIMEDIA Inc. KKR 6/91 Ba3 B1 5/11 Sold to PE
128 Quality Distribution Inc, Apollo 5/03 Caa1 B3 3/12 Exited via IPO; DE (9/09)
129 Quintiles Transnational Corp. Bain , TPG, 3i 1/08 B1 Ba3 11/13 Exiting via IPO
130 Rafaella Apparel Group, Inc. Cerberus 6/05 B1 Caa3 3/10 Sold to Strategic
131 RBS Global (fka Rexnord Holdings) Apollo 7/06 B2 B2 8/13 Exiting via IPO; high recovery DE (5/09)
132 Realogy Corp. Apollo 3/07 B3 B3 7/13 Exited via IPO; DEs (9/09 & 5/11)
133 RGIS Services LLC Blackstone, GS Mezzanine Partners 4/07 B2 B2 5/12 Still Owned
134 Rockwood Specialties Group KKR 11/00 B1 Ba3 12/10 Exited via IPO
135 Sabre Holdings Corp. TPG , Silver Lake 4/07 B2 B2 9/13 Still Owned
136 Sealy Corp. KKR 3/04 B2 B2 9/12 Exited via IPO
137 Secure Computing Corp. Warburg Pincus 8/06 B2 B2 11/08 Sold to Strategic
138 Select Medical Corp. Welsh Carson, Thoma Cressey 1/05 B1 B1 12/13 Exited via IPO
139 SemGroup, L.P. Carlyle/Riverstone 12/04 B1 Caa2 7/08 Chapter 11 (7/08)
140 Sensata Technologies B.V. Bain 4/06 B2 Ba3 12/13 Exited via IPO; high recovery DE (4/09)
141 Sensus Metering Systems Inc. GS Capital, Jordan Company 12/03 B2 B3 12/13 Still Owned
142 Sequa Corporation Carlyle 11/07 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
143 Simmons Co, THL Bedding Co. TH Lee 12/03 B2 Caa3 1/10 Pmt Default (2/09); Chapter 11 (1/10)
144 Smart & Final Holdings Corp. Apollo 5/07 B1 B3 10/12 Sold to PE
145 SourceHOV LLC Apollo 6/06 B2 B2 4/13 Sold to PE
146 Spheris Inc. Warburg Pincus , Soros Private Equity 12/04 B3 Ca 2/10 Chapter 11 (2/10)
147 SS&C Technologies, Inc. Carlyle 10/05 B2 Ba3 7/12 Exited via IPO
148 Stallion Oilfield Services, Ltd. Carlyle/Riverstone 1/07 B2 Caa3 10/09 Chapter 11 (10/09)
149 Stiefel Laboratories, Inc. Blackstone 8/07 B1 B1 7/09 Sold to Strategic
150 SunGard Data Systems Inc Bain, KKR, Blackstone, Silver Lake, TPG, GS,
Providence
151 Surgical Care Affiliates TPG l 3/07 B2 B2 10/13 Exiting via IPO
152 Synagro Technologies, Inc. Carlyle 3/07 B2 Ca 4/13 Chapter 11 (2/13)
153 Talecris Biotherapeutics Inc Cerberus 11/06 B2 Ba3 6/11 Sold to Strategic
154 Targa Resources Partners LP Warburg Pincus 10/05 Ba3 Ba3 12/11 Exited via IPO
155 Team Health Inc . Blackstone 10/05 B2 Ba2 12/12 Exited via IPO
156 Telcordia Technologies Providence , Warburg Pincus 3/05 B1 B3 6/11 Sold to Strategic
157 Tervita Corp. GS, CAI, Kelso, Vestar, Alberta Inv Mgt, BC Inv Mgt
& O.S.S. Cap Mgt
10/07 B2 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned
158 The ServiceMaster Co. CD&R; JPM Chase Funding; 7/07 B2 B3 12/13 Still Owned
159 Toys 'R' US, Inc. Bain, KKR, Vornado Realty Trust 3/05 B2 B2 7/13 Still Owned

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Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
160 TransDigm Corp. Warburg Pincus 7/03 B1 B1 10/08 Exited via IPO
161 TransFirst Holdings Inc. Welsh Carson 5/07 B3 B3 4/13 Still Owned
162 Travelport LLC Blackstone 7/06 B2 Caa1 7/13 Still Ownedas of 12/13; DE (10/11); DE with
PE exit (3/14)
163 TRW Automotive Blackstone 2/03 Ba3 B1 9/10 Exited via IPO
164 TSI Acquisition, LLC Carlyle/Riverstone 2/07 B3 Caa1 8/11 Sold to Strategic
165 UCI HoldCo, Inc. Carlyle 6/03 B1 B2 1/11 Sold to Strategic
166 United Rentals Apollo 12/99 Ba2 B1 6/08 Sold to Strategic
167 United Surgical Partners Intl, Inc. Welsh Carson 3/07 B2 B2 2/13 Still Owned
168 Universal City Development Blackstone, NBC Acquisition Corp 3/03 B1 B1 7/11 Sold to Strategic
169 Univision Communications Inc Madison Dearborn , Providence Equity, TPG, TH Lee 7/13 B1 B3 5/13 Still Owned
170 US Foods, Inc. KKR, CD&R 6/07 B3 B3 11/12 Sold to Strategic
171 US Oncology Inc Welsh Carson 5/04 B1 B2 2/11 Sold to Strategic
172 Vanguard Health Systems Blackstone 9/04 B2 B2 11/13 Sold to Strategic
173 Verso Paper Holdings LLC Apollo 7/06 B1 B3 3/13 Exiting via IPO
174 Vertis Inc TH Lee 11/99 B1 Ca 7/08 Chapter 11 (7/08)
175 Vertrue Incorporated JP Morgan, Oak Investment , Rho Ventures 6/07 B2 C 4/12 Chapter 11 (4/12)
176 Veyance Technologies Inc., EPD, Inc. Carlyle 6/07 B2 Caa1 12/09 Stopped providing financials
177 Viant Holdings, Inc. Welsh Carson 5/07 B2 B2 3/10 Sold to Strategic
178 Visant Corp. KKR, DLJ Merchant Banking 10/04 B1 B3 11/13 Still Owned
179 Vistar Inc. Blackstone, Wellspring Capital 6/07 B2 B2 5/08 Sold to Strategic
180 Vought Aircraft Industries Carlyle 6/00 B1 B2 7/10 Sold to Strategic
181 VWR Funding, Inc. Madison Dearborn 6/07 B3 B3 3/13 Still Owned
182 Warner Chilcott Company, Inc. Bain , DLJ Merchant Banking, JP Morgan, TH Lee 1/05 B2 B1 5/13 Exited via IPO
183 Water Pik, Inc. Carlyle, EG Capital 5/07 B3 B2 6/13 Sold to PE
184 Wesco Aircraft Hardware Corp. Carlyle 9/06 B2 Ba3 6/13 Exiting via IPO
185 West Corp. TH Lee, Quadrangle 10/06 B2 B1 4/13 Exiting via IPO
186 Wm Bolthouse Farms Inc Madison Dearborn 11/05 B2 B2 7/12 Sold to Strategic
187 WMG Holdings Corp. Bain , Providence, TH Lee 4/04 B1 Ba3 7/11 Sold to PE
188 Yankee Candle Co. Madison Dearborn 2/07 B2 B2 9/13 Sold to Strategic
Crisis Deals 2008
189 Allied Security Holdings LLC Blackstone 8/08 B1 B1 11/12 Still Owned
190 Aptalis Pharma Inc. TPG 1/08 B1 B2 1/14 Sold to Strategic
191 Apria Blackstone 10/08 Ba3 B2 11/13 Still Owned
192 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. Carlyle 6/08 B1 Ba3 10/13 Exiting via IPO
193 Bright Horizons Family Soutions Bain 5/08 B2 B1 2/13 Exiting via IPO
194 MoneyGram International Goldman Sachs, TH Lee 3/08 B1 B1 3/13 Still Owned
195 NCL Corp. Ltd (Norwegian Cruise Lines) Apollo 1/08 B2 Ba3 4/13 Exiting via IPO
196 TWCC Holding Corp. Bain, Blackstone 8/08 Ba3 B1 6/13 Still Owned
197 X-Rite Inc One Equity, Tinicum Capital, Sagard 11/08 B3 B2 6/11 Sold to Strategic
Crisis Deals 2009
198 Antero Resources LLC Yorktown, Warburg Pincus,
Lehman
11/09 B3 Ba3 10/13 Exiting via IPO
199 Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc. Blackstone 12/09 Ba3 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
200 Stream Global Services, Inc. Ares , Ayala Corp., Providence Equity 9/09 B1 B1 1/14 Sold to Strategic
201 TASC Inc. KKR, General Atlantic 12/09 B1 B2 5/12 Still Owned
Crisis Deals 2010
202 Air Medical Group Holdings Inc. Bain 10/10 B2 B2 5/13 Still Owned
203 American Petroleum Tankers Parent Blackstone, Cerberus 3/10 Caa1 B2 12/13 Sold to Strategic; high recovery DE (3/13)
204 American Tire Distributors, Inc. TPG 5/10 B2 B2 12/12 Still Owned
205 Ardent Medical Services, Inc. Welsh Carson 2/10 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
206 Ascend Learning Inc. Providence Equity 11/10 B2 Caa1 6/13 Still Owned
207 AssuraMed Holding, Inc. CD&R GS Capital 9/10 B2 B2 2/13 Sold to Strategic
208 BOE Intermediate Holding Corp. Madison Dearborn 5/10 B1 B2 10/12 Sold to PE
209 Charter Communications Operating Apollo, Crestview Partners, Oaktree 3/10 Ba3 Ba3 3/13 Exited via IPO
210 CKE Restaurants, Inc. Apollo 6/10 B2 B2 7/13 Sold to PE

CORPORATES
19 JUNE 17, 2014



Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
211 Columbian Chemicals Co. One Equity 11/10 Ba3 Ba3 2/11 Sold to Strategic
212 Decision Insight Info. Group TPG 12/10 B2 B3 7/13 Still Owned
213 DynCorp International Inc. Cerberus 6/10 Ba3 B1 6/13 Still Owned
214 EVERTEC Inc Apollo 8/10 B2 B1 4/13 Exited via IPO
215 Foresight Energy, LLC The Cline Group; Carlyle/Riverstone 8/10 B3 B2 8/13 Still Owned
216 Gymboree Corp. Bain 11/10 B2 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned
217 IMS Health Inc. TPG, Leonard Green 2/10 B1 B2 8/13 Still Owned
218 Hilex Poly Co LLC TPG 9/10 B3 B3 12/12 Sold to PE
219 Interactive Data Corp. Silver Lake, Warburg Pincus 7/10 B2 B2 2/13 Still Owned
220 InVentiv Health Inc. TH Lee, Liberty Lane Partners 7/10 B2 Caa1 12/12 Still Owned
221 Isola USA Corp. TPG 8/10 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
222 Kenan Advantage Group Inc. GS Capital, Centerbridge Partners 7/10 Ba3 B1 12/13 Still Owned
223 Metaldyne, LLC Carlyle, Solus Alternative Asset Management 9/10 B1 B1 12/12 Sold to PE
224 Michael Foods Group, Inc. GS Capital, TH Lee 6/10 B2 B2 12/12 Still Owned
225 MLM Information Services Warburg Pincus 11/10 B2 B2 2/12 Sold to Strategic
226 NBTY Inc. Carlyle 7/10 B1 B2 12/13 Still Owned
227 NexTag, Inc. Providence Equity 12/10 B1 Caa2 12/13 Still Owned
228 Northern Tier Energy LLC TPG, ACON Investments 11/10 B1 B1 11/13 Sold to Strategic
229 Performance Food Group Blackstone, Wellspring Capital 11/10 B2 B1 5/13 Still Owned
230 Quality Home Brands Holdings LLC Quad-C Management/ Apollo 3/10 Caa1 Caa1 12/13 Still Owned
231 Renal Advantage Holdings, Inc. KRG Capital, Bain 11/10 B2 B2 4/12 Sold to Strategic
232 Sagittarius Restaurant LLC (Del Taco) Grotech Capital, GS Mezzanine Partners,
Charlesbank Capital, Leonard Green
4/10 Caa1 Caa1 5/10 Still Owned
233 Scotsman Industries Inc. Warburg Pincus 4/10 B1 B1 1/13 Sold to Strategic
234 Sheridan Investment Partners I LLC Warburg Pincus 12/10 B2 B1 9/12 Still Owned
235 SkillSoft Ltd. Berkshire Partners, Advent International, Bain 5/10 B2 B2 9/12 Still Owned
236 Smile Brands Group Inc. Welsh Carson 12/10 B2 B3 8/13 Still Owned
237 Summit Materials LLC Blackstone, Silverhawk Capital 1/10 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
238 Syniverse Holdings Carlyle 12/10 B2 B2 1/13 Still Owned
239 TransUnion Holding Company, Inc. Madison Dearborn 5/10 B1 B1 6/12 Sold to PE
240 Trinseo S.A. Bain 6/10 B2 B2 8/13 Still Owned
241 Tower International , Inc. Cerberus 8/10 B2 B2 4/13 Exiting via IPO
242 Vertafore Inc. TPG 7/10 B2 B2 7/11 Still Owned
243 Ziggo N.V. Warburg Pincus, Cinven 4/10 Ba3 Ba1 4/13 Exited via IPO
Crisis Deals 2011
244 Academy Ltd KKR 7/11 B2 B2 12/12 Still Owned
245 Airvana Network Solutions Inc. S.A.C. Private Capital, Blackstone 3/11 B3 Caa1 1/13 Still Owned
246 Artel, LLC TPG, Torch Hill 10/12 B3 Caa1 1/14 Still Owned
247 Blackboard Inc. Providence Equity 9/11 B2 B2 10/13 Still Owned
248 Capsugel Inc KKR 8/11 B2 B2 10/13 Still Owned
249 CommScope Holding Company, Inc. Carlyle 1/11 B2 B1 10/13 Exiting via IPO
250 Del Monte Corp. KKR, Vestar, Centerview Capital 3/11 B1 B2 7/13 Still Owned
251 Emdeon Inc. Blackstone, Hellman Friedman 11/11 B2 B2 4/12 Still Owned
252 Endurance International Group Inc. Warburg Pincus, GS Capital 12/11 B1 B2 10/13 Exiting via IPO
253 Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC KKR , Silver Lake, Technology Crossover Ventures 9/11 B1 B1 9/13 Still Owned
254 Immucor Inc. TPG 8/11 B2 B3 4/13 Still Owned
255 Ipreo Holdings LLC KKR 7/11 B2 B2 10/12 Still Owned
256 Laredo Petroleum, Inc. Warburg Pincus 1/11 Caa1 B1 5/13 Exiting via IPO
257 Nexeo Solutions, LLC TPG 2/11 B1 B2 6/13 Still Owned
258 Ontex IV S.A. TPG, GS Capital 3/11 B1 B2 2/13 Still Owned
259 PBF Holding Company LLC First Reserve, Blackstone 1/12 Ba3 Ba3 12/12 Exiting via IPO
260 Pharmaceutical Product Development Carlyle, Hellman & Friedman 12/11 B1 B2 10/12 Still Owned
261 PlayPower, Inc Apollo 10/11 Caa1 Caa2 4/13 Still Owned
262 Polymer Group, Inc. Blackstone 1/11 B1 B1 12/13 Still Owned
26 RegionalCare Hospital Partners, Inc. Warburg Pincus 10/11 B3 Caa1 10/13 Still Owned
264 RentPath, inc. (fka PRIMEDIA INC.) TPG 6/11 B1 B2 5/13 Still Owned

CORPORATES
20 JUNE 17, 2014



Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
265 Rural/Metro Corp. Warburg Pincus 6/11 B2 C 8/13 Chapter 11 (8/13)
266 Samson Investment Co. KKR, Crestview, Natural Gas Partners, Itochu Corp, 12/12 Ba3 B1 9/12 Still Owned
267 Sprouts Farmers Markets LLC Apollo 4/11 B2 B1 8/13 Exiting via IPO
268 SRA International Inc. Providence Equity 7/11 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
269 StoneRiver Group , L.P. TPG 5/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
270 Triple Point Group Holdings Welsh Carson 10/11 B2 B2 6/13 Sold to Strategic
271 Tyrol Acquisition 1 SAS TPG, AXA, Frances sovereign wealth fund,
Charterhouse
272 U.S. Security Associates Holdings, Inc. GS Capital 7/11 B1 B2 7/13 Still Owned
273 W3 Co ( fka Total Safety U.S. Inc) Warburg Pincus 10/11 B2 B2 2/13 Still Owned
Crisis Deals 2012
274 Accudyne Industries Borrower SCA ( fka
Hamilton Sundstrand)
BC Partners, Carlyle 12/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
275 APX Group Inc. Blackstone 11/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
276 Associated Asphalt Partners, LLC GS Capital Partners 3/12 B2 B3 2/13 Still Owned
277 August Cayman Intermediate Holdco Madison Dearborn 4/12 B2 B2 5/13 Still Owned
278 Brasa Holdings TH Lee 6/12 B2 B2 8/13 Still Owned
279 Capital Safety NA Holdings Inc. KKR 1/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
280 Consolidated Container Co LLC Bain 6/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
281 Core Entertainment Inc. Apollo 1/12 B3 B3 1/12 Still Owned
282 EPE Holdings Apollo, Riverstone 4/12 Ba3 Ba3 9/13 Exiting via IPO
283 Evergreen AcqCo 1, LP Leonard Green, TPG 6/12 B2 B2 9/12 Still Owned
284 FPC Holdings, Inc (fka FleetPride Inc) TPG 11/12 B2 B3 11/13 Still Owned
285 GCA Services Group Inc. Blackstone 11/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
286 Getty Images Inc. Carlyle 9/12 B2 B3 10/13 Still Owned
287 Great Wolf Resorts Inc. Apollo 5/12 Caa1 B3 7/13 Still Owned
288 Interline Brands Inc. GS Capital, P2 Capital Partners 6/12 B2 B3 7/13 Still Owned
289 LM U.S. Member LLC (fka Landmark
Aviation Inc.)
Carlyle 10/12 B3 B3 11/13 Still Owned
290 MModal Inc. One Equity 8/12 B2 Caa1 10/13 Still Owned
291 New Breed Holding Co. Warburg Pincus 9/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
292 Par Pharmaceutical Co.ss Inc TPG 9/12 B2 B2 1/14 Still Owned
293 Party City Holdings Inc. TH Lee 7/12 B2 B3 10/13 Still Owned
294 Peak 10 Inc. Welsh Carson 10/12 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
295 Physico-Control International, Inc. Bain 1/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
296 Pinnacle Operating Corp ( fka Jimmy
Sanders)
Apollo 11/12 B2 B2 9/13 Still Owned
297 Sage Products Holdings III, LLC Madison Dearborn 12/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
298 Taminco Global Chemical Corp. Apollo 1/12 B2 B2 1/14 Exiting via IPO
299 Taylor Morrison Communities Inc. TPG, Oaktree, JH Investments 3/12 B1 B1 4/13 Exited via IPO
300 Things Remembered, Inc. Madison Dearborn 5/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
301 TransUnion Holding Company, Inc. Advent, GS Capital 6/12 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
302 WP CPP Holdings LLC Warburg Pincus 12/12 B2 B2 10/13 Still Owned
Crisis Deals 2013
303 Axalta Coating Systems Bermuda Co. Carlyle 2/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
304 Acosta, Inc. TH Lee, Goldman Sachs 11/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
305 ALG B.V.- Apple Leisure Group Bain 2/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
306 American Gaming Systems Apollo 12/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
307 Apex Tool Group, LLC Bain 2/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
308 Athlon Holdings LP Apollo 4/13 B3 B3 9/13 Exiting via IPO
309 Bluestem Brands, Inc. (Fingerhut) Bain / Battery Ventures 11/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
310 BMC Software Inc. Golden Gate Capital, Bain 9/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
311 Brickman Group Holdings KKR 12/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
312 Chesapeake/MPS Merger Limited Madison Dearborn , Carlyle 7/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
313 CompuCom Systems, Inc. TH Lee 5/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
314 Crosby US Acquisition Corp. KKR 10/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned

CORPORATES
21 JUNE 17, 2014



Initial
CFR
Last
CFR Date Comment
315 Crossmark Holdings Warburg Pincus 2/13 B2 B2 8/13 Still Owned
316 CTI Foods LLC T H Lee, GS Capital 5/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
317 Envision Pharmaceutical Holdings , Inc. TPG 11/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
318 EzE Software Group TPG 3/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
319 Gardner Denver, Inc. KKR 7/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
320 Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. Blackstone 9/13 B1 B1 12/13 Exiting via IPO
321 Learfield Communications Inc. Providence Equity 10/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
322 McGraw-Hill Global Education Apollo 3/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
323 Miller Heiman Inc. Providence Equity 9/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
324 Mitchell International, Inc. KKR 10/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
325 Multi Packaging Solutions Madison Dearborn , Carlyle 12/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
326 Permian Holdings, Inc. Carlyle, Riverstone Holdings 1/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
327 Philadelphia Energy Solutions LLC Carlyle, Sunoco Inc. 4/13 B1 B1 12/13 Still Owned
328 Pitney Bowes Management Services Inc. Apollo 10/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
329 PRA Holdings Inc. KKR 9/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
330 Steward Health Care System LLC Cerberus 4/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
331 SurveyMonkey.Com, Inc. Bain, Spectrum Equity, Tiger Global, TPG ( 2011) 1/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
332 Talos Production LLC Apollo, Riverstone 2/13 B3 B3 12/13 Still Owned
333 The Topps Company, Inc. Madison Dearborn, The Tornante Company 9/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
334 Travel Leaders Group, LLC One Equity Partners 11/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
335 TurboCombustor Technologies, Inc. Carlyle , Aero Equity Partners 9/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
336 YP Holdings LLC Cerberus 5/13 B2 B2 12/13 Still Owned
Abbreviations:
CFR: Corporate Family Rating
DE : Distressed Exchange
IPO: Initial Public Offering. Sponsors Exiting via IPO are in the process of winding down their equity ownership in a company.
They still control a majority or a significant minority of the board. Sponsors that have Exited via IPO have sold all of their shares
in a company.

CORPORATES
22 JUNE 17, 2014


Moodys Related Research
Special Comments:
Moody's High-Yield Covenant Database: 12 Most-Active Private Equity Sponsors Provide Weak
Covenant Packages, April 2013 (152178)
It's Risk-On for Private Equity, November 2012 (147409)
Debt-Funded Dividends Continue At a Strong Pace, October 2012 (146029)
Sponsors Extracting More Dividends, But at Leverage Below Boom-Era Peaks, July 2012
(143619)
Lessons from 200 LBO Defaults, June 2012 (142361)
Low-Rated Private Equity-Owned Companies Face A Steep Maturity Wall From 2012-2014,
February 2012 (139725)
Covenant-Lite Loans May Prove Riskier in the Next Downturn, March 2011 (131595)
PIK Toggle: Not So Kind During the Downturn, December 2010 (129077)
Cheating Death: Private Equity Manages Solid Recoveries When Sponsored Companies Default,
November 2010 (128561)
Distressed-Exchange Defaults Surged in 2009, and Many Could Default Again, May 2010
(125082)
Private Equity 2009: Nearly Half of Defaults, But Better-Than-Average Recovery Prospects,
March 2010 (123914)
$640 Billion and 640 Days Later: How Companies Sponsored by Big Private Equity Have
Performed During the U.S. Recession, November 2009 (121005)
Safeguards for Lenders When Private Equity Layers on Debt, September 2009 (120167)
Private Equity: Tracking the Largest Sponsors, February 2008 (104486)
To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of
this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.

CORPORATES
23 JUNE 17, 2014


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contacts continued from page 1
Analyst Contacts:
NEW YORK +1.212.553.1653
Christina Padgett +1212.553.4164
christina.padgett@moodys.com
John Puchalla +1212.553.4026
john.puchalla@moodys.com

Report Number: 170039
Author
John Rogers
Production Associate
Vinod Babu Muniappan

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CORPORATES JUNE 17, 2014

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