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Discussion Papers Debates on Current

Affairs Series

Dumitru Mînzărari
Nr.5
March - May
Russian foreign 2009

policy as an
obstacle to
democratic
development in
post-soviet area
2 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul”

DISCUSSION PAPERS
Debates on Current Affairs Series

Dumitru Mînzărari

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY


AS AN OBSTACLE
TO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
IN POST-SOVIET AREA

Nr. 5
March - May 2009

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 3


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
This publication does not necessarlity reflect the
collective view of IDIS „Viitorul” or the opinion of its
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holds the copyright to this publication. No part of it
can be copied, reproduced, or published in any form,
without prior written permission from the Institute for
Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) „Viitorul”. The
reference to IDIS “Viitorul” is mandatory when quoting
from this study.
The publication of this study was made possible through the support from the GMF
Black Sea Trust Fund. We would also like to thank the Polish-American Freedom
Foundation for supporting the research for the paper.
© Copyright 2009 IDIS „Viitorul”.

4 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Dumitru Mînzărari (dumitru.minzarari@viitorul.org) is an associate research fellow on
foreign and security policy with the Chişinău-based Institute for Develop­m ent and
Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul”.
He graduated from the Military College “Alexandru cel Bun,” received a Licentiate in
Political Science from the State University of Moldova and a Master in International
Affairs degree from Columbia University in New York.
His previous professional experience includes working with the Ministry of Defen­s e of
the Republic of Moldova, where he covered international cooperation with NATO and
OSCE, conventional arms control and peacekeeping issues.
He is also the recipient of merit-based Edmund S. Muskie/Freedom Support Act
graduate scholarship (2004-2006), Lane Kirkland (2007-2008) and REVACERN (2009)
research fellowships.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 5


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
6 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 8

COMPARING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCE................................. 12

Using the Small States Model......................................................................... 12

Regionalism and Interdependence.................................................................. 14

The Mystery of Russian Influence.................................................................... 17

THE CASE OF MOLDOVA............................................................................... 22

The Essence of Post-Soviet Transition............................................................. 22

Discrediting Liberal Values.............................................................................. 24

Moldova Forced to Bandwagon...................................................................... 26

THE CHANGING NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION................... 31

Switching to Non-Military Aggression.............................................................. 31

Understanding the New Trends of Inter-State Aggression.................................. 34

The Tools of Indirect Aggression..................................................................... 39

CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................. 47

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 7


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years there have been has a significant impact on the liberalization
many voices in the West, both in the process in transition countries. It advocates
academia and in the policy world, insisting the crucial influence of the “snowballing”
that democratic development in the post- effect as described in the case of the third
Soviet area should be described as a fail- wave of democratization. According to this
ure. At the same time their invoked reasons theory, when a nation reaches certain de-
suggested that it is internal factors such mocratization level, it will contribute to the
as poor governance, corrupted elites, inef- advance of democratic transition across the
ficient policies, etc., leading to that failure. border, in the neighboring countries.4 Similar
Indeed, the existing scholarship tends to conclusions can be found in the research
predominantly focus on domestic obstacles done by other scholars, insisting that inter-
to democratic development. It points out national influence has been the key reason
to internal structure, human agency, or the behind the spread of democracy over the
connection of the two as being the reasons last few decades5. The efforts of the United
for democratic transition success or failure. States and European Union to promote
democratic reforms around the world using
Economic development, as researchers ar- diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural
gue1, is an important factor able to encour- tools are an example of this process. Such
age or trigger the transition to democracy. efforts are based on the democratic peace
Another one is the human development fac- theory, which suggests that since demo-
tor, which leads to the increase of citizens’ cratic states dot not go to war against each
competence and participation in the politi- other, then spreading democracy means
cal process. It has also been considered promoting a peaceful international environ-
by a number of researchers as crucial for ment.
the transition to democratic system and its
consolidation. Its importance is obvious as There are also opinions suggesting the
democratic transition may require a home- Western democratization efforts may also
grown demand for political reform in order be sometimes guided by US or EU domes-
to move forward2. Also, this factor seems tic reasons, aiming at either legitimizing the
to play a significant role during the most domestic order at home, or boosting the
painful periods of transition, when reforms national pride and self-confidence.6 How-
may provoke dissatisfaction among the ever, significantly less research was done
population. Then, only a more literate and to reveal how international factor hinders
sophisticated citizenry may be ready to put democratic development in transition states,
up with social and economic disappointing although there were isolated efforts men-
performance of the government, capable of tioning the case when democratic states
realizing that democratic development could made attempts to subvert fragile democra-
bring new positive changes3. cies perceiving certain geopolitical interests
to be at stake7. Otherwise there was clearly
There is yet another body of research which
4 Huntington (1991)
advocates the idea that international factor 5 Linz and Stepan (1996) and Gleditsch (2002)
1 See Learner (1958), Lipset (1959), Londregan and 6 Pevehouse (2002)
Poole (1996), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Boix 7 Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Democracy from the Outside-
and Stokes (2003), and Epstein et al. (2006) In? International Organizations and Democratization’,
2 Bratton and van de Walle (1997) International Organization, Vol. 56, No.3 (Summer
3 Diamond et al. (1999) 2002), pp. 522-523

8 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
insufficient attention paid to obstructions of used against Moldova one could detect
foreign nature, aimed at freezing and even political subversion, economic disruption,
reversing democratic reforms, especially in propaganda dissemination, social disor-
transition post-Soviet countries. As any kind ganization and psychological warfare.8 They
of foreign influence has the potential to af- are used to exploit the loopholes of the
fect the national security of a state exposed international law, and to attain goals similar
to external pressure, it is necessary to to the aims of a foreign military aggression
discuss democratic transition also through – controlling the national government and
a security environment angle, which may resources of the targeted country.
push it towards success or trigger the tran-
sition’s stagnation and regress. This has been made easier because of the
ignorance surrounding both the subject of
That approach is of a significant impor- foreign influence and its effects on demo-
tance, since the dominant trend among the cratic transition in post-Soviet area. The ex-
researchers, experts and politicians is to isting debates over the issue of democratic
ignore the link between democratic devel- development did not put under scrutiny how
opment and security. However the former foreign obstacles, created by other coun-
is so much dependent on the latter that this tries, can obstruct the democratization of
dependence can determine its success of transition countries. This paper will address
failure. obstacles that include the inimical influence
and pressure from abroad, employed as a
The aim of the current paper is to also ad- rule by an authoritarian state, which aims at
dress this issue, emphasizing the ways in controlling the targeted transition country.
which foreign factors, affecting the security Developing that argument, the study will
of a state, may affect its process of demo- suggest reasons why democratic develop-
cratic transition. The focus will be heavily ment in post-Soviet countries has been
on the Republic of Moldova, addressing such a disappointment.
and analyzing factors triggering the danger-
ous effects of the foreign influence national Identifying the reasons behind democratic
security democratic transition link. Similarly failure in post-Soviet countries is an impor-
to the cases of other post-Soviet countries, tant endeavor. It offers new insights into
such as Ukraine and Georgia, the main their post-Cold War transition, when they
vulnerabilities of Moldova are explained by currently seem to be predominantly experi-
its Soviet-time experience and inheritance. encing either transition stagnation or a dem-
They include economic, social, and political ocratic reverse. The present paper claims
links, on the top of the connections main- that it is the Russian foreign policy which is
tained between the domestic elites of these largely responsible for this persistent trend.
countries and the Russian political elites. It will mostly refer to the case of Moldova,
and in some instances to Ukraine and
Addressing these issues the study will Georgia. Since these are the states that
examine the contemporary shifts in the se- clearly expressed their will to join European
curity architecture of the post-Soviet area, Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
which hints to a change in the nature of tion9, they are the priority targets of Russian
inter-state aggression. During the recent foreign policy efforts aimed at obstructing
years we have observed that in that particu- their Euro-Atlantic integration. This is done
lar region the preference was given to the through creating influence mechanisms
tools of indirect aggression. It is different 8 Authors such as L. Damrosch (1989) and Bugajski
from the conventional military aggression as (2004) among others, have written about the use of
it has a more subtle character, and while it indirect aggression tools in the foreign policy.
9 Moldovan political leadership has stressed numerous
is poorly addressed by the international law, times that since, according to the Constitution, their
it generates threats of a bigger magnitude. country is neutral then Moldova does not intend to
Among the indirect aggression methods become a member of NATO.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 9


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
over the indigenous elites, in the attempt but rather dismiss it imprudently as what
to control these countries’ foreign and do- they see as the Russian elite post-imperial
mestic policy options. Such actions lead syndrome. The Western policymakers
to the erosion of the institutional checks and many scholars believe it is Moscow’s
and balances, subversion of the incipient temporary unreadiness to accept the cur-
mechanisms of these fragile democracies, rent geopolitical setup. Comparing today
and the promotion of a single party or group Russia with former empires like France and
into power, encouraging and supporting the Britain they fall trap to a major misjudgment,
growth of authoritarian trends. Together with shortsightedly ignoring that Russia, unlike
the exploitation of the separatist conflicts the other two countries at their time, has
and tendencies on the territories of Ukraine, all the means, the will, and the capacity for
Georgia and Moldova, these foreign efforts bringing desired changes in the existing
resulted in hindering their democratic transi- regional architecture. As a result any voiced
tion. concerns regarding the real goals behind
the specific Russian foreign policy moves
This is not a new policy, but instead a con- are tabbed by most Western observers as
tinuous element of the Russian foreign pol- hysteria and exaggerated fears.
icy towards the ex-Soviet republics. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union the policy- The study claims that this insufficient under-
makers in Moscow have strived to maintain standing of the reasons behind the Mos-
their control over the former soviet satellites. cow’s foreign policies among the Western
In many cases they managed to attain this public, including the experts and research-
goal through informal links and contacts ers specializing on Russia, is mainly caused
with the semi-authoritarian rulers or depend- by mirror imaging analysis error10 and by
ent elites in former Soviet republics. With the failure to grasp to the full extent the
the march of “color” revolutions through the strategic culture of Russian influential policy-
capitals of Ukraine and Georgia, the Kremlin makers. In order to understand the foreign
elite have become extremely concerned policy pursued by Russia’s leadership today
that they might lose their ability to influence one should be aware of the heavy influence
the post-Soviet countries. that domestic security and military estab-
lishments have on this process, as well as
At the same time a more active role and the real impact that the deeply ingrained
involvement of the West in the post-Soviet roots of the Soviet strategic thought has on
republics was also perceived by Russia as the final policy choices.
a threat to its national interests. The West-
ern efforts to foster democratic reforms in The Russian early 1990s period has also
these countries would result, according had a tremendous impact on the current
to the Russian policymakers, in their drift elite, who cut their teeth on surviving the
towards EU at the same time leaving the
10 It is an analysis error, when analysts or political
Russian “sphere of influence”. This paper leaders project their own values and national culture
will discuss the ways Russia has intensi- when analyzing and interpreting events and policies of
fied its foreign policy strains to hinder the a foreign country, using models that ignores the culture
democratic processes in Moldova and in and the values of political leaders of the country under
other former Soviet republics; attempting to scrutiny. For details see Richards J. Heuer, Jr., „The
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” Center for the
maintain its influence over them through de- Study of Intelligence, CIA 1999, p. 70, https://www.
veloping and exploiting their already existing cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
foreign vulnerabilities towards Moscow. csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-
of-intelligence-analysis/index.html. Another interesting
This process is largely overlooked and its reading is offered by the article „Template I: Munich”
of the Bellum project, run by the Stanford Review,
importance is mainly underestimated in the which suggests that the West has fallen into the trap of
West. Experts and politicians do not per- mirror-imaging mistake when evaluating Hitler in 1938
ceive it as an organized and targeted policy, at Munich, http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=392

10 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Russian “wild west” of that time, outliv- Understanding how Russia obstructs
ing many adventurers of gangster, ap- democratic transitions in post-soviet coun-
paratchik, KGB and military cadre breed. tries is even more difficult because of the
It was during those harsh times, when subtlety of the tools that Kremlin uses.
the Russian criminal world sub-culture of In fact, Moscow basically reverted to the
“thief-in-law”11 has slipped into the con- indirect aggression mechanisms that So-
duct of masses, becoming a common viet Union employed during the Cold War.
trend of behavior of the Russian economic Then, aware of the dangers of a nuclear
and political elites. This criminal sub-cul- conflict it confronted its rival, the United
ture, described by usage of specific slang, States, in third world countries through the
aggressive behavior and a tactical thinking use of proxy-wars.13 Since existing provi-
preferring brutal force when doing busi- sions of the international law do not cover
ness, has persisted not only on domestic well the realm of indirect aggression, Rus-
stage but has also spread further, shaping sia has its hands free to unleash hostile
the ways in which the elites conducted actions against its neighbors. The paper
their international affairs12. will look into this, and specifically into how
the modern conditions have resulted in a
transformation of the mechanisms of inter-
11 It comes from the Russian vor v zakone, meaning a state aggression.
thief, within the Russian criminal world who satisfies
certain requirements of the Russian criminal traditions,
and occupying a leading role in the criminal hierarchy. The main scope of the study, however,
For details see Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ remains to investigate how indirect ag-
Thief_in_law gression is used in Russian foreign policy
12 One of the most famous and widely-known accounts to revert democratic transition in Moldova.
of this trend is the case when Anatoly Chubays, the
former head of the Russian presidential administration,
The following chapter will reveal the pre-
the Russian ex-minister of finance and at the time the dominance of the foreign factor, namely
chief executive of the Russia state-run electricity giant of the Russian foreign policy, over the do-
Unified Energy System RAO EES, threatened publicly mestic factor, in guiding the internal proc-
Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin. After his adviser ess and development of the post-Soviet
Valeriu Pasat, a former Ambassador of Moldova to
Russia, former Moldovan minister of defense and
countries this reseach is looking at.
ex-chief of Moldovan Security Service, was sentenced
in Chisinau in January 2006, Chubays stated in the 13 See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Russian media: “I think president Voronin should not Proxy_war
be surprised if he faces very serious problems in the
nearest future”. Few days after this statement some
Moldovan media outlets have spread the news claiming
the president Voronin’s elder son, Oleg, was kidnapped
in Moscow. This was immediately disproved by the
Moldovan presidency spokesperson. The advisor to
Moldovan president, Mark Tkaciuc, came out with a
public statement, saying the case was a precedent of
using criminal lexicon in international affairs, which is
not admissible for an official of such a rang and reputa-
tion like Chubays. See Grani.ru, “Moldovan president’s
advisor: Chubais speaks the language of gangster bust-
up” [Sovetnik prezidenta Moldavii: Chubais govorit na
yazyke banditskih razborok], 18 January 2006, http://
www.grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/m.100782.html.
One other example that had even a higher resonance
was the case in September 1999, in Astana, when
Vladimir Putin, at the time the Prime-minister of Rus-
sia, has used during the press conference the expression
mochit’ v sortire in regards to how terrorists should be
treated [we will waste them even in the closets]. For
more details see Wikipedia http:// ru.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Мочить_в_сортире.

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DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
COMPARING FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCE
Using the Small States Model policy. Therefore, the current paper claims
that it is the literature on the small states15
The debate discussing whether the internal which provides the most suitable analytic
factors are more important than foreign tools for explaining why international pres-
factors in shaping a country’s policies, is sure is often more significant than domes-
a very important one in the framework of tic one in our case.
this paper. If external factors are influencing
the policies of Moldova’s leadership to a The notion of smallness is being used
bigger extent that the internal factors do it, as synonymic to weakness. Employing
as democratic development is concerned, the notion “small” as an analytic concept
then it is highly probable that the failures and describing it, the study refers to the
of democratic transition in the Republic literature that explains “smallness” in com-
of Moldova can be also explained by the parative terms of one actor’s power and
attempts from abroad to obstruct the con- capabilities related to other actors, and
solidation of democratic institutions inside less in terms of size or population. How-
the country. In International Relations and ever, because lower resource capabilities
Comparative Politics schools both groups inevitably limits the scope and domain of
of factors are examined, however the ex- foreign policy, a small state will be one with
isting body of literature tends to consider reduced capacity to influence either the
domestic influence as more prominent security interests of a great power or de-
and decisive. It should be emphasized, fend itself against an attack by an equally
although, that authoritative studies on this motivated great power16. Borrowing from
topic14 focus predominantly on bigger the characteristics of small states summa-
powers, ignoring smaller countries. rized by J. Hey17, the states we look upon
address a narrow scope of foreign policy
Examining the issue through a realist per- issues, preponderantly limit their behav-
spective by looking at the distribution of ior to their immediate geographic arena;
power in the international system, it can they employ mostly diplomatic foreign
be stated that in the case of bigger pow- policy instruments and less military and/
ers domestic processes play somewhat or economic, and mostly tend to underline
a more significant role in shaping their international principles, laws and other type
foreign agenda. However, for the similar of “moral” ideals; they also heavily rely on
reasons, it can be deduced that in the joining multinational institutions, while being
case of smaller countries, susceptible to inclined to assume neutrality.
foreign influence and with smaller capac-
ity to exercise sovereignty, external factors There are a number of other descriptions,
are those that have a bigger say in shaping
15 Vital (1967), Rothstein (1968), and Keohane (1969)
their policies. In this paper I will examine 16 Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Foreign Policies of
post-Soviet countries, vulnerable to both Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Back-
Western and Russian pressure, and less yard”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No.
capable to shape an independent foreign 2 (April 1995), p. 171.
17 Jeanne A. K. Hey, ed. ‘Small States in World
14 For more details see Katzenstein (1976), Krasner Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior,’ (Lynne
(1978), and Putnam (1988) Rienner Publishers, February 2003), p.5

12 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
which have although raised questions state which determines its ability to resist
among scholars, nevertheless are useful pressures from outside21, and the hypoth-
in the framework of this particular paper. esis on the impact of the regionalist char-
Robert Rothstein suggested the small acter of democratic transition22 should not
state is the one ‘which recognizes that it be discarded. This holds true especially
can not obtain security primarily by use of when analyzing the countries that form the
its own capabilities, and that it must rely Russia-run Commonwealth of Independ-
fundamentally on the aid of other states, ent States (CIS)23, which Moldova is also a
institutions, processes, or developments member of.
to do so.”18 Other definitions included
the description of a state whose leaders The current study claims that both the
believe they will never be able to make a weakness of these countries to effectively
significant influence on the system acting oppose foreign pressures of their former
alone or in small groups19. This factor pops metropolis, and their specific regional pat-
up further in the text, when we talk about tern of transition somewhat make the CIS
the ex-Soviet regional elites that become countries unique, when compared with
national elites and the inferiority complex other “waves” of transition, like those in
that guides their perceptions of Russia. Latin America, Southern Europe and even
in the Central Europe. If this holds true,
Foreign policy of Moldova shows different then there is a need to identify a different
trends comparing to the foreign policies of framework for analysis for post-Soviet area
Ukraine or Georgia, as all three countries countries. And then much of the scholarly
carry the influence of their individual spe- literature that advocates the dominant
cific conditions, be it the size, geography, role of internal influences over the exter-
or the way they are strategically assessed nal ones, basing their argument on other
by influential international players. However, regions experience, has less explanatory
what they have in common is their vulner- power when trying to describe the specif-
ability to the foreign influence of the Rus- ics of the post-Soviet transition. And to the
sian Federation, the methods of indirect contrary, foreign factors show to be more
aggression employed by Russia against important in influencing the success or fail-
them, and their responses. It is exactly in ure of its democratic transition.
this context that the three countries are an-
alyzed in this paper, since in order to better At present there is more than sufficient
understand the processes under scrutiny empiric evidence to not question at all
we need more than one case study, to the whether Russia is actually putting pressure
extent that they encounter foreign factors on ex-Soviet republics, and how significant
similar to those affecting Moldova. are her abilities to influence their political
choices. The question is different - how
Therefore, the argument insisting that inter- and to what extent this foreign influence
nal factors are more significant than exter- is affecting the democratic transition in
nal ones in countries ongoing democratic ex-Soviet republics, and specifically in
transition20 is not either very convincing Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia? This will
or valid in our case. The two independent be discussed further, in a separate sec-
variables, namely the structuralist aspect
21 The proximity of a stronger neighbor with both
represented by the power of the transition intention and recourses to interfere into a state’s affairs
sharply increases the chance that external factors will
18 Robert L. Rothstein, ‘Alliances and Small Powers,’ have a dominant influence on a country’s domestic
(New York and London: Columbia University Press political processes.
1968), p. 29 22 See Huntington (1991).
19 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small 23 In this instance and generally in the text I use the
States In International Politics,’ International Organiza- abbreviation CIS to emphasize that I am talking about
tion, Vol. 23, No. 2, (Spring, 1969), p. 296 all former Soviet Union countries except the three
20 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 13


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
tion. But before, it is necessary to look cal and cultural influence. They were also
more thoroughly at why Russia’s ability to actively interacting economically. In other
influence these three countries is so sig- words over an extended period of history
nificant, and considerably overweighs the they experienced intensive and complex
foreign influence of the West, namely that interactions with the West.
of the United States and especially the in-
fluence of the European Union. Being either direct neighbors or colonies,
they become linked through interdepend-
ence ties and mechanisms. As a result
Regionalism and of these interactions there were created
regions representing social and cognitive
Interdependence constructs, rooted in political practice.26
Similar conditions that contributed to the
The existing international relations literature
development and consolidation of de-
on regionalism and interdependence pro-
mocracies in the West have facilitated the
vides useful and powerful insights on why
democratic transition in their ex-colonies
Russia has a stronger say in our subject
and that of their immediate neighbors.
countries. It also explains the differing na-
ture of transition in the ex-Soviet republics
By the same token ex-Soviet republics ex-
comparing to other democratic transition
perienced centuries of Russian influence,
cases. Regionalism is the concept that
first when included in Russian Empire, later
accounts for the specifics of the historic
as a part of the Soviet Union, and now as
experience of our target countries. As Kan-
CIS members. The West has nourished
ishka Jayasuriya has put it:
its democratic traditions over a period of
natural and gradual historic development.
Regionalism is a set of cognitive practices
Russia has always had an authoritarian po-
shaped by language and political dis-
litical culture and a centralized political sys-
course, which through the creation of con-
tem, which were obviously reflected on her
cepts, metaphors, analogies, determine
satellites. It is exactly in this context that
how the region is defined; these serve to
the Huntington’s “snowball effect”, which
define the actors who are included (and
refers to the spread of democracy from
excluded) within the region and thereby
one country to its neighbors, can function
enable the emergence of a regional entity
in the opposite way, promoting authoritari-
and identity24.
anism from one power center to its satel-
lites. This means, the snowball concept
It is obvious that post-Soviet space car-
provides an explanatory framework for the
ries the weight of a dissimilar cultural and
spread of authoritarian governing practices
historical experience in comparison with
from Russia to its neighboring conquered
other regions on whose transition experi-
territories. For this reason the former Soviet
ence the Western development agencies25
republics lacked fundamental prerequisites
are basing their strategies. Southern and
that favored and promoted democratic
Central Europe and even Latin America
development in the countries to the West,
had more interaction with the West, which
and instead carried the legacy of totalitar-
was the pioneer on the path of democratic
ian control and Soviet imperial rule.27
transition and consolidation. Regardless
the nature of their connection with Western
The post-Soviet countries had almost
Europe they were subjected to its politi-
none, or very limited historic trace of state-
24 Kanishka Jayasuriay, ‘Singapore: The Politics of hood over the last few hundred years. And
Regional Definition’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No.4 the very short flake of independence they
(1994), pp. 411-420.
25 The paper refers to both governmental agencies 26 Katzenstein (2000, 354)
such as DFID, USAID, SIDA, and to non-governmental 27 Motyl (2004)
as UNDP, CRS, etc. are.

14 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
have experienced after the collapse of the culture of post-Soviet countries even
Russian Empire did not help them much today. And these details were certainly
in the context of state-building. This has indicative of the new national elites’ in-
contributed to the strengthening of the cul- grained fear of Russia, their complex of
ture of mass submissiveness and fate-ac- inferiority towards Moscow, and especially
ceptance, because they lacked any fresh their preconception that their young states
collective memory of successful rebellions cannot resist Russia’s pressure. It is only in
against oppressors. Then, the massive this instance that domestic politics, beliefs
collectivization that the former Soviet re- and norms to some degree shaped the
publics underwent and the specifics of the elites and consequently their countries’
Soviet system did not allow developing the behavior in international affairs. The new
spirit of personal initiative and the feature national leaders were afraid to oppose
of individuality in their people, or severely Moscow’s pressure and in many instances
subverted these processes. This experi- responded either passively or conceded.
ence had a tremendous effect on Moldo- Hence, instead of working on consolidat-
va’s and other ex-Soviet republics political ing their country’s sovereignty, they have
culture, which survived pretty much intact built its foreign dependence and vulnerabil-
to our days. Add to it the fact that elites, ity towards Russia.
who generally play a key role in transition,
did not change. They only changed their Moldova, but also Ukraine and Georgia,
hats, transforming overnight from regional are facing severe challenges at present,
Soviet administrators into national elites. because of many mistakes they have done
As a result the only difference with these so far in their bilateral relations with Russia.
“new” national elites was that they did not Moldova, like Georgia, is tied up with the
get anymore orders and instructions from agreements on the secessionist region it
Moscow. And even if that did happen, they has signed with Russia under Moscow’s
already had certain liberty to ignore them. pressure. Ukraine is also facing similar dif-
ficulties in regard to the agreements on the
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union stationing of the Russian Fleet in the Black
caught the Union’s republics with virtually no Sea, and on the status of Crimea region.
effective government in regard to the way However, these are not the only serious
their foreign policies were conducted. The challenges that our subject countries are
new elites, which functioned earlier only as facing.
regional administrators had no ideas how to
employ state’s foreign policy tools like diplo- The generations that grew up and received
macy, military and secret services. In fact, their life experience during the Soviet Un-
speaking in M. Oakeshott’s terms “the office ion are still alive. There are a significant
of authority” was very unqualified to run a number of people in Moldova and other
state, and did not have an effective and fully post-Soviet countries, whose cultural iden-
operational “apparatus of power”28. tities are dominated by their Soviet experi-
ence. The Russian language is most com-
These may explain why micromanage- mon lingua franca, especially in Moldova
ment29 is so wide-spread in the institutional and Ukraine, where the majority of people
speak this language. It is of no surprise
28 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘The Vocabulary of a Mod-
ern European State,’ Political Studies, Vol. 23 (June and
then, that there still exists an awareness of
September 1977), 319-341, 409-414 togetherness among people30 living in the
29 In this context the notion of micromanagement is used regions of the former Soviet Union.
to explaine the management style of managers when they
show an exaggerated control over the work and actions
of their subordinates. They try to avoid delegating any 30 David B. Knight, ‘Identity and Territory: Geographi-
decision-making power at all to managers of lower cal Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,’
levels, which affects their initiative, creative thinking and Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
prevents the development of professional experts. Vol. 72, No. 4, (December 1982), pp. 518

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 15


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Apart from political and economic, the Russia, which elevated its opposition to
social and cultural ties based on shared the Western presence in the CIS. As a re-
ideas and mindsets are very solid. This is sult, that expansion of EU and US into CIS
another influential variable that contributes has also caused a both quantitative and
to the consolidation of the “post-Soviet” qualitative growth of Moscow’s activities
region. It is a region that represents a and efforts to strengthen its position, while
social construction, and which, citing Al- instantly trying to reduce the influence of
exander Murphy, is ‘necessarily ideologi- the Western actors.
cal and no explanation of its individuality
or character be complete without explicit While the United States and the European
consideration of the types of ideas that Union are investing considerable efforts
developed and sustained in connection to have a bigger role in the post-Soviet
with the regionalization31.’ A very good space, they are still at disadvantage com-
example that emphasizes the importance paring to Russia. The key element in this
of the regionalism in post-Soviet space is argument is that United States and EU are
the Eurovision song context, where the jury only at the beginning of building stronger,
until very recently was only represented by long-term ties with the countries from the
people from different countries. There was area, which over the time may evolve into
not a completely ungrounded critique that stronger interconnection mechanisms and
the results of this contest are not as much lead to changing the existing regional inte-
based on the performance of artists, as gration pattern.
are in line with the political preferences of
the voting people32. However Russia has already consolidated
a plethora of leverages that it uses to un-
Consequently there are many mechanisms dermine the efforts of Moldovan, Ukrain-
and tools that Russia can consider and ian and Georgian governments to move
assess as to their efficiency in influencing closer to the West. In other words, while
the policy choices of the political leader- the West is offering these countries sig-
ship in CIS countries. With the extension nificant benefits of cooperation that will be
of the European Union which has brought felt only in long-term perspective, Russia
its borders closer to the CIS, and the raise is threatening them with deprivation of the
of the energy security issue on the political basic things necessary for their daily life
agenda of the West, both the US and EU at the very moment. Moscow created and
have increased their economic and politi- is continuously sustaining a strong inter-
cal presence in the area. On one side this dependency with Moldova, although of a
brought positive changes for ex-Soviet re- sharp asymmetrical character. It controls
publics, which declared their goal to inte- the flow of key commodities and misuses
grate into the West. But on the other side its position of the main trade partner, which
it provoked an increased counteraction of is a pressure on the Moldovan population
and consequently on politicians. Russia
31 Alexander B. Murphy, ‘Regions as Social Con- is also able to threaten the very basis of
structs: the Gap Between Theory and Practice,’
Progress in Human Geography, 1991, Vol. 15, No. 1,
these states’ survival, sustaining separatist
pp. 23-35 structures and igniting more ethnic dis-
32 For example during the finals of the Eurovision- content on their territories33. At the same
2008, the way Russia has scored the highest number
of points (8,10, and 12) fits with the regionalism 33 In Georgia Russia sustains the two separatist
principles. It got 12 points from countries like Estonia, conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Moldova it
Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Armenia, 10 backs the Transnistria separatist regime, with funds and
points from Moldova and Serbia, and 8 points from other resources. Russia sends its public functionaries on
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Montenegro. This tendency lengthy duty trips both to Moldova and Georgia, where
was very similar in other years of the contest and in the they councel the rebel regions’ administrations. In
case of other countries. For details see Eurovision-2008 Ukraine Moscow inflates and exploits ethnic divisions
web page at http://www.eurovision.tv/page/the-final- between Russians and Ukrainians, a trend which is
2008 especially visible in the case of Crimea region.

16 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
time there is a deep-rooted feeling among players (US, EU, international organiza-
Russian policymakers that their country will tions), they are by far less motivated than
not be able to revive as a strong influential Russia is. The so-called “Near Abroad”35
global player without controlling its former represents the top priority of the Russian
satellites. And there is strong indication foreign policy, as also confirmed by the
that this has become the sacred goal of Russian former president Vladimir Putin.
the Russian foreign policy for the foresee- To the contrary, the efforts of the United
able future. States and European Union to increase
their presence in CIS are dispersed, vary-
The socially constructed regionalism and ing in their degree and intensity from one
the asymmetric interdependence describ- target country to another, and it stays
ing Russia’s relations with many of its considerably lower on their political agen-
former satellites are able to explain the das. As a result, the volume of resources
advantage and influence that she has in deployed by Moscow “qualitatively” over-
the CIS. It requires significant additional weighs36 those used by the West, while
efforts on the side of the Western partners also the stakes are much higher on the
to upset this advantage. And for the time Russian side.
being it does not seem likely that EU and
US, except for some separate cases, are The importance of stakes in a conflict was
willing to put enough effort and resources to a significant extent researched dur-
into this endeavor. On the top of it, many in ing the Cold War. They were mostly used
the West are rather skeptical that they are to understand ‘the relationship between
able to do anything about the Russian in- the value of the objective sought and the
fluence; they see it as an unalterable trend, costs involved in its attainment’37, being
and not having key interests at stake, are employed especially while developing the
ready to accept the status quo. deterrence strategies. Nonetheless, I am
using it for better understanding of why
Considering that regionalism and result- Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet area
ing interdependence are far from being is qualitatively and quantitatively stronger.
irreversible phenomena - they are socially
constructed and politically contested While Russian influence is perceived by
processes - this makes them open to many countries in the region as negative,
change34. Yet, in order to be able to inflict in contrast with what is perceived as a
changes, there is need for a more thor- benign influence of the West, the Rus-
ough understanding of the advantages sia’s ability to get what it wants in CIS is
that benefit Russia in what may become 35 It is a commonly used expression in both Russian
a competition with the West for regional academic and political circles, describing the countries
influence. The following section will provide of the former Soviet Union.
a more elaborated coverage of the ways 36 The idea refers to the nature of the political systems
in subject countries, lacking the necessary institutional
Russia exploits the regionalism factor. checks and balances, governed by corrupt elites, which
predate on the state resources on the expense of the
The Mystery of Russian citizenry. While the resources donated by the West and
international organizations are targeted at contribut-
Influence ing to democratic development for public good, i.e. in
Moldova Russia buys out local economic and political
Let us look into the first criterion, which elites, subverting them, and building up dependency
makes for the vulnerability of our subject mechanisms that are based on elites’ private interests.
On the top of it, these private interests are of a long-
states to foreign influence. While there ex- term nature, which further increases the ability of Rus-
ists a certain influence on the side of other sia to manipulate and control the domestic elites.
34 Peter J. Katzestein quoted in Edward D. Mansfield 37 Kauffman quoted in Vesna Danilovic, ‘The Sources
and Helen V. Milner, ‘The New Wave of Regionalism,’ of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence, The
International Organization, Vol.53, No.3, (Summer Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3, (January
1999), pp. 591 2001), p. 347

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 17


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
nevertheless stronger. Exactly because contribution to the Soviet military-industrial
Russia’s elite attaches such a tremendous complex, some providing spare parts and
importance to its role in the CIS space, this others providing final products. If, for ex-
has objectively increased their stakes, and ample, a submarine was built at a shipyard
attracted more resources, commitment, in Soviet Socialist Federative Republic of
and especially resolve. For Kremlin this Russia, it would get the necessary compo-
is not only a reputation matter, but also a nent parts from Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus,
matter of rebuilding what they perceive as and so on. A somewhat similar situation
the “greatness of Russia”. In a similar fash- was observed in the civilian industry sec-
ion, international organizations have fewer tor.
stakes and therefore apply less effort to
affect economic and political transition in It is significant to mention that among the
the post-Soviet countries. More than that, first enterprises that Russian government
their actions are less focused and are also or its controlled companies have pur-
limited by various institutional constrains, chased in the former Soviet republics were
by international and domestic laws, which the elements of the old military-industrial
do not exist in the case of Russian foreign complex. In Moldova the Russian state
policies. machine-building enterprise “Salyut”, which
produces among others engines for the
The existing regional multifaceted con- newest Russian jetfighters of MIG and Su-
nections that were erected during the khoy types, purchased the Chisinau-based
Soviet Union and survived until our days “Topaz” company and the “Pribor” plant
represent the pivotal factor that determines in Tighina, which used to work for Soviet
the unchallenged character of the Rus- defense industry. In 2006, at a moment
sian influence in the post-Soviet area. A of a strain in Russian-Ukrainian relations,
significant number of the old, Soviet-time Moscow withdrew from the common An-
military, political, economic, social and 70 military transport aircraft project with
cultural links are still present. This hap- Ukrainian “Antonov” design bureau. While
pened due to both the effort of Russia to officially the reason was that Russia al-
preserve them, and in many instances due ready had its own military transport aircraft
to the reluctance and the lack of interest IL-76, this did not explain why then they
on the side of the West to replace these joined the project initially. Many Russian
connections. As a result the multifaceted analysts explained that decision of the
interaction with Russia is still considerably Russian government by the fact that Kiev
more intense than with other actors, which started to hardly push the NATO accession
places countries like Moldova, Ukraine, issue on Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda.
Georgia and other CIS members within a
common political region with their former The vulnerability of Moldovan economy
metropolis. It has been a top Russian pri- to external shocks, namely to Russian
ority to increase this intraregional flow of trade and economic pressures, became
interactions. obvious in 2005-2006. Then the Russian
The way Soviet economy was designed to National Security Council together with the
function has made this significantly easier Russian government and the State Duma
for Moscow. The Soviet economic-indus- have agreed to use a “complex pressure
trial system was built so that it provides an mechanism” against Moldova and Georgia.
indispensable role for the Soviet republics. As a result Russia has banned the import
All republics were elements of a common of Moldovan agriculture products and
economic structure, characterized by inef- wine38, while also banning the import of
ficiency of its economic performance but
38 New York Times, “A Russian ‘Wine Blockade’
by a strong interdependence. They were against Georgia and Moldova,” 6 April 2006, http://
connected through energy and raw mate- www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/world/europe/06russia.
rial supply networks, each making certain html

18 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Georgian wines and mineral waters39. In a tributed to Ukraine in the West.
last year interview the Georgian Minister of
Interior Vano Merabishvili has claimed that It is worth mentioning that while this pres-
during a casual meeting in Vienna with a sure attempts have worked to an extent or
Russian Federal Security Service depart- another with these three countries, it failed
ment chief, the latter insisted that Russia with Azerbaijan. When Russia’s state-
embargo cost Georgia close to $1 billion. run gas monopoly Gazprom more than
Apparently, the Georgian official intended doubled the prices of gas for Azerbaijan
to describe the Russian embargo as a in December 2006 in response to Baku
deliberate punitive action, at the same time selling gas to Georgia, and by this un-
stating that his country’s wine export to dermining Kremlin economic pressure on
Russia did not go over $65 million40. Tbilisi, Azerbaijan responded by refusing
to buy the Russian gas43. It also halted the
Russia also occupies a very favorable oil supplies to Russia through the Baku-
position as the monopolistic natural gas Novorossiysk pipeline, explaining the move
exporter to Moldova, Ukraine and Geor- by the necessity to use the oil for fueling
gia. All three countries are more or less the domestic electricity plants that previ-
extremely dependent on the Russian gas, ously were powered by the Russian gas.
with Georgia covering an insignificant This is a very descriptive example of how
part of its needs from its own resources, differently are placed various post-Soviet
while Ukraine is able to make up for some states as far as their foreign dependency
35% of its needs in natural gas out of its on Russia and therefore their vulnerability
own reserves41. The Soviet-time pipelines is concerned. It also suggests that if the
infrastructure is also playing a significant West would support Moldova, Ukraine,
role, since it makes it more difficult for the and Georgia to diminish the effects of the
countries to diversify their natural gas sup- Russian pressure, the latter will be less
plies. At different instances Russia has effective, and would allow the ex-Soviet
used this vulnerability unscrupulously and republics a larger margin of maneuver in
without hesitation in order to put pressure their foreign policy.
on all three countries. The gas conflict with
Ukraine managed to gain a large media However apart from the focus on economic
coverage and provoke public outcry in the interaction, there is also a significant com-
West. This might be explained either by mon identity connection among Russia,
the logical connection of this incident with Moldova and Ukraine. The backbone of this
the Ukraine’s increasing pro-European and link is represented by citizenry of Russian
pro-NATO stance after the change of politi- origin, and those that were subject to the
cal elite during the “orange revolution”, the Soviet education and indoctrination. Both
impact of the gas cut-offs on the European in Moldova and Ukraine this constitutes a
energy security42, or by the importance at- significant portion of the total population.
39 BBC News, “Russia Banks Georgian Mineral
While the influence of the latter factor will
Water,” 5 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ decrease with the change of generations,
europe/4976304.stm the influence of the former is a powerful re-
40 Kommersant, “Georgian Interior Minister: Russia ality, which should not be discarded. Many
Pushing Abkhazia,” 28 May 2008, http://www.kommer- citizens of Russian origin in post-Soviet
sant.com/p896961/Russian-Georgian_relations/
41 The CIA World Factbook 2008, “Ukraine:
states share a strong loyalty towards Rus-
Economy”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ sia, even though they hold different citizen-
the-world-factbook/geos/up.html#Econ ships. They connect to Russia, preferring to
42 The Guardian, “Russia Turns off Supplies to Ukraine
in Payment Row, and EU Feels the Chill,” 2 January Studies, 16 January 2006, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/
2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/02/ pdfs/comment_0106.pdf
russia.ukraine. For a more detailed account of these 43 Eurasianet.org, “Russian Ties with Azerbaijan Reach
events see Jonathan Stern “The Russian-Ukrainian Gas New Lows,” 25 January 2007, http://www.eurasianet.
Crisis of January 2006”, Oxford Institute for Energy org/departments/insight/articles/eav012507.shtml

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 19


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
view itself as a part of what they perceive to through using complex political technolo-
be a reviving, great, powerful and influential gies45, and by considering local political
in international affairs Russia. culture, which by and large is derived and
built upon the shared Soviet cultural herit-
This connection is especially strong with age.
the people that do not speak any other
language except Russian. The language To sum everything up, the effectiveness
barrier does not allow them the access to of Russia in putting pressure and influenc-
alternative sources of information except ing the policy choices of Moldova (less
those in Russian language. As a result they of Ukraine and Georgia), derives from the
are getting a one-sided view of the ongoing Chisinau’s systemic dependence on Rus-
events in an informational space completely sia. While researchers often compare the
dominated by Russian government-control- overall level of foreign trade with either
led media outlets. While generally this is not Russia or Western countries, attempting to
so prominent in all former Soviet republics, assess the economic dependence factors,
it is a key feature in the separatist regions this is not exactly an accurate method. To
of Georgia and especially Moldova. The make a parallel with the interdependency
self-proclaimed authorities in Transnistria description of Keohane and Nye, the ef-
are using their security services to block fects of transactions on a dependence
the distribution in Transnistrian region of the relation will vary based on the constraints
printed media from the right bank, employ- or costs associated with them46. And while
ing Soviet-type military equipment to jam Moldova can survive without certain prod-
any electronic media transmissions of Chisi- ucts or transactions coming from the West,
nau to the left bank area, or prohibiting lo- it will confront extremely high economic
cal cable television operators to accept TV and political costs if the flow of natural
channels from the right bank of Dniester44. gas during winter is stopped. Beyond this,
there are a number of shady mechanisms
At the same time the bulk of the popula- used by Russian elites to exercise control
tion in the post-Soviet space is still receiv- over Moldovan, Ukrainian and Georgian
ing news from the electronic media. New national elites, which will be explored more
media is more popular among younger in detail in a separate section on indirect
generation and the population employed in aggression.
the cities, in the public sector and among
better paid segments of the private sector. The opponents may argue that Euro-
However even in the Internet the Russian pean Union has also launched a number
sources are preferred both because of the of mechanisms in order to increase its
language issue and since they offer a very stance in the three countries under scru-
active and detailed coverage of the events tiny. Among those Moldova is benefiting
in the whole post-Soviet space. While from the European Neighborhood Policy47
Western media provides coverage of the 45 For an excellent account of the political technologies
area tailored for the Western public, the employed by Russian elites to manipulate and shape
Russian government-controlled media pro- public opinion see Andrew Wilson, ‘Virtual Politics:
vide news for the local audience, through Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World,’ (New
its numerous local bureaus and offices, Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2005).
Even though the author refers in his book to those
employing a number of local correspond- technologies as mostly used for electoral purposes, they
ents. Therefore Russian news often better are used also routinely by the Kremlin-controlled media
resonates with the local audiences than do outlets to promote official viewpoints, or to discredit
the Western-produced news, being crafted Kremlin’s opponents, at home and abroad.
46 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘Power and
44 Last year the Moldovan Communist Party-controlled Interdependence,’ (Longman, 2000, 3rd Ed.), p.8
NIT TV Channel was allowed by Tiraspol authorities to 47 For details on ENP see the European Commission
be present for a short time in Transnistria, through cable web-page at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_
television. en.htm

20 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
agreement, preferential trade agreements managed. Also, the amount of funds pro-
(GSP Plus and Autonomous Trade Prefer- vided to the six countries in the framework
ences), and the Visa Facilitation agree- of that initiative is rather symbolic. There
ment. However, these are all relatively is a feeling that the project was launched
new mechanisms, which did not reach by inertia, following the joint proposal of
even close a level able to offset the Rus- Poland and Sweden, while being accepted
sian influence in these areas. The second in Brussels more out of solidarity and
problem is that they are either too broad, because of the conjuncture, which was
including even Mediterranean countries favorable to the proposal at that moment.
(ENP)48; the trade agreements pose a In fact, the project is already suffering from
number of requirements, which will take a a lack of enthusiasm showed by certain
while for the local business communities influential EU members. These pessimistic
to conform with them, and even longer to trends were well captured by the European
find new markets; while the visa agreement press.50
likewise others, has a number of flaws, that
diminish its possible positive effects. Finally it is mostly the elites who are able
to use the facilitations that EU is offer-
Further, EU does not seem to have an effi- ing Moldova and other countries. This
cient mechanism to assess and offer feed- does not impact significantly the existing
back on its programs targeted at the post- regionalism factor, because ordinary peo-
Soviet countries. The intentions behind ple have the easy choice of a bird in the
these initiatives are good, while the results hand or the two in the bush. They either
are not getting even close to what it is ex- accept the petty benefits offered by Rus-
pected. A telling example in this regard is a sia, however trappous they seem to be, or
January 2008 article written by Igor Boţan, have to refuse them and try to live with the
the executive director of the Moldovan yet impalpable benefits promised by EU.
think tank ‘Adept”. He then expressed his The next section will look into the case of
embarrassment with the way the Common Moldova, providing further details into its
Visa Application Center in Moldova func- transition process, its vulnerabilities and
tioned and with its excessive, sometime the factors that facilitate the influence of
even humiliating procedures49. While this Russia on Chisinau policy options.
may not be anymore the case, it however
provides an example of the shortcomings
of EU initiatives at their incipient stages.

In the same line, the Eastern Partnership


initiative launched recently by the Europe-
an Union in Prague, Czech Republic, cre-
ates the impression that EU started to pay
bigger attention towards some post-Soviet
countries. Nevertheless that program cur-
rently exists only on paper, and would be
able to show an impact not earlier than
few years from now, and only if efficiently

48 This may have been solved by the launching of the


“Eastern Partnership” project, however at this incipent
stage of the initiative it is premature to draw any
conclusions.
49 Igor Botan, ‘Visa Facilitation Agreement: Beer for
Members of Trade Unions Only?!,’ Association for Par- 50 See the Euro|topics Press Review, “New Friends
ticipatory Democracy ‘Adept’, 30 January 2008, http:// to the East,” 6 May 2009, http://www.eurotopics.net/
www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/political/20080130 en/presseschau/archiv/archiv_results/archiv_article/
DOSSIER49929-New-friends-to-the-east

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 21


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
THE CASE OF MOLDOVA
The Essence of Post-Soviet should take place. It has to be emphasized,
Transition that in order for the transition to start, and
successfully progress, there has to be a
Since the study focuses mostly on the in- pressure on the elites coming from the or-
direct aggression techniques that Russia dinary people, which gives the former the
uses in the post-Soviet space, the country impetus to promote democratic reforms. In
specifics are less important. The tools and case there is no push from the bottom, while
techniques used by Russia to influence the the elites do not feel the urge to promote
democratic transition in Moldova are very changes, they will feel less tension to move
much similar to those used against Ukraine forward and upset the status quo, which
and Georgia. Moldova’s model of post-So- they usually are inclined to preserve. This
viet transition is a rather representative case trend to resist changes is especially promi-
in this regard, as it fits the analytic model of nent when the old elites remain in power,
a country that has voiced the political will and they keep the strong connections with
to integrate with the West, and at the same the Communist past. Earlier in the text, in
time is one of the countries most vulnerable the section on regionalism and interdepend-
to the Russian pressure. Among the three ence this was pointed to as a process taking
countries mentioned in this study, Moldova place in the CIS countries.
seems to be the most vulnerable one, allow-
ing for a very complete overview of the indi- Therefore, the study claims that in Moldova
rect aggression tools that Russian Federation the transition process did not pass even the
employs against its former satellites. first stage, which supposes the liberalization
of the authoritarian regime. What has hap-
The study will not hold the primacy in insist- pened in Moldova is that the country has
ing that CIS states in fact did not underwent switched from a totalitarian to a more lenient
democratic transition per se. And by this I do authoritarian system, which encountered
not only suggest there was no visible result sporadic, inconsistent and non-sustained
of the process. The three-step development, patterns of relatively pluralist elections. These
which is usually associated with democrati- were possible because the competition was
zation and which includes the liberalization of between few segments of the old Com-
authoritarian regimes, transition through mul- munist elites relatively equal in power, which
tiparty elections, and consolidation through made efforts to manipulate the elections in
the strengthening of the of democratic insti- their own ways. And when one segment of
tutions and culture51 in fact did not really take these elites upset the balance of power in
place in the CIS countries, if exposed to a 2001, it consolidated the authoritarian char-
bigger scrutiny. Considering the opinion that acter of the system, making the democratic
transition is an open avenue, and an ongo- reverse obvious, and hindering any possible
ing process that can suffer both progress development and consolidation of demo-
and regress, there is still an implication that cratic institutions in state.
in the start it has to be present a certain will,
a request, or if one wishes a realization on The post-Soviet states were created on the
the part of the population that certain reforms ashes of the disintegrating Soviet Union.
While in other countries in Central Europe
51 Charles Krupnick, ‘Expecting More From Democ- their transition was based on these coun-
racy in Central and Eastern Europe,’ The Whitehead
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, tries shaking off their communist systems,
Summer/Fall 2005, p. 150 this was not the case in the post-Soviet

22 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
newly emerged states52. The collapse of have never got over 9% of votes in national
the USSR was due to nationalistic waves in general elections.
the former Union’s republics, and the revolt
over what was perceived as a humiliat- To explain the transition process, many re-
ing exploitation by Russia. It was directed searchers give preference to the elite-centric
not at the communist system but at Rus- theories, albeit placing the elites as drivers
sians. However even this nationalism was of transition changes. Provided our cases
not a deeply rooted feeling, but instead a when old, local communist elites remained
temporary mental obsession instigated, in power, and did not experience strong
sustained and directed by the local Popu- pressure from the bottom to promote transi-
lar Front movements and party elites. The tion, they preferred to keep the status quo.
fronts themselves were created in the Union On the other side, the balance of domestic
republics in the late 1980s with the pur- power was to a degree or another in their
pose of sustaining the perestroika policy of favor, comparing to possible competitors,
Mikhail Gorbachev, according to the former so they had to make only little compromises
Secretary of the Communist Party of the with their internal challengers. This resulted
Latvian SSR Boris Pugo53. Gradually the in mostly autocratic, or when the pressure of
local party nomenklatura exploited and challengers was more significant, in uncon-
directed the nationalist movements to get solidated, unstable regimes54, which different
popular support against the central au- scholars labeled differently: ‘partial democra-
thorities in Moscow. This in fact led to the cies’, ‘proto-democracies’, ‘illiberal democ-
collapse of the empire due to the rebellion racies’55, ‘feckless democracies’, ‘façade
of the local, republics’ party elites against democracies’, or most recently ‘democracy’s
the central party functionaries. In due time doubles’ and ‘directed democracies’56, but
the nationalism feelings have faded away, which in fact had little in common with a de-
retained only in soft forms, and mostly mocracy.
among the marginal radicals. In Moldova,
already starting mid 1990s, nationalists Just let us look at some facts. It was Mircea
Snegur who stayed in power in Moldova
52 Baltic States were a different case, both because to
a significant extent they did replace their communist
after the collapse of USSR. Until 1989 he
elites, due to their historic experience, which again was used to be the Secretary of the Central
different from these of other Soviet republics. Even Committee of the Communist Party (CC CP)
during the Soviet Union they were always considered in Moldova, and then Chairman of the Pre-
as a separate case, preserving a flavor of Western cul- sidium of the Supreme Soviet of Moldova,
ture, based on their dissimilar regionalism experience.
Also after the collapse of the Soviet Union they were
before becoming the first Moldovan presi-
the only post-Soviet states to get such an organized dent57.
and intense support from the western states, especially
from the Nordic ones. This support sustained the efforts He was replaced as president of Moldova in
of the non-communist elites to promote a democratic 1996 by Petru Lucinschi, who worked first in
transition.
53 Several different online sources claimed that accord-
the CC CP in Tajikistan, returning to Moldova
ing to the Latvian newspaper “Telegraph”, Boris Pugo
54 Michael McFaul 1963-, ‘The Fourth Wave of De-
stated that the Latvian Popular Front was created “to
mocracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions
strengthen perestroika in Latvia”. See Kompromat.lv,
in the Postcommunist World,’ World Politics, Vol. 54, No.
‘KGB wearing smoking the Daugavpils-way’ [KGB v
2 (January 2002), pp. 212-244.
smokinge po-daugavpilsski], 25 November 2004, http://
55 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracies,’
www.kompromat.lv/index.php?docid=readn&id=1353
Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997, http://
and D.Minzarari, S. Niculin and V. Solovyov, ‘The Role
www.foreignaffairs.org/19971101faessay3809/fareed-
of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian Conflict.
zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy.html
Part I: The Decline of URSS and the Soviet leadership
56 Ivan Krastev, ‘Democracy’s “Doubles”,’ Journal of
conspiracy’ [Roli Rossiiskoi Federatii v Uregulirovanii
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 52-62
Pridestrovskogo Konflikta. Chasti Pervaya: Upadok
57 That made him until 1989 the party leader of Mol-
SSSR i Zagovor Tsentra], Eurasianhome.org, 4 April
dovan Soviet Socialist Republic. For more details see
2007, http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mircea_Snegur.
xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=1031 (in Russian).

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 23


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
in 1989 to become the Secretary of CC CP Moldova and its conflict in the eastern part
of Moldova, and then he left for Moscow in of the country, which on the top of it involves
1991, spending the last years of the USSR strategic Russian interests, did not allow for a
working in the Communist Party Central stronger involvement of the Western actors.
Committee of the Soviet Union58. The lack of it prevented the creation of a
stronger impetus for its democratic transition
Lucinschi was replaced as president of process, like it happened in the Baltic States.
Moldova by Vladimir Voronin, who during the The trend continues to a considerable extent
last years of the Soviet Union was the Minis- today. Moldova is benefiting of significantly
ter of Interior of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist less attention from the West, comparing to
Republic, and then in 1991 he graduated Ukraine and Georgia. This happens both on
from the Academy of the Ministry of Interior the policy level and at the level of percep-
of the Soviet Union. Shortly after this, in tions among the Western public, which is
1993, Voronin became the co-president of influenced by local media. When in Janu-
the Organizational Committee aiming the ary 2006 Russia has completely cut off the
creation of the Communists Party of already natural gas supply consecutively to Ukraine
independent Republic of Moldova (CPRM). and Moldova, the latter got much less atten-
Then, in 1994, he was elected as the Sec- tion both in the Western media, and in the
retary of CPRM, and already in 1998 he policy dialogs. Obviously this is because of
became a Member of Parliament59. Vladimir certain objective reasons, like the fact that
Voronin was elected president of Moldova the gas cut off to Ukraine has affected some
in 2001, after Lucinschi dissolved the Parlia- eastern EU members, since the pressure
ment, and then reelected in 2005. in their pipes dropped. However, there are
also many subjective factors that underline
Very similar development was witnessed in the fact that Moldova is considerably lower
Ukraine where Leonid Kravciuk, a member of on the list in the foreign policy agenda of
the Ukrainian Politburo was in 1994 replaced the United States and the European Union.
by Leonid Kuchma, who was also a high Moldova in their view is less important, since
placed functionary in the structure of the Com- it is smaller in territory than Ukraine, and
munist Party, and served two terms as presi- does not play a similar strategic role in its
dent. In Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, an region that Georgia plays in the Caucasus.
ex-Minister of Interior of Georgia, ex-Secretary At the end of the day it is this judgment that
of the Georgian Communist Party, ex-Minister shapes the foreign policy of the Western
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, he joined the countries towards Moldova.
Georgian politics in 1992 to become Georgia’s
president in 1995, and afterwards stayed two However Chisinau gets more attention from
terms in power as president. Moscow, where a certain segment of the
Russian political elite believes Moldova is a
Besides this, returning to Moldovan case, it pivotal state60 in the quest towards preserv-
is very telling that a party bearing the label of ing its influence in the western part of CIS.
“communist” won 40 out of 101 seats in the The idea goes that if Russia loses Moldova,
Moldovan Parliament in 1998, shortly after it then it will steadily lose its ability to influ-
was created, and then again received 71 out ence Ukraine. The Russian policy-makers
of 101 seats in 2001. believe that Moldova has a key position for
projecting power further in the South-Eastern
Discrediting Liberal Values 60 The concept of pivotal states can be traced to the
British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder. It generally
The little importance that the West placed on explains a country that due to different factors, tem-
porary or permanent, is able to “determine the fate of
58 See for details Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/ the region but also affect international stability” – see
wiki/Petru_Lucinschi Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, Paul Kennedy, ‘Pivotal
59 See Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladi- States and U.S. Strategy,’ Foreign Affairs, (January/
mir_Voronin February 1996), Volume 75, No. 1, p. 33

24 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Europe and Balkans61, which supposedly will with the events preceding the August 2008
mount additional pressure on the West, forc- war with Georgia. Then, Russian fighter shot
ing it to withdraw from the CIS. It is perceived down a Georgian UAV over the Abkhazia,
also as strategically well placed territory for Russian military railway engineers were de-
mounting pressure on Ukraine, because ployed to Abkhazia, Russians for the first
it naturally extends the belt of pro-Russian time acknowledged their ground attack
areas that surround Ukraine, starting in the aircraft have violated the Georgian airspace,
east at the border with Russia, going further - which all culminated with the short war be-
south, enfolding Ukraine in Crimea, and tween Moscow and Tbilisi.
moving then to the west to the Odessa re-
gion. In the views of Russian strategists Tran- In fact Transnistria has already been suc-
snistria is a cultural-geographic continuation cessfully used in this game when “Proryv”62,
of this strip of pro-Russian areas. Similarly, a Kremlin-funded youth organization cre-
the Transnistria region of Moldova, which is ated initially in the eastern secessionist
under the Kremlin’s control, may be used to region of Moldova, had opened its branch
export pro-Russian and separatists tenden- in Ukraine’s Crimea. “Proryv” was very ac-
cies into the neighboring regions of Ukraine, tive in promoting the idea of Transnistrian
which as a matter of fact seem to feel less separatism as well as the Russian national-
attachment to Kiev. ist ideas.

These perceptions are at least partially Russian increasingly aggressive foreign


shared by many Ukrainian politicians, who policy in post-Soviet area developed in re-
perceive Transnistria as an existent danger sponse to what Kremlin elites perceived as
to Ukraine, due to its high spill-over potential. a more active involvement of the West in the
It is difficult to assess the dangers posed CIS countries. If before this they preferred to
to Ukraine by a Moldova that underwent keep the status quo, where former satellites
“transnistrization”, meaning it became a Rus- were more or less vulnerable to Moscow’s
sian satellite. But one should not forget the foreign pressure, Russian leadership be-
centuries’ quest of Russia to obtain access came afraid that Western involvement may
to the Black Sea, which today is left fully to offset this state of affairs, increasing the abil-
the Ukrainian mercy. And Kiev is increasingly ity of ex-USSR countries to make independ-
hinting it is not going to extend the agree- ent choices. This resulted in what may be
ment on the stationing of the Russian Black assessed as a mounting confrontation for
Sea Fleet, which will expire in 2017. Having influence in post-Soviet states between Rus-
very little doubt that Russia will not give up its sia and the West. They key to the success
military presence in the Black Sea; consider- or failure in this process will be the degree of
ing the almost half-by-half division of Ukraine involvement and interest of the parts. At the
on political and cultural lines - it should be moment Russia seems by far more interest-
expected that Moldova as a satellite of Rus- ed and involved than are the United States
sia may fit well into that equation drawn by and European Union.
Russian strategists. Russia will become
more active in forcing Ukraine to allow the 62 ‘Proryv’ [Breakthrough], is a youth organization
continuous stay of its fleet in the Black Sea. created in Transnistria by secessionist authorities, with
support from Moscow, aiming the promotion of pro-
The form and extent of these efforts should Russian ideas among the youth, and the prevention of
a “colored” revolution in the region. Modest Kolerov,
be assessed in a comparative perspective
who was the head of the Department for intraregional
61 Interview with the Russian General-Colonel Leonid and cultural relations with foreign countries [Uprav-
Ivashov, contributing to the third, final article (in Rus- lenie prezidenta RF po mejregionalinym i kuliturnym
sian) of the series ,The Role of the Russian Federation sveazyam s zarubejnymi stranami] of the Russian
in Transnistrian Conflict’, Eurasianhome.org, 11 May Presidential Administration was in charge of support-
2007, http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?l ing (including financially) such organizations in the
ang=ru&nic=expert&pid=1077 ex-Soviet republics.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 25


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
From the perspective of Moldova, Ukraine their hope and belief that the West is willing
and Georgia the regional sub-system they to help them in resisting the Russian pres-
are part of is increasingly showing bi-polar sures, and forced them to look for different
confrontation features. While they generally ways of solving their problems with Moscow.
perceive the West as a benign force, they Partly, the reduced Western support may
see Russia as a more unfriendly, if not even be explained by their lack of understanding
hostile country, mainly due to its support to of the West, the insufficient communication
the secessionist tendencies on their territo- and certain domestic constraints of systemic
ries. nature, like Communist Party’s opposition
to the creation of an institutional balance in
On one side there is Russia, with what Moldova63. Apart from the fact that Moldova
seems to be a developing resurrecting is not perceived as an important country for
stance, aiming at increasing its influence in the western interests, local analysts believe
international affairs by regaining control over also that EU tried to distance itself from most
its former satellites. On the other side there is sensitive areas of the Moldovan-Russian
the United States and European Union, with relations because it was afraid Chisinau may
different interests and priorities in the CIS. try to use buck-passing64 or free-riding in its
US interests look to be of a more long-term regard.
nature, expressed in attempts to restrain any
strategic advantages that Russia main gain As a result these had a tremendous impact
by controlling Ukraine and Caucasus. The on the way Moldova has built its foreign
EU on the other side seems to be more in- policy during the last few years. A major
terested in securing a stable neighborhood, switch in Moldova’s foreign policy happened
while tolerating a degree of Russian control during the late 2005 yearly 2006 period.
over the countries at its eastern borders, as The trend became rather obvious only in the
long as it does not upset the status quo. fall 2007, after the general local elections in
EU is limited by institutional constraints, ex- Moldova. However many Western partners
pressed in the interest of some EU members failed to understand this was happening, and
to maintain a lucrative relation with Russia, that Moldova was returning into the orbit of
which plays a key role in supplying them Russia.
with energy resources. This explains in real-
ism terms why some countries benefited Because the expectations of Western sup-
of stronger support from the West than port did not match the actual support re-
Moldova did.
63 For a detailed account see Dumitru Minzarari,
‘EU-Moldova Action Plan: An Unfinished Task or a
Moldova Forced to Bandwagon Complete Failure,’ Discussion Paper no. 2, Institute for
Development and Social Initiatives, January-July 2008,
http://www.pasos.org/content/download/40268/158643/
Moldovan policymakers have already faced file/DP2_EU-Moldova_Action_Plan.pdf.
a number of disappointments in this regard, 64 In the text I use the definition of buck-passing, as the
when over the last several years they repeat- means of avoiding the costs of resisting an aggressor,
edly failed to obtain the expected political passing the burden to another state. See Glen H. Sny-
support from the western partners. This was der, ‘Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the
Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International
especially visible on the subject of Transnis- Security, Vol. 27, No.1, (Summer 2002), pp. 165
trian conflict, during natural gas and energy
cut offs, and during the high pick of conflict
with Russia when it banned the import of
Moldovan wines and other agricultural prod-
ucts.

Those and many other instances have dis-


couraged Moldovan leaders, undermined

26 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
ceived65, Moldovan policymakers begin to Russian pressure and will subordinate itself
look for other strategies to defend what they to Moscow in case the West will fail to cre-
perceived to be the national interest. As it ate a counter-pressure, capable to assist
often happens in corrupt transition societies, Moldova’s political leadership in preserving a
these were tightly intertwined with the elite’s relative independence towards Kremlin.
own personal interests. Ukraine and espe-
cially Georgia were able to balance Russia’s Experiencing the growing Russia’s influence
influence in many instances, being sup- during 2006-2007, which affected both their
ported by the West to oppose the perceived individual economic interests, but also their
source of danger from the east and north basis of political power67, Moldovan elites
respectively. Yet Moldova, lacking the ap- were faced with the choice of paying an ex-
propriate stronger ally that would allow her to tremely high political and economic price for
balance Russia, was left only with the option balancing Russia. Since neither US nor EU
to bandwagon, meaning to ally with the state showed readiness to ease this pressure by
that posed the major threat66. accepting Moldova to pass them partially or
Putting it in a simpler way, Moldova being too completely the costs of balancing Moscow,
weak to oppose external influence, it bent political leadership in Chisinau had no choice
under the strongest pressure, with its policy- but to bandwagon with Russia. In return they
makers following the path of the least resist- tried very hard to negotiate a suitable price
ance. When the cost and benefit effects of in exchange for giving up their pro-Western
the Russian pressure became significantly stance, aiming at compensating potential
bigger than those coming from the European loses and achieving cost minimization. This
Union or the United States, Moldova (and became obvious after the Moldovan local
other post-Soviet countries likewise) will elections in summer 2007, when Chisinau
choose courses of action that will benefit the improved and intensified its relations with
foreign actor perceived as being the most Moscow.
powerful. Or, Moldova will bend against the
In this particular case an additional fac-
65 On 28 June 2007, shortly after the general local tor could have been the perceptions of
elections in which his Communists’ Party has suffered
a painful blow, president Vladimir Voronin in an un-
Moldovan elites, who felt more vulnerable
precedented move invited foreign diplomats stationed when their key, survival interests were at
in Moldova to his residence in Condrita. His words stake. The local elections in the summer of
when he addressed his guests carried a bitter taste of 2007 have shown that Voronin’s Communist
disappointment; he stated that the Western partners Party was losing in popular support. At the
did not provide enough support to Moldova when it
was facing Russia alone, implying indirectly that their
same time their excessive use of admin-
financial support was not sufficient. He also cast doubts istrative resources and voters’ intimidation
whether the Western interest in the withdrawal of the methods68, aimed at compensating for these
Russian troops from Transnistria was genuine, claiming loses were criticized by the western observ-
the West used the issue of military withdrawal only to
annoy Russia. Spelled to an audience where the Rus- 67 To put pressure on Moldova, Russia has employed a
sian ambassador was also present, Vladimir Voronin number of tools, directed both at affecting the masses of
revealed his irritation at the fact that Western election people (cutting off the natural gas supplies), and at the
observers criticized the way his PCRM party misused elites’ interests (banning the import of wines and other
its position in power. It seemed his circle hoped the agricultural products, which mostly belonged to elites,
West will be soft on Voronin for the incumbent party or businesses close to the elites). The risk of balancing
elections violations if his government adopted an anti- Russia increased in summer 2007, when after suffering
Russian stance. This instance was assessed by domestic a serious blow in the general local elections, the Com-
observers as a possible sign of a change in Chisinau munists’ Party of Voronin has decided to re-employ a
foreign affairs priorities and as an attempt by Vladimir pro-Russian stance, which is expected to improve their
Voronin to accommodate Russia two days before his position in the forthcoming parliamentary elections in
meeting with the Russian president Putin. spring 2009.
66 For a more detailed account on balancing and band- 68 Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Obser-
wagoning strategies see Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance vation Mission for the 3-17 June 2007 local elections
Formation and the Balance of World Power,’ Interna- in Moldova, 21 September 2007, http://www.osce.org/
tional Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43 documents/html/pdftohtml/26372_mo.pdf.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 27


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
ers. In response Moldovan communists have akuta, the ex-speaker of the Supreme Soviet
changed their strategy. The 2007 elections of the unrecognized Transnistria, exiled to
became the warning signal that they may not Moscow by the Tiraspol leader Smirnov, who
be able to retain a majority in the Parliament seconded him as the General Secretary of
after the next elections, a condition neces- the Kremlin-sponsored “Interparliamentary
sary to safeguard their economic interests in Assembly of Unrecognized States”.70 In an
Moldova. April 2008 interview to the Russian “Nezavi-
simaya Gazeta” Marakuta stated that “Russia
They feared a new political architecture will is interested in maintaining its geopolitical in-
challenge the status quo, provoking a redis- fluence over the whole Moldova and not only
tribution of economic control and benefits, over Transnistria”71. Even the most radical
similar to what have happened in Russia Russian experts started to cherish the idea
during Putin’s rule, in Georgia after the “rose that a solution to the Transnistrian conflict
revolution”, and in Ukraine after the “orange that would strongly anchor Moldova into the
revolution”. Moldovan communists have in- Russian orbit is very much supportive of the
vested big hopes that Russia might accept Russia’s interests. Ghennadyi Konenko, who
returning Transnistria back under the control is in charge of the Moldova and Transnistria
of Chisinau and secure them the support of Department at the Institute for CIS Countries,
that pro-Russian enclave in the April 2009 has also recently expressed a very similar
parliamentary elections. In return the incum- view. His opinion was that returning Tran-
bent communist party offered to create con- snistria under the control of Chisinau, while
stitutional mechanisms that would provide respecting specific conditions, will make
Russia with convincing guarantees prevent- the secessionist region into a sort of a filter,
ing any possible attempts of Moldova to join which will prevent Moldova from entering
NATO in the long run. They also promised to NATO. Konenko’s conclusion was that such
gradually withdraw from any Western-spon- a solution would promote well the interests of
sored initiatives and in a March interview to Russian Federation72.
the Russian influential “Kommersant” maga-
zine, Moldovan president even accepted that The political system erected by the incum-
his country may leave GUAM69. bent Communist Party in Moldova had a di-
rect contributing effect to the high degree of
This new wave seemed to have met certain country’s vulnerability against the Russian in-
support among the Russian policymakers fluence. Even though formally Moldova has a
and experts. Already at the end of March parliamentary form of government, in practice
2008, the Russian State Duma adopted 70 This structure has its office in Moscow, reportedly is
a declaration on the secessionist regions Kremlin-financed and regularly assists at the meetings
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnis- of the Russian State Duma.
tria. While using a strong language against 71 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, ‘Russia Needs the Whole
Georgia and threatened with the recogni- Moldova, not only Transnistria: Moscow is Looking for
a Universal Model to Extend its Geopolitial Influence’
tion of independence of its rebel regions, it [Rossii nujna vsya Moldova, a ne toliko Pridnestrovye:
mentioned that the Transnistrian negotiations Moskva ishet universalinuju modeli dlea rasshireniya
format still has significant potential. svoego geopoliticeskogo vliyania], 28 April 2008,
http://www.ng.ru/courier/2008-04-28/15_moldavia.html
These were not the only signals suggesting 72 KM.RU, ‘Why Russia Doesn’t Want to Recognize
the Independence of Transnistria?’ [Pocemu Rossiya
that Moscow might be interested in this kind ne Hocet Priznavati Nezavisimosti Pridnestrovya?],
of deal with Moldovan communists. It used 3 June 2008, http://opinion.km.ru/opinion/index.
media outlets and low-level functionaries to asp?data=03.06.2008%2018:40:00&archive=on (audio
throw hints and express its position on that file of the interview included). The Institute for the CIS
subject. One was launched by Grigoryi Mar- Countries is a non-governmental think tank organiza-
tion lead by Konstantin Zatulin, very notorious for his
69 Kommersant, ‘My s Vladimirom Putinym Davno Po- radical, revisionist opinions, advocating the idea that
tereali Vkus k Sobstvennym Hotelkam,’, 11 March 2008, Russia can become a great power by using coercion, in
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=865338 different forms, against its former satellites.

28 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
it experienced during the 2001-2009 period structure as a variable in explaining foreign
of the Communist government a presidential policy… we must explore the extent to which
one, with all resulting explicit and implicit that structure itself derives from the exigen-
consequences. The Communist Party had a cies of the international system’.73 On one
legislative majority in the Parliament and was side it may seem that the Russian pressure
able alone to pass any law, except the con- is so effective on Moldova because it has a
stitutional ones. That is why its double hatted presidential system of government, which
chairman and President Vladimir Voronin lacking institutional checks and balances
governed Moldova as if it would have had a becomes increasingly authoritative. On the
presidential system of government. other side, I would like to point out to what
Almond refers to as Seeley-Hintze law. It
During his two terms in power Vladimir Vo- states that the higher the outside foreign
ronin has dismantled every sign of institu- pressure on a state, the less is the liberty of
tional balance that was in place before him, domestic political system.
resulting in all three branches of state power
coming under his control. The outcome of The Seeley’s conclusion that ‘given a com-
this is that now any of his personal politi- munity which has to maintain itself against
cal weaknesses or the vulnerabilities of his great difficulties and in the midst of great
group will automatically become a vulnerabil- dangers, you may expect to find in it little
ity of the entire nation. liberty and a great deal of government’, was
tested by Hintze, based on historic evidence
Given his personal and his associates’ past analysis. The latter wrote that ‘…free con-
dependencies related to their Soviet-time ac- stitutions emerged only where a number of
tivities, which I referred to earlier in the text, states existed next to each other on equal
they do attract pressure from Kremlin, which terms, the independence of each one being
has ownership of the old KGB archives. A recognized by the other…’74. Nevertheless,
second factor, contributing to the Voronin’s at one point Almond questions the utility of
team vulnerability is their individual and group the Seeley-Hintze formulation in every single
economic interests. Biggest and most lu- case75, indicating certain deviations from the
crative businesses are directly or indirectly framework of the law:
under their or their supporters’ control. And
given the regionalism trend discussed earlier, The contending powers have ideologies
these businesses are in a way or another which direct the kind of influence which they
linked to Russia. exert on the internal affairs of other powers.
Thus the pressure of the Soviet Union on
When Vladimir Putin came into power, one Eastern Europe has tended to perpetuate in-
of his first steps was to build and strengthen ternal power concentration, but the counter-
the Russian state’s control over the business pressure generated within these countries
sector, which now gave Kremlin the power is pluralistic. American external pressure on
to influence foreign companies and interests 73 Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The
that have stakes in the Russian business International Sources of Domestic Politics,’ Interna-
sector. The ban on the import of Moldovan tional Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4, (Autumn, 1978), p.
wines and agricultural products was less 882 quoted in Gabriel A. Almond, ‘The International-
directed at the Moldovan people, than at the National Connection,’ British Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 19, No. 2, (April 1989), p. 241
local elites, which had their share of interest 74 John Robert Seeley, Introduction to Political Sci-
affected. ence, (London: Macmillan, 1886), p. 131; and Otto
Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, (New
Critics may attempt to point to what they York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 164 quoted in
perceive as internal factors that describe G. Almond, ‘The International-National Connection’,
p. 242
Moldovan vulnerabilities to foreign pressure. 75 Almond, Gabriel A., ‘The International-National
However, I would like to refer to Peter Goure- Connection,’ British Journal of Political Science, vol.
vitch in answering that ‘in using domestic 19, No. 2, (April, 1989), p.245

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 29


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
other countries is often pluralistic in its inter- a regional or great power, and have limited
nal consequences. or no ability to pass the buck. Thus, this
model reflects well the realities of the situa-
However, what we could derive out of this is tion in which Moldova was caught, while the
the conclusion that the nature of the foreign presented ideas offer a powerful explana-
pressure has a very determining influence tory force for understanding the post-Soviet
on the type of regime that may emerge on transition of Moldova. The recent events
domestic arena. And what confirms my as- unfolded after April 2009 parliamentary elec-
sumption is the conclusion that an authoritar- tions, which included the anti-communists
ian regime’s pressure from outside contrib- youth protests and the violent crackdown by
utes to the consolidation of an authoritarian police and security forces on the demonstra-
government inside the country, exposed tors, are also better understood using that
to this external influence. A benign foreign framework of analysis.
influence creates conditions favorable to
the transition to a more liberal regime. This Therefore, while we do not have a significant
formulation also follows the logic of the well- volume of empirical evidence, these ideas
known democratic peace theory. are working at least in the cases of the three
countries we refer to in the paper. We could
The Almond’s hesitations do not affect the observe that after the “colored’ revolutions
above statement either. The potential of the in the post-Soviet space, when the Putin’s
pluralistic counter-pressure generated inside administration pressure on the three states
the country (in response to the authoritar- increased, we could witness a significant
ian pressure from the outside) to produce increase of authoritarianism, especially in
a more liberal regime will be inversely pro- case of Moldova. A somewhat similar trend
portional with the force and intensity of the is starting to be visible in Georgia77, while
foreign authoritarian pressure. Which means, Ukraine has faced considerable democratic
the bigger the pressure from a foreign au- backslide and domestic tensions since its
thoritarian country is, the weaker becomes “orange” revolution.
the pluralistic movement inside the targeted
country. It is so because ‘the presence of We are able to conclude at this stage that
external security threats to states can inhibit a negative, aggressive foreign influence is
and erode moves toward democracy. De- more promoting of authoritarian regimes.
mocracy can suffer setbacks during security Because of their nature, such regimes are
crises because leaders will often consolidate easier to manipulate and control from the
their own power to mobilize resources to outside. Since there is one force dominating
meet (or make) external threats.’76 the national political system, without being
constrained by other internal actors, such a
As such, authoritarian regimes will strengthen regime even attracts and encourages foreign
their grip on power by exploiting the security pressure. Building the mechanism to con-
fears of the population and then sidelining trol the leadership of a weak, authoritarian
their domestic competitors. That will con- country gives one the ability to control the
sequently oppress and dismantle pluralistic entire system of the state. This seems to be
processes in the country. And while there the main goal of the Russian foreign policy in
are voices questioning this hypothesis, in- post-Soviet area, represented by Moscow’s
sisting governments have different ways to efforts to maintain and support authoritarian
cope with foreign threats, this still seem to governments in CIS.
be exactly the case when weaker states face
77 The last two elections in Georgia (presidential in
76 William R. Thompson, ‘Democracy and Peace: January 2008 and parliamentary in May 2008) have
Putting the Cart Before the Horse?’ International shown a sharp increase in authoritarian practices being
Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 141- used by president Saakhashvili-led incumbent United
174 quoted in Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Democracy from the National Movement Party. For details see the ODIHR/
Outside-In?’ OSCE EOM final reports.

30 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
THE CHANGING NATURE
OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION

Switching to Non-Military discredit the United States in their ideologi-


Aggression cal confrontation with the West. Then the
Soviet propaganda used to largely criticize
The nature of international conflict has suf- the ‘aggressiveness of the world capital-
fered significant changes since the end of ism’ in its competition with the US over the
the Cold War. While for the most part of global influence.
the human history war was considered an
acceptable tool of foreign policy, today this Prestige also is a very important issue for
perception has underwent certain chang- today’s Russia political establishment79,
es. Due to the spread of liberal democratic and so is the international public opinion.
ideology, embraced by the most industrially The latter is perceived by researchers
developed countries that act as its influen- and policymakers alike to be the “arbiter
tial agents, the international public opinion of the history”, and a “measure as well as
is intolerant and increasingly condemning a source of power”.80 It is of no surprise
of any use of military force by the govern- then, that these are powerful incentives for
ments as an instrument of coercion. And a reviving and assertive Russia.
disregarding this change may significantly
affect the international prestige of a coun- However, there exists a strong belief of an
try, which together with other elements like obsessive force among political establish-
wealth and power creates the capacity of ment in Russia that their country cannot
a state to influence international affairs. As get back on its feet as a powerful player
Gareth Evans has put it: in international affairs, able to balance the
United States as an equal, if it does not
[T]he patterns of global conflict are different control its “Near Abroad”. Hinting to ex-
from those of the past. Traditional inter- Soviet republics, now independent states,
state war is now conspicuously rare, for a that conviction grows on the strategic cul-
number of reasons. First, in sharp contrast ture shared by the Russian leadership in
to the values of the colonial era, there is Kremlin.
now a strong global norm underpinning the
international legal proscription against ter- It is based on the Soviet strategic culture,
ritorial aggression; bellicisme, the ideology which determined the ways in which the
that saw virtue, nobility, and glory in war, Soviet leadership, including its security and
has virtually disappeared in the advanced military apparatus viewed international af-
industrialized countries.78 79 For example Russian analysts describe the incidents
at Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison as carrying “serious
Prestige is especially important for a strategic consequences”: Harlan Alman, ‘The War,
the World, and the Future’ [Voina, mir i budushee],
country that strives for the role of an inter- Eksport Voorujenii, Russian Center for the Analysis of
national influential leader. It was always a Strategies and Technologies, No. 5 (September-October
top priority even for the Soviet leadership 2004), http://www.cast.ru/journal/2004/alman/
to build up their country’s prestige and 80 Alan K. Henrikson, ‘Discussion Paper in Diploma-
cy: What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’ Netherlands
78 Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2006,
Conflict”, Foreign Policy, No. 96, (Fall, 1994), p. 3 p. 4

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 31


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
fairs and the use of military forces. There means, which were crafted and meant to
are other factors contributing to this idea, reach an unimaginable level of sophistica-
such as the “deep defense” tradition81 or tion and subtlety for the western public.
the will to recover the Soviet-time eco- Kremlin has inherited the significant experi-
nomic structure. The former is due to the ence and methodology that Soviet Union
historic experience of Russia, having huge has acquired during the proxy-wars with its
land borders that it had to defend, and as Cold War competitor. Russian elites ben-
a result the tendency to build large buffer efit from the lack of any kind of domestic
spaces between itself and the potential restriction, as there is no pressure from
enemy has emerged. the Russian public on the government to
abide by the rule of law in its foreign policy,
While there still remains some skepticism neither there is a competitive and effec-
among Russian-accommodators in Eu- tive mass-media which would reveal such
rope around the idea that Russia has the violations to the domestic audience. Rus-
obsession of controlling its former Soviet sia has a very long historic experience of
satellites, there is also an increasing un- using this sort of foreign policy tools, and
derstanding of this fact in the West. This is one of the well documented cases was
not questioned or perceived anymore as the attempt of the Russian tsar to influence
an overreaction and paranoia on the side domestic affairs at the end of nineteen
of the East-European countries, whose century in then friendly Bulgaria, which ini-
fear of Russia was until very recent seen tially failed.84
as lacking any ground. In his 2004 refresh-
ing book, Janusz Bugajski wrote in the In post-Soviet Russia the tendency for this
introduction headline the revealing phrase: kind of foreign policy comes probably from
‘near or temporary abroad?’, - stating that the early 1990s. Then Moscow, dependent
‘during the 1990s, the Kremlin sought to on the Western financial assistance, did
regain much of its influence and leverage not want to cause extra irritation that would
and to limit Western penetration in the affect this support, and to a great extent
region.’82 In a last year publication even resorted to non-conventional aggression.
the usually Russian apologist Michael There is a volume of research in the post-
Emerson admitted the ‘Russia’s bullying Soviet space providing convincing argu-
foreign policy towards its smaller neigh- ments that the post-soviet conflicts were in
bors’, and that “Russia manifestly sees fact skillfully plotted by Politburo and KGB
its national interest in sustaining tensions through political subversion and social en-
over Transnistria, Abkhazia and South gineering techniques.
Ossetia’.83
Mircea Snegur, the first president of
Moscow wants to strengthen its control Moldova, claimed that at the end of 1990
over the CIS countries but at the same he had a meeting in Moscow with Mikhail
time its political leadership is aversely Gorbacev and Anatolii Lukianov, the Chair-
against openly using military force to man of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
achieve this goal. It wants to avoid in- According to Snegur, Gorbacev told him
ternational condemnation or jeopard- angrily that if he does not sign the new
izing its quest for the title of international Union treaty, which was supposed to keep
leader. Therefore it mainly uses non-military Moldova inside Soviet Union, then he ‘will
get both Transnistrian and Gagauz repub-
81 Andrei Kokoshin, ‘Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-
lics’. Lukianov, who was present, added to
91,’ MIT Press 1998, pp. 225
82 Janusz Bugajski, ‘Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperi- it that ‘they already have one [a separatist
alism,’ (Westport: Praeger 2004), p. 1
83 Michael Emerson, ‘Time to Think of a Strategic Bar- 84 See Paul W. Blackstock, ‘The Strategy of Subver-
gain with Russia,’ Center for European Policy Studies, sion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations,’
Policy Brief No. 160, May 2008, p. 1 and 5 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).

32 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
republic] on the left bank’.85 And it was years Russian policymakers and gener-
Lukianov who through the “Soyuz” group als have learned to disguise their actions,
of the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies describing them in images and language
has coordinated and granted significant acceptable to the Western audience. Even
support to the Igor Smirnov’s secessionist though it was the instigator and a key side
group in Transnistria.86 to the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, it
claimed Russian military troops were sta-
It becomes obvious that the current in- tioned on the territories of its ex-satellites
terstate aggression model is undergoing for peacekeeping purposes. It invoked on
considerable change due to the increasing numerous occasions humanitarian justifica-
role of international public opinion, which is tions for various actions in breach of sover-
intolerable of armed aggression; and due eignty of CIS countries, and of international
to the importance of international prestige law. A good example is the deployment of
for countries that risk its significant deterio- Russian military railway troops to Abkhazia
ration when they wage military aggression prior to the August 2008 Russian-Georgian
against other states. Therefore the costs of war.
launching an armed aggression against an-
other state are too high, both politically and Apart from this Russian government has
economically, given the recent experience exploited old links with the national elites
of the United States of failing to install a to create dependency mechanisms; it has
reasonable control in Iraq and Afghanistan. attempted to influence elections results by
supporting with campaigning and money
Therefore it was clear for Kremlin that overt certain contestants; it has taken over the
or direct control over the CIS countries key sectors of the economy; it also en-
is impractical and expensive.87 Over the couraged and supported the promotion of
85 Interview with Mircea Snegur for ‘The Role of its sympathizers into high positions in the
the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian Conflict. government structures of CIS countries.
Part I: The Decline of URSS and the Soviet leadership
conspiracy’ article. In the same article there is a refer- As an example, the Transnistrian adminis-
ence to Vadim Bakatin, former KGB Chairman, who in
a 1993 interview to the Russian “Moskovskie Novosti”
tration-funded Olvia-Press news agency
newspaper has admitted that at the end of 80s KGB was has published in 2003 an article, where
creating ‘interfronts’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia among its usual propaganda mix it pro-
to oppose them to the Georgian national movement. vided some scraps of data regarding the
According to Bakatin the creation of such ‘international Moldovan National Army cooperation with
fronts’ in unruly republics aimed at dividing their soci-
eties into two irreconcilable camps.
NATO “Partnership for Peace” Program,
86 In April 1992 P. Lutenko, a senior investigator from which apparently only insiders would
the Moldovan Prosecutor Office went to Moscow to know.88 Another telling case has happened
study the file of Anatolii Lukianov, investigated for tak- shortly before president Voronin appointed
ing part in the August 1991 Russian coup that aimed at a new head of government in the early
overthrowing Gorbacev. Moldovan investigator found
in Lukianov’s personal archives an address from the
2008. On a Moldovan forum a Russian
Supreme Soviet of secessionist Transnistria request- speaking user has written that among Ti-
ing to sign with Moscow the new Union treaty as an raspol political circles the news about the
independent legal subject. The document had Luki- demission of the Tarlev government had
anov’s signature and instructions to a certain “comrade been discussed for more than two months.
Nishanov” to think over the issue and draft the strategy
on how Transnistria would be able to sign the Union’s
The post stated that Tiraspol secession-
treaty. Later, even though Chisinau has refused to take ist leadership also believed that Zinaida
part in the referendum for preserving the Soviet Union Greciannii would become the new prime
structures, Moscow has sent to Moldova the troops of
the Ministry of Interior of the USSR who together with 88 “Olvia-Press”, ‘Moldovan Iceberg: The Top and the
the 14th Army enforced the referendum in Transnistria Underwater Sides of a Neutral Country’ [Moldavskii
and also in the Gagauz-populated areas in the south of Asberg: Nadvodnaya i Podvodnaya Chasti Neitralinoi
then still Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Strany], 24 April 2003, http://www.olvia.idknet.com/
87 Bugajski (2004, 30). ol124-04-03.htm

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 33


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
minister. Few days later even many in- “political action programs”, “political op-
formed persons in Chisinau were surprised erations’, “nonforcible influence”, “indirect
to learn that Voronin indeed has proposed aggression”, and others. While all of them
the candidature of Greciannii as new head do have certain specific trends, they gen-
of Moldovan government. erally tend to describe the efforts of a state
to influence another state, by using tools
There have been a number of signals in of foreign policy, short of military force.
the form of articles both in printed and Through such subtle and unobvious tools
on-line media, pointing to leaks towards expansionist countries are aiming “to pro-
Transnistrian and Russian interested agen- mote political fortunes of forces that they
cies. If this proves to be real, that would believe will be sympathetic to their respec-
confirm the fears insisting that Moldovan tive interests and ideologies.”91
government agencies are full of people Techniques that are being used by Russia
who served in the Soviet Union and did not today against Moldova, but also against
undergo any lustration procedure, similar Ukraine and Georgia are identical to those
to those which were previously conducted used both by the United States and the
in the countries of Central Europe and in Soviet Union in their competition for influ-
Baltic States. Their presence in Moldova’s ence over the Third World countries. They
government institutions increases the were labeled by the United States in the
country’s vulnerability towards Russian late 50s of the last century as “indirect ag-
foreign influence. Moldova probably should gression” and were condemned in strong
look towards other countries that joined phrases, which stated that “the imperialis-
NATO and EU and have done a more thor- tic policies of Communist Russia have led,
ough job in fixing this problem.89 through direct and indirect aggression, to
the subjugation of the national independ-
ence of … states’.92 These methods of in-
Understanding the New direct aggression, already referred to in the
text, include financial support to the inter-
Trends of Inter-State nal pressure groups which are tasked by
Aggression aggressor state to promote policies under-
mining the sovereignty of the target state;
Due to the mentioned obstacles to the putting economic and trade pressures
overt use of military forces in regaining its aimed at squeezing economic and political
control over the ex-Soviet republics, which concessions; and applying political-military
are now independent states, Russian pressure by exploring the separatist and
Federation has relied extensively on more Russian pro-unionist tendencies, etc.
subtle tools of aggression. The way it dealt Therefore looking at the Cold War history,
with the secessionist conflicts in the area it becomes clear that the ongoing trend
of former Soviet Union was recognized by when Russia is using non-military coercive
researchers as being similar to the proxy- techniques to force ex-Soviet countries ful-
war techniques90 that were extensively filling Moscow’s will are not generally new,
employed by the two Cold War competi- but in practice represent strategies used
tors. This kind of actions has found in the before by the USSR.
literature many descriptions, including
“political subversion”, “covert operations”, Many critiques will point out that today
89 Simon Araloff, ‘The Guardians of Europe: Polish not only Russia but also EU and US alike
Secret Service Protects the Borders of the European 91 Lori Fisler Damrosch, ‘Politics Across Borders:
Union, Part VI,’ Axis Information and Analysis, 27 Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Do-
May 2005, http://www.axisglobe.com/polish123.htm mestic Affairs,’ The American Journal of International
90 Anneli Ute Gabanyi in“The Balkan Prism: A Law, Vol. 83, No. 1, (January 1989), p. 2
Retrospecti­ve by Policy-Makers and Analysts”, Deimel, 92 See Quincy Wright, ‘Subversive Intervention,’ The
Johanna; Meurs van, Wim, eds., (Munchen: Verlag Otto American Journal of International Law, Vol. 54, No. 3,
Sagner, 2007), p. 501 (July, 1960), pp. 521-535

34 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
are using this kind of tools to strengthen Ukraine and Georgia. 94
their roles in various regions of the world,
including in these countries. Nonethe- Contrary to this, there is another type of
less this looks so only in appearance and foreign influence. It follows the goal of set-
making a difference between the two ap- ting up that type of political structure in the
proaches is of a key importance. target country, which would allow for the
influencing actor to easily control the policy
I will not consider as a distinct factor choices of the influenced state, isolating
whether the target state has accepted the domestic constituencies from the par-
or not the foreign influence under certain ticipation in decision making. It promotes
form, since a dictatorship may ask for as- into power a small group or a person,
sistance from another authoritarian state to which would destroy any institutional bal-
stay in power. Likewise a government un- ance, since the more authoritarian the
dergoing democratic transition may need system, the more vertical the power rela-
assistance from other democratic countries tions are, the easier for the foreign country
to cope with transition period challenges to establish its control. As a result the
and not to allow for political extremists to targeted country develops an authoritar-
manipulate insufficiently informed or polar- ian political system, which does not allow
ized constituencies. Instead I will consider for the protection of citizens’ human rights
the two approaches, of Russia on one and freedom, and favors its political elites.
hand, and of the Western actors on other Largely, that description fits Moldova, es-
hand, by the purpose and form of their for- pecially after the parliamentary elections in
eign influence. April 2009, when Russia showed an un-
precedented support to the Communists’
On one hand there is the foreign aid or Party of Moldova. This support was given
foreign political influence aimed at as- both through declarations of the Russian
sisting a state to build its institutional leadership, but also was visible in the of-
balance, to strengthen the rule of law ficial messages of the Russian Ministry of
and institutional capacities of the gov- Foreign Affairs. One of its formal messages
ernment. They are exercised having in read that “the results of Moldovan elections
mind the creation of the necessary con- are reflecting the interests of Moldovan and
ditions for the population of the targeted Russian peoples”95.
country to “exercise their political rights
and freedom that are a component 94 There is a strong feeling shared by experts and
researchers that United States support of M. Saakhash-
part of the body of international human vili in Georgia failed over the last few years to prevent
rights law”, and targeting the promotion the raise of authoritarian tools that the incumbent party
of “constructive and nonviolent rela- is using, among them intimidation of opponents and
tions among states.” 93 It does not strive manipulation of elections. See for example Jonathan
to build a domestic government which Wheatley, “Georgia’s Democratic Stalemate,’ OnenDe-
mocracy.net, 14 April 2008, http://www.opendemoc-
would act like an agent of the foreign racy.net/node/36213/pdf and International Crisis Group
influencing power, but instead to create Report No. 189, ‘Georgia: Sliding Towards Authoritari-
the necessary framework for the people anism?’ 19 December 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/
to exercise the right for a free and an library/documents/189_georgia___sliding_towards_au-
informed choice, and force the ruling thoritarianism.pdf.
95 That phrase published on the web-page of the Rus-
elites to be more accountable to them. sian MFA on 7 April 2009 was later edited, and in its
This kind of influence is usually trans- newer version said that “the results of elections…. re-
parent, and is aimed mostly at building flect the interests of the people of our countries” (http://
institutional capacities, developing civil www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/BDD58EAFE7738317C3
society, and educating the citizenry. 25759100299AAC?OpenDocument), while its initial
version stayed unmodified on the web-page of the Rus-
And this is the influence that the West, sian state news agency Novosti Moldova, http://www.
as a rule, is targeting towards Moldova, newsmoldova.ru/news.html?nws_id=812785, accessed
93 Ibid, p. 6 on 26 May 2009.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 35


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Therefore, the difference in purposes of satellites into Western institutions will cre-
foreign influence is either to control the ate a different regionalism pattern that
policy choices of a country or to provide it will irreversibly link them to the West. And
with the conditions where the citizens will together with the military protection of the
contribute to these policy choices. This West, this will make impossible for Russia
difference is also reflected in various ide- to retake, in any form, control over the ter-
ologies that distinguishes the West from ritories of ex-Soviet republics.
the increasingly assertive Putin’s Russia.
The West is dominated by the liberal-dem- I will argue further, that the plans that Rus-
ocratic ideas, where the democratic peace sia cherishes and the tools that it employs
theory has strong roots and cooperation against CIS countries that would like to in-
is the key determinant of interstate rela- tegrate into Western institutions (Moldova,
tions. Russia’s political technologists have Ukraine and Georgia) are of an aggressive
crafted a different ideology, which has bor- nature, representing the classic purposes
rowed massively from the balance of pow- and tools of war. The famous Clausewitz-
er tradition of Metternich’s era. The buzz ian classic definition of war, which he
words of this new-brand Russian ideology understood to be the continuation of state
are ‘status quo”, “order”, “stability’, while in politics by other means, is a more political
fact Kremlin’s intention is very much similar science interpretation of war than a legal
to the one of this Austrian statesman of one. There are many definitions of war, and
nineteenth century: one that includes most largely accepted
conditions defines war as a struggle be-
Moreover, his [Metternich’s] much vaunted tween two or more countries, involving
direction of the other powers in preserving armed forces confrontation, and aiming
the European order was really a mask for at constraining one adversary to give up
maintaining Habsburg influence in inter- any opposition and accept the other side’s
national affairs far out of proportion to the conditions.
power that the monarchy actually pos-
sessed.96 War is an act of aggression and hostility,
where by use of armed people one side
In a similar fashion Russia, painfully ob- exercises a coercive action upon another
serving the extension of the West into what side. The efficiency of this coercive mech-
perceives as its courtyard, and the popu- anism is based on the amount of damage
larity of Western ideologies - it frantically and suffering inflicted on another side, and
opposes it. It does so by both discourag- continues until one belligerent part realizes
ing post-Soviet countries to integrate into that it cannot bear anymore the costs of
the Western institutions and protesting or continuing the war as a perpetrator or as a
even denying the West the right to extend. defending side. The use of armed force or
Russian government claims that the West, its threat is the oldest tool of coercion. Be-
which it perceives as dominated by the cause in the early history the humanity was
United States, should agree on a pact, not very developed and interdependent,
which will accept unconditionally Rus- other possible tools of coercion than use
sia’s dominance of the post-Soviet space, of military force were not existing or useful.
without interfering or obstructing Moscow’s However, in the modern world, character-
action in those countries. Only this way is ized by an advanced civilization develop-
possible, according to the Russian policy- ment and increased interdependence,
makers, to preserve the order, stability and there are many other tools of coercion, like
peace on the European continent. Russia economic, political, and cultural. The last
is afraid that the incorporation of its former one includes both the societal and ideo-
96 Encyclopedia Britannica: The Age of Metternich,
logical realms.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/44183/
Austria/33361/The-Age-of-Metternich-1815-48

36 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Since traditionally war implies the use of interference. The Charter of the Organiza-
armed forces, use of other tools of co- tion of American States specifically empha-
ercion, including military ones, may be sizes that states should not interfere in the
considered and placed under the umbrella internal affairs of other states, prohibiting
of aggression. Nevertheless, war should not only use of military forces, but “also
not be anymore perceived in narrow, con- any other form of interference or attempted
servative terms of a declared belligerent threat against the personality of the State
status among certain countries, but as an or against its political, economic, and cul-
action, following the specific goal to coerce tural elements”.100 These principles were
the enemy to fulfill one’s will. And therefore also reflected in the 1975 CSSE Helsinki
it should not be limited at only considering Final Act, and in the few declaration of the
the use of armed force, but instead should U.N. General Assembly.101
be focused on effects and goals. If it has
the goal of forcing one country to fulfill the There are also opinions opposing the
will of another country, by using tools of consideration of the techniques of sub-
coercion that bring destruction and/or suf- version, labeled as “indirect aggression”,
fering commensurable with those inflicted as aggression in terms of the UN Charter
by military force, then it should be treated provisions. The reason invoked is that
by the international law similar to military such a move “would be contrary to the
aggression. primary purposes of the United Nations
to prevent ‘the scourge of war’ and ‘to
This is convenient also because the Char- suppress acts of aggression and other
ter of the United Nations does includes breaches of the peace’.”102 Yet, such ar-
acts of aggression as cases that have to guments were more appropriate in 1960
be dealt with by the UN Security Council. than at present time. If used today, they
The problem in this case is caused by first of all fail to consider the changing na-
the lack of a legal definition of interstate ture of human society and that wars can
aggression in the legal framework of the be waged using means other than military
United Nations that would include other ones, with no less effectiveness and with
tools of coercion except the military one. no less human suffering.
According to the Charter, it is the Security
Council who makes the decision whether The changing nature of interstate aggres-
there is or not an act of aggression.97 sion that affected the way countries wage
warfare was very well captured in a study
In the past there were attempts at the produced by two senior Chinese officers
United Nations to come up with a definition in 1999. Underlying the decrease in vis-
of aggression.98 And the issue has already ible armed violence in the future wars they
been a hot discussion topic among schol- concluded:
ars and practitioners for a good while.99
However the efforts to come up with a War which has undergone the changes of
single definition were not very success- modern technology and the market sys-
fully, as it could have been expected. It is tem will be launched even more in atypical
interesting, although, how certain regions forms. In other words, while we are seeing
have succeeded in defining aggression, a relative reduction in military violence, at
given their historical experience of foreign the same time we definitely are seeing an
97 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39 increase in political, economic, and tech-
98 See John N. Hazard, ‘Why Try Again to Define Ag- 100 L. Damrosch (1989:7)
gression?’ The American Journal of International Law, 101 Ibid, pp. 7-10
Vol. 62, No.3, (July, 1968), pp. 701-710 102 Q. Wright (1960, 529). The article claims that the
99 See Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, label “indirect aggression” was promoted to include
‘The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analy- “subversive intervention” in the category of aggression
sis’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. and by this to justify military actions by states or by
52, No. 2, (April, 1958), pp. 244-246 United Nations to stop it.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 37


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
nological violence. However, regardless prosperity. While this in turn would corrode
of the form the violence takes, war is war, the societal links, allowing flourishing the
and a change in the external appearance conditions that increase the division along
does not keep any war from abiding by the cultural, religious, societal lines; the society
principles of war.103 itself can become a direct target. Media
warfare may be used to weaken the values
Therefore, it is possible that a country is and ideological cement that keep the soci-
threatened by a war which may take atypi- ety together, affecting its fabric. Regulatory
cal and non-traditional shape and form, warfare can block an effective response to
employing political, economic, cultural or a crisis by international community; foreign
technological tools, instead of the military aid warfare may undermine democratic
ones. Then, the fact that the target-country transition in unstable regions and promote
does not want to accept it is at war, will not authoritarian regimes; and ideological war-
save it from the real consequences of bel- fare can be targeted at undermining the
ligerent actions launched against it. Ignor- credibility and legitimacy of the West in
ing these new forms and disguises of war regions critical for international peace and
is similar to the case when a government security.
does not do anything while foreign armies
are invading its territories. While military aggression most of the times
destroys the armed force of a country, its
The Chinese officers claimed to have economy and infrastructure, which then
identified a new trend that is already in- can be rebuilt, the “indirect aggression”
fluential and would dictate the wars of has the ability to inflict irreparable dam-
the future, labeling them “non-military war age. It can divide countries and peoples,
operations”.104 They refer to the interna- poisoning relations among them for longer
tional terrorism by pointing out that the use periods, and creating areas of lengthy
of such untraditionally means of warfare by intractable conflicts. There are “indirect ag-
terrorists have brought no less destruction gression” techniques, in fact, that create
to the international community than a mili- major impediments for democratic transi-
tary war.105 And even if considering the use tion in countries like Moldova, Ukraine and
by state actors of new methods of non-mil- Georgia, since they serve as the invisible
itary warfare, which threaten the political, weapons arsenal of Russia to disturb the
economic, and military security of a state, healthy processes that otherwise would
‘the destruction which they do in the areas provide conditions for efficient democrati-
attacked are absolutely not secondary to zation.
pure military wars.’106
If we look at the trend of democratic transi-
The new methods are especially danger- tion in the world, then we can observe a
ous because they do not carry a very pattern of democratic spillover, when the
recognizable pattern of aggression, in the transition waves from democratized coun-
military traditionally perceived way, which tries would reach their neighbors, and then
makes the target unaware and undefended their neighbors’ neighbors, and so on. It
until it is too late. They may aim to disrupt only stopped when it reached countries
the trade connections and/or financial sys- bordering Russian Federation, since the
tem, affecting the economic balance and force of transition has clashed with a coun-
103 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, ‘Unrestricted terforce, aiming to promote a different type
Warfare,’ (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts of transition, an authoritarian one. Now it is
Publishing House, February 1999), p. 6, [FBIS Trans- the force and energy of these two opposite
lated Text], http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC- waives that will decide which transition is
Analysis/unrestricted.pdf
104 Ibid, p. 50
going to be promoted in Moldova, Ukraine
105 Ibid, p. 132 and Georgia.
106 Ibid, p. 116

38 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
The Tools of Indirect Russia to rebuild its influence over these
Aggression countries. As such, the NATO enlargement
is opposed by Kremlin for no other reason
Bugajski identified a number of mecha- than the fear that it would prevent Russia
nisms that the Russian strategy aiming to itself from enlarging over the territories of
increase its influence over its former satel- these countries, since they will be defend-
lites consisted of. In a way they reflected ed by the Alliance institutional agreement
such generally known strategies as political of mutual defense.109
subversion, economic disruption, propa-
ganda dissemination, social disorganization However, these were goals, but the tools
and psychological warfare. to achieve them included diplomatic pres-
sures resulting in the manipulation of trea-
Building up influence over their foreign and ties and interstate agreements, various
security policy choices was among the provocative and inflammatory declarations
first goals. Then, through targeted foreign by Russian officials; propaganda attacks,
investments and takeovers of economi- which included demonization and disin-
cally critical infrastructure the Russian gov- formation techniques, targeting politicians
ernment-controlled companies aimed at both in our examined countries and in the
reaching monopolistic positions on internal West; direct military threats and deploy-
markets of post-Soviet countries. Through ment of troops under the cover of peace-
involvement with officials, parties, media keeping or humanitarian needs, deploy-
outlets and pro-Russian NGOs they were ment of Cossacks recruited through the
to gain influence on the territories of the Russian Ministry of Defense offices110 and
targeted countries. The creation of energy other kinds of volunteers-patriots; energy
and economic investment dependencies control and economic leverages, including
were meant to transform into long-term through attracting high level politicians to
intergovernmental influence.107 invest on Russia’s controlled territory and
thus making them dependent; and inflam-
At the same time Russian officials opposed ing social discontent and exploiting divi-
the strengthening of the Eastern countries’ sions on ethnic, cultural and religions lines.
ties with the West, attempting to limit the
scope and pace of the enlargement of The covert character of these tools makes
Western institutions.108 This was done be- it harder to uncover, understand and be-
cause Kremlin understood that integration lieve that it is possible for such things to
of its former satellites with the Western happen. It often comes out as insignificant
institutions would diminish the regionalism elements of various investigative articles.
pattern with Russia and would build new Such as the 2002 “Moskovskie Novosti”
regional links with Western countries, mov- newspaper article, claiming that the GRU111
ing CIS states into another region. As a re- was training and sending military personnel
sult it would become extremely difficult for to do covert operations in Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Transnistria. The same article
107 During president Lucinschi term in office, Moldo-
van government reportedly tried to ease its depen- 109 Ibid, p. 2
dency with Gazprom by selling its debts to a foreign 110 Oleg Elenski, ‘The New Volunteers’ Army’
company, which was interested to get involved on [Novaya Dobrovolicheskaya Armiya], Nezavisimoye
Moldovan energy market. The Gazprom representative Voennoe Obozrenie, 25 August 2006, http://nvo.ng.ru///
visited Moldova, had some tensed discussions with its forces/2006-08-25/4_kazaki.html#. In this article it
leadership, then went to Tiraspol, and soon Moldova is also revealed that Russian Cossacks have fought in
was encountering energy shortages due to energy cuts. post-Soviet conflicts in early 90s, including in Transn-
That particular initiative of the government to address istria. It is clear also that they are also, through some
the energy dependency on Russia has then failed, as arrangement, a part of the Russian official military
Moldovan government backed from its respective structures.
agreement with a Western company. 111 Russian Defense Intelligence Agency (GRU –
108 Bugajski (2004, 30-31) Glavnoe Razvedyvatelinoe Upravlenie)

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 39


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
confirmed the habit of Russian intelligence In fact Russian politicians and analysts did
to infiltrate into foreign organized crime not shy away from accepting they used
groups and use this for further intelligence subterfuge, subversion and indirection as
activities.112 key tools of their foreign policy in post-
Soviet area. Konstantin Zatulin, who is a
Apart from these methods Kremlin has member of the State Duma on the party
built upon the Soviet-time regionalism in list of the pro-Putin “Edinaya Rossiya”,
developing cultural and educational ties, and exercises the duties of the first deputy
involving politicians, academics, journalists, chairman of the Committee on CIS affairs
formal and informal leaders, and erecting and relations with compatriots abroad of
its political influence capital. To decrease the Duma, is a revealing example in this
Western interest and involvement in CIS regard.
countries Russia has attempted to isolate
the latter’s leaders, pushing them into cor- In a 1997 Zatulin has co-authored an arti-
ner until they had no other perceived ally cle, where he claimed that Russia have to
or supporter than Russia. As mentioned “use all its economic, military, ethno-demo-
earlier Moscow has also increasingly used graphic and other instruments of influence,
its intelligence officers to penetrate criminal and not allow for the consolidation of state
networks in target countries, and through power around forces of an anti-Russian
their locally built connection mechanisms and anti-integrationist orientation. Only
to influence local authorities; it penetrated active measures (including destabilization
military and intelligence services of its of situation on domestic arena in regions
former satellites.113 where the anti-Russian and anti-integra-
tionist forces are especially active) are able
These strategies were tested and used to prevent the slow but irreversible proc-
to an extent or another all over the former ess… of those countries leaving the Rus-
Soviet Union, which proves the claim that sian sphere of influence and transforming
Russia had a structural and organized ap- CIS into fiction.’ The article also mentioned
proach towards using indirect methods of in relation to Azerbaijan that Russia has
aggression against its neighboring coun- to support military superiority of Armenia
tries. It was not only Moldova and Georgia over Azerbaijan115, to instigate the unionist
that tasted the bitterness of this treatment. feeling of Lezgin people, a part of which
Bugajski gives a thorough account of this, lives in the north of Azerbaijan, and to bring
writing that: back on the agenda the issue of Talysh
autonomy, triggering the federalization of
In order to return Kyiv more firmly under its 115 This is another widespread trend of a tool largely
control, Moscow engaged in various forms used by Russia in Georgia and Moldova. Mikhail Berg-
of subterfuge and subversion. The di- man, the military commandant of the Benderi (Tighina)
verse methods included energy blackmail, garrison in his ‘Leader in a Strange Pack’ [Vojdi v Ciu-
joi Stae] book, republished by Transnistrian newspaper
economic buyouts, media propaganda, ‘Celovek i ego Prava” has alleged that in 1993 the com-
discrediting pro-independence politicians, mander of the 145 motorized rifle division (12 military
attempts at diplomatic isolation, manipula- base of the Russian Ministry of Defense) Major-Gener-
tion of ethnic and regional issues, threats al Vladimir Gladyshev delivered to the representatives
of direct military intervention to protect of Adjarian Ministry of Interior and of the Ministry
of State Security 1300 light weapons (automatic rifles
Russian ethnics, lingering territorial claims, and machine guns). He did it at the verbal order of his
and challenges over the ownership of the superior, Colonel-General Fedor Reut, the commander
Sevastopol naval base in Crimea.114 of the Group of Russian Forces in Caucasus who in his
turn received a verbal order from Pavel Grachev, the
Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation. The transfer
112 Igor Korolikov, ‘Killers’ Trade Union,’ Moskovskie of arms was done with all necessary paperwork, under
Novosti, No. 25, 9 July 2002 the supervision of the Federal Security Service of
113 Ibid, pp. 29-49 Russia (FSB). See http://www.lindex.lenin.ru/Lindex4/
114 Ibid, p. 81 Text/9220.htm

40 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Azerbaijan and making the country unsta- The contract allowed “Edinstvo” to deliver
ble for hydrocarbon-related foreign invest- consular services on behalf of the Russian
ments. Similar things were said in relation Consular Office in Chisinau for a period
to Ukraine, insisting the only powerful guar- of six months, and allowed an exten-
anty of a friendly and cooperating Ukraine sion for another half a year. According to
is its federalization in regard to Crimea.116 the contract “Edinstvo” had to provide in
All these ideas resemble very close the Bender and surrounding territories neces-
principles used by Russian in its foreign sary assistance and issue passports to
policy towards Moldova. people who would like to become Russian
citizens. The Russian Consular Office in
Moscow has taken as habit to provide Chisinau took the responsibility to provide
Russian passports to people leaving in “Edinstvo” with all necessary consultation
the areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and and documents.119 The dramatic conse-
Transnistria. When according to some quences of this “passportization’ policy of
sources the number of people with Rus- Kremlin in the secessionist regions was
sian passports have reached as high as seen during Duma and presidential elec-
80-90% in Georgian secessionist regions tions of Russian Federation, when despite
and some 25% in Transnistria117, Rus- the protests of Tbilisi and Chisinau, who
sia began insisting that it has the right to insisted the polling stations should be
“defend its citizens” in the conflict regions opened only at the Russian Embassy and
even using military means, if necessary, consular offices, Russia has opened nu-
putting additional pressure on Georgian merous polling stations in Transnistria, Abk-
and Moldovan governments. In the case hazia, and South Ossetia.120
of Moldova, however, because Chisinau
did not accept the Russian request for the The procedure of “passportization” has
opening of a consular office in Tiraspol, started very soon after the collapse of the
Moscow has started to deliver visas in Soviet Union and took the form of Russian
Transnistria through the office of the Rus- government efforts to implement the insti-
sian LDPR in Tiraspol, using it as a de- tute of double citizenship in the ex-Soviet
facto Russian consulate.118 Other organiza- republics. The Russian foreign minister An-
tions, including the youth movement “Pro- drei Kozyrev called this process “the most
ryv” were also involved in similar activities. important instrument” necessary for the so-
lution of the “key strategic goal of the Rus-
On 2 November 2000 the consular of- sian foreign policy”.121 Even though initially
fice of the Russian Federation in Chisinau it faced the opposition, either overt of more
has signed a contract with the “Edinstvo” subtle, Russia has managed to overcome
[Unity] organization in Transnistria, who them. Starting 1997 it started to encour-
presented itself as a social movement. age the receiving of Russian passports by
116 K. Zatulin and A. Migranean, ‘CIS: the beginning 119 On behalf of the Russian Embassy in Chisinau
and the end of history. Changing the landmarks’ [SNG: the contract was signed by Andrey Viktorovici
Nachalo i Konetz Istorii. K Smene Veh], Nezavisimaya Kainov, and Vlarii Valentinovici Avdeev, the deputy
Gazeta, 26 March 1997, http://www.zatulin.ru/index. chair of the “Edinstvo” executive committee has
php?&section=publications&id=35 signed it on behalf of “Edinstvo”. See “The Role
117 Vladimir Bukarski, ‘A Fort on Nistru’ [Fortpost na of the Russian Federation in Transnistrian Conflict.
Dnestre], Zavtra, No. 35 (667), 30 August 2006 Part III”, http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.
118 ‘Moldova’s Uncertain Future,’ International Crisis xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=1077
Group Report, No. 175, 17 August 2006, p. 17, http:// 120 Another result of the deliberate “passportization”
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/ policy is the “humanitarian” interventions of Russian
moldova/175_moldova_s_uncertain_future.pdf. LDPR military in secessionist regions.
stands for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and 121 I. Zevelev, ‘Sootechestvenniki v Rossiiskoi Politike
its leader is the notorious Vladimir Jirinovski. Actually na Postsovetskom Prostranstve’ [Compatriots issue in
is has became a habit for all Russian parties with a the Russian Foreign Policy on Post-Soviet Area], Rus-
nationalistic agenda to open their offices in Transnistria, sia in Global Affairs, No.1, (January-February 2008),
as if it was a Russian province. http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/30/9127.html

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 41


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
people living in CIS countries, often going ington124, that took control over many cent-
against the will and the law of post-Soviet ers of the state power in Moldova, Ukraine
countries. As I. Zelenev put it, “by treating and Georgia, and are forcing these coun-
Russians in the near abroad not only as tries to promote anti-Russian policies. The
national minorities in those countries but very illustrative case happened during the
also as compatriots, Moscow has built 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, when Rus-
the reason, when convenient, to raise this sian president V. Putin reportedly told Unit-
issue in her relations with neighbors. The ed States president G. Bush that Ukraine
newly drafted “Russia and compatriots” is not even a state.125 Also in a similar line
concept allowed Kremlin to address the goes the effort to promote ideas alleging
topic of diasporas as an internal issue.”122 that the post-Soviet countries have the
features of failed states, they cannot take
Apart from this there are few other tech- decisions by themselves, and in exchange
niques used by Kremlin to justify its in- for Russian assistance and support they
tervention into the domestic affairs of its should think to trade the remnants of their
ex-satellites. Its apologists argue that after sovereignty, meaning supporting the efforts
the collapse of the Soviet Union the former of Russian foreign policy in international
republics are undergoing degradation. fora.
They insist that Russia is surrounded by a
ring of states incapable of developing with- There is a lot of work done to promote cul-
out any foreign assistance; that they need tural and identity ties between Russia on
not even financial but especially political, one side, and Moldova and Ukraine on the
organizational, and moral assistance. As other, although in Russia itself many over-
a result, insist Russian researchers, these zealous critiques assess this activity as
post-Soviet states can either progress with insufficient. Obviously Ukraine and Moldo-
the help of Russia, or get bogged down in va represent higher priority targets, due to
their development, continuing to degrade. the considerable level of Russian minorities
However, they continue, the degradation and speakers they have and the role that
of post-Soviet space will lead to chaos, Russian language plays in the daily lives
which will spill over into Russia. Therefore of their citizens. This is done through pro-
Russian government should pay more at- motion and opening of TV stations, local
tention to oppose this chaos in post-Soviet offices of Russian radio stations and news-
republics, being proactive, instead of wast- papers, funding of Russian history study
ing resources in tackling chaos inside Rus- and cultural programs, supporting of NGOs
sia, which is in their view an unnecessary and even whole universities. While many
reactive approach.123 of these initiatives are declared as cultural
support, they end in financing nationalistic
The sovereignty of ex-Soviet republics is
also questioned, in academia, expert com- 124 Inter-Media Consulting, “Deputat Gosdumy RF
Sergey Markov: Ukraina Potereala Svoi Suverenitet’
munity and policymakers’ circles. There is [Russian State Duma Deputy Sergey Markov: Ukraine
a sufficient amount of Russian scholarship has Lost its Sovereignty], 12 May 2008, http://www.
literature, insisting that CIS countries lack imk.com.ua/ru/articles/25794
sovereignty, or are only in the process of 125 Kommersant, ‘Blok NATO Razoshelsea na
building their statehood. And that it is the Blokpakety’ [NATO Blok Divided into Block Packs],
No. 57, 7 April 2008, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.
Western radicals, neoconservatives, and aspx?DocsID=877224&NodesID=5. According to the
Russophobe-minded persons from Wash- article, Putin addressed Bush angrily “You understand
George, that Ukraine is not even a state, don’t you!
122 Ibid. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern
123 M. Deleagin, ‘Posle SNG: Odinocestvo Rossii’ Europe, another part, and a significant one, are the terri-
[After CIS: The Loneliness of Russia], Russia in tories donated by us!” Putin went on, suggesting that if
Global Affairs, No. 4, (July-August, 2005), http://www. Ukraine will be offered NATO membership, then it will
globalaffairs.ru/numbers/15/4512.html disappear as a state, since Russia will seize the eastern
regions and Crimea from Ukraine.

42 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
groups, parties, and initiatives, which ad- ed public is an easier subject to stylistic
vocate the increase of Russian influence. and rhetorical manipulations. 127
An increasingly large support is offered
through the Russian media to the idea of An important place in the Russia’s arsenal
having CIS countries joining a supra-state of indirect aggression techniques used in
structure of the type of European Union post-Soviet area is occupied by the so-
but under the Russia’s leadership. called CIS peacekeeping operations. After
the collapse of the USSR Russia has ben-
A special attention should be paid to the efited of the fact that it had military troops
efforts of Moscow to build a virtual his- in the regions and the West was afraid and
tory around the origins and nature of the reluctant to get involved in former Soviet
Transnistrian conflict, the role of Russian Union. As a result Russia had it hands
Federation in it, as these efforts are very completely free to continuously promote
visible on the Internet 126; however this is local conflicts, in the orchestration of which
beyond the scope of this paper. Russia Soviet leadership had played such an in-
conducted rather successful propaganda strumental role. Usual strategy included
campaign, promoting pro-Russian ideas, siding with the rebel regions, fighting on
discrediting the European Union and their side against the ex-republics, either
United States, and local politicians that directly; or by using its military mobilization
supported the integration with the West, system it recruited ex-militaries willing to
and demonizing the pro-Romanian oppo- fight for money, and seconding them to the
sition. For its purposes it used domestic conflict regions.
printed media, local publications of pop-
ular Russian newspapers, and especially Russian political leadership would get in-
the new media. The latter deserves spe- volved again when militarily rebels would
cial attention, since it targets mostly the achieve a good strategic stance, and
youth, and judging by the nature of the when they wanted to keep it unchallenged.
posts on forums and other online plat- Moscow would press the capitals of
forms, it does it rather successfully. The newly independent republics into cease-
reduced level of education, the growing fires, forcing on them the same Russian
tendency among students to buy their military that participated in the conflict as
grades and degrees, encouraged by peacekeepers. Afterwards, it practiced
the increasing number of foreign remit- the maintenance of a “controlled” level of
tances they are receiving from their par- tensions in the conflict, which were not
ents, contributes to the general level of serious enough to become a destabiliz-
ignorance among much of the Moldovan ing factor, but at the same time they were
youth. This, coupled with the Soviet-time used to continuously claim the necessity
inherited political apathy and illiteracy of preserving the Russian peacekeeping in
created conditions, that led communica- the regions.128 It has pushed for the recog-
tion studies conclude that a less educat- nition of CIS as “international organization”
126 Both Tiraspol authorities and Russian agencies are by the UN, since this would have allowed
putting efforts into flooding the Internet with stories of Moscow to decide “peacekeeping” deploy-
“ex-combatants”, witnesses, “victims”, that “have seen ments without prior UN Security Council
with their own eyes” what has happened during the
approval.129
conflict. Funds and efforts are put into printing books
and writing articles. An especially interesting example 127 G. Ray Funkhouser & Nathan Maccoby, ‘An Ex-
is the case with Wikipedia: Tiraspol authorities have perimental Study on Communicating Specialized Sci-
hired personnel who write detailed descriptions of the ence Information To a Lay Audience,’ Commu­nication
Moldovan-Russian relations, Transnistrian conflict Research, Vol. 1, 1974, p. 110
events; they manipulate the facts and generally attempt 128 Bobo Lo, ‘Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of
to promote a different version of the conflict, similar Russian Foreign Policy,’ Royal Institute of Internation-
to how Soviet-time specialists were building virtual al Affairs, Chatham House Papers (London: Blackwell,
history. 2003), p. 92.
129 Bugajski, (2004:37)

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 43


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
In Moldova Moscow’s peacekeepers sian officials, Russian Orthodox Church
turned into the protective force, which leaders that were praising and chanting
provided the cover for the separatist lead- the importance of Russian solder on Nistru
ership to consolidate its quasi-institutions [Dniester] river, delivering decorations and
and build its own armed forces. Russian gifts, and providing an abundant media
military that were portrayed as peacekeep- coverage of this.
ers have violated numerous times even the
agreements imposed on Moldova by Rus- One of the most frequent strategies em-
sia. In 1994 it has unilaterally withdrawn ployed by Russia in the conflict region is to
many of its military control posts at the river force Moldova to accept Transnistria as “an
Nistru, allowing them to be immediately equal side” in negotiations, in an attempt to
manned by the Tiraspol armed groups. cover for the fact that it is Moscow behind
This has lead to the establishment of the the conflict, and to promote instead the se-
customs and border guards’ posts of the cessionist region as a victim of Chisinau’s
secessionist leadership at the conditional aggression. Western countries are also
separation line with the territory controlled the targets of this strategy. In case Russia
by Chisinau. succeeds in these efforts, it will be able to
unquestionably promote its own agenda
When Moldovan leadership started to behind the scenes, presenting its initiatives
largely advocate both at home and abroad on behalf of the Transnistrian leadership,
the idea of Russian troop’s withdrawal, able to stall and block anything that does
pointing out that there is no role for them not fit its interests. It will offer Moscow the
anymore, Moscow responded aggres- possibility to endlessly freeze the conflict
sively. It launched a wide media campaign resolution conflict, when Chisinau or its
underlying how crucial is for the security Western partners will offer solutions that
of the region the continuous stay of its would have the capacity to offset the Rus-
militaries and that in case they leave the sia’s monopolistic role in the conflict reso-
conflict may switch to the violent stage lution process.
again. It has staged a number of drama-
turgical scenes bringing to the region Rus-

44 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
CONCLUSION
This paper attempted to address a subject, ates opposition and competing policies from
which is completely ignored in Moldova, and Kremlin. It is as simple as that: many Western
understanding which would, in the opinion efforts to promote democratic transition in
of the author, considerable advance the ef- post-Soviet area, including in Moldova do not
ficiency of Chisinau’s foreign policy. For the succeed or bring limited results because they
sake of objectivity we should recognized that are opposed by counter-policies of Russian
the subject is not very popular in the West ei- Federation. This explains to a great extent
ther. The paper had few goals. First, it aimed the failures of Western actors to promote
to point out that the failure of democratic democratic reforms in CIS, an explanation not
transition in Moldova cannot and should not entirely accepted in Brussels. Metaphorically
be only explained by internal factors. Instead, we could say that while in post-Soviet area
it is necessary to realize that Moldova’s dem- Russia plays wise, at full strength and aiming
ocratic transition is heavily influenced by the for victory, the West is laid-back, untroubled,
external factors, and namely, by the negative relaxed and plays for fun, without investing
pressure of the Russian foreign policy and sufficiently well thought efforts, necessary to
the indirect aggression techniques used by attain more ambitious goals.
Moscow against Chisinau.
The study offers suggestions in regard to the
Then, the study sought to address the policies of foreign aid coming from the West,
idea, that while Moldova is placed on the and particularly on the democratic develop-
confrontation line between two political tran- ment assistance promoted by organizations
sition waves, - democratic from the West such as USAID, DFID, SIDA, UNDP, etc. The
and authoritarian from Russia, - it is mostly volume of assistance they offer has an in-
affected by the authoritarian wave. In both creasingly reduced output, while its efficiency
cases, this is explained by Moldova having is subjected to a growing criticism of the
inherited and its political system being domi- Western experts. The democratic develop-
nated by Soviet inherited trends and mecha- ment assistance efforts are undermined by
nisms. That determines its integration into the employed strategies. They are not entirely
a Russian dominated region, and therefore adequate because they fail to grasp the
generates its vulnerability to Russia. Another realities on the ground. It is suggested that
factor that makes Moldova more vulner- Moldova and other post-Soviet states should
able to the authoritarian wave from the East be treated not as much focusing on the influ-
is the environment of insecurity generated ence of domestic factors, but considering the
and maintained by the Russian Federation. security threats of foreign origin, which corrupt
Both conditions, as explained by the Seeley- the political system of government, turning it
Heintz law, provide for favorable ground for into an inefficient and authoritarian one.
the development of an authoritarian system
of governance. This idea has strong repercussions at least in
the case of Moldova, because it underlines
The third conclusion of that paper suggests systemic errors of the Western development
that the West has significantly lower stakes in efforts, both governmental and non-govern-
Moldova, comparing to what Moscow has, mental. One of the main consequences of
which results in Russia generating more re- these efforts, due to the ways and strategies
sources, stronger policies and more decisive they are promoted through, is that they are of-
and intense actions. The expansion of West- fering the financial support and the legitimacy
ern policies in post-Soviet countries gener- that the authoritarian political leadership in

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC 45


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
Chisinau needs for mimicking the democratic through institutional economic, political, cultural,
processes. Therefore, there are cases when and security ties. This also exposes the reality
Western democratic development endeavors that Republic of Moldova will not be able to
essentially contribute to the consolidation of advance on the democratic transition path, as
the “smart authoritarianism” in Moldova, both long as it is not integrated into the European
through its actions and inactions. Union. Only that would free Moldova of the
vulnerabilities linked to its placement in the CIS
Similarly, the paper strongly suggests that region dominated by Russia and will protect
the democratization of the post-Soviet area, it against any resulting consequences of that
in the absence of significant Western balanc- Russia-dominated regionalism.
ing of the Russian foreign pressure targeted
at the CIS countries, will inevitably fail. The The paper provides the following recommen-
reason behind this is that Moscow is also dations for the interested actors:
powerfully promoting a wave of authoritarian- Western partners of Moldova, including the
ism, likewise the West is trying to promote a international development agencies would
process of democratic transition. Ironically, have to understand the dominant influence
this very much resembles the ideological of foreign factor, as the Russian foreign
confrontation between USSR and the West policy is, on the failure or success of demo-
taking place during the Cold War. Then, cratic transition in Moldova and would need
each side was promoting practices and po- to adapt their policies and strategies of en-
litical regimes that would allow them to culti- gagement;
vate and maintain loyalties or dependencies there is a strong necessity to study the trans-
in the targeted weaker countries. For specific formation of interstate aggression, and the
political and economic reasons Brussels new non-military aggression methods and
refuses to accept that, being more interested techniques employed by Russian Federation
in calming Kremlin, than in effectively ad- to take political control over Moldova and
dressing the issues on which the West and other CIS countries; as well as the effects
Russia of today are natural competitors. As that the threats to their national security have
a result Russia perceives these moves as on the dynamic of democratic transition and
concession and submission. This places, the emergence of authoritarianism;
EU especially, on the Russian strategy map as Moldovan leadership is not capable to re-
as a weak opponent, with obvious vulner- sist alone the foreign pressure of Kremlin, the
abilities, which Russia is eager to exploit, only possibility to prevent the transformation
maintain and even develop. This Russian of Moldova into a classic satellite of Russia is
perception of the EU as being weak is guid- convincing the West to get involved in Moldo-
ing Moscow’s policies towards Brussels, as va more actively, continuously countering the
the Russian political and strategic cultures Russian policies of foreign influence, and po-
see concessions to a weaker opponent as tentially offering it the EU membership.
shameful and disgraceful.
The current paper is designed as a reading
Therefore any political leadership in Chisinau, for experts, but also for students interested
indifferent of its color and affiliation, will be in the studies of security and democratic
forced to flirt with Moscow, as long as the transition. While it focuses predominantly on
West will not be able to provide a level of sup- Moldova, the paper provides useful ideas for
port, substantial enough to assist Moldova understanding the failures of “color” revolu-
in balancing the Russian foreign pressure. A tions in Ukraine and Georgia, contrary to
fist step in this regard would be the a political some that are claiming that “color revolutions
move of a “surgical” type, which instead of an bring chaos and instability”; the particularities
evolutionary integration of Moldova into the EU of democratic transition in post-Soviet area,
would employ a more quick one, detaching the Russian foreign policy in that region, and
Moldova from CIS with its post-Soviet features, the influence of the Soviet heritage of CIS
dominated by Russia, and linking it to the West countries on their post-Soviet transition.

46 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
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NoteS

50 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC


DEVELOPMENT IN POST-SOVIET AREA
IDIS „Viitorul” is a research, education and outreach organization which
activates in the field of economic analysis, governance, law, political sciences,
strategic and organizational science. IDIS is also a common platform that brings
together young intellectuals who are concerned with the success of transition to-
wards the free market and the open society. Consistent with this mission, IDIS has
forged several linkages between the academic and policy-making environments,
generating policy analysis and recommendations for various areas of public in-
terest, creating and disseminating of the best practices, good governance, and
economic analysis.

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