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De Leon v.

CA
Spouses de Leon were united in wedlock, and in 1971, they had a child named Susana. Sometime in 1972,
a de facto separation between the spouses occurred due to irreconcilable differences, with wife leaving
the conjugal home. She left for the US and became a US citizen. She filed for dissolution of marrige while
in the US but held it in abeyance as she wanted to obtain property settlements with husband in the Phil. A
letter-agreement was entered into with her mother-in-law, which obligated thelatter solidarily with the
husband to deliver certain real properties in the Phils. And abroad as well as to pay the sum of 100k and
$35k on the same day, and to give monthly support payable in 6 mos. In advance every year for the care
of Susana de Leon. The mother-in-law made cash payments to the wife in the said amounts. Meanwhile,
the spouses filed before the CFI of Rizal to dissolve the CPG and an order similar to the agreement was
rendered by the court. When Sylvia sought for the execution of the order, as she was also seeking
payment of support for 4,500.00php monthly. The mother-in-law then filed to intervene in the case as the
owner of the properties subject to the order of the court, and questioned the validity of the agreement,
which had for its purpose the termination of the marital relationship of the spouses (Intimidation asserted
by the MIL: bring to court alleging adultery or concubinage on the part of the husband to scandalize the
family.) The lower court ordered the wife to return the amounts paid and reiterating the order of the
court for the dissolution of the CPG. An appeal was filed by the wife in the CA, who affirmed the decision
of the lower court. Instant appeal filed.
W/N the letter-agreement was valid?
No. The SC agrees with respondent court in declaring the agreement to be void applied Art. 121 of the
civil code w/c provides that contracts for personal separation between husband and wife, as well as every
extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the CPG or ACP between spouses.
However, the argument of the MIL, that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid,
the ff. requisites must concur:
1) the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent
to be given;
2) the threatened act must be unjust or unlawful;
3) the threat must be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and
the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil;
4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.
Applying the foregoing, the intimidation applied by the wife is obviously not the intimidation referred to
by law. It is not the principal cause that moved her to enter into the agreement.

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