EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECIONS !"# CIRILO RO$ MONE%O,
respondents.

&A'UNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.
1
The 19!
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the "ouse of
#epresentatives be $a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one %ear
immediatel% preceding the election.$
(
The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 19!& Constitution see's to prevent is the
possibilit% of a $stranger or newcomer unac(uainted with the conditions and
needs of a communit% and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that communit%.$
)
)etitioner *melda #omualde+,-arcos filed her Certificate of Candidac% for
the position of #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te with the )rovincial
Election 1upervisor on -arch , 1992, providing the following information in
item no. 3
*
#E1*/ENCE *N T"E C4N1T*T5ENC6 7"E#E * 1EE8
T4 BE E0ECTE/ *--E/*ATE06 )#ECE/*N9 T"E
E0ECT*4N3 :::::::::: 6ears and seven -onths.
4n -arch ;&, 1992, private respondent Cirilo #o% -onte<o, the incumbent
#epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and a candidate for the same
position, filed a $)etition for Cancellation and /is(ualification$
5
with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional re(uirement for residenc%. *n his petition, private respondent
contended that -rs. -arcos lac'ed the Constitution=s one %ear residenc%
re(uirement for candidates for the "ouse of #epresentatives on the
evidence of declarations made b% her in >oter #egistration #ecord 9?,No.
&&?9!!;
6
and in her Certificate of Candidac%. "e pra%ed that $an order be
issued declaring @petitionerA dis(ualified and canceling the certificate of
candidac%.$
7
4n -arch ;9, 1992, petitioner filed an AmendedBCorrected Certificate of
Candidac%, changing the entr% $seven$ months to $since childhood$ in item
no. of the amended certificate.
8
4n the same da%, the )rovincial Election
1upervisor of 0e%te informed petitioner that3
CTDhis office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned
Certificate of Candidac% on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having alread%
lapsed on -arch ;E, 1992. The CorrectedBAmended
Certificate of Candidac% should have been filed on or
before the -arch ;E, 1992 deadline.
9
Conse(uentl%, petitioner filed the AmendedBCorrected Certificate of
Candidac% with the C4-E0EC=s "ead 4ffice in *ntramuros, -anila on
-arch &1, 1992. "er Answer to private respondent=s petition in 1)A No. 92,
EE9 was li'ewise filed with the head office on the same da%. *n said Answer,
petitioner averred that the entr% of the word $seven$ in her original Certificate
of Candidac% was the result of an $honest misinterpretation$
1+
which she
sought to rectif% b% adding the words $since childhood$ in her
AmendedBCorrected Certificate of Candidac% and that $she has alwa%s
maintained Tacloban Cit% as her domicile or residence.
11
*mpugning
respondent=s motive in filing the petition see'ing her dis(ualification, she
noted that3
7hen respondent @petitioner hereinA announced that she
was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban Cit% and
run for Congress in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, petitioner
immediatel% opposed her intended registration b% writing a
letter stating that $she is not a resident of said cit% but of
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her
siF month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a
petition with the C4-E0EC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the .irst /istrict to the 1econd /istrict and pursued
such a move up to the 1upreme Court, his purpose being
to remove respondent as petitioner=s opponent in the
congressional election in the .irst /istrict. "e also filed a
bill, along with other 0e%te Congressmen, see'ing the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town
of Tolosa out of the .irst /istrict, to achieve his purpose.
"owever, such bill did not pass the 1enate. "aving failed
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for
the same ob<ective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit along with respondent for the <udgment and verdict
of the electorate of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te in an honest,
orderl%, peaceful, free and clean elections on -a% , 1992.
1(
4n April ;?, 1992, the 1econd /ivision of the Commission on Elections
@C4-E0ECA, b% a vote of ; to 1,
1)
came up with a #esolution 1A finding
private respondent=s )etition for /is(ualification in 1)A 92,EE9 meritoriousG
;A stri'ing off petitioner=s CorrectedBAmended Certificate of Candidac% of
-arch &1, 1992G and &A canceling her original Certificate of Candidac%.
1*

/ealing with two primar% issues, namel%, the validit% of amending the
original Certificate of Candidac% after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidac%, and petitioner=s compliance with the one %ear
residenc% re(uirement, the 1econd /ivision held3
#espondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer
that the printed word $1even$ @monthsA was a result of an
$honest misinterpretation or honest mista'e$ on her part
and, therefore, an amendment should subse(uentl% be
allowed. 1he averred that she thought that what was
as'ed was her $actual and ph%sical$ presence in Tolosa
and not residence of origin or domicile in the .irst
0egislative /istrict, to which she could have responded
$since childhood.$ *n an accompan%ing affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban Cit%, a component of
the .irst /istrict, to which she alwa%s intended to return
whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
.urthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner=s theor% of dis(ualification b% alleging that she
has been a resident of the .irst 0egislative /istrict of 0e%te
since childhood, although she onl% became a resident of
the -unicipalit% of Tolosa for seven months. 1he asserts
that she has alwa%s been a resident of Tacloban Cit%, a
component of the .irst /istrict, before coming to the
-unicipalit% of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her
registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban Cit% so that she can be a
candidate for the /istrict. "owever, this intention was
rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election 4fficer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban. 1he never disputed this claim
and instead implicitl% acceded to it b% registering in
Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent=s claim of $honest
misinterpretation or honest mista'e.$ Besides, the
Certificate of Candidac% onl% as's for #E1*/ENCE. 1ince
on the basis of her Answer, she was (uite aware of
$residence of origin$ which she interprets to be Tacloban
Cit%, it is curious wh% she did not cite Tacloban Cit% in her
Certificate of Candidac%. "er eFplanation that she thought
what was as'ed was her actual and ph%sical presence in
Tolosa is not eas% to believe because there is none in the
(uestion that insinuates about Tolosa. *n fact, item no. in
the Certificate of Candidac% spea's clearl% of $#esidenc%
in the CONSTITUENCY where * see' to be elected
immediatel% preceding the election.$ Thus, the eFplanation
of respondent fails to be persuasive.
.rom the foregoing, respondent=s defense of an honest
mista'e or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent=s contention that an
amendment ma% be made, she cited the case of Alialy v.
COMELEC @; 1C#A 92!A. The reliance of respondent on
the case of Alial% is misplaced. The case onl% applies to
the $inconse(uential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primaril% to secure timel% and orderl% conduct of
elections.$ The 1upreme Court in that case considered the
amendment onl% as a matter of form. But in the instant
case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconse(uential deviation. The change in the
number of %ears of residence in the place where
respondent see's to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her (ualification as a candidac%,
speciall% those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversel%
affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought b% the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrit% of
the election.
-oreover, to allow respondent to change the seven @!A
month period of her residenc% in order to prolong it b%
claiming it was $since childhood$ is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission.
The arithmetical accurac% of the ! months residenc% the
respondent indicated in her certificate of candidac% can be
gleaned from her entr% in her >oter=s #egistration #ecord
accomplished on Hanuar% ;, 1992 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te for I months at
the time of the said registration @AnneF A, )etitionA. 1aid
accurac% is further buttressed b% her letter to the election
officer of 1an Huan, -etro -anila, dated August ;?, 199?,
re(uesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
)ermanent 0ist of >oters thereat so that she can be re,
registered or transferred to Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. The
dates of these three @&A different documents show the
respondent=s consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te from
-etro -anila onl% for such limited period of time, starting
in the last wee' of August 199? which on -arch , 1992
will onl% sum up to ! months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent=s
contention that it was an error.
FFF FFF FFF
Based on these reasons the AmendedBCorrected
Certificate of Candidac% cannot be admitted b% this
Commission.
FFF FFF FFF
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing
discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied
with the one %ear residenc% re(uirement of the
Constitution.
*n election cases, the term $residence$ has alwa%s been
considered as s%non%mous with $domicile$ which imports
not onl% the intention to reside in a fiFed place but also
personal presence in,that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. /omicile denotes a fiFed
permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for li'e reasons, one intends to return.
@)erfecto .a%pon vs. Eliseo Juirino, 9I )hil ;9?G
#omualde+ vs. #TC,Tacloban, ;;I 1C#A ?EA. *n
respondent=s case, when she returned to the )hilippines in
1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but 1an
Huan, -etro -anila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to -etro -anila and not Tacloban.
This /ivision is aware that her claim that she has been a
resident of the .irst /istrict since childhood is nothing
more than to give her a color of (ualification where she is
otherwise constitutionall% dis(ualified. *t cannot hold
ground in the face of the facts admitted b% the respondent
in her affidavit. EFcept for the time that she studied and
wor'ed for some %ears after graduation in Tacloban Cit%,
she continuousl% lived in -anila. *n 1929, after her
husband was elected 1enator, she lived and resided in
1an Huan, -etro -anila where she was a registered voter.
*n 19I2, she lived in 1an -iguel, -anila where she was
again a registered voter. *n 19!, she served as member
of the Batasang )ambansa as the representative of the
Cit% of -anila and later on served as the 9overnor of
-etro -anila. 1he could not have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of the Cit% of -anila.
.urthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidac%
for the office of the )resident in 199;, she claimed to be a
resident of 1an Huan, -etro -anila. As a matter of fact on
August ;?, 199?, respondent wrote a letter with the
election officer of 1an Huan, -etro -anila re(uesting for
the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of
voters that she ma% be re,registered or transferred to
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. These facts manifest that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban Cit% since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidac% because she became a resident of man%
places, including -etro -anila. This debun's her claim
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, 0e%te, she was a
resident of the .irst 0egislative /istrict of 0e%te since
childhood.
*n this case, respondent=s conduct reveals her lac' of
intention to ma'e Tacloban her domicile. 1he registered
as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of -anila. Although she
spent her school da%s in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to sta% and
reside in other different places. *n the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC @;;I 1C#A ?EA the Court eFplained how one
ac(uires a new domicile b% choice. There must concur3 @1A
residence or bodil% presence in the new localit%G @;A
intention to remain thereG and @&A intention to abandon the
old domicile. *n other words there must basicall% be
animus manendi with animus non revertendi. 7hen
respondent chose to sta% in *locos and later on in -anila,
coupled with her intention to sta% there b% registering as a
voter there and eFpressl% declaring that she is a resident
of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban
Cit%, where she spent her childhood and school da%s, as
her place of domicile.
)ure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there
must li'ewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
#espondent=s statements to the effect that she has alwa%s
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompan%ing
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. #espondent has not presented an%
evidence to show that her conduct, one %ear prior the
election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. 7orse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of -anila.
*t is evident from these circumstances that she was not a
resident of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te $since childhood.$
To further support the assertion that she could have not
been a resident of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te for more than
one %ear, petitioner correctl% pointed out that on Hanuar%
;, 1992 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
1,A of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. *n doing so, she placed in her
>oter #egistration #ecord that she resided in the
municipalit% of Tolosa for a period of siF months. This ma%
be inconse(uential as argued b% the respondent since it
refers onl% to her residence in Tolosa, 0e%te. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the .irst /istrict
of 0e%te prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing
but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for siF months onl%.
15
*n a #esolution promulgated a da% before the -a% , 1992 elections, the
C4-E0EC en ban denied petitioner=s -otion for #econsideration
16
of the
April ;?, 1992 #esolution declaring her not (ualified to run for the position of
-ember of the "ouse of #epresentatives for the .irst 0egislative /istrict of
0e%te.
17
The #esolution tersel% stated3
After deliberating on the -otion for #econsideration, the
Commission #E140>E/ to /EN6 it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re,
eFamination of the resolution granting the petition for
dis(ualification.
18
4n -a% 11, 1992, the C4-E0EC issued a #esolution allowing petitioner=s
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the .irst /istrict of
0e%te. 4n the same da%, however, the C4-E0EC reversed itself and issued
a second #esolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19
*n a 1upplemental )etition dated ;2 -a% 1992, petitioner averred that she
was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in
the .irst /istrict of 0e%te held -a% , 1992 based on the canvass completed
b% the )rovincial Board of Canvassers on -a% 1?, 1992. )etitioner alleged
that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of !E,?!1 votes compared
to the &I,&& votes received b% #espondent -onte<o. A cop% of said
Certificate of Canvass was anneFed to the 1upplemental )etition.
4n account of the #esolutions dis(ualif%ing petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and the public respondent=s
#esolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.
)etitioner raises several issues in her 4riginal and 1upplemental )etitions.
The principal issues ma% be classified into two general areas3
I. The issue o! "etitioner#s $uali!iations
7hether or not petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te for a period of one
%ear at the time of the -a% 9, 1992 elections.
II. The %urisditional Issue
aA )rior to the elections
7hether or not the C4-E0EC properl% eFercised its
<urisdiction in dis(ualif%ing petitioner outside the period
mandated b% the 4mnibus Election Code for
dis(ualification cases under Article ! of the said Code.
bA After the Elections
7hether or not the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral
Tribunal assumed eFclusive <urisdiction over the (uestion
of petitioner=s (ualifications after the -a% , 1992
elections.
I. "etitioner#s $uali!iation
A perusal of the #esolution of the C4-E0EC=s 1econd /ivision reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of $/omicile$ and
$#esidence$ in election law. 7hile the C4-E0EC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence
is s%non%mous with domicile, the #esolution reveals a tendenc% to substitute
or mista'e the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate=s (ualifications for
election to the "ouse of #epresentatives as re(uired b% the 19!
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
(ualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our <urisdiction.
Article 2E of the Civil Code decrees that $CfDor the eFercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence.$ *n On& vs. Re'ubli
(+
this court too' the
concept of domicile to mean an individual=s $permanent home$, $a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that the% disclose
intent.$
(1
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of $the
fact of residing or ph%sical presence in a fiFed place$ and animus manendi,
or the intention of returning there permanentl%.
#esidence, in its ordinar% conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. *t is the ph%sical presence of a person in a given
area, communit% or countr%. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has ta'en up his abode ends. 4ne ma% see'
a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. *f a person=s
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicileG if his intent is to leave as soon
as his purpose is established it is residence.
((
*t is thus, (uite perfectl%
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
"owever, a person can onl% have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfull% abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
of choice. *n Uyten&su vs. Re'ubli,
()
we laid this distinction (uite clearl%3
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
$#esidence$ is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporar%G $domicile$ denotes a fiFed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man ma% have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. #esidence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at an% time, but he
ma% have numerous places of residence. "is place of
residence is generall% his place of domicile, but it is not b%
an% means necessaril% so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
.or political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated b%
the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearl% and une(uivocall% emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used s%non%mousl% with domicile.
*n Nuval vs. (uray,
(*
the Court held that $the term residence. . . is
s%non%mous with domicile which imports not onl% intention to reside in a
fiFed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.$
(5
Larena vs. Teves
(6
reiterated the same
doctrine in a case involving the (ualifications of the respondent therein to the
post of -unicipal )resident of /umaguete, Negros 4riental. )ay'on vs.
*uirino,
(7
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence.
(8
1o settled is the concept @of
domicileA in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 19! Constitution on the residence (ualification for
certain elective positions have placed be%ond doubt the principle that when
the Constitution spea's of $residence$ in election law, it actuall% means onl%
$domicile$ to wit3
-r. Nolledo3 7ith respect to 1ection 2, * remember that in
the 19!1 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to re(uire residence in the place not less than one %ear
immediatel% preceding the da% of the elections. 1o m%
(uestion is3 7hat is the Committee=s concept of residence
of a candidate for the legislatureK *s it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residenceK
-r. /avide3 -adame )resident, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembl% are concerned, the
proposed section merel% provides, among others, $and a
resident thereof$, that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one %ear preceding the da% of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 19!& Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile.
(9
FFF FFF FFF
-rs. #osario Braid3 The neFt (uestion is on 1ection !,
page ;. * thin' Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that $resident$ has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
-r. /e los #e%es3 /omicile.
-s. #osario Braid3 6es, 1o, would the gentleman consider
at the proper time to go bac' to actual residence rather
than mere intention to resideK
-r. /e los #e%es3 But we might encounter some difficult%
especiall% considering that a provision in the Constitution
in the Article on 1uffrage sa%s that .ilipinos living abroad
ma% vote as enacted b% law. 1o, we have to stic' to the
original concept that it should be b% domicile and not
ph%sical residence.
)+
*n Co vs. Eletoral Tribunal o! the +ouse o! Re'resentatives,
)1
this Court
concluded that the framers of the 19! Constitution obviousl% adhered to the
definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
)(
*n the light of the principles <ust discussed, has petitioner *melda #omualde+
-arcos satisfied the residenc% re(uirement mandated b% Article >*, 1ec. I of
the 19! ConstitutionK 4f what significance is the (uestioned entr% in
petitioner=s Certificate of Candidac% stating her residence in the .irst
0egislative /istrict of 0e%te as seven @!A monthsK
*t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidac% which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has
satisfied the constitution=s residenc% (ualification re(uirement. The said
statement becomes material onl% when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. *t would be plainl% ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberatel% and 'nowingl% ma'e a statement in a certificate of candidac%
which would lead to his or her dis(ualification.
*t stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merel% committed an honest
mista'e in <otting the word $seven$ in the space provided for the residenc%
(ualification re(uirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
(uestioned entr% obviousl% resulted in the subse(uent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual sta% in Tolosa,
0e%te instead of her period of residence in the .irst district, which was $since
childhood$ in the space provided. These circumstances and events are
ampl% detailed in the C4-E0EC=s 1econd /ivision=s (uestioned resolution,
albeit with a different interpretation. .or instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban Cit% to ma'e her
eligible to run in the .irst /istrict, private respondent -onte<o opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban Cit%.
)etitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the .irst /istrict,
which is Tolosa, 0e%te, a fact which she subse(uentl% noted down in her
Certificate of Candidac%. A close loo' at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion3 the entr% for residence @*tem No. !A is
followed immediatel% b% the entr% for residence in the constituenc% where a
candidate see's election thus3
!. #E1*/ENCE @complete AddressA3 ,r&y- Olot. Tolosa.
Leyte
)41T 4..*CE A//#E11 .4# E0ECT*4N )5#)41E13
,r&y- Olot. Tolosa. Leyte
. #E1*/ENCE *N T"E C4N1T*T5ENC6 7"E#E *
1EE8 T4
BE E0ECTE/ *--E/*ATE06 )#ECE/*N9 T"E
E0ECT*4N3::::::::: 6ears and Seven -onths.
"aving been forced b% private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in 0e%te instead of petitioner=s claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had <otted down her period of sta% in her legal residence or
domicile. The <uFtaposition of entries in *tem ! and *tem the first
re(uiring actual residence and the second re(uiring domicile coupled with
the circumstances surrounding petitioner=s registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviousl% led to her writing down an unintended entr% for which she could be
dis(ualified. This honest mista'e should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the .irst /istrict if such fact were established b%
means more convincing than a mere entr% on a piece of paper.
7e now proceed to the matter of petitioner=s domicile.
*n support of its asseveration that petitioner=s domicile could not possibl% be
in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, the 1econd /ivision of the C4-E0EC, in its
assailed #esolution of April ;?,1992 maintains that $eFcept for the time when
@petitionerA studied and wor'ed for some %ears after graduation in Tacloban
Cit%, she continuousl% lived in -anila.$ The #esolution additionall% cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner=s domicile ought to be
an% place where she lived in the last few decades eFcept Tacloban, 0e%te.
.irst, according to the #esolution, petitioner, in 1929, resided in 1an Huan,
-etro -anila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 19I2, following
the election of her husband to the )hilippine presidenc%, she lived in 1an
-iguel, -anila where she as a voter. *n 19! and thereafter, she served as
a member of the Batasang )ambansa and 9overnor of -etro -anila. $1he
could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of
-etro -anila,$ the C4-E0EC stressed. "ere is where the confusion lies.
7e have stated, man% times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
#esidence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to stud% or to do other things of a temporar% or semi,
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion
b% the C4-E0EC that $she could not have been a resident of Tacloban Cit%
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidac% because
she became a resident of man% places$ flies in the face of settled
<urisprudence in which this Court carefull% made distinctions between
@actualA residence and domicile for election law purposes. *n Larena vs.
Teves,
))
su'ra, we stressed3
CTDhis court is of the opinion and so holds that a person
who has his own house wherein he lives with his famil% in
a municipalit% without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with
his famil% in another municipalit%, has his residence in the
former municipalit%, notwithstanding his having registered
as an elector in the other municipalit% in (uestion and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating ever% time that he is a resident of the
latter municipalit%.
-ore significantl%, in )ay'on vs. *uirino,
)*
7e eFplained that3
A citi+en ma% leave the place of his birth to loo' for
$greener pastures,$ as the sa%ing goes, to improve his lot,
and that, of course includes stud% in other places, practice
of his avocation, or engaging in business. 7hen an
election is to be held, the citi+en who left his birthplace to
improve his lot ma% desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or
for an% other reason, he ma% not absent himself from his
professional or business activitiesG so there he registers
himself as voter as he has the (ualifications to be one and
is not willing to give up or lose the opportunit% to choose
the officials who are to run the government especiall% in
national elections. /espite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsa'en him. This ma% be the eFplanation
wh% the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. *t finds
<ustification in the natural desire and longing of ever%
person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one=s birth must be overcome
b% positive proof of abandonment for another.
.rom the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above,cited statements
supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position
of #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, the C4-E0EC was obviousl%
referring to petitioner=s various places of @actualA residence, not her domicile.
*n doing so, it not onl% ignored settled <urisprudence on residence in election
law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the 4mnibus Election Code @B.). 1A.
)5
7hat is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish
the fact of petitioner=s domicile, which we lift verbatim from the C4-E0EC=s
1econd /ivision=s assailed #esolution3
)6
*n or about 19& when respondent was a little over %ears
old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, 0e%te
@Tacloban Cit%A. 1he studied in the "ol% *nfant Academ% in
Tacloban from 19& to 19?9 when she graduated from
high school. 1he pursued her college studies in 1t. )aul=s
College, now /ivine 7ord 5niversit% in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the 0e%te Chinese 1chool, still in Tacloban Cit%.
*n 192; she went to -anila to wor' with her cousin, the
late spea'er /aniel L. #omualde+ in his office in the
"ouse of #epresentatives. *n 192?, she married eF,
)resident .erdinand E. -arcos when he was still a
congressman of *locos Norte and registered there as a
voter. 7hen her husband was elected 1enator of the
#epublic in 1929, she and her husband lived together in
1an Huan, #i+al where she registered as a voter. *n 19I2,
when her husband was elected )resident of the #epublic
of the )hilippines, she lived with him in -alacanang
)alace and registered as a voter in 1an -iguel, -anila.
C*Dn .ebruar% 19I @she claimed thatA she and her famil%
were abducted and 'idnapped to "onolulu, "awaii. *n
November 1991, she came home to -anila. *n 199;,
respondent ran for election as )resident of the )hilippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidac% wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of 1an
Huan, -etro -anila.
Appl%ing the principles discussed to the facts found b% C4-E0EC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes
during the last four decades. None of these purposes une(uivocall% point to
an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, 0e%te. -oreover,
while petitioner was born in -anila, as a minor she naturall% followed the
domicile of her parents. 1he grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood
there and eventuall% established residence in different parts of the countr%
for various reasons. Even during her husband=s presidenc%, at the height of
the -arcos #egime=s powers, petitioner 'ept her close ties to her domicile of
origin b% establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthda%s and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well,
publici+ed pro<ects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives
held positions of power either through the ballot or b% appointment, alwa%s
with either her influence or consent. These well,publici+ed ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the histor% and lore of the (uarter centur% of
-arcos power in our countr%. Either the% were entirel% ignored in the
C4-E0EC=1 #esolutions, or the ma<orit% of the C4-E0EC did not 'now
what the rest of the countr% alwa%s 'new3 the fact of petitioner=s domicile in
Tacloban, 0e%te.
)rivate respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not
petitioner=s domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was
eight %ears old. "e avers that after leaving the place in 192;, she
$abandoned her residenc% @siA therein for man% %ears and . . . @could notA
re,establish her domicile in said place b% merel% eFpressing her intention to
live there again.$ 7e do not agree.
.irst, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once ac(uired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner=s being born in -anila, Tacloban, 0e%te was her domicile of origin
b% operation of law. This domicile was not established onl% when her father
brought his famil% bac' to 0e%te contrar% to private respondent=s averments.
1econd, domicile of origin is not easil% lost. To successfull% effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate3
)7
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicileG
;. A bona !ide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new oneG and
&. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
*n the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 4nl% with evidence
showing concurrence of all three re(uirements can the presumption of
continuit% or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence re(uires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
)8
*n the case at bench, the evidence adduced
b% private respondent plainl% lac's the degree of persuasiveness re(uired to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment re(uires the
voluntar% act of relin(uishing petitioner=s former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing @domiilium
voluntariumA.
*n this connection, it cannot be correctl% argued that petitioner lost her
domicile of origin b% operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
)resident .erdinand E. -arcos in 192;. .or there is a clearl% established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of $domicile$ and $residence.$
)9

The presumption that the wife automaticall% gains the husband=s domicile b%
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
$residence$ in Article 11E of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one
area where the two concepts are well delineated. /r. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area eFplains3
*n the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between
domicile and residence. Both terms impl% relations
between a person and a placeG but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
<uridical, independent of the necessit% of ph%sical
presence.
*+
Article 11E of the Civil Code provides3
Art. 11E. The husband shall fiF the residence of the
famil%. But the court ma% eFempt the wife from living with
the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the #epublic.
A surve% of <urisprudence relating to Article 11E or to the concepts of
domicile or residence as the% affect the female spouse upon marriage %ields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automaticall% loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband=s choice of residence upon
marriage.
Article 11E is a virtual restatement of Article 2 of the 1panish Civil Code of
19 which states3
0a mu<er esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde (uiera
(ue fi<e su residencia. 0os Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con <usta causa eFimirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o= a pais
eFtran<ero.
Note the use of the phrase $donde $uiera su !i/e de residenia$ in the
afore(uoted article, which means wherever @the husbandA 0ishes to
establish residene. This part of the article clearl% contemplates onl% actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of fiFing a famil% home or
residence. -oreover, this interpretation is further strengthened b% the phrase
$uando el marido translade su residenia$ in the same provision which
means, $when the husband shall trans!er his residence,$ referring to another
positive act of relocating the famil% to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviousl% cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fiFed,
fairl%,permanent concept when it plainl% connotes the possibilit% of
transferring from one place to another not onl% once, but as often as the
husband ma% deem fit to move his famil%, a circumstance more consistent
with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fiF the actual residence is in harmon% with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unif% the famil%, recogni+ing the fact
that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles @of
originA. This difference could, for the sa'e of famil% unit%, be reconciled onl%
b% allowing the husband to fiF a single place of actual residence.
>er% significantl%, Article 11E of the Civil Code is found under Title > under
the heading3 #*9"T1 AN/ 4B0*9AT*4N1 BET7EEN "51BAN/ AN/
7*.E. *mmediatel% preceding Article 11E is Article 1E9 which obliges the
husband and wife to live together, thus3
Art. 1E9. The husband and wife are obligated to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelit% and render
mutual help and support.
The dut% to live together can onl% be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
ph%sicall% together. This ta'es into account the situations where the couple
has man% residences @as in the case of the petitionerA. *f the husband has to
sta% in or transfer to an% one of their residences, the wife should necessaril%
be with him in order that the% ma% $live together.$ "ence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 11E refers to $domicile$ and not to $residence.$ 4therwise,
we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while
the husband, for professional or other reasons, sta%s in one of their @variousA
residences. As /r. Tolentino further eFplains3
#esidence and /omicile 7hether the word $residence$
as used with reference to particular matters is
s%non%mous with $domicile$ is a (uestion of some
difficult%, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
word is used. 1ometimes the% are used s%non%mousl%, at
other times the% are distinguished from one another.
FFF FFF FFF
#esidence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the
ph%sical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a countr% residence
and a cit% residence. #esidence is ac(uired b% living in
placeG on the other hand, domicile can eFist without
actuall% living in the place. The important thing for domicile
is that, once residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to sta% there permanentl%, even if
residence is also established in some other
place.
*1
*n fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and
the wife during the marriage is not an iron,clad principleG *n cases appl%ing
the Civil Code on the (uestion of a common matrimonial residence, our
<urisprudence has recogni+ed certain situations
*(
where the spouses could
not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed
to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviousl%
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile @apart from being allowed to
opt for a new oneA. *n 1e la 2ina vs. 2illareal
*)
this Court held that $CaD
married woman ma% ac(uire a residence or domicile separate from that of
her husband during the eFistence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce.$
**
Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. *n
instances where the wife actuall% opts, .under the Civil Code, to live
separatel% from her husband either b% ta'ing new residence or reverting to
her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. *n Arroyo vs.
2as$ues de Arroyo
*5
the Court held that3
5pon eFamination of the authorities, we are convinced
that it is not within the province of the courts of this countr%
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render con<ugal rights to, the other. 4f course where
the propert% rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible @siA b% process of contempt, ma% be entered to
compel the restitution of the purel% personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roofG and he eFperience of those countries
where the courts of <ustice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the polic% of the
practice is eFtremel% (uestionable. Thus in England,
formerl% the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of con<ugal rights at the instance of either
husband or wifeG and if the facts were found to warrant it,
that court would ma'e a mandator% decree, enforceable
b% process of contempt in case of disobedience, re(uiring
the delin(uent part% to live with the other and render
con<ugal rights. 6et this practice was sometimes critici+ed
even b% the <udges who felt bound to enforce such orders,
and in 3eldon v. 3eldon @9 )./. 2;A, decided in 1&, 1ir
Hames "annen, )resident in the )robate, /ivorce and
Admiralt% /ivision of the "igh Court of Hustice, eFpressed
his regret that the English law on the sub<ect was not the
same as that which prevailed in 1cotland, where a decree
of adherence, e(uivalent to the decree for the restitution of
con<ugal rights in England, could be obtained b% the
in<ured spouse, but could not be enforced b%
imprisonment. Accordingl%, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the -atrimonial Causes
Act @1?A abolished the remed% of imprisonmentG though
a decree for the restitution of con<ugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience ma% serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical pa%ment of a stipend in the character of
alimon%.
*n the voluminous <urisprudence of the 5nited 1tates, onl%
one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to ma'e a preemptor% order re(uiring one of the spouses
to live with the otherG and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the Cit% of New 4rleans. The
decision referred to @Bahn v. /arb%, &I 0a. Ann., !EA was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of 0ouisiana similar
to article 2I of the 1panish Civil Code. *t was decided
man% %ears ago, and the doctrine evidentl% has not been
fruitful even in the 1tate of 0ouisiana. *n other states of the
American 5nion the idea of enforcing cohabitation b%
process of contempt is re<ected. @;1 C%c., 11?A.
*n a decision of Hanuar% ;, 19E9, the 1upreme Court of
1pain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de >alladolid re(uiring a wife to return to the
marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to ma'e a particular disposition of certain mone%
and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial propert%, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the propert% which she had brought to the marriage. @11&
Hur. Civ., pp. 1, 11A But it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned b% an% other penalt% than the conse(uences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and
control of her propert%G and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessaril% have been
followed b% imprisonment for contempt.
)arentheticall% when )etitioner was married to then Congressman -arcos,
in 192?, petitioner was obliged b% virtue of Article 11E of the Civil Code
to follow her husband=s actual place of residence fiFed b% him. The problem
here is that at that time, -r. -arcos had several places of residence, among
which were 1an Huan, #i+al and Batac, *locos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places -r. -arcos did fiF as his famil%=s residence. But
assuming that -r. -arcos had fiFed an% of these places as the con<ugal
residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. 1he
did not lose her domicile of origin.
4n the other hand, the common law concept of $matrimonial domicile$
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our <urisprudential
eFperiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 192E, into the New .amil%
Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code
and the .amil% Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted b%
the term domicile in an entirel% new provision @Art. I9A distinctl% different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 11E. The provision recogni+es
revolutionar% changes in the concept of women=s rights in the intervening
%ears b% ma'ing the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.
*6
7ithout as much belaboring the point, the term residence ma% mean one
thing in civil law @or under the Civil CodeA and (uite another thing in political
law. 7hat stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned,
affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should onl% be interpreted to mean $actual residence.$ The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation
therefore, is that when petitioner married the former )resident in 192?, she
'ept her domicile of origin and merel% gained a new home, not a domiilium
neessarium.
Even assuming for the sa'e of argument that petitioner gained a new
$domicile$ after her marriage and onl% ac(uired a right to choose a new one
after her husband died, petitioner=s acts following her return to the countr%
clearl% indicate that she not onl% impliedl% but eFpressl% chose her domicile
of origin @assuming this was lost b% operation of lawA as her domicile. This
$choice$ was une(uivocall% eFpressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
)C99 when petitioner sought the )C99=s permission to $rehabilitate @ourA
ancestral house in Tacloban and .arm in 4lot, 0e%te. . . to ma'e them
livable for the -arcos famil% to have a home in our homeland.$
*7

.urthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 199; in
Tacloban, 0e%te, while living in her brother=s house, an act which supports
the domiciliar% intention clearl% manifested in her letters to the )C99
Chairman. 1he could not have gone straight to her home in 1an Huan, as it
was in a state of disrepair, having been previousl% looted b% vandals. "er
$homes$ and $residences$ following her arrival in various parts of -etro
-anila merel% (ualified as temporar% or $actual residences,$ not domicile.
-oreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific
situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highl% illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile
upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one
where situations eFist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the
wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
*n the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated
b% this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established b%
the parties weigh heavil% in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner=s
claim of legal residence or domicile in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te.
**. The /urisditional issue
)etitioner alleges that the <urisdiction of the C4-E0EC had alread% lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April ;?, 1992,
fourteen @1?A da%s before the election in violation of 1ection ! of the
4mnibus Election Code.
*8
-oreover, petitioner contends that it is the "ouse
of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal and not the C4-E0EC which has
<urisdiction over the election of members of the "ouse of #epresentatives in
accordance with Article >* 1ec. 1! of the Constitution. This is untenable.
*t is a settled doctrine that a statute re(uiring rendition of <udgment within a
specified time is generall% construed to be merel% director%,
*9
$so that non,
compliance with them does not invalidate the <udgment on the theor% that if
the statute had intended such result it would have clearl% indicated it.$
5+
The
difference between a mandator% and a director% provision is often made on
grounds of necessit%. Adopting the same view held b% several American
authorities, this court in Marelino vs. Cruz held that3
51
The difference between a mandator% and director%
provision is often determined on grounds of eFpedienc%,
the reason being that less in<ur% results to the general
public b% disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
*n Tra'' v. M Cormi4, a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirt%
@&EA da%s within which a decree ma% be entered without
the consent of counsel, it was held that $the statutor%
provisions which ma% be thus departed from with impunit%,
without affecting the validit% of statutor% proceedings, are
usuall% those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
0egislature or some incident of the essential act.$ Thus, in
said case, the statute under eFamination was construed
merel% to be director%.
The mischief in petitioner=s contending that the C4-E0EC should have
abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the 4mnibus
Election Code because it lac'ed <urisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts
and other (uasi,<udicial bodies would then refuse to render <udgments
merel% on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
*n an% event, with the enactment of 1ections I and ! of #.A. II?I in relation
to 1ection ! of B.). 1,
5(
it is evident that the respondent Commission
does not lose <urisdiction to hear and decide a pending dis(ualification case
under 1ection ! of B.). 1 even after the elections.
As to the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal=s supposed
assumption of <urisdiction over the issue of petitioner=s (ualifications after the
-a% , 1992 elections, suffice it to sa% that "#ET=s <urisdiction as the sole
<udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and (ualifications of
members of Congress begins onl% after a candidate has become a member
of the "ouse of #epresentatives.
5)
)etitioner not being a member of the
"ouse of #epresentatives, it is obvious that the "#ET at this point has no
<urisdiction over the (uestion.
*t would be an abdication of man% of the ideals enshrined in the 19!
Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberatel% ma'e distinctions in law
solel% on the basis of the personalit% of a petitioner in a case. 4bviousl% a
distinction was made on such a ground here. 1urel%, man% established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sa'e
perpetuating power during the pre,E/1A regime. 7e renege on these
sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of E/1A ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to den% an individual what he or
she <ustl% deserves in law. -oreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to
repeat the mista'es of the past.
7"E#E.4#E, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessar%
residence (ualifications to run for a seat in the "ouse of #epresentatives in
the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, the C4-E0EC=s (uestioned #esolutions dated
April ;?, -a% !, -a% 11, and -a% ;2, 1992 are hereb% 1ET A1*/E.
#espondent C4-E0EC is hereb% directed to order the )rovincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the dul% elected #epresentative of the
.irst /istrict of 0e%te.
14 4#/E#E/.
)eliiano. %-. is on leave-



Sep!r!te Op,",o"-

'UNO, J., concurring3
*t was Aristotle who taught man'ind that things that are ali'e should be
treated ali'e, while things that are unali'e should be treated unali'e in
proportion to their unali'eness.
1
0i'e other candidates, petitioner has clearl%
met the residence re(uirement provided b% 1ection I, Article >* of the
Constitution.
(
7e cannot dis(ualif% her and treat her unali'e, for the
Constitution guarantees e(ual protection of the law. * proceed from the
following factual and legal propositions3
.irst. There is no (uestion that petitioner=s original domicile is in Tacloban,
0e%te. "er parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in
Tacloban. The% have vast real estate in the place. )etitioner went to school
and thereafter wor'ed there. * consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both
her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. "er domicile of origin as it
was the domicile of her parents when she was a minorG and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of ma<orit%.
1econd. There is also no (uestion that in -a%, 192?, petitioner married the
late )resident .erdinand E. -arcos. B% contracting marriage, her domicile
became sub<ect to change b% law, and the right to change it was given b%
Article 11E of the Civil Code provides3
Art. 11E. The husband shall !i5 the residene o! the !amily.
But the court ma% eFempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the #epublic.
)
@Emphasis suppliedA
*n 1e la 2i6a v. 2illareal and (eo'ano,
*
this Court eFplained wh%
the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. 7e
held3 $The reason is founded upon the theoreti identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is
the home of the other. *t is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinaril% eFists, where
union and harmon% prevail.$
5
*n accord with this ob<ective, Article
1E9 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife $to live
together.$
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner=s
marria&e to former )resident -arcos i'so !ato resulted in the loss of her
Tacloban domicile. * respectfull% submit that her marriage by itsel! alone did
not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 11E of the Civil Code
merel% gave the husband the right to fiF the domicile of the famil%. *n the
eFercise of the right, the husband ma% e5'liitly choose the prior domicile of
his wife, in which case, the wife=s domicile remains unchanged. The husband
can also im'liitly ac(uiesce to his wife=s prior domicile even if it is different.
1o we held in de la 2i6a,
6
. . . . 7hen married women as well as children sub<ect to
parental authorit% live, 0ith the a$uiesene o! their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
latter live, the% have their own inde'endent domiile. . . .
*t is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate
choice of a different domicile b% the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliar% decision made b% the husband in the eFercise of the
right conferred b% Article 11E of the Civil Code binds the wife. An%
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrar% to the domiciliar%
choice of the husband cannot change in an% wa% the domicile
legall% fiFed b% the husband. These acts are void not onl% because
the wife lac's the capacit% to choose her domicile but also because
the% are contrar% to law and public polic%.
*n the case at bench, it is not disputed that former )resident -arcos
eFercised his right to fiF the famil% domicile and established it in Batac,
*locos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that 'artiular 'oint o!
time and throu&hout their married li!e. 'etitioner lost her domiile in
Taloban. Leyte. 1ince petitioner=s Batac domicile has been fiFed b%
operation of law, it was not affected in 1929 when her husband was elected
as 1enator, when the% lived in 1an Huan, #i+al and where she registered as
a voter. *t was not also affected in 19I2 when her husband was elected
)resident, when the% lived in -alacaMang )alace, and when she registered
as a voter in 1an -iguel, -anila. Nor was it affected when she served as a
member of the ,atasan& "ambansa, -inister of "uman 1ettlements and
9overnor of -etro -anila during the incumbenc% of her husband as
)resident of the nation. 5nder Article 11E of the Civil Code, it was onl% her
husband who could change the famil% domicile in Batac and the evidence
shows he did not effect an% such change. To a large degree, this follows the
common law that $a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and b%
operation of law, ac(uires that of her husband, no matter 0here the 0i!e
atually lives or 0hat she believes or intends.$
7
.ourth. The more difficult tas' is how to interpret the effect of the death on
1eptember ;, 199 of former )resident -arcos on petitioner=s Batac
domicile. The issue is of !irst im'ression in our <urisdiction and two @;A
schools of thought contend for acceptance. 4ne is espoused b% our
distinguished colleague, -r. Hustice /avide, Hr., heavil% rel%ing on American
authorities.
8
"e echoes the theor% that a!ter the husband#s death. the 0i!e
retains the last domiile o! her husband until she ma4es an atual han&e.
* do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife
still retains her dead husband=s domicile is based on anient ommon la0
0hih 0e an no lon&er a''ly in the "hili''ine settin& today. The common
law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her
the power of ac(uiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9

0egal scholars agree that two @;A reasons support this common law doctrine.
The !irst reason as pinpointed b% the legendar% Blac'stone is derived from
the view that $the ver% being or legal eFistence of the woman is suspended
during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband.$
1+
The seond reason lies in $the desirabilit% of having the interests
of each member of the famil% unit governed b% the same law.$
11
The
'resum'tion that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an e5tension of this common law concept. The one't and its e5tension
have 'rovided some o! the most ini$uitous /uris'rudene a&ainst 0omen. *t
was under common law that the 1!& American case of ,rad0ell v. Illinois
1(
was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. *t was
unblushingl% ruled that $the natural and proper timidit% and delicac% which
belongs to the female seF evidentl% unfits it for man% of the occupations of
civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator.$ *ndeed, the rulings relied upon b%
-r. Hustice /avide in CH1
1)
and A- H5# ;d
1*
are American state court
decisions handed down between the %ears 191!
15
and 19&,
16
or be!ore the
time 0hen 0omen 0ere aorded e$uality o! ri&hts 0ith men. 5ndeniabl%,
the women=s liberation movement resulted in far,ranging state legislations in
the 5nited 1tates to eliminate gender ine(ualit%.
17
1tarting in the decade of
the seventies, the courts li'ewise liberali+ed their rulings as the% started
invalidating laws infected with gender,bias. *t was in 19!1 when the 51
1upreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struc' a big blow for women e(ualit%
when it declared as unconstitutional an *daho law that re(uired probate
courts to choose male famil% members over females as estate
administrators. *t held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot <ustif%
a seF,based distinction. These si&ni!iant han&es both in la0 and in ase
la0 on the status o! 0omen virtually obliterated the ini$uitous ommon la0
surrenderin& the ri&hts o! married 0omen to their husbands based on the
dubious theory o! the 'arties# theoreti oneness. The Cor'us %uris
Seundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women=s
right as the% observed3 $"owever, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the
common law theor% of marriage, there is no reason 0hy a 0i!e may not
a$uire a se'arate domiile !or every 'ur'ose 4no0n to the la0.$
19
*n
publishing in 19I9 the Restatement o! the La0. Seond 7Con!lit o! La0s
8d9, the reputable American 0aw *nstitute also categoricall% stated that the
view of Blac'stone $. . . is no lon&er held. As the result o! statutes and ourt
deisions. a 0i!e no0 'ossesses 'ratially the same ri&hts and 'o0ers as
her unmarried sister.$
(+
*n the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging
to the anahronisti ommon la0 that demeans women, especiall% married
women. * submit that the Court has no choice eFcept to brea' awa% from this
common law rule, the root of the man% degradations of .ilipino women.
Before 19, our laws particularl% the Civil Code, were full of gender
discriminations against women. 4ur esteemed colleague, -adam Hustice
.lerida #uth #omero, cited a few of them as follows3
(1
FFF FFF FFF
Le&al 1isabilities Su!!ered by 3ives
Not generall% 'nown is the fact that under the Civil Code,
wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. .or
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the seF of the giver or the value of the gift,
other than from her ver% close relatives, without her
husband=s consent. 1he ma% accept onl% from, sa%, her
parents, parents,in,law, brothers, sisters and the relatives
within the so,called fourth civil degree. 1he ma% not
eFercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband ob<ects on serious grounds or if
his income is sufficient to support their famil% in
accordance with their social standing. As to what
constitutes $serious grounds$ for ob<ecting, this is within
the discretion of the husband.
FFF FFF FFF
Because of the present ine(uitable situation, the
amendments to the Civil 0aw being proposed b% the
5niversit% of the )hilippines 0aw Center would allow
absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such
that the divorced spouses are free to get married a %ear
after the divorce is decreed b% the courts. "owever, in
order to place the husband and wife on an e(ual footing
insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the
following are specified as the grounds for absolute
divorce3 @1A adulter% or having a paramour committed b%
the respondent in an% of the wa%s specified in the #evised
)enal Code or @;A an attempt b% the respondent against
the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the #evised )enal CodeG @&A abandonment
of the petitioner b% the respondent without <ust cause for a
period of three consecutive %earsG or @?A habitual
maltreatment.
7ith respect to propert% relations, the husband is
automaticall% the administrator of the con<ugal propert%
owned in common b% the married couple even if the wife
ma% be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law
does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as
such administrator. Conse(uentl%, the husband is
authori+ed to engage in acts and enter into transactions
beneficial to the con<ugal partnership. The wife, however,
cannot similarl% bind the partnership without the husband=s
consent.
And while both eFercise <oint parental authorit% over their
children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the propert% pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Ta'ing the lead in Asia, our government eFerted efforts, principall%
through legislations, to eliminate ine(ualit% between men and
women in our land. The 0atershed ame on Au&ust :. ;<== 0hen
our )amily Code too4 e!!et 0hih. amon& others. terminated the
une$ual treatment o! husband and 0i!e as to their ri&hts and
res'onsibilities.
((
The .amil% Code attained this elusive ob<ective b% giving new rights to
married women and b% abolishing seF,based privileges of husbands. Among
others, married women are now given the <oint right to administer the famil%
propert%, whether in the absolute communit% s%stem or in the s%stem of
con<ugal partnershipG
()
<oint parental authorit% over their minor children, both
over their persons as well as their propertiesG
(*
<oint responsibilit% for the
support of the famil%G
(5
the right to <ointl% manage the householdG
(6
and, the
right to ob<ect to their husband=s eFercise of profession, occupation,
business or activit%.
(7
O! 'artiular relevane to the ase at benh is Artile
>< o! the )amily Code 0hih too4 a0ay the e5lusive ri&ht o! the husband to
!i5 the !amily domiile and &ave it /ointly to the husband and the 0i!e. thus3
Art. I9. The husband and 0i!e shall !i5 the !amily domiile.
*n case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court ma% eFempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the eFemption. "owever, such
eFemption shall not appl% if the same is not compatible
with the solidarit% of the famil%. @Emphasis suppliedA
Artile >< re'ealed Artile ;;? o! the Civil Code. Commenting on
the dut% of the husband and wife to live together, former -adam
Hustice Alice 1empio,/i% of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a 0i!e may no0 re!use to live 0ith her husband,
thus3
(8
@;A The wife has the dut% to live with her husband, but she
ma% refuse to do so in certain cases li'e3
@aA *f the place chosen b% the husband
as famil% residence is dangerous to her
0ifeG
@bA *f the husband sub<ects her to
maltreatment or abusive conduct or
insults, ma'ing common life impossibleG
@cA *f the husband compels her to live
with his parents, but she cannot get
along with her mother,in,law and the%
have constant (uarrels @/el #osario v.
/el #osario, CA, ?I 49 I1;;AG
@dA 7here the husband has continuousl%
carried illicit relations for 1E %ears with
different women and treated his wife
roughl% and without consideration.
@/adivas v. >illanueva, 2? )hil. 9;AG
@eA 7here the husband spent his time in
gambling, giving no mone% to his famil%
for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and la%ing
hands on her. @)anuncio v. 1ula, CA, &?
49 1;9AG
@fA *f the husband has no fiFed residence
and lives a vagabond life as a tramp @1
-anresa &;9AG
@gA *f the husband is carr%ing on a
shameful business at home @9ahn v.
/arb%, & 0a. Ann. !EA.
The inesa'able onlusion is that our )amily Code has om'letely
emani'ated the 0i!e !rom the ontrol o! the husband, thus
abandoning the parties= theoretic identit% of interest. No less than
the late revered -r. Hustice H.B.0. #e%es who chaired the Civil
Code #evision Committee of the 5) 0aw Center gave this insightful
view in one of his rare lectures after retirement3
(9
FFF FFF FFF
The .amil% Code is primaril% intended to reform the famil%
law so as to emancipate the wife from the eFclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parit% with him
insofar as the famil% is concerned. The 0i!e and the
husband are no0 'laed on e$ual standin& by the Code.
The% are now <oint administrators of the famil% properties
and eFercise <oint authorit% over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authorit% in
the famil%. The husband 0ill no lon&er 'revail over the
0i!e but she has to agree on all matters concerning the
famil%. @Emphasis suppliedA
*n light of the .amil% Code which abrogated the ine(ualit% between
husband and wife as started and perpetuated b% the common law,
there is no reason in es'ousin& the anomalous rule that the 0i!e
still retains the domiile o! her dead husband. Article 11E of the
Civil Code which provides the statutor% support for this stance has
been repealed b% Article I9 of the .amil% Code. B% its repeal, it
becomes a dead,letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it b%
giving it further effect in an% wa% or manner such as b% ruling that
the petitioner is still bound b% the domiciliar% determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from rec'oning with the .amil% Code, we have to consider our
Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and e(ual protection of
law.
)+
It an hardly be doubted that the ommon la0 im'osition on a married
0oman o! her dead husband#s domiile even beyond his &rave is 'atently
disriminatory to 0omen. *t is a gender,based discrimination and is not
rationall% related to the ob<ective of promoting famil% solidarit%. *t cannot
survive a constitutional challenge. *ndeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the ;<=@ Constitution is more onerned 0ith e$uality
bet0een se5es as it e5'liitly ommands that the State $. . . shall ensure
!undamental e$uality be!ore the la0 o! 0omen and men.$ To be eFact,
section 1?, Article ** provides3 $The 1tate recogni+es the role of women in
nation building, and shall ensure fundamental e(ualit% before the law of
women and men. 7e shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this
constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman=s
treatment.
)rescinding from these premises, * respectfull% submit that the better stane
is to rule that 'etitioner rea$uired her Taloban domiile u'on the death o!
her husband in ;<=<. This is the necessar% conse(uence of the view that
petitioner=s Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband=s
deathG otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at an% point of time.
This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before
it was ta'en awa% b% Article 11E of the Civil Code, a right now recogni+ed b%
the .amil% Code and protected b% the Constitution. 0i'ewise, * cannot see
the fairness of the common law re(uiring petitioner to choose again her
Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile.
1he lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fiFed their domicile in Batac. "er husband is
dead and he cannot rule her be%ond the grave. The law disabling her to
choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common
law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her
dead husband=s domicile. There is neither rh%me nor reason for this gender,
based burden.
,ut even assumin& ar&uendo that there is need !or onvinin& 'roo! that
'etitioner hose to rea$uire her Taloban domiile. still. the reords reveal
am'le evidene to this e!!et. *n her affidavit submitted to the respondent
C4-E0EC, petitioner averred3
FFF FFF FFF
&I. *n November, 1991, * came home to our beloved
countr%, after several re(uests for m% return were denied
b% )resident Cora+on C. A(uino, and after * filed suits for
our 9overnment to issue me m% passport.
&!. But * came home without the mortal remains of m%
beloved husband, )resident .erdinand E. -arcos, which
the 9overnment considered a threat to the national
securit% and welfare.
&. 5pon m% return to the countr%, * wanted to immediatel%
live and reside in Tacloban Cit% or in 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te,
even if m% residences there were not livable as the% had
been destro%ed and cannibali+ed. The )C99, however,
did not permit and allow me.
&9. As a conse(uence, * had to live at various times in the
7estin )hilippine )la+a in )asa% Cit%, a friend=s apartment
on A%ala Avenue, a house in 1outh .orbes )ar' which m%
daughter rented, and )acific )la+a, all in -a'ati.
?E. After the 199; )residential Elections, * lived and
resided in the residence of m% brother in 1an Hose,
Tacloban Cit%, and pursued m% negotiations with )C99 to
recover m% se(uestered residences in Tacloban Cit% and
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
?E.1 *n preparation for m% observance
of All 1aints= /a% and All 1ouls= /a% that
%ear, * renovated m% parents= burial
grounds and entombed their bones
which had been eFcalvated, unearthed
and scattered.
?1. 4n November ;9, 199&, * formall% wrote )C99
Chairman -agtanggol 9unigundo for permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . @oAur ancestral house
in Tacloban and farmhouse in 4lot,
0e%te . . . to ma'e them livable for us
the -arcos famil% to have a home in our
own motherland.
FFF FFF FFF
?;. *t was onl% on EI Hune 199?, however, when )C99
Chairman 9unigundo, in his letter to Col. 1imeon 8empis,
Hr., )C99 #egion #epresentative, allowed me to repair
and renovate m% 0e%te residences. * (uote part of his
letter3
/ear Col. 8empis,
5pon representation b% -rs. *melda #.
-arcos to this Commission, that she
intends to visit our se(uestered
properties in 0e%te, please allow her
access thereto. 1he ma% also cause
repairs and renovation of the
se(uestered properties, in which event,
it shall be understood that her
underta'ing said repairs is not
authori+ation for her to ta'e over said
properties, and that all eFpenses shall
be for her account and not
reimbursable. )lease eFtend the
necessar% courtes% to her.
FFF FFF FFF
?&. * was not permitted, however, to live and sta% in the
1to. NiMo 1hrine residence in Tacloban Cit% where *
wanted to sta% and reside, after repairs and renovations
were completed. *n August 199?, * transferred from 1an
Hose, Tacloban Cit%, to m% residence in Baranga% 4lot,
Tolosa, 0e%te, when )C99 permitted me to sta% and live
there.
It is then lear that in ;<<8 'etitioner reestablished her domiile in
the )irst 1istrit o! Leyte. *t is not disputed that in 199;, she first
lived at the house of her brother in 1an Hose, Tacloban Cit% and
later, in August 199?, she transferred her residence in Baranga%
4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. Both Tacloban Cit% and the municipalit% of 4lot
are within the .irst /istrict of 0e%te. 1ince petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 199; in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, she more than
complied with the constitutional re(uirement of residence
$. . . for a period of not less than one %ear immediatel% preceding
the da% of the election,$ i.e., the -a% , 1992 elections.
The evidene 'resented by the 'rivate res'ondent to ne&ate the Taloban
domiile o! 'etitioner is nil. "e presented petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration
#ecord filed with the Board of Election *nspectors of )recinct 1E,A of
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te wherein she stated that her period of
residence in said baranga% was siF @IA months as of the date of her filing of
said >oter=s #egistration #ecord on Hanuar% ;, 1992.
)1
This statement in
petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration #ecord is a nonA're/udiial admission. The
Constitution re(uires at least one @1A %ear residence in the distrit in which
the candidate shall be elected. *n the case at bench, the reference is the
.irst /istrict of 0e%te. )etitioner=s statement 'roved that she resided in 4lot
siF @IA months before Hanuar% ;, 1992 but did not dis'rove that she has
also resided in Tacloban Cit% starting 199;. As aforestated, 4lot and
Tacloban Cit% are both within the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, hence, her siF @IA
months residence in 4lot should be counted not against, but in her favor.
)rivate respondent also presented petitioner=s Certificate of Candidac% filed
on -arch , 1992
)(
where she placed seven @!A months after *tem No.
which called for information regarding $residence in the constituenc% where *
see' to be elected immediatel% preceding the election.$ Again, this original
certificate of candidac% has no evidentiar% value because an -arch 1, 1992
it was corrected b% petitioner. *n her AmendedBCorrected Certificate of
Candidac%,
))
petitioner wrote $since childhood$ after *tem No. . The
amendment of a certificate of candidac% to correct a bona !ide mista'e has
been allowed b% this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As
we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
)*
viz.3
FFF FFF FFF
The absence of the signature of the 1ecretar% of the local
chapter N.) in the original certificate of candidac%
presented before the deadline 1eptember 11, 1929, did
not render the certificate invalid. The amendment o! the
erti!iate. althou&h at a date a!ter the deadline. but
be!ore the eletion. 0as substantial om'liane 0ith the
la0. and the de!et 0as ured.
*t goes without sa%ing that petitioner=s erroneous Certificate of
Candidac% filed on -arch , 1992 cannot be used as evidence
against her. )rivate respondent=s petition for the dis(ualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two @;A brittle pieces of
documentar% evidence petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration #ecord
and her original Certificate of Candidac%. #anged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
Tacloban, private respondent=s two @;A pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to dis(ualif% petitioner, more so, to den% her the right to
represent the people of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te who have
overwhelmingl% voted for her.
.ifth. 1ection 1E, Article *N,C of the Constitution mandates that $bona !ide
candidates for an% public office shall be free from an% form of harassment
and discrimination.$
)5
A detached reading of the records of the case at
bench will show that all forms of legal and eFtra,legal obstacles have been
thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people=s
representative in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te. *n petitioner=s Answer to the
petition to dis(ualif% her, she averred3
)6
FFF FFF FFF
1E. )etitioner=s @herein private respondent -onte<oA motive
in filing the instant petition is devious. 7hen respondent
@petitioner hereinA announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban Cit% and run for Congress
in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, petitioner @-onte<oA
immediatel% opposed her intended registration b% writing a
letter stating that $she is not a resident of said cit% but of
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.$ @AnneF $;$ of respondent=s
affidavit, AnneF $;$A. After respondent @petitioner hereinA
had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of
her siF,month actual residence therein, petitioner
@-onte<oA filed a petition with the C4-E0EC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the .irst /istrict to the 1econd
/istrict and pursued such move up to the 1upreme Court
in 9.#. No. 11!E;, his purpose being to remove
respondent @petitioner hereinA as petitioner=s @-onte<o=sA
opponent in the congressional election in the .irst /istrict.
"e also filed a bill, along with other 0e%te Congressmen,
see'ing to create another legislative district, to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the .irst /istrict and to ma'e it a part
of the new district, to achieve his purpose. "owever, such
bill did not pass the 1enate. "aving, failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
ob<ective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent @petitioner hereinA for the <udgment
and verdict of the electorate of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te in
an honest, orderl%, peaceful, free and clean elections on
-a% , 1992.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were
not lost
to the perceptive e%e of Commissioner -aambong who in his
/issenting 4pinion,
)7
held3
FFF FFF FFF
)rior to the registration date Hanuar% ;, 1992 the
petitioner @herein private respondent -onte<oA wrote the
Election 4fficer of Tacloban Cit% not to allow respondent
@petitioner hereinA to register thereat since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban Cit%. The purpose of
this move of the petitioner @-onte<oA is not lost to @siA the
Commission. *n 5N/ No. 92,EE1 @In the matter o! the
Le&islative 1istrits o! the "rovines o! Leyte. Iloilo. and
South Cotabato. Out o! 3hih the Ne0 "rovines o!
,iliran. (uimaras and Saran&&ani 3ere Res'etively
CreatedA, . . . "on. Cirilo #o% 9. -onte<o, #epresentative,
.irst /istrict of 0e%te, wanted the -unicipalit% of Tolosa, in
the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, transferred to the 1econd /istrict
of 0e%te. The "on. 1ergio A... Apostol, #epresentative of
the 1econd /istrict of 0e%te, opposed the move of the
petitioner @-onte<oA. 5nder Comelec #esolution No. ;!&I
@/ecember ;9, 199?A, the Commission on Elections
refused to ma'e the proposed transfer. )etitioner
@-onte<oA filed $Motion !or Reonsideration o! Resolution
No. 8@:>$ which the Commission denied in a #esolution
promulgated on .ebruar% 1, 1992. )etitioner @-onte<oA
filed a petition for ertiorari before the "onorable 1upreme
Court @Cirilo #o% 9. -onte<o vs. Commission on Elections,
9.#. No. 11!E;A (uestioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling
from the 1upreme Court, petitioner @-onte<oA tried to ma'e
sure that the respondent @petitioner hereinA will register as
a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
#epresentative not in the .irst but in the 1econd /istrict.
*t did not happen. 4n -arch 1I, 1992, the "onorable
1upreme Court unanimousl% promulgated a $1eision,$
penned b% Associate Hustice #e%nato 1. )uno, the
dispositive portion of which reads3
*N >*E7 7"E#E4., 1ection 1 of
#esolution No. ;!&I insofar as it
transferred the municipalit% of Capoocan
of the 1econd /istrict and the
municipalit% of )alompon of the .ourth
/istrict to the Third /istrict of the
province of 0e%te, is annulled and set
aside. 7e also den% the )etition pra%ing
for the transfer of the municipalit% of
Tolosa from the .irst /istrict to the
1econd /istrict of the province of 0e%te.
No costs.
)etitioner=s @-onte<o=sA plan did not wor'. But the
respondent @petitioner hereinA was constrained to register
in the -unicipalit% of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban Cit%, her domicile. *n an% case, both Tacloban
Cit% and Tolosa are in the .irst 0egislative /istrict.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are
forms of ran' harassments and invidious discriminations against
petitioner to den% her e(ual access to a public office. 7e cannot
commit an% hermeneutic violence to the Constitution b% torturing
the meaning of e(ualit%, the end result of which will allow the
harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is
but one Constitution for all .ilipinos. )etitioner cannot be ad<udged
b% a $different$ Constitution, and the worst wa% to interpret the
Constitution is to in<ect in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
1iFth. *n (alle&o v. 2era,
)8
we eFplained that the reason for this residence
re(uirement is $to eFclude a stranger or newcomer, unac(uainted, with the
conditions and needs of a communit% and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that communit% . . . .$ )etitioner=s lifetime contacts
with the .irst /istrict of 0e%te cannot be contested. Nobod% can claim that
she is not ac(uainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the
place. None can argue she cannot satisf% the intent of the Constitution.
1eventh. *n resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to
effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner
received 1event% Thousand .our "undred 1event%,one @!E,?!1A votes,
while private respondent got onl% Thirt%,1iF Thousand Eight "undred Thirt%,
Three @&I,&&A votes. )etitioner is clearl% the overwhelming choice of the
electorate of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and this is not a sleight of statistics.
7e cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highl% arguable technical
considerations. *n case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give
life to the people=s political <udgment.
A !inal 'oint. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunit%
to rectif% the ine(ualit% of status between women and men b% re<ecting the
ini(uitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and b%
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To
rule that a married woman is eternall% tethered to the domicile dictated b%
her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance
of advantage of a husband over his wife. 7e should not allow the dead to
govern the living even if the glories of %ester%ears seduce us to shout long
live the deadO The .amil% Code buried this gender,based discrimination
against married women and we should not eFcavate what has been
entombed. -ore importantl%, the Constitution forbids it.
* vote to grant the petition.
,ellosillo and Melo. %%-. onur-
.RANCISCO, J., concurring3
* concur with -r. Hustice 8apunan=s ponencia finding petitioner (ualified for
the position of #epresentative of the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. *
wish, however, to eFpress a few comments on the issue of petitioner=s
domicile.
/omicile has been defined as that place in which a person=s habitation is
fiFed, without an% present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is
properl% the domicile of a person in which he has voluntaril% fiFed his abode,
or habitation, not for a mere special or temporar% purpose, but with a present
intention of ma'ing it his permanent home @; C.H.1. 1A. *t denotes a fiFed
permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
li'e reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances,
in the sense that the% disclose intent. @4ng "uan Tin v. #epublic, 19 1C#A
9II, 9I9A
/omicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law
attributes to ever% individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his
parents, or of the head of his famil%, or of the person on whom he is legall%
dependent at the time of his birth. 7hile the domicile of origin is generall%
the place where one is born or reared, it ma%be elsewhere @; C.H.1. 2A.
/omicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has
elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicileG it has for its
true basis or foundation the intention of the person @; C.H.1. IA. *n order
to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and ac(uired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following re(uisites must concur, namel%, @aA
residence or bodil% presence in the new localit%, @bA intention to remain there
or animus manendi, and @cA an intention to abandon the old domicile or
animus non revertendi @#omualde+ v. #TC, Br. !, Tacloban Cit%, ;;I 1C#A
?E, ?12A. A third classification is domicile b% operation of law which
attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinaril% resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the
wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child @; C.H.1.
!A.
*n election law, when our Constitution spea's of residence for election
purposes it means domicile @Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the "ouse of
#epresentatives, 199 1C#A I9;, !1&G Nuval v. 9ura%, 2; )hil. I?2, I21A. To
m% mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this
concept, of domicile which led to petitioner=s dis(ualification b% ruling that
petitioner failed to compl% with the constitutionall% mandated one,%ear
residence re(uirement. Apparentl%, public respondent Commission deemed
as conclusive petitioner=s sta% and registration as voter in man% places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in
Tacloban, 0e%te. *n several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the
rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence @.a%pon v.
Juirino, 9I )hil. ;9?, &EEA. #espondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule eFcept to surmise petitioner=s intent of
abandoning her domicile of origin.
*t has been suggested that petitioner=s domicile of origin was supplanted b%
a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile b% operation of law. The
proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 199 she retains her
husband=s domicile, i.e., Batac, *locos Norte, until she ma'es an actual
change thereof. * find this proposition (uite untenable.
Tacloban, 0e%te, is petitioner=s domicile of origin which was involuntaril%
supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, *locos Norte, upon her marriage in 192?
with then Congressman -arcos. B% legal fiction she followed the domicile of
her husband. *n m% view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to full%
and effectivel% perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1

The (uestion of domicile, however, is not affected b% the fact that it was the
legal or moral dut% of the individual to reside in a given place @; C.H.1.
11A. Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the
marriage subsists, she automaticall% loses it upon the latter=s termination, for
the reason behind the law then ceases. 4therwise, petitioner, after her
marriage was ended b% the death of her husband, would be placed in a (uite
absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifel% obligations
%et made to hold on to one which no longer serves an% meaningful purpose.
*t is m% view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of
Tacloban, 0e%te upon her husband=s death without even signif%ing her
intention to that effect. *t is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectivel% abandoned Tacloban,
0e%te for Batac, *locos Norte or for some other placeBs. The clear rule is that
it is the part% @herein private respondentA claiming that a person has
abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove
preponderantl% such abandonment or loss @.a%pon v. Juirino, su'ra at ;9G
; C.H.1. 1IA, because the presumption is strongl% in favor of an original
or former domicile, as against an ac(uired one @; C.H.1. 1IA. )rivate
respondent unfortunatel% failed to discharge this burden as the record is
devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has ac(uired whether voluntaril% or
involuntaril%, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrar%, clearl% show that petitioner has complied with
the constitutional one,%ear residence re(uirement. After her eFile abroad,
she returned to the )hilippines in 1991 to reside in 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, but
the )residential Commission on 9ood 9overnment which se(uestered her
residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her
transient sta% in various places in -anila @Affidavit p.I, attached as AnneF *
of the )etitionA. *n 199;, she ran for the position of president writing in her
certificate of candidac% her residence as 1an Huan, -etro -anila. After her
loss therein, she went bac' to Tacloban Cit%, ac(uired her residence
certificate
(
and resided with her brother in 1an Hose. 1he resided in 1an
Hose, Tacloban Cit% until August of 199? when she was allowed b% the
)C99 to move and reside in her se(uestered residential house in 4lot,
Tolosa, 0e%te @AnneF *, p. IA.
)
*t was in the same month of August when she
applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in 1an Huan, -etro
-anila in order to register anew as voter of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, which she
did on Hanuar% ;, 1992. .rom this se(uence of events, * find it (uite
improper to use as the rec'oning period of the one,%ear residence
re(uirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous
registration in 1an Huan, -etro -anila. The fact which private respondent
never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after
the 199; presidential election from 1an Huan, -etro -anila to 1an Hose,
Tacloban Cit%, and resided therein until August of 199?. 1he later
transferred to 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te @AnneF *, p. !A. *t appearing that both
Tacloban Cit% and Tolosa, 0e%te are within the .irst Congressional /istrict of
0e%te, it indubitabl% stands that she had more than a %ear of residence in the
constituenc% she sought to be elected. )etitioner, therefore, has
satisfactoril% complied with the one,%ear (ualification re(uired b% the 19!
Constitution.
* vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion3
)etitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the C4-E0EC ruled that
she was dis(ualified from running for #epresentative of her /istrict and that,
in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a ma<orit% vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not b% a straightforward ruling did the
C4-E0EC pronounce its decision as has been its unvar%ing practice in the
past, but b% a startling succession of $reverse somersaults.$ *ndicative of its
shifting stance visAaAvis petitioner=s certificate of candidac% were first, the
action of its 1econd /ivision dis(ualif%ing her and canceling her original
Certificate of Candidac% b% a vote of ;,1 on April ;?, 1992G then the denial
b% the C4-E0EC en ban of her -otion for #econsideration on -a% !,
1992, a da% before the electionG then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
-a% 11, 1992 or three da%s after the election, allowing her proclamation in
the event that the results of the canvass should show that she obtained the
highest number of votes @obviousl% noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingl% over her opponentA, but almost simultaneousl% reversing
itself b% directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless
be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the dis(ualification issue presented b% the case at
bench is the interpretation to be given to the one,%ear residenc% re(uirement
imposed b% the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.
1
Bearing in mind that the term $resident$ has been held to be s%non%mous
with $domicile$ for election purposes, it is important to determine whether
petitioner=s domicile was in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and if so, whether she
had resided there for at least a period of one %ear. 5ndisputed is her
domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
/epending on what theor% one adopts, the same ma% have been changed
when she married .erdinand E. -arcos, then domiciled in Batac, b%
operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainl% released her from the
obligation to live with him at the residence fiFed b% him during his lifetime.
7hat ma% confuse the la%man at this point is the fact that the term $domicile$
ma% refer to $domicile of origin,$ $domicile of choice,$ or $domicile b%
operation of law,$ which sub<ect we shall not belabor since it has been ampl%
discussed b% the 'onente and in the other separate opinions.
*n an% case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to
the effect of the husband=s death on the domicile of the widow. 1ome
scholars opine that the widow=s domicile remains unchangedG that the
deceased husband=s wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind.
9iven this interpretation, the widow cannot possibl% go far enough to sever
the domiciliar% tie imposed b% her husband.
*t is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterall%
to fiF the residence or domicile of the famil%, as laid down in the Civil Code,
(

but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale
underl%ing the mutual dut% of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to
close one=s e%es to the star' realities of the present.
At the other eFtreme is the position that the widow automaticall% reverts to
her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. /oes the law so
abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
domicileK To answer this (uestion which is far from rhetorical, one will have
to 'eep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Ever%one must have a
domicile. Then one must have onl% a single domicile for the same purpose at
an% given time. 4nce established, a domicile remains until a new one is
ac(uired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined b% the law be
is sub<ect to.
At this <uncture, we are confronted with an uneFplored legal terrain in this
<urisdiction, rendered more mur'% b% the conflicting opinions of foreign legal
authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the dar'ness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated b%
eFperience and the necessit% of according petitioner her right to choose her
domicile in 'eeping with the enlightened global trend to recogni+e and
protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedl%, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil,
political and social rights are concerned, is a relativel% recent phenomenon
that too' seed onl% in the middle of this centur%. *t is a historical fact that for
over three centuries, the )hilippines had been coloni+ed b% 1pain, a
conservative, Catholic countr% which transplanted to our shores the 4ld
7orld cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on
our government of the 1panish Civil Code in 19, the people, both men and
women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband=s being
the head of the famil% and the wife=s subordination to his authorit%. *n such
role, his was the right to ma'e vital decisions for the famil%. -an% instances
come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namel%,
that $the husband shall fiF the residence of the famil%.$
)
Because he is made
responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the famil%,
*
he is also
empowered to be the administrator of the con<ugal propert%, with a few
eFceptions
5
and ma%, therefore, dispose of the con<ugal partnership
propert% for the purposes specified under the lawG
6
whereas, as a general
rule, the wife cannot bind the con<ugal partnership without the husband=s
consent.
7
As regards the propert% pertaining to the children under parental
authorit%, the father is the legal administrator and onl% in his absence ma%
the mother assume his powers.
8
/emeaning to the wife=s dignit% are certain
strictures on her personal freedoms, practicall% relegating her to the position
of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few3 The wife cannot, without
the husband=s consent, ac(uire an% gratuitous title, eFcept from her
ascendants, descendants, parents,in,law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.
9
7ith respect to her emplo%ment, the husband wields a veto
power in the case the wife eFercises her profession or occupation or
engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the famil%,
according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and
valid grounds.
1+
-ost offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal,minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred da%s
following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given
birth to a child.
11
The mother who contracts a subse(uent marriage loses
the parental authorit% over her children, unless the deceased husband,
father of the latter, has eFpressl% provided in his will that his widow might
marr% again, and has ordered that in such case she should 'eep and
eFercise parental authorit% over their children.
1(
Again, an instance of a
husband=s overarching influence from be%ond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered b% .ilipino wives for hundreds of
%ears evo'ed no protest from them until the concept of human rights and
e(ualit% between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the 5nited Nations Charter of which the )hilippines was one of
the original signatories. B% then, the 1panish $con(uistadores$ had been
overthrown b% the American forces at the turn of the centur%. The bedroc' of
the 5.N. Charter was firml% anchored on this credo3 $to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignit% and worth of the human person, in
the e$ual ri&hts o! men and 0omen.$ @Emphasis suppliedA
*t too' over thirt% %ears before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit,
owing largel% to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. 7hat
ma% be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All .orms of
/iscrimination Against 7omen @CE/A7A adopted b% the 5.N.
9eneral Assembl% which entered into force as an international
treat% on 1eptember &, 191. *n ratif%ing the instrument, the
)hilippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter,
for its Constitution, no less, declared that $The )hilippines. . .
adopts the generall% accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the polic% of peace, e(ualit%,
<ustice, freedom, cooperation, and amit% with all nations.$
1)
4ne
such principle embodied in the CE/A7 is granting to men and
women $the same rights with regard to the law relating to the
movement of persons and the !reedom to hoose their residene
and domiile.$
1*
@Emphasis suppliedA.
CE/A7=s pro,women orientation which was not lost on .ilipino women was
reflected in the 19! Constitution of the )hilippines and later, in the .amil%
Code,
15
both of which were speedil% approved b% the first lad% )resident of
the countr%, Cora+on C. A(uino. Notable for its emphasis on the human
rights of all individuals and its bias for e(ualit% between the seFes are the
following provisions3 $The 1tate values the dignit% of ever% human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights$
16
and $The 1tate recogni+es
the role of women in nation,building, and shall ensure the fundamental
e(ualit% before the law of women and men.$
17
A ma<or accomplishment of women in their (uest for e(ualit% with men and
the elimination of discriminator% provisions of law was the deletion in the
.amil% Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights e(ual to that of their husbands. 1pecificall%,
the husband and wife are now given the ri&ht /ointly to !i5 the !amily domiileG
18
concomitant to the spouses= being <ointl% responsible for the support of the
famil% is the right and dut% of both spouses to manage the householdG
19
the
administration and the en<o%ment of the communit% propert% shall belong to
both spouses <ointl%G
(+
the father and mother shall now <ointl% eFercise legal
guardianship over the propert% of their unemancipated common child
(1
and
several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women=s
rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularl% 'nown as $7omen
in /evelopment and Nation Building Act$
((
Among the rights given to
married women evidencing their capacit% to act in contracts e(ual to that of
men are3
@1A 7omen shall have the capacit% to borrow and obtain loans and eFecute
securit% and credit arrangements under the same conditions as menG
@;A 7omen shall have e(ual access to all government and private sector
programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and
shall en<o% e(ual treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement
programsG
@&A 7omen shall have e(ual rights to act as incorporators and enter into
insurance contractsG and
@?A -arried women shall have rights e(ual to those of married men in
appl%ing for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without
need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the .ourth 7orld Conference of 7omen in
Bei<ing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that
$7omen=s #ights are "uman #ights$ and that $All obstacles to women=s full
participation in decision,ma'ing at all levels, including the famil%$ should be
removed. "aving been herself a -ember of the )hilippine /elegation to the
*nternational 7omen=s 6ear Conference in -eFico in 19!2, this writer is onl%
too 'eenl% aware of the unremitting struggle being waged b% women the
world over, .ilipino women not eFcluded, to be accepted as e(uals of men
and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them bac' from their
proper places under the sun.
*n light of the ineForable sweep of events, local and global, legislative,
eFecutive and <udicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them
and eliminating whatever poc'ets of discrimination still eFist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at libert% to
choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardlessK
* submit that a widow, li'e the petitioner and others similarl% situated, can no
longer be bound b% the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was
before. Neither does she automaticall% revert to her domicile of origin, but
eFercising free will, she ma% opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. *n
returning to Tacloban and subse(uentl%, to Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, both of
which are located in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, petitioner ampl% demonstrated
b% overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile
in the two places sufficed to meet the one,%ear re(uirement to run as
#epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te.
*n view of the foregoing eFpatiation, * vote to 9#ANT the petition.
/IUG, J., separate opinion3
The case at bench deals with eFplicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. *t is a bedroc' in our legal
s%stem that sets up ideals and directions and render stead% our strides
hence. *t onl% loo's bac' so as to ensure that mista'es in the past are not
repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function
and wea'ens its goals. A constitution ma% well become outdated b% the
realities of time. 7hen it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we
owe it respect and allegiance. Anarch%, open or subtle, has never been, nor
must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitor% needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its ver% essence.
Constitutional provisions must be ta'en to be mandator% in character unless,
either b% eFpress statement or b% necessar% implication, a different intention
is manifest @see -arcelino vs. Cru+, 1;1 1C#A 21A.
The two provisions initiall% brought to focus are 1ection I and 1ection 1! of
Article >* of the fundamental law. These provisions read3
1ec. I. No person shall be a -ember of the "ouse of
#epresentatives unless he is a natural,born citi+en of the
)hilippines and, on the da% of the election, is at least
twent%,five %ears of age, able to read and write, and,
eFcept the part%,list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one %ear immediatel%
preceding the da% of the election.
1ec. 1!. The 1enate and the "ouse of #epresentatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole <udge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and (ualifications of their respective -embers. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine -embers,
three of whom shall be Hustices of the 1upreme Court to
be designated b% the Chief Hustice, and the remaining siF
shall be -embers of the 1enate or the "ouse of
#epresentatives, as the case ma% be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organi+ations
registered under the part%,list s%stem represented therein.
The senior Hustice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election @the $C4-E0EC$A is constitutionall% bound to
enforce and administer $all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
election . . .$ @Art. *N, C, 1ec. ;, ConstitutionA that, there being nothing said to
the contrar%, should include its authorit% to pass upon the (ualification and
dis(ualification prescribed b% law of andidates to an elective office. *ndeed,
pre,proclamation controversies are eFpressl% placed under the C4-E0EC=s
<urisdiction to hear and resolve @Art. *N, C, 1ec. &, ConstitutionA.
The matter before us specificall% calls for the observance of the
constitutional one,%ear residenc% re(uirement. The issue @whether or not
there is here such complianceA, to m% mind, is basicall% a (uestion of fact or
at least ineFtricabl% lin'ed to such determination. The findings and <udgment
of the C4-E0EC, in accordance with the long established rule and sub<ect
onl% to a number of eFceptions under the basic heading of $grave abuse of
discretion,$ are not reviewable b% this Court.
* do not find much need to do a compleF eFercise on what seems to me to
be a plain matter. 9enerall%, the term $residence$ has a broader connotation
that ma% mean 'ermanent @domicileA, o!!iial @place where one=s official
duties ma% re(uire him to sta%A or tem'orary @the place where he so<ourns
during a considerable length of timeA. .or civil law purposes, i.e., as regards
the eFercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence @see Article 2E, Civil
CodeA. *n election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced b%
this Court in Romualdez vs. Re&ional Trial Court, Branch !, Tacloban Cit%
@;;I 1C#A ?E, ?E9AG thus3
*n election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence
as s%non%mous terms, thus3 $@tAhe term $residence$ as
used in the election law is s%non%mous with $domicile,$
which imports not onl% an intention to reside in a fiFed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.$ $/omicile$
denotes a fiFed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for li'e reasons, one
intends to return. . . . . #esidence thus ac(uired, however,
ma% be lost b% adopting another choice of domicile. *n
order, in turn, to ac(uire a new domicile b% choice, there
must concur @1A residence or bodil% presence in the new
localit%, @;A an intention to remain there, and @&A an
intention to abandon the old domicile. *n other words,
there must basicall% be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of timeG
the change of residence must be voluntar%G and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
5sing the above tests, * am not convinced that we can charge the
C4-E0EC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its
assailed resolution.
The C4-E0EC=s <urisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends
when the <urisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. *t signifies
that the protestee must have theretofore been dul% proclaimed and has
since become a $member$ of the 1enate or the "ouse of #epresentatives.
The (uestion can be as'ed on whether or not the proclamation of a
candidate is <ust a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections
dictated solel% on the number of votes cast in an election eFercise. * believe,
it is not. A ministerial dut% is an obligation the performance of which, being
ade(uatel% defined, does not allow the use of further <udgment or discretion.
The C4-E0EC, in its particular case, is tas'ed with the full responsibilit% of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as ma% be re(uired b% law
before a proclamation is properl% done.
The Court, on its part, should, in m% view at least, refrain from an% undue
encroachment on the ultimate eFercise of authorit% b% the Electoral Tribunals
on matters which, b% no less than a constitutional fiat, are eFplicitl% within
their eFclusive domain. The nagging (uestion, if it were otherwise, would be
the effect of the Court=s peremptor% pronouncement on the abilit% of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own <udgment in a contest
$relating to the election, returns and (ualification$ of its members.
)rescinding from all the foregoing, * should li'e to neFt touch base on the
applicabilit% to this case of 1ection I of #epublic Act No. II?I, in relation to
1ection !; of ,atas "ambansa ,l&. 1, each providing thusl%3
#E)5B0*C ACT N4. II?I
FFF FFF FFF
1ec. I. E!!et o! 1is$uali!iation Case. An% candidate
who has been declared b% final <udgment to be dis(ualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. *f for an% reason a candidate is not declared
b% final <udgment before an election to be dis(ualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, in(uir% or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or an% intervenor,
ma% during the pendenc% thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATA1 )A-BAN1A B09. 1
FFF FFF FFF
1ec. !;. E!!ets o! dis$uali!iation ases and 'riority.
The Commission and the courts shall give priorit% to cases
of dis(ualification b% reason of violation of this Act to the
end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than
seven da%s before the election in which the dis(ualification
is sought.
An% candidate who has been declared b% final <udgment to
be dis(ualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for an%
reason, a candidate is not declared b% final, <udgment
before an election to be dis(ualified, and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.
* reali+e that in considering the significance of the law, it ma% be preferable
to loo' for not so much the specific instances the% ostensibl% would cover as
the principle the% clearl% conve%. Thus, * will not scoff at the argument that it
should be sound to sa% that votes cast in favor of the dis(ualified candidate,
whenever ultimatel% declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingl% be considered to be stra% votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed b% the rationale of the now prevailing
doctrine first enunciated in the case of To'aio vs. "aredes @;& )hil. ;&
C191;DA which, although later abandoned in Tizon vs. Comele @1E& 1C#A
I! C191DA, and Santos vs. COMELEC @1&! 1C#A !?E C192DA, was
restored, along with the interim case of (eronimo vs. Ramos @1&I 1C#A
?&2 C192DA, b% the Labo @1!I 1C#A 1 @199DA, Abella @;E1 1C#A ;2&
C1991DA, Labo @;11 1C#A ;9! C199;DA and, most recentl%, ,enito @;&2 1C#A
?&I C199?DA rulings. ,enito vs. Comele was a unanimous decision penned
b% Hustice 8apunan and concurred in b% Chief Hustice Narvasa, Hustices
.eliciano, )adilla, Bidin, #egalado, /avide, #omero, -elo, Juiason, )uno,
>itug and -endo+a @Hustices Cru+ and Bellosillo were on official leaveA. .or
eas% reference, let me (uote from the first Labo decision3
.inall%, there is the (uestion of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the $uo 0arranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as ma%or. "e cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained onl% the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviousl% not the
choice of the people of Baguio Cit%.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is 1antos v.
Commission on Elections, @1&! 1C#A !?EA decided in
192. *n that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was dis(ualified as a turncoat and considered a non,
candidate, were all disregard as stra%. *n effect, the
second placer won b% default. That decision was
supported b% eight members of the Court then, @Cuevas,
%., 'onente, with -a'asiar, Concepcion, Hr., Escolin,
#elova, /e la .uente, Alampa% and A(uino, %%.,
concurring.A with three dissenting @Teehan'ee, Acting C.%.,
Abad 1antos and -elencio,"errera, %%.A and another two
reserving their vote. @)lana and 9utierre+, Hr., %%.A 4ne
was on official leave. @.ernando, C.%.A
#e,eFamining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds,
that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
(eronimo v. Ramos, @1&I 1C#A ?&2A which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 191; in To'aio
v. "aredes, @;& )hil. ;&A was supported b% ten members
of the Court, @9utierre+, Hr., 'onente, with Teehan'ee,
Abad 1antos, -elencio,"errera, )lana, Escolin, #elova,
/e la .uente, Cuevas and Alampa%, %%., concurringA
without an% dissent, although one reserved his vote,
@-a'asiar, %.A another too' no part, @A(uino, %.A and two
others were on leave. @.ernando, C.%. and Concepcion,
Hr., %.A There the Court held3
. . . it would be eFtremel% repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionall%
guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not ac(uired the
ma<orit% or pluralit% of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituenc%, the
ma<orit% of which have positivel%
declared through their ballots that the%
do not choose him.
1ound polic% dictates that public elective
offices are filled b% those who have
received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it
is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it
receives a ma<orit% or pluralit% of the
legal votes cast in the election. @;E
Corpus Huris ;nd, 1 ;?&, p. I!I.A
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be dis(ualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessaril% entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, dis(ualified, or
non,eligible person ma% not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. "owever, in the absence
of a statute which clearl% asserts a contrar% political and
legislative polic% on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, (ualified, or
eligible, the% should not be treated as stra%, void or
meaningless. @at pp. ;E,;1A
Considering all the foregoing, * am constrained to vote for the dismissal of
the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion3
*n m% view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections
has the power to dis(ualif% candidates on the ground that the% lac' eligibilit%
for the office to which the% see' to be elected. * thin' that it has none and
that the (ualifications of candidates ma% be (uestioned onl% in the event
the% are elected, b% filing a petition for $uo 0arranto or an election protest in
the appropriate forum, not necessaril% in the C4-E0EC but, as in this case,
in the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this
case too' part in the proceedings in the C4-E0EC is of no moment. 1uch
proceedings were unauthori+ed and were not rendered valid b% their
agreement to submit their dispute to that bod%.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authori+ed proceedings
for determining a candidate=s (ualifications for an office before his election.
There are none in the 4mnibus Election Code @B.). Blg. 1A, in the
Electoral #eforms 0aw of 19! @#.A. No. II?IA, or in the law providing for
s%nchroni+ed elections @#.A. No. !1IIA. There are, in other words, no
provisions for pre,proclamation contests but onl% election protests or $uo
0arranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for $dis(ualification,$ but the%
are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibilit% of a candidate. These
provisions are concerned with the incapacit% @due to insanit%, incompetence
or conviction of an offenseA of a person either to be a andidate or to
ontinue as a andidate for public office. There is also a provision for the
denial or cancellation of certificates of candidac%, but it applies onl% to cases
involving false representations as to certain matters re(uired b% law to be
stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the 4mnibus Election
Code3
1;. 1is$uali!iations. An% person who has been
declared b% competent authorit% insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced b% final <udgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for an% offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalt% of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
dis(ualified to be a andidate and to hold an% office,
unless he has been given plenar% pardon or granted
amnest%.
The dis(ualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration b%
competent authorit% that said insanit% or incompetence
had been removed or after the eFpiration of a period of
five %ears from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes dis(ualified. @Emphasis
addedA
I. 1is$uali!iations. An% candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a part% is declared b% final
decision of a competent court guilt% of, or found b% the
Commission of having @aA given mone% or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functionsG @bA
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidac%G @cA
spent in his election campaign an amount in eFcess of that
allowed b% this CodeG @dA solicited, received or made an%
contribution prohibited under 1ections 9, 92, 9I, 9! and
1E?G or @eA violated an% of 1ections E, &, 2, I and
;I1, paragraphs d, e, ', v, and cc, sub,paragraph I, shall
be dis(ualified !rom ontinuin& as a andidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. An% person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign countr%
shall not be (ualified to run for an% elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign countr% in
accordance with the residence re(uirement provided for in
the election laws. @Emphasis addedA
!. "etition to deny due ourse to or anel a
erti!iate o!
andiday. A verified petition see'ing to den% due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidac% ma% be filed
b% an% person e5lusively on the &round that any material
re'resentation ontained therein as re$uired under
Setion @B hereo! is !alse. The petition ma% be filed at an%
time not later than twent%,five da%s from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidac% and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen da%s
before the election. @Emphasis addedA
the Electoral #eforms 0aw of 19! @#.A. No. II?IA3
I. E!!et o! 1is$uali!iation Case. An% candidate
who has been declared b% final <udgment to be dis(ualified
shall not be voted !or, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. I! !or any reason a andidate is not delared
by !inal /ud&ment be!ore an eletion to be dis$uali!ied and
he is voted !or and reeives the 0innin& number o! votes
in suh eletion, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, in(uir% or protest
andG upon motion for the complainant or an% intervenor,
ma% during the pendenc% thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate 0henever the
evidene o! his &uilt is stron&. @Emphasis addedA.
!. "etition to 1eny 1ue Course to or Canel a
Certi!iate o! Candiday. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall appl% to petitions to den% due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidac% as provided in 1ection !
of Batas )ambansa Blg. 1.
and the 0ocal 9overnment Code of 1991 @#.A. No. !1IEA3
?E. 1is$uali!iations. The following persons are
dis(ualified from running for an% elective local position3
@aA Those sentenced b% final <udgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable b%
one @1A %ear or more of imprisonment, within two @;A %ears
after serving sentenceG
@bA Those removed from office as a result of on
administrative caseG
@cA Those convicted b% final <udgment for violating the oath
of allegiance to the #epublicG
@dA Those with dual citi+enshipG
@eA .ugitive from <ustice in criminal or nonpolitical cases
here or abroadG
@fA )ermanent residents in a foreign countr% or those who
have ac(uired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivit% of this CodeG
and
@gA The insane or feeble,minded.
The petition filed b% private respondent Cirilo #o% -onte<o in the C4-E0EC,
while entitled $.or Cancellation and /is(ualification,$ contained no allegation
that private respondent *melda #omualde+,-arcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidac% which were false, it sought her
dis(ualification on the ground that $on the basis of her >oter #egistration
#ecord and Certificate of Candidac%, CsheD is dis(ualified from running for
the position of #epresentative, considering that on election da%, -a% ,
1992, CsheD would have resided less than ten @1EA months in the district
where she is see'ing to be elected.$ .or its part, the C4-E0EC=s 1econd
/ivision, in its resolution of April ;?, 1992, cancelled her certificate of
candidac% and corrected certificate of candidac% on the basis of its finding
that petitioner is $not (ualified to run for the position of -ember of the "ouse
of #epresentatives for the .irst 0egislative /istrict of 0e%te$ and not because
of an% finding that she had made false representations as to material matters
in her certificate of candidac%.
-onte<o=s petition before the C4-E0EC was therefore not a petition for
cancellation of certificate of candidac% under ! of the 4mnibus Election
Code, but essentiall% a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. *t is
important to note this, because, as will presentl% be eFplained, proceedings
under ! have for their purpose to dis(ualif% a person from being a
andidate, whereas $uo 0arranto proceedings have for their purpose to
dis(ualif% a person from holding 'ubli o!!ie. Hurisdiction over $uo 0arranto
proceedings involving members of the "ouse of #epresentatives is vested in
the Electoral Tribunal of that bod%.
*ndeed, in the onl% cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the
cancellation of certificates of candidac%, the allegations were that the
respondent candidates had made !alse re'resentations in their certificates of
candidac% with regard to their itizenshi',
1
a&e,
(
or residene.
)
But in the
generalit% of cases in which this Court passed upon the (ualifications of
respondents for office, this Court did so in the conteFt of election protests
*
or
$uo 0arranto proceedings
5
filed a!ter the 'rolamation o! the res'ondents or
'rotestees as 0inners.
Three reasons ma% be cited to eFplain the absence of an authori+ed
proceeding for determining be!ore eletion the (ualifications of a candidate.
.irst is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessit% for determining his eligibilit% for the office. *n contrast,
whether an individual should be dis(ualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses @e.g., vote bu%ing, over spending, commission
of prohibited actsA is a pre<udicial (uestion which should be determined lest
he wins because of the ver% acts for which his dis(ualification is being
sought. That is wh% it is provided that if the grounds for dis(ualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted forG if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be countedG and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
6
1econd is the fact that the determination of a candidate=s eligibilit%, e.g., his
citi+enship or, as in this case, his domicile, ma% ta'e a long time to ma'e,
eFtending be%ond the beginning of the term of the office. This is ampl%
demonstrated in the companion case @9.#. No. 1;E;I2, Agapito A. A(uino
v. C4-E0ECA where the determination of A(uino=s residence was still
pending in the C4-E0EC even after the elections of -a% , 1992. This is
contrar% to the summar% character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidac%. That is wh% the law ma'es the receipt of certificates of candidac%
a ministerial dut% of the C4-E0EC and its officers.
7
The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidac% that the% are eligible for the
position which the% see' to fill, leaving the determination of their
(ualifications to be made after the election and onl% in the event the% are
elected. 4nl% in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidac% is the C4-E0EC given <urisdiction.
Third is the polic% underl%ing the prohibition against pre,proclamation cases
in elections for )resident, >ice )resident, 1enators and members of the
"ouse of #epresentatives. @#.A. No. !1II, 12A The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as $sole <udges$ under the Constitution of the
eletion, returns and $uali!iations of members of Congress or of the
)resident and >ice )resident, as the case ma% be.
B% providing in ;2& for the remed% of $uo 0arranto for determining an
elected official=s (ualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed,
while being conspicuousl% silent about a pre,proclamation remed% based on
the same ground, the 4mnibus Election Code, or 4EC, b% its silence
underscores the polic% of not authori+ing an% in(uir% into the (ualifications of
candidates unless the% have been elected.
Apparentl% reali+ing the lac' of an authori+ed proceeding for declaring the
ineligibilit% of candidates, the C4-E0EC amended its rules on .ebruar% 12,
199& so as to provide in #ule ;2, 1 the following3
(rounds !or dis$uali!iation. An% candidate who does
not possess all the (ualifications of a candidate as
provided for b% the Constitution or b% eFisting law or who
commits an% act declared b% law to be grounds for
dis(ualification ma% be dis(ualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lac' of provision for declaring the ineligibilit% of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied b% a mere rule. 1uch an act is e(uivalent to the creation
of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the C4-E0EC, in
the eFercise of its rulema'ing power under Art. *N, A, I of the
Constitution, cannot do. *t is noteworth% that the Constitution withholds from
the C4-E0EC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote,
which essentiall% involves an in(uir% into $uali!iations based on a&e.
residene and itizenshi' of voters. @Art. *N, C, ;@&AA
The assimilation in #ule ;2 of the C4-E0EC rules of grounds for ineligibilit%
into grounds for dis(ualification is contrar% to the evident intention of the law.
.or not onl% in their grounds but also in their conse(uences are proceedings
for $dis(ualification$ different from those for a declaration of $ineligibilit%.$
$/is(ualification$ proceedings, as alread% stated, are based on grounds
specified in 1; and I of the 4mnibus Election Code and in ?E of
the 0ocal 9overnment Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from beomin& a andidate or !rom ontinuin& as a andidate for public
office. *n a word, their purpose is to eliminate a andidate !rom the rae
either from the start or during its progress. $*neligibilit%,$ on the other hand,
refers to the lac' of the (ualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding 'ubli o!!ie and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibilit% is to remove the inumbent !rom o!!ie.
Conse(uentl%, that an individual possesses the (ualifications for a public
office does not impl% that he is not dis(ualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. 7e have this
sort of dichotom% in our Naturali+ation 0aw. @C.A. No. ?!&A That an alien has
the (ualifications prescribed in ; of the law does not impl% that he does
not suffer from an% of dis(ualifications provided in ?.
*ndeed, provisions for dis(ualifications on the ground that the candidate is
guilt% of prohibited election practices or offenses, li'e other pre,proclamation
remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of $grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest,$
8
through the use of $manufactured$
election returns or resort to other tric'er% for the purpose of altering the
results of the election. This rationale does not appl% to cases for determining
a candidate=s (ualifications for office before the election. To the contrar%, it is
the candidate against whom a proceeding for dis(ualification is brought who
could be pre<udiced because he could be prevented from assuming office
even though in end he prevails.
To summari+e, the declaration of ineligibilit% of a candidate ma% onl% be
sought in an election protest or action for $uo 0arranto filed pursuant to
;2& of the 4mnibus Election Code within 1E da%s after his proclamation.
7ith respect to elective local officials @e.g., 9overnor, >ice 9overnor,
members of the 1angguniang )anlalawigan, etc.A such petition must be filed
either with the C4-E0EC, the #egional Trial Courts, or -unicipal Trial
Courts, as provided in Art. *N, C, ;@;A of the Constitution. *n the case of
the )resident and >ice )resident, the petition must be filed with the
)residential Electoral Tribunal @Art. >**, ?, last paragraphA, and in the case
of the 1enators, with the 1enate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of
Congressmen, with the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal. @Art.
>*, 1!A There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the
filing of dis(ualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibilit% in the case
of candidates for )resident, >ice )resident, 1enators and members of the
"ouse of #epresentatives, because of the same polic% prohibiting the filing
of pre,proclamation cases against such candidates.
.or these reasons, * am of the opinion that the C4-E0EC had no
<urisdiction over 1)A No. 92,EE9G that its proceedings in that case, including
its (uestioned orders, are voidG and that the eligibilit% of petitioner *melda
#omualde+,-arcos for the office of #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of
0e%te ma% onl% be in(uired into b% the "#ET.
Accordingl%, * vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in 1)A No. 92,EE9, including its (uestioned orders
doted April ;?, 1992, -a% !, 1992, -a% 11, 1992 and -a% ;2, 1992,
declaring petitioner *melda #omualde+,-arcos ineligible and ordering her
proclamation as #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te suspended. To
the eFtent that #ule ;2 of the C4-E0EC #ules of )rocedure authori+es
proceedings for the dis(ualification of candidates on the ground of
ineligibilit% for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the
proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa. C-%-. onurs-
'ADILLA, J., dissenting3
* regret that * cannot <oin the ma<orit% opinion as eFpressed in the well,written
ponencia of -r. Hustice 8apunan.
As in an% controvers% arising out of a Constitutional provision, the in(uir%
must begin and end with the provision itself. The controvers% should not be
blurred b% what, to me, are academic dis(uisitions. *n this particular
controvers%, the Constitutional provision on point states that $no person
shall be a member of the "ouse of #epresentatives unless he is a natural,
born citi+en of the )hilippines, and on the da% of the election, is at least
twent%,five @;2A %ears of age, able to read and write, and eFcept the part% list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereo! !or a 'eriod o! not less than one year immediately
'reedin& the day o! the eletion.$ @Article >*, section IA
*t has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residene
has been understood as s%non%mous with domiile. This argument has been
validated b% no less than the Court in numerous cases
1
where significantl%
the !atual irumstanes clearl% and convincingl% proved that a person
does not effectivel% lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein
is manifest with his 'ersonal 'resene in the place, ou'led 0ith ondut
indiative o! suh intention.
7ith this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different
modalities within which the phrase $a resident thereof @meaning, the
legislative districtA for a period of not less than one %ear$ would fit.
The first instance is where a person=s residence and domicile coincide in
which case a person onl% has to prove that he has been domiciled in a
permanent location for not less than a %ear before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his
domicile in which case he would have the luFur% of district shopping,
provided of course, he satisfies the one,%ear residence period in the district
as the minimum period for eligibilit% to the position of congressional
representative for the district.
*n either case, one would not be constitutionall% dis(ualified for abandoning
his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still,
domicile of choiceG neither would one be dis(ualified for abandoning
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he
desires to be a candidate.
The most eFtreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person
maintains several residences in different districts. 1ince his domicile of origin
continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment
@animus non revertendiA, he can practicall% choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered b% the unambiguous
limitation that C!or a 'eriod o! not less than one year immediately 'reedin&
the day o! the eletionC, he must be a resident in the district where he
desires to be elected.
To m% mind, the one %ear residence period is crucial regardless of whether
or not the term $residence$ is to be s%non%mous with $domicile.$ *n other
words, the candidate=s intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisf% the length of time prescribed b% the fundamental law. And
this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. "e must be familiar with
the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one,%ear residence in said district would be the minimum
period to ac(uire such familiarit%, if not versatilit%.
*n the case of petitioner *melda #. -arcos, the operative facts are distinctl%
set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec ;nd /ivision dated ;?
April 1992 @as affirmed b% the Comelec en banA
*n or about 19& when respondent was a little over %ears
old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, 0e%te
@Tacloban Cit%A. 1he studied in the "ol% *nfant Academ% in
Tacloban from 19& to 19? when she graduated from
high school. 1he pursued her college studies in 1t. )aul=s
College, now /ivine 7ord 5niversit% of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the 0e%te Chinese "igh 1chool, still in Tacloban
Cit%. *n 192; she went to -anila to wor' with her cousin,
the late 1pea'er /aniel L. #omualde+ in his office in the
"ouse of #epresentatives. *n 192?, she married eF,
president .erdinand -arcos when he was still a
congressman of *locos Norte. 1he lived with him in Batac,
*locos Norte and registered there as a voter. 7hen her
husband was elected 1enator of the #epublic in 1929, she
and her husband lived together in 1an Huan, #i+al where
she registered as a voter. *n 19I2 when her husband was
elected )resident of the #epublic of the )hilippines, she
lived with him in -alacanang )alace and registered as a
voter in 1an -iguel, -anila.
/uring the -arcos presidenc%, respondent served as a
-ember of the Batasang )ambansa, -inister of "uman
1ettlements and 9overnor of -etro -anila. 1he claimed
that in .ebruar% 19I, she and her famil% were abducted
and 'idnapped to "onolulu, "awaii. *n November 1991,
she came home to -anila. *n 199; respondent ran for
election as )resident of the )hilippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidac% wherein she indicated that she is
a resident and registered voter of 1an Huan, -etro -anila.
4n August ;?, 199?, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of 1an Huan, -etro -anila, re(uesting for
cancellation of her registration in the )ermanent 0ist of
>oters in )recinct No. 12! of 1an Huan, -etro -anila, in
order that she ma% be re,registered or transferred to Brg%.
4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. @AnneF ;,B, AnswerA. 4n August &1,
199?, respondent filed her 1worn Application for
Cancellation of >oter=s )revious #egistration @AnneF ;,C,
AnswerA stating that she is a dul% registered voter in 12!,
A, Brg%. -a%tunas, 1an Huan, -etro that she intends to
register at Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
4n Hanuar% ;, 1992 respondent registered as a voter at
)recinct No. 1,A of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. 1he filed with the
Board of Election *nspectors CE .orm No. 1, >oter
#egistration #ecord No. 9?,&&?9!!;, wherein she alleged
that she has resided in the municipalit% of Tolosa for a
period of I months @AnneF A, )etitionA.
4n -arch , 1992, respondent filed with the 4ffice of the
)rovincial Election 1upervisor, 0e%te, a Certificate of
Candidac% for the position of #epresentative of the .irst
/istrict of 0e%te wherein she also alleged that she has
been a resident in the constituenc% where she see's to be
elected for a period of ! months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows3
!. )#4.E11*4N 4#
4CC5)AT*4N3
"ouse,wifeB TeacherB
1ocial 7or'er
. #E1*/ENCE
@complete addressA3
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te
)ost 4ffice Address
for election purposes3
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te
9. #E1*/ENCE *N
T"E
C4N1T*T5ENC6
7"E#E*N * 1EE8 T4
BE E0ECTE/
*--E/*ATE06
)#ECE/*N9
E0ECT*4N3
:::::::: 6ears
Seven -onths
1E. * A- N4T A
)E#-ANENT
#E1*/ENT 4., 4#
*--*9#ANT T4, A
.4#E*9N
C45NT#6.
T"AT * A- E0*9*B0E for said officeG That * will support
and defend the Constitution of the #epublic of the
)hilippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
theretoG That * will obe% the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated b% the dul%,constituted authoritiesG That the
obligation imposed b% m% oath is assumed voluntaril%,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasionG and
That the facts stated herein are true to the best of m%
'nowledge.
@1gd.A *melda
#omualde+,
-arcos
@1ignature of
CandidateA
)etitioner=s aforestated certificate of candidac% filed on -arch 1992
contains the decisive component or seed of her dis(ualification. *t is
contained in her answer under oath of $seven months$ to the (uer% of
$residence in the constituenc% wherein * see' to be elected immediatel%
preceding the election.$
*t follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is dis(ualified from the position of
representative for the 1st congressional district of 0e%te in the elections of
-a% 1992, for failure to meet the $not less than one,%ear residence in the
constituenc% @1st district, 0e%teA immediatel% preceding the da% of election
@ -a% 1992A.$
"aving arrived at petitioner=s dis(ualification to be a representative of the
first district of 0e%te, the neFt important issue to resolve is whether or not the
Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and 'rolaim the
0inner out of the remainin& $uali!ied candidates for representative in said
district.
* am not unaware of the pronouncement made b% this Court in the case of
Labo vs. Comele, 9.#. I2I?, August 1, 199, 1!I 1C#A 1 which gave
the rationale as laid down in the earl% 191; case of To'aio vs. "aredes, ;&
)hil. ;& that3
. . . . 1ound polic% dictates that public elective offices are
filled b% those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a ma<orit% or
pluralit% of the legal votes cast in the election. @;E Corpus
Huris ;nd, 1 ;?&, p. I!IA
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be dis(ualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessaril% entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, dis(ualified, or
non,eligible person ma% not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. "owever, in the absene
o! a statute which clearl% asserts a contrar% political and
legislative polic% on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, (ualified, or
eligible, the% should not be treated as stra%, void or
meaningless.
5nder 1ec. I #A II?I, @An Act *ntroducing Additional #eforms in the
Electoral 1%stem and for other purposesA @? 4.9. 9E2, ;; .ebruar% 19A it
is provided that3
. . . An% candidate who has been declared b% final
<udgment to be dis(ualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. *f for an% reason a
candidate is not declared b% final <udgment before an
election to be dis(ualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, in(uir% or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or an% intervenor, ma%, during the pendenc%
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the provision (uoted above. As the law now
stands, the legislative polic% does not limit its concern with the effect of a
final <udgement of dis(ualification onl% be!ore the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
dis(ualified candidate 1"A00 N4T BE C45NTE/. The law has also
validated the <urisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue
hearing the petition for dis(ualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, i! !or any reason. he is not delared by
!inal /ud&ment be!ore an eletion to be dis$uali!ied.
1ince the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend
proclamation @when evidence of his guilt is strongA is also eFplicit under the
law. 7hat happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
dis(ualifiedK Then, votes cast for him $shall not be counted$ and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
*t stands to reason that 1ection I of #A II?I does not ma'e the second
placer the winner simpl% because a $winning candidate is dis(ualified,$ but
that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest
number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the dis(ualified candidate
not being counted or considered.
As this law clearl% reflects the legislative polic% on the matter, then there is
no reason wh% this Court should not re,eFamine and conse(uentl% abandon
the doctrine in the Hun 0abo case. *t has been stated that $the (ualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased b% the electorate alone. The
will of the people as eFpressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibilit%$ most especiall% when it is mandated b% no less than the
Constitution.
ACC4#/*N906, * vote to /*1-*11 the petition and to order the )rovincial
Board of Canvassers of 0e%te to proclaim the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes, from among the (ualified candidates, as the dul%
elected representative of the 1st district of 0e%te.
+ermosisima. %r- %-. dissent-
REGALADO, J., dissenting3
7hile * agree with same of the factual bases of the ma<orit% opinion, * cannot
arrive con<ointl% at the same conclusion drawn therefrom "ence, this dissent
which assuredl% is not formulated $on the basis of the personalit% of a
petitioner in a case.$
* go along with the ma<orit% in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as
the same are pertinent to this case, and which * have simplified as follows3
1. )etitioner, although born in -anila, resided during her
childhood in the present Tacloban Cit%, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have ta'en
up permanent residence therein. 1he also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that
cit%.
;. 7hen she married then #ep. .erdinand E. -arcos who
was then domiciled in Batac, *locos Norte, b% operation of
law she ac(uired a new domicile in that place in 192?.
&. *n the successive %ears and during the events that
happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as
a 1enator and then as )resident, she lived with him and
their famil% in 1an Huan, #i+al and then in -alacanang
)alace in 1an -iguel, -anila.
?. 4ver those %ears, she registered as a voter and actuall%
voted in Batac, *locos Norte, then in 1an Huan, #i+al, and
also in 1an -iguel, -anila, all these merel% in the eFercise
of the right of suffrage.
2. *t does not appear that her husband, even after he had
assumed those loft% positions successivel%, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, *locos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariabl% voted in
all elections.
I. After the ouster of her husband from the presidenc% in
19I and the so<ourn of the -arcos famil% in "onolulu,
"awaii, 5.1.A., she eventuall% returned to the )hilippines
in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed
to have been merel% temporar% residences.
!. *n 199;, petitioner ran for election as )resident of the
)hilippines and in her certificate of candidac% she
indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident
of 1an Huan, -etro -anila.
. 4n August ;?, 199?, she filed a letter for the
cancellation of her registration in the )ermanent 0ist of
>oters in )recinct No. 12! of 1an Huan, -etro -anila in
order that she ma% $be re,registered or transferred to
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.$ 4n August &1, 199?, she
followed this up with her 1worn Application for
Cancellation of >oter=s )revious #egistration wherein she
stated that she was a registered voter in )recinct No. 12!,
A, Brg%. -a%tunas, 1an Huan, -etro -anila and that she
intended to register in Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
9. 4n Hanuar% ;, 1992, petitioner registered as a voter at
)recinct No. 1,A of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, for which
purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
*nspectors a voter=s registration record form alleging that
she had resided in that municipalit% for siF months.
1E. 4n -arch , 1992, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidac% for the position of #epresentative of the .irst
/istrict of 0e%te wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for $Seven -onths$ of the constituenc% where she
sought to be elected.
11. 4n -arch ;9, 1992, she filed an $AmendedBCorrected
Certificate of Candidac%$ wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidac% to item $. #E1*/ENCE *N
T"E C4N1T*T5ENC6 7"E#E * 1EE8, T4 BE
E0ECTE/ *--E/*ATE06 )#ECE/*N9 T"E
E0ECT*4N3$ was changed or replaced with a new entr%
reading $1*NCE C"*0/"44/.$
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidac%,
petitioner had complied with the residenc% re(uirement of one %ear as
mandated b% no less than 1ection I, Article >* of the 19! Constitution.
* do not intend to impose upon the time of m% colleagues with a dissertation
on the difference between residence and domicile. 7e have had enough of
that and * understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be s%non%mous with domicile.
That is so understood in our <urisprudence and in American 0aw, in
contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil,
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or
controlling.
Conse(uentl%, since in the present case the (uestion of petitioner=s
residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, * am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term,
specificall% its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and
domicile b% operation of law, as understood in American law from which for
this case we have ta'en our <urisprudential bearings.
-% readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or
what is termed the $domicile of origin,$ constitutes the domicile of an infant
until abandoned, or until the ac(uisition of a new domicile in a different
place.
1
*n the instant case, we ma% grant that petitioner=s domicile of origin,
(
at least as of 19&, was what is now Tacloban Cit%.
Now, as * have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three 'inds, that is,
domicile b% birth, domicile b% choice, and domicile b% operation of law. The
first is the common case of the place of birth or domiilium ori&inis, the
second is that which is voluntaril% ac(uired b% a part% or domiilium 'ro'io
motuG the last which is conse(uential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
)
is sometimes called domiilium neesarium. There is no debate that the
domicile of origin can be lost or replaced b% a domicile of choice or a
domicile b% operation of law subse(uentl% ac(uired b% the part%.
7hen petitioner contracted marriage in 192? with then #ep. -arcos, b%
operation of law, not onl% international or American but of our own
enactment,
*
she ac(uired her husband=s domicile of origin in Batac, *locos
Norte and correspondingl% lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban Cit%.
"er subse(uent changes of residence to 1an Huan, #i+al, then to 1an
-iguel, -anila, thereafter to "onolulu, "awaii, and bac' to now 1an Huan,
-etro -anila do not appear to have resulted in her thereb% ac(uiring new
domiciles of choice. *n fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was b% reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his
peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them.
"er residence in "onolulu and, of course, those after her return to the
)hilippines were, as she claimed, against her will or onl% for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of
choice.
5
After petitioner=s return to the )hilippines in 1991 and up to the present
imbroglio over her re(uisite residenc% in Tacloban Cit% or 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te, there is no showing that she ever attempted to ac(uire an% other
domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her
legal domicile in Batac, *locos Norte. 4n that score, we note the ma<orit%=s
own submission
6
that, to successfull% effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate @aA an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, @bA a
bona !ide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and @cA acts which correspond with the purpose.
7e conse(uentl% have to also note that these re(uirements for the
ac(uisition of a domicile of choice appl% whether what is sought to be
changed or substituted is a domicile of origin @domiilium ori&inisA or a
domicile b% operation of law @domiilium neesariumA. 1ince petitioner had
lost her domiilium ori&inis which had been replaced b% her domiilium
neesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, *locos Norte
which, if at all, can be the ob<ect of legal change under the contingencies of
the case at bar.
To get out of this (uandar%, the ma<orit% decision echoes the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner #egalado E. -aambong in 1)A 92,EE9 of the
Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel proposition.
*t ma% be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin b%
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
)resident .erdinand E. -arcos in 192; @si, 192?A. B%
operation of law @domiilium neesariumA, her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, *locos
Norte althou&h there 0ere no indiations o! an intention
on her 'art to abandon her domiile o! ori&in. Because of
her husband=s subse(uent death and through the
operation of the provisions of the New .amil% Code
alread% in force at the time, however, her le&al domiile
automatially reverted to her domiile o! ori&in. . . .
@Emphasis suppliedA.
.irstl%, * am pu++led wh% although it is conceded that petitioner had ac(uired
a domiilium neesarium in Batac, *locos Norte, the ma<orit% insists on
ma'ing a (ualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of
origin. * find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares
where petitioner=s domicile is at an% given time, and not her self,serving or
putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. 4therwise, contrar% to their
own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the
ma<orit% would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban Cit% as @for
lac' of a term in law since it does not eFist thereinA the e(uivalent of what is
fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
1econdl%, domicile once lost in accordance with law can onl% be recovered
li'ewise in accordance with law. "owever, we are here being titillated with
the possibilit% of an automatic reversion to or reac(uisition of a domicile of
origin after the termination of the cause for its loss b% operation of law. The
ma<orit% agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin b% her
marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof.
* am impressed b% the ingeniousness of this theor% which proves that,
indeed, necessit% is the mother of inventions. #egretfull%, * find some
difficult% in accepting either the logic or the validit% of this argument.
*f a part% loses his domicile of origin b% obtaining a new domicile of choice,
he thereb% voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. *f,
thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not 'er se recover
his original domicile unless, b% subse(uent acts legall% indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile,
which is precisel% what petitioner belatedl% and, evidentl% <ust for purposes
of her candidac%, unsuccessfull% tried to do.
4ne=s subse(uent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot
automaticall% restore his domicile of origin, not onl% because there is no
legal authorit% therefor but because it would be absurd )ursued to its logical
conse(uence, that theor% of i'so /ure reversion would rule out the fact that
said part% could alread% ver% well have obtained another domicile, either of
choice or b% operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. 1ignificantl%
and obviousl% for this reason, the .amil% Code, which the ma<orit%
ineFplicabl% invo'es, advisedl% does not regulate this contingenc% since it
would impinge on one=s freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not onl% voluntarily abandoned her
domicile of choice @unless we assume that she entered into the marital state
against her willA but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
through her ac(uisition of a new domicile b% o'eration o! la0. *n fact, this is
even a case of both voluntary and le&al abandonment of a domicile of origin.
7ith much more reason, therefore, should we re<ect the proposition that with
the termination of her marriage in 199, petitioner had supposedl% 'er se
and i'so !ato reac(uired her domicile of origin which she lost in 192?.
4therwise, this would be tantamount to sa%ing that during the period of
marital coverture, she was simultaneousl% in possession and en<o%ment of a
domicile of origin which was onl% in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is li'ewise to the effect that while after the
husband=s death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,
9
she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she
ma'es an actual change.
1+
*n the absence of affirmative evidence, to the
contrar%, the presumption is that a wife=s domicile or legal residence follows
that of her husband and will continue after his death.
11
* cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the ma<orit%=s
theor% based on Articles I and I9 of the .amil% Code. All that is of an%
relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fiF the
famil% domicile is now shared b% the spouses. * cannot perceive how that
<oint right, which in the first place was never eFercised b% the spouses, could
affect the domicile fiFed b% the law for petitioner in 192? and, for her
husband, long prior thereto. *t is true that a wife now has the coordinate
power to determine the on/u&al or !amily domicile, but that has no bearing
on this case. 7ith the death of her husband, and each of her children having
gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the eFercise
of that <oint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present
factual setting of this controvers%. *nstead, what is of concern in petitioner=s
case was the matter of her having ac(uired or not her own domicile of
choice.
* agree with the ma<orit%=s discourse on the virtues of the growing and
eFpanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with e(ual rights
and recognition b% Constitution and statutor% conferment. "owever, * have
searched in vain for a specific law or <udicial pronouncement which either
eFpressl% or b% necessar% implication supports the ma<orit%=s desired theor%
of automatic reac(uisition of or reversion to the domiilium ori&inis of
petitioner. /efinitel%, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that
should govern this issue, there is a world of differenceG and, un(uestionabl%,
this should be resolved b% legislative articulation but not b% the elo(uence of
the well,turned phrase.
*n sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban Cit% as her domicile of origin since
192? and not having automaticall% reac(uired an% domicile therein, she
cannot legall% claim that her residenc% in the political constituenc% of which it
is a part continued since her birth up to the present. #espondent
commission was, therefore, correct in re<ecting her pretension to that effect
in her amendedBcorrected certificate of candidac%, and in holding her to her
admission in the original certificate that she had actuall% resided in that
constituenc% for onl% seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessar% to further pass upon the procedural
issues raised b% petitioner.
4N T"E .4#E94*N9 )#E-*1E1, * vote to /*1-*11 the petition for lac' of
merit.
DA/IDE, %R., J., dissenting3
* respectfull% dissent from the opinion of the ma<orit% written b% -r. Hustice
1antiago -. 8apunan, more particularl% on the issue of the petitioner=s
(ualification.
5nder 1ection !, 1ubdivision A, Article *N of the Constitution, decisions,
orders, or rulings of the C4-E0EC ma% be brought to this Court onl% b% the
special civil action for ertiorari under #ule I2 of the #ules of Court @Aratuc
vs. C4-E0EC, 1C#A ;21 C19!9DG /ario vs. -ison, 1!I 1C#A ?
C199DA.
Accordingl%, a writ of ertiorari ma% be granted onl% if the C4-E0EC has
acted without or in eFcess of <urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
@1ection 1, #ule I2, #ules of CourtA. 1ince the C4-E0EC has, undoubtedl%,
<urisdiction over the private respondent=s petition, the onl% issue left is
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in dis(ualif%ing the petitioner.
-% careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of ;? April
1992 of the C4-E0EC 1econd /ivision and the En ,an resolution of !
-a% 1992 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse thereof. The resolution of the 1econd /ivision dispassionatel% and
ob<ectivel% discussed in minute details the facts which established be%ond
cavil that herein petitioner was dis(ualified as a candidate on the ground of
lac' of residence in the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. *t has not
misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of
substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The ma<orit% opinion, however, overturned the C4-E0EC=s findings of fact
for lac' of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of
origin, which is allegedl% within the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te.
* respectfull% submit that the petitioner herself has provided the C4-E0EC,
either b% admission or b% documentar% evidence, overwhelming proof of the
loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban Cit% and
not Tolosa, 0e%te. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of
origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her sta%,
unfortunatel%, was for onl% seven months before the da% of the election. 1he
was then dis(ualified to be a candidate for the position of #epresentative of
the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. A holding to the contrar% would be
arbitrar%.
*t ma% indeed be conceded that the petitioner=s domicile of choice was either
Tacloban Cit% or Tolosa, 0e%te. Nevertheless, she lost it by o'eration o! la0
sometime in May ;<DB u'on her marria&e to the then Congressman @later,
)residentA .erdinand E. -arcos. A domicile b% operation of law is that
domicile which the law attributes to a person, independentl% of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that
of the wife arising from marriage @; C.H.1. /omicile !, 11A. 5nder the
governing law then, Article 11E of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her
domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, *locos
Norte. 1aid Article reads as follows3
Art. 11E. The husband shall fiF the residence of the famil%.
But the court ma% eFempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the #epublic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo -. Tolentino states3
Although the dut% of the spouses to live together is mutual,
the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered b% law to fiF the famil% residence. This right
even predominates over some rights recogni+ed b% law in
the wife. .or instance, under article 11! the wife ma%
engage in business or practice a profession or occupation.
But because of the power of the husband to fiF the !amily
domiile he ma% fiF it at such a place as would ma'e it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her
profession. .or <ustifiable reasons, however, the wife ma%
be eFempted from living in the residence chosen b% the
husband. The husband cannot validl% allege desertion b%
the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of
residence, when it appears that the% have lived for %ears
in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his
choice of a different home is not made in good faith.
@Commentaries and Hurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the )hilippines, vol. 1, 192 ed., &&9A.
5nder common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile
and, b% operation of law, ac(uires that of her husband, no matter where the
wife actuall% lives or what she believes or intends. "er domicile is fiFed in
the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and sub<ect to certain
limitations, he can change her domicile b% changing his own @;2 Am Hur ;d
/omicile ?, &!A.
*t must, however, be pointed out that under Article I9 of the .amil% Code,
the fiFing of the famil% domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the
husband, but is now a <oint decision of the spouses, and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term $famil%
domicile,$ and not famil% residence, as $the spouses ma% have multiple
residences, and the wife ma% elect to remain in one of such residences,
which ma% destro% the dut% of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits$ @A0*C*A >. 1E-)*4,/*6, "andboo' on the .amil%
Code of the )hilippines, C19D, 1E;A.
The theor% of automatic restoration of a woman=s domicile of origin upon the
death of her husband, which the ma<orit% opinion adopts to overcome the
legal effect of the petitioner=s marriage on her domicile, is unsupported b%
law and b% <urisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband=s
death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she ma'es an actual change @; C.H.1.
/omicile 1;, ;!A. 4r, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife
to ac(uire her own domicile is revived, but until she eFercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death @;2 Am Hur ;d
/omicile I;, ?2A. Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but
her 'o0er to a$uire her o0n domiile.
Clearl%, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner=s domicile was
that of her husband at the time of his death which was Batac, *locos
Norte, since their residences in 1an Huan, -etro -anila, and 1an -iguel,
-anila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectivel% perform his official duties. Their residence in 1an Huan was a
con<ugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she
was alread% a widow. *n her sworn certificate of candidac% for the 4ffice of
the )resident in the s%nchroni+ed elections of -a% 199;, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of 1an Huan, -etro -anila. 1he also voted in
the said elections in that place.
4n the basis of her evidence, it was onl% on 8B Au&ust ;<<B when she
eFercised her right as a widow to ac(uire her own domicile in Tolosa, 0e%te,
through her sworn statement re(uesting the Election 4fficer of 1an Huan,
-etro -anila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in
)recinct 12! thereat and pra%ing that she be $re,registered or transferred to
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, the place of CherD birth and permanent residence$
@photocop% of EFhibit $B,$ attached as AnneF $;$ of private respondent
-onte<o=s CommentA. Notabl%, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her >oter=s Affidavit sworn to on 12
-arch 199; @photocop% of EFhibit $C,$ attached as AnneF $&,$ Id.A, her >oter
#egistration #ecord sworn to on ; Hanuar% 1992 @photocop% of EFhibit $E,$
attached as AnneF $2,$ Id.A, and her Certificate of Candidac% sworn to on
-arch 1992 @photocop% of EFhibit $A,$ attached as AnneF $1,$ Id.A, she
solemnl% declared that she was born in -anila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. *s it Tacloban
Cit% or Tolosa, 0e%teK *n the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition
for dis(ualification @AnneF $*$ of )etitionA, she declared under oath that her
$domicile or residence is Tacloban Cit%.$ *f she did intend to return to such
domicile or residence of origin wh% did she inform the Election 4fficer of 1an
Huan that she would transfer to 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, and indicate in her
>oter=s #egistration #ecord and in her certificate of candidac% that her
residence is 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%teK 7hile this uncertaint% is not important
insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
nevertheless proves that fort%,one %ears had alread% lapsed since she had
lost or abandoned her domicile of origin b% virtue of marriage and that such
length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memor%.
* find to be misplaced the reliance b% the ma<orit% opinion on )ay'on vs.
*uirino @9I )hil. ;9? C192?DA, and the subse(uent cases which established
the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one=s profession, or engage in business in other
states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. 1o is the
reliance on 1ection 11! of the 4mnibus Election Code which provides that
transfer of residence to an% other place b% reason of one=s $occupationG
professionG emplo%ment in private and public serviceG educational activitiesG
wor' in militar% or naval reservationsG service in the arm%, nav% or air force,
the constabular% or national police forceG or confinement or detention in
government institutions in accordance with law$ is not deemed as loss of
original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage
of a woman. The reason for the eFclusion is, of course, Article 11E of the
Civil Code. *f it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not
operate as an abandonment of domicile @of origin or of choiceA, then such
cases and legal provision should have eFpressl% mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self,serving claim of the
petitioner in her affidavit @AnneF $A$ of her Answer in C4-E0EC 1)A No.
92,EE9G AnneF $*$ of )etitionA that her $domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban Cit%,$ and that she $never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which CsheD alwa%s intended to return whenever
absent.$ 1uch a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article
11E of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the
vicissitudes of the petitioner=s life after her marriage in 192? conclusivel%
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
ac(uired a new one animo et !ato @84115T" 8ENT 8ENNAN, A Treatise
on #esidence and /omicile, C19&?D, ;1?, &;IA.
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner=s claim that
she $merel% committed an honest mista'e$ in writing down the word $seven$
in the space provided for the residenc% (ualification re(uirement in the
certificate of candidac%. 1uch a claim is self,serving and, in the light of the
foregoing dis(uisitions, would be all sound and fur% signif%ing nothing. To
me, she did not commit an% mista'e, honest or otherwiseG what she stated
was the truth.
The ma<orit% opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who
asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it
@*mperial >ictor% 1hipping Agenc% vs. N0#C, ;EE 1C#A 1! C1991DG ).T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, ;;1 1C#A 19 C199&DA. "aving admitted
marriage to the then Congressman -arcos, the petitioner could not den% the
legal conse(uence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her
husband. The ma<orit% opinion rules or at least concludes that $CbD% operation
of law @domiilium neesariumA, her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automaticall% became Batac, *locos Norte.$ That conclusion is
consistent with Article 11E of the Civil Code. 1ince she is presumed to retain
her deceased husband=s domicile until she eFercises her revived power to
ac(uire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has
eFercised her right to ac(uire her own domicile. 1he miserabl% failed to
discharge that burden.
* vote to den% the petition.
Sep!r!te Op,",o"-
'UNO, J., concurring3
*t was Aristotle who taught man'ind that things that are ali'e should be
treated ali'e, while things that are unali'e should be treated unali'e in
proportion to their unali'eness.
1
0i'e other candidates, petitioner has clearl%
met the residence re(uirement provided b% 1ection I, Article >* of the
Constitution.
(
7e cannot dis(ualif% her and treat her unali'e, for the
Constitution guarantees e(ual protection of the law. * proceed from the
following factual and legal propositions3
.irst. There is no (uestion that petitioner=s original domicile is in Tacloban,
0e%te. "er parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in
Tacloban. The% have vast real estate in the place. )etitioner went to school
and thereafter wor'ed there. * consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both
her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. "er domicile of origin as it
was the domicile of her parents when she was a minorG and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of ma<orit%.
1econd. There is also no (uestion that in -a%, 192?, petitioner married the
late )resident .erdinand E. -arcos. B% contracting marriage, her domicile
became sub<ect to change b% law, and the right to change it was given b%
Article 11E of the Civil Code provides3
Art. 11E. The husband shall !i5 the residene o! the !amily.
But the court ma% eFempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the #epublic.
)
@Emphasis suppliedA
*n 1e la 2i6a v. 2illareal and (eo'ano,
*
this Court eFplained wh%
the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. 7e
held3 $The reason is founded upon the theoreti identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is
the home of the other. *t is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinaril% eFists, where
union and harmon% prevail.$
5
*n accord with this ob<ective, Article
1E9 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife $to live
together.$
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner=s
marria&e to former )resident -arcos i'so !ato resulted in the loss of her
Tacloban domicile. * respectfull% submit that her marriage by itsel! alone did
not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 11E of the Civil Code
merel% gave the husband the right to fiF the domicile of the famil%. *n the
eFercise of the right, the husband ma% e5'liitly choose the prior domicile of
his wife, in which case, the wife=s domicile remains unchanged. The husband
can also im'liitly ac(uiesce to his wife=s prior domicile even if it is different.
1o we held in de la 2i6a,
6
. . . . 7hen married women as well as children sub<ect to
parental authorit% live, 0ith the a$uiesene o! their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
latter live, the% have their own inde'endent domiile. . . .
*t is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate
choice of a different domicile b% the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliar% decision made b% the husband in the eFercise of the
right conferred b% Article 11E of the Civil Code binds the wife. An%
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrar% to the domiciliar%
choice of the husband cannot change in an% wa% the domicile
legall% fiFed b% the husband. These acts are void not onl% because
the wife lac's the capacit% to choose her domicile but also because
the% are contrar% to law and public polic%.
*n the case at bench, it is not disputed that former )resident -arcos
eFercised his right to fiF the famil% domicile and established it in Batac,
*locos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that 'artiular 'oint o!
time and throu&hout their married li!e. 'etitioner lost her domiile in
Taloban. Leyte. 1ince petitioner=s Batac domicile has been fiFed b%
operation of law, it was not affected in 1929 when her husband was elected
as 1enator, when the% lived in 1an Huan, #i+al and where she registered as
a voter. *t was not also affected in 19I2 when her husband was elected
)resident, when the% lived in -alacaMang )alace, and when she registered
as a voter in 1an -iguel, -anila. Nor was it affected when she served as a
member of the ,atasan& "ambansa, -inister of "uman 1ettlements and
9overnor of -etro -anila during the incumbenc% of her husband as
)resident of the nation. 5nder Article 11E of the Civil Code, it was onl% her
husband who could change the famil% domicile in Batac and the evidence
shows he did not effect an% such change. To a large degree, this follows the
common law that $a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and b%
operation of law, ac(uires that of her husband, no matter 0here the 0i!e
atually lives or 0hat she believes or intends.$
7
.ourth. The more difficult tas' is how to interpret the effect of the death on
1eptember ;, 199 of former )resident -arcos on petitioner=s Batac
domicile. The issue is of !irst im'ression in our <urisdiction and two @;A
schools of thought contend for acceptance. 4ne is espoused b% our
distinguished colleague, -r. Hustice /avide, Hr., heavil% rel%ing on American
authorities.
8
"e echoes the theor% that a!ter the husband#s death. the 0i!e
retains the last domiile o! her husband until she ma4es an atual han&e.
* do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife
still retains her dead husband=s domicile is based on anient ommon la0
0hih 0e an no lon&er a''ly in the "hili''ine settin& today. The common
law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her
the power of ac(uiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9

0egal scholars agree that two @;A reasons support this common law doctrine.
The !irst reason as pinpointed b% the legendar% Blac'stone is derived from
the view that $the ver% being or legal eFistence of the woman is suspended
during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband.$
1+
The seond reason lies in $the desirabilit% of having the interests
of each member of the famil% unit governed b% the same law.$
11
The
'resum'tion that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an e5tension of this common law concept. The one't and its e5tension
have 'rovided some o! the most ini$uitous /uris'rudene a&ainst 0omen. *t
was under common law that the 1!& American case of ,rad0ell v. Illinois
1(
was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. *t was
unblushingl% ruled that $the natural and proper timidit% and delicac% which
belongs to the female seF evidentl% unfits it for man% of the occupations of
civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator.$ *ndeed, the rulings relied upon b%
-r. Hustice /avide in CH1
1)
and A- H5# ;d
1*
are American state court
decisions handed down between the %ears 191!
15
and 19&,
16
or be!ore the
time 0hen 0omen 0ere aorded e$uality o! ri&hts 0ith men. 5ndeniabl%,
the women=s liberation movement resulted in far,ranging state legislations in
the 5nited 1tates to eliminate gender ine(ualit%.
17
1tarting in the decade of
the seventies, the courts li'ewise liberali+ed their rulings as the% started
invalidating laws infected with gender,bias. *t was in 19!1 when the 51
1upreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struc' a big blow for women e(ualit%
when it declared as unconstitutional an *daho law that re(uired probate
courts to choose male famil% members over females as estate
administrators. *t held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot <ustif%
a seF,based distinction. These si&ni!iant han&es both in la0 and in ase
la0 on the status o! 0omen virtually obliterated the ini$uitous ommon la0
surrenderin& the ri&hts o! married 0omen to their husbands based on the
dubious theory o! the 'arties# theoreti oneness. The Cor'us %uris
Seundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women=s
right as the% observed3 $"owever, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the
common law theor% of marriage, there is no reason 0hy a 0i!e may not
a$uire a se'arate domiile !or every 'ur'ose 4no0n to the la0.$
19
*n
publishing in 19I9 the Restatement o! the La0. Seond 7Con!lit o! La0s
8d9, the reputable American 0aw *nstitute also categoricall% stated that the
view of Blac'stone $. . . is no lon&er held. As the result o! statutes and ourt
deisions. a 0i!e no0 'ossesses 'ratially the same ri&hts and 'o0ers as
her unmarried sister.$
(+
*n the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging
to the anahronisti ommon la0 that demeans women, especiall% married
women. * submit that the Court has no choice eFcept to brea' awa% from this
common law rule, the root of the man% degradations of .ilipino women.
Before 19, our laws particularl% the Civil Code, were full of gender
discriminations against women. 4ur esteemed colleague, -adam Hustice
.lerida #uth #omero, cited a few of them as follows3
(1
FFF FFF FFF
Le&al 1isabilities Su!!ered by 3ives
Not generall% 'nown is the fact that under the Civil Code,
wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. .or
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the seF of the giver or the value of the gift,
other than from her ver% close relatives, without her
husband=s consent. 1he ma% accept onl% from, sa%, her
parents, parents,in,law, brothers, sisters and the relatives
within the so,called fourth civil degree. 1he ma% not
eFercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband ob<ects on serious grounds or if
his income is sufficient to support their famil% in
accordance with their social standing. As to what
constitutes $serious grounds$ for ob<ecting, this is within
the discretion of the husband.
FFF FFF FFF
Because of the present ine(uitable situation, the
amendments to the Civil 0aw being proposed b% the
5niversit% of the )hilippines 0aw Center would allow
absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such
that the divorced spouses are free to get married a %ear
after the divorce is decreed b% the courts. "owever, in
order to place the husband and wife on an e(ual footing
insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the
following are specified as the grounds for absolute
divorce3 @1A adulter% or having a paramour committed b%
the respondent in an% of the wa%s specified in the #evised
)enal Code or @;A an attempt b% the respondent against
the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the #evised )enal CodeG @&A abandonment
of the petitioner b% the respondent without <ust cause for a
period of three consecutive %earsG or @?A habitual
maltreatment.
7ith respect to propert% relations, the husband is
automaticall% the administrator of the con<ugal propert%
owned in common b% the married couple even if the wife
ma% be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law
does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as
such administrator. Conse(uentl%, the husband is
authori+ed to engage in acts and enter into transactions
beneficial to the con<ugal partnership. The wife, however,
cannot similarl% bind the partnership without the husband=s
consent.
And while both eFercise <oint parental authorit% over their
children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the propert% pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Ta'ing the lead in Asia, our government eFerted efforts, principall%
through legislations, to eliminate ine(ualit% between men and
women in our land. The 0atershed ame on Au&ust :. ;<== 0hen
our )amily Code too4 e!!et 0hih. amon& others. terminated the
une$ual treatment o! husband and 0i!e as to their ri&hts and
res'onsibilities.
((
The .amil% Code attained this elusive ob<ective b% giving new rights to
married women and b% abolishing seF,based privileges of husbands. Among
others, married women are now given the <oint right to administer the famil%
propert%, whether in the absolute communit% s%stem or in the s%stem of
con<ugal partnershipG
()
<oint parental authorit% over their minor children, both
over their persons as well as their propertiesG
(*
<oint responsibilit% for the
support of the famil%G
(5
the right to <ointl% manage the householdG
(6
and, the
right to ob<ect to their husband=s eFercise of profession, occupation,
business or activit%.
(7
O! 'artiular relevane to the ase at benh is Artile
>< o! the )amily Code 0hih too4 a0ay the e5lusive ri&ht o! the husband to
!i5 the !amily domiile and &ave it /ointly to the husband and the 0i!e. thus3
Art. I9. The husband and 0i!e shall !i5 the !amily domiile.
*n case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court ma% eFempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the eFemption. "owever, such
eFemption shall not appl% if the same is not compatible
with the solidarit% of the famil%. @Emphasis suppliedA
Artile >< re'ealed Artile ;;? o! the Civil Code. Commenting on
the dut% of the husband and wife to live together, former -adam
Hustice Alice 1empio,/i% of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a 0i!e may no0 re!use to live 0ith her husband,
thus3
(8
@;A The wife has the dut% to live with her husband, but she
ma% refuse to do so in certain cases li'e3
@aA *f the place chosen b% the husband
as famil% residence is dangerous to her
0ifeG
@bA *f the husband sub<ects her to
maltreatment or abusive conduct or
insults, ma'ing common life impossibleG
@cA *f the husband compels her to live
with his parents, but she cannot get
along with her mother,in,law and the%
have constant (uarrels @/el #osario v.
/el #osario, CA, ?I 49 I1;;AG
@dA 7here the husband has continuousl%
carried illicit relations for 1E %ears with
different women and treated his wife
roughl% and without consideration.
@/adivas v. >illanueva, 2? )hil. 9;AG
@eA 7here the husband spent his time in
gambling, giving no mone% to his famil%
for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and la%ing
hands on her. @)anuncio v. 1ula, CA, &?
49 1;9AG
@fA *f the husband has no fiFed residence
and lives a vagabond life as a tramp @1
-anresa &;9AG
@gA *f the husband is carr%ing on a
shameful business at home @9ahn v.
/arb%, & 0a. Ann. !EA.
The inesa'able onlusion is that our )amily Code has om'letely
emani'ated the 0i!e !rom the ontrol o! the husband, thus
abandoning the parties= theoretic identit% of interest. No less than
the late revered -r. Hustice H.B.0. #e%es who chaired the Civil
Code #evision Committee of the 5) 0aw Center gave this insightful
view in one of his rare lectures after retirement3
(9
FFF FFF FFF
The .amil% Code is primaril% intended to reform the famil%
law so as to emancipate the wife from the eFclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parit% with him
insofar as the famil% is concerned. The 0i!e and the
husband are no0 'laed on e$ual standin& by the Code.
The% are now <oint administrators of the famil% properties
and eFercise <oint authorit% over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authorit% in
the famil%. The husband 0ill no lon&er 'revail over the
0i!e but she has to agree on all matters concerning the
famil%. @Emphasis suppliedA
*n light of the .amil% Code which abrogated the ine(ualit% between
husband and wife as started and perpetuated b% the common law,
there is no reason in es'ousin& the anomalous rule that the 0i!e
still retains the domiile o! her dead husband. Article 11E of the
Civil Code which provides the statutor% support for this stance has
been repealed b% Article I9 of the .amil% Code. B% its repeal, it
becomes a dead,letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it b%
giving it further effect in an% wa% or manner such as b% ruling that
the petitioner is still bound b% the domiciliar% determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from rec'oning with the .amil% Code, we have to consider our
Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and e(ual protection of
law.
)+
It an hardly be doubted that the ommon la0 im'osition on a married
0oman o! her dead husband#s domiile even beyond his &rave is 'atently
disriminatory to 0omen. *t is a gender,based discrimination and is not
rationall% related to the ob<ective of promoting famil% solidarit%. *t cannot
survive a constitutional challenge. *ndeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the ;<=@ Constitution is more onerned 0ith e$uality
bet0een se5es as it e5'liitly ommands that the State $. . . shall ensure
!undamental e$uality be!ore the la0 o! 0omen and men.$ To be eFact,
section 1?, Article ** provides3 $The 1tate recogni+es the role of women in
nation building, and shall ensure fundamental e(ualit% before the law of
women and men. 7e shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this
constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman=s
treatment.
)rescinding from these premises, * respectfull% submit that the better stane
is to rule that 'etitioner rea$uired her Taloban domiile u'on the death o!
her husband in ;<=<. This is the necessar% conse(uence of the view that
petitioner=s Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband=s
deathG otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at an% point of time.
This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before
it was ta'en awa% b% Article 11E of the Civil Code, a right now recogni+ed b%
the .amil% Code and protected b% the Constitution. 0i'ewise, * cannot see
the fairness of the common law re(uiring petitioner to choose again her
Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile.
1he lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fiFed their domicile in Batac. "er husband is
dead and he cannot rule her be%ond the grave. The law disabling her to
choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common
law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her
dead husband=s domicile. There is neither rh%me nor reason for this gender,
based burden.
,ut even assumin& ar&uendo that there is need !or onvinin& 'roo! that
'etitioner hose to rea$uire her Taloban domiile. still. the reords reveal
am'le evidene to this e!!et. *n her affidavit submitted to the respondent
C4-E0EC, petitioner averred3
FFF FFF FFF
&I. *n November, 1991, * came home to our beloved
countr%, after several re(uests for m% return were denied
b% )resident Cora+on C. A(uino, and after * filed suits for
our 9overnment to issue me m% passport.
&!. But * came home without the mortal remains of m%
beloved husband, )resident .erdinand E. -arcos, which
the 9overnment considered a threat to the national
securit% and welfare.
&. 5pon m% return to the countr%, * wanted to immediatel%
live and reside in Tacloban Cit% or in 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te,
even if m% residences there were not livable as the% had
been destro%ed and cannibali+ed. The )C99, however,
did not permit and allow me.
&9. As a conse(uence, * had to live at various times in the
7estin )hilippine )la+a in )asa% Cit%, a friend=s apartment
on A%ala Avenue, a house in 1outh .orbes )ar' which m%
daughter rented, and )acific )la+a, all in -a'ati.
?E. After the 199; )residential Elections, * lived and
resided in the residence of m% brother in 1an Hose,
Tacloban Cit%, and pursued m% negotiations with )C99 to
recover m% se(uestered residences in Tacloban Cit% and
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
?E.1 *n preparation for m% observance
of All 1aints= /a% and All 1ouls= /a% that
%ear, * renovated m% parents= burial
grounds and entombed their bones
which had been eFcalvated, unearthed
and scattered.
?1. 4n November ;9, 199&, * formall% wrote )C99
Chairman -agtanggol 9unigundo for permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . @oAur ancestral house
in Tacloban and farmhouse in 4lot,
0e%te . . . to ma'e them livable for us
the -arcos famil% to have a home in our
own motherland.
FFF FFF FFF
?;. *t was onl% on EI Hune 199?, however, when )C99
Chairman 9unigundo, in his letter to Col. 1imeon 8empis,
Hr., )C99 #egion #epresentative, allowed me to repair
and renovate m% 0e%te residences. * (uote part of his
letter3
/ear Col. 8empis,
5pon representation b% -rs. *melda #.
-arcos to this Commission, that she
intends to visit our se(uestered
properties in 0e%te, please allow her
access thereto. 1he ma% also cause
repairs and renovation of the
se(uestered properties, in which event,
it shall be understood that her
underta'ing said repairs is not
authori+ation for her to ta'e over said
properties, and that all eFpenses shall
be for her account and not
reimbursable. )lease eFtend the
necessar% courtes% to her.
FFF FFF FFF
?&. * was not permitted, however, to live and sta% in the
1to. NiMo 1hrine residence in Tacloban Cit% where *
wanted to sta% and reside, after repairs and renovations
were completed. *n August 199?, * transferred from 1an
Hose, Tacloban Cit%, to m% residence in Baranga% 4lot,
Tolosa, 0e%te, when )C99 permitted me to sta% and live
there.
It is then lear that in ;<<8 'etitioner reestablished her domiile in
the )irst 1istrit o! Leyte. *t is not disputed that in 199;, she first
lived at the house of her brother in 1an Hose, Tacloban Cit% and
later, in August 199?, she transferred her residence in Baranga%
4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. Both Tacloban Cit% and the municipalit% of 4lot
are within the .irst /istrict of 0e%te. 1ince petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 199; in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, she more than
complied with the constitutional re(uirement of residence
$. . . for a period of not less than one %ear immediatel% preceding
the da% of the election,$ i.e., the -a% , 1992 elections.
The evidene 'resented by the 'rivate res'ondent to ne&ate the Taloban
domiile o! 'etitioner is nil. "e presented petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration
#ecord filed with the Board of Election *nspectors of )recinct 1E,A of
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te wherein she stated that her period of
residence in said baranga% was siF @IA months as of the date of her filing of
said >oter=s #egistration #ecord on Hanuar% ;, 1992.
)1
This statement in
petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration #ecord is a nonA're/udiial admission. The
Constitution re(uires at least one @1A %ear residence in the distrit in which
the candidate shall be elected. *n the case at bench, the reference is the
.irst /istrict of 0e%te. )etitioner=s statement 'roved that she resided in 4lot
siF @IA months before Hanuar% ;, 1992 but did not dis'rove that she has
also resided in Tacloban Cit% starting 199;. As aforestated, 4lot and
Tacloban Cit% are both within the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, hence, her siF @IA
months residence in 4lot should be counted not against, but in her favor.
)rivate respondent also presented petitioner=s Certificate of Candidac% filed
on -arch , 1992
)(
where she placed seven @!A months after *tem No.
which called for information regarding $residence in the constituenc% where *
see' to be elected immediatel% preceding the election.$ Again, this original
certificate of candidac% has no evidentiar% value because an -arch 1, 1992
it was corrected b% petitioner. *n her AmendedBCorrected Certificate of
Candidac%,
))
petitioner wrote $since childhood$ after *tem No. . The
amendment of a certificate of candidac% to correct a bona !ide mista'e has
been allowed b% this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As
we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
)*
viz.3
FFF FFF FFF
The absence of the signature of the 1ecretar% of the local
chapter N.) in the original certificate of candidac%
presented before the deadline 1eptember 11, 1929, did
not render the certificate invalid. The amendment o! the
erti!iate. althou&h at a date a!ter the deadline. but
be!ore the eletion. 0as substantial om'liane 0ith the
la0. and the de!et 0as ured.
*t goes without sa%ing that petitioner=s erroneous Certificate of
Candidac% filed on -arch , 1992 cannot be used as evidence
against her. )rivate respondent=s petition for the dis(ualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two @;A brittle pieces of
documentar% evidence petitioner=s >oter=s #egistration #ecord
and her original Certificate of Candidac%. #anged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
Tacloban, private respondent=s two @;A pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to dis(ualif% petitioner, more so, to den% her the right to
represent the people of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te who have
overwhelmingl% voted for her.
.ifth. 1ection 1E, Article *N,C of the Constitution mandates that $bona !ide
candidates for an% public office shall be free from an% form of harassment
and discrimination.$
)5
A detached reading of the records of the case at
bench will show that all forms of legal and eFtra,legal obstacles have been
thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people=s
representative in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te. *n petitioner=s Answer to the
petition to dis(ualif% her, she averred3
)6
FFF FFF FFF
1E. )etitioner=s @herein private respondent -onte<oA motive
in filing the instant petition is devious. 7hen respondent
@petitioner hereinA announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban Cit% and run for Congress
in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, petitioner @-onte<oA
immediatel% opposed her intended registration b% writing a
letter stating that $she is not a resident of said cit% but of
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.$ @AnneF $;$ of respondent=s
affidavit, AnneF $;$A. After respondent @petitioner hereinA
had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of
her siF,month actual residence therein, petitioner
@-onte<oA filed a petition with the C4-E0EC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the .irst /istrict to the 1econd
/istrict and pursued such move up to the 1upreme Court
in 9.#. No. 11!E;, his purpose being to remove
respondent @petitioner hereinA as petitioner=s @-onte<o=sA
opponent in the congressional election in the .irst /istrict.
"e also filed a bill, along with other 0e%te Congressmen,
see'ing to create another legislative district, to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the .irst /istrict and to ma'e it a part
of the new district, to achieve his purpose. "owever, such
bill did not pass the 1enate. "aving, failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
ob<ective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent @petitioner hereinA for the <udgment
and verdict of the electorate of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te in
an honest, orderl%, peaceful, free and clean elections on
-a% , 1992.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were
not lost
to the perceptive e%e of Commissioner -aambong who in his
/issenting 4pinion,
)7
held3
FFF FFF FFF
)rior to the registration date Hanuar% ;, 1992 the
petitioner @herein private respondent -onte<oA wrote the
Election 4fficer of Tacloban Cit% not to allow respondent
@petitioner hereinA to register thereat since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban Cit%. The purpose of
this move of the petitioner @-onte<oA is not lost to @siA the
Commission. *n 5N/ No. 92,EE1 @In the matter o! the
Le&islative 1istrits o! the "rovines o! Leyte. Iloilo. and
South Cotabato. Out o! 3hih the Ne0 "rovines o!
,iliran. (uimaras and Saran&&ani 3ere Res'etively
CreatedA, . . . "on. Cirilo #o% 9. -onte<o, #epresentative,
.irst /istrict of 0e%te, wanted the -unicipalit% of Tolosa, in
the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, transferred to the 1econd /istrict
of 0e%te. The "on. 1ergio A... Apostol, #epresentative of
the 1econd /istrict of 0e%te, opposed the move of the
petitioner @-onte<oA. 5nder Comelec #esolution No. ;!&I
@/ecember ;9, 199?A, the Commission on Elections
refused to ma'e the proposed transfer. )etitioner
@-onte<oA filed $Motion !or Reonsideration o! Resolution
No. 8@:>$ which the Commission denied in a #esolution
promulgated on .ebruar% 1, 1992. )etitioner @-onte<oA
filed a petition for ertiorari before the "onorable 1upreme
Court @Cirilo #o% 9. -onte<o vs. Commission on Elections,
9.#. No. 11!E;A (uestioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling
from the 1upreme Court, petitioner @-onte<oA tried to ma'e
sure that the respondent @petitioner hereinA will register as
a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
#epresentative not in the .irst but in the 1econd /istrict.
*t did not happen. 4n -arch 1I, 1992, the "onorable
1upreme Court unanimousl% promulgated a $1eision,$
penned b% Associate Hustice #e%nato 1. )uno, the
dispositive portion of which reads3
*N >*E7 7"E#E4., 1ection 1 of
#esolution No. ;!&I insofar as it
transferred the municipalit% of Capoocan
of the 1econd /istrict and the
municipalit% of )alompon of the .ourth
/istrict to the Third /istrict of the
province of 0e%te, is annulled and set
aside. 7e also den% the )etition pra%ing
for the transfer of the municipalit% of
Tolosa from the .irst /istrict to the
1econd /istrict of the province of 0e%te.
No costs.
)etitioner=s @-onte<o=sA plan did not wor'. But the
respondent @petitioner hereinA was constrained to register
in the -unicipalit% of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban Cit%, her domicile. *n an% case, both Tacloban
Cit% and Tolosa are in the .irst 0egislative /istrict.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are
forms of ran' harassments and invidious discriminations against
petitioner to den% her e(ual access to a public office. 7e cannot
commit an% hermeneutic violence to the Constitution b% torturing
the meaning of e(ualit%, the end result of which will allow the
harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is
but one Constitution for all .ilipinos. )etitioner cannot be ad<udged
b% a $different$ Constitution, and the worst wa% to interpret the
Constitution is to in<ect in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
1iFth. *n (alle&o v. 2era,
)8
we eFplained that the reason for this residence
re(uirement is $to eFclude a stranger or newcomer, unac(uainted, with the
conditions and needs of a communit% and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that communit% . . . .$ )etitioner=s lifetime contacts
with the .irst /istrict of 0e%te cannot be contested. Nobod% can claim that
she is not ac(uainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the
place. None can argue she cannot satisf% the intent of the Constitution.
1eventh. *n resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to
effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner
received 1event% Thousand .our "undred 1event%,one @!E,?!1A votes,
while private respondent got onl% Thirt%,1iF Thousand Eight "undred Thirt%,
Three @&I,&&A votes. )etitioner is clearl% the overwhelming choice of the
electorate of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and this is not a sleight of statistics.
7e cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highl% arguable technical
considerations. *n case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give
life to the people=s political <udgment.
A !inal 'oint. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunit%
to rectif% the ine(ualit% of status between women and men b% re<ecting the
ini(uitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and b%
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To
rule that a married woman is eternall% tethered to the domicile dictated b%
her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance
of advantage of a husband over his wife. 7e should not allow the dead to
govern the living even if the glories of %ester%ears seduce us to shout long
live the deadO The .amil% Code buried this gender,based discrimination
against married women and we should not eFcavate what has been
entombed. -ore importantl%, the Constitution forbids it.
* vote to grant the petition.
,ellosillo and Melo. %%-. onur-
.RANCISCO, J., concurring3
* concur with -r. Hustice 8apunan=s ponencia finding petitioner (ualified for
the position of #epresentative of the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. *
wish, however, to eFpress a few comments on the issue of petitioner=s
domicile.
/omicile has been defined as that place in which a person=s habitation is
fiFed, without an% present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is
properl% the domicile of a person in which he has voluntaril% fiFed his abode,
or habitation, not for a mere special or temporar% purpose, but with a present
intention of ma'ing it his permanent home @; C.H.1. 1A. *t denotes a fiFed
permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
li'e reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances,
in the sense that the% disclose intent. @4ng "uan Tin v. #epublic, 19 1C#A
9II, 9I9A
/omicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law
attributes to ever% individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his
parents, or of the head of his famil%, or of the person on whom he is legall%
dependent at the time of his birth. 7hile the domicile of origin is generall%
the place where one is born or reared, it ma%be elsewhere @; C.H.1. 2A.
/omicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has
elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicileG it has for its
true basis or foundation the intention of the person @; C.H.1. IA. *n order
to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and ac(uired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following re(uisites must concur, namel%, @aA
residence or bodil% presence in the new localit%, @bA intention to remain there
or animus manendi, and @cA an intention to abandon the old domicile or
animus non revertendi @#omualde+ v. #TC, Br. !, Tacloban Cit%, ;;I 1C#A
?E, ?12A. A third classification is domicile b% operation of law which
attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinaril% resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the
wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child @; C.H.1.
!A.
*n election law, when our Constitution spea's of residence for election
purposes it means domicile @Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the "ouse of
#epresentatives, 199 1C#A I9;, !1&G Nuval v. 9ura%, 2; )hil. I?2, I21A. To
m% mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this
concept, of domicile which led to petitioner=s dis(ualification b% ruling that
petitioner failed to compl% with the constitutionall% mandated one,%ear
residence re(uirement. Apparentl%, public respondent Commission deemed
as conclusive petitioner=s sta% and registration as voter in man% places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in
Tacloban, 0e%te. *n several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the
rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence @.a%pon v.
Juirino, 9I )hil. ;9?, &EEA. #espondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule eFcept to surmise petitioner=s intent of
abandoning her domicile of origin.
*t has been suggested that petitioner=s domicile of origin was supplanted b%
a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile b% operation of law. The
proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 199 she retains her
husband=s domicile, i.e., Batac, *locos Norte, until she ma'es an actual
change thereof. * find this proposition (uite untenable.
Tacloban, 0e%te, is petitioner=s domicile of origin which was involuntaril%
supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, *locos Norte, upon her marriage in 192?
with then Congressman -arcos. B% legal fiction she followed the domicile of
her husband. *n m% view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to full%
and effectivel% perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1

The (uestion of domicile, however, is not affected b% the fact that it was the
legal or moral dut% of the individual to reside in a given place @; C.H.1.
11A. Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the
marriage subsists, she automaticall% loses it upon the latter=s termination, for
the reason behind the law then ceases. 4therwise, petitioner, after her
marriage was ended b% the death of her husband, would be placed in a (uite
absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifel% obligations
%et made to hold on to one which no longer serves an% meaningful purpose.
*t is m% view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of
Tacloban, 0e%te upon her husband=s death without even signif%ing her
intention to that effect. *t is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectivel% abandoned Tacloban,
0e%te for Batac, *locos Norte or for some other placeBs. The clear rule is that
it is the part% @herein private respondentA claiming that a person has
abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove
preponderantl% such abandonment or loss @.a%pon v. Juirino, su'ra at ;9G
; C.H.1. 1IA, because the presumption is strongl% in favor of an original
or former domicile, as against an ac(uired one @; C.H.1. 1IA. )rivate
respondent unfortunatel% failed to discharge this burden as the record is
devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has ac(uired whether voluntaril% or
involuntaril%, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrar%, clearl% show that petitioner has complied with
the constitutional one,%ear residence re(uirement. After her eFile abroad,
she returned to the )hilippines in 1991 to reside in 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, but
the )residential Commission on 9ood 9overnment which se(uestered her
residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her
transient sta% in various places in -anila @Affidavit p.I, attached as AnneF *
of the )etitionA. *n 199;, she ran for the position of president writing in her
certificate of candidac% her residence as 1an Huan, -etro -anila. After her
loss therein, she went bac' to Tacloban Cit%, ac(uired her residence
certificate
(
and resided with her brother in 1an Hose. 1he resided in 1an
Hose, Tacloban Cit% until August of 199? when she was allowed b% the
)C99 to move and reside in her se(uestered residential house in 4lot,
Tolosa, 0e%te @AnneF *, p. IA.
)
*t was in the same month of August when she
applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in 1an Huan, -etro
-anila in order to register anew as voter of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, which she
did on Hanuar% ;, 1992. .rom this se(uence of events, * find it (uite
improper to use as the rec'oning period of the one,%ear residence
re(uirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous
registration in 1an Huan, -etro -anila. The fact which private respondent
never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after
the 199; presidential election from 1an Huan, -etro -anila to 1an Hose,
Tacloban Cit%, and resided therein until August of 199?. 1he later
transferred to 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te @AnneF *, p. !A. *t appearing that both
Tacloban Cit% and Tolosa, 0e%te are within the .irst Congressional /istrict of
0e%te, it indubitabl% stands that she had more than a %ear of residence in the
constituenc% she sought to be elected. )etitioner, therefore, has
satisfactoril% complied with the one,%ear (ualification re(uired b% the 19!
Constitution.
* vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion3
)etitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the C4-E0EC ruled that
she was dis(ualified from running for #epresentative of her /istrict and that,
in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a ma<orit% vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not b% a straightforward ruling did the
C4-E0EC pronounce its decision as has been its unvar%ing practice in the
past, but b% a startling succession of $reverse somersaults.$ *ndicative of its
shifting stance visAaAvis petitioner=s certificate of candidac% were first, the
action of its 1econd /ivision dis(ualif%ing her and canceling her original
Certificate of Candidac% b% a vote of ;,1 on April ;?, 1992G then the denial
b% the C4-E0EC en ban of her -otion for #econsideration on -a% !,
1992, a da% before the electionG then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
-a% 11, 1992 or three da%s after the election, allowing her proclamation in
the event that the results of the canvass should show that she obtained the
highest number of votes @obviousl% noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingl% over her opponentA, but almost simultaneousl% reversing
itself b% directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless
be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the dis(ualification issue presented b% the case at
bench is the interpretation to be given to the one,%ear residenc% re(uirement
imposed b% the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.
1
Bearing in mind that the term $resident$ has been held to be s%non%mous
with $domicile$ for election purposes, it is important to determine whether
petitioner=s domicile was in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te and if so, whether she
had resided there for at least a period of one %ear. 5ndisputed is her
domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
/epending on what theor% one adopts, the same ma% have been changed
when she married .erdinand E. -arcos, then domiciled in Batac, b%
operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainl% released her from the
obligation to live with him at the residence fiFed b% him during his lifetime.
7hat ma% confuse the la%man at this point is the fact that the term $domicile$
ma% refer to $domicile of origin,$ $domicile of choice,$ or $domicile b%
operation of law,$ which sub<ect we shall not belabor since it has been ampl%
discussed b% the 'onente and in the other separate opinions.
*n an% case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to
the effect of the husband=s death on the domicile of the widow. 1ome
scholars opine that the widow=s domicile remains unchangedG that the
deceased husband=s wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind.
9iven this interpretation, the widow cannot possibl% go far enough to sever
the domiciliar% tie imposed b% her husband.
*t is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterall%
to fiF the residence or domicile of the famil%, as laid down in the Civil Code,
(

but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale
underl%ing the mutual dut% of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to
close one=s e%es to the star' realities of the present.
At the other eFtreme is the position that the widow automaticall% reverts to
her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. /oes the law so
abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
domicileK To answer this (uestion which is far from rhetorical, one will have
to 'eep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Ever%one must have a
domicile. Then one must have onl% a single domicile for the same purpose at
an% given time. 4nce established, a domicile remains until a new one is
ac(uired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined b% the law be
is sub<ect to.
At this <uncture, we are confronted with an uneFplored legal terrain in this
<urisdiction, rendered more mur'% b% the conflicting opinions of foreign legal
authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the dar'ness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated b%
eFperience and the necessit% of according petitioner her right to choose her
domicile in 'eeping with the enlightened global trend to recogni+e and
protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedl%, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil,
political and social rights are concerned, is a relativel% recent phenomenon
that too' seed onl% in the middle of this centur%. *t is a historical fact that for
over three centuries, the )hilippines had been coloni+ed b% 1pain, a
conservative, Catholic countr% which transplanted to our shores the 4ld
7orld cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on
our government of the 1panish Civil Code in 19, the people, both men and
women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband=s being
the head of the famil% and the wife=s subordination to his authorit%. *n such
role, his was the right to ma'e vital decisions for the famil%. -an% instances
come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namel%,
that $the husband shall fiF the residence of the famil%.$
)
Because he is made
responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the famil%,
*
he is also
empowered to be the administrator of the con<ugal propert%, with a few
eFceptions
5
and ma%, therefore, dispose of the con<ugal partnership
propert% for the purposes specified under the lawG
6
whereas, as a general
rule, the wife cannot bind the con<ugal partnership without the husband=s
consent.
7
As regards the propert% pertaining to the children under parental
authorit%, the father is the legal administrator and onl% in his absence ma%
the mother assume his powers.
8
/emeaning to the wife=s dignit% are certain
strictures on her personal freedoms, practicall% relegating her to the position
of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few3 The wife cannot, without
the husband=s consent, ac(uire an% gratuitous title, eFcept from her
ascendants, descendants, parents,in,law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.
9
7ith respect to her emplo%ment, the husband wields a veto
power in the case the wife eFercises her profession or occupation or
engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the famil%,
according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and
valid grounds.
1+
-ost offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal,minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred da%s
following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given
birth to a child.
11
The mother who contracts a subse(uent marriage loses
the parental authorit% over her children, unless the deceased husband,
father of the latter, has eFpressl% provided in his will that his widow might
marr% again, and has ordered that in such case she should 'eep and
eFercise parental authorit% over their children.
1(
Again, an instance of a
husband=s overarching influence from be%ond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered b% .ilipino wives for hundreds of
%ears evo'ed no protest from them until the concept of human rights and
e(ualit% between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the 5nited Nations Charter of which the )hilippines was one of
the original signatories. B% then, the 1panish $con(uistadores$ had been
overthrown b% the American forces at the turn of the centur%. The bedroc' of
the 5.N. Charter was firml% anchored on this credo3 $to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignit% and worth of the human person, in
the e$ual ri&hts o! men and 0omen.$ @Emphasis suppliedA
*t too' over thirt% %ears before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit,
owing largel% to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. 7hat
ma% be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All .orms of
/iscrimination Against 7omen @CE/A7A adopted b% the 5.N.
9eneral Assembl% which entered into force as an international
treat% on 1eptember &, 191. *n ratif%ing the instrument, the
)hilippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter,
for its Constitution, no less, declared that $The )hilippines. . .
adopts the generall% accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the polic% of peace, e(ualit%,
<ustice, freedom, cooperation, and amit% with all nations.$
1)
4ne
such principle embodied in the CE/A7 is granting to men and
women $the same rights with regard to the law relating to the
movement of persons and the !reedom to hoose their residene
and domiile.$
1*
@Emphasis suppliedA.
CE/A7=s pro,women orientation which was not lost on .ilipino women was
reflected in the 19! Constitution of the )hilippines and later, in the .amil%
Code,
15
both of which were speedil% approved b% the first lad% )resident of
the countr%, Cora+on C. A(uino. Notable for its emphasis on the human
rights of all individuals and its bias for e(ualit% between the seFes are the
following provisions3 $The 1tate values the dignit% of ever% human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights$
16
and $The 1tate recogni+es
the role of women in nation,building, and shall ensure the fundamental
e(ualit% before the law of women and men.$
17
A ma<or accomplishment of women in their (uest for e(ualit% with men and
the elimination of discriminator% provisions of law was the deletion in the
.amil% Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights e(ual to that of their husbands. 1pecificall%,
the husband and wife are now given the ri&ht /ointly to !i5 the !amily domiileG
18
concomitant to the spouses= being <ointl% responsible for the support of the
famil% is the right and dut% of both spouses to manage the householdG
19
the
administration and the en<o%ment of the communit% propert% shall belong to
both spouses <ointl%G
(+
the father and mother shall now <ointl% eFercise legal
guardianship over the propert% of their unemancipated common child
(1
and
several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women=s
rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularl% 'nown as $7omen
in /evelopment and Nation Building Act$
((
Among the rights given to
married women evidencing their capacit% to act in contracts e(ual to that of
men are3
@1A 7omen shall have the capacit% to borrow and obtain loans and eFecute
securit% and credit arrangements under the same conditions as menG
@;A 7omen shall have e(ual access to all government and private sector
programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and
shall en<o% e(ual treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement
programsG
@&A 7omen shall have e(ual rights to act as incorporators and enter into
insurance contractsG and
@?A -arried women shall have rights e(ual to those of married men in
appl%ing for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without
need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the .ourth 7orld Conference of 7omen in
Bei<ing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that
$7omen=s #ights are "uman #ights$ and that $All obstacles to women=s full
participation in decision,ma'ing at all levels, including the famil%$ should be
removed. "aving been herself a -ember of the )hilippine /elegation to the
*nternational 7omen=s 6ear Conference in -eFico in 19!2, this writer is onl%
too 'eenl% aware of the unremitting struggle being waged b% women the
world over, .ilipino women not eFcluded, to be accepted as e(uals of men
and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them bac' from their
proper places under the sun.
*n light of the ineForable sweep of events, local and global, legislative,
eFecutive and <udicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them
and eliminating whatever poc'ets of discrimination still eFist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at libert% to
choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardlessK
* submit that a widow, li'e the petitioner and others similarl% situated, can no
longer be bound b% the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was
before. Neither does she automaticall% revert to her domicile of origin, but
eFercising free will, she ma% opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. *n
returning to Tacloban and subse(uentl%, to Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, both of
which are located in the .irst /istrict of 0e%te, petitioner ampl% demonstrated
b% overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile
in the two places sufficed to meet the one,%ear re(uirement to run as
#epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te.
*n view of the foregoing eFpatiation, * vote to 9#ANT the petition.
/IUG, J., separate opinion3
The case at bench deals with eFplicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. *t is a bedroc' in our legal
s%stem that sets up ideals and directions and render stead% our strides
hence. *t onl% loo's bac' so as to ensure that mista'es in the past are not
repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function
and wea'ens its goals. A constitution ma% well become outdated b% the
realities of time. 7hen it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we
owe it respect and allegiance. Anarch%, open or subtle, has never been, nor
must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitor% needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its ver% essence.
Constitutional provisions must be ta'en to be mandator% in character unless,
either b% eFpress statement or b% necessar% implication, a different intention
is manifest @see -arcelino vs. Cru+, 1;1 1C#A 21A.
The two provisions initiall% brought to focus are 1ection I and 1ection 1! of
Article >* of the fundamental law. These provisions read3
1ec. I. No person shall be a -ember of the "ouse of
#epresentatives unless he is a natural,born citi+en of the
)hilippines and, on the da% of the election, is at least
twent%,five %ears of age, able to read and write, and,
eFcept the part%,list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one %ear immediatel%
preceding the da% of the election.
1ec. 1!. The 1enate and the "ouse of #epresentatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole <udge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and (ualifications of their respective -embers. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine -embers,
three of whom shall be Hustices of the 1upreme Court to
be designated b% the Chief Hustice, and the remaining siF
shall be -embers of the 1enate or the "ouse of
#epresentatives, as the case ma% be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organi+ations
registered under the part%,list s%stem represented therein.
The senior Hustice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election @the $C4-E0EC$A is constitutionall% bound to
enforce and administer $all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
election . . .$ @Art. *N, C, 1ec. ;, ConstitutionA that, there being nothing said to
the contrar%, should include its authorit% to pass upon the (ualification and
dis(ualification prescribed b% law of andidates to an elective office. *ndeed,
pre,proclamation controversies are eFpressl% placed under the C4-E0EC=s
<urisdiction to hear and resolve @Art. *N, C, 1ec. &, ConstitutionA.
The matter before us specificall% calls for the observance of the
constitutional one,%ear residenc% re(uirement. The issue @whether or not
there is here such complianceA, to m% mind, is basicall% a (uestion of fact or
at least ineFtricabl% lin'ed to such determination. The findings and <udgment
of the C4-E0EC, in accordance with the long established rule and sub<ect
onl% to a number of eFceptions under the basic heading of $grave abuse of
discretion,$ are not reviewable b% this Court.
* do not find much need to do a compleF eFercise on what seems to me to
be a plain matter. 9enerall%, the term $residence$ has a broader connotation
that ma% mean 'ermanent @domicileA, o!!iial @place where one=s official
duties ma% re(uire him to sta%A or tem'orary @the place where he so<ourns
during a considerable length of timeA. .or civil law purposes, i.e., as regards
the eFercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence @see Article 2E, Civil
CodeA. *n election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced b%
this Court in Romualdez vs. Re&ional Trial Court, Branch !, Tacloban Cit%
@;;I 1C#A ?E, ?E9AG thus3
*n election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence
as s%non%mous terms, thus3 $@tAhe term $residence$ as
used in the election law is s%non%mous with $domicile,$
which imports not onl% an intention to reside in a fiFed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.$ $/omicile$
denotes a fiFed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for li'e reasons, one
intends to return. . . . . #esidence thus ac(uired, however,
ma% be lost b% adopting another choice of domicile. *n
order, in turn, to ac(uire a new domicile b% choice, there
must concur @1A residence or bodil% presence in the new
localit%, @;A an intention to remain there, and @&A an
intention to abandon the old domicile. *n other words,
there must basicall% be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of timeG
the change of residence must be voluntar%G and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
5sing the above tests, * am not convinced that we can charge the
C4-E0EC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its
assailed resolution.
The C4-E0EC=s <urisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends
when the <urisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. *t signifies
that the protestee must have theretofore been dul% proclaimed and has
since become a $member$ of the 1enate or the "ouse of #epresentatives.
The (uestion can be as'ed on whether or not the proclamation of a
candidate is <ust a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections
dictated solel% on the number of votes cast in an election eFercise. * believe,
it is not. A ministerial dut% is an obligation the performance of which, being
ade(uatel% defined, does not allow the use of further <udgment or discretion.
The C4-E0EC, in its particular case, is tas'ed with the full responsibilit% of
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as ma% be re(uired b% law
before a proclamation is properl% done.
The Court, on its part, should, in m% view at least, refrain from an% undue
encroachment on the ultimate eFercise of authorit% b% the Electoral Tribunals
on matters which, b% no less than a constitutional fiat, are eFplicitl% within
their eFclusive domain. The nagging (uestion, if it were otherwise, would be
the effect of the Court=s peremptor% pronouncement on the abilit% of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own <udgment in a contest
$relating to the election, returns and (ualification$ of its members.
)rescinding from all the foregoing, * should li'e to neFt touch base on the
applicabilit% to this case of 1ection I of #epublic Act No. II?I, in relation to
1ection !; of ,atas "ambansa ,l&. 1, each providing thusl%3
#E)5B0*C ACT N4. II?I
FFF FFF FFF
1ec. I. E!!et o! 1is$uali!iation Case. An% candidate
who has been declared b% final <udgment to be dis(ualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. *f for an% reason a candidate is not declared
b% final <udgment before an election to be dis(ualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, in(uir% or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or an% intervenor,
ma% during the pendenc% thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATA1 )A-BAN1A B09. 1
FFF FFF FFF
1ec. !;. E!!ets o! dis$uali!iation ases and 'riority.
The Commission and the courts shall give priorit% to cases
of dis(ualification b% reason of violation of this Act to the
end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than
seven da%s before the election in which the dis(ualification
is sought.
An% candidate who has been declared b% final <udgment to
be dis(ualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for an%
reason, a candidate is not declared b% final, <udgment
before an election to be dis(ualified, and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.
* reali+e that in considering the significance of the law, it ma% be preferable
to loo' for not so much the specific instances the% ostensibl% would cover as
the principle the% clearl% conve%. Thus, * will not scoff at the argument that it
should be sound to sa% that votes cast in favor of the dis(ualified candidate,
whenever ultimatel% declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingl% be considered to be stra% votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed b% the rationale of the now prevailing
doctrine first enunciated in the case of To'aio vs. "aredes @;& )hil. ;&
C191;DA which, although later abandoned in Tizon vs. Comele @1E& 1C#A
I! C191DA, and Santos vs. COMELEC @1&! 1C#A !?E C192DA, was
restored, along with the interim case of (eronimo vs. Ramos @1&I 1C#A
?&2 C192DA, b% the Labo @1!I 1C#A 1 @199DA, Abella @;E1 1C#A ;2&
C1991DA, Labo @;11 1C#A ;9! C199;DA and, most recentl%, ,enito @;&2 1C#A
?&I C199?DA rulings. ,enito vs. Comele was a unanimous decision penned
b% Hustice 8apunan and concurred in b% Chief Hustice Narvasa, Hustices
.eliciano, )adilla, Bidin, #egalado, /avide, #omero, -elo, Juiason, )uno,
>itug and -endo+a @Hustices Cru+ and Bellosillo were on official leaveA. .or
eas% reference, let me (uote from the first Labo decision3
.inall%, there is the (uestion of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the $uo 0arranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as ma%or. "e cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained onl% the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviousl% not the
choice of the people of Baguio Cit%.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is 1antos v.
Commission on Elections, @1&! 1C#A !?EA decided in
192. *n that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was dis(ualified as a turncoat and considered a non,
candidate, were all disregard as stra%. *n effect, the
second placer won b% default. That decision was
supported b% eight members of the Court then, @Cuevas,
%., 'onente, with -a'asiar, Concepcion, Hr., Escolin,
#elova, /e la .uente, Alampa% and A(uino, %%.,
concurring.A with three dissenting @Teehan'ee, Acting C.%.,
Abad 1antos and -elencio,"errera, %%.A and another two
reserving their vote. @)lana and 9utierre+, Hr., %%.A 4ne
was on official leave. @.ernando, C.%.A
#e,eFamining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds,
that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
(eronimo v. Ramos, @1&I 1C#A ?&2A which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 191; in To'aio
v. "aredes, @;& )hil. ;&A was supported b% ten members
of the Court, @9utierre+, Hr., 'onente, with Teehan'ee,
Abad 1antos, -elencio,"errera, )lana, Escolin, #elova,
/e la .uente, Cuevas and Alampa%, %%., concurringA
without an% dissent, although one reserved his vote,
@-a'asiar, %.A another too' no part, @A(uino, %.A and two
others were on leave. @.ernando, C.%. and Concepcion,
Hr., %.A There the Court held3
. . . it would be eFtremel% repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionall%
guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not ac(uired the
ma<orit% or pluralit% of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituenc%, the
ma<orit% of which have positivel%
declared through their ballots that the%
do not choose him.
1ound polic% dictates that public elective
offices are filled b% those who have
received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it
is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it
receives a ma<orit% or pluralit% of the
legal votes cast in the election. @;E
Corpus Huris ;nd, 1 ;?&, p. I!I.A
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be dis(ualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessaril% entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, dis(ualified, or
non,eligible person ma% not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. "owever, in the absence
of a statute which clearl% asserts a contrar% political and
legislative polic% on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, (ualified, or
eligible, the% should not be treated as stra%, void or
meaningless. @at pp. ;E,;1A
Considering all the foregoing, * am constrained to vote for the dismissal of
the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion3
*n m% view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections
has the power to dis(ualif% candidates on the ground that the% lac' eligibilit%
for the office to which the% see' to be elected. * thin' that it has none and
that the (ualifications of candidates ma% be (uestioned onl% in the event
the% are elected, b% filing a petition for $uo 0arranto or an election protest in
the appropriate forum, not necessaril% in the C4-E0EC but, as in this case,
in the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this
case too' part in the proceedings in the C4-E0EC is of no moment. 1uch
proceedings were unauthori+ed and were not rendered valid b% their
agreement to submit their dispute to that bod%.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authori+ed proceedings
for determining a candidate=s (ualifications for an office before his election.
There are none in the 4mnibus Election Code @B.). Blg. 1A, in the
Electoral #eforms 0aw of 19! @#.A. No. II?IA, or in the law providing for
s%nchroni+ed elections @#.A. No. !1IIA. There are, in other words, no
provisions for pre,proclamation contests but onl% election protests or $uo
0arranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for $dis(ualification,$ but the%
are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibilit% of a candidate. These
provisions are concerned with the incapacit% @due to insanit%, incompetence
or conviction of an offenseA of a person either to be a andidate or to
ontinue as a andidate for public office. There is also a provision for the
denial or cancellation of certificates of candidac%, but it applies onl% to cases
involving false representations as to certain matters re(uired b% law to be
stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the 4mnibus Election
Code3
1;. 1is$uali!iations. An% person who has been
declared b% competent authorit% insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced b% final <udgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for an% offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalt% of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
dis(ualified to be a andidate and to hold an% office,
unless he has been given plenar% pardon or granted
amnest%.
The dis(ualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration b%
competent authorit% that said insanit% or incompetence
had been removed or after the eFpiration of a period of
five %ears from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes dis(ualified. @Emphasis
addedA
I. 1is$uali!iations. An% candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a part% is declared b% final
decision of a competent court guilt% of, or found b% the
Commission of having @aA given mone% or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functionsG @bA
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidac%G @cA
spent in his election campaign an amount in eFcess of that
allowed b% this CodeG @dA solicited, received or made an%
contribution prohibited under 1ections 9, 92, 9I, 9! and
1E?G or @eA violated an% of 1ections E, &, 2, I and
;I1, paragraphs d, e, ', v, and cc, sub,paragraph I, shall
be dis(ualified !rom ontinuin& as a andidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. An% person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign countr%
shall not be (ualified to run for an% elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign countr% in
accordance with the residence re(uirement provided for in
the election laws. @Emphasis addedA
!. "etition to deny due ourse to or anel a
erti!iate o!
andiday. A verified petition see'ing to den% due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidac% ma% be filed
b% an% person e5lusively on the &round that any material
re'resentation ontained therein as re$uired under
Setion @B hereo! is !alse. The petition ma% be filed at an%
time not later than twent%,five da%s from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidac% and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen da%s
before the election. @Emphasis addedA
the Electoral #eforms 0aw of 19! @#.A. No. II?IA3
I. E!!et o! 1is$uali!iation Case. An% candidate
who has been declared b% final <udgment to be dis(ualified
shall not be voted !or, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. I! !or any reason a andidate is not delared
by !inal /ud&ment be!ore an eletion to be dis$uali!ied and
he is voted !or and reeives the 0innin& number o! votes
in suh eletion, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, in(uir% or protest
andG upon motion for the complainant or an% intervenor,
ma% during the pendenc% thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate 0henever the
evidene o! his &uilt is stron&. @Emphasis addedA.
!. "etition to 1eny 1ue Course to or Canel a
Certi!iate o! Candiday. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall appl% to petitions to den% due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidac% as provided in 1ection !
of Batas )ambansa Blg. 1.
and the 0ocal 9overnment Code of 1991 @#.A. No. !1IEA3
?E. 1is$uali!iations. The following persons are
dis(ualified from running for an% elective local position3
@aA Those sentenced b% final <udgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable b%
one @1A %ear or more of imprisonment, within two @;A %ears
after serving sentenceG
@bA Those removed from office as a result of on
administrative caseG
@cA Those convicted b% final <udgment for violating the oath
of allegiance to the #epublicG
@dA Those with dual citi+enshipG
@eA .ugitive from <ustice in criminal or nonpolitical cases
here or abroadG
@fA )ermanent residents in a foreign countr% or those who
have ac(uired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivit% of this CodeG
and
@gA The insane or feeble,minded.
The petition filed b% private respondent Cirilo #o% -onte<o in the C4-E0EC,
while entitled $.or Cancellation and /is(ualification,$ contained no allegation
that private respondent *melda #omualde+,-arcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidac% which were false, it sought her
dis(ualification on the ground that $on the basis of her >oter #egistration
#ecord and Certificate of Candidac%, CsheD is dis(ualified from running for
the position of #epresentative, considering that on election da%, -a% ,
1992, CsheD would have resided less than ten @1EA months in the district
where she is see'ing to be elected.$ .or its part, the C4-E0EC=s 1econd
/ivision, in its resolution of April ;?, 1992, cancelled her certificate of
candidac% and corrected certificate of candidac% on the basis of its finding
that petitioner is $not (ualified to run for the position of -ember of the "ouse
of #epresentatives for the .irst 0egislative /istrict of 0e%te$ and not because
of an% finding that she had made false representations as to material matters
in her certificate of candidac%.
-onte<o=s petition before the C4-E0EC was therefore not a petition for
cancellation of certificate of candidac% under ! of the 4mnibus Election
Code, but essentiall% a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. *t is
important to note this, because, as will presentl% be eFplained, proceedings
under ! have for their purpose to dis(ualif% a person from being a
andidate, whereas $uo 0arranto proceedings have for their purpose to
dis(ualif% a person from holding 'ubli o!!ie. Hurisdiction over $uo 0arranto
proceedings involving members of the "ouse of #epresentatives is vested in
the Electoral Tribunal of that bod%.
*ndeed, in the onl% cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the
cancellation of certificates of candidac%, the allegations were that the
respondent candidates had made !alse re'resentations in their certificates of
candidac% with regard to their itizenshi',
1
a&e,
(
or residene.
)
But in the
generalit% of cases in which this Court passed upon the (ualifications of
respondents for office, this Court did so in the conteFt of election protests
*
or
$uo 0arranto proceedings
5
filed a!ter the 'rolamation o! the res'ondents or
'rotestees as 0inners.
Three reasons ma% be cited to eFplain the absence of an authori+ed
proceeding for determining be!ore eletion the (ualifications of a candidate.
.irst is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessit% for determining his eligibilit% for the office. *n contrast,
whether an individual should be dis(ualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses @e.g., vote bu%ing, over spending, commission
of prohibited actsA is a pre<udicial (uestion which should be determined lest
he wins because of the ver% acts for which his dis(ualification is being
sought. That is wh% it is provided that if the grounds for dis(ualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted forG if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be countedG and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
6
1econd is the fact that the determination of a candidate=s eligibilit%, e.g., his
citi+enship or, as in this case, his domicile, ma% ta'e a long time to ma'e,
eFtending be%ond the beginning of the term of the office. This is ampl%
demonstrated in the companion case @9.#. No. 1;E;I2, Agapito A. A(uino
v. C4-E0ECA where the determination of A(uino=s residence was still
pending in the C4-E0EC even after the elections of -a% , 1992. This is
contrar% to the summar% character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidac%. That is wh% the law ma'es the receipt of certificates of candidac%
a ministerial dut% of the C4-E0EC and its officers.
7
The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidac% that the% are eligible for the
position which the% see' to fill, leaving the determination of their
(ualifications to be made after the election and onl% in the event the% are
elected. 4nl% in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidac% is the C4-E0EC given <urisdiction.
Third is the polic% underl%ing the prohibition against pre,proclamation cases
in elections for )resident, >ice )resident, 1enators and members of the
"ouse of #epresentatives. @#.A. No. !1II, 12A The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as $sole <udges$ under the Constitution of the
eletion, returns and $uali!iations of members of Congress or of the
)resident and >ice )resident, as the case ma% be.
B% providing in ;2& for the remed% of $uo 0arranto for determining an
elected official=s (ualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed,
while being conspicuousl% silent about a pre,proclamation remed% based on
the same ground, the 4mnibus Election Code, or 4EC, b% its silence
underscores the polic% of not authori+ing an% in(uir% into the (ualifications of
candidates unless the% have been elected.
Apparentl% reali+ing the lac' of an authori+ed proceeding for declaring the
ineligibilit% of candidates, the C4-E0EC amended its rules on .ebruar% 12,
199& so as to provide in #ule ;2, 1 the following3
(rounds !or dis$uali!iation. An% candidate who does
not possess all the (ualifications of a candidate as
provided for b% the Constitution or b% eFisting law or who
commits an% act declared b% law to be grounds for
dis(ualification ma% be dis(ualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lac' of provision for declaring the ineligibilit% of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied b% a mere rule. 1uch an act is e(uivalent to the creation
of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the C4-E0EC, in
the eFercise of its rulema'ing power under Art. *N, A, I of the
Constitution, cannot do. *t is noteworth% that the Constitution withholds from
the C4-E0EC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote,
which essentiall% involves an in(uir% into $uali!iations based on a&e.
residene and itizenshi' of voters. @Art. *N, C, ;@&AA
The assimilation in #ule ;2 of the C4-E0EC rules of grounds for ineligibilit%
into grounds for dis(ualification is contrar% to the evident intention of the law.
.or not onl% in their grounds but also in their conse(uences are proceedings
for $dis(ualification$ different from those for a declaration of $ineligibilit%.$
$/is(ualification$ proceedings, as alread% stated, are based on grounds
specified in 1; and I of the 4mnibus Election Code and in ?E of
the 0ocal 9overnment Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from beomin& a andidate or !rom ontinuin& as a andidate for public
office. *n a word, their purpose is to eliminate a andidate !rom the rae
either from the start or during its progress. $*neligibilit%,$ on the other hand,
refers to the lac' of the (ualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding 'ubli o!!ie and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibilit% is to remove the inumbent !rom o!!ie.
Conse(uentl%, that an individual possesses the (ualifications for a public
office does not impl% that he is not dis(ualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. 7e have this
sort of dichotom% in our Naturali+ation 0aw. @C.A. No. ?!&A That an alien has
the (ualifications prescribed in ; of the law does not impl% that he does
not suffer from an% of dis(ualifications provided in ?.
*ndeed, provisions for dis(ualifications on the ground that the candidate is
guilt% of prohibited election practices or offenses, li'e other pre,proclamation
remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of $grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest,$
8
through the use of $manufactured$
election returns or resort to other tric'er% for the purpose of altering the
results of the election. This rationale does not appl% to cases for determining
a candidate=s (ualifications for office before the election. To the contrar%, it is
the candidate against whom a proceeding for dis(ualification is brought who
could be pre<udiced because he could be prevented from assuming office
even though in end he prevails.
To summari+e, the declaration of ineligibilit% of a candidate ma% onl% be
sought in an election protest or action for $uo 0arranto filed pursuant to
;2& of the 4mnibus Election Code within 1E da%s after his proclamation.
7ith respect to elective local officials @e.g., 9overnor, >ice 9overnor,
members of the 1angguniang )anlalawigan, etc.A such petition must be filed
either with the C4-E0EC, the #egional Trial Courts, or -unicipal Trial
Courts, as provided in Art. *N, C, ;@;A of the Constitution. *n the case of
the )resident and >ice )resident, the petition must be filed with the
)residential Electoral Tribunal @Art. >**, ?, last paragraphA, and in the case
of the 1enators, with the 1enate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of
Congressmen, with the "ouse of #epresentatives Electoral Tribunal. @Art.
>*, 1!A There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the
filing of dis(ualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibilit% in the case
of candidates for )resident, >ice )resident, 1enators and members of the
"ouse of #epresentatives, because of the same polic% prohibiting the filing
of pre,proclamation cases against such candidates.
.or these reasons, * am of the opinion that the C4-E0EC had no
<urisdiction over 1)A No. 92,EE9G that its proceedings in that case, including
its (uestioned orders, are voidG and that the eligibilit% of petitioner *melda
#omualde+,-arcos for the office of #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of
0e%te ma% onl% be in(uired into b% the "#ET.
Accordingl%, * vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in 1)A No. 92,EE9, including its (uestioned orders
doted April ;?, 1992, -a% !, 1992, -a% 11, 1992 and -a% ;2, 1992,
declaring petitioner *melda #omualde+,-arcos ineligible and ordering her
proclamation as #epresentative of the .irst /istrict of 0e%te suspended. To
the eFtent that #ule ;2 of the C4-E0EC #ules of )rocedure authori+es
proceedings for the dis(ualification of candidates on the ground of
ineligibilit% for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the
proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa. C-%-. onurs-
'ADILLA, J., dissenting3
* regret that * cannot <oin the ma<orit% opinion as eFpressed in the well,written
ponencia of -r. Hustice 8apunan.
As in an% controvers% arising out of a Constitutional provision, the in(uir%
must begin and end with the provision itself. The controvers% should not be
blurred b% what, to me, are academic dis(uisitions. *n this particular
controvers%, the Constitutional provision on point states that $no person
shall be a member of the "ouse of #epresentatives unless he is a natural,
born citi+en of the )hilippines, and on the da% of the election, is at least
twent%,five @;2A %ears of age, able to read and write, and eFcept the part% list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereo! !or a 'eriod o! not less than one year immediately
'reedin& the day o! the eletion.$ @Article >*, section IA
*t has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residene
has been understood as s%non%mous with domiile. This argument has been
validated b% no less than the Court in numerous cases
1
where significantl%
the !atual irumstanes clearl% and convincingl% proved that a person
does not effectivel% lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein
is manifest with his 'ersonal 'resene in the place, ou'led 0ith ondut
indiative o! suh intention.
7ith this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different
modalities within which the phrase $a resident thereof @meaning, the
legislative districtA for a period of not less than one %ear$ would fit.
The first instance is where a person=s residence and domicile coincide in
which case a person onl% has to prove that he has been domiciled in a
permanent location for not less than a %ear before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his
domicile in which case he would have the luFur% of district shopping,
provided of course, he satisfies the one,%ear residence period in the district
as the minimum period for eligibilit% to the position of congressional
representative for the district.
*n either case, one would not be constitutionall% dis(ualified for abandoning
his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still,
domicile of choiceG neither would one be dis(ualified for abandoning
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he
desires to be a candidate.
The most eFtreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person
maintains several residences in different districts. 1ince his domicile of origin
continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment
@animus non revertendiA, he can practicall% choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered b% the unambiguous
limitation that C!or a 'eriod o! not less than one year immediately 'reedin&
the day o! the eletionC, he must be a resident in the district where he
desires to be elected.
To m% mind, the one %ear residence period is crucial regardless of whether
or not the term $residence$ is to be s%non%mous with $domicile.$ *n other
words, the candidate=s intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisf% the length of time prescribed b% the fundamental law. And
this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. "e must be familiar with
the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one,%ear residence in said district would be the minimum
period to ac(uire such familiarit%, if not versatilit%.
*n the case of petitioner *melda #. -arcos, the operative facts are distinctl%
set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec ;nd /ivision dated ;?
April 1992 @as affirmed b% the Comelec en banA
*n or about 19& when respondent was a little over %ears
old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, 0e%te
@Tacloban Cit%A. 1he studied in the "ol% *nfant Academ% in
Tacloban from 19& to 19? when she graduated from
high school. 1he pursued her college studies in 1t. )aul=s
College, now /ivine 7ord 5niversit% of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the 0e%te Chinese "igh 1chool, still in Tacloban
Cit%. *n 192; she went to -anila to wor' with her cousin,
the late 1pea'er /aniel L. #omualde+ in his office in the
"ouse of #epresentatives. *n 192?, she married eF,
president .erdinand -arcos when he was still a
congressman of *locos Norte. 1he lived with him in Batac,
*locos Norte and registered there as a voter. 7hen her
husband was elected 1enator of the #epublic in 1929, she
and her husband lived together in 1an Huan, #i+al where
she registered as a voter. *n 19I2 when her husband was
elected )resident of the #epublic of the )hilippines, she
lived with him in -alacanang )alace and registered as a
voter in 1an -iguel, -anila.
/uring the -arcos presidenc%, respondent served as a
-ember of the Batasang )ambansa, -inister of "uman
1ettlements and 9overnor of -etro -anila. 1he claimed
that in .ebruar% 19I, she and her famil% were abducted
and 'idnapped to "onolulu, "awaii. *n November 1991,
she came home to -anila. *n 199; respondent ran for
election as )resident of the )hilippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidac% wherein she indicated that she is
a resident and registered voter of 1an Huan, -etro -anila.
4n August ;?, 199?, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of 1an Huan, -etro -anila, re(uesting for
cancellation of her registration in the )ermanent 0ist of
>oters in )recinct No. 12! of 1an Huan, -etro -anila, in
order that she ma% be re,registered or transferred to Brg%.
4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. @AnneF ;,B, AnswerA. 4n August &1,
199?, respondent filed her 1worn Application for
Cancellation of >oter=s )revious #egistration @AnneF ;,C,
AnswerA stating that she is a dul% registered voter in 12!,
A, Brg%. -a%tunas, 1an Huan, -etro that she intends to
register at Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
4n Hanuar% ;, 1992 respondent registered as a voter at
)recinct No. 1,A of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te. 1he filed with the
Board of Election *nspectors CE .orm No. 1, >oter
#egistration #ecord No. 9?,&&?9!!;, wherein she alleged
that she has resided in the municipalit% of Tolosa for a
period of I months @AnneF A, )etitionA.
4n -arch , 1992, respondent filed with the 4ffice of the
)rovincial Election 1upervisor, 0e%te, a Certificate of
Candidac% for the position of #epresentative of the .irst
/istrict of 0e%te wherein she also alleged that she has
been a resident in the constituenc% where she see's to be
elected for a period of ! months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows3
!. )#4.E11*4N 4#
4CC5)AT*4N3
"ouse,wifeB TeacherB
1ocial 7or'er
. #E1*/ENCE
@complete addressA3
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te
)ost 4ffice Address
for election purposes3
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te
9. #E1*/ENCE *N
T"E
C4N1T*T5ENC6
7"E#E*N * 1EE8 T4
BE E0ECTE/
*--E/*ATE06
)#ECE/*N9
E0ECT*4N3
:::::::: 6ears
Seven -onths
1E. * A- N4T A
)E#-ANENT
#E1*/ENT 4., 4#
*--*9#ANT T4, A
.4#E*9N
C45NT#6.
T"AT * A- E0*9*B0E for said officeG That * will support
and defend the Constitution of the #epublic of the
)hilippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
theretoG That * will obe% the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated b% the dul%,constituted authoritiesG That the
obligation imposed b% m% oath is assumed voluntaril%,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasionG and
That the facts stated herein are true to the best of m%
'nowledge.
@1gd.A *melda
#omualde+,
-arcos
@1ignature of
CandidateA
)etitioner=s aforestated certificate of candidac% filed on -arch 1992
contains the decisive component or seed of her dis(ualification. *t is
contained in her answer under oath of $seven months$ to the (uer% of
$residence in the constituenc% wherein * see' to be elected immediatel%
preceding the election.$
*t follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is dis(ualified from the position of
representative for the 1st congressional district of 0e%te in the elections of
-a% 1992, for failure to meet the $not less than one,%ear residence in the
constituenc% @1st district, 0e%teA immediatel% preceding the da% of election @
-a% 1992A.$
"aving arrived at petitioner=s dis(ualification to be a representative of the
first district of 0e%te, the neFt important issue to resolve is whether or not the
Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and 'rolaim the
0inner out of the remainin& $uali!ied candidates for representative in said
district.
* am not unaware of the pronouncement made b% this Court in the case of
Labo vs. Comele, 9.#. I2I?, August 1, 199, 1!I 1C#A 1 which gave
the rationale as laid down in the earl% 191; case of To'aio vs. "aredes, ;&
)hil. ;& that3
. . . . 1ound polic% dictates that public elective offices are
filled b% those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a ma<orit% or
pluralit% of the legal votes cast in the election. @;E Corpus
Huris ;nd, 1 ;?&, p. I!IA
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be dis(ualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessaril% entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, dis(ualified, or
non,eligible person ma% not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. "owever, in the absene
o! a statute which clearl% asserts a contrar% political and
legislative polic% on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, (ualified, or
eligible, the% should not be treated as stra%, void or
meaningless.
5nder 1ec. I #A II?I, @An Act *ntroducing Additional #eforms in the
Electoral 1%stem and for other purposesA @? 4.9. 9E2, ;; .ebruar% 19A it
is provided that3
. . . An% candidate who has been declared b% final
<udgment to be dis(ualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. *f for an% reason a
candidate is not declared b% final <udgment before an
election to be dis(ualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, in(uir% or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or an% intervenor, ma%, during the pendenc%
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the provision (uoted above. As the law now
stands, the legislative polic% does not limit its concern with the effect of a
final <udgement of dis(ualification onl% be!ore the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
dis(ualified candidate 1"A00 N4T BE C45NTE/. The law has also
validated the <urisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue
hearing the petition for dis(ualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, i! !or any reason. he is not delared by
!inal /ud&ment be!ore an eletion to be dis$uali!ied.
1ince the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend
proclamation @when evidence of his guilt is strongA is also eFplicit under the
law. 7hat happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
dis(ualifiedK Then, votes cast for him $shall not be counted$ and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
*t stands to reason that 1ection I of #A II?I does not ma'e the second
placer the winner simpl% because a $winning candidate is dis(ualified,$ but
that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest
number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the dis(ualified candidate
not being counted or considered.
As this law clearl% reflects the legislative polic% on the matter, then there is
no reason wh% this Court should not re,eFamine and conse(uentl% abandon
the doctrine in the Hun 0abo case. *t has been stated that $the (ualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased b% the electorate alone. The
will of the people as eFpressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibilit%$ most especiall% when it is mandated b% no less than the
Constitution.
ACC4#/*N906, * vote to /*1-*11 the petition and to order the )rovincial
Board of Canvassers of 0e%te to proclaim the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes, from among the (ualified candidates, as the dul%
elected representative of the 1st district of 0e%te.
+ermosisima. %r- %-. dissent-
REGALADO, J., dissenting3
7hile * agree with same of the factual bases of the ma<orit% opinion, * cannot
arrive con<ointl% at the same conclusion drawn therefrom "ence, this dissent
which assuredl% is not formulated $on the basis of the personalit% of a
petitioner in a case.$
* go along with the ma<orit% in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as
the same are pertinent to this case, and which * have simplified as follows3
1. )etitioner, although born in -anila, resided during her
childhood in the present Tacloban Cit%, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have ta'en
up permanent residence therein. 1he also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that
cit%.
;. 7hen she married then #ep. .erdinand E. -arcos who
was then domiciled in Batac, *locos Norte, b% operation of
law she ac(uired a new domicile in that place in 192?.
&. *n the successive %ears and during the events that
happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as
a 1enator and then as )resident, she lived with him and
their famil% in 1an Huan, #i+al and then in -alacanang
)alace in 1an -iguel, -anila.
?. 4ver those %ears, she registered as a voter and actuall%
voted in Batac, *locos Norte, then in 1an Huan, #i+al, and
also in 1an -iguel, -anila, all these merel% in the eFercise
of the right of suffrage.
2. *t does not appear that her husband, even after he had
assumed those loft% positions successivel%, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, *locos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariabl% voted in
all elections.
I. After the ouster of her husband from the presidenc% in
19I and the so<ourn of the -arcos famil% in "onolulu,
"awaii, 5.1.A., she eventuall% returned to the )hilippines
in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed
to have been merel% temporar% residences.
!. *n 199;, petitioner ran for election as )resident of the
)hilippines and in her certificate of candidac% she
indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident
of 1an Huan, -etro -anila.
. 4n August ;?, 199?, she filed a letter for the
cancellation of her registration in the )ermanent 0ist of
>oters in )recinct No. 12! of 1an Huan, -etro -anila in
order that she ma% $be re,registered or transferred to
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.$ 4n August &1, 199?, she
followed this up with her 1worn Application for
Cancellation of >oter=s )revious #egistration wherein she
stated that she was a registered voter in )recinct No. 12!,
A, Brg%. -a%tunas, 1an Huan, -etro -anila and that she
intended to register in Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
9. 4n Hanuar% ;, 1992, petitioner registered as a voter at
)recinct No. 1,A of 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, for which
purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
*nspectors a voter=s registration record form alleging that
she had resided in that municipalit% for siF months.
1E. 4n -arch , 1992, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidac% for the position of #epresentative of the .irst
/istrict of 0e%te wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for $Seven -onths$ of the constituenc% where she
sought to be elected.
11. 4n -arch ;9, 1992, she filed an $AmendedBCorrected
Certificate of Candidac%$ wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidac% to item $. #E1*/ENCE *N
T"E C4N1T*T5ENC6 7"E#E * 1EE8, T4 BE
E0ECTE/ *--E/*ATE06 )#ECE/*N9 T"E
E0ECT*4N3$ was changed or replaced with a new entr%
reading $1*NCE C"*0/"44/.$
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidac%,
petitioner had complied with the residenc% re(uirement of one %ear as
mandated b% no less than 1ection I, Article >* of the 19! Constitution.
* do not intend to impose upon the time of m% colleagues with a dissertation
on the difference between residence and domicile. 7e have had enough of
that and * understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be s%non%mous with domicile.
That is so understood in our <urisprudence and in American 0aw, in
contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil,
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or
controlling.
Conse(uentl%, since in the present case the (uestion of petitioner=s
residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, * am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term,
specificall% its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and
domicile b% operation of law, as understood in American law from which for
this case we have ta'en our <urisprudential bearings.
-% readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or
what is termed the $domicile of origin,$ constitutes the domicile of an infant
until abandoned, or until the ac(uisition of a new domicile in a different
place.
1
*n the instant case, we ma% grant that petitioner=s domicile of origin,
(
at least as of 19&, was what is now Tacloban Cit%.
Now, as * have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three 'inds, that is,
domicile b% birth, domicile b% choice, and domicile b% operation of law. The
first is the common case of the place of birth or domiilium ori&inis, the
second is that which is voluntaril% ac(uired b% a part% or domiilium 'ro'io
motuG the last which is conse(uential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
)
is sometimes called domiilium neesarium. There is no debate that the
domicile of origin can be lost or replaced b% a domicile of choice or a
domicile b% operation of law subse(uentl% ac(uired b% the part%.
7hen petitioner contracted marriage in 192? with then #ep. -arcos, b%
operation of law, not onl% international or American but of our own
enactment,
*
she ac(uired her husband=s domicile of origin in Batac, *locos
Norte and correspondingl% lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban Cit%.
"er subse(uent changes of residence to 1an Huan, #i+al, then to 1an
-iguel, -anila, thereafter to "onolulu, "awaii, and bac' to now 1an Huan,
-etro -anila do not appear to have resulted in her thereb% ac(uiring new
domiciles of choice. *n fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was b% reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his
peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them.
"er residence in "onolulu and, of course, those after her return to the
)hilippines were, as she claimed, against her will or onl% for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of
choice.
5
After petitioner=s return to the )hilippines in 1991 and up to the present
imbroglio over her re(uisite residenc% in Tacloban Cit% or 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te, there is no showing that she ever attempted to ac(uire an% other
domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her
legal domicile in Batac, *locos Norte. 4n that score, we note the ma<orit%=s
own submission
6
that, to successfull% effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate @aA an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, @bA a
bona !ide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and @cA acts which correspond with the purpose.
7e conse(uentl% have to also note that these re(uirements for the
ac(uisition of a domicile of choice appl% whether what is sought to be
changed or substituted is a domicile of origin @domiilium ori&inisA or a
domicile b% operation of law @domiilium neesariumA. 1ince petitioner had
lost her domiilium ori&inis which had been replaced b% her domiilium
neesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, *locos Norte
which, if at all, can be the ob<ect of legal change under the contingencies of
the case at bar.
To get out of this (uandar%, the ma<orit% decision echoes the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner #egalado E. -aambong in 1)A 92,EE9 of the
Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel proposition.
*t ma% be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin b%
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
)resident .erdinand E. -arcos in 192; @si, 192?A. B%
operation of law @domiilium neesariumA, her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, *locos
Norte althou&h there 0ere no indiations o! an intention
on her 'art to abandon her domiile o! ori&in. Because of
her husband=s subse(uent death and through the
operation of the provisions of the New .amil% Code
alread% in force at the time, however, her le&al domiile
automatially reverted to her domiile o! ori&in. . . .
@Emphasis suppliedA.
.irstl%, * am pu++led wh% although it is conceded that petitioner had ac(uired
a domiilium neesarium in Batac, *locos Norte, the ma<orit% insists on
ma'ing a (ualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of
origin. * find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares
where petitioner=s domicile is at an% given time, and not her self,serving or
putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. 4therwise, contrar% to their
own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the
ma<orit% would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban Cit% as @for
lac' of a term in law since it does not eFist thereinA the e(uivalent of what is
fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
1econdl%, domicile once lost in accordance with law can onl% be recovered
li'ewise in accordance with law. "owever, we are here being titillated with
the possibilit% of an automatic reversion to or reac(uisition of a domicile of
origin after the termination of the cause for its loss b% operation of law. The
ma<orit% agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin b% her
marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof.
* am impressed b% the ingeniousness of this theor% which proves that,
indeed, necessit% is the mother of inventions. #egretfull%, * find some
difficult% in accepting either the logic or the validit% of this argument.
*f a part% loses his domicile of origin b% obtaining a new domicile of choice,
he thereb% voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. *f,
thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not 'er se recover
his original domicile unless, b% subse(uent acts legall% indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile,
which is precisel% what petitioner belatedl% and, evidentl% <ust for purposes
of her candidac%, unsuccessfull% tried to do.
4ne=s subse(uent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot
automaticall% restore his domicile of origin, not onl% because there is no
legal authorit% therefor but because it would be absurd )ursued to its logical
conse(uence, that theor% of i'so /ure reversion would rule out the fact that
said part% could alread% ver% well have obtained another domicile, either of
choice or b% operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. 1ignificantl%
and obviousl% for this reason, the .amil% Code, which the ma<orit%
ineFplicabl% invo'es, advisedl% does not regulate this contingenc% since it
would impinge on one=s freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not onl% voluntarily abandoned her
domicile of choice @unless we assume that she entered into the marital state
against her willA but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
through her ac(uisition of a new domicile b% o'eration o! la0. *n fact, this is
even a case of both voluntary and le&al abandonment of a domicile of origin.
7ith much more reason, therefore, should we re<ect the proposition that with
the termination of her marriage in 199, petitioner had supposedl% 'er se
and i'so !ato reac(uired her domicile of origin which she lost in 192?.
4therwise, this would be tantamount to sa%ing that during the period of
marital coverture, she was simultaneousl% in possession and en<o%ment of a
domicile of origin which was onl% in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is li'ewise to the effect that while after the
husband=s death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,
9
she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she
ma'es an actual change.
1+
*n the absence of affirmative evidence, to the
contrar%, the presumption is that a wife=s domicile or legal residence follows
that of her husband and will continue after his death.
11
* cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the ma<orit%=s
theor% based on Articles I and I9 of the .amil% Code. All that is of an%
relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fiF the
famil% domicile is now shared b% the spouses. * cannot perceive how that
<oint right, which in the first place was never eFercised b% the spouses, could
affect the domicile fiFed b% the law for petitioner in 192? and, for her
husband, long prior thereto. *t is true that a wife now has the coordinate
power to determine the on/u&al or !amily domicile, but that has no bearing
on this case. 7ith the death of her husband, and each of her children having
gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the eFercise
of that <oint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present
factual setting of this controvers%. *nstead, what is of concern in petitioner=s
case was the matter of her having ac(uired or not her own domicile of
choice.
* agree with the ma<orit%=s discourse on the virtues of the growing and
eFpanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with e(ual rights
and recognition b% Constitution and statutor% conferment. "owever, * have
searched in vain for a specific law or <udicial pronouncement which either
eFpressl% or b% necessar% implication supports the ma<orit%=s desired theor%
of automatic reac(uisition of or reversion to the domiilium ori&inis of
petitioner. /efinitel%, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that
should govern this issue, there is a world of differenceG and, un(uestionabl%,
this should be resolved b% legislative articulation but not b% the elo(uence of
the well,turned phrase.
*n sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban Cit% as her domicile of origin since
192? and not having automaticall% reac(uired an% domicile therein, she
cannot legall% claim that her residenc% in the political constituenc% of which it
is a part continued since her birth up to the present. #espondent
commission was, therefore, correct in re<ecting her pretension to that effect
in her amendedBcorrected certificate of candidac%, and in holding her to her
admission in the original certificate that she had actuall% resided in that
constituenc% for onl% seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessar% to further pass upon the procedural
issues raised b% petitioner.
4N T"E .4#E94*N9 )#E-*1E1, * vote to /*1-*11 the petition for lac' of
merit.
DA/IDE, %R., J., dissenting3
* respectfull% dissent from the opinion of the ma<orit% written b% -r. Hustice
1antiago -. 8apunan, more particularl% on the issue of the petitioner=s
(ualification.
5nder 1ection !, 1ubdivision A, Article *N of the Constitution, decisions,
orders, or rulings of the C4-E0EC ma% be brought to this Court onl% b% the
special civil action for ertiorari under #ule I2 of the #ules of Court @Aratuc
vs. C4-E0EC, 1C#A ;21 C19!9DG /ario vs. -ison, 1!I 1C#A ?
C199DA.
Accordingl%, a writ of ertiorari ma% be granted onl% if the C4-E0EC has
acted without or in eFcess of <urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
@1ection 1, #ule I2, #ules of CourtA. 1ince the C4-E0EC has, undoubtedl%,
<urisdiction over the private respondent=s petition, the onl% issue left is
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in dis(ualif%ing the petitioner.
-% careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of ;? April
1992 of the C4-E0EC 1econd /ivision and the En ,an resolution of !
-a% 1992 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse thereof. The resolution of the 1econd /ivision dispassionatel% and
ob<ectivel% discussed in minute details the facts which established be%ond
cavil that herein petitioner was dis(ualified as a candidate on the ground of
lac' of residence in the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. *t has not
misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of
substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The ma<orit% opinion, however, overturned the C4-E0EC=s findings of fact
for lac' of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of
origin, which is allegedl% within the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te.
* respectfull% submit that the petitioner herself has provided the C4-E0EC,
either b% admission or b% documentar% evidence, overwhelming proof of the
loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban Cit% and
not Tolosa, 0e%te. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of
origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her sta%,
unfortunatel%, was for onl% seven months before the da% of the election. 1he
was then dis(ualified to be a candidate for the position of #epresentative of
the .irst Congressional /istrict of 0e%te. A holding to the contrar% would be
arbitrar%.
*t ma% indeed be conceded that the petitioner=s domicile of choice was either
Tacloban Cit% or Tolosa, 0e%te. Nevertheless, she lost it by o'eration o! la0
sometime in May ;<DB u'on her marria&e to the then Congressman @later,
)residentA .erdinand E. -arcos. A domicile b% operation of law is that
domicile which the law attributes to a person, independentl% of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that
of the wife arising from marriage @; C.H.1. /omicile !, 11A. 5nder the
governing law then, Article 11E of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her
domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, *locos
Norte. 1aid Article reads as follows3
Art. 11E. The husband shall fiF the residence of the famil%.
But the court ma% eFempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the #epublic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo -. Tolentino states3
Although the dut% of the spouses to live together is mutual,
the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered b% law to fiF the famil% residence. This right
even predominates over some rights recogni+ed b% law in
the wife. .or instance, under article 11! the wife ma%
engage in business or practice a profession or occupation.
But because of the power of the husband to fiF the !amily
domiile he ma% fiF it at such a place as would ma'e it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her
profession. .or <ustifiable reasons, however, the wife ma%
be eFempted from living in the residence chosen b% the
husband. The husband cannot validl% allege desertion b%
the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of
residence, when it appears that the% have lived for %ears
in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his
choice of a different home is not made in good faith.
@Commentaries and Hurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the )hilippines, vol. 1, 192 ed., &&9A.
5nder common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile
and, b% operation of law, ac(uires that of her husband, no matter where the
wife actuall% lives or what she believes or intends. "er domicile is fiFed in
the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and sub<ect to certain
limitations, he can change her domicile b% changing his own @;2 Am Hur ;d
/omicile ?, &!A.
*t must, however, be pointed out that under Article I9 of the .amil% Code,
the fiFing of the famil% domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the
husband, but is now a <oint decision of the spouses, and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term $famil%
domicile,$ and not famil% residence, as $the spouses ma% have multiple
residences, and the wife ma% elect to remain in one of such residences,
which ma% destro% the dut% of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits$ @A0*C*A >. 1E-)*4,/*6, "andboo' on the .amil%
Code of the )hilippines, C19D, 1E;A.
The theor% of automatic restoration of a woman=s domicile of origin upon the
death of her husband, which the ma<orit% opinion adopts to overcome the
legal effect of the petitioner=s marriage on her domicile, is unsupported b%
law and b% <urisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband=s
death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she ma'es an actual change @; C.H.1.
/omicile 1;, ;!A. 4r, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife
to ac(uire her own domicile is revived, but until she eFercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death @;2 Am Hur ;d
/omicile I;, ?2A. Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but
her 'o0er to a$uire her o0n domiile.
Clearl%, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner=s domicile was
that of her husband at the time of his death which was Batac, *locos
Norte, since their residences in 1an Huan, -etro -anila, and 1an -iguel,
-anila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectivel% perform his official duties. Their residence in 1an Huan was a
con<ugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she
was alread% a widow. *n her sworn certificate of candidac% for the 4ffice of
the )resident in the s%nchroni+ed elections of -a% 199;, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of 1an Huan, -etro -anila. 1he also voted in
the said elections in that place.
4n the basis of her evidence, it was onl% on 8B Au&ust ;<<B when she
eFercised her right as a widow to ac(uire her own domicile in Tolosa, 0e%te,
through her sworn statement re(uesting the Election 4fficer of 1an Huan,
-etro -anila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in
)recinct 12! thereat and pra%ing that she be $re,registered or transferred to
Brg%. 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, the place of CherD birth and permanent residence$
@photocop% of EFhibit $B,$ attached as AnneF $;$ of private respondent
-onte<o=s CommentA. Notabl%, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her >oter=s Affidavit sworn to on 12
-arch 199; @photocop% of EFhibit $C,$ attached as AnneF $&,$ Id.A, her >oter
#egistration #ecord sworn to on ; Hanuar% 1992 @photocop% of EFhibit $E,$
attached as AnneF $2,$ Id.A, and her Certificate of Candidac% sworn to on
-arch 1992 @photocop% of EFhibit $A,$ attached as AnneF $1,$ Id.A, she
solemnl% declared that she was born in -anila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. *s it Tacloban
Cit% or Tolosa, 0e%teK *n the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition
for dis(ualification @AnneF $*$ of )etitionA, she declared under oath that her
$domicile or residence is Tacloban Cit%.$ *f she did intend to return to such
domicile or residence of origin wh% did she inform the Election 4fficer of 1an
Huan that she would transfer to 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te, and indicate in her
>oter=s #egistration #ecord and in her certificate of candidac% that her
residence is 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%teK 7hile this uncertaint% is not important
insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
nevertheless proves that fort%,one %ears had alread% lapsed since she had
lost or abandoned her domicile of origin b% virtue of marriage and that such
length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memor%.
* find to be misplaced the reliance b% the ma<orit% opinion on )ay'on vs.
*uirino @9I )hil. ;9? C192?DA, and the subse(uent cases which established
the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one=s profession, or engage in business in other
states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. 1o is the
reliance on 1ection 11! of the 4mnibus Election Code which provides that
transfer of residence to an% other place b% reason of one=s $occupationG
professionG emplo%ment in private and public serviceG educational activitiesG
wor' in militar% or naval reservationsG service in the arm%, nav% or air force,
the constabular% or national police forceG or confinement or detention in
government institutions in accordance with law$ is not deemed as loss of
original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage
of a woman. The reason for the eFclusion is, of course, Article 11E of the
Civil Code. *f it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not
operate as an abandonment of domicile @of origin or of choiceA, then such
cases and legal provision should have eFpressl% mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self,serving claim of the
petitioner in her affidavit @AnneF $A$ of her Answer in C4-E0EC 1)A No.
92,EE9G AnneF $*$ of )etitionA that her $domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban Cit%,$ and that she $never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which CsheD alwa%s intended to return whenever
absent.$ 1uch a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article
11E of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the
vicissitudes of the petitioner=s life after her marriage in 192? conclusivel%
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
ac(uired a new one animo et !ato @84115T" 8ENT 8ENNAN, A Treatise
on #esidence and /omicile, C19&?D, ;1?, &;IA.
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner=s claim that
she $merel% committed an honest mista'e$ in writing down the word $seven$
in the space provided for the residenc% (ualification re(uirement in the
certificate of candidac%. 1uch a claim is self,serving and, in the light of the
foregoing dis(uisitions, would be all sound and fur% signif%ing nothing. To
me, she did not commit an% mista'e, honest or otherwiseG what she stated
was the truth.
The ma<orit% opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who
asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it
@*mperial >ictor% 1hipping Agenc% vs. N0#C, ;EE 1C#A 1! C1991DG ).T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, ;;1 1C#A 19 C199&DA. "aving admitted
marriage to the then Congressman -arcos, the petitioner could not den% the
legal conse(uence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her
husband. The ma<orit% opinion rules or at least concludes that $CbD% operation
of law @domiilium neesariumA, her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automaticall% became Batac, *locos Norte.$ That conclusion is
consistent with Article 11E of the Civil Code. 1ince she is presumed to retain
her deceased husband=s domicile until she eFercises her revived power to
ac(uire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has
eFercised her right to ac(uire her own domicile. 1he miserabl% failed to
discharge that burden.
* vote to den% the petition.
.oot"ote-
1 Harrolt v. -abberl%, 1E& 5.1. 2E @11A.
; C4N1T, art. >*, states3
1ec. I. No person shall be a member of the
"ouse of #epresentatives unless he is a natural,
born citi+en of the )hilippines and, on the da% of
the election, is at least twent%,five %ears of age,
able to read and write, and eFcept the part%,list
representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one %ear
immediatel% preceding the da% of the election.
See, Harrolt v. -abberl%, su'ra, note 1.
& 9allego vs. >era, !& )hil. ?2& @19?1A.
? Rollo, p. 11?, AnneF $/$.
2 Rollo, p. 11E, AnneF $/$.
I Rollo, p. 11&.
! Rollo, p. 111.
Rollo, p. 112, AnneF $E$.
9 1igned b% >irgilo 1. 4ledan, )rovincial Election
1upervisor *>, 0e%teG Rollo,
p. 11I, AnneF $.$.
1E Rollo, p. 11!, AnneF $9$. )etitioner eFplained
the circumstances surrounding the filling up of
the original certificate thus3
1. 4n -arch , 1992, * filed m% certificate of
candidac% for -ember of the "ouse of
#epresentatives @CongresswomanA of the .irst
0egislative /istrict of the province of 0e%te, which
was drafted b% -r. .ilomeno A. Leta.
;. * learned latel% that Congressman Cirilo
-onte<o wants to dis(ualif% me as * allegedl% lac'
residence in the constituenc% because of the
entr% of the word $1E>EN$ in *tem No. of m%
certificate of candidac%.
&. * read m% certificate of candidac% before
signing it and thought of the word $#E1*/ENCE$
to mean actual or ph%sical residence, and the
word $1E>EN$ merel% reflected m% actual and
ph%sical residence in Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa,
0e%te.
&.1. The word $1E>EN$ was placed on m%
certificate of candidac% to indicate that at lease
one @1A month had passed from m% registration
as voter of Tolosa, 0e%te, on Hanuar% ;, 1992,
when * wrote $EI$ months under $)E#*4/ 4.
#E1*/ENCE$ as m% actual or ph%sical residence
in the town.
?. * thought then that the sense in *tem No. 1E of
m% certificate of candidac% stating $T"AT * A-
eligible for said 4ffice$ was sufficient to affirm
that * possess all the (ualifications, including m%
residence, for -ember of the "ouse of
#epresentatives for which * am aspiring in the
-a% , 1992 elections.
2. The fact, however, is that m% domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban Cit%, a component
cit% of the .irst 0egislative /istrict of 0e%te *
never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which * alwa%s intended to
return whenever absentG indeed in 199;, *
returned to Tacloban Cit% to live and sta% there.
4n November 2, 199;G * bought m% #esidence
Certificate No. 12;;I1I0 there, which is made
an integral part hereof as AnneF $*$ @AnneF $;$
hereofA.
11 Id., at p. 1;E. See also, Rollo, p. 1&E,1&&,
AnneF $*$, petitioner=s Affidavit eFplaining her
residence3
1&. * established m% domicile, however in
Tacloban, 0e%te @Tacloban Cit% in 19&, when
was little over eight @A %ears old. 1hortl% after m%
mother died on April !, 19&, m% widowed father,
>icente 4restes #omualde+, brought me and m%
brothers. . .and m% sisters to Tacloban, 0e%te
@now Tacloban Cit%A his hometown.
FFF FFF FFF
1. * have alwa%s considered Tacloban Cit% as
m% permanent residence or residence of origin
have not abandoned and have never intended to
abandon m% permanent residence or residence
of origin there. To it * alwa%s intend to return
whenever absent.
19. *n 192;, * went to -anila to wor' with m%
cousin, the late spea'er
/aniel L. #omualde+ in his office in the "ouse of
#epresentatives.
;E. *n -a%, 192?, * married )resident .erdinand
E. -arcos when he was still the congressman of
*locos, Norte.
;1. As a dutiful wife who loved him deepl%, * lived
with him in Batac, *locos Norte and registered as
a voter there.
;;. *n 19I2, m% husband was elected )resident
of the #epublic of the )hilippines. Together, we
lived in -alacaMang )alace and * registered as a
voter in 1an -iguel, -anila.
;&. -% registration as voter in Batac, *locos
NorteG 1an Huan, #i+al @now 1an Huan, -etro
-anilaAG and 1an -iguel, -anila, was for
convenience because * had to live with m%
husband to serve him when he was
congressman, 1enator and )resident of the
#epublic of the )hilippines. /uring those %ears
however, * never intended nor desired to
abandon m% domicile or residence of origin in
Tacloban Cit%, which * established since * was a
child.
FFF FFF FFF
&&. Throughout the -arcos )residenc%, * spent
most of m% birthda% anniversaries and attended
the 1to. Nini .iesta in Tacloban Cit%. * regularl%
visited m% domicile or residence of origin in 0e%te
and even held important functions and
entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
&?. After )resident .erdinand E. -arcos and *,
together with our children and innocent
grandchildren were abducted and 'idnapped to
"onolulu, "awaii, in .ebruar%, 19I, m% 0e%te
properties were se(uestered b% the )C99, and
were destro%ed and cannibali+ed.
FFF FFF FFF
&. 5pon m% return to the countr%, * wanted to
immediatel% live and reside in Tacloban Cit% or in
4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te even if m% residences there
were not livable as the% had been destro%ed and
cannibali+ed. The )C99, however, did not
permit and allow me.
FFF FFF FFF
?E. After the 199; )residential Elections, * lived
and resided in the residence of m% brother in 1an
Hose, Tacloban Cit%, and pursued m%
negotiations with )C99 to recover m%
se(uestered residences in Tacloban Cit% and
Baranga% 4lot, Tolosa, 0e%te.
1; Rollo, p. 1;;.
1& Commissioners -anolo B. 9orospe and
Teresita /%,0iaco .lores formed the ma<orit%
opinion. Commissioner #emedies A. 1ala+ar,
.ernando dissented.
1? Rollo, p. I?.
12 Rollo, p. 2!,I?.
1I )etitioner filed a $-otion to #ecall #esolution
)romulgated on April ;?, 1992 and to /ismiss
the )etition Because of 0apse of HurisdictionG
Alternativel%, -otion for #econsideration.$ The
Commission=s -a% !, 1992 #esolution treated
the same simpl% as a -otion for #econsideration.
1! Commissioners #egalado E. -aambong,
#emedios A. 1ala+ar,.ernando and Hulio ..
/esamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting
opinions. *n dis(ualif%ing petitioner, the ma<orit%
held3
As it stands now, onl% the Certificate of
Candidac% respondent filed on -arch , 1992,
stands, and on the basis of the entries therein,
she is dis(ualified to run for failure to meet the
constitutional re(uirement of one @1A %ear of
residence in the place where she wanted to be
elected.
1 Rollo, p. !, AnneF $B$.
19 Rollo, AnneF $/$.
;E 19 1C#A 9II @19I!A. See also, Corre v.
Corre, 1EE )hil. ;;1 @192IA.
;1 Id. at 9I9.
;; 5%tengsu v. #epublic, 92 )hil. 9E @192?A.
;& Id.
;? 2; )hil. I?2 @19;A.
;2 Citin& )eople v. Bender 1?? N.6.1., 1?2.
;I I1 )hil. &I @19&?A.
;! 9I )hil. ;9? @192?A.
; Id, see also 5<ano v. #epublic, 1! 1C#A 1?!
@19IIAG Nuval v. 9ura%, su'ra
note ;;.
;9 ** #EC4#/ 4. T"E 19!
C4N1T*T5T*4NA0 C4N>ENT*4N, 11E @Hul% ;;,
19IA.
&E Id.
&1 199 1C#A I9; @1991A.
&; Id, at !1?.
&& I1 )hil. &I @19&?A.
&? 9I )hil. ;9?, ;99,&EE @192?A.
&2 B.). 1, sec. 11! states3
FFF FFF FFF
An% person who transfers residence to another
cit%, municipalit% or countr% solel% b% reason of
his occupationG professionG emplo%ment in private
or public serviceG educational activitiesG wor' in
militar% or naval reservationsG service in the arm%,
nav% or air forceG the constabular% or national
police forceG or confinement or detention in
government institutions in accordance with law
shall not be deemed to have lost his original
residence.
&I Rollo, p. &.
&! 1 Am Hur ;19,;;E.
& ;E Am Hur !1.
&9 T40ENT*N4 1 C4--ENTA#*E1 P
H5#*1)#5/ENCE 4N T"E C*>*0 C4/E, ;;E
@19!A.
?E Id.
?1 T40ENT*N4, 1 C4--ENTA#*E1 AN/
H5#*1)#5/ENCE 4N C*>*0 C4/E, ;;E @19!A.
?; 5nder modern laws, it is clear that man%
eFceptions to the rule that the domicile of the wife
is determined b% that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingl%, the wife ma% ac(uire another and
separate domicile from that of her husband
where the theoretical unit% of the husband and
wife is dissolved, as it is b% the institution of
divorce proceedingsG or where the husband has
given cause for divorceG or where there is a
separation of the parties b% agreement, or a
permanent separation due to desertion of the
wife b% the husband or attributable to cruel
treatment on the part of the husbandG or where
there has been a forfeiture b% the wife of the
benefit of the husband=s domicile. 9 #.C.0., 2?2,
ited in /e 0a >ina, su'ra. I! the la0 allo0s the
0i!e to automatially revert to her ori&inal
domiile or a$uire a ne0 domiile under these
situations. all the more should it santion a
reversion or the a$uisition o! a ne0 domiile
by the 0i!e u'on the death o! her husband.
?& ?1 )hi. 1& @19;EA.
?? The rule that the wife automaticall% ac(uires
or follows her husband=s domicile is not an
absolute one. A specific situation recogni+ed in
1panish <urisprudence involves the one in which
husband ac(uiesces @1 -anresa ;;&A or gives
his tacit consent @1caevola, Civil CodeG &2?.A
?2 ?; )hil. 2? @19;1A.
?I Hustice Alicia 1empio,/i% recogni+es the
same Civil Code distinction. "owever, ta'ing
another approach, she writes3
@IA The above Article @Article I9, .CA uses the
term $famil% domicile$ instead of famil% residence
because the spouses ma% have multiple
residences, and the wife ma% elect to remain in
one of such residences, which ma% destro% the
dut% of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits. 1E-)*4,/*6,
"AN/B448 4N T"E .A-*06 C4/E 4. T"E
)"*0*))*NE1, 1E; @19A.
?! Rollo, pp. 1&;,1&&.
? The provision reads3 1ection !. "etition to
deny due ourse or to anel a erti!iate o!
andiday. A verified petition see'ing to den%
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidac%
ma% be filed b% an% person eFclusivel% on the
ground that an% material representation
contained therein as re(uired under
1ection !? hereof is false. The petition ma% be
filed at an% time not later than twent%,five da%s
from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidac% and shall be decided after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen da%s before the
election.
?9 -arcelino vs. Cru+, 1;1 1C#A 21 @19&A.
2E American Tupe .ounders Co. v. Hustice=s
Court, 1&& Cal. 19, I2 )ac. !?;G "eillen v.
)hillipps, Cal. 22!, ;I )ac. &IIG /ra'e v.
Bagle%, I9 -o. App. &9G 1tate v. /avis, 19? -o.
22.
21 Su'ra, note &9, itin& "uffines v. 9old 12?
Tenn. 2&, 2G ; 1.7. &2&, &2?.
2; 1ec. I. E!!et o! 1is$uali!iation Case. An%
candidate who has been declared b% final
<udgment to be dis(ualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. *f
for an% reason a candidate is not declared b%
final <udgment before an election to be
dis(ualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, in(uir% or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or an%
intervenor, ma% during the thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
1ec. ! "etition to 1eny 1ue Course or to Canel
a Certi!iate Candiday.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall appl%
to petitions to den% due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidac% as provided in 1ection !
of Batas )ambansa Blg. 1.
2& C4N1T., art. >*, sec. 11 states3
The 1enate and the "ouse of #epresentatives
shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole <udge of all (uestions relating to the
election, returns, and (ualifications of their
respective -embers. . . .
)5N4, %., concurring3
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, b'., v. &, 11&1
@aA @7. #oss translation, 19;2 edA.
; *t provides3 $No person shall be a member of
the "ouse of #epresentatives unless he is a
natural born citi+en of the )hilippines and on the
da% of the election, is at least twent%,five %ears of
age, able to read and write, and eFcept the part%
list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereo! !or a 'eriod o! not less than one
year immediately 'reedin& the day o! the
eletion.$ @Emphasis suppliedA
& There are two @;A other instances when a
married woman ma% have a domicile different
from the husband3 @1A if the% are legall%
separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 1EI of the Civil
Code, and @;A if the husband forcibl% e<ects the
wife from the con<ugal home to have illicit
relations with another. @/e la >iMa v. >illareal and
9eopano, ?1 )hil. 1& C19;EDA.
? O' it.
2 Id., at pp. 1I,1!.
I Id., at p. ;E, itin& 1 -anresa ;;&.
! ;2 A- H5# ;nd 1. ?, p. &!.
; CH1 on /omicile, 1. 1;, ;!G ;2 A- H5# ;nd
on /omicile 1. I;, ?I.
9 ; CH1, 1. 1;, p. ;?.
1E #estatement of the 0aw, ;d, Conflict of 0aws
;d., 1. ;1, p. ?.
11 Ibid.
1; & 5.1. ??;G ;1 0aw Ed. ??;G 1.C. 1I 7all
1&E.
1& Su'ra.
1? Su'ra.
12 *n re 9reen=s Estate, 191 N.6.1. !2!, 11!
-isc. EE, 1I2 N.6.1. 1EI&, 99 -isc. 2;.
1I Clar' et al. v. Ba'er et al., 19I 1E !2E, 1I
9a I2.
1! 0efcourt, 7omen and The 0aw, 199E ed.
1 ?E? 51 !1.
19 ; CH1 1. 1;, p. ;2 itin& 1hute v. 1argent,
&I A ;;, I! N.". &E2.
;E O' it., p. ?.
;1 7omen=s 1tatus in )hilippine 1ociet%, 5) 0aw
Center, 19!9, pp. ?,I.
;; *n submitting the draft of the .amil% Code to
)resident Cora+on A(uino, the Civil Code
#evision Committee stated3
Close to fort% %ears of eFperience under the Civil
Code adopted in 19?9 and changes and
developments in all aspects of .ilipino 0ife since
then have revealed the unsuitabilit% of certain
provisions of that Code, implanted from foreign
sources, to )hilippine cultureG the unfairness,
un<ustness, and gaps or inade(uacies of othersG
and the need to attune them to contemporar%
developments and trends.
*n particular to cite onl% a few instances @1A
the propert% regime of con<ugal partnership of
gains is not in accord with .ilipino custom,
especiall% in the rural areas, which is more
congenial to absolute communit% of propert%G @;A
there have considerabl% been more grounds for
annulment of marriage b% the Church than those
provided b% the Code, thus giving rise to the
absurd situation of several marriages alread%
annulled under Canon 0aw but still considered
subsisting under the Civil 0aw and ma'ing it
necessar% to ma'e the grounds for annulment
under both laws to coincideG @&A une$ual
treatment o! husband and 0i!e as to ri&hts and
res'onsibilities. 0hih neessitates a res'onse to
the lon&Astandin& lamor !or e$uality bet0een
men and 0omen no0 mandated as a 'oliy to be
im'lemented under the Ne0 ConstitutionG @?A the
inade(uac% of the safeguards for strengthening
marriage and the famil% as basic social
institutions recogni+ed as such b% the New
ConstitutionG @2A recent developments have
shown the absurdit% of limiting the grounds for
legal separation to the anti(uated two grounds
provided under the Civil CodeG @IA the need for
additional safeguards to protect our children in
the matter of adoption b% foreignersG and @!A to
bring our law on paternit% and filiation in step with
or abreast of the latest scientific discoveries.$
@Emphasis suppliedA
;& Article 9I, .amil% Code.
;? Article ;;2, .amil% Code.
;2 Article !E, .amil% Code.
;I Article !1, .amil% Code.
;! Article !&, .amil% Code.
; O' it., "andboo' on the .amil% Code of the
)hilippines, pp. 9,99.
;9 As cited in /i%, "andboo' on the .amil% Code
of the )hilippines, pp. 1?,12.
&E 1ection 1, Article *** of the Constitution
provides3 $No person shall be deprived of life,
libert%, or propert% without due process of law,
nor shall an% person be denied the e(ual
protection of the laws.$
&1 EFhibit $E$G see also EFhibit $B$ in 1)A No.
92,EE1.
&; EFhibit $A$ in 1)A No. 92,EE9.
&& EFhibit $;$ in 1)A No. 92,EE9.
&? ; 1C#A 92!, 9IE @19I1AG See Canceran v.
C4-E0EC, 1E! )hil. IE! @19IEAG 9abaldon v.
C4-E0EC, 99 )hil. 9 @192IA.
&2 1ection ;I, Article ** of the Constitution also
provides3 $The 1tate shall guarantee e(ual
access to opportunities for public service . . . .$
&I AnneF $9,$ )etition.
&! )etition, AnneF $B,1$ pp. I,!.
& !& )hil. ?2&, ?29 @1921A.
.#ANC*1C4, %., concurring3
1 See Articles I,!& of E.4. ;E9, as amended,
otherwise 'nown as The .amil% Code of the
)hilippines.
; #esidence Certificate No. 12;;I1I0, dated
Nov. 2, 199;.
& )C99 Chairman 9unigundo=s letter addressed
to Col. 8empis.
#4-E#4, %., separate opinion3
1 Art. >*, 1ec. I, Const.3 $No person shall be a
-ember of the "ouse of #epresentatives unless
he is a natural,born citi+en of the )hilippines and,
on the da% of the election, is at least twent%,five
%ears of age, able to read and write, and, eFcept
the part%,list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereo! !or a 'eriod not less than one
year immediately 'reedin& the day o! the
eletion.C
; Art. 11E3 $The husband shall fiF the residence
of the famil%. But the court ma% eFempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the #epublic.
& Art. 11E, Civil Code.
? Art. 111, Civil Code.
2 Art. 11;, Civil Code.
I Art. 1!1, Civil Code.
! Art. 1!;, Civil Code.
Art. &;E, Civil Code.
9 Art. 11?, Civil Code.
1E Art. 11!, Civil Code.
11 Art. ?, Civil Code.
1; Art. &;, Civil Code.
1& Art. **, 1ec. ;, Const.
1? )art *>, Art. 12, )aragraph ?, CE/A7.
12 EFecutive 4rder No. ;E9, Hul% I, 19!, as
amended b% EFecutive 4rder No. ;;!, Hul%
1!,19!, which too' effect on August &, 19.
1I Art. ** 1ec. 11, Const.
1! Art. **, 1ec. 1?, Const.
1 Art. I9, .amil% Code.
19 Art. !1, .amil% Code.
;E Art. 9I, .amil% Code.
;1 Art. ;;2, .amil% Code.
;; #epublic Act No. !19; approved .ebruar% 1;,
199;.
;& Ibid., 1ec. 2.
-EN/4LA, %., separate opinion3
1 0abo, Hr. v. C4-E0EC, ;11 1C#A ;9! @199;A
@for ma%orA.
; 0oong v. C4-E0EC, ;1I 1C#A !IE @199;A
@for regional vice governorA.
& Abella v. 0arra+abal, 1E 1C#A 2E9 @199AG
Abella v. C4-E0EC, ;E1 1C#A ;2& @1991A @for
provincial governorA.
? Co. v. "#ET, 199 1C#A I9; @1991A @election
protest against a CongressmanA.
2 .a%pon v. Juirino, 9I )hil. ;9? @192?A @$uo
0arranto against a governorAG 9allego v. >erra,
!& )hil. ?2& @19?1A @$uo 0arranto against a
ma%orAG 0arena v. Teves, I1 )hil. &I @19&?A @$uo
0arranto against a provincial board memberAG
Tanseco v. Arteche, 2! )hil. ;;! @19&;A @$uo
0arranto against a governorA3 6ra v. AbaMo, 2;
)hil. &E @19;A @$uo 0arranto against a
municipal presidentAG >ivero v. -urillo, 2; )hil.
I9? @19;9A @$uo 0arranto against a municipal
presidentA. C!- A+nar v. C4-E0EC, 12 1C#A
!E& @199EA @$uo 0arranto although prematurel%
filed, against a governor,electA.
I #.A. No. II?I, IG 0abo, Hr. v. C4-E0EC,
su'ra note 1.
! 4EC, !I.
0agumba% v. C4-E0EC, 1I 1C#A 1!2 @19IIA.
)A/*00A, %., dissenting3
1 Nuval vs. 9ura%, 9.#. No. &E;?1, /ecember
;9, 19;G 0arena vs. Teves, 9.#.
No. ?;?&9, /ecember 1E, 19&?G 9allego vs.
>erra, 9.#. No. ?I?1, November ;?, 19?1G /e
los #e%es vs. 1olidum, 9.#. No. ?;!9. August
&1, 19&2G but see #omualde+ vs. #TC, Br. !
Tacloban Cit%, where a sudden departure from
the countr% was not deemed $voluntar%$ so as to
constitute abandonment of domicile both in !at
and in law.
; AnneF $A$ )etition, pp. ;,?.
#E9A0A/4, %., dissenting3
1 1truble vs. 1truble, TeF. Civ. App., 1!! 1.7.
;d, ;!9, ;&.
; This is also referred to as natural domicile or
domicile b% birth @Hohnson vs. Twent%,4ne Bales,
1& .ed. Cas. I&A.
& 1tor%, Conflict of 0aws, 1ec. ?IG #ailroad Co.
vs. 8imbrough, 112 8% 21;, !? 1.7. ;;9G and
Hohnson vs. "arve%, ;I1 8%. 2;;, 1.7. ;d ?;,
?I, ?!, as cited in Blac'=s 0aw /ictionar%, ?th ed.
? Article 11E, Civil Code.
2 Towson vs. Towson, 1;I >a. I?E, 1E; 1.E. ?,
2;G .isher vs. Hordan, C.C.A. TeF., 11I .. ;d.
1&, 1IG -inic' vs. -inic', 111 .la. ?I9, 1?9
1o. ?&, ?G "art+ler vs. #ade'a, ;I2 -ich.
?21, ;21 N.7. 22?.
I Citin& 1 Am. Hur. ;19,;;E.
! -onte<o vs. -arcos, En ,an, -a% 1E, 1992.
Citin& ;E Am. Hur. !1.
9 Cheel% vs. Cla%ton, /.C., 11E 5.1. !E1, 0. Ed.
;9.
1E *n re 9ates= Estate, 191 N.6.1. !2!, 11! -isc.
EE *n re 9reen=s Estate, 1I? N.6.1. 1EI&, 99
-isc. 2;, affirmed 1I2 N.6.1. 1E, 1!9 App.
/iv. 9E, as reported in ; C.H.1. ;!.
11 Clar' vs. Ba'er, 19I 1.E. !2E, 1I 9a. I2, o'.
it. &!.
The 0awphil )ro<ect , Arellano 0aw .oundation