ECHEGARAY v. SEC.

OF JUSTICE
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.

LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. VS. DENR
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 127882, January 27 2004
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No.
7942 to govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources.
On April 9, 1995, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. But shortly before
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, (March 30
th
), the President
entered into an Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. Subsequently, DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s.
1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942 which was also later repealed by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No.
7942, the latter being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are present to
raise the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942.
HELD:
When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited
to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to
hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than
a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional
rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.
Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La
Bugal Blaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous
peoples cooperative organized under Philippine laws
representing a community actually affected by the mining
activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as
other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of
WMCP. These petitioners have standing to raise the
constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a
personal and substantial injury. They claim that they would
suffer irremediable displacement as a result of the
implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining
activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the
appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse
to that of respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the
FTAAs validity.
In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have
standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of
which the FTAA was executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to
the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul
it. In other words, they contend that petitioners are not real
parties in interest in an action for the annulment of contract.
Public respondents contention fails. The present action is not
merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and
mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA,
which they submit is unconstitutional. As the case involves
constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with
whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether
they have legal standing.
Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial
review that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity WMCP points out that the petition was filed only
almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not
raised at the earliest opportunity.
The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the
question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after
the execution of the state action complained of. That the
question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a
valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary
rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would
lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the
proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.


DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PresidentialProclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) declaring a
state of national emergency. On the same day, the President
issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017.
The proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among somemilitary officers, leftist insurgents of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reigns of government as a clear
and present danger. All programs and activities related to the
20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I are
cancelled. Likewise, all permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments are revoked. Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents
mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be implemented. During
the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist.
Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency, the President lifted PP 1017 by
issuing Proclamation No. 1021.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions
moot and academic.
HELD:
Moot and academic case - one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing
it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they
justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that
must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed
that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights,
it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this
Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that
the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in
the presentpetitions, the military and the police, on the extent of
the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly,
respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.


LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Dec. 1, 2004

Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40,
as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government
and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service
contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to
service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973
Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the
Filipino nation.

Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals
and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance
only?

Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale
activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day
management by the contractor, provided that the State retains
the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or
modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full
control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of
directors of a private corporation: the performance of
managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions
may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.

Gonzales v. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: The president issued EO 43 creating the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform to recommend
amendments to the Constitution. Petitioner, in his capacity as
taxpayer, filed a petition assailing constitutionality of the
Commission.

HELD: The Preparatory Commission was created by the
President by virtue of EO 43. An amount was set aside for its
operation from the funds of the Office of the President. There
was no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
powers. Petitioner cannot question the constitutionality of the
Commission in his capacity as taxpayer.

Gonzales v. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition in his capacity as taxpayer
questioning the constitutionality of the creation by the President
of seventy positions for presidential advisers on the ground that
the President did not have the power to create these positions.

HELD: Petitioner has not proven that he has sustained any injury
as a result of the appointment of presidential advisers.


INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO
H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL
HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and
AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and
MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA,
LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA
PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC
CONSORTIUM, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004]
FACTS:
Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity
and eligibility of the awarded contractor Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter.
Private respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up
with other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and
ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of Memorandum
of Agreements and Teaming Agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.
RULING:
NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to
conclude that a consortium had actually been formed amongst
MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT.
The president of MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC
without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of
the consortium. It did not show that MPEI or its president have
been duly pre-authorized by the other members of the putative
consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf
and, more important, to commit them jointly and severally to
the bid undertakings. The letter is purely self-serving and
uncorroborated.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-
impairment clause.

Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA.
PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus

against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or
neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even
as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the
automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its
Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the
government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by
then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the
non-impairment clause by which the government may be bound
(for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the non-
impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed
as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the
State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. INES V.
GARCIA, defendant-appellee. ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ,
commissioner-appellee.
FACTS:
In an expropriation case, Alejandro A. Marquez was appointed as
commissioner of the court together with the commissioners for
the parties. The commission met five times. On Nov. 10, 1964,
Atty. Marquez filed a motion praying that his commission be
fixed at P3,864 or 5% of P77,280, the approved fair market value
of the land of Ines V. Garcia. The republic of the Philippines
opposed the motion contending that the commissioner is
entitled to a compensation of five pesos per meeting and,
therefore, the fee of Marquez should be fixed at twenty-five
pesos.
The lower court held that the fee of five pesos fixed in eminent
domain proceedings by section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
is merely the minimum and that it has discretion to provide for a
bigger amount of compensation. The court fixed the
commissioners fee at five hundred pesos (P500). The court
ordered that one-half of the fee is chargeable against the
government and the other half against Ines V. Garcia. The
Republic of the Philippines appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is liable to pay
one-half of the fee of Atty. Marquez as commissioner in the
condemnation proceeding?
HELD:
The Republics appeal is meritorious because section 16 of Rule
41 unmistakably provides that the State is exempt from paying
legal fees. Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court complements
Rule 141 by providing that no costs shall be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law.
There is no law requiring the Republic to pay costs in eminent
domain proceedings . the commissioners fee in expropriation
cases are taxed as part of the costs and the government is not
liable for costs.
The Solicitor-General observes that since Ines V. Garcia did not
appeal, it may be assumed that she had already paid the sum of
P250 as the fee of Atty. Marquez. (He did not submit any
appelleess brief)

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618 June 7, 2011
Nachura, J.

Issue:

whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET); whether or not the PET violates Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution

Held:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which
the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on
the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme
Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court,
as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial
power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and
enforceable is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent
of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial
courts, respectively.

At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as
well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original
jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals,which are not,
strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in
Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the
SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to
judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper
party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as
PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest,
it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in
the Constitution.

Note:

The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of
the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by
the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institutionindependent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

Lozano vs. Nograles
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-
ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES,
Representative, Majority, House of Representatives

Facts:

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their
capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the
nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy
that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of
Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged
that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the
prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding
the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of
proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of
thorough debates and consultations.

Issue:

Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in
promulgating the HR1109.

Held:

No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a
Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing
changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward
H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the
possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution
convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners
have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from
the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved
that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time
for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no
rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet
been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109
involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent
future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act
that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial
review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete
injury.

The petitions were dismissed.

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP),
represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA,
Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY
FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON
CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO
KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS
MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III,
MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS,
RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA,
Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN.
AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members
of the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for
certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a
group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of
dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in
the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent
and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the
funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects
to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of
separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further,
the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to
legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of
pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the
exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or
not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In
this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The
petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that
there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers
suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been
illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues
impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of
issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves
the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of
jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the
Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded
to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case
of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because
to invalidate *a law+ based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing
proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge
the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly
legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President
to recommend projects and programs which may be funded
from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is
endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the
DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power
given to the President to execute appropriation laws and
therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in
establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and
thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between
the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process
remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.