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2
121.2 121.2 84.8 73.3 72.0
df 54 53 51 46 45
p <.0001 <.0001 .002 .006 .006
CFI .901 .900 .950 .960 .960
RMSEA .067 .068 .049 .046 .046
BIC 316.0 324.1 303.9 333 339.8
CAIC 280.4 287 263.8 285.5 290.8
Note: Ind. Ded. = inductive and deductive; Cont. = contents; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error
of approximation; BIC = Bayesian information criterion; CAIC = consistent Akaikes information criterion.
21-Wilhelm.qxd 9/8/2004 5:09 PM Page 385
tests. Although it is not good practice to
measure rather general constructs with single
tasks, there is certainly evidence suggesting
that, if need be, this sole task should be a
figural-spatial reasoning measure. Whether such
a task is classified as inductive or deductive is
not important for that purpose.
Frequently, the composition of intelligence
batteries is not well balanced in the sense that
there are many indicators for one intelligence
construct but few or no tests for other intelli-
gence constructs. In such cases (e.g., Roberts
et al., 2000), the overall solution can be domi-
nated by tasks other than fluid intelligence
tasks. As a result, figural-spatial reasoning tasks
might not be the best selection in these cases to
reflect the g factor of such a battery.
When interpreting the results from this study,
it is important to keep in mind that the differ-
ences between various models were not that big.
With different tasks and different participants, it
is possible that different results emerge. The
present results are preliminary and in need of
replication and extension. The most important
result from the study reported above is that in a
critical test aimed to assess a distinction
between inductive and deductive reasoning, no
such distinction could be found. Latent factors
of inductive and deductive reasoning are per-
fectly correlated in several models. The result of
a unity of inductive and deductive reasoning
was also obtained with multidimensional
scaling, exploratory factor analysis, and tetrad
analysis. It is important to note that this result
emerged considering the desiderata for future
research provided by Carroll (1993, p. 232).
Specifically, the present tasks have been
selected or constructed based on a careful review
of the individual-differences and cognitive
literature on the topic, the items were analyzed
by latent item response theory, and the scales
were analyzed by confirmatory factor analyses.
The current tests include several new reasoning
measures that are based on and informed
through cognitive psychology.
WORKING MEMORY AND REASONING
There have been several attempts to explain
reasoning ability in terms of other abilities that
are considered more basic and tractable. Specifi-
cally, working memory has been proposed as
the major limiting factor for human reasoning
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; S, Oberauer,
Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). The
working definition of working memory has been
that any task that requires individuals to simul-
taneously store and process information can be
considered a working memory task (Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990). This definition has been criti-
cized because it seems to include all reasoning
measures. The definition has also been criti-
cized because its notion of storage and pro-
cessing are imprecise and fuzzy (see Chapter
22, this volume). A critique of the working
memory = reasoning hypothesis can also focus
on the problem of the reduction of one construct
386HANDBOOK OF UNDERSTANDING AND MEASURING INTELLIGENCE
Verbal
gf
Figural
Quant.
IV2
DV1
DV2
IN1
IN2
IV1
IF2
DF1
DF2
DN1
DN2
IF1 .35
.57
.50
.68
.67
.60
.33
.49
.45
.63
.73
.69
.83
.84 1.00
Figure 21.2 Higher-Order Model of Fluid Intelligence (Reasoning)
21-Wilhelm.qxd 9/8/2004 5:09 PM Page 386
in need of explanation through another one
(Deary, 2001) that is not doing any better.
However, this critique is unjustified for several
reasons.
1. It is easy to construct and create working
memory tasks. Many tasks that satisfy the above
definition work in the sense that they correlate
highly with other working memory measures,
reasoning, Gf, and g. In addition, it is easy and
straightforward to manipulate the difficulty of a
working memory item by manipulating the stor-
age demand, the process demand, or the time
available to do storage, processing, or both.
Those manipulations account for a large amount
of variance of task difficulty in almost all cases.
2. There is an enormous corpus of research
on working memory and processes in working
memory in cognitive psychology (Conway,
Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, & Towse, in press;
Miyake & Shah, 1999). It is fruitful to derive
knowledge and hypotheses about individual dif-
ferences in cognition from this body of research.
3. In the sense of a reduction of working
memory on biological substrates, intensive and
very productive research has linked working
memory functioning to the frontal lobes and
investigated the role of various physiological
parameters to cognitive functioning (Kane &
Engle, 2002; see Chapter 9, this volume, for a
review of research linking reasoning to various
neuropsychological parameters). Hence, the
equation of working memory with reasoning is
complemented by relating working memory to
the frontal lobes and other characteristics and
features of the brain.
The strengths of the relation found between
latent factors of working memory and reasoning
vary substantially, fluctuating between a low of
.6 (Engle, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999; Kane et al., 2004) and a high of
nearly 1 (Kyllonen, 1996). In the discussion of
the strength of the relation, several sources that
could cause an underestimation or an overesti-
mation should be kept in mind.
1. The relation should be assessed on the
level of latent factors because this is the level
of major interest when it comes to assessing
psychological constructs. There should be more
than three indicators of sufficient psychometric
quality for each construct to allow an evaluation
of the measurement models on both sides.
2. Depending on the task selection and the
breadth of the definition of both constructs, the
specification of more than one factor on both
sides might be necessary (Oberauer, S,
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003).
3. The definition of constructs and task
classes is a difficult issue. Classifying anything
as a working memory task that requires simulta-
neous storage and processing could turn out to
be overinclusive. Restricting fluid intelligence
to figural-spatial reasoning measures is likely to
be underinclusive. The comments on tasks of
reasoning ability presented in this chapter, as
well as similar comments on what constitutes a
good working memory task (see Chapters 5 and
22, this volume), might be a good starting point
for definition of task classes.
4. Content variation in the operationaliza-
tion for both constructs can have an influence on
the magnitude of the relation. When assessing
reasoning ability, one is well advised to use
several tasks with verbal, figural, and quantita-
tive content. The same is true for working
memory. This chapter provided some evidence
for the content distinction on the reasoning side.
Similar evidence for the working memory
side is evident in structural models that posit
content-specific factors of working memory
(Kane et al., 2004; Kyllonen, 1996; Oberauer,
S, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000).
Relating working memory tasks of one content
with reasoning tasks of another content causes
one to underestimate the true relation.
5. A mono-operation bias should be avoided
in assessing both constructs. Using only com-
plex span tasks or only dual-tasks to assess
working memory functioning does not do
justice to the much more general nature of the
construct (Oberauer et al., 2000). Task class-
specific factors or task-specific strategies might
have an effect on the estimated relation.
6. Reasoning measureslike other intelli-
gence tasksare frequently administered under
time constraints. Timed and untimed reasoning
Measuring Reasoning Ability387
21-Wilhelm.qxd 9/8/2004 5:09 PM Page 387
ability are not perfectly correlated (Wilhelm &
Schulze, 2002). Similarly, working memory tasks
frequently have timed aspects (Ackerman, Beier,
& Boyle, 2003). For example, there might be
only a limited time to execute a process before
the next stimulus appears, there might be a timed
rate of stimulus presentation, and the like.
Common speed variance could inflate the corre-
lation between working memory and reasoning.
The assumption that working memory is a
critical ingredient to success on reasoning tasks
is compatible with experimental evidence and
theories from cognitive psychology. The ability
to successfully create and manipulate mental
representations was argued to be the critical
ingredient in reasoning. Whether the necessary
representations can be created and manipulated
depends crucially on working memory. This
prediction has gained strong support from the
correlational studies relating working memory
and reasoning. If the individual differences in
reasoning ability and working memory turn out
to be roughly the same, the evidence supporting
the predictive validity of reasoning ability and
fluid intelligence applies to working memory
capacity, too. After careful consideration of
costs and benefits, it might be sensible to use
more tractable working memory tasks for many
practical purposes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The fruitful avenue to future research on mea-
suring and understanding reasoning ability is
characterized by (a) more theoretically moti-
vated work in the processes and resources
involved in reasoning and (b) the use of confir-
matory methods on the item and test level to
investigate meaningful measurement and struc-
tural models. The major result of efforts directed
that way would be a more profound understand-
ing of important thought processes and an
improved construction and design of measures
of reasoning ability. A side product of such
efforts will be generative item production and
theoretically derived assumptions about psycho-
metric properties of items and tests. Another
side product would be the option to develop
more appropriate means of altering reasoning
ability. There are several very interesting
attempts to develop training methods for rea-
soning ability, and the initial results are encour-
aging in some cases (Klauer, 1990, 2001).
Although it was not possible to discriminate
between inductive and deductive reasoning
psychometrically, it could be possible that
appropriate training causes differential gains in
both forms of reasoning. The cognitive processes
in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks
might be different, but the individual differences
we can observe on adequate measures are not.
This does not exclude the option that both
thought processes might be affected by different
interventions.
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