US vs Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272 15 Phil 488

March 19, 1910 Petitioner: The United States Respondent: Ah Chong
FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad
elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his
room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice
"Who is there?", but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by the
chair that had been placed the door and believing that he was being
attacked he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon, he called to his
employers and rushed back int the room to secure the bandages to bind
up the wound. Defendant was charged with murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for
murder in the case at bar
HELD: The Court held that Ah Chong must be acquitted. Had the facts
been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in
killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art XI of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides that in order for the act to be justified, the requisites must be
present.
Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact):
1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself
If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah
Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression, there would have
been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his
home and the knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or
repel such aggression.
The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest
Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah Chong.
Criminal Law 1: Honest Mistake of Fact (Textbook: Reyes - Book 1,
Professor: Atty. Amurao)

Plaintiff-appelle: The United States

Defendant-appellant: Ah Chong
Ponente: J. Carson
FACTS:
The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and
was sharing the house with the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was
employed as a house boy. The door of the room they were occupying was
not furnished with a permanent lock, and as a measure of security, they
fasten the door by propping a chair against it. One evening, Ah Chong
was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of their
room.The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when
either returned late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity. Ah Chong sat up in bed and called out twice,
Who is there? but heard no answer. The room was quite dark, and as
there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, he leaped to his feet and called out. If
you enter the room, I will kill you. Suddenly, he was struck by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he
was being attacked, he seized a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow and wildly struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was criminally liable.
HELD:
No. The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence. In the present case, the
accused acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense. Had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act.
Moreover, the accused cannot be said to have been negligent or reckless
as the facts as he saw them threatens his person and his property. Under
such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, as the ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
People vs. Pugay G.R. No. 74324 November 18, 1988
Facts of the Case:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and

sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prision mayor as
minimum to 20 years (prision temporal) as maximum and for Samson to
be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands
for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19,
1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived drunk and started making fun of Miranda. Pugay
after making fun of Miranda, took a can of gasoline and poured its
contents on the latter, despite Gabion telling Pugay not to do the deed.
Still, Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
Issue: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the
crime?
Is Pugay criminally liable?
Ruling: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that the crime of
murder is also present?
There is NO conspiracy in this case. Conspiracy is determined when two
or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the
felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is
not essential that there must be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. However, it is sufficient if at the time of
the commission of the crime, the accused has the same purpose and were
united and executed.
In the case at bar, there was no animosity between Miranda and the
accused; to add that at the commission of the crime, the accuseds intent
was purely coincidental since he is under the influence of liquor at the
commission of the crime.
Since there was NO conspiracy to speak of, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against Miranda is individual and not collective and each of them is liable

only on the act that was committed by him.

Is Pugay criminally liable?
Having failed to exercise the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from every act committed by his
companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased,
Pugay is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
BELOW!
SEP 2, 2009
Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.
"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his
acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct,
then through fear of incurring punishment."
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
No. L-74324 17November1988
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and
sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as
mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to
be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands
for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19,
1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite.
Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of
Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness)
told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a

human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a
few hours after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?
If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven
with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as
to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add
to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely
coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of
miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable
only for the act that was committed by him.

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE
ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
Calimutan v. People
G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006
Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate
Cause, intentional felonies and culpable felonies
Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1
FACTS:

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in

confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his
companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the

record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And
granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit
so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness

Saano, together with two other companions, had a drinking
spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they
crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge
against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for suspecting that
he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he
punched him
Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan
picked a stone, as big as a mans fist and hitting Cantre at the
left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already
able to ran away.
o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and
Calimutan desisted from any other act of violence
Witness Saano then brought Cantre home where he
complained of backache and also of stomach ache and was
unable to eat
By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating
profusely and his entire body felt numb

Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a

doctor so his mother just continue to wipe him with a
piece of cloth and brought him some food when he
asked.
o After eating a little, he vomited.
o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and
stomach ache, he died.
The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of
Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause
of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
suspected food poisoning
With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas
of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was done by Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal
hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his
abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a blunt
object like a stone.
RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment
Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecutions account of the
incident, held that Calimutan was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8
years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs
of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as compensatory damages
and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
o
NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing
Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the unlawful
aggression by Cantre ceased
o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the
victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous
o
criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended
CA: Affirmed RTC
Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari
contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of death
constituted reasonable doubt

ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment
for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period
of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is
further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death and P50,000.00 as
moral damages

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral

certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error)
o
Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is
evidence, and although it does not necessarily bind the
courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value
may sufficiently establish the causal relationship
between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and
the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which
resulted in the latters death
Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would
NOT have occurred
o Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate
cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone thrown
at him by petitioner Calimutan.
Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday
and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim
Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by
Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as
the cause of death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to
be given credence by the courts
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies

according to the means by which they are committed, in

particular:
o (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice)
o (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
act or omission of the offender is NOT
malicious
the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
o
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre
cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal.
A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo,
and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed
to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing
wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by
the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the
affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased

catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion

was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate
cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form
of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the

time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause."