ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.

vs CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # l-24693 July 31, 1967 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Ordinance)
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Manila Ordinance No. 4760 regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses on
the ground that it is unreasonable and hence violative to the due process clause, wherein it requires establishments to provide guest
registration forms on the lobby open for public view at all times.
RespondentCityMayor contends that the challenged ordinance was a valid and proper exercise of police power measure for the proper purpose
of curbing immorality. An explanatory note for the challenged ordinance made mention of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication inManilatraceable in great part to the existence of motels and the like.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: No, the challenged ordinance as an exercise of police power was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
As a due process requirement, an ordinance must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression for it to be valid. Thus it
would be unreasonable to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely for the well-being of the people, specially if there is no factual foundation
being laid to prove its alleged violation of due process and offset the ordinances presumed validity.
Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)
Posted by taxcasesdigest on Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Labels: constitutional law, due process, police power
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of
due process:
1. refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation
may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body.
Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.



Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or
business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop
the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence
this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.

Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong Case Digest
Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong
86 SCRA 270
No.L-29646
November 10, 1978

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas.
It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop
the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of
Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion
and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment
of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to
engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is
admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down
any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Namil vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, March 01, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.On May 20, 2001, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) No. 8031108 which contained,
inter alia, the petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning candidates.The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Palimbang issued COCVP No. 8031109 which listed the private respondents as winners. After investigation, Commissioner Sadain submitted his
Recommendation to the Comelec that there was a valid proclamation of the winning candidates as contained in the COCVP No. 8031109, and
the immediate installation of private respondents as winning members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang. This Recommendation was
adopted by the public respondent which was contained in the assailed Resolution No. 4615 issued on November 6, 2001.

The petitioners contend that the public respondents Resolution No. 4615 is null and void since it was issued without according them due notice
and hearing, contrary to the enshrined principle of due process. The public respondent thus committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The petitioners allege that they were never accorded the chance to present their side in connection with the investigation that was purportedly
conducted by Commissioner Sadain and on the memoranda/report of the public respondents officers. The public respondent simply approved
the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain. The petitioners were kept in the dark, learned about the controversy only when they were
notified of the assailed resolution of the public respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution
No. 4615 without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined principle of due process.

Held: Yes. While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws, the same is subject to the right of the
parties to due process. In this case, the petitioners had been proclaimed as the winning candidates and had assumed their office. Since then,
they had been exercising their rights and performing their duties as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Their
proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same.
The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process in the proceedings before the public respondent
exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we also ruled in Farias vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs.
Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

In this case, the public respondent nullified the proclamation of the petitioners and ousted them from their office as members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, based solely on the recommendations of its law department and of Commissioner Sadain, and on the
memoranda of its officers. The petitioners were not accorded a chance to be heard on the said recommendations and the memorandum of
Regional Election Director Clarita Callar, certification of Celia Romero, and certification of Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12,
2001 before it issued the assailed resolution.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in
proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs.
Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to
partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
NAMIL VS. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28 OCT 2003]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for
their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that
they should be recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked
the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them
found the second proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation of the private respondents
as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have assumed
office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a
violation of the due process principle.


Issue: Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects thereof without notice and hearing.


Held: No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed
assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before
the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been
notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Farias vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo vs. COMELEC,
the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation Vs. Torres
Phil. Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. Vs. Torres
231 SCRA 335
G.R. No.98050
March 17, 1994

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification
election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter
wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees.
The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis
thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification
election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging
denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.

Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all
the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
P
HIL
. P
HOSPHATE
F
ERTILIZER
C
ORP
. V
S
. T
ORRES
[231 SCRA 335; G.R. N
O
.98050; 17 M
AR
1994]
Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor andEmployment a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner,a l l e g i n g t h a t a s a s u p e r v i s o r y u n i o n d u l y r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e
D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r a n d Employment it was seeki ng to represent the supervi sory employees of Phi li ppine
PhosphateFertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom thesuperi ntendents and the professional and techni cal employees.
However, the PMPI fi led anamended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisoryempl oyees of petiti oner but also i ts professional/technical and confidential employees. Theparti es therein
agreed to submit thei r respecti ve posi ti on papers and to consi der the amendedpeti ti on submi tted for decisi on on the
basis thereof and related documents. Mediator -Arbi ter Mi l ado issued an order granti ng the petiti on and di recting the
holding of a certifi cation el ecti onamong the "supervisory, professi onal (engineers, anal ysts, mechanics, accountants,
nurses, midwives, etc. ), technical, and confi denti al empl oyees. PHILPHOS appealed the o rder to theSecretary of Labor and
Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary BienvenidoLaguesma dismissi ng the appeal. PHI LPHOS moved for
reconsi deration but the same wasdeni ed; hence, the i nstant petiti on all egi ng deni al of due process on t he part of the
DOLE towhich the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to beheard or, as appl ied to admi nistrati ve
proceedings, an opportuni ty to explain one' s si de or anopportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of
petitioner PHILPHOSagreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of
the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliancewith the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to presentits side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront andexamine the
wi tnesses of the other party. But i t did not; instead i t opted to submi t i ts posi ti on pa p e r wi t h t h e Me di a t o r - Ar bi t er .
Be s i d es , p et i t i o ne r ha d a l l t h e op po r t u ni t y t o v e nt i l a t e i t s arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
KEYWORDS: The Philippine version of Avatar (only unlike Avatar, I HATE this case because Malcolm was so narrow-minded, and it didnt have
the same message as the film)
FACTS:
Since time immemorial (Spanish regime), there has been a segregation of non-Christian Tribes in the Philippines. The rationale is to
facilitate the transformation of these societies into civility.
The same segregation was espoused under the American Administration. There was a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes under the Organic
Law, and even under statute, particularly the Administrative Code of 1917 allowed provincial boards to determine, by virtue of the
interest of law and order, segregation of uncivilised/non-Christian Tribes to be approved by the Secretary of Interior.
By virtue of such laws, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which designated 800 hectares of the sitio of Tigbao as
the permanent settlement of the Mangyanes in Mindoro. This was approved by the Secretary of Interior.
The resolution was with a penal clause that refusal of compliance will entail imprisonment not more than 60-days in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code
Rubi, et al. applied for a writ of habeas corpus for being illegally deprived of their liberty by provincial officials as they are being held on
the reservation in Tigbao against their will. (one of them even escaped from the reservation and is being held in custody by the provincial
sheriff)
o It is important to understand that the Manguianes are semi-nomadic in nature, and are one of the tribes that practise caigin.
o The Spanish, Americans consider their lifestyle as uncivilised and barbaric, and actually has nothing to do with religious
affiliation (since by their classification, members of other faiths who live like they do are not part of these non-Christians)
ISSUE: Was there undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial authorities in the creation of these reservations?
RULING: No, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
The two-fold distinction is this: (1) is it delegation to make the law, which includes the discretion on what it shall be; or is it (2) conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law?
Malcolm felt that the authority given to provincial boards falls under the second, which is allowable under the rule on non-delegation of
powers.
Another exception to the general rule, is that the central legislative body is allowed, since time immemorial, to delegate legislative powers
to local authorities. The provincial governor and the provincial board, as official representatives of the province are better qualified to
judge when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. This is under the presumption that they know their
territory and their constituents the best.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may
only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well
as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of
the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.


Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.


Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him
the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a
preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532
requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and
dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532
savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond
the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.


Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.


Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of
Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any
other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious
objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be
imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or
English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance,
this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of
private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
Tags: constitutional law, constitutional law 2, digest, trinidad, yu cong eng, yu cong eng v. trinidad
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
7 June 1926 | Taft | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands

Facts
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the
Chinese Bookkeeping Act, was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in 1921. It provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other
activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language
other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand
English, Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books were seized.



Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed
a petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge.

Arguments

By the petitioner
o Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his books in English or Spanish, he would have no means of
verifying the correctness of the books. If he would employ a translator or interpreter, he might be at the mercy of his
employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to the Act, he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set
of accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to remain in total ignorance of the status of his business.
o The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese merchants out of business (They do 60% of the business in the
country).
o The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese merchants of their liberty and property without due process of
law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws.
o Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities as
the citizens and subjects of Great Britain and Spain.
By the respondent
o The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of proper legislative power. Due to the inability of internal
revenue officials to check the books of the Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of money corresponding to
taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court
A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in languages other than those
listed
Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may keep his account books in Chinese, but he has to keep another
set of books in the prescribed languages
A third construction is that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books to facilitate governmental inspection of the
same for tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds of books shall be kept.
The Act is not unconstitutional under the Courts construction of the law. A literal interpretation would render it unconstitutional, so
the Court made a reasonable construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Philippine Supreme Courts decision denying an original petition for
prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972, on the ground of its invalidity.


Issues
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the
fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.

What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of great indefiniteness to conform to what the court assumes
was, or ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such
strained construction, in order to make a law conform to a constitutional limitation, cannot be sustained.

It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the
legislative department of the government. (US v. Reese)

Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due process of law, and denies them the equal
protection of the laws.

Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14
th
Amendment were extended to the PH; hence, said
guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v.
Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)

PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of their transactions. However, it is NOT within the
police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in Chinese.

To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the public require such interference and 2) the means
are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise
of the legislatures police power is subject to the courts supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)

We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must
guess at its meaning violates due process of law.

Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to
affect them (as distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.
Y
U
C
ONG
E
NG
V
S
. T
RINIDAD
[47 P
HIL
385; G.R. N
O
. 20479; 6 F
EB
1925]
Facts:
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila,with a violation of Act 2972, which provides
that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person,company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity
for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its accountbooks i n any language other than
Engl ish, Spani sh or any local di al ect. He was arrested, hi sbooks were sei zed, and the trial was about to proceed, when
he and the other petiti oner, CoLi am, on their own behal f, and on behal f of al l the other Chi nese merchants in the
Phi li ppi nes, filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internalrevenue engaged in the
prosecution, and against the judge presiding.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keepproper records of their business transactions
in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which anadequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had.
Butwe are cl early of opi ni on that i t is not wi thin the pol ice power of the Phi li ppine Legisl ature, because it would be
oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaininga set of books i n the Chinese language, and i n the
Chi nese characters, and thus prevent themfrom keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its conduct

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating
rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing
arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad,
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to Congress.
The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying
with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing
of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not
be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner
from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.


Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the
evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car


Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically
pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the
public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation
against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No.
92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. petitioner charged in violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun ban) invokes
deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.

Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House
of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver
Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in
a check point and police search the car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred for inquest to the
City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the
purpose how Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the charges. The
prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against
petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car was
illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this
is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the
seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4)
Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably
corroborated by other attendant matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without warrant could only be
resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a
law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
Because there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such
action constitutes an unreasonable intrusion of the petitioners privacy and security of his property in violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of
the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.

** Javier v Comelec 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroadthe private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to theCommission on Elections
to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commissionon Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the
private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.


Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.

Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking
his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador
On November 23, 2010
0 0

Due Process impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election,
Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the
AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed
with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse
of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be
resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2
nd
Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en
banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and
academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Case Digest on Ynot vs. IAC 148 SCRA 659
Book Summary by:WritingNow360 Original Author: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Summary rating: 2 stars (12 Ratings)
Visits : 3424
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Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) F: Petitioners'''' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to
Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was
affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. (2) There is no doubt that by
banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the
necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not
see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there
is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was
carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him elementary fair play. (4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution

Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767214-case-digest-ynot-vs-iac/#ixzz2HKxX9QOU

** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued
without prior notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the
Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to
the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether
the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued
without prior notice and hearing.


Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.


Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the
Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to
the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether
the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of national security. The radio station
was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish
factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even
promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The
rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming
moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is
need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.


Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.


Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional
Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69
Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept subordinates views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government
actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that
all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the
clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such
evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of
widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues
to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most
accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. DANS
137 SCRA 628
Facts:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of
national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner
was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the
respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech.
It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift
towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.

ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press?
RULING:
Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Yet the freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to
all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution
The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil.
635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.

** Ang Tibay v CIR 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this
averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was
alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by
the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system
of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject
to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable
cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth. So ordered.

** Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing
the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas
and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated
to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that
an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether
or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.