Towards Internalisation of Democracy?

Regional Organisations and the Survival of Democracy in Africa

Paper for ECPR Conference 18-22/09/2003 in Marburg (Section No.26)

Draft version. Your comments are most welcome.








Christof Hartmann
Assistant Professor
Institute of Development Research (IEE)
Ruhr-University Bochum
Universittsstrasse 150
D-44780 Bochum
christof.hartmann@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 2
1 Introduction
1

Most of the recent analysis and writing about political development in Africa is
marked by a profound scepticism: The enthusiasm for the initial wave of democ-
ratic change in the early 1990s is definitively gone. The hopes accompanying the
latecomers such as Kenya were dashed by rollbacks as for example in Liberia or
Zimbabwe. In our collective imagination the typical African setting would most
likely be represented by state collapse and protracted civil war and not by democ-
racy of whatever definition. Much of the academic writing, especially from outside
Africa, is certainly identifying processes of social and political transformation (Af-
rica works), but has little interest for formal democratic processes. These are con-
sidered to have been captured by the authoritarian elites in democratic disguise
and/or dictated by donor countries via policies of political conditionality.
This paper starts from a different assumption: The space for democratic move-
ments has been considerably enlarged, the standards of free and fair elections
have been maintained in many countries, and only few Africans nurture any nostal-
gia for the era of the benign or not so benign dictators of the 1970s and 1980s. If
the stocktaking of democratisation is a disappointment to the policy-makers in- and
outside of Africa it couldnt come as a surprise to the more realist and sober ob-
servers. The slow change towards democracy becomes apparent even among those
African elites that are generally thought to be hostile to reform and democratisa-
tion. The paper argues that norms about legitimate statehood on the Sub-Saharan
African continent have been modified during the last decade, and subsequently
have had a powerful impact on national regime dynamics. This norm dynamics is
highlighted by changed policies and practices of regional and sub-regional bodies.
In a first step, however, we will have to look for a sound theoretical explanation.

2 Democratic Regimes and Democratic Hegemons

Several approaches might be used based on different theoretical premises: First,
donors could use their power to enforce political system change and compliance of
African client states. Second, transnational coalitions of social actors could have
effectively undermined the legitimacy of authoritarian models of governance.
While both approaches hold some explanatory power (but are also empirically falsi-
fied in many cases), the paper uses a third approach that is complementary to the
first two but adds another perspective: Changing formal and informal institutions
and rules within the African state system might have had some impact on member

1
The author would like to thank Andreas Mehler and the participants of the November
2002 DVPW Workshop in Freiburg for their helpful comments to a previous version of this
paper.

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 3
states of African regional organizations and modified the behaviour and expecta-
tions of governing elites (for a more detailed statement see Hartmann 1999).
The enforcement of these new norms within a regional body could be considered as
the reflection of a growing internalisation of these norms among the members or as
the outcome of the imposition by the most powerful member(s). The development
of democratic guarantee clauses and internal democracy requirements for mem-
bership in regional and sub-regional organizations allows thus for two variants of
regime theory: A neo-realist interpretation looks for the role and interests of he-
gemons in the maintenance of regimes. Samuel Huntington argued in 1984 that in
a historical perspective - the spread of democracy has been closely related to the
rise and fall of democratic hegemonial powers. We thus had to look for the pres-
ence and role of democratic hegemons on the Sub-Saharan continent.
An institutionalist interpretation assumes that the regime (considered as a set of
rules and norms) once it is properly established takes a life of its own and is no
longer controlled by any member state. In applying such a perspective (Mller
1993) to democracy regimes we may ask three questions. Did the parameters of
internal debate about models of democracy and paths of democratisation in the
member states change? Did the cost of non-compliance with the rules and norms of
the regime increase? To what extent do coalitions maintain power within the na-
tional member states that favour compliance with the principles of the regime?
A closer look might be helpful at other regions of the world, where strict rules
about legitimate governance have been enforced by regional bodies. The Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) had included a strict requirement to a democratic
form of government in Article 3 of its Statute. The clause was used in 1962 to ban
Cuba from the OAS. The many deficiencies of weak Latin American democracies,
however, and subsequent military coups had no direct consequences for member-
ship status. All military regimes did effectively claim to bring their countries back
to the same set of democratic rules after a transitional period. In 1991, the OAS
became active for the first time in the defence of democracy in a member state
(Haiti). In the Santiago Declaration of June 1991 (Resolution 1080) all OAS member
states solemnly affirmed the principle of a pro-active policy to defend representa-
tive democracy (cf. Farer 1992). In Europe, both the European Community/Union
(with regard to the admission of new members), the CSCE/OSCE (with the Charta of
Paris 1990) and the Council of Europe (admission to the European Human Rights
Convention) formulated relatively precise sets of democratic requisites. A truly
representative and pluralist democracy needs accountability to voters, rule of law
and an independent judiciary. Halperin/ Lomasney (1997:135) summarized their
overview of worldwide interventions in defence of democracy: Recent events
show that there is indeed a basis for an international guarantee clause (for de-
mocracy).
The empirical test to what extent these developments confirm the role of democ-
ratic hegemons or democratic regimes is beyond the scope of this paper. Our test

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 4
of these two hypotheses to the Sub-Saharan African continent will be preceded by
an empirical analysis of changing norms of legitimate statehood in Africa. One op-
tion would be to assess the quality of democratic processes. The paper uses a dif-
ferent research strategy: It systematically analyses the reaction of African states to
non-democratic developments in other African states, especially collective behav-
iour in case of military coups and suspension of basic constitutional rules. The em-
pirical analysis covers all at least temporarily successful military coups in all 47
Sub-Saharan African states in the period 1991- July 2003 and compares the reaction
of organizations both at the sub-regional (ECOWAS, SADC) and the continental level
(OAU).

3 Changing Norms in the African State System

The struggle for political liberation and change in the 1970s and 1980s had a strong
anti-pluralist character in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Social movements were in-
spired by Lumumba, Ghaddafi, Sankara, Rawlings and Museveni. The few experi-
ments with more or less continuous forms of representative democracy at the na-
tional level (such as Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, or Nigeria) were condemned by
academic and political observers as formal or bourgeois and considered to repre-
sent clever attempts of national elites to regain control over social processes.
Genuine democracy was on the contrary defined by popular participation and the
political interests of the rural population had to be given priority over the liberal
and representative needs of urban elites (cf. Anyang Nyongo 1987, Mamdani 1996).
The growing demands for democracy that were raised by non-government organisa-
tions in Africa during the 1980s stressed this participative dimension of democracy
in an excessive way (see the declaration of the African NGO Steering Committee
from April 1986 in Nairobi or the African Charter for Participation in Development
and Transformation of February 1990 finalized in Arusha under the sponsorship of
the UN Regional Organisation for Africa (ECA).
The wind of change in the early 1990s did not immediately modify these funda-
mentals. Within some years, however, the political landscape had dramatically
changed. The political elites converted (with some notable exceptions such as
Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea or Swaziland) to liberal democracy. They also realized the
benefits of such an adaptation to generally low international standards (see Clap-
ham 1996 for a detailed analysis of partial compliance with international standards
of political and economic conditionality). Even the African social scientists con-
verted (again with some exceptions) to Dahls standard procedural definition of
democracy which had started its worldwide triumph with ODonnell and Schmitters
analysis of Latin American transition processes in 1986 and its subsequent applica-
tion to Eastern Europe and Asia.
By the mid-1990s the constraints of change had become apparent. Some newly
elected presidents differed little in their behaviour from their non-elected prede-

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 5
cessors. Some states did not survive the process of political liberalization and au-
thoritarian breakdown. The dinosaurs la Bongo or Eyadema proved to be long-
lived, and Krkou and Ratsiraka were successfully returned to power. Where is
the third wave asked Ihonvbere in 1996 and opened a series of deficit-oriented
and very critical accounts of political developments in Africa. But do these bleak
scenarios really give the whole picture? And how did the position of African re-
gional and sub-regional organizations evolve over time?

3.1 The Organization of African Unity/ African Union

The adoption of the OAU Charta in 1963 amounted to "the most clear-cut possible
victory for the principle of juridical sovereignty, over any pretensions to suprana-
tional continental union" (Clapham 1996: 110). The only organ entitled to make
binding policy decisions in the name of the organization was the annual meeting of
the Heads of State and Government. Still, even this council lacked any competen-
cies to enforce decisions against member states. The permanent OAU office had no
own competencies and its head got the intentiously low profile title of Administra-
tive Secretary General.
Although the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of member
states belonged to the basic rules of the OAU, many African rulers did support re-
bel movements and opposition politicians in neighbouring states. But at the same
time mutual material and military support was the rule. "African rulers under-
standably supported the principle of unrestricted domestic sovereignty, and at
least for the first two decades after independence, even the most muted criticism
of the internal autocracy of other African states was virtually non-existent" (Clap-
ham 1996: 187). Because of this the OAU was labelled a cartel of head of states or
a holy alliance (Bayart 1989: 250).
As long as individual member states did not threaten the maintenance of this state
system by interventionist foreign policies (Somalia or Libya) they did not need to
expect any inquiries about the denial of civil and political rights or bad govern-
ance. While dictatorship and gross human rights violations in Uganda reached their
peak, Head of State Idi Amin was elected to OAU Chairman in 1975.
2
Whoever man-
aged to gain power by whatever means in an African capital could rely on the sup-
port of his peers including the lobbying for support in international donor circles.
"Though contested, for example, by Nkrumah after his overthrow in the Ghanaian
coup d'tat of February 1966, this provided a practicable means of averting in-
volvement in disputes which could otherwise have divided African states between
the supporters of rival domestic regimes" (Clapham 1996: 112).

2
It has to be acknowledged that Idi Amin also got standing ovations on 1.10.1975 in the UN
General Assembly following his speech as OAU-Chairman, and the UN Secretary General
gave a public dinner in honour of Amin the day after.

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 6
First signs of change became evident in the OAU Declaration on the situation in
South Africa (Harare-Declaration of 21 August 1989). It said, among others: "We
also believe that all men and women have the right and obligation to participate in
the government of their countries, as equal members of society. No individual or
group of individuals has the right to govern without the public consent of the rest
of the society" (cit. Africa Research Bulletin-Political Series 9366 - 9/89). During
the 26
th
Summit of the OAU in July 1990 in Addis Abeba a first debate about de-
mocracy took place, and some African presidents (ironically those who hadnt
gained power by democratic means such as Ugandan newly elected OAU-Chairman
Yoweri Museveni or Nigerian military ruler Babangida) asked for a fresh and coura-
geous reorientation of the discourse about African democracy. In the final declara-
tion of the summit (with the heading The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in
Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World) the heads of state
confirmed their commitment to democratise their societies and to consolidate their
democratic institutions. This process should allow each member state to decide in
full sovereignty on its own system of democracy on the basis of its socio-cultural
values (see Le Monde of 13.7.1990). In retrospective, it seems difficult to identify
many 1990 democratic institutions worthwhile of further consolidation. What mat-
ters, however, was the vaguely formulated commitment to democracy as a main
goal of the organization. Since the presidential and parliamentary elections in
Zambia 1991 the OAU secretariat also started to send small groups for election ob-
servation. Their mandate was severely restricted, and they rarely came up with
any criticism on organizational or political aspects of electoral processes in mem-
ber states (Garber 1993).
There was little change in the OAU position in the following years.
3
The 33
rd
sum-
mit 1997 in Harare brought a sudden policy change apparently caused by the mili-
tary coup against the elected government in Sierra Leone that had taken place few
weeks before the conference. The OAU did now strongly and explicitly condemn
any type of military rule on the continent and approved a military intervention in
Sierra Leone to restore democracy. This was an obvious departure from the princi-
ple of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. Secretary-
General Salim resumed the results of the conference by saying that military coups
were from now on unacceptable to the continent (ARB-PS 12712 - 6/97).
The transformation of the OAU into African Union (AU) during the Summit in Lusaka
in July 2001 brought further interesting changes: Even if the elaboration of a new

3
The then OAU-Secretary General Salim Salim confirmed this ambivalent stance in an in-
terview with Jeune Afrique, when he subsumed the promotion of democracy (in contrast to
border conflicts) among the social and not political problems of the continent and organi-
zation: "Nous devons donc nous concentrer sur des questions moins politiques, mais davan-
tage conomiques et sociales, comme l'intgration conomique, la prvention des conflits
locaux, la dfense de dmocratie. (..) C'est aussi le rle de l'OUA de favoriser cette dmo-
cratisation respectueuse des ralits locales. (..) Les gens veulent participer. Ce processus
est irrversible" (Jeune Afrique 1827 (11.1.96), 60-65, especially 64, 65).

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 7
treaty was not used to formulate harder criteria for membership in the African Un-
ion, the new Article 30 states very explicitly: Governments which shall come to
power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the
activities of the Union. Any transparent procedures for the exclusion or suspension
of member states on the basis of this article are lacking. The condemnation of un-
constitutional government change belongs to the guiding principles of the treaty
(Art. 4 p). A (military) intervention in the domestic affairs of member states is re-
stricted to the following cases: Crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

3.2 ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did not include political
integration as a main objective of the organization upon its foundation in 1975.
Nevertheless, the ECOWAS did become active in the fields of conflict management
and military intervention, for the first time in the early 1990s in Sierra Leone with
the ECOMOG Operation. The ECOWAS supreme decision-making powers are concen-
trated in the annual Council of Heads of State and Government that is also appoint-
ing the Executive Secretary.
With the political principles of 1991 the members of the most important West
African regional organization committed themselves to the promotion and consoli-
dation of democratic systems of government. They also confirmed their engage-
ment for political pluralism and representative institutions. The political princi-
ples were signed while the majority of member states violated these very same
principles, but the sub-region was taken by a general enthusiasm about the democ-
ratic renewal (cf. Mair 2001: 247). Significantly, in the new ECOWAS Treaty of 1993
these explicit mentions of political pluralism and individual liberties have disap-
peared and made place for a more general promotion of popular participation and
democracy in line with the terminology used by the OAU.
The commitment to democracy in the modified 1993 ECOWAS treaty served the
member states as the legal title when planning and implementing the second mili-
tary intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 (reinstatement of the Kabbah government)
and for the condemnations of military coups in Gambia, Niger and Ivory Coast (for
details see Table 1).

3.3 SADC

In contrast to its predecessor SADCC the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC) had a political mandate right from its beginning in 1991. The SADC Treaty
and the accompanying Windhoek Declaration affirm a set of political principles and
a code of conduct for the intra-regional relations. According to one of the five fun-
damental principles human rights, democracy, and rule of law have to be compre-

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 8
hensively respected. As mechanisms for the implementation or enforcement of
these principles are again lacking, the principles have to be seen as political com-
mitments and not as binding rules. Still, the SADC in contrast to ECOWAS was es-
tablished with the explicit objective to build common political values, systems, and
institutions (cf. Mair 2001: 309).
The decision-making process in the SADC is similarly dominated by the annual
summit of the Heads of State and Government. There is also an organ for Politics,
Defence and Security (ODPS), whose precise relationship to the other SADC organs
was initially unclear. Under the leadership of Zimbabwean Head of State Robert
Mugabe (who felt the SADC was totally dominated by Mandela and South Africa) the
ODPS tried to affirm its autonomy in 1997, but was eventually suspended until fur-
ther notice by the SADC Summit. Only in March 2001 a compromise was reached
whereby the ODPS remains autonomous but reports to the SADC Summit and is di-
rected by a troika. This stalemate explains why the SADC had no efficient organiza-
tional framework when the political crisis broke out in Lesotho 1998 and the Gov-
ernment of South Africa decided to intervene militarily.

4 Changing Practice?

We might thus argue that at the normative level constitutional democracy has be-
come a guiding principle of African international relations. The establishment of
new norms that are supposed to guide the policies of African states is a significant
development. But it should not obscure the fact that the commitment of African
states does not guarantee subsequent compliance with the norms. Nor did the
OAU/AU or the sub-regional bodies establish any procedures to enforce the compli-
ance. The second part of our analysis has therefore to concentrate on the actual
practice in the African state system.

4.1 Measurement Problems

The measurement of democratic performance is confronted with numerous theo-
retical and methodological challenges. For lack of space it is impossible to discuss
these challenges in detail. Suffice to say that a major distinction could be drawn
between a growing body of research using quantifying scales on a dictatorship-
democracy continuum and other researchers who work with dichotomist categori-
zations (democracy versus non-democracy).
While in the first case (e.g. Freedom House Index) democratic performance is
measured with a set of indicators, and the outcome of the measurement may pro-
duce detailed analysis of political developments (especially over time), the overall
question if a country is a democracy or not in the first place, is difficult to answer.
Different indicators with mixed results have to be weighted against each other, and

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 9
the assessment may consist in salomonic verdicts such as semi-democracies. The
second group argues that a minimal set of procedural criteria have to be given
(free elections, political competition) in order to classify a country as a democracy.
If these criteria are not given, then the country is a dictatorship notwithstanding
its specific democratic credentials. This method thus produces clear outcomes that
however may be empirically questionable because the minimal set of criteria is
biased or the operationalization is problematic (cf. Przeworski et al 2000 for an
example).
Although African elites hardly know anything about these social science concepts,
they are somehow confronted with the same dilemma. In introducing democracy
guarantee clauses - and assumed they are serious about it African states are left
with the decision whether to assess the democratic performance of members
against a complex set of indicators or to decide about the belonging of states to
one of the two basic types: democracies or non-democracies. The hypothesis that
guides the following analyses is that African states are clearly not monitoring de-
mocratic practice in the sense of a set of indicators. They have instead implicitly
agreed that there is a single basic criterion that ex negativo excludes a country
from the family of democracies: the access to power via unconstitutional means.

4.2 Inactivity in cases of incremental democratic decay

There is no need for a detailed analysis of the inactivity of African continental and
sub-regional organisations in cases of slow and incremental erosion of democratic
standards in member states. Southern African head of states may feel concerned
about what happens in Zimbabwe, but are very timid or completely silent in openly
criticizing the decline of political and civil rights under Mugabes rule. The South
African government tried to mediate and claimed to have avoided the worst, but it
was only in the framework of the Commonwealth Monitoring Group that President
Thabo Mbeki opted for a more decisive position.
As long as an African government has reached power in acceptable elections, and
the political majority of a country (manifested in the elected parliament) supports
democratically questionable policies or constitutional revisions, the relevant re-
gional bodies will remain silent about the consequent violation of basic democratic
standards.
It remains to be seen whether the new initiatives of the last two years that culmi-
nated in the NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) will modify this as-
sessment. During the July 2002 Summit of the African Union in Durban an African
Steering Committee was created to monitor the efforts of member states in the
field of good governance in the framework of a peer review. While the democratic
leaders (Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa) in a first phase secured an exclusive access
to this committee for democratic states, during further negotiations other, less
prominent democracies such as Libya and Kenya (then governed by Moi) managed

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 10
to get elected on the committee. Any agreement on indicators and procedures was
therefore made illusory. South African President Mbeki announced in November
2002 that the peer review mechanism should be limited to economic questions as
political governance would fall under the competence of the African Union (cf.
ARB-ES October 2002, 15399). This was a strict departure from the original concept
of both the G8 and the Plan Omega of Senegals President Abdoulaye Wade that
had provided for a close linkage of political and economic questions.

4.3 Increased activity in cases of open rollback

The analysis of regional action in the case of open rollback or military coups
against democratically elected governments is more interesting. In the following
Table 1 all (at least temporarily) successful coups have been included that have
occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1991. Therefore the table neither gives coups
against authoritarian regimes nor coup attempts as the latter did not require any
decision-making of regional bodies.
4

Table 1: Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa 1991-2003
Year Country Type of Coup/ Regional reaction
1991 Togo Civil-military Coup against democratic transition gov-
ernment; protests from Germany and France; no reac-
tion from regional bodies.
1992 Sierra Leone I Military coup; new regime is recognized regionally and
internationally.
1993 Burundi I Military coup; condemnation by OAU, which sends an
observer group; transitional government is established.
1993 Nigeria Military coup; condemnation by Commonwealth; South
African attempts to mobilize African governments
against recognizing the Abacha regime fails.
1994 Gambia Military coup; condemnation by Commonwealth and
ECOWAS, later tacit approval of the new regime.
1995 Comoros I Military coup; French military intervention (following a
South African threat to take action) re-establishes the
government, but not the President.
1995 Sao Tom I Military coup; Return to constitutional order following
an Angolan mediation
Sources: Own compilation by author; updated until 31.07.2003.


4
In some cases these criteria are difficult to apply: Coup attempts in the Central African
Republic in 1996 and 2001 were put down by foreign military troops already present in the
country (first MISAB: Mali, Gabon, Chad, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Togo under French
guidance; and in 2001 Libyan and other African troops).

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 11
Year Country Type of Coup/ Regional reaction
1996 Niger Military coup; no condemnation; few protests by na-
tional elites following an institutional deadlock be-
tween President and Parliament; recognition of new
regime.
1997 Congo
(Brazzaville)
Coup (but in a context of civil war since 1994); no reac-
tion from regional or continental organisations.
1997 Burundi II Military coup against transitional government; Eco-
nomic sanctions approved by regional neighbours; OAU-
condemnation and mediation; without success.
1997 Sierra Leone II Military coup; Condemnation by OAU and ECOWAS; Mili-
tary Intervention by ECOWAS reinstates the overthrown
government.
1998 Guinea-Bissau Military coup; Senegalese military intervention ap-
proved by ECOWAS; Re-establishment of constitutional
order but agreement with rebel movement on former
Presidents non-candidature in forthcoming elections.
1998 Lesotho Military coup; South African military intervention leads
to establishment of transitional government.
1999 Comoros II Military coup; OAU, formerly very active in the media-
tion of secessionist crisis, strongly condemns the coup
and asks for non-recognition of government; in 2001
OAU recognizes the new Constitution and power-sharing
arrangement.
1999 Cte dIvoire I Military coup; condemnation by OAU and ECOWAS; mili-
tary regime is recognized following the formation of an
inclusive transitional government and announcement of
elections.
2002 Madagascar Incumbent president Ratsiraka does not recognize elec-
toral defeat and calls on his supporters to military re-
sistance. OAU mediation fails; South African govern-
ment recognizes electoral winner; situation is eventu-
ally resolved militarily with the army taking sides for
newly elected President; regional bodies eventually
recognize new government.
2002 Cte dIvoire II Coup attempt leads to civil war; Condemnation by AU
and ECOWAS; military intervention by France, French-
mediated peace agreement leads to inclusive govern-
ment with some rebels taking ministries.
2003 Central African
Republic
Dissident military units take capital and suspend consti-
tutional order; President exiled; strongly condemned by
African Union, but not by neighbouring countries.
2003 Sao Tom II Military coup while President is on trip abroad; media-
tion by Angola and Nigeria leads to re-establishment of
government after a week; President reaffirms his com-
mitment to balance of power and more inclusive gov-
ernment.

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 12
The analysis leads to some surprising results: We see a very timid reaction to mili-
tary coups in the period 1991-1997; exceptions such as Burundi I confirm the rule.
In this latter case it seems plausible that the threat of the civil war was more deci-
sive for the action of OAU than the suspension of constitutional rule.
1997 marks a turning point. In the wake of the OAU Summit both in Burundi and
Sierra Leone decisive action was taken, most likely to the surprise of the coup-
makers, who were not used to face any similar consequences before. The instru-
ment of embargo (against Burundi) was applied for the first time in the history of
the African state system outside South Africa/ Rhodesia. South African attempts to
enforce similar sanctions against Nigeria had been rejected two years before as 'not
an African way to deal with an African problem' (cit. Vale/ Maseko 1998, 272). The
ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone was the first African military intervention for the
restoration of democracy. Whatever the hidden agendas of the intervening power
Nigeria, the re-instatement of the Kabbah regime was used as the official legitimi-
sation and served as a self-reinforcing mechanism and a powerful reminder to all
future coup-makers that similar activities could lead to similar reactions.
From the table we see also that after 1999 there is a near complete cessation of
military coups against democratic regimes. The more recent events in Cte
dIvoire, Central African Republic and Sao Tom and Princip may indicate a new
window of opportunity for coup-makers, although in all three cases regime change
was not on the agenda of the putschists. According to a scheme familiar to stu-
dents of African politics mutineers strived for corporatist interests or for the inclu-
sion of marginalized political and regional interests in the government of the coun-
try. Even though mutineers did thus not intend to suspend constitutions or the de-
mocratic system of government, the legitimacy of rules is seriously weakened if
military officers might have the power to revise the policies or decisions of those
elected by the population.
Some differences remain between bigger and smaller countries and between coun-
tries whose democratic standards are beyond doubt and those whose are not. The
was no or only timid action against Nigeria, Madagascar or Cte dIvoire, while re-
gional organizations started punitive (military) action against the powerless states
Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone.
In Guinea-Bissau and the Comoros ingenious solutions were found to reconcile the
fiction of the maintenance of constitutional order with the generally desired depar-
ture of heads of state with poor commitment to democracy and constitutionalism.
Part of the regionally engineered deals was the voluntary resignation or the de-
parture for exile and the holding of fresh elections under the old constitutional dis-
pensation. After the Christmas coup in Cte dIvoire 1999 the general relief over

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 13
the exit of a corrupt and undemocratically acting President was a major reason for
the rapid recognition of the transitional government.
5

A first conclusion offered by the empirical test is that the principle of democratic
state practice is firmly established by continental and regional bodies. Decisive
action against military coups show that the treaty principles are more than lip-
service, even if other motives than the defence of democracy are influencing the
decision to intervene or not. The cost of undemocratic governance (in the sense of
the reactions of neighbouring countries and regional organizations) has considera-
bly increased during the last decade, but it is especially costly once democracy has
been established in the first place. It is less the lack of democracy than the roll-
back of a successful process of democratisation that leads to consequences. Some
Presidents like Museveni in Uganda are indeed very successful in selling minimal
steps of political liberalization as continuous and incremental progress towards a
more comprehensive system of democracy while similar standards of political free-
doms in other countries would be considered as serious flaws or democratic regres-
sion. The Latin American OAS regime is not enforcing the democratisation of Cuba,
but eventually hindering the re-militarisation of Paraguay. In a similar way the nas-
cent African regime may not bring the democratisation of Togo but defend the de-
mocratic acquis of Niger.
If democratic governance has not become a prerequisite for participation in the
African state system, constitutional rule has. African regional organizations have
shown a tendency to restrict democracy to the principle of constitutionalism and to
protect regimes that acquired power via constitutional means. The new Article 30
of the African Union Treaty states it very explicitly: Governments which shall
come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate
in the activities of the Union. This strategy allows to ignore the democratic qual-
ity of constitutional provisions and to stick to a very broad definition of democracy
that integrates institutional (populist or illiberal) alternatives and some very idio-
syncratic interpretations.
We may also conclude that regional organizations remain cartels of state presi-
dents, but democratically elected leaders gain a majority in these cartels and have
a strong interest to maintain democratic norms. Still, they will defend democracy
as a principle and be very benign when assessing the many inevitable deficits in the
slow institutionalisation of democracy within the political processes of African
countries. In other words, they have no interest in pushing the evaluation of de-
mocratic quality beyond the question of constitutionality.



5
A similar scenario could occur in the Central African Republic where neighbouring states
might reconsider their refusal of the coup leaders depending on the broad-basedness of
the new government announced by the new regime.

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 14
5. Towards Sub-regional Democracy-Regimes?

What about our initial theoretical alternatives on institutionalist and hegemonic
approaches on regime formation? It makes sense to break down our empirical
analysis to the sub-regional level in order to answer this question.

Table 2: Success and Failure of Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa 1991-2003
Sub-Region West Africa Central Africa East Africa Southern Africa
Democracies Benin
Cape Verde
Cte dIvoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea Bissau
Mali
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone

CAR
Congo
Sao Tom

Burundi
Comoros
Kenya
Madagascar
Mauritius
Tanzania
Botswana
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Non-
Democracies
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Liberia
Mauritania
Togo
Cameroon
Chad
DR Congo
Equatorial
Guinea
Gabon


Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda

Angola
Swaziland
The classification of countries to the two regime types follows the two criteria of basically
free elections and the existence of a democratic constitution.
All states with military coups against democratic governments are marked. Bold marking
means: Coup was successful; Italic marking means: Constitutional order restored.

There are some significant differences between the African sub-regions. In East
Africa and especially in Central Africa (where strong regional organizations are
lacking) the democracies are a minority and remain vulnerable to military coups. In
Southern Africa the principle of constitutional democracy seems on the contrary to
be firmly established. With the exception of Lesotho there havent been any at-
tempts to openly challenge basic constitutional rules, although the quality of de-
mocracy has apparently gone down in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The balance
sheet for West Africa is more ambivalent: While many countries succeeded in their
transition to democracy, these young democracies seem particularly endangered at
the same time. Some states such as Benin, Ghana, or Mali have maintained democ-
ratic rule in very unfavourable contexts and against a legacy of decades of military
rule. The challenges of state collapse and deeply entrenched authoritarian political
traditions are certainly stronger here than in the countries of Southern Africa.

Hartmann, Internalising Democracy 15
The regionally uneven institutionalisation of democracy has certainly a lot to do
with the strength of regional organizations that exert pressures on member states.
Only in West and Southern Africa did democratic member states reach the critical
threshold of gaining a majority in the sub-regional organizations. But these two
sub-regions also clearly have democratic hegemons. South Africas and Mandelas
genuine commitment to democracy was decisive not only in Lesotho. In West Africa
the policy did change with the democratisation of the hegemon (cf. also Mair 2001:
251). Only the regime change in Nigeria allowed the ECOWAS to effectively push
for democracy in other member states. The new hegemon and power-player in East
Africa, Uganda, has, on the contrary spread a different political model in her sub-
region (to Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia). It favours former military rulers
converted to civil politicians, has a anti-pluralist character and an expansionist for-
eign policy to satisfy the needs of the powerful military core group. But it also
firmly subscribes to the principle of constitutional rule.
The paper started from the assumption that an analysis of intra-African relation-
ships and of regional organizations within Africa may give us a better indicator of
how seriously Africans take democracy than the asymmetrical relationships be-
tween the North and Sub-Saharan Africa where lip-services are possible and neces-
sary. While the new ideas of Peer Review seem a step too revolutionary to succeed
in the short term, some noteworthy developments have taken place. The formation
of a regime of democratic states in Africa is still limited to the defence of democ-
racy in its very core meaning: The constitutional rule of elected governments.
Given the long way that had to be taken and the still unfavourable social and eco-
nomic contexts this is not a little achievement.


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The text of the African Union treaty is available at www.africa-union.org.