DI ANE F.

GOT T L I E B
WI TTGENSTEI N' S CRI TI QUE OF THE
T R A CT A T US VI EW OF RULES*
1. I NT R ODUC T I ON
Of the three main doctrines of the Tractatus, namely, the picture theory
of meaning, the truth-functional thesis, and the theory that all logical
truths are tautologies, at least the truth-functional thesis was un-
equivocally repudiated by Wittgenstein by 1930.1 Motivated by the
desire to provide an account of the definiteness of Sense contained in the
seemingly vague sentences of ordinary language, the truth-functional
thesis held that on any occasion when a sentence of ordinary language
was meant and understood, the sentence was analyzable into the
elementary propositions of which it was a logical product. Implicit in it
was a view of rules which, when made explicit, can be seen to be the
target of several of the themes about rules propounded in the Philoso-
phical Investigations. The purpose of this paper is to relate Wittgenstein' s
dissatisfaction with the truth-functional thesis (early statements of which
appear in 1930 when he returned to philosophy) to the critique of the
Tractatus view of rules which can be discerned in the Philosophical
Investigations.
The topic of rules is not so prominent in the text of the Tractatus as it is
in Wittgenstein's published works from the Philosophical Grammar to
the Philosophical Investigations. During the period in which the Trac-
tatas was conceived and written, Wittgenstein was aware of no special
philosophical problem attaching to the concept of "rule". He used the
term in an unselfconscious and unreflective way. It achieved importance
for him as a problematic concept 2 only after he had made some attempts
in the early thirties to correct what he had come to believe were
fundamental errors in the Tractatas philosophy. In the Philosophical
Grammar, the Blue and Brown Books, and in the seven parts of the
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics written form 1937 through
1945, can be seen the trail of the development of his thought on rules up
until the version that is found in various clusters of remarks in the text of
the Philosophical Investigations, Part One. My paper focuses on a few
points on this long and winding trail: a brief sketch of the role of rules
Synthese 56 (1983) 239- 251. 0039- 7857/ 83/ 0562- 0239 $01. 30
Copyright 0 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
240 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
in the Tractatus, the presentation and explanation of Wittgenstein' s
repudiation of the truth-functional thesis from 1930 to 1934, and finally
interpretation of a few themes of the PI treatment of rules that are
illuminated by the understanding of their historical background within
the Wittgenstein corpus.
The literature on Wittgenstein' s Philosophical Investigations until
recently contained relatively little comment on the passages in the PI
dealing with the topic of rules. Some commentators take for granted that
Wittgenstein believed that meaning is rule governed in the PI, 3 and
others, notably Stanley Cavell and James Bogen, 4 argue that in the PI
philosophy of language rules are not important to meaning. In a paper
contained in a recently published anthology of essays entitled Witt-
genstein: To Follow a Rule, 5 Gordon Baker presents an overview of the
complex of philosophical issues involved in the Investigations passages
on rules, and makes the following two claims. First, Wittgenstein' s
purpose in the rules discussion in the PI is not to deny that language is
rule governed or, I would add, to assert it; but rather to make clear what it
means to say that the use of language is rule governed. 6 Second, "the
critical examination of philosophers' myths about rules and rule-
following in the Investigations is a direct development from Witt-
genstein's earliest criticism of logical atomism". 7 It is this latter point that
I aim to develop in this paper. I will emphasize central features of the
critique of logical atomism not so far found in the literature, in particular,
an elaboration of the role of thinking in the truth-functional thesis, and
an interpretation of the machine analogies contained in P! (193,194)
in the context of the critique of logical atomism. 8
2. RULES I N THE TRACTATUS
There are a number of passages form the period 1930 through 1934, in
the Philosophical Grammar and in Waismann' s reports of Wittgenstein' s
conversations with the Vienna Circle which make plain Wittgenstein' s
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of logical analysis contained in the
Tractatus. 9 The main elements of the doctrine of logical analysis to
which Wittgenstein refers in these passages can be paraphrased roughly
as follows: All propositions with sense, including the propositions of
everyday language, have an analysis into elementary propositions
consisting of combinations of simple signs, names in combination. This is
because all sentences with sense, including the sentences of everyday
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES 241
language, are in perfect logical order. 1 By "order", Wittgenstein means
that they have a determinate or definite sense in contrast to a vague
one.1 ~ If a proposition has a definite sense, then it must be possible that it
have an analysis into elementary propositions consisting of names in
combinationJ 2 The motivation for this doctrine is illuminated by
Wittgenstein' s retrospective view of it in Philosophical Investigations,
98 through 103. PI 98 echoes Tractatus 5.5563: "All the pro-
positions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect
logical order", and points out that this thesis combined with the
observation that the sentences of our everyday language are apparently
vague produces the result that "there must be perfect order even in the
vaguest sentence". PI 101 emphasizes that the notion of there being a
logical analysis of every proposition with sense was the result of a
preconception, a preconception that existed despite the fact that the
author of the Tracatus did not see how the elementary propositions were
hidden in the visible sign, did not see how the simple signs with definite
sense were contained within the apparently vague sense of the physical
signs.
What is the role of rules in this account? The handful of explicit
remarks on the topic of rules in the Tractatus can be classified in a
superficial way into two groups: (1) those which mention "rules of logical
syntax"; and (2) those which speak of "translation rules for the
translation of one language into another". 13 None of them bear an
explicit relation to the doctrine of the logical analysis of propositions with
sense into a logical product of elementary propositions. Once again,
Wittgenstein' s retrospective view of the doctrine in the Philosophical
Investigations proves to be helpful. From the perspective of the PI
looking back on his Tractatus view, Wittgenstein sees it as follows: The
ideal of a language with definite sense is reconciled with the apparent
vagueness of everyday language by means of a hypothetical process of
analysis that takes place when language is used. 14 The unanalyzed
proposition may appear to be vague and indefinite; and from the
Tractatus viewpoint an indefinite sense is not a sense at all. However, if a
. I S' *
person means ot Understands a sentence, it must have a sense; and if it has
a sense, it 1~ have a definite sense. Rules for the translation of the
propositional signs of the sentences of everyday life into elementary
propositions will play a role in the mental processes of meaning and
understanding. When I understand, the rules must be available to me,
albeit dimly, in order to regulate the translation procedure (PI, 102).
242 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
We will see that by 1930 Wittgenstein will repudiate the doctrine on
the grounds that "at the root of [it] there was a false and idealized picture
of the use of language" (PG, p. 211).
3. TI l E BASI C CRI TI CI SM OF LOGI CAL ATOMI SM
A repeated theme of passages from Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
and passages from the posthumously published Philosophical Grammar
can be paraphrased as follows: the mistake in the notion of analysis was
that if it were true that every sentence with sense were a truth function of
elementary propositions, then the logical product of these elementary
propositions would in some way be contained or "hidden" in the
sentence itself. But what could this mean? It might mean that the
analyzed form of the sentence was hidden in the unanalyzed form,
as a quotient is hidden in the sign 753/3. In the arithmetical case, we
have a method for determining the quotient, and when we carry out
the calculation the heretofore hidden quotient is brought out into the
open.
In the Tractatus, when Wittgenstein spoke of a "complete analysis" of
a sentence with sense, he spoke as if there were a calculus according to
which the analysis could be carried out. But he had only the vaguest
notion of such a calculus, a notion suggested by the analysis that Russell
had given of the definite article. Lacking such a calculus, what sense
could be given to the notion of a "complete analysis" or "a logical
pr oduct . . , hidden in a sentence"? Just as a division in arithmetic is
carried out in accordance with calculation rules, an analysis would
require a method of carrying it out. But there was no method. Black
quotes Wittgenstein: "the false concept that Russell, Ramsey and I had.
So that one awaits a logical analysis of facts, as if for a chemical analysis
of compounds." 15
4. AN OVERVEW OF THE PI CRI TI QUE OF
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES
At about the same time as the origin of the passages stating the basic
criticism of logical atomism, there appear three themes which are to have
important consequences for the development of his conception of a rule
in the Philosophical Investigations. In the first place, he draws a
distinction between a connection set up by means of a mechanism and a
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES 243
connection set up in a calculus. In a mechanism, the effect can
unexpectedly be determined by some unforeseen occurrence such as the
malfunctioning of the mechanism for various reasons. In a calculus, the
result is not dependent upon, nor vulnerable to, the accidents of fortune.
In the second place, he expresses a determination to avoid in his
philosophy explanatory appeals to "the occult appearance of the process
of t hi nki ng. . , a nd. . , to replace in these processes any working of the
imagination by acts of looking at real objects" (Blue Book, p. 4). In the
third place, he changed his attitude towards the relation of rules and
language. The preconceived notion of an analysis that must be taking
place according to strict rules was replaced by a metaphor which lay at
the bottom of a new method of investigation. 16 This feature of
Wittgenstein' s technique has two aspects: the construction of specific
language-games, and the comparison of specific characteristics of
language to characteristics of games played according to definite rules,
where the comparison is made not in relation to a specific language-game
as such. 17
By the time of the PI, the distinction between a mechanism and a
calculus has developed into a decisive objection against one inter-
pretation of the Tractarian notion of the role of rules in meaning
(meinen) and understanding. The objection consists of two main points:
the uncovering of a logical inconsistency in the conception of a rule as a
part of a mechanism of any sort; and the arguments specifically directed
at the conception of a rule as a part of a mental process, event or
mechanism. There is some effort in the PI to lay out a model of the role of
a rule of language, alternative to the rule in the mental-medium picture,
and to describe the grammar or use of the expression "to follow a rule";
but much of the discussion of rules in the PI makes use of the game
metaphor to support points made about rules of language in lieu of a
more direct approach.
Two fundamental criticisms of the Tractatus view of rules can be
discerned in the PI discussion. First, where the Tractatus had claimed
that what could be said could be said clearly, implying that the rules for
the use of language were definite and exact, the PI argues that rules of
language ought not be presumed to have strict application. Witt-
genstein's views about the vagueness of applications of rules are by now
fairly well digested, and in any case are thoroughly explained in Volume
1 of Baker and Hacker' s commentary on the PI. ~8 Second, it is logically
inconsistent to think of a rule of language as something functioning in a
244 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
mental medium. It is this second point that I will elaborate in this paper in
what follows.
5. RULES AND THI NKI NG I N THE PI
Early in the PI (PI, 53, 54), Wittgenstein sketches a conception of
using language according to a rule that avoids any mention of mental
processes, and constructs the conception out of descriptions of materials
that are public objects and actions. It should be noted that this effort is
not intended to provide a general account of the role of a rule of
language. The PI contains no such general account. The particular
purpose of these remarks is to show that a rule for the definition of colors,
connected to a particular language-game designed to conform to the
Tractatus account of language, involves nothing occult. Their target is
the view that the correspondence between name and object is a "queer
connection of a word with an obj ect " (PI, 38), effected by "some
remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an obj ect " (PI, 38).
This sketch of the role Of a rule of language appears in connection with
the language-game designed to conform to the conception of the sense of
a sentence as being composed of names that correspond to primary
elements, a feature of his logical atomism in the Tractatus. The words of
the language are names of primary or simple elements, and the sequences
of words are a complex of names to which correspond a complex of
elements. The remarks on the role of rules in this conception of language
occur in the midst of a long discussion of logical atomism which criticizes
it from a variety of angles. P! 51 through 54, the remarks on rules,
although occurring in the midst of this critique, may be attached to
language-game 48 for only comparatively incidental reasons. The
application of the language in 48 is exact (the notion of family
resemblance or fluctuating definitions has no role in the application of its
elementary signs); each word corresponds to an object; the distinction
between word and sentence is clear and unproblematical, and the use of
the signs is not related to any purpose or form of life. These con-
siderations together make the matter of the relation of sign and what is
designated much simpler than it is in the other language-games.
The concept of the role of a rule functioning outside of a mental
medium as opposed to the concept of a rule functioning hidden in a
mental medium is supported by no argumentation in these passages other
than a reinforcing comparison with "the kinds of case where we say that a
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES 245
game is played according to a definite rule". Nevertheless, it is
appropriate that the sketch of a concept of a rule functioning in a public
medi um be at t ached to a l anguage-game constructed so as to conform to
the Tractatus's logical atomism; and it is plausible that this connect i on is
not merely accidental. Thinking t hrough Wittgenstein' s basic criticism
of logical atomism shows that the doctrine' s reliance on the concept of a
rule functioning in a mental medi um was essential to its appearance of
coherence.
The mistake in the doctrine of logical analysis, the claim that there was
an analysis of a proposition al t hough no met hod for carrying out the
analysis existed, was obscured by what Wittgenstein later called its
"dogmat i c ''19 character. That there must be such an analysis was a
"preconcei ved not i on", a "requi rement " (PI, 107, 108) rather t han a
"result of investigation". For with respect to a "preconcei ved not i on",
the lack of rules to achieve the analysis need not count as a shortcoming
of the theory. Allied with the notion that the analysis must be taking place
in the mind, it can be assumed that the rules must be present somehow in
the mind, albeit "hi dden". Gi ven the lack of a calculus, the process of
analysis had to be assumed to be taking place in a hidden locale; for if one
"open to vi ew" were involved, the lack of a met hod of analysis and the
consequent impossibility of analysis insofar as there was not a met hod for
carrying it out, would have been all too obvious. It is for this reason that
the mental medium as the locale of the process of analysis of the sentence
cannot fairly be regarded as incidental to the view t hat propositions with
sense are truth-functions of el ement ary propositions. In a famous pas-
sage from the Blue Book, Wittgenstein says that we have a faith that "t he
mechani sm of the mi nd. . , can bring about effects which no material
mechani sm coul d" .20 For one who believes that when we mean and un-
derstand language, such an analysis must be taking place, the lack of a
met hod of analysis will not trouble one. For such a one also has faith t hat
the mind can do wonderful things that we do not begin to understand.
In a passage from the Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein says t hat
"for his purposes, it can never be essential t hat a symbolic phenomenon
occurs in the mi nd and not on paper so that others can see it" (PG, p. 59).
It is plausible t hat there is a connect i on bet ween the role of thinking in
the mistaken not i on of logical analysis in the Tractatus and the avoidance
in the later philosophy of appeals to ment al mechanisms, processes or
events as explanations of meani ng (meinen) and understanding t hat
characterized Wittgenstein' s philosophical method. It is plausible to
246 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
think that his det ermi nat i on to rid his phi l osophy of an "occul t "
charact er was bor n of a desire to pr ot ect himself from repeat i ng the same
mistake, i.e., of provi di ng an expl anat i on which relied on the mys-
teriousness of the processes of the mind as a way of obscuring its basic
unintelligibility.
Consi st ent with the PI's met hod of conduct i ng grammat i cal in-
vestigations, 21 a mai n avenue of appr oach to the topic of rules in the PI is
by means of the gr ammar or use of the expression "follows a rul e". It
appears that cont ai ned in the P! implicitly or explicitly are a number of
argument s specifically di rect ed to or rel at ed to the concl usi on that no
versi on of a mentalistic account is capabl e of provi di ng criteria for the
application of the expression "follows a rul e". 22 The argument s cover a
spect rum of types of account s of ment al phenomena that coul d be
indicated as a way of model i ng what happens when an individual person
follows a rule. Each account contains within it an el ement that coul d be
desi gnat ed plausibly as that which happens "i n the mi nd" which
constitutes the following of a rule. Among these argument s are some
which, if valid, are valid against any t heory holding that it is an intention
to follow a rule in performi ng a cert ai n action that makes the action
rule-following; t here are some which, if valid, are valid against any
t heory that holds that a rule is actualized as a dynami c el ement within a
causal mechani sm of any sort. The passages cont ai ni ng these argument s
are difficult to interpret, and the validity of the argument s difficult to
assess. In the time remaining, I want to devel op an i nt erpret at i on of just
one of these argument s which I bel i eve is decisive against a part i cul ar
view of rule-following, viz., that what "goi ng- by- a- r ul e" is, is the
funct i oni ng of a rule in a ment al mechani sm.
6. RULES AND MACHI NES
The passage from the Philosophical Grammar cited above continues:
"we are misled by the idea of a mechani sm that works in special medi a"
(PG, p. 59). In a closely rel at ed passage are the seeds of a fut her criticism
of the Tractatus concept i on of rules that focus not on the ment al aspect
of a ment al mechani sm, but rat her have as their t arget the not i on of a rule
funct i oni ng as part of a mechani sm of any sort. " A mechani cal ,
electrical, psychol ogi cal connect i on is somet hi ng which may or may not
funct i on . . . . It gives the wrong idea if you say that the connect i on
bet ween name and obj ect is a psychol ogi cal one" (PG, p. 56).
TI l E TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES 247
This passage from the Philosophical Grammar is the first of a series of
attempts to bring out the distinction between "being causally deter-
mined" and "being logically determined" that constitutes the in-
coherence of the notion of a rule functioning as an element in a causal
mechanism. It finds expression in the PI in 193,194 and 218 through
221. PI 193 and 194 are a more sophisticated version of similar
passages found in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics I and
III. In the PI, the passages are presented in relation to the problem of
how a use extended in time could be present as the meaning of an
expression, when we say of the meaning that it can be grasped in a flash.
PI 193 and 194 discuss an analogous problem: how is it that the
"action of a machine", "the possible movements of a machine", "are
already there in it in some mysterious way", "seem to be in it from the
start" (PI, 193, 194). The action of a machine would normally be
thought to be something that is extended in time. How then could the
action, which is extended in time, be in the machine at the start, i.e., at a
moment before it has unfolded in time?
For our purposes, what is important in these remarks is Wittgenstein' s
conception of the relation between an actual machine and an ideal
machine, or machine-as-symbol, as he also calls it. There are two ways of
regarding the future movements of a machine. We can look at a machine
(or a drawing of it) as a symbol, from which its movements can be derived
as if the parts of the machine "could do nothing other". This is analogous
to the way the twenty-fifth member of the series 1, 4, 9, 16, . . . can be
derived (PI, 193). In both cases, what will be derived seems as definitely
determined as "objects which are already lying in a drawer and which we
then take out" (PI, 193). In both cases, certain movements and certain
(bestimmt) numbers are derived or determined, in contrast to other ways
in which the machine could have moved, and other numbers that could
have been written down. It is with respect to the machine-as-symbol that
we think that the action of the machine seems to be there in it from the
start.
Second, we can regard a given actual machine and predict its future
movements. In this case, we do not forget the possibility of parts breaking
and bending. The predetermination (vorausbestimmten) of the actual
movements of an actual machine is not the same as the case of deriving a
series of movements from a symbol. In the case of the actual machine,
empirical conditions that hold for the given machine play a role in
determing future movements. For example, a pin's fitting too tightly in a
248 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
socket, or the pin' s material being too brittle, are part of the conditions
that empirically det ermi ne the movement s of the actual machine. But
such considerations play no role in determining the movement s of the
machine-as-symbol.
What is the point of the comparison of the actual machi ne with the
machine-as-symbol? This becomes clearer as we look at two predeces-
sors of these passages in RFMI and III. 23 A rule, as it is actually meant, is
intelligible as a "driving power" in a machine, only if the machi ne is the
ideal or symbolic sort, not the actual sort. The reason for this is as follows.
The result of the application of a rule of a calculus is rigidly determined.
From the drawing of the parts of a machi ne whose parts are assumed to be
perfectly rigid, we can calculate with perfect certainty the future
movement s of the machine. The working of the ideal or mathematical
machi ne "is only the picture of the working of a machi ne" (RFM, III-48).
Calling it a picture brings out the fixed character of the action of the
machine which can be predicted, derived or calculated from the drawing.
The const ruct i on of a machi ne on paper does not break when t he machi ne itself succumbs
to external forces. - Or again, I should like to say that they are not subj ect to wind and
weat her like physical things; rat her t hey are unassailable, like shadows. ( RFM, 1-102)
A rule conceived of as a "driving power" in an actual machi ne is
unintelligible. A rule cannot really "do work" (RFM, III-48), for the
result of its application is det ermi ned in a way that no force functioning
on an actual occasion can be. The point of distinction between the
intelligibility of a rule as a driving power in a machine-as-picture or an
ideal machine, and the unintelligibility of a rule as a driving power in an
actual machine, is to emphasize that the result of the application of a rule,
in contrast to the effect of an actual mechanism, is invariant. A
mechanical process whether in the mind or in an extramental material
mechani sm can causally determine the result of a calculation, but it
cannot logically det ermi ne the result of a calculation.
Thus, the implicit argument goes, to conceive of a rule as a part of a
mechani sm is to make a conceptual blunder. For, if a rule funct i oned as
part of a mechanism, it would have to have true of it two contradictory
features: it would have an application that both had the possibility of
varying and did not have the possibility of varying.
This is one point of PI 218 t hrough 221. The analogy of the
applications of a rule being "a visible section of rails invisibly laid to
infinity" (PI, 218) symbolizes "a difference between being causally
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES 249
determined and being logically determined" (PI, 220). It is "a
mythological description of the use of a rule" (PI 221). The logical is
predetermined in a way that the causal is not.
For our purposes, the point of the argument contained in the machine
metaphors is as follows. The determination of the meaning of signs,
insofar as the meaning is regulated by rules, could not be contained in
and effected by individuals' acts of meaning (meinen) and understanding
language, if these acts are supposed to be effected by means of mental
mechanisms. It is important to note that this argument is a criticism of the
Tractatus only if thinking in the Tractatus, as it is engaged in the meaning
and understanding of language, includes the action of mental
mechanisms. "Thought " (der Gedanke) and "thinking" in the Tractatus
are not, so far as I can find, terms that get detailed interpretation, in this
respect, either in the text or the secondary commentary. It is plausible to
think that in the Tractatus, the role of thinking, the work it accomplishes
and how it does so, is left unspecified. In contrast, the treatment of the
concept of "thought" and "thinking" in the PI is rich and complex.
Wittgenstein cautions the reader in an important passage on rules in PI
81 that the origins of the mistaken notion that he once held that "if
anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a
calculus according to definite rules", can "only appear in the right light
when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understand-
ing, meaning (meinen) and thinking (denken)". Much of the book is
devoted to this undertaking. Before completing the task of com-
prehending the relation of rules and thinking implicit in the Tractatus
and explicit in the PI, one needs to grasp Wittgenstein' s views on
intention, dispositions, and conscious and unconscious experiences
characteristic of rule-following, as well as mental mechanisms.
NOTES
* I am indebted to Stephen Barker and Kingsley Price for stimulating criticisms of a
previous version of this paper. The paper is part of a larger work in progress, entitled
' Wittgenstein' s Concept of a Rule of Language in the Philosophical Investigations'.
1 F. Waismann, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, in Brian McGuinness (ed.), 1979, pp.
129-30, pp. 182-83; and L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, in R. Rhees (ed.),
University of California Press, Berkeley, Appendix 4A and 4B, pp. 211-12.
2 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 72-4.
3 For example, R. Rhees, Discussions of Wittgens-tein~Schocken Books, New York, 1970,
pp. 44, 55.
250 DI ANE F. GOTTLI EB
4 S. Cavell, ' Availability of Wittgenstein' s later philosophy' , Must We Mean What We
Say?, Scribners, New York, 1969, pp. 48, 50; see also James Bogen, Wingenstein's
Philosophy of Language, Humanities Press, New York, 1970, pp. 169-220; and R. Miller,
' Wittgenstein in Transition' , Philosophical Review, October, 1977, pp. 527-29.
5 Gordon Baker, ' Following Wittgenstein: Some Signposts for Philosophical lnvestigations
143-242' , Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds.), Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1981. I do not discuss Saul Kripke' s book, Wittgenstein on Rules
and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA,
1982, which was published after this paper was completed.
6 Gordon Baker, ' Following Wittgenstein' , pp. 39-40, 42-43.
7 Ibid., p. 45.
8 I believe that clear understanding of Wittgenstein' s grounds for repudiating the
t rut h-funct i onal thesis of the Tractatas will pave the way for insight into a new concept of a
rule found in the PI; and that progress in explicating what the new concept of a rule is will
have a role in clarifying aspects of the private language discussion and in understanding the
appeal to ordinary language as a way of telling whether an expression of language makes
sense. I mention this to indicate the place of my topic in a larger context of interpretive
issues on the philosophy of language of the PI. In this paper, however, my goal is only to
outline the main features of the PI critique of the Tractatus view of rules.
9 See note 1 above.
10 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. Pears and B. McGuinness (trans.),
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, # 5.5563.
11 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca,
N.Y., 1964, p. 305.
12 Tractatus, 3.23 and 4.221.
13 E.g., Tractatas, 3.334; 3.343, 3.344, and 4.0141.
14 An antipsychologistic reading of the Tractatus that conflicted with the claim that a
hypothetical process of analysis takes place when language is used is not ruled out in any
obvious way by the text of the Tractatus. There is evidence, however, for interpreting
the t rut h-funct i onal thesis in the way that I have suggested. For example, Baker and
Hacker quote from a preliminary manuscript of the PhilosophicalInvestigations: "How can
I understand a proposition now, if it is for analysis to show what I really understand? Here
there sneaks in the idea of understanding as a special mental process." Wingenstein,
Understanding and Meaning, Vol. I, pp. 507-508. Baker and Hacker put the point as
follows: "Gi ven the apparent necessity of an ideally sharp and determinate logical structure
of language, and given that the appearance of language is so far removed from this ideal,
how can we understand language al all? Analysis will, must, reveal the sharpness of the
underlying structure, but it has not yet been carried out. Consequently, in TLP,
understanding, grasping the hidden, ideal structure of the proposition must be something
carried out by the mysterious operation of a hypothetical mental mechani sm" (p, 508).
Malcolm has a similar view: "Where does this complete articulation occur that turns a
sentence into an unambiguous depiction of uniquely one situation? Where is it achieved?
Apparent l y not in an ordinary physical sentence, such as ' The window is to the left of the
fireplace'. For this sentence certainly does not have a unique sense on all occasions of
utterance. The complete articulation does not occur in the physical pattern of sounds or
marks. Where does it occur? The only possible answer, from the viewpoint of the Tractatus,
THE TRACTATUS VI EW OF RULES
251
is that it takes place in our thinking or meaning . . . . According to this conception thoughts
are clear and perfectly ordered, just as they are. Thei r clarity is not impaired by the
vagueness and ambiguity of their physical embodiment, their ' clothing' ". (N. Malcolm,
Memory and Mind, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1977, p. 138.)
15 M. Black, A Companion, p. 208.
16 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 36.
17 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 29-31, 53-54, 79-83, 100, and
562-68.
18 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning, Vol. I, The
University of Chicago Press, Chacago, 1980, pp. 351-447. Although I agree in the main
with the general thrust of their interpretation on this topic, I disagree with their
interpretation of some specific passages, which have a bearing on the issue of whether there
is a correspondence between meaning and rules in the PI.
19 See Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, pp. 182-83.
20 L. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p. 3.
21 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 90.
22 These are scattered thoughout the text of the first half of Part One. See Gordon Baker,
' Following Wittgenstein' , p. 43.
23 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Macmillan, New York,
1956.
Dept. of Philosophy
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, MD 21218
U.S.A.