G.R. No.

L-7188 August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the
City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he
was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of
which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed
their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of
each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal,
the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator
himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was
executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such
as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not
complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages
having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the
signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six
pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2
of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a
fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new
Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by
the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil
Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court
for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his
heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by
this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should
be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry
out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the
death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to
the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes
a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate
such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses
with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion
and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.




G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.
TUASON, J .:
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the
defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold,
along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are thus
summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died
on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate
of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;
5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land
to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered
up to the date;
7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M. Po,
the last purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and
Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance,
whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance
because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or
judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in
so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration
were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause
than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the plaintitff
and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be
appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ.,concur.




G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III,
and MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
declaring the deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the
petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the
Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her
and to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued on
February 5, 1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of
Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of
judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by respondent
Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City;
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of the Banilad Friad
Lands Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT
No. 27639;
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu, covered by TD No.
010661, with an area of 76-708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac Mactan
Island, with an area of Forty Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square
meters more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a Government lot at Lahug, Cebu
City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central, Cebu City. " (Rollo, p.
40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid for them for
the amount of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded to lone
bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs of the late Don
Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Felipe V.
Belandres and approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-Officio Sheriff, was issued
for these lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, bid at
P20,000.00;
2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete for the transfer
to her name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled "Pilar Teves, et al. vs
Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal among which, is that movant, Palicte, is
not one of those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R, she
does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that
the deed of redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR
ENTITLED TO REDEEM UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE,
OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
B
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER, WHO IS A
DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR
DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 29(a),
RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS A
DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT
OF REDEMPTION OF CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE
AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE AS THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT DEBT
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION
OF FOUR (4) PARCELS OF LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL AND VOID AND
INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of
redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided in
the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in
the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the
property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold,
or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the property was
sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment
debtor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall
within the term "successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276 Fed.,
216, 223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the
purpose of redemption (Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38
Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App.,
61; 127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of
law (XI McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint debtors who were
joint owners of the property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal.,
50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact
that some portion of her husband' title passes to her (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479;
12 Pac., 486). This court has held that a surety can not redeem the property of the
principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the debt of the principal,
stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently is not a
successor in interest in the property. (G. Urruitia & Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28
Phil., 260, 268). (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was
levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs
in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent's
liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the property is under administration.
(Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of
their shares in the decedent's property even while it is under administration. With more reason
should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an
administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three other co-heirs, the
administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputed
parcels of land. We see no need for such prior approval. While it may have been desirable, it is not
indispensable under the circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced
in the act of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contends that the administrator and
the three other heirs agreed to the redemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such approval.
What is beyond dispute from the records is that they did not disapprove nor reprobate the acts of
the petitioner. There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was not
beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate pending the order of
distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of
its properties is greater than anybody else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely
holds it for the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent interest were allowed to
exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103
Phil. 889, 892) where a son redeemed the property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs.
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court called
"inchoate right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as successor-in-interest of
her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or mother, is also an
inchoate or contingent interest, because upon the death of the father or the mother or
both, he will have a right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate
interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem a property sold on execution,
then the son is such a successor in interest, as he has an inchoate right to the
property of his father.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator as the judgment
debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the judgment debtor
and the heirs who will eventually acquire that estate should not be prohibited from doing their share
in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to transfer the titles of the
four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon
Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the estate.
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 267, 345-
346):
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of
Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in
a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1)
there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the
estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such
order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses,
expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the estate" have
been paid, which is but logical and proper, (3) besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties,
and not of the court."
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-redemptioners in the
redemption made by the petitioner before the motion to transfer titles to the latter's name may be
granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders declaring the deed
of redemption null and void and denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to
Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the
redemption as stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.


[G.R. No. 126950. July 2, 1999]
NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE petitioners, vs.
GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated November 25,
1995 of the Fifth Division
[1]
of the Court of Appeals for allegedly being contrary to law.
The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was
survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed
Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication and hearing, the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order dated March 30, 1966
admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable (Exhs. B,
C and C-1).
On June 6, 1966, the same court issued an Order approving the Settlement of Estate submitted by
the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, portions of which read:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
We, ANGEL CUSTODIO NUFABLE, GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, and
MARCELO NUFABLE, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos, and with residence and postal address at
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
- HEREBY DECLARE AND MAKE MANIFEST -
1. That on August 9, 1965, Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving (a) Last Will and Testament
(marked Exh. G) disposing (of) his properties or estate in favor of his four legitimate children,
namely: Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor Nufable and Marcelo Nufable;
2. That on March 30, 1966, the said Last Will and Testament was probated by the Honorable
Court, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, and is embodied in the same order appointing
an Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify only if she put up a necessary bond
of P1,000.00;
3. That herein legitimate children prefer not to appoint an Administratrix, as agreed upon (by)
all the heirs, because they have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made
by the testator, the expenses of the proceedings and that they have already taken possession of
their respective shares in accordance with the will;
4. That the herein heirs agreed, as they hereby agree to settle the estate in accordance with the
terms and condition of the will in the following manner, to wit:
a) That the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided
for community ownership but respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will;
xxx xxx xxx.
(Exhs. E and E-1)
Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable
mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development Bank of the Philippines
[DBP] (Pre-trial Order, dated January 7, 1992, p. 103, Original Records). Said mortgagors
became delinquent for which reason the mortgaged property was foreclosed by DBP on February
26, 1973 (id.).
On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable (who died on August
29, 1978 [TSN, Testimony of Nelson Nufable, Hearing of August 18, 1992, p. 17]), purchased
said property from DBP (Exh. 1).
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the lower court a complaint dated
July 25, 1985 To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet Title and To Recover Damages
against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silnor Nufable and his mother Aquilina Nufable. Plaintiffs
pray:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court that after trial judgment be rendered
ordering:
(a) That the said Deed of Sale (Annex C) executed by the Development Bank of the
Philippines in favor of the defendants be declared null and void as far as the three fourths ()
rights which belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;
'(b) That the said three fourths () rights over the above parcel in question be declared as
belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth right to each of them;
(c) To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs by way of actual and
moral damages the amount of P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees, and to pay
the costs.
(d) Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and equitable. (p. 6, Original
Records)
In their Answer, defendants contend:
4. Paragraph 4 is denied, the truth being that the late Angel Nufable was the exclusive owner
of said property, that as such owner he mortgaged the same to the Development Bank of the
Philippines on March 15, 1966, that said mortgage was foreclosed and the DBP became the
successful bidder at the auction sale, that ownership was consolidated in the name of the DBP,
and that defendant Nelson Nufable bought said property from the DBP thereafter. During this
period, the plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which were public, never filed any third
party claim nor attempted to redeem said property as redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale,
Annex B to the complaint, is fictitious, not being supported by any consideration; (pp. 20-
21, id.)
The Deed of Sale (Annex B), referred to by the parties is a notarized Deed of Sale, dated July
12, 1966 (marked as Exhibit H) by virtue of which, spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable, as
vendors, sold portion of the subject property to herein plaintiffs for and in consideration
of P1,000.00 (Exh. 5).
[2]

On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
[3]
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as the rightful co-owners of the
subject property and entitled to possession of southern portion thereof; and defendant-appellee
Nelson Nufable to portion.
No award on damages.
No costs.
Defendants-appellees Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals
[4]
dated October 2, 1996.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable, the probate thereof not being an issue in this case;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact that the Development Bank
of the Philippines became the absolute, exclusive, legal, and rightful owner of the land in
question, from whom petitioner Nelson Nufable acquired the same by purchase and that,
therefore, no award can be made in favor of private respondents unless and until the Development
Bank of the Philippines title thereto is first declared null and void by the court.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failed to take into consideration the
probated will of the late Esdras Nufable bequeathing the subject property to all his four children.
[5]
In the
present petition, petitioners present the issue of whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable
and its subsequent probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner
Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of, the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP, for short). They contend that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Esdras
Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testators testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provision of the will.
[6]
The question of the
intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.
The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, an Order
dated March 30, 1966 was issued by then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch II, admitting to
probate the last will and testament executed by the decedent.
[7]
Thereafter, on June 6, 1966, the same court
approved the Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable wherein they agreed
(T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for community
ownership but respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will.
[8]
In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated
that they have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses
of the proceeding and that they have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with the
will. Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on the disposition of
their shares. The probate court simply approved the agreement among the heirs which approval was
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.
[9]

It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the entire
property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio with DBP, the
other heirs of Esdras - namely: Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo - had already acquired successional rights over
the said property. This is so because of the principle contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the effect
that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for
the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of the late
Esdras Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was approved
on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically
referred to the subject property in stating that the land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental,
should not be divided because this must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of
them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.
[10]
It was therefor the will of the decedent that the
subject property should remain undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years
pursuant to Article 870
[11]
of the Civil Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouse mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March 15, 1966,
they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angels right over the subject property was limited only to
pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angels right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited
to that portion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule
that a co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property.
[12]

The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable had no right to mortgage the
subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only to pro indiviso share
of the property in question.
[13]
Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the rights of co-owners over a co-
owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment. As a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The
prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that no one can give what he does not have.
[14]

Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by petitioners of the subject
property.
[15]
This being the case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his
share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the formers knowledge and consent
[16]
as in the case at
bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who
never benefitted.
[17]

Furthermore, the Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966 marked as Exhibit H executed by spouses Angel
and Aquilina Nufable in favor of respondents Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo wherein the former sold, ceded
and transferred back to the latter the portion of the subject property bolsters respondents claim that there
was co-ownership. Petitioner Nelson himself claimed that he was aware of the aforesaid Deed of Sale.
[18]

Anent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that the Development Bank of the Philippines
acquired ownership of the land in question through foreclosure, purchase and consolidation of
ownership. Petitioners argue that if petitioner Nelson Nufable had not bought said land from the DBP, private
respondents, in order to acquire said property, must sue said bank for the recovery thereof, and in so doing,
must allege grounds for the annulment of documents evidencing the banks ownership thereof. Petitioners
contend that since petitioner Nelson Nufable simply bought the whole land from the bank, they cannot be
deprived of the ownership of without making any pronouncement as to the legality or illegality of the
banks ownership of said land. It is argued that there was no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity of the
banks acquisition of said land; and that neither was there a finding by the court that the bank illegally
acquired the said property.
As adverted to above, when the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had no right to
mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his pro indiviso share as the property was subject to
the successional rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras. Moreover, in case of foreclosure, a sale would
result in the transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the seller can be in a position to convey
ownership of the things sold.
[19]
And in one case,
[20]
it was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective unless
the mortgagor has title to the property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining pro
indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto,
[21]
who are the private
respondents herein.
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and he causes
the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the
true owner. Likewise, under Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes. In the case of Noel vs. Court of Appeals,
[22]
this Court held that a buyer of a
parcel of land at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against a widow acquired only one-half interest on the
land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her husband became
impressed with a constructive trust in behalf of said heirs.
Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the subject property in its
name terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership.
[23]
When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the
winning bidder in the public auction, DBP merely held the portion in trust for the private
respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property, he merely stepped into the shoes of DBP
and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the DBP should have been impleaded as party-defendant in
the case at bar. Petitioners contend that DBP was never impleaded and that due process requires that DBP be
impleaded so that it can defend its sale to petitioner Nelson Nufable; and that it was the duty of private
respondents, and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead the bank and ask for the annulment of documents
evidencing the banks ownership of the disputed land.
In the Rejoinder to the Reply, private respondents that the non-inclusion of DBP as a necessary party
was not questioned by petitioners from the time the Complaint was filed until the case was finished. It was
only after the adverse decision by the respondent Court of Appeals that petitioners raised the issue.
At the outset, it should be stated that petitioners never raised this issue in their Answer and pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants; the inclusion as a
party being compulsory.
[24]
On the other hand, in case of proper or necessary parties, i.e., persons who are not
indispensable but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties, the
court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action without making such persons parties, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons.
[25]
Proper parties, therefore, have been
described as parties whose presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.
[26]
Any
claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
[27]

The pivotal issue to be determined is whether DBP is an indispensable party in this case.
Private respondents do not question the legality of the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and the
subsequent sale of the same to DBP. The subject property was already purchased by petitioner Nelson from
DBP and the latter, by such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to the former. Clearly, petitioners
interest in the controversy is distinct and separable from the interest of DBP and a final determination can be
had of the action despite the non-inclusion of DBP as party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an
indispensable party, did not have to be impleaded in this case.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition for review
on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., (Chairman), on official business leave abroad.




SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J .:
Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his last will and testament is its life and
soul which deserves reverential observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No.
112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the
decision of the Court of Appeals
[1]
dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the will
of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of
petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the
declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament, including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said
paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
[2]

The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques,
statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with
my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in
Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.
[3]

The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private
respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity,
his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition
for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The
petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a
newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices
were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana
Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceaseds
natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition
with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not
executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion
Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will,
because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their
marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open
cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had acquired
jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After
the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial
court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of
the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore, their
relationship was an adulterous one. Thus:
The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION
REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed
by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his two attesting witnesses during the
trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and adulterous
and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the
testator, which constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy, thus
making the will intrinsically invalid.
[4]

The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the
will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio
Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the
oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally
married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision
which affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification
that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. The appellee
court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during
the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void,
either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in
striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being
contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes
is his wife.
[5]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition
for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was
contrary to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion
Oning Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness Gloria
Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latters father
were sister and brother. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the
purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was
against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further
alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was
cohabiting with the testator hence, she could never contact any valid marriage with the
latter. Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal
declaration of the testator, himself, were sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. To further support their contention, petitioners attached a copy of the
marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.
[6]

The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
[7]
Thus, the court merely inquires on its
due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.
[8]
The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been
proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
[9]
The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations
demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are
doubtful legality.
[10]
Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined,
the probate court may also do so.
[11]
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
[12]

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of
the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding
were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of
consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the
will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the
testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need
not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals
(139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself,
acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she
has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full
knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in
fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony
because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted
he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
[13]
To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the
illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno
case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some
of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the
testator admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous
relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time
she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay
and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed
husband of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning
Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated
that the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or
void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for
being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption
of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Reyes is his wife.
[14]

In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting
belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their
failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position
that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the
same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for
review. This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual issues since its
jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by
the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not
be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which
petitioners have not shown in this case.
[15]

Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it
appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J .:
Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his last will and testament is its life and
soul which deserves reverential observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No.
112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the
decision of the Court of Appeals
[1]
dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the will
of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of
petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the
declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament, including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said
paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
[2]

The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques,
statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with
my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in
Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.
[3]

The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private
respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity,
his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition
for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The
petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a
newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices
were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana
Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceaseds
natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition
with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not
executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion
Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will,
because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their
marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open
cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had acquired
jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After
the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial
court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of
the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore, their
relationship was an adulterous one. Thus:
The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION
REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed
by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his two attesting witnesses during the
trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and adulterous
and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the
testator, which constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy, thus
making the will intrinsically invalid.
[4]

The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the
will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio
Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the
oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally
married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision
which affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification
that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. The appellee
court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during
the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void,
either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in
striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being
contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes
is his wife.
[5]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition
for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was
contrary to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion
Oning Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness Gloria
Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latters father
were sister and brother. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the
purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was
against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further
alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was
cohabiting with the testator hence, she could never contact any valid marriage with the
latter. Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal
declaration of the testator, himself, were sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. To further support their contention, petitioners attached a copy of the
marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.
[6]

The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
[7]
Thus, the court merely inquires on its
due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.
[8]
The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been
proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
[9]
The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations
demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are
doubtful legality.
[10]
Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined,
the probate court may also do so.
[11]
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
[12]

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of
the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding
were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of
consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the
will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the
testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need
not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals
(139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself,
acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she
has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full
knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in
fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony
because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted
he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
[13]
To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the
illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno
case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some
of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the
testator admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous
relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time
she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay
and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed
husband of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning
Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated
that the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or
void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for
being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption
of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Reyes is his wife.
[14]

In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting
belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their
failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position
that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the
same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for
review. This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual issues since its
jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by
the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not
be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which
petitioners have not shown in this case.
[15]

Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it
appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.




[G. R. No. 3643. March 23, 1909.]
AMBROSIA POSTIGO, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. DOLORES BORJAL, Respondent-Appellee.

D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
On the 2d of September, 1903, Enrique Borjal executed his will and testament, of which the following extract
is pertinent to this issue: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
I hereby declare that I have been married to Doa Ambrosia Postigo for nearly twenty-five years, and that
we have had no issue during our marriage. I also declare that all our property, with the exception of two
parcels of land in the sitio of Caraycayon Gignaroy was acquired during marriage. The first of these parcels is
bounded on the north by the great River Baraton (here follows the description); the second, or that of
Gignaroy, is bounded on the north (description follows). All of said property shall be administered by my
wife for the space of four years in order to satisfy all of our debts, particularly that due to Don Domingo
Monasterio. At the expiration of the four years my wife shall transfer the parcels in Gignaroy which extend
from the great River Barayon down to the Arroyo de Gignaroy (description follows) to my sisters Dolores
Borjal.
On the 26th of November, 1904, the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines appointed commissioners
to appraise the property of the deceased. They submitted to the court their report on the 30th of October,
1905, stating that they took the oath of office before the justice of the peace of Tigaon and immediately
proceeded to assess the property presented by the administratrix of the estate. At the same time they
published notices summoning all creditors who had claims against the said property and fixed the 15th and
30th day of each month for the hearing of claims. The first hearing by the commissioners took place on the
30th of December, 1904; successive ones were held on the 15th and 30th of each month from January to
October, 1905, but no claims whatever were presented by the creditors of the said estate of the late Enrique
Borjal.
The court below, on the 9th of July, 1906, thereupon approved the partition of the hereditary property
made by said commissioners in all of its parts, and ordered that the latter place Dolores Borjal in possession
of that portion of the inheritance corresponding to her without the necessity of waiting for the four years
stipulated in the will. To this end the court ordered that a formal deed of transfer be made out and
forwarded to the court in order that it might be included in the proceedings; that a certified copy of the
deed of transfer be also sent to the registrar of property in compliance with law; that the fees of the
commissioners appointed by the court be charged in equal parts to both inheritances, and that the bond
given by the executrix be canceled.
From said decision the latter appealed, and after giving bond for P500 he appeal was admitted and
forwarded to this court.
All debts that might be outstanding against the estate of the late Enrique Borjal having been held to be
barred by reason of their not being presented for collection within the period fixed for the purpose by the
duly appointed commissioners, the question at issue and presented to this court is whether the clause which
provided for the retention by the widow of the property which the deceased willed to his sister, Dolores
Borjal, may be considered as set aside, and the usufruct of the said property bequeathed to his widow,
Ambrosia Postigo, for the period of four years from the death of the testator for the purposes of meeting
the debts of the estate, particularly that owing to Domingo Monasterio, should be considered as having
terminated.
A rule that is uniformly laid down by the courts is, that the will of the testator is the primary and principal
law governing wills and testaments, and when the testamentary provisions are clearly and positively stated,
questions arising in the courts in connection with the execution of and compliance therewith shall be
adjusted in harmony with the plain and literal meaning of the language of the testator, except where it
clearly appears that his intention was other than that actually expressed. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of May 24, 1882; October 13, 1896; October 8, 1902.) cralaw
The above legal doctrine already constitutes a uniform settled rule and is in accord with the conclusive
provision of article 675 of the Civil Code which reads: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
Every testamentary provision shall be understood in the literal meaning of its words, unless it clearly
appears that the will of the testator was different. In case of doubt, that which appears most in accordance
with the intention of the testator, according to the tenor of the same will, shall be observed.
Section 640 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, among other things, that after payment of the debts
and of the expenses of administration, the property of the testator shall be disposed of according to his will;
and section 643 of said code when enumerating the duties of an executor states that one of them is to
administer all property coming into his possession according to the will of the testator.
The testator bequeathed to his widow the usufruct of two parcels of land for the period of four years, in
order that she might meet the debts of her husband. Consequently, the circumstance that outstanding debts
of the said estate were declared to be barred, owing to the failure of the various creditors and especially of
the one named in the will, to appear within the time specified by the commissioners, is no valid reason for
shortening the period fixed in the will within which the usufruct should accrue to the widow and executrix.
The barring of the debts of the estate cannot effect a modification of the will, nor cause the testamentary
provision of the testator to be interpreted as meaning anything but that stated in his will.
Clearly and precisely the testator provided as his last will that his said wife should administer the said parcels
of land for four years, in order that she might pay his debts. The fact that no creditor ever appeared to
collect them is no reason why the widow and executrix should be deprived of the usufruct of said properties
before the lapse of the said four years. Such deprivation would be in violation of the special law that governs
the matter, that is, the will of the testator, by which his property must be administered, according to the
legal provisions and settled rules hereinbefore cited.
The validity and efficiency of the usufruct bequeathed to the widow and executrix of the testator is not
incompatible with the provisions of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because apart from the
obligation imposed by the testator upon his wife in the matte of the payment of his debts, which obligation
she was unable to fulfill inasmuch as no creditor presented himself, there exists the order or request that
she should retain the said lands in her possession for four years, and there is no valid reason why the will of
the testator should not be complied with and the land be delivered to Dolores Borjal at the expiration of said
four years.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed,
and that it be held, as we do hereby hold, that Ambrosia Postigo is entitled to possession and to administer
for the period of four years, from the death of the testator, the two parcels of land and that Dolores Borjal
cannot take possession thereof until after the lease of the said term. No special ruling is made as to the costs
in either instance.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of
FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery
of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor,
and which he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y
posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man
of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en
prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su
uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a
ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said
Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No.
203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in
that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she
submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit
"C", the probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As
the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real
and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving
the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now
being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N.
Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of
the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed
by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's
position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause
8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that
if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly
did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of
the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1wph 1. t
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the
widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered
the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court
violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of
his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only
remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless
a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in
his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to
its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and
literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.
The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo
1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo
voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha
menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados,
ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve
cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As
already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his
widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies
should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if
the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or
dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee
for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights
of innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the
Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon,
JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.



G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J .:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
x x x x x x x x x
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
x x x x x x x x x
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph 1. t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time,
certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require
his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will,
such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision
in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which
would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine ofrenvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918,
pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
x x x x x x x x x
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
x x x x x x x x x
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of
laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will
then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs
vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply
in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to
be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar
to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.



G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph 1. t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph 1. t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.
2
So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
3
Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.


[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
[1]
modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City
[2]
declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.
[3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.
[4]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.
[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.
[7]
He discovered that
his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.
[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the fathers name was left blank.
[9]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple
drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support
would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired
during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was
signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.
[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.
[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.
[13]
Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.
[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.
[15]
Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
[16]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including
ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul
F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located
at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my
real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last
Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
(sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia
R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.
[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo
was still alive.
[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.
[20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition
[22]
for letters of administration
over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of
all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.
[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary.
[24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.
[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.
[26]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate
even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status
of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and
so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981
as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her
favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required
by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
SO ORDERED.
[27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.
[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified
its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.
[29]
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.
[30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the
deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.
[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of
the decision.
[33]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,
[34]
denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
[35]

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,
[36]
the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial
court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is
duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the
case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzos will.
[38]

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.
[39]
Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of
the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[40]
we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case,
the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
[41]
that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,
[42]
we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
[43]
We
hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.
[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.
[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made
final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special
administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

STREET, J .:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,
decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next
of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition
and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of
controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924,
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been
judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his
cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will
above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died
on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not
presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at
the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The
will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial
determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil
Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no
testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the
final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the
situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F.
Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental
relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there
declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or
more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special
designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator
or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will
calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had
been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not
only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had
been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error
whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the
whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that
this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of
the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is
declared, among other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir
is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among
other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when
the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted
conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the
fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a
consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the
better right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its
provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two
provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As
between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two,
dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more
specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict,
therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in
subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly
subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true
that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so
understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is
held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of
harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords
independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion
is impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of
article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed
(incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion
occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the
inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and
incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to
bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be
made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the
disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an
accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion
rather than for intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the
subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an
inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of
the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in
appellant's brief, by provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession
(Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13
Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be
understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of
the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition
be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil. net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and
in the common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial
intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption against it, a
presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
Avancea, C, J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants.
Fernando Salas for appellee.
CARSON, J .:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to
probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased.
The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary
thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the
deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were
denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the
alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind
and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo
Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears
upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario, testified in support of
the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and
their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent
herself, who was present when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the
third subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes no
comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and
sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because
of death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness
stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of
any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such
as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore
that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their
presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence
and in the presence of each other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the
searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for
appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single
incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction,
however, which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the
deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was
given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and
was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that his
wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument,
and that he was given nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether
this was immediately before or after, or both before and after he attached his signature to the
will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with
the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that
nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the will, and that one
witness might remember the former occasion and the other witness might recall the latter,
although neither witness could recall both. But, however this may have been, we do not think
that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of
an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is
sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy
of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of
contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances
under which it was executed, or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the
incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was present must have been
directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit as
to negative the possibility or probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the
conclusion that the witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when
it is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the
witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity, and on the other
hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that
occurred, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial
judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence
and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time
and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these
witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time
in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of
these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at or
between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have
been made, this being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was
executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the
testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore that they were
in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged that
the will was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the
house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to
make himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the
testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his
manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and settled purpose
to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to
swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine
and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the
signature attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny the genuineness of the
signature of his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine
signature was not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in
response to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to
understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination,
he was forced to admit that because his brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will
was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for
many months prior to the one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further,
that, although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of
his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony
of this witness could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the
subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its
execution on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened to
pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would
furnish conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will
was not executed at the time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing
witnesses. We do not think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for
the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in
which it was executed.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was
introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to
the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge, who held in this
connection as follows:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the presiding
judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of
signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures, and does not find
that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that the signature which
appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the
subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First,
that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that for some reason which is not stated
the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his
name every day.
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two
signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its
execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact
that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of
asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness
in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the
evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the
person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the
disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the
testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates
a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability
that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact
indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But
when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or
descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and
sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were
adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers
or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or
attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his
property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were
grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence
of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation
that the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the
degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows
out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or
other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has
ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity
requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking"
(Trish vs. Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on
one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of
body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him
to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodgevs. Lodge,
2 Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise"
(Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has not been understood that a testator must
possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . .
Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from
age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in
upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the
rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680); and, that "Sound mind
does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree"
(Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held
that "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane
or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from
disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the
testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from
knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in"
(Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition
of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves,
because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at the time of
making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity
set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced
in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary
capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be
no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the
existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the
manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p.
71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the
execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it
was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its
execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his
own free will and accord.
The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance
against the appellants.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J .:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan,
admitting to probate a document which was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto
Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of
Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a
year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by
the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the
testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to
the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior
to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained
the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one
Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which
the will was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will
was executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read
them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented
each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus
written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the
witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over
it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in
the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect
accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure
have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the
testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point
considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at
the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his
mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was
not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a
witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the
testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed
the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will
was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will
was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he
had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and
made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the
execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was
able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the
opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he
had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the latter had
suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question
was propounded to Doctor Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him,
do you think he was in his right mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental
disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his
opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state
in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the
testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and
who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to
the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and
discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the
testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician,
Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be
unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for
a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can
be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident
that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can
not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property
by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances,
but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs.
Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court.
The numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially
applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is
in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will
to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep.,
463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep.,
689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not
render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills
that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are
many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right
which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary
capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses,
disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the
numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be
in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as,
had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to
bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind
and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which
he was engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case:
The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well
informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that
time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of
the properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to
make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create
the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his
physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their
strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind
acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions
in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem
bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that
he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational
expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as
was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and
mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who
knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we
think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and
that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear
that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what
the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing
and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present
during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar
is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.











G.R. No. L-23729 December 5, 1925
Estate of the deceased MARIANO CORRALES TAN. FLAVIANA SAMSON, administratrix-
appellee,
vs.
VICENTE CORRALES TAN, ET AL., claimants. VICENTE CORRALES TAN, appellant.
Gregorio Perfecto for appellant.
Epimaco Molina for appellee.

OSTRAND, J .:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring that Flaviana
Samson was legally married to the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan, that she and her children
Arsenia, Gregoria, Santiago, Dativa, Aurelio, and Amancio Corrales Tan y Samson, are his
legal heirs, and the appellant Vicente Corrales Tan, while a natural child of said Mariano
Corrales Tan, has not been legally acknowledged as such and is therefor not entitled to a share
in the inheritance beyond the amount bequeathed to him in the will of the deceased.
The evidence in the case has not been brought before this court and we are, therefore, not in
position to review the findings of fact of the court below. Upon these findings there can be no
doubt that Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased and that the children of the
marriage are legitimate heirs.
The only other question to be determined is whether upon the facts found Vicente Corrales Tan
can be considered an acknowledged natural child of the deceased. The court below found that
before his marriage to Flaviana Samson, Mariano Corrales Tan was living with a woman by the
name of Prudencia Santos and with her had a child, the herein appellant, who was born on the
5th of April, 1894; that the child was baptized on the 22d of the same month and that in his
certificate of baptism Exhibit A, it is stated that he was the natural child of Mariano Corrales Tan
and Prudencia de los Santos; that in Exhibit B, another document of the same date on file in the
archives of the parish church where the child was baptized, Mariano Corrales Tan, in the
presence of two witnesses, recognized Vicente Corrales Tan Quintin as his natural child had
with Florentina de los Santos.
The following articles of the Civil Code prescribe the manner in which the acknowledgment of
natural children may be effected:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will,
or in some other public document.
Art. 133. A person of full age may not be acknowledged as a natural child without his
consent.
The approval of the court, to be granted after hearing the prosecuting officer, shall be
necessary to the acknowledgment of a minor, unless such acknowledgment be made in a
certificate of birth or in a will.l awphi1.net
The minor may in any case contest the acknowledgment within the four years next following
the attainment of his or her majority.
Art. 137. Actions for the acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during
the lifetime of the putative parents except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter must
commence the action within the four years next following the attainment of its majority.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some document, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In the case the action must be commenced within the six months next following the discovery
of such document.
Vicente Corrales became of age long before the death of his father. Hence, paragraph 1 of
article 137 above quoted is not applicable to his case and, in order to establish his status as an
acknowledged natural child, he must show that he was so acknowledged during the life of the
deceased. According to article 131, such acknowledgment "must be made in the record of birth,
in a will, or in some other public document." The appellant argues that the entries in the records
of the parish church together with document Exhibit B, must be considered as a sufficient record
of birth under that article.
This contention cannot be sustained. The record of birth mentioned in article 131 is that
provided for in article 326 of the same Code and as the application of that article to the
Philippine Islands was suspended by decree of the Governor-General dated December 29,
1889, and was never put into effect, it follows that form of acknowledgment did not exist in this
country in the year 1894. Whether entries in the civil register provided for in section 2214 of the
Administrative Code will meet the requirements of article 131, we need not here decide.
But it is argued that article 327 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present case. That article
reads:
The records of the registry shall be evidence of civil status and no other evidence thereof
shall be admitted, unless such records have never existed or the books of the registry have
disappeared, or the question arises in the course of litigation.
In our opinion that article only lays down a rule of evidence and has no bearing on the
formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural child; as we have seen, article 131 requires
that unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be made in
the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.
The appellant suggests that the fact that he in the will of the deceased is named as one of the
legatees is an implied acknowledgment. There is, of course no merit in this suggestion; legatees
are as often as not unrelated to the testator.lawphi 1. net
It is also suggested that Exhibit B is a public document and, therefore, in itself a sufficient
acknowledgment. Assuming without conceding that it is a public document, it would
nevertheless not constitute an acknowledgment unless duly approved by a court (art. 133, Civil
Code; Legare vs. Cuerques, 34 Phil., 221).
In his fourth and last assignment of error the appellant contends that the court below erred in
denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The new evidence is
not before us, but as far as can be gathered from the record, it consists of the record of a
proceeding before a customhouse immigration board, in which proceeding the deceased
appears to have acknowledged that appellant was his son, and it is argued that the proceedings
were of a quasi-judicial nature and that the action of the board in the matter constituted a
judicial approval of the acknowledgment. We do not think so; the collector of customs and his
subordinate boards are not courts within the meaning of article 133, supra.
The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.



EN BANC
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
TRINIDAD NEYRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ENCARNACION
NEYRA, Defendant-Appellee.
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.
Lucio Javillonar for appellee.
DE JOYA, J.:
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister,
Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the
recovery of one-half () of the property mentioned and described therein,
which had been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra, and which had
been previously divided equally between the two extrajudicially, demanding
at the same time one-half () of the rents collected on the said property by
the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. The defendant filed an answer admitting
that the property mentioned and described therein was community property,
and at the same time set up counterclaims amounting to over P1,000, for
money spent, during the last illness of their father, and for money loaned to
the plaintiff.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled
to one-half () of the said property, adjudicating the same to her, but at the
same time ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77,
plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of
Appeals for Manila, alleging several errors, attacking the execution and
validity of said agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was
dismissed, pursuant to the to an agreement or compromise entered into by
the parties, as shown by the corresponding document, dated November 3,
1942, which was filed in the case the following day, November 4, 1942.chanroblesvi rtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two
years, unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly
from heart attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was
claimed, she had been suffering for sometime.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942,
dismissing the appeal, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty.
Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since
November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a petition, dated
November 23, 1942, asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the
Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal, claiming that the alleged
compromise or agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not have been
understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold
of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if
it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark
appearing on said document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad
Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will; and that the court had no more
jurisdiction over the case, when the alleged agreement was filed on
November 4, 1942, at the instance of Trinidad Neyra, as Encarnacion was
already dead at the time.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for
reconsideration, is whether or not said compromise or agreement had been
legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942.
Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the
parties, in this case, has fully established the following facts:chanrobles vi rtual law library
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938,
leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second
marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion
Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with
the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their
dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court
of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the first case, filed
in March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by Encarnacion
Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No.
366 Raon Street, Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants,
in the court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21,
1943 (G.R. No. 8162); and the second is the instance case.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer
any ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16,
disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de
Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever
in said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who
had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will was brought to the
attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due deliberation and
consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty offered by
Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered
by said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion
Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one
week before her death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat, and gave him
instructions for the preparation of a new will; that Atty. Sikat, instead of
preparing a new will, merely prepared a draft of a codicil, amending said will,
dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious organization, among
others as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the
authorities of religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance;
but it was also rejected.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious
adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to
make confession, after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in
her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy
communion; that Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be
made, and, as a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was
solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo
Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took
holy communion; that after the mass, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion
Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the
same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister
Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters
greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and
two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they also
talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had
reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, the instant case being
the second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition
that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad
Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property
collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to
Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to
prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but
Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day,
November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the
preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other
instructions for the preparation of her last will and testament; that Attorney
Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and
testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries
therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two
documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since
the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of
compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in
a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad,
Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if
their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change
made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any
change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of
a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two
documents, in duplicate, on her bed in thesala, in the presence of attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M.
Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the
presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also
signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio
Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents,
at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by
Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no
interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the
Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of
irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the
testatrix.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the
witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of
documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942.chanroblesvi rtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified,
however, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the
agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her
bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they
were in the caida.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the
documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed,
thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz
also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's, thumbmark was affixed to the will,
only in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one
Ildefonso del Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the
nature of effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never
seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease
often live as long as ten (10) years, while others die after a few weeks only,
and that as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to
90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the
heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250-
1253; McCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)chanrobles virtual law library
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on
November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of
about two (2) years.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the
testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical
experts.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the
opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy
mental capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties
deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20
Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have beencompos mentis, in spite of the
physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak,
being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the attending physician that the
deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition
for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible
witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to
him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs.Corrales Tan Quintin, 44
Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition,
neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his
hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata
and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)chanrobles vi rtual law library
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of
the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other
persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted,
but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental
condition at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata and
Almojuelavs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)chanrobles virtual law li brary
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted
that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November
3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time
of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case,
remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they
enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And
that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they
preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that
Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the
agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time
Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her
bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is
untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the
time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in
the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not
whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the
documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case.
(Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the
testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.
(Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)chanrobles virtual law li brary
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they
are children of legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but
eliminated from the will, dated November 3, 1942.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect
that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and
that the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents
embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in
their presence; and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question,
when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within
their view, is absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is
contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra
and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to
deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief.
And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal
aphorism - falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil.,
728, 735.)chanrobles vi rtual law library
To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the
two documents, dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously
placed great emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two
sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were
banking evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the
most violent. Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the
reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They had forgotten that Encarnacion
Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian
faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They had
also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than that embalmed
in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the
two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest
relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of
imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family
life. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought
her happiness, and that she had always been just to her sister, who had been
demanding insistently what was her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon
reconciliation, as she did not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in
her heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most logical that
Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her generosity, under her
last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said
agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly
labors.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been
legally signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in
the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos
mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the
time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on
November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been
dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have
appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for
Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-
affirmed, without costs. So ordered.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.




G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ,
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J .:1wph 1.t
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-
R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the
probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua
legal and valid. The respondent court
1
denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the
two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to pay
damages to the plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their possession and to reimburse the
latter the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties from the date of the
firing of the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are the following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay,
together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this
judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing
properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory,
Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to
wit: t .hqw
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of the Alsua
spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by the spouses and
all the above named heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in the
inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five parcels of land
Identified with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock which
are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children but five of
them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code (old) to
avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning the inheritance they
are entitled to in the event of death of one of them they have decided to effectuate an
extrajudicial partition of all the properties described in Annex "A" thereto under the
following terms and conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real properties with
the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of
land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of
land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real properties with
the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels
of land with a total land area of 6,639,810 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real properties
with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47
parcels of land with a total land area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of
P58,830.00. t. hqw
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit that the
totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as described in the
preceding paragraph, constitute one half of the properties described in Annex "A",
including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned to them
as their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the conjugal properties but
includes the paraphernal properties waiving now and forever any complaint or claim
they have or they may have concerning the amount, value, extension and location of
the properties that are allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any claim they
have or they may have over the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses
reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the heirs
acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of the surviving
spouse, including any amount in cash, are even less than the one- half that should
correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal
properties. In consequence they waive any claim that they have or may have over said
portion of said properties or any amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving
spouse, including any right or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal
properties of Do;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the surviving
spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the properties assigned or
adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The properties which were
reserved for them (the spouses) should be considered as his or her legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties and the fair compensation of his or her usufruct
on the properties that the surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag
be distributed in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her death unless said
properties of some of them have been disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving
spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the provision
contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other heirs, in the concept of
damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or adjudicated
to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his share or participation in
the estate or as his inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the
absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a Tinay separately
executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the provisions of which were in
conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their
holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime
among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in
the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would belong
to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children. The
holographic will of Do;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus Alsua, resident of and with
postal address in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the full possession
of my mental and physical faculties freely and spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in
my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish language which I speak, write and
understand, this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I
ordain and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don Jesus Alsua
and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still living and they are
Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5)
died during their minority, single and without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during our
conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able to acquire
conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands and urban lands
registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the
City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my spouse Don
Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal, and the other half, to
my children Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando
Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be understood, however, that the other half that
corresponds as legitime to my above named children have already been given to
them, pursuant to a document dated November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same
day, month and year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15;
Lib. 11; Series of 1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully
comply with each and every clause contained in the said document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the
same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children
mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my
spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without having to
post any bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this testament on this 5th
day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines. t.hqw
(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE
ALSUA
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on the same
day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the Court of First Instance
of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic wins which were
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No.
485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal
codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly
acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and
paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the
"Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses
Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs
under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto
each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired
subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever
belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four
children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the
surviving spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all
the properties reserved for themselves.
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my spouse and I have agreed to
divide the properties which we have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers
all the properties that I have partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition dated
November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No.
11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties which by reason of this testament I leave to my
husband as his share and the other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties
that up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao
of the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to
my husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave
to my aforecited children all the properties described in the above mentioned
Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one of
them and in the profits (fruits) expressed in the same, and in the event that the
properties granted to one or any of my children should exceed in quantity or value
those corresponding to another or others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the
same be divided among my children as their inheritance from the free portion of my
property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance the part
of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my
children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of
the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those
properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that it is my
will that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or would pertain to me, which
have not been disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among
my above-mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August
14,1956. t. hqw
(SGD.) FLORENTINA RALLA
DE ALSUA
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate
but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on
the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their
respective supplemental petitions for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate
proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils
thereto were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to serve
without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary
having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed his duties as
such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list
of all his remaining properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio
imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and
testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a)
it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his
properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of
1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the
children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as
to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his
death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a
bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a Tinay had been paid, all
her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of partition
executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the
partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court
approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings
on the estate of Do;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will of
November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the
Court of First Instance of Albay and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions
thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on
the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or
threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the main
beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was
secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of
the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of
1949 agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco,
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don
Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially
confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949 which had already been partially executed by
all the signatories thereto in the partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated November 14, 1959, the
Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She
then filed with the Probate Court an inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the
oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did not include some properties appearing in the
agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the
"Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus.
According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots
with a total land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total
assessed value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00
per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi
City including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an
assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of
P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua
and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest
to Francisco, the oppositors also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory
of the estate of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over the same, alleging
that she bought the properties from their father and presenting the two Deeds of Sale now being
assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural
land to Francisco by their father for the price of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962
evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the
oppositors filed Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with
damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special
Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on
November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay
promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which states: t. hqw
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS the Will
executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14, 1959, which had
been marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be
made the basis for division and distribution of the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds that the
sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are
lawful and valid sales and accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The
Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay to the defendant,
Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the appealed decision
in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus
t. hqw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set aside as it
hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special
Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case
No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are hereby
declared null and void, ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to
pay to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to
render an accounting of properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs
the net gain, in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this complaint, up to the
complete restoration of the properties pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208
of the New Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to the plaintiffs
and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four assigned errors, to wit: t. hqw
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the probate
court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents, oppositors to the
probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus
Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator Don Jesus
Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26, 1961 (Exh.
U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that the same is of no
moment. The controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his
will cannot be determined by acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in
formally agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don
Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings
No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court
not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which
petitioners claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private
respondents from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the case
of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50
O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when
he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We quote: t. hqw
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the
rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to
public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see
that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to
law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S., 502: t.hqw
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence
of the right of any living person, but to determine whether or not the
decedent has performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes,
which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral
duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the
departed, and he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit
from the performance of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the
duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the
public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person (Matter of
Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of Marriman's
Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217
app. Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's
Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the court is,
in effect, an additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of
the assets of the deceased. Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164
Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred in not allowing
the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that the
disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found
by the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be
disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows: t. hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a wilt at the
time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the respondent court itself
when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the due execution of the questioned will and
testament of Don Jesus, declaring: t. hqw
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will and testament
of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the
New Civil Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning accepts the findings of the
inferior court concerning the question,t. hqw
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About 2
weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a
new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous holographic will
which he made on January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated August 14,
1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and every page of said page he
wrote on each page the word "cancelado", and affixed his signature
thereon (Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He
then instructed Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with their
corresponding descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio Imperial,
Sr. and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge S, Imperial,
who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga
City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to
make a new will, and accordingly gave more detailed instructions as to
how he wanted to divide his properties among his four children. He
handed to them a list and on the left he indicated the name of the child to
whom the listed properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes
of the instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his
major language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are
always in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will and after
reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and after
making a few minor corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to
put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that the
signing of the will should be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of
November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon
Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is
a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of
Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence of
Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don Jesus was
requesting him to be one of the attesting witnesses to his will. Mr.
Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus, considered it an honor
to be so asked, and gladly went with the Imperials. They arrived at the
residence of Don Jesus at Ligao; Albay, almost ten o'clock of that
morning, and they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter
requested them to be seated at the usual receiving room on the ground
floor while he announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was on the
second floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to
be signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr.
Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in conversation.
Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across
the road from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already
informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will that
morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had
already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus,
without much delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the coming back
of Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the living room, namely:
Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr.
Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the
witnesses who testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in
bright and lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and
the merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made
a remark that it is about time to do what they were there for, and this was
followed by a more or less statement from Jesus, who said: t. hqw
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a ustedes que
esten presentes para ser testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y
testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo
documento tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro que, despues
de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos
todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of December 7,
1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on
another part of the same sala for convenience in signing because there
were chairs all around this table. The will which consisted of nine pages,
with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round table and the
signing began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial assisting each person signing
by indicating the proper place where the signature shall be written. Don
Jesus, as testator, signed first. After signing the original and the two
other sets, the three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who
signed as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed
next as another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished
signing all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who
also signed as the third attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don
Jesus signed ten times, one on the margin of each of the nine pages,
and at the end of the instrument proper. Each of the three attesting
witnesses (Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on each
set, one on the margin of each of the nine pages, one at the end of
the instrument proper and one below the attestation clause. The original
will was marked as Exh. A (or set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K)
and the triplicate of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya
were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge)
imperial. It was also clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the
will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and
witnessed said signing, and that when each of these three witnesses
was signing, Don Jesus and the two other attesting witnesses were
present and Witnessing said Signing. The signing by the testator and the
attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as
Notary Public with commission for the entire province of Albay, notarized
the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat which seal he brought along
that morning. After all the three sets were notarized, they were all given
back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same folder. At that
moment, it was already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of
them to lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp.
474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude that the
same had not complied with the requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code.
... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the lower court
declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will,
are supported by the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter,
review or revise the same. Hence, there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the
lower court and the respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts and such
facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at that
the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned last will
and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain details which were a
little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life." First was the fact that the
spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the
conjugal properties of the spouses between the spouses themselves and the children under the
terms and conditions and dispositions herein before stated and to implement its provisions, Don
Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their respective holographic wigs both
dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as
reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and
upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in due time the
partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by the probate court on July 6,
1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 was an
enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse, barring him
from violating said partition agreement, barring him from revoking his holographic will of January 5,
1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and
testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial Partition of
November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil
Code which are applicable hereto. These Articles provide as follows: t. hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of
man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances,
except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in
accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of
contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may be
deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one
who has made a prior will or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be
given a wider scope as to include in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new Civil Code, a
person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even before as long
as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article
1056 of the old Civil Code. The court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the
partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates, citing the case
of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5,
1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra, the
Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior will before the testator can partition
his properties among his heirs, and We quote the pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition made by
Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants
herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the
following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a
person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein
said article is found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of
his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be
tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in
the chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is
entirely different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents
during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their
property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference
to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect
to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos
of the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise
leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in conformity with the
fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because
neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they
simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which,
otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to carry into
effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and
the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts
inter vivos or by last will, must be understood in accordance with this distinction. The
Idea is to divide the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This
designation constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect after his death,
and said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is the expression of
the testator's last will and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes
the second part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator
may make this division in the same will or in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With
these words, the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall
hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the partition and
not to the effects thereof, which means that, for purposes of partition the formal
solemnities which must accompany every testament or last will are not necessary.
Neither is it necessary to observe the special for. realities required in case of
donations, because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of
dividing those which already have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos,
partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for
by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when
the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his
property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A
person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a
donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish
between one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will
to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial partition of
November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as against public
policy had been validly ratified by the holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955
and his codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who
executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of
the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not
warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as
quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of
Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the
extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not
revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary
provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void
and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future
inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs
made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained specific
designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial compliance with
the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there
could have been no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of
Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among the
children for the simple reason that the property or properties were not specifically described in the
public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows: t. hqw
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and in the
amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it
shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall
be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which may be
disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her share in
such portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to
the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don
Jesus and Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only one-half
of their combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and cannot anymore be
revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with
regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was distributed in
accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956.
It must be stressed here that the distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win
and codicil, independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the
same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills and codicils jointly would
be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because
upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay and
We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the
husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her
holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made in the fourth clause but it only provided
that, to wit: t. hqw
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado este mi
testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada
en el parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la
otra mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that "Should I acquire new
properties after the execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse
and above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is,
one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts." From the above-
quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don Jesus whatever new properties
Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in the free
portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the codicil: t. hqw
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se sacara de ni
cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los que no he dispuesto aun en
favor de mis hijos en la escritura de reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la mitad
de gananciales que le corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos
bienes que se adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo declaro que es
mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero que me pertenecen y me
pudieran pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre
mis herederos mencionados despues de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states: t. hqw
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance the part
of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my
children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of
the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those
properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that it is my
will that any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or would pertain to me, which
have not been disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among
my above-mentioned heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in
the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige
her husband to give equally to the children, upon his death, all such properties she was
bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on November 14, 1959
in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow
the properties equally to the children, it follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to
Don Jesus under her holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by
any condition obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949
and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the
same provisions as those of Do;a Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that
Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such,
would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A win may be
revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void."
There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will
and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case
at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate
only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And
secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his
property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not
prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole
Alsua estate is being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted to the remaining
estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil resulting in all such properties becoming the
properties of Don Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his
previous holographic will and codicil, by making another win expressly cancelling and revoking the
former, the next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of the provisions of the contested will.
Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will
may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon
the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: t.hqw
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed to
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for ought that appears in the record,
in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will probability exists that the case win
come up once again before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a behalf that we might as well meet head-on the time
of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 contained an express
revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement
requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken
into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees
to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be
acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming
Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties distributed to the
children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus does
not show that the former had in fact been included in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed
that the intention of Don Jesus in his last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the
Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion of the conjugal assets
totally left to his free disposal and that which he received as his inheritance from Do;a Tinay. The
legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or
intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to
Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was,
We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so.
We have clearly laid down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: t. hqw
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own Idea of a just
distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly
expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect
what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased person.
The only functions of the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the
deceased as manifested in the wig. Once that intention has been determined through
a careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been
violated, it is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or
unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment upon the
motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated, nothing in the
law restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and
secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward process of
her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those who
expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly benefited and
favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who would have been entitled to an equal
share under the extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as
a man of culture and honor and would not snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the
other as one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had been diminished
considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of age and in view of his
weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his properties had been left to his
assistant Madarieta who, for his part received instructions from Francisco and her husband, Joseph
Betts. According to the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not legally tenable. Under
Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere weakness of mind or
partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not render a person incapable of making a
will. t. hqw
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration
generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental
capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of
mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will,
provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he
is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and under Article 800, the law presumes that
every person is of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the
acceptance by the respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of
the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will
was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned from
the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a
mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private
respondents. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave
detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his children
by means of a list of his properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will
prepared by his lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at
his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which
ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by
Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose
of their meeting or gathering, to wit: t. hqw
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para ser
testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y
encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other details which, in the words
of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such
as the fact that Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he
had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime, the alleged redundant and
unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the properties under question to petitioner
Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been bequeathed to her in the will of
November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the basis for finding that
Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his other children with less favor, and that he was more sympathetic
to Francisca so as to or forget the former depriving them of benefits already given to them and
rewarding the latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to violate
his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to reconcile
with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which,
however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that
Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous holographic
win and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere speculation which depends
entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law does not require that a will be
probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or
unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of
the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal
ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever
reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already
assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus desired to
have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his
death may be a reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no
certainty that such was actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may
offer or as difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it
can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for annulment of the two Deeds
of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity.
Private respondents mainly contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no
actual consideration paid. They further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact and,
therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. On the other hand,
petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the respondent court to set aside on appeal the
factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive;
and this same principle applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower
court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should
not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact"
described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are based
upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the
absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions
to the general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be
reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil.
15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27,
1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety &
Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion as to the nullity of
the contested sales was not supported by the evidence on record and adduced during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed of sale over
agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the
consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of
Don Jesus, not assailed as a forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness,
again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a
deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also bears the signature of Don Jesus, also
admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated August 26, 1961 and signed by Don
Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No.
0252 in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness of
his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November
26, 1962, in the amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5)
Exhibit "X-1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated November 26,
1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 "
and "X-5 ", endorsements on the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures
thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue
Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging the receipt of BPI
Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in payment of Balance of
Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are convinced and satisfied from this array
of documentary evidence that in fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter,
Francisca for the total consideration of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being without cause
or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court upheld said
claim on the basis that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the
speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to
change his mind as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children. The two
contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and
"W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time during this long drawn-out
litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also
sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the private
respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment of the
consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his
allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of Francisco made
payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof,
and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used
Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of the
given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the
case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil
Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience,
considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the subject properties
and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love
must be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside.
The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case
No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.
Melencio Herrera, J., concur in the result.