Journal of Contemporary Asia and Europe, Vol.3, No.1-2 (Jan-December) 2009, pp.

25-38

India’s Naval Strategy in the Changing

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean
Dr. Mohammed Khalid
Department of Evening Studies
Panjab University. Chandigarh
mdkhalidchd@yahoo.com

Narrowly defined, strategy means “the art of the general” (from Greek strategos).
In its military aspect the term relates to stratagems by which a general seeks to deceive an
enemy, plan the campaigns and the way he moves and disposes his forces in war. It is the
art of projecting and directing campaigns in the naval warfare. 1 Nations add strategy to
adjust and correlate political, economic, technological, and psychological factors along
with military elements in the management of their national policies. Due to this addition,
demarcation between strategy as a purely military phenomena and national strategy as a
whole has blurred since 19th century and this distinction has become even less clear in the
20th century when nations became more independent and line between war and peace less
clearly definable.2
Naval strategy is planning and conduct of war at sea, movement of fleets and
deception of enemy. Naval strategy of any maritime power changes with the change in
the geopolitical settings. Revolutionary technological changes and politico-economic
metamorphosis have a direct bearing on land-sea relationships.3 Changes in naval
strategy depend on the way the radius of action for ships increases (or decreases);
technical factors which augments the endurance of fleets through propulsion of ships;
economic dynamics of the region; geographical factors which influence the national
policies; and richness of the sea bed and its sub-soil which become assets and stakes to be
protected. Thus the role of sea takes new dimension with the change in geopolitics –
global, regional and local. The naval strategy is an important aspect of policy planning of
a nation and is carried out by the navy which is the organized maritime military force of a
nation. It includes personals, air and missile forces, ship yards and shore bases for the
building and maintenance of fleets. Navy has been used in different ways throughout

1
history. It was used in explorations and discovery in the 15th century, to discover sea
routes to India, China, and the Americas in the 15th and 16th centuries, to carry out trade
and commerce and colonization throughout 17th through 19th centuries. Navies were used
by different European nations in their national rivalries for control of sea routes and
expand their domains as colonial powers. It was extensively used in the world wars and a
deterrent during the Cold War. In the late 20th and early 21st century, along with its
traditional role it is used for humanitarian operations, coastal defenses, secure the sea
lanes of communications, check drug paddling, and fight out terrorism and sea piracy.4
India has a maritime history of about 5000 years and first tidal dock in the country
was probably built in 2300 BC during the Indus Valley Civilisation on the Gujarat coast.
Indians had been well versed about sea routes and naval expeditions, ship building and
use of compass (Matsya yantra) for navigation in the 4th and 5th centuries AD. Mauryan
Empire had a state department of waterways under a superintendent of ships
(navadhyoksha).5 In the later years there existed sea lanes between India and
neighbouring lands for trade and commerce which helped spread influence of Indian
culture and religions to Southeast Asia, the islands of Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Maldives and
the Arab world. The Indian rulers like Satvahanas (who ruled most parts of central India
during 28 BC to 250 AD) and Cholas of Tamil Nadu sent naval expeditions to Burma and
Malay Peninsula during the 10th and 13th centuries. Vijayanagara Empire of Karnataka
had a strong navy throughout 14th to 16th centuries. Kalingas of Orissa controlled most of
the sea routes in the Bay of Bengal and established trade with ports across Southeast
Asia. Marathas in the 17th century and the Mughal navy under Shaista Khan had
formidable flotillas used for various purposes.6
Indian navy was created as Hon’ble East India Company’s Marine in 1612 at
Surat (Gujarat) with a purpose to protect Company’s trade. East India Company took
control of Bombay in 1665 and made it as its head quarters in 1672. By 1686, most of
the British commerce shifted to Bombay and the name of Hon’ble East India Company's
Marine was changed to Bombay Marine. The role of Bombay marine expanded to protect
the trade off Bombay. It was also given the task to fight the rival Portuguese, Dutch and
the French, and keep a check on the interlopers and pirates of various nationalities. The
Bombay Marine was involved in combat against the Marathas (in 1775-1782, 1803-1805,

2
and 1817-1818 wars) and the Sidis (on the west coast of India).7 In the Burma War of
1824 against the Konbaung Dynasty Bombay Marine actively participated.8 The Marine
was renamed as Her Majesty's Indian Navy in 1830, and with the capture of Aden in
1839 the British instituted the Indus Flotilla to meet the manifold commitments of Navy.9
In the China War of 1840 Indian navy was part of expedition of warships British sent to
quell the rebellion by the Chinese.10 Navy underwent many changes of its nomenclature
as it was again renamed the Bombay Marine from 1863 to 1877 and then Her Majesty's
Indian Marine. At that time, the Marine had an Eastern Division based at Calcutta under
the Superintendent, Bay of Bengal, to look after the British commercial interests in the
eastern flank of Indian Ocean. A Western Division at Bombay under the Superintendent
Arabian Sea to protect the trade routes and sea lanes in the Arabian Sea and western
Indian Ocean.11 In recognition to the services rendered during various campaigns, its title
was changed to Royal Indian Marine in 1892. Throughout these years, Indian Ocean was
a ‘British lake’ and British Navy was its unchallenged master.
During the First World War navy with a fleet of minesweepers and vassals
patrolled the sea, ferried troops and carry war stores to Iraq, Egypt and East Africa and
clear mines. With the expansion of naval outreach, the Royal Indian Marine was re-
organized into the Royal Indian Navy in 1934 to look after the coastal defence while
Britain’s Royal Navy continued to look after overall maritime defence of India.12 It had
one naval base at Bombay and training establishments scattered in other parts of India.
When the Second World War started in 1939, the Royal Indian Navy consisted of eight
warships which included five sloops, one trawler, one survey ship and one patrol craft. It
had 114 officers and 1732 ratings (sailors were called ratings). All the six rating training
schools (Gunnery, Seamanship, Signals, Anti-submarine, Boys Training Establishment
and Mechanical Training Establishment) were concentrated inside the Naval Dockyard of
Bombay. Officers were sent to Britain for basic and advanced training in all disciplines.13
During the War, the Royal Indian Navy underwent a phenomenal expansion.14
Small vessels were introduced to serve as minesweepers and patrol crafts, first Basset
class trawler (built in Garden Reach Workshop Calcutta) was commissioned in 1941, and
first Bangor class fleet minesweeper (also built in India) entered service in 1943. Sloops,
harbor defence motor launches, landing craft, and minesweepers were brought from

3
Britain, America and Australia. The naval base and dockyard at Bombay was
modernized. At the end of War in 1945, the Navy had seven sloops, four anti submarine
frigates, eight corvettes, fourteen minesweepers, sixteen trawlers, one survey ship, two
depot ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, one hundred and fifty landing craft, two hundred
harbour crafts and forty five defence launches. The number of personnel had risen to
3014 officers and 27,433 ratings which mostly served in shore establishments.15
After the war, the British assessed that their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean
in the times to come were the unhindered oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, control of
the eastern and western approaches to India, air communications to Iraq, Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka), Burma and Malaya, and control of the seas and island territories. They also
understood the strategic position of India in the Indian Ocean and its importance for
unhindered British communications with New Zealand and Australia.16 The British
government in India viewed the Royal Indian Navy as a `Dominion Navy', responsible:
primarily for the safety of Indian and Empire shipping in the sea areas contiguous to
India's coastline, their approaches and the trade routes in the Indian Ocean; and for the
combined operational training of the Indian Army's specialist amphibious formations,
providing escort and assault ships and craft for landing these formations on hostile
shores; and in conjunction with the Air Force, to ensure the timely neutralization of any
foreign invading force attempting a land on the shores of India.17
The British anticipated that India after independence would be a member of the
British Commonwealth and would be required to protect the sea routes and ports while
main responsibility for keeping open the sea communications would rest with the Royal
Navy. To ensure the defence of her bases and the security of shipping, India, in common
with other countries of the Empire, would, therefore need a Navy to protect coastal
waters from submarine, mining and air attack and to assist in the protection of trade in the
ocean shipping routes. The British viewed Russia as the only major power likely to
seriously threaten India and therefore was taken as the basis for estimating the forces
India would require for her defence. India's central position in the Indian Ocean would
therefore require an increased naval force especially for larger warships as compared to
the small units which the Royal Indian Navy had.18 The British estimates of these threat
perceptions became unfounded as it had to grant independence to India in 1947.

4
 At the time of Independence, the Royal Indian Navy consisted of 32 vessels
suitable only for coastal patrol and insufficient to patrol its long coastline, let alone play a
meaningful strategic role in the Indian Ocean.19 It had 11,000 officers and men. The
senior officers were drawn from the Royal Navy. The prefix 'Royal' was dropped on 26
January 1950 with India becoming a Republic. Realising the importance of naval
strength, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had once stated, “…We cannot afford to be weak at
sea. History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean, has in the first
instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy, and in the second, India’s very
independence itself”. In spite of this understanding about the importance of navy, it
remained relatively neglected of the three services after independence. May be the Indian
leadership perceived that the bulk of the threats to India were land-based.20
First major operations by the Indian Navy were taken up in December 1961 when
it launched ‘Operation Vijay’ to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from the Portuguese
occupation. Indian Navy demonstrated its surveillance and patrolling exercise (Operation
Chutney) and deployed naval task force to control the seaward approaches to the
Portuguese Indian territories, immobilize units of the Portuguese Navy inside Goa
harbour and successfully land its forces there.21 During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, India
restricted its naval power to just patrolling the sea. On the other hand, Pakistan put its
navy to good use, and attacked India’s coastal regions.22Between 1947 and 1964; fiscal
constraints prevented India the implementation of ambitious plans for naval expansion.
Consequently, many of the vessels became obsolete or of little operational value. With
the growth of Indian trade and commerce and growing realization of offshore assets
within the 2.02 million sq. km. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), first efforts were made
for naval rearmament in the 1964-69 Defence Plan. 23 It called for the replacement of
India's aging fleet and the development of a submarine service.
India had developed Mazagon Dock shipyard (after government took it over in
1960) for the local production with British help. Soviet Union also offered support for a
planned naval expansion. It also supplied naval vessels, support systems, and training on
extremely favorable terms. By the mid-1960s, Soviet Union virtually replaced Britain as
India's principal naval supplier.24 Due to its expansion; Indian naval planners could make
a definite strategy for the future role of Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean. During the war

5
between India and Pakistan in 1971, Navy demonstrated this strategy and positioned its
aircraft carrier INS Vikrant in the Bay of Bengal to block access to Eastern Pakistan (now
Bangladesh). Long-range submarine PNS Ghazi sent by Pakistan to attack INS Vikrant
was trapped and destroyed along the Andhra Pradesh coast. Fighter pilots on board INS
Vikrant later attacked Eastern Pakistan and destroyed several Pakistani ships and airfields
of its armed forces. Several Indian naval destroyer ships cruised all the way to the
Karachi port and carried the attacks successfully.25
For the protection of India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, Indian Navy
was divided into three regional commands. The Western Naval Command headquartered
in Bombay, the Southern Naval Command in Kochi (Cochin, Kerala), on the Arabian
Sea, and the Eastern Naval Command in Vishakhapatnam, (Andhra Pradesh), on the Bay
of Bengal. Additionally, it developed important bases in Calcutta and Goa.26 In 1963-64,
a resident naval officer’s organization was set up at Port Blair with a naval garrison and
some transport and communication facilities. During the 1980s, Indian naval power grew
significantly and naval facilities at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, the Nicobar
Islands, and Lakshadweep were significantly upgraded and modernized. In 1985, first
naval air station was commissioned in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in 2001
India set up a strategic command to make its Navy more effective in the Bay of Bengal
and the Arabian Sea.27 Navy now was not merely to protect the coastal waters but play a
larger role in the Indian Ocean. Due to its expansion and development Navy could be
capable to thwart a coup (operation Cactus) attempt by Tamil rebels in 1988 who had
hijacked a vessel, in which, one of the hostages included a senior Maldivian minister.28 In
October 1999, the Navy along with the Indian Coast Guard rescued a hijacked Japanese
cargo ship, ‘Alandro Rainbow’, from pirates.29 During the Kargil conflict between India
and Pakistan in 1999, Navy launched Operation Talwar blocking the naval sea-trade
routes to not only safeguard India's maritime assets from a possible Pakistani naval
attack, but also to deter Pakistan from initiating a full-scale war.30
After the end of Cold War, in the early 1990s navy undertook major
modernization programme which included the induction of more destroyers, frigates and
hydrographic survey ships. It planned to build warships, submarines, missile-firing
nuclear submarine and a 17,000-ton air defense ship capable of carrying between twelve

6
and fifteen aircraft. To build a modern navy India made indigenous efforts to remain self-
reliant. Construction of ships and development of major sub systems, sensors and weapon
systems --with the help of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
and Defence Public Sector Understandings (PSUs)-- made India self reliant in its naval
capability in many ways. Commissioning of the indigenously built destroyer, INS Delhi
on November 15, 1997, and INS Mysore on June 2, 1999 enabled India to become a
builder’s Navy from a buyer’s one.31
Focused on strategy to develop a blue water capability, the Indian Navy began to
procure new weapon systems in 2003 and started participation in exercises. Efforts to
procure aircraft carriers such as Admiral Gorshkov and other additional carriers could be
seen in that direction. Share of navy in country’s defence budget increased. For example,
Navy was allocated approximately 18% (US$3.57 billion) of the total defense budget in
2003-2004 so that it could replace old vessels as fast as possible. Navy also
commissioned its first indigenously produced ship, INS Shivalik and two Russian-
produced frigates, INS Talwar and INS Trishul.32 By 2010 it has been intended to
develop a strategic force, centered on two aircraft carrier battle groups, nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) and strategic bomber/maritime strike aircraft, to play a dominant role
in the Indian Ocean Region. Navy is focusing east wards to counter the influence of
Chinese Navy and plans to stretch out to Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean.33
On the occasion of the first ever fleet review held on the Eastern seaboard
(February 2006), President A P J Abdul Kalam, observed that “the road to becoming a
regional power would have to begin with engaging East and South East Asia first. Nearly
40 percent of the world population lives in our region. The economic growth of this
region depends on the heavy transportation in the Indian Ocean, particularly the Malacca
Strait and the Navy has an increasing role to provide necessary support for carrying out
these operations”.34 Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash stressed that the economic
resurgence of India depends on maritime peace and that India is now poised to be a
regional power.35 The Navy recently reiterated its interest in receiving a larger role in the
security of the Malacca Strait, which in is a larger security responsibility in the region.36
The Indian has readied itself for future with a focus on Design and production of an
indigenous net platform on which the network-centric operations will be based. It is

7
concentrating on the procedures so that the Air Force and the Navy can operate jointly. It
is reducing the number of types of warships, to reduce logistic complexity and improve
ship availability. Navy is instituting a programme for integration of the submarine force
into the network and equip submarines with communication systems with minimal loss of
stealth. Development of precision guided weapons and interoperable radar system
network between all combatant units are also underway.37
Having a 5:1 advantage over the Pakistan Navy in terms of combat vessels, air
assets and manpower, India does not consider it a maritime threat. It is more concerned to
have a strong presence in the eastern South China Sea to counter China’s growing
influence in the Indian Ocean, Coco Island (Myanmar)38 and China’s help to develop
Gwadar port on Pakistan's western seaboard which can provide China an access to the
Persian Gulf.39 Another major challenge for the Indian Navy in coming years could be the
rising menace of terrorism which Pakistan is abetting as a proxy war on India since the
late 80s. Terrorism is no longer restricted to land; it has its manifestations at sea also.
Threat of Maritime terrorism became evident in 2000 when Al Qaeda terrorists carried
out a suicide bombing against the US Navy destroyer (USS Cole) while it was harbored
in the port of Aden. Seventeen American sailors were killed.40 There is always a
possibility of further attacks by Al Qaeda to disrupt world trade. A string of hijacks by
Somali pirates along the Gulf of Eden shows the vulnerability of merchant ships in the
Indian Ocean. Increasing commercial activities in the Gulf of Mannar (an arm of the
Laccadive Sea in the Indian Ocean) make it the most preferred destination for pirates and
terrorists like LTTE, and other groups that have used the sea route to attack targets
around the Indian Ocean. The use of sea rout by Pakistan based terrorists to attack
Mumbai in November 2008 makes it imperative for Indian navy to adopt new techniques
to tackle this menace. An overwhelming proportion of India's imports, especially oil,
comes by sea. Control over sea lanes of communication is vital. All this requires
continuous review of maritime strategy and a naval fleet that can protect India’s “rightful
domain” stretching from Africa's east coast to the western shores of Australia.41
India's "Look-East" policy has brought in increased economic and strategic ties
with Southeast Asian countries in the recent years. India is vying to be part of Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation. This is not possible if India lacks in naval strategy and

8
planning. A large share of India's trade passes through the Malacca Strait, making the
waterway a crucial security concern for India in view of the threat of piracy and maritime
terrorism. Even US recognize the need for a friendly naval presence in the dangerous
waters of the eastern Indian Ocean, particularly along the Straits of Malacca.
The Indian Ocean is a very important body of waters as it provides major sea
routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.
An estimated 40% of the world's offshore oil production generates from the Indian Ocean
and its waters carry a heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oil
fields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. Its fish are of great and growing importance to
the bordering countries for domestic consumption and export. Large reserves of
hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and
Western Australia. Beach sands rich in heavy minerals and other offshore deposits are
actively exploited by bordering countries, particularly India, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, and Thailand.42 To meet the emerging challenges and protect other economic
interests, India had to build a mighty naval force which now has approximately 55,000
personnel on active duty, including 5,000 members of the naval aviation wing and 2,000
marine commandos. It currently operates more than 155 vessels, including the INS
Viraat, the only aircraft carrier in Asia carrying jet fighters. India has developed
considerable wherewithal considered vital for any navy which seeks to establish its
authority over the seas. After Russian aircraft carrier (Admiral Gorshkov) joins the Navy,
it will become fifth largest and one of the best equipped navies in the world.43

In the Indian Ocean Region, India’s concerns also include the promotion of a
shared understanding of issues and concerns relevant to maritime security and stability. It
has shown concern to develop doctrines, strategies, procedures, organizational and
logistic systems to promote the provision of speedy, responsive, and effective
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief (HADR) throughout the Indian Ocean
Region.44 India feels that maritime security protection are essential pre-requisites to
secure the offshore assets within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), fisheries and deep
sea interests, major and minor harbours and seaward security of long coastline and island
territories. That is why Indian Navy played a major role in rescue operations during the
2004 tsunami, 45 sent warships to rescue Indians trapped in Lebanon during the 2006 war

9
between Israel and the Hezbollah guerrilla group.46 It is operating from Strait of Malacca
to the Gulf of Aden, patrolling pirate infested east coast of Africa about 2,900 km. away
from the home ports. Navy has recently rescued an Indian ship from pirates and shoot
them. It saved a distressed Saudi Arabian chemical tanker, fired its machine guns at them
and sent three speedboats filled with pirates fleeing for the lawless Somali coast.47

As part of naval strategy, to demonstrate its naval might and provide exposure to
its naval forces, India conducts naval exercises with other countries to increase naval
interoperability and strengthen cooperative security relationship. Some such exercises
take place annually like the ‘Varuna’ with the French Navy held at east coast and aimed
at facilitating mutual learning and practices. ‘Indra’ is held as biennial Russian-Indian
naval exercise aimed at practicing cooperative engagement to enforce maritime law and
counter piracy, terrorism and drug smuggling. ‘Malabar’ exercises are conducted with the
U.S. Navy off the Goa coast. Indian Navy holds joint exercise named ‘Konkan’ with the
Royal Navy of United Kingdom.48 Apart from the joint exercises with navies from outside
the region; Indian navy has conducted naval exercises with the countries of Indian Ocean
littoral. For instance, Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercises (SIMBEX-08) are
held on Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal every year.49
Indian Navy conducted joint naval exercise with China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy in 2003. Apart from the Indian Ocean, India has steadily shown presence in
South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. In 2007, Navy conducted naval exercise with
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S Navy in the Pacific. India has also signed an
agreement with Japan in October 2008 for joint naval patrolling in the Asia-Pacific
region.50 Exercises are held with Vietnam, Philippines and New Zealand. In 2007, India
and South Korea decided to conduct naval exercise every year. India held the first Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) with an objective to provide a forum for all the littoral
states of the Ocean to cooperate on mutually agreed areas for better security in the region.
Since 2000, its naval ships have made port calls in Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Greece,
Oman, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, South Africa, Kenya, Qatar,
Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and some other countries between 2005
and 2007.51 Indian Navy Team undertook a daring mission in 2006 to ski traverse

10
Antarctica --the Geographic South Pole and it became 1st Submariners in the World to
reach the South Pole

To boost defence cooperation with its eastern neighbours, Indian Navy hosts
MILAN since 1995 which is a meeting of Asia-Pacific navies to discuss regional
maritime security. Since its inception, the exercise has continued to build greater mutual
understanding and closer cooperation between participating Navies. This multi-nation
naval exercise off the Andaman coast is annually held in which Navies of Singapore,
Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand participate. The
exercise has continued to build greater mutual understanding and closer cooperation
among the participating Navies. MILAN has grown from a small congregation of five
nations to nine in 2006 with 20 ships attending. In 2008, 13 nations were invited to
participate and for the first time Australia deployed a ship to participate in the
multinational exercise.52

In the changed post Cold war global environment, future role of the Indian navy
calls for a balanced maritime defence force, increase in aircraft carrier force from two to
three and extend the reach and operational areas into the South China Sea. Bilateral
exercises with South Korea and Vietnam (in October and November 2000) fit within
India's shifting definition of its naval areas of concern which now extends from the north
of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. India’s move to expand its operations and
radius of action and establishment of an expeditionary-capable force is akin to changing
economic dynamics in the Ocean region. With the recent and ongoing up gradation and
inductions, the Indian Navy is on its way to become a truly blue-water navy. It is already
among the most powerful in the region, and poised to be a formidable force in the Indian
Ocean Region. To ensure a secure and peaceful environment in the contiguous waters,
and further its political, economic, diplomatic and military objectives, Indian Navy has
truly changed its profile with the changing geopolitics of the Indian Ocean --from a
traditional coast guard to one of the world's largest sea forces.

11
References:

1. Corbett, Julian S: Preinciples of Maritime Strategy, Classics of Sea power series.

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

2. Bateman, Sam and Sherwood, Dick (ed) Strategic Change and Naval Roles,
Issues for a medium Naval Power, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, 1993.
3 Maritime strategy seems to begin with Alferd T. Mahan who wrote the influence
of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. However different scholars have used the
term in the context of world domination. Maritime strategy is the total response of
a nation to the ocean around it for which sea power is required to achieve
economic, political and military goals at sea. See, Rai, Ranjit: A Nation and its
Navy at War, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1984, p. 44; also see, Potter,E. B
(ed): Sea Power, A Naval History, Naval Institute Press, 1981, pp. 1-13.
4 Birmingham, David: A Concise History of Portugal, Cambridge University Press,
2003, p.33; Littlehales, G.W, “The Navy as a Motor in Geographical and
Commercial Progress”, Journal of American Geographical Society of New York,
1899; Headrick, D.R: The Tools of Empir: technology and European imperialism
in the nineteenth century,OUP,1981; Hart, Jonathan: Comparing Empires:
European Colonialism from Portuguese Expansion to the Spanish-American War,
Palgrave, Macmillan, 2008; “Navy Global Involvement”, see at,
http://www.navy.com/about/navylife/onduty/navyglobalinvolvement.
5 Chakarvarti, P.C, “Naval Warfare in Ancient India”, The Indian Historical
Quarterly, Vol.4, No. 4, 1930, pp. 645-664; Chaudhri, K.N: Trade and
Civilisation in the Indian Ocean, Cambridge University Press, 1985; Corn,
Charles and Glasserman, Debbie: The Scents of Eden: A History of the Spice
Trade, Kodansha America, 1999.
6 For history of Indian Navy, see, “Indian Navy”, at
http://indiannavy.nic.in/history.htm
7 “The Genesis of Indian Navy”, see at, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com?NAVY?
history/1600s/Genesis
8 Hall, D G E: Europe and Burma, Oxford University Press, 1945: Rough, Harold:
The Victorians at War, 1815-1914, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2004, p. 66-68.
9 Gavin, R.J: Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967, C. Hurst & Co. 1975, pp. 62-
90.
10 “Indian Navy”, See at, http://indiannavy.nic.in/genesis.htm
11 Ibid.,
12 The Royal Indian Marine participated in the First World War and expanded
considerably. But the end of the war brought severe retrenchment and the Royal
Indian Marine was reduced to a very small force capable of only defence duties of
a few ports. A large number of Indians therefore lost their jobs. The maritime
defence of India was entrusted to the Royal Navy depriving Indians of valuable
seafaring experience. On the insistence of some prominent citizens, the British
relented to introduce a small fighting force in the name of the Royal Indian Navy.

12
 See, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/categoryblog/25-tryst-with-
destiny.html
13 “The Growth of the Navy till1965”, accessed at,
http://indiannavy.gov.in/t2t2e/Trans2Trimph/chapters/1_navy's%20growth%20till
%201965-1.htm
14 Prasad, Bisheshwar (ed): Royal Indian Navy, 1939-1945, The Official History of
the Indian Forces in the Second World War, Combined Inter-Services Historical
Section (India & Pakistan), 1964
15 See, “Military History”, at, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/in-
navy-history.htm
16 Aldrich, Richard James, “British strategy and the end of Empire: South Asia,
1945-51, in, British Intelligence, Strategy, and Cold War, 1945-51, Routledge,
London, 1992, pp. 275-307.
17 The Chiefs of the Staff Committee Report of 1944 on the Size and Composition
of the Post War Forces in India, Accessed from, “The Growth of the Navy till
1965”, http://irfc-nausena.nic.in/modules.php?
name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=182
19 For the naval strength of Navy at the time of India’s independence, see,
ttp://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14510630
21 Khera, P. N: Operation Vijay: The Liberation of Goa and Other Portuguese
Colonies in India, Historical section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India;
New York Times, 19th December, 1961, p.32; Arthur MarkWeisburd: Use of
Force: The Practice of States Since World War II, Penn State Press, 1997, pp. 35-
37.
22 Dittmer, Lowell: South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and
China, M E Shar, 2005, pp. 77; Lome, John Kavic: India’s Quest for Security:
defence policies, 1947-1965, University of California Press, 1969, p. 190;
Hiranandani, Gulab, “THE INDIAN END OF TELESCOPE: India and its Navy”,
Naval War College Review, vol. LV, No. 2, spring 2002.
23 “Indian Navy”, see at, http://www.defenceindia.com/defenceind/indian_navy.html
24 Ibid.,
25 “THE INDIAN NAVY AT WAR: 1971, Blockade from the seas”, for details see,
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/Banerjee.html
26 For command structure of Indian Navy, see, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/Commands.html
27 Purpose behind setting up this command was to protect trade routes, check gun
running, smuggling, piracy on high seas, narcotics trade and prevent the use of
some of the uninhabited islands as dumping grounds by the LTTE, the
Myanmarese rebels and even suspected Indonesian rebels. For the creation and
Andaman and Nicobar Command, see,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/anc.htm
28 ‘operation Cactus”, see at, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-
FORCES/Army/History/1970s/Operation-Cactus.html; and,
http://armedforces.nic.in/navy/cactus.htm
29 “Indonesians convicted for hijacking Japanese ship”, Asian Tribune, Vol.6, No.
16, 26 February, 2003.

13
 30 Major General Ashok K Mehta (retd),”India's national interest had been made
coterminous with maritime security”, see, News at,
http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ashok.htm; Shyam Parekh,”Indian Navy
celebrates its silent Kargil victory”, DNA Read the World, Wednesday,
November 30, 2005
31 For details see, http://www.defenceindia.com/defenceind/indian_navy.html
32 Indian Navy’s share in the country’s defense budget was 16.7% in 2003-04,
which shows that Indian navy in the early 21st century is into the process of
colossal betterments. See, “Indian Navy in Early Twenty-First Century”, at,
http://www.indianetzone.com/37/indian_navy_early_twenty-first_century.htm
33 “India challenges China in South Chin Sea”, Asia Times Online, April 27, 2000,
accessed from, http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BD27Df01.html
34 Balalji Reddy, ”Indian Navy eyes China in the east – plans to go global to make
its presence felt” India daily, see at,
http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/6937.asp; THE NAVAL FLEET REVIEW,
VISAKHAPATNAM, 12.2.2006, see at,
http://indiannavy.nic.in/NewPfr06/FleetReviewReport.htm
35 For Admiral Arun Parkash’s views on the importance of modernization of Indian
Navy, see, The Hindu, 11 February, 2006; Indian Defence Review, vol 21.3,
2008; Narendra Kaushal: “A Presidential Node”, at,
http://mod.nic.in/samachar/march1-06/h8.htm
36 Gurpreet S Khurana, ”Safeguarding the Malacca Straits”, Sahara Times, New
Delhi, 01 January 2005, p. 10.
37 Admiral Madhvendra Singh (Retd),” The Indian Navy in 2020”, Security
Research Review, 21 June, 2006.
38 China has set up electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island (Myanmar)
in the Bay of Bengal, some 300 km south of the Burmese mainland. Chinese
Army is also building a base on Small Coco Island in the Alexandra Channel
between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea north of India's Andaman
Islands. These two islands, which have been leased to China since 1994, are
located at a crucial point in traffic routes between the Bay of Bengal and the Strait
of Malacca. The Coco Islands are thus ideally located for monitoring Indian naval
and missile launch facilities in Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the south and
movements of the Indian Navy and other navies throughout the eastern Indian
Ocean. The Burmese government however denies Chinese presence and calls it
rumor that it has leased the islands to China. See,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/china/coco.htm; Selth Andrew,
”Irrawaddy: Chinese whispers: The Great Coco Island mystery”, BurmaNet
News, 9 January,2007.
39 Gwadar is located on the southwestern coast of Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea. It is
strategically located between three increasingly important regions: the oil-rich
Middle East, heavily populated South Asia and the economically emerging and
resource-laden region of Central Asia. In 2007, the government of Pakistan
handed over port operations to PSA Singapore for 25 years, and gave it the status
of a Tax Free Port for the following 40 years. The main investors in the project

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 are Pakistani Government and People's Republic of China. See, Niazi, Tarique,
“Gwadar: China’s Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean, AFAR, 28 February, 2005.
40 It was a suicide bombing attack against the U.S. Navy destroyer on 12 October
2000 while it was harbored in the port of Aden. Seventeen American sailors were
killed. See, http://www.cargolaw.com/2000nightmare_cole.html
41 “India and the Emerging Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region”, accessed from,
http://www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/030819-21ES.htm
42 Berlin, Donald L: INDIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, see, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/History/2000s/Donald.pdf
43 “Indian Navy Today”, for detail see, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/Link4.html
44 During the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake crisis, the Indian Navy deployed 27
ships, 19 helicopters, 6 naval aircraft and over 5000 naval personnel in disaster
relief operations. These deployments were a part of various area-specific relief
operations including Operation Madath in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu, Operation Sea Waves in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
Operation Castor in Maldives, Operation Rainbow in Sri Lanka and Operation
Gambhir in Indonesia. This was one of the largest relief mobilizations that the
Indian Navy had undertaken. Indian Naval groups were able to start large scale
rescue operations in neighboring countries within 12 hours from the time of the
tsunami, and was the first foreign navy to reach the affected areas. See,
Giridharadas, Anand: India is projecting its military power, International Herald
Tribune: Asia Pacific, 22 September. 2008;
45 “Tsunami diplomacy improves India's global image”, Indian Express, 9 February,
2005;

46 An estimated 12,000 Indians lived in Lebanon. During the conflict, India

redirected four of its naval vessels to Lebanon to evacuate Indian citizens. These
ships travelled between Beirut and Cyprus to take all citizens to safety. India also
evacuated 200-500 citizens of Sri Lanka and around 100 of Nepal. Warships were
stationed in eastern Mediterranean during the Israeli offensive fully prepared for a
mass evacuation of Indian citizens of the city of Beirut. Indian Navy: “A Helping
Navy more than a Fighting Navy”, Her Captain’s Voice, accessed at,
http://mrwhite.blog.co.in/2008/08/28/indian-navy-a-helping-navy-more-than-a-
fighting-navy/; “After rescuing thousands, ships return”, Mumbai Newsline, 11
August 2006

47 Rao, Radhakrishna: Anti-Piracy Operations: INDIAN NAVY GETS A NEW

EDGE, accessed from,
http://www.sarkaritel.com/news_and_features/infa/january2009/21antipiracy_ope
rations.htm

48 “Indian navy-French Navy joint exercise ‘Varuna 08’, See, Frontier India:
Strategic and Defence, 8 May, 2008, at http://frontierindia.net/indian-navy-
french-navy-joint-exercise-varuna-08; “Russia, India complete joint Naval
exercise INDRA-2009”, See at, http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2009-02-

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 12/506784news.html; “INDO–US BILATERAL NAVAL EXERCISE –
MALABAR 08”, see at, http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/Press081015.htm;
“Konkan 2006”,see at, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/Bridges/2006/Konkan/?g2_page=2
49 “SIMBEX 08”, Frontier India, 28 March 2008, op.cit
50 ''Strategic Interests Pull Japan and India Together'', PINR, 16 February, 2007, see,
http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=618&language_id=1;
Kapila, Subhash, “JAPAN-INDIA JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY
COOPERATION (2008) OVERHYPED”, SAAG (South Asia Analysis Group)
Paper No. 2921, 13 November 2008.
51 'Realising the Indian Dream', INDIA DEFENCE CONSULTANTS, 8 October
2006, accessed from, http://www.indiadefence.com/ind-dream.htm; “Indian naval
ships coming on courtesy tour, Gulf Times, 24.7.2007.
52 Sakhuja,Vijay: Naval Diplomacy: Indian Initiatives, see at, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/history/millenium/32-indian-initiatives.html; “Milan, a
gathering of regional navies, to start from Jan 18”, Thaindian News, 11 January,
2008; also see, Defence India,at,
http://www.defenceindia.com/newsupdate/news.html
53 See, Singh, Satyinder: Blue Print to Blue Waters: The Indian Navy, 1951-1991,
--------------, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 39-40.
54 For details of Indian Navy in its formative years, see, Singh, K. R: Navies of
Soiuth Asia, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2002.
55 In 1950-51 Navy was allocated 4.8% of the defense budget and it went as low as
3.97% in 1965. It was after 1980s that the share of navy in the budget allocations
began to increase. See, Rahul, Roy-Choudhry: Sea Power and Indian Security,
Brassy’s London, 1995, pp. 193-94.
56. http://www.indianetzone.com/37/indian_navy_early_twenty-first_century.htm
Indian Navy in 21st century

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