SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET
AL., respondents.
Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.
Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents. aisadc
SYLLABUS
1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW; LAND ACQUISITION; SECTION 16(e) THEREOF;
CONSTRUED. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16.
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands . . . (e) Upon receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or
at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE
BASIC LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The conclusive effect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or
set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power
or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that
the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9.
There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the
clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in
striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED.
The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of
the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from
the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than
in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full
payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is
transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation
under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under
Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate
the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties
simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they
have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in
all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however,
misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court
must rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 of
purposes of exercising the landowner's right to appropriate the same. The immediate
effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: ". . . within the context of
the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss."
D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J p:
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently
stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: cdasia
". . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt,
we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich
alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be
applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No.
118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were
ordered consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20,
1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and
ruled as follows: cdtai
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:
a)DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is
declared null and void insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or
bonds;
b)Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately
deposit not merely 'earmark', 'reserve' or 'deposit in
trust' with an accessible bank designated by
respondent DAR in the names of the following
petitioners the following amounts in cash and in
government financial instruments within the
parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657: cdt
P 1,455,207.31Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P15,914,127.77AMADCOR;
c)The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the
petitioners to withdraw the above-deposited amounts
without prejudice to the final determination of just
compensation by the proper authorities; and
d)Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately
conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation for the lands of the
petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from notice
within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the
cases within 30 days after they are submitted for
decision." 4 aisadc
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,
5 denying their motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged
lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private
respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending
summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of
their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. cdta
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994,
this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper
determination and disposition.

As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:
"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were
transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively,
based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of
the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54
have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the
parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283
respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562,
respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES 'C'
& 'D') without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying
with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the
compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible
bank.' (Rollo, p. 6).
"The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located
at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares
covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F.
Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice
to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries
executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to pay
rentals to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to
at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the
DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank
to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a
trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February
1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of
Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX 'E'; Rollo, p. 7); that the
beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they
signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing
themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank (Rollo, p. 133).
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was
respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of
Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2)
that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did
not collect any amount as rental from the substituting
beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99). cdasia
"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to
its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the
properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No.
10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the
property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a
decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F')
fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34
and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for
said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust
account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision
was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust
account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX 'G'). With
respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it
is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is
covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay
with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that emancipation patents
were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were
registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken
thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that
on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR
was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices
of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR.
(Rollo, pp. 8-9)
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to
participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100)." 8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because
it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in
cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation
for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the
DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved"
the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that
before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds. 10 cdtai
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9
is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54
of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were
also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions. cdt
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely
intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however,
denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments.
17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null
and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides
for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in
holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final
resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as
used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no
way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for
the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657. aisadc
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . .
.
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in
any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid
modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is
allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit." cdta
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment,
19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and
an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules
and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation
for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same
vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution
of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the
negative. cdasia
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the
deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final
compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to
petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his
behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the
DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by
the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely
to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster
the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of
"Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform." 22
"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is
divested of his property even before actual payment to him in
full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted
principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either. cdtai
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected."
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding
petitioners' assertion as it found that:
". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation
envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the
case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that
'payments of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money' even as the Supreme Court admits in
the same case 'that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other' the Supreme Court
in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule . . . that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation."
23 (Emphasis supplied.) aisadc
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the
"Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation
from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment
other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there
must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation
under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under
Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and
notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use
of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them.
But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which
rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an
authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery
twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for
purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the
use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and
immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: cdta
". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent
domain, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." 24
(Emphasis supplied.)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove
all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite
this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts'
dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It
must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the
rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution
and laws are also entitled to protection. 26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
toto. cdasia
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:
The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review
filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines,
assailing the Court of Appeals decision, which granted private respondents'
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and
Development Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners
whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes
to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA
6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect
to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents
filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the
DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in
cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited
in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper determination and
disposition. The CA found the following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening
of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an
accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is
taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the
compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before
taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or
in bonds.
On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a
valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.Landbank averred that the issuance of
the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of
the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also
used.

ISSUES:
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990)
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in
cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.

RULING:
1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides: Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The
conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The
power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or
putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot
extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And
in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.

2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts
already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply
because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the landowner is
deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly
and immediately compensated.
Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.