Ching T Camposagrado

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CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADO ATTY. KIT VILLASIS

SSPRO/ WED 5:30-8:30

G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS:
1. On January 19, 1955, Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the
purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.
2. Petitioners claim that forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two
deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944.
3. On June 20, 1958, the Court of First Instance rendered a Decision which found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."
4. On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an
inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

5. On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger
portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had
revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the
oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."

6. Having an unfavorable Decision, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate Court held that the
decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable
independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE
1. whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal;
2. whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had
likewise become final;

3. whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor
of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.

HELD
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent base on the following premise:
1. Oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve
the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. The SC conformed with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's
stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator
and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable
or otherwise.

2. Pursuant to the Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249 doctrine, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver
the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to
allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel i s still
appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

3. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed
in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in
favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances
(affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July
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31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more
doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
1
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the
Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the
case at bar.

32. GERONA v DE GUZMAN

Facts:
Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo
de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein
respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died some time in Septermber 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his
estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his
forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud
only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said properties
reconveyed to them.
Contentions:
Defendants argue that Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners
is barred by the statute of limitations.
Rulings:
TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case after finding that Placida was a legitimate child of Marcelo and that the properties described
herein belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and Camila. It also ruled that Petitioners action had already prescribed.
CA: affirmed ruling of the trial court
Contentions:
Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is not subject to the statue of limitations; that if affected, the
period of 4 years did not begin to run until discovery of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by respondents took place in 1956 or 1957
and that it had not prescribed when the present action was commenced.
SC: The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates
from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo
when they executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An
action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of
limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June
25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively.
Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of
majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority
in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence their action.

37. G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS:

3


ISSUE


HELD
or otherwise.

allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still

1
case at bar.
39. AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND 236 SCRA 488 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioners instituted Special Proceeding for allowance of Holographic will of the late Annie Sand. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondents noticed the defect, erasures, alteration, and correction which were not duly signed by decedent and the will was
procured by through improper pressure and undue influence.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the lower court holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the
NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: WON the CA decision for disallowance to probate the Holographic will of decedent is meritorious?
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HELD: NO, reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten
by the testator.
42. Alfonso v. Andres
FACTS:
The cases is a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by the respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against the petitioners
Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlina Fundialan. The respondents were asked to give their reply with regards to the complaint. But
they werent able to file within the reglementary period, and kept on extending. The respondents contested that they werent able to file within
the reglementary period due to their indigency and poverty. They submitted that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal since
PAO had just entered its appearance in their behalf. They also contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the
circumstances that the case may be decided on the merits not merely on technicalities. Respondents on the other hand contended that the failure
to file appellants brief on time is one circumstance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case they contended that the CA
exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon the petitioners failure to file their appellants brief within the extended period of
75 days after the original 45-day period. Hence this petition of the petitioners.
ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable because it
overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.
RULING: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.
The petition of the petitioners has no merit. Failure to file brief on time is the basis. As per Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the grounds of
dismissal of an appeal is based on the following grounds:
e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
The petitioners answered that they should be given consideration citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, were the late
filing of the appellants brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest.
Court however thought otherwise. The case in interest is NOT of public interest, and poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners
complacency in allowing months to pass before exerting any effort to file it. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to
petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They
were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late.
Also, the disregarding of technicalities is not convincing. The Rules of the Court were constructed for the swift justice to be given upon those
who deserve it. If it will be disregarded, Rules of Court will have no effect whatsoever then. It will only be relaxed for the benefit of the
deserving and for justice, to which this case doesnt have.
32. GERONA v DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo
de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein
respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died some time in Septermber 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his
estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his
forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud
only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said properties
reconveyed to them.
Contentions:
Defendants argue that Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners
is barred by the statute of limitations.
Rulings:
TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case after finding that Placida was a legitimate child of Marcelo and that the properties described
herein belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and Camila. It also ruled that Petitioners action had already prescribed.
CA: affirmed ruling of the trial court
Contentions:
5

Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is not subject to the statue of limitations; that if affected, the
period of 4 years did not begin to run until discovery of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by respondents took place in 1956 or 1957
and that it had not prescribed when the present action was commenced.
SC: The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates
from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo
when they executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An
action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of
limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June
25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively.
Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of
majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority
in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence their action.

33. G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007

CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner,
vs.
DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.

Facts:
Here is a petition for Review on Certiorari in the decision of the RTC Makati appealed to the Court of Appeals and hence, this
petition.
On January 31, 1990,Dr. Werner petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letter testamentary t o Att.
Nogales and the same was allowed. After 4 years Dr Werner died. Hence, Atty. Nogales petition for letter testamentary. However, petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the said petition. Alleging among others that RTC Makati had no jurisdiction over the case and she was denied due
process of law. Petition of Atty. Nogales was granted.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and whether or not the petitioner had been denied due
process?
Held:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at
the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed.Hence, applying the
aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the petition for the
probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers children from his previous
marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded
every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without
basis.

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

37. G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS:
6



ISSUE


HELD
or otherwise.

allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel i s still

1
case at bar.

39. AJERO vs. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND 236 SCRA 488 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioners instituted Special Proceeding for allowance of Holographic will of the late Annie Sand. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondents noticed the defect, erasures, alteration, and correction which were not duly signed by decedent and the will was
procured by through improper pressure and undue influence.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
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On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the lower court holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the
NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: WON the CA decision for disallowance to probate the Holographic will of decedent is meritorious?
HELD: NO, reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten
by the testator.
40. Joaquina R Infante de Arranz et al., petitioners, vs. The HON. Nicolas Galing, Presiding Jugde, RTC. Branch 166, and Joaquin R
INFANTE, respondents.
Facts:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and
allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the
petitioners as legatees and devisees.
The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. There being no
opposition to this instant case, private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo, one of the testamentary witnesses
on the witness stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
Upon learning this, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as
required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the probate of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the legatees and devisees are properly notified.
Held:
The court held that Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. The court shall also cause copies of the notice
of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the
person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to
mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be
known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the
allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the
probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of t he will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

42. Alfonso v. Andres
FACTS:
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ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable because it
overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.

51. IN THE MATTER OF PETITION TO PROBATE LAST WILLS AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE LOPEZ, NOVEMBER 12, 2012.
FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namel y, petitioner
Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria)
as compulsory heirs. Before Enriques death, he executed a Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his
executor and administrator. On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the
RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported
last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of Richard.
The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria. Opposition specifically states that in the acknowlegdment, it states that the entire document
consist only of seven pages, but the actual pages consist of eight. Respondents contends that the discrepancy is fatal on the validity of the
document considering that it is a substanstial defects which is a ground for disallowance of a will. Respondents also move for the denial of the
appeal on the ground of non-compliance in the prescribed procedure that the appeal on special proceedings must be through a record on appeal.

ISSUES:
1. W/N TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED PETITIONER AN APPEAL?
2. W/N THE DISCREPANCY IN THE NUMBER OF PAGES OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND FATAL
ERROR AND AS GROUND FOR DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL.
HELD:
1. YES, Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on appeal.
2. YES, The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While
Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the torm of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement
in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification
and acknowledgment are written cannot be deemed substantial " compliance. The acknowledgment will which actually consists of 8 pages
including acknowlegment which discrepancy cannot be explained by its mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence.
Petition DENIED.

52. G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

9

Facts:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court a will executed by Ruperta C. Palaganas, a foreigner although it has not been
probated in its place of execution.
Respondent filled with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of Ruperta s will and for his appointment as the special
administrator of her estate. However, petitioners oppose on the petition arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the
U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Held:
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that
the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76
further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of
the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7 The rules do
not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA
VARGAS, respondents.
(G.R. No. 156536 , October 31, 2006)
Facts:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely
Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and
Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters.
Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same
property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their
respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995.
She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same
property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property and when the offer to redeem was
refused and after having failed to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level, Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the
amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996. Joining her in the action were her children
with Santiago.
10

After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention
for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to
petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the
other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to strictly comply with
the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil Code for a written notice of sale to be served upon respondents by the vendors prior to the
exercise of the former's right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30
days before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too
late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the
property owned by respondents' co-heirs. This was affirmed by the RTC but on Appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring
that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon
respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement is null and void
Whether or not the respondent co-heirs has the right to redeem the subject property
Held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate
or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended
to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents
never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the
estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to
Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their
co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual
sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the
redemption.
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the
method of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088,
which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other
heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position
to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its
terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain
doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation.
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents
to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

46.
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent
(G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005)
Facts:
11

Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in
the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with
his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he
married Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was
signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause
and again on the left hand margin.
The will provides that Placido Valmonte, upon his death shall give, devise and bequeath to Josefina one half (1/2) portion of a lot and 2 storey
building in Makati which he jointly owned with his deceased sister, all the rest, residue and remainder of his real and personal properties,
including his savings account bank book in USA. He also appoint his wife as sole executrix of his last will and testament, and said executrix be
exempt from filing a bond.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the ground of Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in
the execution and attestation of the will; and Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an
advanced state of senility.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but the same was reversed by the CA which admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA
upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held
that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude
and impolite ways"
6
did not make him a person of unsound mind.
Issue:
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.
Held:
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As
an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The
law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto."
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators
state of mind at the time.
Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is
misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made." The party challenging
the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of
the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no
evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it
was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
"because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the
will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator
and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.
12

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in
them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we
have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

*****Additional notes:
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is
not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity
does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."

31. RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADORF. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.
MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners, COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN
F. MARQUEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 125715. December 29, 1998]
FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena;
(5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr.; (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the
spouses acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 47572,
[1]
wherein they constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto
himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572 thus, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350
[2]
was issued in
his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
[3]
covering the land described in TCT
No. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both
private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. TCT No. 33350 was cancelled by TCT No. 47572, issued
in private respondents name.
when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael
Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective share over the land in question however private respondents ignored petitioners demands.
Petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for Reconveyance and Partition with Damages before the trial
court
[4]
alleging that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter Vivos were fraudulent since the private respondents
took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents.
private respondents argued that petitioners action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed
within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
[5]

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision
[6]
in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed trial court finding and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not their action for reconveyance had prescribed. No.
2. Can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wifes share, validly donate this portion to the respondents. No
3. Whether he can validly donate the other half of the property which he owns. Yes
HELD:
1. No. When Rafael Marquez, Sr. misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their
children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article
1456 was established.
[11]
Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to
13

intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, to hold
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
[13]
For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when
TCT No. 33350 was issued which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May
31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

2. No.
Art. 736 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.
3. Yes. Again, the query need not detain us at length for the Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the inherent rights of an owner
is the right to dispose of his property.
[19]

50. BALTAZAR vs. LAXA

G.R. No. 174489
April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled
Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala(Will) in the Pampango dialect executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G.
Limpin (Judge
Limpin) and was read to Paciencia twice thereby expressing in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on pages and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino) who attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna
Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it
was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will oron September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for
the United States of America (USA). There, she residedwith Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years after
the death of Paciencia , Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds:

a. the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law;
b. Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution;
c. she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats;
d. the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his
benefit;
e. signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged;
f. assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and,
g. that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
9. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.
2. Whether or not bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery
be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
3. Whether or not the absence of the subscribing witnesses and the notary public negates due execution of the Will.

RULING:
1. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound
so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats,
undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly,
thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.
14

Furthermore, the Court is convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act. A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how
she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his
two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee

2. No. We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old
maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator
and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her
relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the
latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence
of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not
supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record.

3. No. For all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing
witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of
Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an
established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify,
that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify,
that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

Danilo Aluad, Leonora Aluad, Divina Aluad, Prospero Aluad, and Connie Aluad
vs. Zenaido Aluad

Facts:
Maria Aluad and Zenaido Aluad were raised by childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin owned 6 lots identified as Lot
Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682. After he died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
Matilde executed a Deed of Donation, covering all 6 lots inherited from Crispin, in favor of Maria. The Deed provides that for and in
consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought
up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated.
Matilde subsequently sold Lot 676 to Zenaido Aluad and executed a last will and testament devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680
to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent. Thereafter, Matilde died.
The petitioners, childred of Maria Aluad, filed before the RTC a Complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession
of Lot Nos. 674 and 676 against Zenaido Aluad. RTC granted their petition but CA reversed the trial courts decision holding that the Deed of
Donation was really a donation mortis causa because of certain clauses provided therein and that it did not comply with the formalities of a
will.

Issue:

WON the donation mortis causa is valid.

Ruling:

No. The donation mortis causa was not a valid will. Art. 805 provides that every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. And Article 806
provides that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. These was not followed, hence the will
was void.
Having said these, the will transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming that the formalities were observed, no right
to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria since the will was not probated. Thus, the sale of Lot 67 was proper. And Lot 674 was
properly disposed to respondent by the last will and testament, but subject of course to the qualification that Matildes will must be probated.

Alfonso v. Andres
15

29 July 2010, G.R. No. 166236
ISSUE: The dismissal of petitioners' appeal by the honorable court of appeals is highly unjustified, iniquitous and unconscionable
because it overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of petitioners case which involves a deprivation of their property rights.
FACTS:

ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005

FACTS
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado .
Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the
issuance of letters testamentary to the respondent.
Four months after the petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of
the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature
of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation
clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters
testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.
RTC and CA both dismissed the petition
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could
not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the
ruling of the CA. And that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the petitioners were made parties in the proceedings
2. Whether or not the proceedings in the RTC was tainted by extrinsic fraud

16

RULING
1. Yes the petitioners were made parties to the proceedings
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings. Under the Rules of
Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.
Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to
all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and
petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners
praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time,
long after the Decision became final and executory.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will
shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

2. No. The procedure in the RTC was not tainted with extrinsic fraud.
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting
their case before the probate court.

PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]

Facts
Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legally adopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and
Maria entered into an extra judicial settlement of his estate. The other Private respondents, the Rodriguezes, however filed an action an action
to annul Marias adoption which the CFI upheld. It was also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the adoption as legal.
In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no other heirs but her brothers and sisters, the private respondents. Who then
entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted
as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land
covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure
new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.
Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after being unable to do so, filed a complaint to annul the partition. Her
complaint was dismissed by the RTC and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.
ISSUES
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid;
(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

RULING
1. No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed
Section 4, Rule 74
]
provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons
or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. So the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in
her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
17

[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title
were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who
were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941
2. No. The deed of partition is not valid.
No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication
was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition,
the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of
fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.

Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel,
she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code

3. The court ruled that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.
The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine
that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such
purpose.

28. SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud,
Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu.
Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator, and after filing an opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco, assisted
by their corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria appointed as administratrix of the estate & letters of administration of the estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00. The Clerk of Court, Atty.
Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition. In his
Commissioners report dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to
arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend. He reported that those
who were present agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 & divide the
proceeds equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate based on
Glorias absence & change of residence. The Court ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale afterthe payment of the sum
ofP36,000 which shall remain in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment of necessary taxes.
Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Original Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter.
In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu,
alleging that the CFIs order was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false
and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing that
extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void,
hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annul the CFIs order.
HELD: The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold
Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of judgment. The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.
18

The veracity of Atty. Taneos report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving
at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged
meeting. The Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to
show their consent and conformity thereto. It was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them
the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs
showing conformity thereto. The CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling
the assailed order. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and
binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope
in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void
ab initio.
The petition was denied
47. RABADILLA vs CA
FACTS: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of 511,
855 sq meters of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. The codicil was duly probated and
admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.
The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The
codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and
should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot,
the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein petitioner. In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a
complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed
the complaint. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
HELD: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted
to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would
be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights
and title over said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause
of action and the tral court erred in dismissing her complaint..
NERI VS. UY (Case No. 41)
FACTS:
Anunciacion Neri (decedent) had two children from her first marriage (Eutropia and Victoria) and five from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired
several homestead properties in Samal, Davao del Norte.
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children (Rosa and Douglas), with
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale, adjudicating among themselves
the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P80,000.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC,
assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and
Vicoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
RTC rendered the sale void because Eutropia nd Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. The CA reversed. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
19

WON the Extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale as far as the shares of Eutropia and Victoria were concerned was
valid.
RULING:
The SC granted the petition.
The SC stated that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with
Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the
Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if
they should come from different marriages.
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them
to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate.
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the
next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein. It cannot be
denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death

and that, as owners
thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.
BALABAD v. RUBLICO
G.R. No. 160743 August 4, 2009
FACTS:
Julian Angeles owns two parcel of land in the then Makati, Rizal. Julian was married to Corazon Rublico, who already had a son when
they were married. After his death, his compulsory heirs were his wife, Corazon and his brother Epitacio.
While on her death bed, Corazon executed a deed entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale, in which Corazon and
Epitacio adjudicated unto themselves the two lots registered in the name of Julian and conveyed by way of absolute sale both their shares in the
said lots in favor of Cornelia Balabad, Epitacios daughter. Said deed was notarized by Atty. Francisco who testified that Corazon imprinted
her thumbmark on the document after he read and explained the contents thereof in Tagalog to her, while Vicente, Epitacios son, signed in
behalf of Epitacio by virtue of a power of attorney. After two days Corazon passed away.
The Title remained in the name of Julian, but more than two years after Corazons death, Sergio Rublico, son of Corazon by Teofilo
Rublico, executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating unto himself the same parcels of land
which had been subject of the deed of sale between Corazon and Cornelia. He later filed a petition for reconstitution of the owners copy of
TCT which petition was granted and a new owners duplicate title was issued in his name. He later sold the lots to spouses Laureano and
Felicidad Yupano. Cornelia caused the annotation on the TCT in favor of the Yapangos of her adverse claim over the said properties.
Cornelia filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages. She argued that Sergio knew of the sale made by
Corazon in her favor and was even given part of the proceeds. Cornelia also averred that the Yupanos could not be considered as buyers in
good faith, because they only lived a block from the disputed properties and had knowledge that the two lots had been sold to Cornelia prior to
Corazons death.
For their part, respondents argued that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale could not have been executed because at the
time, Corazon was already dying. Sergio also argued that the property was originally bought by his mother, but was only registered in the name
of Julian in keeping with the tradition at that time.
20

After the trial, Makati RTC ruled in favor of Cornelia. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUEs:
1. Is the Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person valid?

HELD: NO. Respondent Sergio Rublico never had the right to sell the subject properties to the Yupanos, because he never owned
them to begin with. Nemo dat quod non habet. Even before he could inherit any share of the properties from his mother, Corazon, the latter had
already sold them to Cornelia.
G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989
PABLO RALLA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND
MARINELLA RALLA, respondents.

FACTS:
This petition seeks to nullify the Order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, excluding from the probate proceedings 63
parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, denying the petitioner's motions for
reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan.
On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in CFI of Albay docketed as SP No.
564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; docketed as Civil Case No. 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (SP No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the
ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo for its probate would no longer be
beneficial and advantageous to him. The motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court
agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed
because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo 149 parcels of land from
which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro who was
deprived of his successional rights over the said properties. The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R.
No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, the
court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the
division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to partition the 63 parcel of land forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, which
were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved by Judge Grageda.
On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding.
Eleven years later, On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the probate of Rosendo's will in SP 1106,
which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979, the order of November 3, 1966, was set aside.
On June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of 63
Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No. 2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge Untalan
reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit: The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63)
parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special
Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied by respondent Judge
Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for
reconsideration was filed.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before
said Will was probated, is a NULL considering that such was already decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs.
Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated.
HELD:
The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil
case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of
the will of Rosendo Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes
that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance
where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a
will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
21

UTULO v. PASION
G.R. No. 45904, September 30, 1938
FACTS:
Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, was appointed as the judicial administratrix of the property of Juan Garcia Sanchez, who
died intestate. She being the widow and the legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia are the
presumptive forced heirs of Juan. Luz Garcia married the Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings,
she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband.
Utulo filed a petition in the same court for the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife, stating that her only heirs
were he himself and his mother-in-law, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate
of her father, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased.
Pasion objected to the petition. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said
judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the
administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant.
The court granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial administration is necessary.
HELD:
NO. This court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings.
And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in the following language:
xxxx
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal,
of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546;
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable
Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondadvs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason
can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased
ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon
the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it
among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections 182-184,
196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and
expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among
the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other
coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property.
(Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot
agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable where the
estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex.
Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the
coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-
contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole.

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