COMMENTARY

Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29
23
Overall, it seems unrealistic to believe
that net capital inows on the needed
scale would materialise: the result could
well be that the rupee would remain
under downward pressure even in the
absence of outows of portfolio capital.
One should not rule out a balance-of-
payments crisis. To avoid/overcome it
what would be needed is to depreciate
the rupee to somewhere in the Rs 70+
level and adopt extremely tight, dea-
tionary monetary and scal policies to
get out of the cycle of high ination,
which would need a fall in the nominal
exchange rate, in turn, leading to fur-
ther ination. The medicine would be
bitter and it is most unlikely that a gov-
ernment facing elections in less than a
year would be able to administer it.
Growth and the Exchange Rate
There is no evidence that oating exchange
rates help growth. On the contrary, in
the modern era (last 70 years), every fast
growing economy from Germany and
Japan in the Bretton Woods era, to China
for the last 30 years have used xed/
managed exchange rates supporting
e xport-led manufacturing gro wth. If man-
aging the domestic value of a currency is
legitimate and important, surely manag-
ing the external value is no less crucial?
Remember, negative net exports corre-
spondingly reduce output, growth and
jobs, and their unchecked continuation
is a potential threat to nancial stability.
Demystifying Sheikh Abdullah
Altaf Hussain Para
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah has
been the most dominating
political gure of modern Jammu
and Kashmir who played a
signicant role in shaping its
post-1947 politics. Frequently
mentioned in various works, both
scholarly and journalistic, his role
is often viewed in black and white
terms. This article attempts to
place his political work in the
contexts of its times and nd clues
to the regions present
predicaments from a study of
Kashmirs modern history.
A
n eminent scholar and journa list,
M J Akbar, rightly regards Sheikh
Mohammed Abdullah as the archi-
tect of modern Kashmir saying: The
modern history of Kashmir begins with
the greatest Kashmiri of modern times,
Sheikh Abdullah (Akbar 1991: xii). Sheikh
Abdullah was, without question, the
dominant gure in Kashmir from 1930s
until his death in 1982.
1
He was the most
enigmatic and complex political leader
of Kashmir. He had a meteoric rise to the
top slot of Kashmir politics and continued
to dominate the political scene for more
than 50 years with enduring impact.
However, notwithstanding his abiding
contribution, perhaps no other person
has become as controversial as Sheikh
Abdullah did. In this article, I intend to
revisit his role with a view to understand
the politics of modern Kashmir.
Sheikh Abdullah was the harbinger
of national consciousness
2
and instru-
mental to introduce political modernisa-
tion in the state of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K). Those who met Sheikh Abdullah
during his political heyday attest to
his enormous charm, considerable pres-
ence, and unquestioned charisma and
autho rity though his political wisdom
was always not so evident. By establish-
ing the Muslim Conference, Sheikh Ab-
dullah not only started political life in
the state, but also his organisation be-
came an important pressure group over
the feudal establishment which com-
pelled the state to introduce different
socio-economic and administrative re-
forms. The organisation, with Sheikh
its moving sprit, championed civil liber-
ties, freedom of the press, spread of
modern education and economic eman-
cipation of the downtrodden sections of
the society.
3
Undeterred by the state-sponsored
communalism and non-Muslim sub-
jects (barring exceptions) reactionary
role,
4
it was through Sheikh Abdullahs
persis tent efforts that the slogans like
Hindu-Muslim-Sikh Ithad, Zindabad
Zindabad became the rallying slogans
throughout the struggle for freedom.
Since Sheikh Abdullahs secular politi-
cal discourse was in accordance with
Kashmiri mass psyche, which believes
in religious syncretism, he was well-re-
ceived by common Kashmiris. It is no
wonder then that during 1947, when the
whole sub continent was burning in the
communal re, Gandhiji saw a ray of hope
in Kashmir where the Muslim majority
protected the life and property of the
non-Muslim minority.
5

No Ideology
Although, Sheikh Abdullah was deeply
religious and staunchly secular, his
politics, however, was never truly rooted
in ideology, rather he used ideologies
to raise his own stakes. Although the
National Conference was founded on lofty
ideals, after he abandoned the platform
of the Muslim Conference, in reality,
however, the new creed was preached
by him to free himself from the domina-
tion of Punjabi Muslim inuence.
6
In the
Altaf Hussain Para (altafhussainpara@gmail.com)
is with the Government Amar Singh College,
Srinagar.
COMMENTARY
july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
24
same way, Sheikh Abdullahs closeness
with the Indian National Congress (INC),
particularly to its brand ambassador,
Jawaharlal Nehru, was not motivated by
any ideological uniformity but rather by
mutual interests. It is not an unknown
fact that from 1940s INC became the big-
gest source of funding to the National
Conference.
7
By afliating himself with
Nehru, it was not only that Sheikh
Abdullahs popularity received an enor-
mous boost at the national level, but it
also helped mitigate the intensity of
pro paganda made against him by Kashmiri
pandits. In return, the Congress needed
Sheikh Abdullah as a counter-argument
to Jinnahs two-nation theory.
8
Sheikh Abdullah was unfortunately a
poor judge of crucial situations. The Indian
Partition of 1947 and the Bangladesh
Crisis of 1971 are only a few cases in
reference. He disastrously failed to antici-
pate the partition as late as in 1946. In
May that year when the prospects of
Pakistan were as bright as daylight, he
considered it as a hypothetical question.
9

It was this misjudgment and blind eye to
the events of such importance which
caught him unprepared in 1947. In the
same way, he took the short-term conse-
quences of 1971 crisis as a nal verdict of
history and reached a hasty accord with
Indira Gandhi.
Instrument of Accession
Abdullah was essentially a Kashmiri
patriot, inspired by socialist rather than
communal aspiration, who would have
preferred independence for his state had
it been possible or, failing it, to retain it
as a semi-independent entity under the
protection of Nehrus India.
10
In Jinnahs
Pakistan, there was no possibility of
enjoying special positions and powers.
11

However, with the Poonch revolt
12
shaking
the basis of Dogra Raj in August-Septem-
ber 1947, and the tribals thundering to-
wards Srinagar shouting slogans against
the National Conference and creating pan-
ic in its rank and le, it became a case of
India or death for Sheikh Abdullah.
13
His
hasty slogan freedom before accession
was rendered irrelevant due to the force
of circumstances. It was against this
backdrop that Sheikh A bdullah provided
his fullest support (Poplai 1959: 75) to
the accession offer made by the defeated
Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, to the
Indian dominion. Nehru was fully aware
that Sheikh A bdullah had waded through
blood to shake hands with India. Thus, in
the I nstrument of Accession which was
subsequently signed, Sheikh Abdullah
remai ned Nehrus prime concern.
By lending his crucial support to the
accession, Sheikh Abdullah got three
things in return: (a) control over the
state administration; (b) a provisional
accession; and (c) its limited character.
The reference in Hari Singhs letter to
his desire to call upon Sheikh Abdullah
to form an interim government and the
governor general expressing satisfaction
at this gives a clear impression about the
conditions attached to the accession. By
the Instrument of Accession, Hari Singh
accepted only three subjects foreign
affairs, defence and communications as
ones which the dominion legislature may
make laws from the state. It is quite
probable that a prior understanding was
made between Nehru and Sheikh Abdul-
lah to grant the state autonomy in its in-
ternal matters.
14
While accepting the ac-
cession it was made clear from the outset
that its nality was strictly conditional on
a reference to the people of the state.
Nehru declared on 2 November 1947 his
governments pledge to hold a referen-
dum under international auspices such
as the United Nations (UN) to determine
whether the people wished to join India
or Pakistan.
15
For Sheikh Abdullah this
provision was signicant in two ways.
First, he used it as an argument that
p eople, not Hari Singh, had the right to
conrm the acce ssion. Second, through
this provision there was an escape route
if at any point the Indian state failed to
full its commitments.
By the above-cited provisions of the
Instrument of Accession, Sheikh Abdullah
became a true successor of Hari Singh
with unbridled powers, backed by dem-
ocratic India, to deal with those who do
not subscribe to his views on accession.
In the pursuit of establishing a regi-
mented state, scores of intellectuals and
leaders were banished and imprisoned
for showing disagreement with the
views of Sheikh Abdullah.
16
He became
the champion advocate of Kashmirs
accession with India both within the
state and at international fora. He would
project accession as the ultimate goal
and logical culmination of Kashmirs
freedom struggle.
Against Plebiscite and Pakistan
Being a mass leader, Sheikh Abdullah
was, however, aware about two harsh
realities: (a) that his stand about acces-
sion was unpopular, and (b) that there
was a strong pro-Pakistan constituency
in his state. It is not surprising then that
he started advocating against both the
plebiscite and Pakistan.
Many may be surprised to note that
the rst open opposition against the
plebiscite was not made by the Indian
Right, but it came from Sheikh Abdullah
only nine days after Nehru made his
pledge. Making the destruction caused
by the tribal invasion an excuse, Sheikh
Abdullah declared: there may not be a
referendum at all after this disaster at
Baramulla, Uri, Pattan and Muzzaffara-
bad and other places.
17
His lieutenant
and the iron man of the National Con-
ference, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad,
conrmed his leaders views a few days
later when he commented that the peo-
ple of Kashmir are more likely to be
asked to ratify the provisional decision
to accede to India at the general elections
than to vote in a referendum to decide
the future of the state....
18

In the same manner Sheikh Abdullah
became the worst critic of Pakistan and
strongly refused to accept it as a party to
the Kashmir issue. A few lines from his
famous speech at the UN in February 1948
will sufce to substantiate this. Speaking
both against the plebiscite and Pakistan
in the same breath he declared:
I had thought all along that the world had got
rid of Hitlers...but from what is happening in
my poor country, I am convinced they have
transmigrated their souls into Pakistan...
The (plebiscite) offer (was) made by the
prime minister of India when, I think, he had
not the slightest need for making it, for
Kashmir was in distress...I refuse to accept
Pakistan as a party in the affairs of Jammu
and Kashmir; I refuse this point blank...We
have seen enough of Pakistan.
19

That was Sheikh Abdullah at the
prime of his power. Outside power he
would speak a different tune.
COMMENTARY
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29
25
With the plebiscite and Pakistan syn-
drome refusing to die, particularly after
the UN resolutions,
20
Sheikh Abdullah
launched a massive project to win over
the people for an anticipated referen-
dum. On the one hand, he introduced
sweeping land reform,
21
perhaps un-
known to any non-communist state, and
on the other, he systematically used his
regimented state apparatus to eliminate
all the opposing views. But things re-
mained as they were. Sentiments die
hard. The observations made in this re-
gard by Indira Gandhi
22
from Srinagar
and Sardar Patel in their letters to Nehru
on 14 May 1948 and 3 July 1950 respec-
tively, were as much relevant then as
they are now. Patel informed Nehru:
it appears that both the National Conference
and Sheikh Sahib are losing their hold on
the people of the valley and are becoming
somewhat unpopular...In such circumstanc-
es...plebiscite is unreal.
23

The memories of communal passions
roused by Partition politics, the Jammu
massacre
24
and the treatment to the
National Conference workers on the
rst appearance of the Indian army in
the state
25
were still fresh in the
popular psyche.
New Avatar
Seeing the growing anti-India sentiment
and the prospects of winning plebiscite
becoming dark, Nehru got apprehensive
of Sheikh Abdullah and in frustration
pressurised him to ratify the accession on
the oor of the constituent assembly.
26
It
was unacceptable to Sheikh Abdullah in
view of his popular alienation and isola-
tion. To regain his inuence he came out
in a new avatar. He started voicing his
reservations on acce ssion and started
again dreaming of an independent
Kashmir.
27
In an emotional speech at
Hazratbal on 25 April 1952 he said: it
would be better to die than to submit to
the taunt that India was our bread giv-
er.
28
With Sheikh Abdullah becoming a
liability to India, he was unceremoni-
ously sacked at the direct orders of his
best friend, Nehru.
29
It set an unhealthy
precedent which has honestly been fol-
lowed by the Indian state since then.
Once out of power, Sheikh Abdullah
started preaching the gospel of Kashmiris
right to self-determination for more than
two decades by patronising the plebiscite
front.
30
He also acknowledged Pakistan
as an unavoidable fact of the Kashmir
issue
31
using symbols like Pakistani salt
and the green handkerchief (Koul 1993)
to inuence the simple minds of common
Kashmiris. His consistent advocacy for
22 years created a deep-rooted mass
psyche and memory which he himself
failed to eradicate when he abandoned
the platform of plebiscite in return to the
state chief ministership. He added insult
to injury by disowning the Kashmiris
longest political struggle for the right to
self-determination by calling it Siyasi
Aawaragardi (political waywardness).
When the Congress dislodged him
again in 1977, he also tried to interpret
the Accord of 1975 in his own typical
way. He said, since the Congress Party
has withdrawn its support, the accord
that had been concluded between him
and Indira Gandhi should be deemed to
have ended.
32
Thus, Sheikh Abdullah was not only
the architect of accession, but also its
demolisher. He used accession as a
bargaining ploy to secure for himself
the kingdom of Dogra and in the course
created a disputed identity of the masses
he claimed to represent. True to his split
personality, he made frequent U-turns
and somersaults and left his people
where they nd themselves now. The
need of the hour is to revisit the role
of Sheikh Abdullah in the light of
present political scenario of J&K so that
many complexities related to it are
better understood.
Notes
1 For detailed information about Sheikh
Abdullahs early life and times see his own
auto biography, Aatash-i-Chinar, Srinagar, 2006.
See also Bazaz (1954); Saraf (1977); and Taseer
(1968). A few political biographies which give us
different perspectives on Sheikh Abdullahs
political life include, Puri (1983); Koul (1985)
and Bhattacharjea 2008.
2 On the emergence of national consciousness,
see Zutshi 1986; Bazaz, op cit; Khan 1980 and
Yasin and Raqi, 1980.
3 For demands of Sheikh Abdullahs political
organisation see two historical documents, viz,
National Demand signed by the leaders of the
National Conference on 29 August 1938 and
Naya Kashmir Manifesto passed in 1944 annual
session of the organisation.
4 On this issue recently two authoritative
works have been published. See, Rai 2004 and
Zutshi 2003.
5 Mahatma Gandhi used the accession of Kashmir
to Indian Union as an argument to douse
Hindu communal reactions to Partition. At a
prayer meeting on 29 December 1947, Gandhi
said: My sole hope and Prayer is that Kashmir
will become a beacon of light in this benighted
subcontinent, Tendulkar (1958), p 222.
6 After rst meeting with Nehru in North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1936, Sheikh
Abdullah was so impressed that he declared in
a press conference at Amritsar: Communal
tension in Kashmir is the result of propaganda
by the communal leaders of Punjab. We want
people of Punjab not to interfere in our internal
affairs. Our next programme will be to follow
the principles of the Congress Party and after
returning to Kashmir, I will strive to set up an
organisation which supports national ideology,
Aatish-i-Chinar, op cit, pp 209-11.
7 See for example, the condential report to
M A Jinnah, 20 August 1943, Indian Ofce
Records, R/1/1/3913.
8 Nehru who was aware about the potential signi-
cance of Sheikh Abdullah, wrote to Krishna
Kriplani on 6 March 1940 that Sheikh Abdullah
was denitely a man who counts and will count
and paid rst of the three goodwill visits to Kash-
mir to woe the National Conference leadership.
He was followed in succeeding years by a chain
of Congress leaders. Nehru Papers, Teen Murti,
New Delhi, 41/2601.
9 Khidmat, Srinagar, 6 May 1946.
10 See my unpublished PhD theses entitled
E mergence of Modern Kashmir: A Study of
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullahs Role, Kashmir
University, 2008. See particularly chapter on
Accession.
11 Ibid.
12 Between August and October, 1947, a major
local revolt against the Maharajas oppressive
rule developed among the Muslim population
of north-western Poonch area of Jammu. For
details see, Birdwood 1956, pp 50-51.
13 It is interesting to note here that the slogan of
the raiders was reported to be: Down with the
National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah.
See Secret Eighth Meeting of the Defense
Committee Held at 11 am on Saturday, the
25 October 1947.
14 See the text of the letters exchanged between
the Maharaja and Lords Mountbatten and the
Instrument of Accession as set out in the Govern-
ment of Indias White Paper on Jammu and
Kashmir 1948, pp 47-48.
15 Nehrus broadcast from New Delhi on 2 Nove m-
ber, ibid, pp 52-54.
16 The National Conference regime ironically,
suppresses all the opposition against its views
in the state, no healthy opposition was allowed
to grow. The state government promulgated an
Ordinance entitled the Enemy Agents Ordi-
nance allocating for the arrest and summary
trials of those suspected of pro-Pakistan lean-
ings Bazaz 1965, p 12. For more details, see Butt
1981, pp 46-47.
17 Hindustan Times, 12 November 1947.
18 Times of India, 17 November 1947.
19 Varshney cited in Raju and Thomas, pp 194-95.
20 Full text of UN resolutions is given in Korbel
1966.
21 On land reforms see, Thorner 1956, p 50,
See also Ladjensky 1977, pp 179-80.
22 On 14 May 1948, Indira Gandhi wrote to her
father from Srinagar: they say that only Sheikh
Saheb is condent of winning the plebiscite,
Gandhi 2004, pp 512-18.
23 Patel to Nehru, 3 July 1950, Das, p 317. Compare
also ex defence minister Krishna Menons answer
to a journalist who enquired, in 1956, why India
had never held the promised plebiscite: because
we would lose it. Quoted in Sayeed 1967, p 266.
COMMENTARY
july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
26
24 On this little known and still controversial
episode, see my thesis, op cit, pp 133-35.
25 About seven National Conference workers were
killed during the night of 5 November 1947 near
Rambagh by Indian army. See Whitehead 2007:
p 184.
26 See Nehrus condential Note for Sheikh
Abdullah, dated 25 August 1952.
27 GM Sadiqs letter to Sheikh Abdullah on 11 Sep-
tember 1956.
28 As cited by Noorani 2006.
29 For detailed description, see my dissertation,
op cit, Chapter IX.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Mir Qasim, Dastan-I-Hyat, (Urdu), p 385.
References
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Bazaz, P N (1965): The Shape of Things in Kashmir
(Delhi: Pamposh Publications).
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gle for the Freedom, Cultural, and Political:
From the Earlier Times to the Present Day (New
Delhi: Kashmir Publishing Company).
Bhattacharjea, Ajit (2008): Sheikh Mohammad
Abdullah: Tragic Hero of Kashmir (New Delhi:
Roli Books).
Birdwood, Lord (1956): Two Nations and Kashmir
(London: Robert Hall).
Butt, Sunaulla (1981): Kashmir in Flames (Srina-
gar: Ali Mohammad & Sons).
Das, Durga (1971): ed. Sardar Patels Correspond-
ence, Vol I, Ahmadabad.
Gandhi, Sonia (2004): ed. Two Alone, Two Togeth-
er: Letters Between Indira Gandhi & Jawaharlal
Nehru 1940-64 (New Delhi: Trafalgar Square
Publishing).
Khan, Hassan (1980): Freedom Movement in Kash-
mir 1931-40 (Delhi: Light and Life Publishers).
Korbel, Josef (1966): Danger in Kashmir (Prince-
ton: Princiton University Press).
Koul, R N (1985): Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: A
Political Phoenix (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers).
Koul, Shyam (1993): Kashmir: Some Realities,
Kashmir Times, 6 June.
Ladjensky, Wolf (1977): Land Reforms: Observa-
tions in Kashmir in L J Walinsky (ed.), Agrari-
an Reforms as Unnished Business (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press).
Noorani, A G (2006): Kashmir: Blunder of the
Past, Frontline, 29 December.
Poplai, S L (1959): Selected Document on Asian Af-
fairs: India 1947-50, Volume I (Bombay: Oxford
University Press).
Puri, Balraj (1983): Abdullahs Era (Srinagar:
Kashmir University).
Rai, Miridu (2004): Hindu Rulers, Muslim Sub-
jects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir
(New Delhi: Permanent Black).
Saraf, Mohammad Yusuf (1977): Kashmiris Fight
for Freedom, 2 Volumes (Lahore: Ferozsons).
Sayeed, Khalid (1967): The Political System of Paki-
stan (Boston: Houghton Mifin Company).
Taseer, Abdul Rasheed (1968): Tarikh-i-Hurriyat-i-
Kashmir (Srinagar: Mahaz).
Tendulkar, D G (1958): Mahatma, Volume 8, (New
Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India).
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India (Delhi: University Press).
Varshney, Ashutosh (1992): Three Compromised
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South Asia: (Boulder: West View).
Whitehead, Andrew (2007): A Mission in Kashmir
(New Delhi: Penguin).
Yasin, Mohammad and Qaiyaum Raqi (1980):
History of the Freedom Struggle in Jammu and
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Is There a Need for China
Studies in India?
Tansen Sen
We need to understand China in a
more complex, globalised, and
intrinsically connected world, not
only because of security concerns,
but also due to issues such as the
economy, the environment, and
the scarcity of resources. Against
the backdrop of the recent policy
document entitled Nonalignment
2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy
for India in the Twenty First
Century, this article argues that
there is little interest within the
Indian government, the leading
think tanks, or the private sector
in developing China studies in
India at present.
A
recent policy document entitled
Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign
and Strategic Policy for India in
the Twenty First Century released by
the Delhi-based think tank Centre for
Policy Research remarked that,
China will, for the foreseeable future, re-
main a signicant foreign policy and securi-
ty challenge for India. It is the one major
power, which impinges directly on Indias
geopolitical space. As its economic and mili-
tary capabilities expand, its power differen-
tial with India is likely to widen.
The document goes on to recommend
various ways in which India should re-
spond to possible territorial and eco-
nomic conicts with China.
Leaving aside the soundness of the
predictions and the policy recommenda-
tions on dealing with China outlined in
the document, I was confounded by two
issues when reading it. First, I did not
see names of any China scholars from
India involved in drafting the report.
This could either mean that there are no
competent China scholars in India to
contribute to the report, or that the
drafters of the report thought that they
possessed enough expertise on China
and India-China relations to make the
necessary policy recommendations.
The second issue that perplexed me
was the fact that given the importance
of (and the perceived threat from) China,
as repeatedly underscored in the docu-
ment, the drafters of the report did not
nd it necessary to recommend the de-
velopment of research infrastructure in
India on China and Chinese affairs. This
could also mean one of two things. Either
the drafters are satised with the current
state of China studies in India, or that they
believe that there is no need for a cohort
of China academics, beyond the diplo-
matic corps, journalists, op-ed writers,
etc, to play a role in the deliberations of
Indias China policy. For them, scholars
of China in India seem to be irrelevant to
any kind of policy-related discourse. The
document clearly indicates that there is
no need for China studies in India.
Lack of Interest
I have wondered the same things about
the Indian governments interest (or lack
thereof) in consulting China scholars and
investing in the eld of China studies in
India. This is in stark contrast to the
Title VI programme (sometimes also
Tansen Sen (Tansen.Sen@baruch.cuny.edu)
is with the Department of History, Baruch
College, City University of New York.