TRIA V.

LIRAG
G.R. No. L-13994. April 29, 1961.
DOCTRINE:
A judgment upon a compromise is a judgment rendered with the consent of the parties for the
purpose of executing a settlement of the action. It is in the nature of a contract and is in effect an
admission by the parties that the judgment is a just determination of their rights on the facts of
the case, had they been proved. Even more than a contract that may be enforced by ordinary
action for specific performance, the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment,
and may, therefore, be enforced as such by a writ of execution. In fact, a compromise has upon
the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Delgado and Lirag executed a deed of sale of land payable in the manner stipulated therein.
Delgado filed an action for recovery of money alleging that Lirag violated the terms of their
agreement. Lirag filed an answer. onse!uently, Delgado and Lirag submitted to a compromise
agreement. "he lower court rendered a decision transcribing and incorporating as part thereof
said compromise agreement. "ria substituted Delgado as party to the case. Lirag filed a motion
for execution alleging that "ria failed to comply with the compromise agreement. "he motion
was granted. "ria did not appeal thus, the corresponding writ of execution was issued. #or
reasons not stated in the record, said writ was not enforced. $ence, on motion of Lirag, an alias
writ of execution was issued. "ria filed a motion to lift alias writ of execution arguing that the
compromise agreement was a mere contract that may be enforced by ordinary action specific
performance, not by writ of execution. "he court ruled that the compromise agreement was part
and parcel of the judgment and may, therefore, be enforced, as such, by writ execution.
#urthermore, the order was already final executory, therefore, "ria is already barred from
!uestioning its propriety.
FACT:
%ariano &. Delgado and defendant 'enceslao A. Lirag executed a deed selling to Lirag a
parcel of land situated in amarines (ur, payable in the manner stipulated therin. Alleging
that Lirag had violated the terms of the agreement, Delgado filed an action for the recovery
of )*,+++, plus attorney,s fees and costs.
After the filing of Lirag,s answer, the parties submitted to the court the following
compromise agreement-
o "hat the parties hereby agree to rescind the deed of sale.
o "hat the plaintiff will pay to the defendant the sum of )./,0++, representing sums
of money received by the plaintiff from the defendant and expenses incurred by
the latter. 1pon full payment of this amount, the defendant will deliver to the
plaintiff the land that is the subject matter of the said deed of sale2
o "hat the parties mutually relin!uish their claims for damages and attorney,s fees
against one another2 and
o "hat the plaintiff may sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the land subject3
matter of the sale or any part thereof in order to raise such sum as may be
necessary to pay the afore3mentioned amount of )./,0++.++ to the defendant,
provided however, that no sale, mortgage or disposition made by the plaintiff
shall be valid unless made with the consent of the defendant2 and that in case of
disagreement the matter shall be settled by the ourt.
"he ourt of #irst Instance of amarines (ur rendered a decision transcribing and
incorporating as part thereof said compromise agreement, the dispositive part of which
decision reads-
o In view thereof, the foregoing agreement is approved and judgment is rendered
in conformity therewith, without pronouncement as to costs.
Delgado conveyed all his rights to the disputed land to one 4alerie ). "ria who, with Lirag,s
conformity, substituted Delgado as plaintiff in this case. Lirag filed a 5motion for execution5,
upon the ground that "ria had not paid the sum of )./,0++.++, in violation of the
compromise agreement and the decision.
"he motion was granted. 6o appeal having been ta7en therefrom, the corresponding writ of
execution was issued. #or reasons not stated in the record, said writ was not enforced.
Again, motion of Lirag, an alias writ of execution was issued.
(oon thereafter, "ria filed a motion to lift alias writ of execution, which was denied.
$ence, this appeal by "ria.
"ria maintains that his failure to pay was imputable to Lirag, because Lirag, in violation of
said agreement, refused to lend him 8"ria9 the :" to the land in !uestion, as well as to
sign papers and pleadings necessary to enable him 8"ria9 to raise funds with which to pay
said amount.
#urthermore, "ria insists that the compromise agreement was merely a contract, which
may be enforced by ordinary action specific performance, not by writ of execution.
I!E:
.. ':6 the compromise agreement may be enforced by the writ of execution
;. ':6 "ria is already barred from !uestioning the order of the court granting the motion for
execution.
"ELD#RATIO:
.. <E(. (aid compromise agreement is more than a contract. It had been submitted to the
court for approval with re!uest that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, and
was accordingly approved by the court and incorporation into its decision, which was
5rendered in conformity there with.5 In other words, it was part and parcel of the judgment
and may, therefore, be enforced, as such, by writ execution. 8Art. ;+/=, ivil ode of the
)hilippines.9
;. <E(. "ria failed to call the attention of this ourt to the alleged refusal of Delgado so that
the controversy could be resolved conformably to the decision. &esides, notice of Lirag>s
motion for execution of the decision was duly served upon "ria, who filed a written
opposition thereto. <et, when the lower court issued its order overruling the opposition and
granting said motion, "ria did not appeal from said order and thus allowed it to become final
and executory. $e did not !uestion its propriety until the issuance of an alias writ of
execution. It is now too late, therefore, to invo7e the alleged breach of the compromise
agreement by Lirag as a ground to bar the execution of the decision in this case.