Global Risks 2011 LD ExecSum

World Economic Forum
in collaboration with :
Marsh & McLennan Companies
Swiss Reinsurance Company
Wharton Center for Risk Management,
University of Pennsylvania
Zurich Financial Services
Global Risks
2011
Sixth Edition
An initiative of the Risk Response Network
January 2011
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Figure 1 | Global Risks Landscape 2011:
Perception data from the World Economic Forums Global Risks Survey
Economic Risks
Asset price collapse
Extreme commodity price volatility
Extreme consumer price volatility
Extreme energy price volatility
Fiscal crises
Global imbalances and currency volatility
Infrastructure fragility
Liquidity/credit crunch
Regulatory failures
Retrenchment from globalization
Slowing Chinese economy (<6%)
Environmental Risks
Air pollution
Biodiversity loss
Climate change
Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions
Flooding
Ocean governance
Storms and cyclones
Societal Risks
Chronic diseases
Demographic challenges
Economic disparity
Food security
Infectious diseases
Migration
Water security
Geopolitical Risks
Corruption
Fragile states
Geopolitical conict
Global governance failures
Illicit trade
Organized crime
Space security
Terrorism
Weapons of mass destruction
Technological Risks
Critical information infrastructure
breakdown
Online data and information security
Threats from new technologies
Figure | Risks Interconnection Map (RIM) 2011 2
Global Risks 2011 | 3
Contents
Preface 4
Executive summary 6
Cross-cutting global risks
Economic disparity and global governance failures 10
Risks in focus 1
The macroeconomic imbalances nexus 14
Risks in focus 2
The illegal economy nexus 22
Risks in focus 3
The water-food-energy nexus 28
Risks to watch 36
Conclusion 41
Appendix 1
Denitions and methodology 42
Appendix 2
Survey data overview 2011 44
Appendix 3
Common global risk response strategies 48
Appendix 4
Guide to online global risks 2011 resources 50
References and further reading 51
Acknowledgements 52
Project team 56
4 | Global Risks 2011
Preface
Since 2006 the World Economic Forums Global Risks
report has provided a unique and timely analysis of
the risks that are shaping the global environment.
Underscored by an unprecedented pace of change,
stakeholders from across business, government and
civil society face a new imperative in understanding
and managing emerging risks.
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition provides a high-
level overview of 37 selected global risks as seen
by members of the World Economic Forums Global
Agenda Councils and supported by a survey of 580
leaders and decision-makers around the world. The
report also benets from the expertise and thought
leadership of the World Economic Forums Global
Risk Partners: Marsh & McLennan Companies, Swiss
Reinsurance Company, Wharton Center for Risk
Management, University of Pennsylvania, and Zurich
Financial Services.
This report aims to enhance understanding of how a
comprehensive set of global risks are evolving, how
their interaction impacts a variety of stakeholders,
and what trade-offs are involved in managing them.
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition is a useful tool for
policy-makers, CEOs, senior executives and thought
leaders around the world. It aims to equip institutions
to understand and respond to global risks and to
embrace change as a source of innovation.
Most importantly, I hope that focusing on the critical
connections between key global risks, stakeholders
and decision-makers will inspire all to engage
collectively in efforts to improve the global systems
overall resilience.
At the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting
2011 in Davos-Klosters, the Forum will go beyond
its current global risk work in launching the Risk
Response Network (RRN). The RRN will build on the
understanding embodied in Global Risks 2011, Sixth
Edition to provide a platform for our Partners and
constituents to collaborate in multistakeholder efforts
to shape a more secure, innovative and resilient future.
I hope you nd the report both informative and
provocative.
Klaus Schwab
Founder and Executive Chairman
The World Economic Forums Risk Response Network
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition is a agship product of the World Economic Forums new Risk Response
Network (RRN).
The RRN is a unique platform for global decision-makers to better understand, manage and respond to
complex and interdependent risks. It will bring a rigorous approach to understanding the complexity of
risks that face corporate, government and civil society leaders, and will provide tools enabling them to
better mitigate risks and capture associated opportunities. It will combine:
The most compelling insights, drawn from the World Economic Forums communities and
contributors, including active expert groups such as our Network of Global Agenda Councils and a
formal network of the worlds top universities and private sector content providers;
The most relevant global decision-makers, brought together through a community of Risk Ofcers
from top corporations, governments and international organizations;
The most suitable tools and services, including analytic tools and risk management processes to
enable decision-makers to better understand key risks in depth and in context, to respond to them
proactively and mobilize quickly and efciently in times of crisis
This report lays the foundations for the RRN by highlighting three ways for leaders to improve their
response to complex and interdependent risks:
Proactively address the causes, rather than the symptoms, of global risk, identifying effective
points of intervention in underlying structures and systems in particular with respect to global
governance failures and economic disparities;
Devise coordinated response strategies to address the existence of difcult trade-offs and the
threat of unintended consequences caused in part by increased interconnectedness.
Take a longer-term approach to assessment and response, particularly when seeking to manage
global risks that emerge over decades rather than months or years.
The RRN will build on these insights over the coming months by launching a series of initiatives and
workstreams focused on a variety of global risks highlighted in this Report. We hope that you will nd
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition to be thought-provoking. But, more importantly, we hope many of you will
join the World Economic Forums initiative to collectively better understand and respond to the new world
of risk.
The world is in no position to face major,
new shocks. The nancial crisis has
reduced global economic resilience,
while increasing geopolitical tension and
heightened social concerns suggest
that both governments and societies
are less able than ever to cope with
global challenges. Yet, as this report
shows, we face ever-greater concerns
regarding global risks, the prospect of
rapid contagion through increasingly
connected systems and the threat of
disastrous impacts.
In this context, Global Risks 2011, Sixth
Edition reveals insights stemming from
an unparalleled effort on the part of the
World Economic Forum to analyse the
global risk landscape in the coming
decade.
1
Two cross-cutting global risks
Two risks are especially signicant given their high
degrees of impact and interconnectedness. Economic
disparity
2
and global governance
3
failures both
inuence the evolution of many other global risks and
inhibit our capacity to respond effectively to them.
In this way, the global risk context in 2011 is dened by
a 21st century paradox: as the world grows together, it
is also growing apart.
Globalization has generated sustained economic
growth for a generation. It has shrunk and reshaped
the world, making it far more interconnected and
interdependent. But the benets of globalization seem
unevenly spread a minority is seen to have harvested
a disproportionate amount of the fruits. Although
growth of the new champions is rebalancing economic
power between countries, there is evidence that
economic disparity within countries is growing.
Issues of economic disparity and equity at both the
national and the international levels are becoming
increasingly important. Politically, there are signs of
resurgent nationalism and populism as well as social
fragmentation. There is also a growing divergence
of opinion between countries on how to promote
sustainable, inclusive growth.
To meet these challenges, improved global governance
is essential. But this is another 21st century paradox:
the conditions that make improved global governance
so crucial divergent interests, conicting incentives
and differing norms and values are also the ones
that make its realization so difcult, complex and
messy. As a result, we see failures such as the Doha
Development Round of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the lack of international agreement at the
Copenhagen Conference on climate change. The G20
is seen as the most hopeful development in global
governance but its efciency in this regard has not
been proven.
Executive summary
1
For more information see Appendix 2.
2
Wealth and income disparities, both within countries and between countries
3
Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks
Three important risks in focus
Beyond these two cross-cutting global risks, three
important clusters of risks have emerged in this years
analysis:
The macroeconomic imbalances nexus: A
cluster of economic risks including macroeconomic
imbalances and currency volatility, scal crises and
asset price collapse arise from the tension between
the increasing wealth and inuence of emerging
economies and high levels of debt in advanced
economies. Savings and trade imbalances within and
between countries are increasingly unsustainable while
unfunded liabilities create extreme long-term pressure
on scal positions. One way out of these imbalances
would be coordinated global action but this is
challenging given the conicting interests of different
states.
The illegal economy nexus: This nexus examines
a cluster of risks including state fragility, illicit trade,
organized crime and corruption. A networked world,
governance failures and economic disparity create
opportunities for such illegal activities to ourish. In
2009, the value of illicit trade around the globe was
estimated at US $1.3 trillion and growing. These risks,
while creating huge costs for legitimate economic
activities, also weaken states, threatening development
opportunities, undermining the rule of law and keeping
countries trapped in cycles of poverty and instability.
International cooperation both on the supply side
and on the demand side is urgently needed.
The water-food-energy nexus: A rapidly rising
global population and growing prosperity are putting
unsustainable pressures on resources. Demand for
water, food and energy is expected to rise by 30-50%
in the next two decades, while economic disparities
incentivize short-term responses in production and
consumption that undermine long-term sustainability.
Shortages could cause social and political instability,
geopolitical conict and irreparable environmental
damage. Any strategy that focuses on one part of
the water-food-energy nexus without considering
its interconnections risks serious unintended
consequences.
Five risks to watch
Five risks have been designated as risks to watch,
as survey respondents assessed them with high
levels of variance and low levels of condence while
experts
4
consider they may have severe, unexpected
or underappreciated consequences:
Cyber-security issues ranging from the growing
prevalence of cyber theft to the little-understood
possibility of all-out cyber warfare
Demographic challenges adding to scal
pressures in advanced economies and creating
severe risks to social stability in emerging
economies
Resource security issues causing extreme
volatility and sustained increases over the long run
in energy and commodity prices, if supply is no
longer able to keep up with demand
Retrenchment from globalization through populist
responses to economic disparities, if emerging
economies do not take up a leadership role
Weapons of mass destruction, especially
the possibility of renewed nuclear proliferation
between states
Effective risk response is not only about proactively
reducing the downsides associated with global risks;
it is also about seizing the opportunities for innovation
and growth that may arise. Throughout this report, a
series of risk response strategies are explored that can
help stakeholders achieve both goals.
4
Unless otherwise noted, in this report experts refers to the Global Agenda Council members and other contributors who are
acknowledged at the end of this report. They provided input through various means, including participating in the Global Risks Survey,
taking part in workshops, reviewing the report and providing individual advice and counsel.
Executive summary
Cross-cutting global risks
Economic disparity and global
governance failures
Economic disparity and global governance failures
emerged from the Forums Global Risks Survey 2010
as the two most highly connected risks and were
perceived as both very likely and of high impact (see
Figure 1, Global Risks Landscape, and Figure 2,
Risks Interconnection Map, at the beginning of the
report). They inuence the context in which global risks
evolve and occur in two critical ways: rst, they can
exacerbate both the likelihood and impact of other
risks; second, they can inhibit effective risk response.
Economic disparity
and social fragmentation
Definition: Wealth and income disparities, both within countries
and between countries, threaten social and political stability as
well as economic development.
The Global Risks Survey identied economic disparity
as one of the most important risks in the coming
decade. The Forums Global Agenda Council survey
also supports this nding, having ranked economic
disparity as the second most important trend in terms
of impact on the business community and as the most
underestimated trend in terms of its impact.
Economic disparity is tightly interconnected with
corruption, demographic challenges, fragile states,
global imbalances and asset-price collapse.
Respondents perceived economic disparity as
inuencing chronic diseases, infectious diseases,
illicit trade, migration, food (in)security, terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. They saw economic
disparity as inuenced by climate-change related risks
and global governance failures. The data indicate that
economic disparity and geopolitical conict reinforce
one another.
Economic disparity plays out between and within
countries. Ease of communication has made
inequalities between countries more visible. Despite
robust growth in some emerging economies, many
countries remain trapped in a cycle of poverty with
tremendous implications ranging from lack of access
to basic social infrastructure such as good education,
healthcare and sanitation to political fragility of the
state.
Stakeholders also expressed concerns over evidence
of rising economic disparity within countries, in
advanced and emerging economies alike. Economic
analysis by the OECD and others suggests that real
income growth of the top income quintiles of the
populations in Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Italy, and the USA was twice as large as
that of the bottom quintiles between the mid-1980s
to mid-2000s.
5
Income inequality as measured by the
Gini Index over the past decade has also increased
rapidly in emerging economies such as India, China,
or Indonesia. While such studies are subject to
methodological criticisms and there is disagreement
over the ndings, the risk of rising economic disparity,
even in terms of perception alone, is concerning.
Many factors may have contributed to this trend
within countries, including the erosion of employment
culture, the decline of organized labour, and failures of
education systems to keep pace with the increasing
demands of the workplace.
Economic disparities are also seen as contributing to
a broader process of global social fragmentation.
Globalization has led to different groups within
countries having divergent economic interests,
undermining a sense of broader national solidarity.
At the same time, transnational associations are
becoming more important in individual and group
identity, enabled by the internationalization of media
and communication. Traditional forms of association
have been eroded. Trust in institutions seems to have
dropped.
In part, it may be that vertically-integrated national
societies are being replaced by more uid,
transnational societies. This naturally offers a range
of opportunities for cross-cultural communication
and community-forming unhindered by geography.
However, it also creates tensions within countries that
lead to global risks, and undermines governments
political capacity to respond to local manifestations of
those risks.
Cross-cutting global risks:

5
OECD (2008), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries
Definition: Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements
or networks, combined with competing national and political
interests, impede attempts to cooperate on addressing global
risks.
While risks are increasingly globalized and
interconnected, global governance capacities are
highly fragmented. Global governance failures
create and exacerbate systemic global risks, Survey
results showed strong interconnections between
global governance failures and regulatory failures,
corruption and economic disparity, with retrenchment
from globalization and global governance failures being
seen as mutually reinforcing.
Global governance failures cited by experts include:
UN climate change negotiations; the uncompleted
Doha Development Round of trade negotiations; lack
of progress on some of the Millennium Development
Goals; the stalling of United Nations Security Council
reform; and challenges to frameworks designed to
prevent the proliferation of the capability of nuclear
weapons. There is a growing sense of paralysis in
responding to global challenges. The Washington
Consensus is no longer accepted as the baseline
model for economic development, but neither has it
been replaced by an alternative set of unied values.
The United States National Intelligence Council
and the European Unions Institute for Security
Studies recently concluded that current governance
frameworks will be unable to keep pace with looming
global challenges unless extensive reforms are
implemented. Increasingly, emerging economies
feel that unfairly they have insufcient inuence in
international institutions as they are currently designed.
Yet there is uncertainty over the ability and willingness
of rising powers to shoulder a greater share of global
responsibilities, as well as reluctance on the part of
established powers to recognize the limits of their own
power.
It is uncertain whether global governance will muddle
along with an increasingly ill-tting institutional
framework, whether we will nd the capacity and will
to embrace more agile structures enabled by global
networks and new forms of collaboration, or whether
the idea of coordinated global governance will be
discarded entirely.
Effective global governance is also held back by
ineffective decision-making structures at the national
level. Arguably, technological and social shifts
have weakened the ability of leaders to implement
internationally agreed commitments which are
unpalatable in the short-term, as the cost of mobilizing
interest groups has fallen. The difculties in achieving
an international climate change agreement, as
well as resistance to internationally coordinated
macroeconomic policy measures, are cases in point.
A counterbalance would be a well-informed and
well-mobilized global public opinion sharing norms
and values of global citizenship, but this is not yet fully
developed.
Recognizing the importance of global
governance failures, the World Economic
Forum in 2009 launched the Global Redesign
Initiative. Its purpose has been to stimulate
a strategic thought process among all
stakeholders about ways in which international
institutions and arrangements should and could
be adapted to contemporary challenges.
A series of specic proposals on how some
of the gaps and failures in international
cooperation might begin to be addressed was
presented for initial discussion with senior
representatives of about 50 governments and
20 international organizations at a special
summit in Doha, Qatar, on 30-31 May 2010.
The proposals are also available at:
http://www.weforum.org/globalredesign
Cross-cutting global risks:
Risks in focus 1
The macroeconomic imbalances nexus
Risk description
and impacts
This cluster of three economic risks global
imbalances and currency volatility, scal crises
and asset price collapse is characterized by both
internal imbalances (within countries) and external
imbalances (between countries).
Internal imbalances are produced by many factors,
including government policies and private sector
behavior and are inuenced by the stage of economic
development. Fiscal imbalances in advanced
economies have widened because of government
proigacy. They were exacerbated by the impact of the
nancial crisis. First, many governments were forced
to set aside large packages to bailout failing banks
and stabilize the nancial system. Second, and more
importantly, many governments provided large scal
stimuli to mitigate the recessionary impact of the crisis.
The combination of bailout and stimulus packages
resulted in burgeoning decits and expanding debt-
to-GDP ratios, particularly in advanced economies.
Achieving scal consolidation while avoiding hampering
the fragile recovery is a short-term challenge. However
in the long-term, a key scal challenge will be
nancing the unfunded liabilities of current and future
generations (see discussion below and Risk to Watch
Demographic Challenges).
Related to this point, external imbalances between
countries are also of concern. At the heart of global
imbalances is a mismatch between saving and
investment. Decit countries do not save enough
relative to their investments, and surplus countries do
not invest enough given their high savings. In principle,
external imbalances are not bad. Capital will tend to
ow to the most protable use; in a globalized system,
that includes cross-border capital ows. As long as
the recipients of such ows put them to productive
use (i.e. as long as the resulting investments generate
revenue that is high enough to serve and amortize
the debt incurred) no major problem arises.
6
External
imbalances become a problem if they contribute to an
unsustainable accumulation of debt or, for countries
that actively control their exchange rates, if they lead to
an unsustainable accumulation of foreign reserves.
These imbalances lead to two primary risks. First, they
lead to slow growth, increasing accumulation of debt
and scal pressures create risks of sovereign defaults
in certain advanced economies which could also affect
banking systems worldwide (and vice-versa). Second,
such weakness creates the risk of excessive capital
ows to emerging markets, increasing the bubble risk
and potentially leading to asset price collapse. While
global imbalances will continue to imply a net ow of
capital from surplus to decit countries, these risks
arise when increases in gross ows of capital from
advanced to emerging economies are not matched by
the commensurate ability of economies to absorb such
ows productively.
Figure 3 shows how these risks are linked graphically,
and Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive list of the direct
and indirect impacts of these risks to stakeholders.
These risks link strongly to other global risks. For
example, scal pressures in advanced economies
will accelerate the ongoing power shift towards Asia,
increasing the risk of geopolitical tensions. All three
risks could also exacerbate global governance failures
as countries resort to zero-sum calculations and short-
term, populist solutions.
6
Some prominent economists, including US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, have argued that global imbalances contributed
materially to the recent global financial crisis by lowering the cost of debt and encouraging investors to search for higher yields in riskier
assets such as the US housing market.
Risks in focus 1:
Figure 1
Table 1
System diagram for risks associated with the macroeconomic imbalances nexus
Impact of risks related to macroeconomic imbalances (non-exhaustive)
Impacts Direct Impacts Indirect Impacts
Impact on
governments
Advanced economies: Tough budget
decisions in balancing stimulus and austerity;
debt defaults, rescheduling or rescue
Emerging economies: Increased need to
explore currency adjustment
Lack of political will to address other
global challenges such as climate
change
Impact on society /
populations
Advanced economies: Low growth in
face of severe austerity; inability to meet
entitlement commitments
Emerging economies: Social adjustments
through shift towards domestic demand
rather than exports (need for redistribution
and social security schemes to boost
consumption and lower savings)
Welfare increases in China in the
longer term as a result of greater
reliance on domestic consumption
once rebalancing takes place
Impact on business Protectionist (trade and nancial) pressures
Threat of collapse of banking system along
with government nance; uncertainty
Realignment of business models as
global adjustments and retrenchment
from globalization shift demand
patterns
Figure 3
Table 1
Risks in focus 1:
Source: World Economic Forum
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
Discrepancy
Oil exporters
China and East Asia
Germany + Japan
ROW
Other defcit nations
US
%

o
f

W
o
r
l
d

G
D
P
Major trends and
uncertainties
As Figure 4 shows, global imbalances increased
signicantly between 1996 and 2009. While the
nancial crisis acted to reduce these somewhat from
recent highs, the IMF and others expect them to
increase again in the future. Running sustained and
large current account decits requires capital inows
on the part of decit countries. This implies an increase
in public debt when accompanied by scal decits.
Figure 5 shows the long-run trends for government
debt for G7 economies, including recent increases.
Figure 4
Figure 5
Global current account imbalances 1996-2009
Average government debt ratios in G7 Economies,1950-2010 (PPP-weighted)
Source: Long-Term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/13, 1 September 2010
Source: IMF World Economic Forum Outlook, April 2010
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
Gross Debt
Net Debt
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
%

o
f

G
D
P
Risks in focus 1:
Figure 6 Net present value of the impact on fscal imbalance defcits of the fnancial crisis
and ageing-related spending for selected countries.
There is a high degree of risk and uncertainty regarding
how much debt can be borne by the public sector,
particularly in advanced economies, before the debt
burden seriously impacts economic growth through
increasing borrowing costs, politically unacceptable
amortization payments, and the subsequent need for
scal austerity. Based on a sample of 44 countries over
a period of 200 years Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen
Reinhart have found that there are distinct debt-to-
GDP thresholds where debt growth becomes non-
linear. Specically, for public debt held by advanced
and emerging economies they found this threshold
to be approximately 90%.
7
After this threshold, the
burden of debt reduces median GDP growth by roughly
one percentage point and average GDP growth by
considerably more. Depending on which measures of
debt are used, US public debt is either fast approaching
or even just past this threshold, while many European
countries are well beyond it. Further, if current spending
and income trends continue, IMF analysis indicates that
net government debt for G7 economies could rapidly
increase to unprecedented levels.
However, some economists argue that the standard
debt-to-GDP ratios reported widely by ofcial
agencies fail to measure a countrys true long-term
scal prospects. A more accurate measure of scal
outlook is to factor in future liabilities not counted
as current debt by calculating the net present value
(NPV) of all future obligations relative to the NPV of
all future income streams. Figure 6 summarizes such
an IMF calculation for selected countries, with the
average of the sample representing an NPV of 444%
of GDP. While there are large uncertainties in these
calculations, such analysis suggests that the impact
of uncounted future liabilities is very large, and that the
impact of age-related liabilities will dwarf short-term
issues such as the cost of scal stimulus.
7
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010), Growth in a Time of Debt, NBER Working Paper No. 15639, January 2010
Source: Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis, IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/13, 9 June 2009
J
A
P
I
T
A
T
U
R
M
E
X
F
R
A
G
E
R
G
B
R
A
v
e
r
g
a
g
e
A
U
S
U
S
A
E
S
P
K
O
R
C
A
NAging
Crisis
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
%

o
f

G
D
P
Risks in focus 1:
Given the magnitude of uncovered future liabilities, the
IMF and Bank of International Settlements analysis
implies that without signicant adjustments in the
medium-term, almost all advanced economies face
serious threats to scal solvency in the long-run.
8

This suggests that countries will have to embark
on major scal consolidation exercises, increasing
taxes or reducing spending, in order to cover the gap
between expected future liabilities and expected future
income. Experts argued that there is a distinct risk that
politicians will not be able to muster the necessary will
to prevent severe nancial market turbulences and,
ultimately, protect their countries against default.
In light of the pressures of such scal and
macroeconomic imbalances, discussions with
experts highlighted three non-exclusive and negative
scenarios whereby this cluster of risks produces
severe challenges to the global nancial and economic
systems and beyond.
In the rst scenario, a combination of recessionary
pressures and lack of market condence in the short-
term and unfunded social obligations in the long-term
could drive both scal and banking crises in selected
advanced economies. In some countries, crises in
public nances will mean a fall in value of government
bonds, taking with them the value of assets invested
by nancial institutions. For countries with a higher
proportion of private lending, as the threat of sovereign
default rises, capital will ee banks that are seen
to ultimately be reliant on public rescues. In either
event, the direct impacts of scal crises are likely to
be compounded by credit and banking crises with
adverse systemic implications for the global nancial
system.
In the second scenario, emerging markets experience
an asset price collapse. Loose monetary policy and
slow growth in advanced economies, together with
high growth in emerging markets, is already attracting
increasing gross capital ows to emerging economies
and decoupling their stock markets from those of
advanced economies. This could result in asset
bubbles as rising equity markets leak into real estate
prices. Although some emerging markets are trying to
restrain these capital inows, it would be difcult for all
emerging markets simultaneously to resist the upward
pressure on their currencies. Such asset bubbles,
driven as they are by excess liquidity rather than
increases in underlying value, could result in severe
crashes, damaging both emerging markets and the
world economy as a whole.
The nal scenario, although regarded by many as
unlikely, is a repeat of the stagation of the 1970s
in advanced economies. This scenario sees loose
monetary policy proving unable to stimulate economic
activity, while supply-side restrictions for commodities
and energy arise because of geopolitical conict in the
Middle East, or merely an outpacing of global supply
by robust growth in the emerging world, leading to
a loss of condence in the ability of central banks
in advanced economies and emerging countries to
control ination.
8
See also IMF Country Report No. 10/248, 12 July 2010, Gokhale J, (2009) Measuring the Unfunded Obligations of European Countries,
National Centre for Policy Analysis and Kotlikoff, L (2010), A Hidden Fiscal Crisis?, Finance and Development, September 2010
Risks in focus 1:
Levers and
trade-offs
Recognizing trade-offs in managing
global imbalances
Lack of agreement on how to reduce global
imbalances makes it difcult to create joint
responsibility at the international level. Diverging
interests in the short-term are driven by both political
and economic factors. While advanced economies see
continuing imbalances as economically unsustainable,
emerging economies running trade surpluses fear that
adjustments involving currency appreciation would hurt
employment in export sectors and potentially threaten
social stability.
Political leaders in advanced economies are under
increasing pressure to seek short-term solutions but
uncoordinated actions, such as simultaneous currency
depreciation by multiple countries, could create new
risks. For all countries to attempt to devalue their
currencies at the same time would only have negative
impacts.
There are three primary levers through which the risks
described above could be addressed.
Strengthening global coordination
Although unlikely, experts consider that the G20 and
IMF could play a key role in developing a stronger
policy framework to discourage the build-up of
unsustainable imbalances. Renewed leadership on
promoting international exchange rate coordination is
particularly important to avoid currency wars.
However, even more powerful would be cooperation
on meaningful growth policies that change the
incentives for the use of income in both decit and
surplus countries. Both price and income adjustments
are required to reduce imbalances, and successful
adjustment must include debtor and creditor (or decit
and surplus) countries.
Strengthening nancial systems
Weak nancial systems are a likely source of
risk in both advanced and emerging economies;
strengthening regulation and institutions in general
is a key point of intervention. Many proposals have
been made in this regard, including the Basel III
provisions, and implementation is now seen as of most
importance. Possibilities for strengthening the global
nancial system through regulation include:
Better surveillance of the nancial sector, including
all systemically relevant players
Tighter capital and liquidity ratios for all banking
institutions (including non-banks), with higher
ratios for systemically relevant institutions
Risk retention for securitization (so-called skin in
the game)
Improved transparency and counterparty risk
management in over-the-counter derivative
markets
As outlined in the Forums Financial Development
Report 2010, strengthening nancial systems in
emerging economies by developing capital markets
and improving access to retail nancial services could
increase both domestic condence and investment
opportunities, both of which could stimulate
consumption and help to offset global imbalances as
well as reduce the risk of asset bubbles.
Facilitating domestic transitions
towards balanced economies
While decit countries will necessarily be required to
take on far-reaching price and cost adjustments to
enhance the competitiveness of their exports, surplus
countries need to address weaknesses in private
domestic consumption. This would not only increase
the welfare of surplus societies, but also facilitate the
necessary adjustments in decit countries by raising
their exports.
Most importantly, advanced economies urgently need
to recognize the rising challenge of scal stress caused
by unfunded liabilities linked to ageing societies.
To shift dependence from government-provided
social insurance to private savings for pensions and
healthcare services, states will require a combination of
careful reform, nancial innovation, and private sector
solutions to gradually but signicantly reduce the
burden on public nances and offset the risk of future
scal crises.
Risks in focus 1:
Risks in focus 2
The illegal economy nexus
Risk description
and impacts
Illicit trade, organized crime and corruption are
chronic risks that are perceived as highly likely to occur
and of medium impact. As a highly interconnected
nexus representing the illegal economy, however,
experts see these risks as of central importance to
the global risk landscape. As Figure 7 illustrates,
both survey data and experts suggest that this nexus
heavily inuences three other important global risks
fragile states, terrorism and geopolitical conict
which, in turn, have a signicant and negative impact
on global stability.
There is a feedback loop between this nexus and
economic disparity. Economic disparity provides an
enabling environment for illicit trade, corruption and
organized crime to grow in advanced and emerging
economies. In turn, the proceeds reinforce the power of
the privileged, while undermining economic development
by raising the costs of doing legitimate business, thereby
increasing inequalities both within and between countries.
Similarly, while global governance failures have created
a growing space for illegal activities, these activities
have, in turn, tended to undermine efcient global
governance.
Although this nexus of risks is often seen as more
pervasive in emerging economies, a signicant
proportion of the demand for illicit goods is generated
in advanced economies. Illegal networks also use
the international banking and real estate systems to
facilitate their nancial management, laundering money
and hiding prots from tax authorities.
The impacts of this nexus of risks can also spread
far beyond emerging economies. For example, illicit
trade of intellectual property-protected goods reduces
incentives for innovation and investment. Trade in
counterfeit medicines risks human health globally.
Security risks arising from fragile states terrorism and
geopolitical conict may have broad consequences.
And as Table 2 below shows, corruption in both
emerging and advanced economies is a low-intensity
transaction cost that sties growth, distorts markets
and undermines the rule of law.
Risks in focus 2:
Table 1
Impact of risks related to the illegal economy nexus (non-exhaustive)
Impact on
governments
Weakened institutions/undermining and
corruption of the rule of law
Erosion of civil service function/capture of
state institutions by corruption
Lack of continuity in policies affecting
business
Small tax base/loss of revenue
Exodus of capital
Threats to political stability
Decreased regional investments
Shift of power to disruptive groups
Impact on society /
populations
Erosion of trust in public institutions
Potential for draconian responses that limit
economic opportunity (stricter migration
policies)
Brain drain / skill depletion from emigration
Reduction in tourism
Destruction of biosphere through
unregulated activities
Criminalization/marginalization of
segments of the population
Impact on business Increased transaction costs
Lost legitimate sales
Deterred/appropriated investments
Exposure to threats, bribes and reduced
security of personnel
Higher costs of capital
Pressure to participate in corrupt
practices through perceived
competitive disadvantage
Table 2
Risks in focus 2:
Figure 1 System diagram for risks associated with the illegal economy nexus Figure 7
Major trends and
uncertainties
The negative effects of corruption, illicit trade,
organized crime and fragility are easy to characterize
but extremely difcult to quantify. The opaqueness of
this nexus of risks has resulted in too little attention
and too few resources devoted to mitigating it, and
the signicance of this nexus of risks has increased
considerably in recent years in part because of global
governance failures, as informal networks engage in
legal and regulatory arbitrage.
Illicit trade is now thought to represent between 7 and
10% of the global economy in some countries, illicit
trade is the major source of income. Table 3 below is
one example of attempts to judge the market size of
illicit trade of different goods based on public sources.
It must be stressed that these numbers are extremely
rough estimates and are the subject of signicant
debate; the Forums Global Agenda Council on Illicit
Trade is currently developing a methodology to track
effectively the global impact of these activities.
It should be noted that even when ows of illicit
goods and criminal activity are small relative to global
markets, they can have an outsized effect on fragile
states as the real value of such activity can dwarf
national salaries and government budgets.
The potential for this nexus of risks to cause contagion
has arguably been demonstrated recently in Kyrgyzstan.
Members of the Forums Global Agenda Councils
argue that the undermining of state leadership and
economic growth by corrupt ofcials and organized
crime contributed signicantly to social tensions
which erupted in violent conict in June 2010, causing
widespread destruction, hundreds of civilian deaths and
the displacement of 400,000 ethnic Uzbeks.
Figure 1 Rough estimated market size of illicit
goods based on public sources
(in USD billion)
Table 3
Counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs: 200
Prostitution: 190
Marijuana: 140
Counterfeit electronics: 100
Cocaine: 80
Opium and heroin: 60
Web video piracy: 60
Software piracy: 50
Cigarette smuggling: 50
Human trafcking: 30
Environmental crimes and natural resources trade: 20
Logging: 5
Art and cultural artefacts: 5
Small arms: 1
Source: Havocscope and experts
Levers and
trade-offs
Recognizing trade-offs in responding
to the illegal econnomy nexus
Why has so little progress been made in mitigating
this nexus of risks? One reason is that structures
which enable illicit activities also benet many people
who would not consider themselves as engaging in
criminal behaviour; for example, secrecy jurisdictions
allow individuals and corporations to avoid tax.
Increasing transparency and reducing illicit trade would
undoubtedly involve increased costs and lower prots
for many businesses. Similarly, there are large costs
in shifting populations who currently rely on producing
goods for illicit markets (such as poppy-farmers in
Afghanistan) to other, legal activities.
However, if global leaders appreciate the importance
of this issue as a collective challenge, a number of
measures could be employed.
Improve global coordination with
stronger multilateral frameworks
Stronger links between international civil society and legal
institutions in advanced economies would assist activists
and law enforcement in emerging economies in tracking
and halting ows of illicit capital out of fragile states. This
was exemplied in the recent ruling by Frances Supreme
Court allowing a judicial inquiry into complaints of alleged
corruption and the removal of government assets led
against three African heads of state.
Reducing variation in regulation and enforcement
capacity would inhibit the capacity of illicit activities
to shift to the least-vigilant jurisdictions. National laws
containing extraterritorial provisions to hold companies
liable for corruption, such as the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the United Kingdom Anti-Bribery
Bill, offer a potential illustration example of how
regulations could be extended and harmonized across
jurisdictions.
Increase the transparency of
international nancial and trade ows
The global nancial system allows the prots of
illicit trade, organized crime and corruption to be
transferred and hidden. This protects participants,
deprives governments of tax revenue and shifts tax
burdens from capital onto wages and consumption.
Ensuring transparency of nancial ows would reduce
opportunities for money to be laundered or transferred
out of emerging economies, as well as enabling more
effective law enforcement.
The Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic
Development recommends ve steps to achieving
greater transparency to ensure that nancial ows can
be tracked, veried and taxed:
Requiring benecial ownership to be a matter of
public record, to reveal the true owners of capital
Requiring multinational companies to undertake
country-by-country reporting of all sales, prots
and taxes
Requiring all trade pricing to be conducted under
the OECD arms-length principle and with pricing
declarations and online data available to customs
authorities, to curtail trade mispricing that avoids
taxes and duties
Implementing global automatic tax information
exchange for all non-resident individuals,
corporations and trusts
Harmonizing anti-money laundering laws globally
to standardize the predicate offences for money
laundering, reduce legal arbitrage and ensure
enforcement can proceed across different
jurisdictions
Transparency in physical movement of goods similarly
needs to be increased, to track the movement
of products that may constitute illicit trade or be
associated with organized crime and corruption. More
responsible monitoring of supply chains could have a
large impact.
Risks in focus 2:
Figure 1
Increased demand side intervention
Experts argue that a greater understanding of the
human and economic impact of engaging in illicit trade
would reduce demand for illicit goods in advanced
economies. This implies a focus on education, ethics
training and the construction of new norms.
Similarly, rather than viewing it as an end in itself to
reduce illicit trade, organized crime and corruption,
this goal could be reframed as a means to support
economic growth and human security. Such a
reframing could shift priorities and behaviour while
driving greater cooperation among institutions.
For certain elements of illicit trade, there may be a case
for reducing the prots on offer to organized crime
by bringing trade within the framework of the law, as
proposed recently in California with the legalization of
marijuana.
For the corporate sector, reframing corruption from an
issue of compliance to an issue of risk could increase
vigilance in monitoring legal or reputational exposure.
This requires a more precise assessment of the costs
of this nexus to businesses and government tax
bases.
9
The Forum is convening private sector actors
through its Partnering Against Corruption Initiative to
clarify the business impacts of corruption and develop
collective solutions with government and civil society.
Reducing economic disparity
Economic disparity is an enabling environment for
this nexus, as it provides the incentive for individuals
to supply and consume the outputs of illicit trade,
organized crime and corruption.
Reducing economic disparities is a major challenge;
it must be faced at a structural level. An empirically
reliable long-term strategy is to invest in universal
education, equipping populations with the knowledge
and skills to contribute fully to economic activity.
Similarly, investments that attempt to correct for
structural unemployment should be investigated.
9
See for example Transparency International, the International Chamber of Commerce, the UN Global Compact and the World
Economic Forum (2008) Clean Business is Good Business: The Case against Corruption http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_
BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption_2008.pdf
Risks in focus 2:
Risks in focus 3
The water-food-energy nexus
Risk description
and impacts
Water security, food security and energy security
are chronic impediments to economic growth and
social stability. Figure 8 shows their interrelatedness:
food production requires water and energy; water
extraction and distribution requires energy; and energy
production requires water. Food prices are also highly
sensitive to the cost of energy inputs through fertilizers,
irrigation, transport and processing.
Economic growth and population growth are common
drivers for all three risks, especially as improving
living conditions in emerging economies results in
more resource-intensive consumption patterns.
Environmental pressures also drive resource insecurity
from climate shifts to extreme weather events that
alter rainfall and affect crop production.
Governance failures in terms of managing shared
resources such as trans-boundary water and energy
sources and food trade agreements create tensions
that can lead to conict, as seen recently in Yemen.
Economic disparity also often exacerbates this nexus
of risks as governments and consumers seek short-
term, unsustainable solutions to economic hardship
such as growing high-value, water-intensive export
crops in water-deprived regions.
It is at the local level that most opportunities can be
found for improving resource efciency and managing
trade-offs between energy, water and food production.
However, at the global and regional levels there are few
initiatives to raise awareness, share leading practices
and motivate consumers in an integrated approach.
Table 4 shows a non-exhaustive list of some of the
direct and indirect impacts stemming from this nexus.
Risks in focus 3:
Table 1
Impacts of risks related to the water-food-energy nexus (non-exhaustive)
Impact on
governments
Stagnation in economic development
Political unrest
Cost of emergency food relief
Signicantly reduced agricultural yields
Threats to energy security
Increased social costs linked to
employment and income loss as
agriculture is negatively effected
National security risks/conict over
natural resources
Impact on society /
populations
Increased levels of hunger and poverty
Increased environmental degradation
Severe food and water shortages
Social unrest
Food price spikes
Migration pressures
Irreparably damaged water sources
Loss of livelihoods
Impact on business Export constraints
Increased resource prices
Commodity price volatility as shortages
ripple through global markets
Energy and water restrictions
Lost investment opportunities
Table 4
Risks in focus 3:
Figure 1 System diagram for risks associated with the water-food-energy nexus Figure 8
Major trends and
uncertainties
Agriculture is the dominant water user, consuming
more than 70% of total global water demand.
Industrially produced meat is especially water-
intensive, requiring up to 20,000 litres of water to
produce a kilogram, compared to approximately 1,200
litres to produce a kilogram of grain. Both population
growth and increasing meat consumption in emerging
economies will therefore have a tremendous impact on
resource needs.
As Figure 9 shows, over the next 10 years, the world
population is expected to rise from the current 6.83
billion to approximately 7.7 billion, with most of the
growth in emerging economies. The United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects a
50% increase in demand for food by 2030, and the
International Food Policy Research Instituted (IFRI)
expects a 30% increase in demand for water, with
other estimates rising to over 40%. The International
Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that the world economy
will demand at least 40% more energy by 2030;
producing this energy will draw heavily on freshwater
resources. For such increased demand for water, food
and energy to be realized, signicant and perhaps
radical changes in water use will be required as well as
new sources for food and energy production exploited.
For food production, supply-related challenges may limit
the ability of farmers to meet growth in demand. Already,
major grain-producing areas in China, India and the
United States, for example depend on unsustainable
mining of groundwater. In some regions, such as
North Africa and Australia, climate-related changes of
precipitation have already critically reduced the levels
of freshwater supply. In northeast China, one of the
countrys main grain-producing regions, climate change
could increase drought losses by over 50% by 2030.
10

Climate change is likely to be exacerbated by meeting
the growing demand for energy. Over 75% of the
global increase in energy use from 2007-2030 is
expected to be met through fossil fuels, especially
coal, and an estimated 77% of the power stations
required to meet demand are yet to be built.
10
The Economics of Climate Adaptation (ECA) Working Group (2009) Shaping Climate Resilient Development: A Framework for Decision-
Making
Figure 1 World Population 1960-2050 Figure 9
Source: World Economic Forum Water Initiative, edited by D. Waughray (2010). Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus,
based on United Nations Population Division, UN-DESA, UN Revision 2008
Developed countries
Developing countries
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
0
0
0

m
i
l
l
i
o
n

p
e
o
p
l
e
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
5
2
0
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3
5
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0
4
0
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0
4
5
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0
5
0
Risks in focus 3:
Risks in focus 3:
Levers and
trade-offs
Recognizing trade-offs in the
water-food-energy nexus
Tough trade-offs will increasingly be needed between
energy, food and water in terms of resource allocation
and planning. The key challenge is to incorporate the
complex interconnections of this nexus of risks into
response strategies that are integrated and take into
account the many relevant stakeholders. The Forum
is working on such an approach with its innovative
initiative WRG Phase 2, run in partnership with the
Water Resources Group (See page 33: The Forums
Water Initiative: Focusing on the Water-Food-Energy
Nexus).
Unintended consequences abound. For example,
because of policy incentives designed to reduce
vehicle emissions, by 2030 the IEA predicts that at
least 5% of global road transport will be powered
by biofuel over 3.2 million barrels per day.
However, producing those fuels could consume
between 20-100% of the total quantity of water now
used worldwide for agriculture. This is clearly an
unsustainable trade-off. Another example is shale gas
extraction, which promises access to new reserves of
fossil fuels, but is highly water-intensive and may pose
a risk to water quality.
Few governments are developing energy policy with
a goal of not only enabling economic growth and
reducing carbon emissions, but also ensuring water
efciency; the nature of this nexus, however, means
pursuing multiple goals will become a necessity. Trade-
offs between the three resources, as well as trade-
offs between users in the form of resource rationing,
will become an increasingly important issue, as will
managing these trade-offs through a combination of
market mechanisms and regulation.
However, beware of false dichotomies. It is not
necessary to trade biodiversity for economic growth,
for example. Such trade-offs exist primarily when
policy-makers and resource-users act in a short-
term, reactive and hurried fashion. To avoid these
unnecessary trade-offs and tackle the necessary
ones, the Forum has identied a number of response
strategies for further exploration.
Integrated and multistakeholder
resource planning
The challenges associated with managing trade-
offs of food, energy and water resources rest with
governments. Experts argue that meeting those
challenges is undermined by the existence of
separate administrative structures and policies for
agriculture, water, energy and urban planning. The
development of high-level commissions that cut across
government departments, stakeholders and country
representatives could improve public-sector-led
governance, planning and information ows.
A recent example of a regionally-focused, integrated
approach is the Mekong River Commissions Strategic
Environmental Assessment. This document examines
the cumulative risks and opportunities of hydropower
projects in ve separate countries. It explicitly
considers the links between energy generation, water
availability and food production, including second-and
third-order impacts to ecosystems, social systems and
economic development over a 15 year perspective.
The Forums New Vision for Agriculture initiative,
which is now being piloted through national-level
partnerships in Tanzania and Vietnam, has developed
a framework for multi-stakeholder collaboration to
accelerate sustainable agricultural growth. In this
model, the governments national agriculture strategy
provides the framework for focusing expertise and
investments from diverse stakeholders to accelerate
sustainable agricultural growth, thus multiplying efforts
and reducing risk for all involved.
Regionally-focused infrastructure
development
Multistakeholder coordination on regional infrastructure
investment could signicantly enhance resilience
with regard to food, water and energy security. For
example, by investing in regional electricity grids, Gulf
Cooperation Council countries increased the reliability
of their power supply. Experience shows that countries
with adequate levels of infrastructure, coupled with
institutions which ensure that the scarcity value of
water is reected, can be extraordinarily adaptive.
11
Market-led resource pricing
Resource pricing has a large role to play in managing
demand for food, water and energy. Prices are kept
articially low by government subsidies or other
regulation in many countries, thereby increasing
demand. However, even if they were allowed to
rise through market mechanisms, prices would not
account for many of the negative externalities created
by water, food and energy consumption. Both the
cost of local impacts (such as the long-run social
and environmental costs of resource exploitation)
and global impacts (such as contribution to climate
change through carbon emissions) should ideally be
included in resource pricing. Without accurate pricing
to reect the full cost of resource use, it is likely that
unsustainable decisions regarding resource use will
continue.
However raising the price of water has signicant
and negative social impacts in many regions. To
account for these, market mechanisms must be
managed progressively so as not to endanger social
stability by disadvantaging poor consumers; the
human cost of higher resource prices should be
recognized by stakeholders and solved with careful
planning. Further, increased resource prices will
inevitably impact economic growth, as higher prices
are passed on to consumers. Experts suggest that
despite such challenges, efforts to create properly-
costed systems are critical to the future sustainability
of global prosperity, as the cost of severe shortages
because of irreparable damage to water and food
sources would far exceed the costs incurred through
proactive resource management. In regions such as
the Middle East and North Africa, market prices may
also attract private investment in infrastructure that can
better preserve the scarce resources currently being
depleted.
Community-level empowerment
and implementation
Experts argued that policies which aim to manage food,
energy or water resources are in many cases well-
designed; many of the barriers to sustainable resource
use relate to implementation. As an example, lack of
sanitary facilities impacts water security through the
contamination of local water sources. However it may
not be enough simply to build sanitation facilities without
also addressing social norms on open defecation; to
ensure that such facilities are used requires implementing
cultural shifts as well infrastructure investment.
Overcoming such barriers means engaging, empowering
and incentivizing local actors at the community level to
ensure that those actually using core resources are also
the guardians of their sustainable consumption.
Technological and nancial
innovation for managing the nexus
Further research and investment in transformative
technologies and risk management tools that address
the nexus as a whole are needed. Ensuring that such
tools are locally appropriate and broadly adopted is key
to their success. Many efciency improvements require
new operational management models and access
to information. Innovations such as synthetic protein
manufacturing, drip irrigation, and hybridization of crops
to make them salt resistant could potentially maintain
food security while simultaneously achieving water
and energy efciency, but require investment for both
development and implementation.
Innovative nancial risk management initiatives also
look promising, such as the development of safety
net payments for Vietnamese rice farmers if yields fall
below expected levels due to pests, diseases or weather
events such as droughts, oods and typhoons. In the
past, damages to agriculture due to weather or pests
have resulted in losses of up to 5% of Vietnamese GDP;
thanks to multi-stakeholder collaboration between
agricultural banks, insurers and the national government,
this scheme addresses multiple risks to help ensure food
security on a national level, protecting the livelihoods
of farmers and thus increasing the overall resilience of
food production in the country. However, most of these
instruments remain focused on a particular target such
as yield or weather risk, and as such do not address
regional risk management across sectors, or the ultimate
risk of food supply. The interconnected nature of the
challenge suggests that further work in integrating
technical and nancial solutions is needed.
11
In southeast Australia, for example, a 70% reduction in water availability has had big effects on the composition of agriculture, but
little impact on the overall economic value of agriculture.
Risks in focus 3:
Risks in focus 3:
The Forums Water Initiative:
Focusing on the Water-Food-Energy Nexus
The World Economic Forum has partnered with the Water Resources Group (WRG) on an innovative
initiative under the guidance of the Global Agenda Council on Water Security. This initiative, known as WRG
Phase 2, will engage governments who wish to work progressively on a water sector reform strategy; and
then provide a supporting public-private approach. The initiative will follow the ACT process undertaking
Analysis to help Convene and build Coalitions to develop Transformational policies, programmes,
projects and partnerships aimed to create proof points that such a coordinated platform approach can
work. There are two main steps to this process:
Step 1: Initial diagnostic. The initiative will create a comprehensive fact base on the national water
supply and demand balance to 2030 and the economic implications of the options available to
address any gaps;
Step 2: Country-level work. When invited by the government, the initiative will offer multidisciplinary
support through a public-private advisory platform. This will help the government shape and test
concepts and governance processes that seek to close identied future water volume gaps; to
improve water resource management in a river basin, country or region; and to build this inform
national into regional water adaptation planning.
The outcome of the WRG Phase 2 will be a validated and unique public-private model and a nanced
global platform that can support governments who wish to catalyze change in their water sectors.
An example of this initiative in action is the Forums ongoing work in Jordan, supported by the Jordanian
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Step one is
underway, involving deep analysis and building cost-curves to understand the gaps between water supply
and demand, and developing prioritized recommendations and sector strategies. Step two will build on
recent work with the Jordan Business Alliance on Water, a collaboration catalysed at the 2009 World
Economic Forum on the Middle East and involving the Jordanian government, Jordan Chamber of Industry,
American Chamber of Commerce, USAID and GTZ.
A special focus of the initiative is to build awareness and better understanding of the water-food-energy-
climate nexus. This nexus represents the most important global dimension of the water crisis in terms of
managing economic growth and other impacts connected to water scarcity. The Global Agenda Council
on Water Security is a key supporter of the initiative, and will help the Forum develop deeper and more
focused analysis of issues related to the water-food-energy nexus and the associated risks to growth.
The WRG Phase 2 initiative aims to contribute a range of expert brieng documents into the Forums
Risk Response Network as well as to relevant Government ofcials and other stakeholders facing the
challenges of the water-food-energy nexus.
For more information on this initiative, please see http://www.weforum.org/water
Risks to watch
Some risks in the global risk landscape saw low levels
of condence or strongly varying expert views as to
likelihood and impact. For these very reasons, such
risks may surprise or overwhelm us, and they have
been designated as risks to watch.
Cyber security
Awareness is growing that the real world is vulnerable
to security threats from the virtual world, but the
complexity of cyber security issues is still not well
understood and its risks could be underestimated.
Cyber security encompasses online data and
information security and critical information
infrastructure breakdown, and ranges from petty
online theft by disenfranchised youths to government-
led provocations with potentially catastrophic
consequences.
Four distinct global risk-related activities stand out:
Cyber theft has become a growing industry with a
long tail, particularly in countries where economic
disparity has recently been combined with access
to global communication technologies. Actors in
this eld range from entrepreneurial individuals to
shell corporations built with the hope of economic
gains offset by acceptable risks. Interestingly, some
assessments indicate that cyber thieves experience
a substantially lower feeling of guilt than is apparent
in other criminal activities.
Cyber espionage, whether by the private or
public sector, has brought the age-old practice of
intelligence-gathering into a new era. Particularly
insidious, as has repeatedly been shown in the
past two decades, is the use of such techniques
not only by countries generally understood as
enemies but also by friendly allies.
Cyber war is little understood by the general public
and has stirred controversy among civilian and
military leaders. While an open war in cyber space is
possible, experts indicate that the interplay between
cyber war and physical war poses a more likely risk
for society, with aggression online not only serving
but also potentially provoking conventional attacks.
Cyber terrorism is perhaps even less understood
and is fuelling concerns over the openness of
the Internet, security and privacy. Many have
inferred a high risk of cyber terrorist attacks
from terrorist organizations extensive use of the
Internet in recent years for doctrinal, recruitment,
and operational communication purposes as well
as some occurrences of cyber theft. However,
these practices do not in themselves indicate any
capacity for large-scale cyber terrorist attacks,
and it should be noted that terrorist use of the
Internet equally allows law enforcement agencies
to gather valuable intelligence.
In addition to these intentional or malevolent risks, a
range of risks relate to design aws in smart systems
connected to the Internet. Data gathered for one
benign purpose may be spread to other networks with
unintended consequences, potentially leading to new
machine-to-machine threats.
Further contributing to confusion about cyber
securitys landscape is the constant innovation in each
of the above elds and potential new connections
among them. Nevertheless, understanding the range
of negative consequences is central to managing
effective risk response. The pervasiveness of the
Internet and importance of related technologies to
everyday life and business means that should a major
disruption occur, it is likely to have high impact globally.
Risks to watch
Demographic challenges and
opportunities: population cluster
bombs, global graying and
demographic dividends
Demographic change has major implications
throughout the world, ranging from political instability
in fragile states to enjoyment of a demographic
dividend in emerging economies to scal crises in
advanced economies. The most signicant changes
which vary considerably by country involve the rate
of population growth, evolution of the age structure
and the pace of urbanization. In addition to their
effects on national income, shifts in these demographic
indicators can have powerful implications for global
income, economic inequality, environmental quality,
social stability and migration.
Ageing populations in many advanced economies
add to scal stress as the ratio of the working
age population to the elderly falls. Many emerging
economies are also experiencing rapidly ageing
populations as longevity increases, creating a new set
of development challenges in the absence of adequate
nancing solutions.
For certain developing countries, the population
size and growth rate are creating intense and rising
pressure on resources, public institutions and social
stability. In countries where rapid population growth
is combined with weak institutions, lack of economic
opportunties, fragile ecosystems, gender inequality
and severe urban crowding, the potential for large
numbers of disaffected youth engaging in resource-
based conict is a real risk. The Forums Global
Agenda Council on Population Growth has identied
14 countries encompassing 450 million people
where high population growth is combined with
water and other resource stresses. Such population
cluster bombs could send myriad shock waves to
neighbouring countries and regions.
One example is Niger. With every woman having, on
average, upwards of seven children, Nigers population
has gone from 3 million in 1960 to 16 million today
and is projected to almost quadruple to 58 million
in 2050. However, population growth has already
outstipped the countrys ability to produce food. In the
last decade, Niger has experienced several episodes
of severe food insecurity and famine,including a famine
that affected almost half the population in 2010.
In addition, decreasing soil productivity and a high
vulnerability to the effects of climate change mean that
Nigers ability to further increase food production will
become even more strained. Already there are signs of
increased inter-ethnic conict over scarce resources.
Implications could be felt more widely, especially since
Niger has one of the most important uranium mines in
Africa.
Emerging economies that have reduced fertility rates
are experiencing a demographic dividend as smaller
family size means fewer dependents for each working
adult and greater investment in each child. Realizing
this potenial requires the development of so-called
21st century skills among young people, and a
supporting institutional environment with an emphasis
on sectors and policies that improve employment
prospects and the operation of nancial markets.
As well as national ownership, a strong global voice is
needed to help address population issues. To this end,
the World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council
on Population Growth has called on the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA) to reafrm the worlds
interest in global and national demographic dynamics,
including rates of population growth, to reassert its
leadership in the population and development arena,
to rebalance its portfolio of activities and to subject its
activities to periodic external review.
12
21st century skills as viewed by experts include: good living and career skills related to global citizenship, civic responsibility, ethics,
environmental awareness, health literacy, cross-cultural sensitivity and leadership. It also includes workforce readiness skills pertaining
to creativity, innovation, entrepreneurship, critical thinking, communication, collaboration, ICT and media literacy. In addition, it
includes basic skills in math, science, reading, geography and history.
Risks to watch
Resource security
Beyond the food-energy-water nexus addressed
above, this cluster of risks involves extreme
commodity price volatility and extreme energy
price volatility. It is a relatively uncontroversial
assertion that demand for natural resources will
increase in the medium term because of a combination
of population growth and projected increases in
per-capita consumption. But there is uncertainty
as to whether supply can keep pace. This leads
some experts to argue that, in the long-term, the
world should expect at best, sustained increases in
commodity prices, and at worst, shortages of key
resources.
Empirically, entrepreneurs have responded to
increased prices in the short-term with technological
and process innovations that have lowered prices in
the long-term. When adjusted for ination, the price
of most commodities actually declined from 1950 to
2000 despite rapidly rising overall demand. Some
experts, such as the late Julian Simon, have argued
that such declines are likely to continue.
13
However there are two types of supply-side scarcity:
as well as the soft temporary limits driven by
inadequate past investment in production, there are
the hard, natural limits of a resources availability.
Such hard resource limits lead a number of experts
to doubt whether technology and innovation can
continue to increase the supply of core commodities
at the required rate implied by population and
economic growth in the long-term. They argue that
the contribution of technological advancement to
increased supply is slowing; that certain resources
such as water have no easy substitutes; and that
the unprecedented growth experienced in emerging
economies in recent years might outpace the
investment required to meet demand.
Externalities also play a role in price increases: as
the most accessible sources of commodities are
exhausted, the technical and environmental challenges
to their extraction are likely to rise, increasing costs
either directly or through regulatory responses.
Sustained increases in commodity prices and
shortages of key resources would have a negative
impact on global economic growth. Further, should
resulting price rises in nished goods be transferred
to consumers, the poorest will likely be worst hit,
increasing economic disparity and the interconnected
risks that this implies.
Increases in resource efciency can help mitigate this
situation. Behavioural changes on the part of both
consumers and businesses can reduce demand.
Removing perverse incentives for the inefcient use
of some resources hydrocarbon subsidies and
underpriced water can support these changes.
Stronger rules on the stewardship of common, trans-
border resources such as water or sheries may
help prevent a generalization of the tragedy of the
commons. And continued investment in technologies
and infrastructure that increase the efciency of
resource extraction, distribution and use is also
necessary.
In the long-term, a model of truly sustainable
consumption where private sector business models
adopt resource limits as a driver of business innovation
as advocated by the Forums Driving Sustainable
Consumption Initiative , could shift this current set
of risks to an opportunity for renewed growth and
competitive advantage.
13
Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource, 1981.
Risks to watch
Risks to watch
Retrenchment from globalization
As the power and capacity of the United States to
lead diminishes, emerging economies are amassing
increasing political, economic and military power. A
key question in determining the scale and scope of
retrenchment from globalization will be the extent to
which emerging economies will be ready to embrace
leadership for defending the open international system
that facilitated their rise in the rst place.
In many advanced economies strengthening
political forces either directly or indirectly advocate
retrenchment from globalization. Economic difculties
mean policy-makers are increasingly tempted to
resort to protectionist measures and anti-globalization
rhetoric. Some of the stimulus packages adopted
during the nancial crisis already entailed elements of
protectionism. Countries with growing current account
decits will almost certainly continue to seek short-
term adjustments through protectionist or other trade-
restricting measures.
Unemployment and unequal wealth distribution
within both advanced and emerging countries also
disenfranchises large parts of societies from the
benets of globalization. This may result in socio-
political unrest and general socio-economic backlash
against globalization. There are early signs of this
risk in the rise of extremist parties in Europe (at both
extremes of the political spectrum) and in the US (tea
party) coupling arguments of economic nationalism
with anti-immigration rhetoric. Similar sentiments are
being heard in some emerging economies, such as in
North Africa.
While experts regard full retrenchment from
globalization as a low-probability scenario, even
marginal restrictions to global movements of goods,
people and ideas could lead to economic loss as gains
of trade and the benets of global division of labour
decrease. Such restrictions could simultaneously
exacerbate other risks by limiting opportunities for
countries to spread risks and share resources across
borders.
Weapons of mass destruction
There is no argument about the high potential impact
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but a broad
range of assessments do surround the likelihood of
WMD materializing as a global risk. The chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk could
occur in two ways. One is through terrorist attacks. The
other is through geopolitical conict. Both are affected
by global governance failures. While WMD covers a
range of weapons of varying concern, the key WMD risk
is felt by most experts to be that of nuclear proliferation,
both among states and non-state actors, closely
followed by the potential use of biological weapons.
Regimes to restrict the spread of WMD have proven
surprisingly effective, particularly in conjunction with the
high capital and political costs associated with nuclear
weapons in particular. The norm of non-use of nuclear
weapons, in addition, has become well established.
Contrary to widespread fears in the 1960s, only a
handful of states currently carry nuclear arsenals. Some
states such as South Africa and Libya have even gone
so far as to renounce their nuclear ambitions altogether.
More recently, the May 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was broadly viewed as
a marginal success, despite its shortcomings.
Nonetheless, the dynamics of the nuclear status quo
are unstable. While the expansion of nuclear-powered
electricity generation does not pose a weapons
proliferation risk per se, it is still likely to raise concerns
regarding dual-use technologies, thereby highlighting
imperfections in global energy governance. In parallel,
delay in the ratication of the New START Treaty
risks undermining the reset in relations between
the Russian Federation and the United States and
weakening the impetus of non-proliferation and arms
reduction as do recurring worries regarding North
Koreas nuclear status and the uncertainties surrounding
Irans intentions on the matter. Meanwhile, technological
barriers to manufacturing and delivering WMD have
been falling, and illegal transfers of technology have
occurred repeatedly, including in the nuclear realm.
According to some experts, the risk of acquisition
of WMD materials by non-state actors and their
willingness to use such tools is considerable and
could increase. While a fully-edged nuclear programme
is far beyond the capacity of any non-state actor, much
nuclear material remains insecure. Perhaps even more
signicantly, the Forums community of experts argues
that the use by terrorists of improvised radiological
devices, the sabotage of commercial chemical plants
and/or supply chains, and the possible occurrence of
small-scale biological attacks rank high among risks to
watch in the CBRN eld.
Conclusion
As the different chapters of this report have shown,
addressing global risks requires new capacities in
terms of risk analysis as well as formal and informal
risk response mechanisms at the global level. Three
key features stand out to dene the requirements of
these capacities:
First, interconnections between risks require us
to better understand the systems behind risks as
well as the risk context. It is no longer sufcient to
simply assess operational risks in the corporate
context or national security challenges in the
government context. Identifying the central nodes
in risk interconnections is a crucial element of risk
response. Analyses such as the one provided
in this report that focus on risk interconnections
therefore play an important role at focusing the
debate on risk response.
Second, with global risks playing out both at
the global and national levels and different
stakeholders being affected in different ways,
the world faces a signicant challenge in
coordinating national and global responses. By
denition, none of the risks discussed in this
report can be addressed by a single actor alone;
we therefore need to continue efforts to create
a common framework for assessing risks in a
multistakeholder, collaborative environment.
Third, while in an increasingly turbulent global
environment there is the temptation to always
focus on the most recent risk event, it is
important to take a long-term perspective to risk
assessment and response. Many global risks
could emerge over decades rather than months or
years; this is one reason why this report maintains
a ten-year outlook. Long-term commitment is
required to ensure that the effectiveness of the
response matches the magnitude of global risks.
As such, addressing the two central risks in this
report economic disparity and global governance
failures could go a long way towards improving both
the effectiveness of risk response and overall resilience
at the global level. Both risks have strong impact on
the three important clusters highlighted by this years
risk perception survey. While many of the longer-term
developments and effects of global risks are difcult
to anticipate with a reasonable degree of certainty,
investments in these central risks are certain to have
positive effects on overall risk resilience.
However even with the best analysis, we can never
anticipate or prepare for all risks. In an increasingly
connected world, there is a plethora of risks that
are beyond the planning and assessment capacities
of decision-makers and risk experts alike. To be
prepared for these future challenges and to continue
to seize opportunities in rapidly changing strategic
environments, organizations and decision-makers
must continue to invest in our ability to adapt and
learn, thereby building more resilient systems. We
hope that the Forums Risk Response Network will
make a tangible and valuable contribution towards
achieving this goal.
Dening global
risks
For a threat to be considered a global risk it
must have global geographic scope, cross-industry
relevance, uncertainty as to how and when it will
occur, high levels of economic and/or social impact,
and it must require a multistakeholder approach to risk
response.
Global Scope: Risks that affect no less than three
world regions on at least two different continents.
While these risks may have regional or even local
origin, their impact potentially can be felt globally.
Cross-Industry Relevance: Risks that affect three
or more industries.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty about how the risk
manifests itself within 10 years combined with
uncertainty about the magnitude of its impact
(assessed in terms of likelihood and severity).
Economic Impact: The risk has the potential to
cause economic damage of US$ 10 billion or
more.
Multistakeholder Approach: The complexity of the
risk requires a multistakeholder approach for its
mitigation. The risks are classied in ve domains:
economic, geopolitical, environmental, societal
and technological risks.
Further, risks are not all equal. The 2010 report deals
with two main types of risks:
Creeping or chronic global risks that manifest
as long-term drains on economic or social activity
but do not occur as major, time-bound events (in
health, chronic disease is in this category);
Acute or event-driven global risks that have
an identiable onset when they occur (pandemics
fall in this category).
We dene resilience as the ability of a system to
reorganize under change and deliver its core function
continually, despite the impact of external or internally
generated risks.
Appendix 1:
Denitions and methodology
Global risk report
methodology and
sources
The insights portrayed in Global Risks 2011, Sixth
Edition are based on:
World Economic Forum Global Risks Survey
2010:
The Global Risks Survey seeks the opinion of experts,
business leaders and policy-makers on a selection
of global risks tracked by the World Economic
Forum. This is a perception survey which received
approximately 580 valid responses across the 37
global risks in ve risk categories. Respondents were
asked to assess risk likelihood and impact over a ten
year time horizon (2010-2020) and also provided their
level of condence in their answers. Respondents
also assessed risk interconnections by choosing up
to six other risks they judged were related in some
way to the risk being assessed. Respondents also
had the option to add data on the dominant type of
interconnection between risks. Data were analysed
using a range of statistical techniques, both descriptive
and analytical. For more information on the full risk set,
please see our interactive website at:
http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2011.
Note: the starting point for this report is a risk
perception survey. An important point to note is how
risks are perceived is not equivalent to the actual
exposure faced by stakeholders. While drawing
on perception data for insights into global risks, the
Forums Global Risks reports explicitly look to combat
perception biases, by taking a 10 year perspective,
encouraging experts to engage in debate and
challenge their own assumptions, and by specically
focusing on risk interconnectedness and the trade-offs
involved in risk response. Finally, by highlighting how
experts perceive risks, the Forum aims to improve
multistakeholder awareness regarding both well-
known and less-understood risks in the hope that risk
response will be served.
Workshops and discussions with leading
experts:
Eighteen workshops and numerous individual
discussions with the Forums community of risk
experts provided valuable context and insight into
the survey data and form the basis for much of the
analysis in this report. Please see acknowledgements
for details of the experts involved.
Collaboration with the Forums Risk Partners:
The Forum beneted greatly from data, expertise
and guidance from our four risk partners: Marsh &
McLennan Companies, Swiss Reinsurance Company,
Wharton Center for Risk Management, University of
Pennsylvania and Zurich Financial Services.
Outcomes of the Network of Global Agenda
Councils:
Comprising over 1,000 of the worlds leading experts
across 72 key topics in the global arena, the Forums
Network of Global Agenda Councils serves as an
advisory board to the Forum and other interested
parties, such as governments and international
organizations. Input into this report from the councils
included survey data from the Global Agenda Council
Survey 2010 (600 respondents), data and insight
drawn from council reports and proposals, the use of
transcripts from council calls, output from the Summits
on the Global Agenda and individual contributions by
council members.
Desk research and internal expert review:
The World Economic Forums internal resources
conducted an extensive research process. In addition,
internal expert reviews were provided by 30 World
Economic Forum topic experts.
Appendix 1:
Denitions and methodology
The Global Risks
Landscape 2011
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition draws on the insights
of 580 expert respondents to the Forums Global Risks
Survey across stakeholder groups and regions. The
survey measured the perception of risk likelihood, risk
impact and risk interconnections from 2010 to 2020
for 37 global risks. A visualization of the results of this
survey can be seen at the beginning of the report. The
risks set is based on previous Global Risks reports
as well as input from the Network of Global Agenda
Councils and the Forums risk partners to reect the
evolving risk context.
The Global Risks Landscape 2011 (Figure 1) reveals
that respondents in general perceive event-driven
risks as having higher impact than risks that are more
chronic in nature and more distributed over time.
This is a well-known bias in risk perception: there is
a tendency to discount the impact of risks which are
long-term and familiar, and the tendency to inate the
impact of risks which involve extreme shocks, such
as scal crises and geopolitical conict.
There are three interesting exceptions to this
observation. First, the risk of climate change; though
dened explicitly as chronic in nature, ranked highest
when likelihood and impact are combined. Two
other chronic risks are seen as particularly likely
and of high impact: economic disparity and global
governance failures.
The global risks perceived as having the highest
combined impact and likelihood among those
assessed appear in Table 5 below.
For more information on the Global Risks Landscape
2011, please go to:
http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2011
Appendix 2:
Survey data overview 2011
Figure 1 Top 10 risks by likelihood and
impact combined
Table 5
Ranking Likelihood x Impact
1 Climate change
2 Fiscal crises
3 Economic disparity
4 Global governance failures
5 Extreme weather events
6 Extreme energy price volatility
7 Geopolitical conict
8 Corruption
9 Flooding
10 Water security
Risks
Interconnection
Map 2011
A key feature of the Forums Global Risks Survey is its
assessment of risk interconnections. Table 6 shows
the top 10 risks in terms of average strength of these
interconnections. The Risks Interconnection Map
(RIM) 2011 (Figure 2), which provides a visualization of
perceived interconnections and their strengths, can be
found on the inside cover of this report and is further
explored on http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2011.
The data indicate that the most interconnected risks
are economic disparity and global governance
failures. This makes them central to the visualization
of risk interconnections. It also makes them central to
our understanding of global risk as it implies that they
are particularly important in shaping the contemporary
risk context, creating or exacerbating other global risks
and inhibiting effective response. As such they are
discussed separately below.
Interestingly, the distribution of their interconnections
differs substantially. Global governance failures
directly impact a large number of other risks, and are
perceived predominantly as an inuencer of other risks.
Economic disparity, on the other hand, has stronger
interconnections with a smaller set of risks and there is
more evidence of perceived feedback loop dynamics.
Further analysis of interconnections revealed three
distinct clusters, which are analysed in the Risks in
Focus section below. One cluster consists of global
imbalances and currency volatility, asset-price
collapse and scal crises. The second cluster links
illicit trade, organized crime, corruption, and fragile
states. A third cluster links climate change with
water security, food security and extreme energy
price volatility.
Risks were dened by category, and it is interesting to
observe that societal risks were the most inuential on
risks in other categories. While much media attention
is paid to geopolitical and economic risk, social risks
may in fact be of greater systemic concern.
Figure 1 Top 10 risks in terms of average strength
of interconnections
Table 6
Appendix 2:
Ranking Interconnection
1 Economic disparity
2 Global governance failures
3 Geopolitical conict
4 Fragile states
5 Corruption
6 Food security
7 Regulatory failures
8 Climate change
9 Fiscal crises
10 Asset price collapse
Differences in risk
perception among
respondents
The Forums survey data show that perceptions on the
37 global risks assessed in the survey vary signicantly
by stakeholder group and geography. Respondents
tend to worry more about risks which are traditionally
viewed as being in their domain: businesses indicate
the highest level of concern about economic risks
while governments and international organizations
tend to perceive societal risks as the most concerning.
Table 7 shows the major differences in perception
across stakeholders and geographic groupings.
Respondents from the BRIC countries tended in
general to rate risks as lower in both likelihood
and impact than those from OECD countries. This
is surprising in that BRIC countries are at least as
exposed to the downside of global risks as OECD
countries, and for some risks, such as climate change,
exposures may be far greater. The explanation may
lie in a greater comfort with risk-taking in fast-growing
economies.
Economic disparities were viewed as similarly
important by all types of stakeholders and across
all geographies. Both North Americans and Asians
considered environmental risks to be of the greatest
aggregate concern while in Europe, societal risks rated
the highest.
Stakeholder and geographic differences in risk perception from the Global Risks Survey Table 7
Appendix 2:
Respondent: Governments Business Academia International
Organizations
North
America
Europe Asia
Most concerned
about:
Societal risks Economic risks Environmental
risks
Societal risks Environmental
risks
Societal risks Environmental
risks
Perception relative
to other groups:
Climate change
(likelihood > others)
Fragile states
(impact > others)
Geopolitical conict
(> academia,
business)
Illicit trade,
organized crime,
fragile states
(> others)
Fiscal crises
(impact > Int. Org)
Slowing Chinese
economy
(impact > Int. Org)
Consumer price
volatility
(> academia)
Terrorism
(likelihood > govts)
Food security
(impact < others)
Climate change
(impact > business)
Fragile states
Biodiversity loss
(> others)
Climate change
Climate change
(impact > business)
Fragile states
Illicit trade,
organized crime
and fragile states
(> others)
Food security
Global imbalances
(> Europe)
Regulatory failures
(> Asia)
Consumer price
volatility
(impact > Asia)
Retrenchment from
globalization
(> Europe)
Terrorism (> Asia)
Critical information
infrastructure
breakdown
(> others)
Regulatory failures
(> Asia)
Consumer price
volatility (impact
> Asia)
Retrenchment from
globalization
(> Europe)
Terrorism (> Asia)
infrastructure
breakdown
(> others)
Global governance
failures (> Asia)
Demographic
challenges
(> North America)
Global imbalances
(> Europe)
Retrenchment from
globalization
(> Europe)
Consumer price
volatility (likelihood
> NorthAmerica
Outliers in the risk landscape for further reection
Four risks are broadly perceived to be outliers in the Global Risks 2011 landscape, either because of
high levels of uncertainty about their assessment or because the attributes of these risks are only now
becoming visible. These risks are considered here because under certain circumstances they could move
rapidly to the centre of the risk landscape.
First, space security the risk of economic damage and geopolitical tension from insufcient regulation of
commercial and military activity beyond the earths atmosphere. This was the least familiar risk of the set,
with respondents displaying very low levels of condence in their responses because of a lack of technical
knowledge or readily plausible scenarios. This led a number of experts to suggest this risk was being
systematically underestimated. The Forums Global Agenda Council on Space Security is undertaking work
in this area.
The robustness of the Chinese economy since the global nancial crisis means a slowing Chinese
economy was this year perceived to be one of the least likely of the 37 global risks, a signicant change
from previous years. However, the potential impact is high, with Chinese growth currently fuelling a
signicant proportion of the worlds economic activity. A Chinese slowdown might also precipitate social
instability domestically, leading to political instability that could threaten the entire region.
Ocean governance is another outlier, ranking low in both likelihood and impact despite expert opinion
that places the decline of sh stocks and disputes over marine territories as highly likely and of very high
impact.
A nal outlier is threats from new technologies unintended consequences for human, animal or plant
life from the release of agents into the biosphere created by genetic engineering, synthetic biology or
nanotechnology. Stakeholders rated this threat as of low impact and likelihood. However while experts
interviewed concurred that numerous regulatory authorities in this area lower the risks likelihood, it was
being underestimated in terms of impact.
Appendix 2:
The focus of this report is on improving understanding
of global risks, rather than analysing optimal risk
response strategies that is left to the ongoing
discussions in the Forums Risk Response Network
and beyond.
Nevertheless, a generic framework for risk response
is helpful when contemplating risk. Figure 10 depicts
ve broad, non-exclusive strategies that might be
employed by a government, corporation or individual
to reduce overall risk exposure.
The rst and most obvious option is to seek to avoid
the risk wherever possible. The second option is to
mitigate the risk directly to attempt to reduce the
impact or likelihood of the risk at source. For example,
a corporation facing climate change-related risks could
lobby internationally to reduce carbon emissions.
The third option is to adapt to the risk by preparing for
its occurrence. Here, a corporation may strengthen
buildings or prepare emergency response plans.
Homeowners residing in ood-prone areas could
elevate their structures or collaborate to put drainage
systems in place.
The fourth option involves transferring risk. For
individuals and companies, risk could be transferred
to a third party such as an insurer, or through more
sophisticated hedging strategies (see below). The
equivalent from a systemic perspective is to diffuse the
risk, such that the second and third-order impacts are
reduced. For example, ensure that the collapse of a
single bank does not cause the collapse of interbank
lending.
These options can all reduce the resulting impact of
the risk on an organization or system. But the nal step
is also critically important it involves accepting the
residual risk, such that the organization or individual
is well aware of the potential impact and can hold
reserves or make other provisions to deal with the
possible consequences.
Appendix 3:
Common global risk response strategies
Figure 1 Generic risk response strategies Figure 10
Source: Adapted from Cleary & Mallerets Resilience to Risk and, Vernon L Groses Managing Risk
Catastrophe nancing: the use of alternative risk transfer instruments
The most common form of risk transfer, insurance, shifts exposure to insurers in a exchange for a premium.
However this depends on insurers being able to protably pool and absorb a range of risks through
diversication over time and geography. This is becoming more difcult as disasters are increasingly
regionally and temporally concentrated, thanks in part to development in hazard-prone areas. Of the 25
most costly insured catastrophes in the past 40 years, two-thirds have occurred since 2001.
The World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council on the Mitigation of Natural Disasters produced an
analysis* of new forms of risk transfer which involve shifting parts of catastrophe risk exposure directly to
nancial markets. Alternative risk transfer (ART) instruments offer innovative nancial solutions to meet the
growing needs of nancial coverage of catastrophic risks and permit investors to play a more direct role in
that sphere.
One example of such instruments is a catastrophe bond which enables a company, international
organization or a government to issue bonds to protect them against predened risks. Over 160 cat
bonds have been issued to date around the world to protect against pandemics, terrorism and natural
disasters. Another promising nancial innovation is weather-index based micro-insurance for subsistence
farmers in countries where traditional insurance is unavailable or unaffordable.
With proper regulation and transparency, such alternative risk transfer instruments can provide additional
capital and offer new ways to hedge catastrophe risks, protect individuals and reduce the systemic impact
of future disasters.
* Michel-Kerjan, Erwann Hedging Against Tomorrows Catastrophes, in Learning from Catastrophes,
Kunreuther and Useem (Eds), Wharton School Publishing, 2010
Appendix 3:
Common global risk response strategies
Interactive website
The Forum has prepared a series of interactive
resources related to Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition.
This includes an online version of this report, a data
explorer showing the results of the Global Risks
Survey, videos, interviews, quotes, data narratives and
an interactive version of the global risks barometer.
Please go to http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2011
to explore this material.
The global risks
barometer
The global risks barometer assesses the inuencing
factors, global impact and risk perceptions of
the 37 risks in the ve risk categories: economic,
geopolitical, societal, environmental and technological
at a global level. In Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition,
the inuencing factors and global impact have been
generated and rened though the 18 workshops with
experts in each risk category. The risk perception
characteristics, which include key interconnections,
likelihood, severity, and variation in perception and
condence level are data extracted from the Global
Risks Survey 2010.
The barometer is designed to trigger discussions on
global risks at multiple levels: at an individual risk
level to understand the factors that inuence the risk
and its consequences described as global impact, in
relationship with the highly interconnected risks to
understand the directionality and the feedback loop
with other risks, and at a systemic level as it has been
illustrated in the Global Risk Landscape.
The barometer is a living document for several
reasons. First, the risks that have been captured at
a global level do not necessarily play out at a local
level in a similar manner hence there is a need for
further discussion. Second, the risk characteristics
evolve as the world moves on. Lastly, there are many
interpretations on how the risks may be inuenced and
impacted; hence there is a broader need to continually
improve the work.
The full list of barometers, as illustrated in a dashboard
format below (gure 11), is available at the World
Economic Forums interactive website:
http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2011.
Readers are encouraged to provide constructive
contribution to further elaborate this living document
that will feed into future Global Risks reports.
Appendix 4:
Guide to online global risks 2011 resources
Figure 1
Figure 1
Sharp increase and volatility in the prices of nancial assets
including mortgages, asset-backed securities and debt instruments
Sharp increase and volatility in prices of real assets
(commercial and private real estate)
Excessive capital ows to emerging markets,
inducing asset price bubbles
New arbitrage opportunities, causing currency carry trades
from low-to high-interest rate countries
Changes in central bank policy frameworks which allocate more
weight to overall nancial stability rather than just price stability
Policy shifts encouraging domestic consumption and creating
further productive investment opportunities in emerging economies
Greater transparency and stronger nancial regulation regarding
surveillance, capital and liquidity ratios, risk retention and counterparty
risk management in over-the-counter derivative markets
Reversals of global economic
growth as collapse in asset prices
undermines consumer condence
and the allocative efciency of the
nancial system (the current nancial
crisis reduced world output by
roughly 2% and contracted advanced
economies by roughly 4%).
Possible collapse of banking
systems as investors lose trust in
nancial markets and governance
institutions.

Perceived impact
in Billion US $
Drivers and indicators Global impact
Asset price
collapse
A collapse of real and nancial asset prices leads to the destruction of wealth, deleveraging, reduced household
spending and impaired aggregate demand.
Perceived likelihood
to occur in the next ten years
low med high
Figure 1 Example of barometer Asset Price Collapse Figure 11
Cleary, S. and Thierry Malleret (2006). Resilience to Risk
Cottarelli C. and Andrea Schaechter (2010). Long-Term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies, IMF Staff
Position Note SPN/10/13
Economics of Climate Adaptation (ECA) Working Group (2009). Shaping Climate Resilient Development: A
Framework for Decision-Making
Gokhale, J. (2009). Measuring the Unfunded Obligations of European Countries, National Centre for Policy Analysis
(NCPA) Policy Report No. 319
Grose, V. (1987). Managing Risk
International Monetary Fund (2009). Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis, IMF Staff
Position Note SPN/09/13
International Monetary Fund (2010). United States: Selected Issues Paper, IMF Country Report No. 10/248
Kotlikoff, L. (2010). A Hidden Fiscal Crisis?, Finance and Development, September 2010
Kunreuther and Useem (2010). Learning from Catastrophes
Mekong River Commission (2010). Strategic Environmental Assessment
OECD (2008). Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries
Reinhart, C. M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010). Growth in a Time of Debt, NBER Working Paper No. 15639
Simon, J. (1981). The Ultimate Resource
Transparency International, International Chamber of Commerce, UN Global Compact and World Economic Forum
(2008). Clean Business is Good Business: The Case against Corruption
World Economic Forum (2010). Financial Development Report 2010
World Economic Forum (2010). Global Redesign Initiative
World Economic Forum (2009). The Future of the Global Financial System: A Near-Term Outlook and Long-Term
Scenarios.
World Economic Forum (2010). The Middle East and North Africa at Risk 2010
World Economic Forum Water Initiative, edited by D. Waughray (2010). Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-
Climate Nexus
References and further reading
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition synthesizes the
ideas and contributions of many individuals through
workshops, interviews, group calls and research. The
project team thanks everyone who took the challenge
to think hard about global risks for their time, energy
and insights. Without their courage, dedication,
guidance and support, we would not have been able
to successfully develop this report.
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition Partners
Marsh & McLennan Companies
Swiss Reinsurance Company
Wharton Center for Risk Management, University of
Pennsylvania
Zurich Financial Services
With special thanks to the following representatives
of the global risk partners for their contribution to the
project team (in alphabetical order by last name):
Anwarul Hasan, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Daniel Hofmann, Zurich Financial Services
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania
Lucy Nottingham, Oliver Wyman (Marsh &
McLennan Companies)
Gregory Renand, Zurich Financial Services
Alex Wittenberg, Oliver Wyman (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Lisa Wyssbrod, Swiss Reinsurance Company
And to the Steering Board for Global Risks 2011,
Sixth Edition
John Drzik, Oliver Wyman (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Robert Greenhill, World Economic Forum
Howard Kunreuther, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania
Axel Lehman, Zurich Financial Services
Raj Singh, Swiss Reinsurance Company
The project team would also like to thank all the
business, public sector, academic and civil society
leaders who participated in our interviews and
workshops (in alphabetical order by last name with
their afliation at the time of participation):
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, UAE University
Isabella Aboderin, The Oxford Institute of Ageing
Kathrin Amacker, Novartis AG
Peter Anderson, Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life
Sciences, University of Maastricht
Daniel Andris, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Raymond Baker, Global Financial Integrity
Beatrice Baldinger Pirotta, Swiss Reinsurance
Company
Judith Banister, Javelin Investments
Braz Baracuhy, Permanent Mission of Brazil in
Geneva
Jane Barratt, International Federation on Ageing (IFA)
Katinka Barysch, Centre for European Reform (CER)
Esther Baur, Swiss Reinsurance Company
John Beard, World Health Organization (WHO)
Bernard Belk, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Simon Biggs, University of Melbourne
Marcel F. Bischof, World Demographic and Ageing
Forum
David E. Bloom, Harvard School of Public Health
Antoine Bommier, ETH Zurich
Ian Bremmer, Eurasia Group
David Bresch, Swiss Reinsurance Company
John Briscoe, Harvard University
Sharon Brown-Hruska, NERA (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Sharan Burrow, International Trade Union
Confederation (ITUC)
Robert Cailliau, European Organization for Nuclear
Research (CERN)
Richard Caplan, University of Oxford
Irene Casanova, World Economic Forum
Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou, HEC School of
Management
Acknowledgements
Jonathan Cohn, Oliver Wyman (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Andrew Crockett, JPMorgan Chase International
Audrey Kurth Cronin, U.S. National War College
Richard Danziger, International Organization for
Migration (IOM)
Michael Denton, Oliver Wyman (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Xiaoxin Ding, Marsh (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Steve Dobbs, Fluor Corporation
Peter Draper, The South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA)
Michael Drexler, Barclays PLC
Evan Feigenbaum, Eurasia Group
Stephen E. Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations
David Frediani, Marsh & McLennan Companies
Astrid Frey, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Robert Friedman, Bloomberg News
Bruno Gehrig, UBS AG
Bekele Geleta, International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
David Gordon, Eurasia Group
Hans Groth, Pzer Inc.
Lyric Hughes Hale, China Online
Harry Harding, University of Virginia
Sarah Harper, The Oxford Institute of Ageing
David Harrison, NERA (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Katy Hartley, The Philips Center for Health & Well-
being
Sven Hoffmann, Advokatur Hoffmann
James F. Hoge, Foreign Affairs Magazine
Roman Hohl, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Thomas Holzheu, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Pervez Hoodbhoy, Department of Physics, Quaid-i-
Azam University
Dalmer Hoskins, U.S. Social Security Administration
Irene Hoskins, International Federation on Ageing
(IFA)
Jo L. Husbands, The National Academy of Sciences
Martin Indyk, The Brookings Institution
Ralf Jacob, European Commission
Emmanuel Jimenez, The World Bank
Richard Jolly, Institute of Development Studies
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Alexandre Kalache, The New York Academy of
Medicine (NYAM)
Kurt Karl, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Daniel Kaufmann, The Brookings Institution
Frederick Kempe, The Atlantic Council of the United
States
Ilona Kickbusch, World Demographic and Ageing
Forum
Robert Korizek, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Upmanu Lall, Department of Earth and
Environmental Engineering, Columbia University
Axel Lehmann, Zurich Financial Services
Rosemary Leith, World Wide Web Foundation
Veronica Loke, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Ariela Lowenstein, Center for Research and Study
of Aging
Jacques Marcovitch, Universidade de So Paulo
Teruaki Masumoto, Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO)
Andreas C. Meier, World Demographic & Ageing
Forum
Johanna Mendelson Forman, The Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
John Merkovsky, Marsh (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Jean-Pierre Michel, Geneva Medical School and
University Hospitals
Colin Milner, International Council on Active Ageing
(ICAA)
Ernst Mohr, University of St Gallen
Nader Mousavizadeh, Oxford Analytica Ltd
Rainer Mnz, Erste Group Bank AG
Kevin X. Murphy, J.E. Austin Associates Inc. (JAA)
Christoph Nabholz, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Acknowledgements
Edward Newburn, AARP
Herbert Oberhaensli, Nestl
Michael Oborne, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)
Stuart Orr, Freshwater, WWF - World Wide Fund for
Nature
Hubert sterle, Institute of Information Management
Rick Perdian, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Roland Rechtsteiner, Oliver Wyman (Marsh &
McLennan Companies)
Barbara Ridpath, International Centre for Financial
Regulation
Ashutosh Riswadkar, Zurich Financial Services
Daniel Ryan, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Ross Schaap, Eurasia Group
Reto Schnarwiler, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Reto Schneider, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Stephan Schreckenberg, Swiss Reinsurance
Company
Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal, Pathnder G4S
Dinesh Shah, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Louise Shelley, George Mason University
Alexandre Sidorenko, United Nations
Steven Simske, Hewlett-Packard Company
Matt Singleton, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Amy Smithson, James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, World Demographic and
Ageing Forum
Andreas Spiegel, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Ursula M. Staudinger, Jacobs University Bremen
Michael Szoenyi, Zurich Financial Services
Sheana Tambourgi, World Economic Forum
Rolf Tanner, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Jonathan Tepperman, Eurasia Group
Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratgique (FRS)
Torben Thomsen, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Paul Twomey, Argo Pacic, Australia
Wang Feng, The Brookings Institution
Sean West, Eurasia Group
Martin Weymann, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Urs Widmer, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Barrie Wilkinson, Oliver Wyman (Marsh & McLennan
Companies)
Angela Wilkinson, Smith School of Enterprise and
the Environment (SSEE)
Clark B. Winter Jr, SK Capital Partners
Simon Woodward, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Michele Wucker, World Policy Institute
Kaspar Zellweger, Swiss Reinsurance Company
Hania Zlotnik, United Nations
We also would like to thank all the people who
participated in the Global Risks Survey 2010.
Acknowledgements
In addition, the project team expresses its gratitude to
the following colleagues from the World Economic
Forum for their advice and support throughout the
project:
Stephanie Badawi
Jennifer Blanke
Lisa Dreier* (ex ofcio)
Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz
Anne-Sophie Duprat
Miroslav Dusek
Diana El-Azar
Richard Elliott
Martina Gmr
Antonio Human
Viktoria Ivarsson
Danil Kerimi
Ramya Krishnaswamy
Rodolfo Lara Torres
Rim Lemsyeh
Cathy Li
Patrick McGee
Liana Melchenko
Alex Mung
Nathalie de Preux
Michael Pedersen
Miguel Perez
Michele Petochi
Serena Pozza
Pengcheng Qu
Florian Ramseger
Florian Reber
Carissa Sahli
Masao Takahashi
Samantha Tonkin
Akira Tsuchiya
Dominic Waughray
Li Zhang
Founder and Executive Chairman
Klaus Schwab
Managing Directors
Robert Greenhill
Lee Howell
Adrian Monck
Gilbert Probst
Jean-Pierre Rosso* (ex ofcio)
Richard Samans
Kevin Steinberg* (ex ofcio)
Alois Zwinggi
Acknowledgements
* Employed by the World Economic Forum USA
Project team
The Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition team includes the following individuals from the World Economic Forum
(in alphabetical order):
Andrew Bishop, Project Associate, Strategic Risk Foresight, Risk Response Network
Nicholas Davis, Associate Director, Deputy Head of Strategic Risk Foresight, Risk Response Network,
Co-Editor, Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition
Cline Devouassoux, Team Coordinator, Strategic Risk Foresight, Risk Response Network
Elaine Dezenski, Senior Director, Head of Risk Initiatives, Risk Response Network
Kristel Van der Elst, Director, Head of Strategic Risk Foresight, Risk Response Network, Co-Editor,
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition
Chiemi Hayashi, Associate Director, Deputy Head of Risks in Depth, Risk Response Network
Stephan Mergenthaler, Project Manager & Global Leadership Fellow, Strategic Risk Foresight,
Risk Response Network
Stphane Oertel, Associate Director, Strategic Risk Foresight, Risk Response Network
Writer:
Charles Emmerson
Editor:
Nancy Tranchet, Associate Director, Editing, World Economic Forum
Publication, design and layout:
Kamal Kimaoui, Associate Director, Production and Design, World Economic Forum
Yoren Geromin, Designer, Kissing Kourami
Visualisation and digital content:
Scott David, Information Design Consultant
Michael Hanley, Editorial Director, Communications, World Economic Forum
James MacKinnon, 50 Productions
Moritz Stefaner, Freelance Information Visualizer
1 I Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition
Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition
Executive Summary
The world is in no position to face major, new shocks. The financial crisis has reduced global economic resilience,
while increasing geopolitical tension and heightened social concerns suggest that both governments and societies
are less able than ever to cope with global challenges. Yet, as this report shows, we face ever-greater concerns
regarding global risks, the prospect of rapid contagion through increasingly connected systems and the threat of
disastrous impacts.
In this context, Global Risks 2011, Sixth Edition reveals insights stemming from an unparalleled effort on the part of
the World Economic Forum to analyse the global risk landscape in the coming decade.
1
Two cross-cutting global risks
Two risks are especially significant given their high degrees of impact and interconnectedness. Economic disparity
2
and global governance failures
3
both influence the evolution of many other global risks and inhibit our capacity to
respond effectively to them.
In this way, the global risk context in 2011 is defined by a 21st century paradox: As the world grows together, it is
also growing apart.
Globalization has generated sustained economic growth for a generation. It has shrunk and reshaped the world,
making it far more interconnected and interdependent. But the benefits of globalization seem unevenly spread a
minority is seen to have harvested a disproportionate amount of the fruits. Although growth of the new champions is
rebalancing economic power between countries, there is evidence that economic disparity within countries is
growing.
Issues of economic disparity and equity at both the national and the international levels are becoming increasingly
important. Politically, there are signs of resurgent nationalism and populism as well as social fragmentation. There is
also a growing divergence of opinion between countries on how to promote sustainable, inclusive growth.
To meet these challenges, improved global governance is essential. But this is another 21st century paradox: The
conditions that make improved global governance so crucial divergent interests, conflicting incentives and differing
norms and values are also the ones that make its realization so difficult, complex and messy. As a result, we see
failures such as the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the lack of international
agreement at the Copenhagen Conference on climate change. The G20 is seen as the most hopeful development in
global governance but its efficiency in this regard has not been proven.
1
For more information see Appendix 2 of the report.
2
Wealth and income disparities, both within countries and between countries.
3
Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks.
Global_Ri!k!_2011_E$_S#mma%17:La%o#" 17.12.10 10:51 Page 1
Three important risks in focus
Beyond these two cross-cutting global risks, three important clusters of risks have emerged in this years analysis:
The macroeconomic imbalances nexus: A cluster of economic risks including macroeconomic imbalances and
currency volatility, fiscal crises and asset price collapse arise from the tension between the increasing wealth and
influence of emerging economies and high levels of debt in advanced economies. Savings and trade imbalances
within and between countries are increasingly unsustainable while unfunded liabilities create extreme long-term
pressure on fiscal positions. One way out of these imbalances would be coordinated global action but this is
challenging given the conflicting interests of different states.
The illegal economy nexus: This nexus examines a cluster of risks including state fragility, illicit trade, organized
crime and corruption. A networked world, governance failures and economic disparity create opportunities for such
illegal activities to flourish. In 2009, the value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at US $1.3 trillion and
growing. These risks, while creating huge costs for legitimate economic activities, also weaken states, threatening
development opportunities, undermining the rule of law and keeping countries trapped in cycles of poverty and
instability. International cooperation both on the supply side and on the demand side is urgently needed.
The water-food-energy nexus: A rapidly rising global population and growing prosperity are putting
unsustainable pressures on resources. Demand for water, food and energy is expected to rise by 30-50% in the next
two decades, while economic disparities incentivize short-term responses in production and consumption that
undermine long-term sustainability. Shortages could cause social and political instability, geopolitical conflict and
irreparable environmental damage. Any strategy that focuses on one part of the water-food-energy nexus without
considering its interconnections risks serious unintended consequences.
Five risks to watch
Five risks have been designated as risks to watch, as survey respondents assessed them with high levels of
variance and low levels of confidence while experts
4
consider they may have severe, unexpected or
underappreciated consequences:
Cyber-security issues ranging from the growing prevalence of cyber theft to the little-understood possibility of all-
out cyber warfare
Demographic challenges adding to fiscal pressures in advanced economies and creating severe risks to social
stability in emerging economies
Resource security issues causing extreme volatility and sustained increases over the long run in energy and
commodity prices, if supply is no longer able to keep up with demand
Retrenchment from globalization through populist responses to economic disparities, if emerging economies
do not take up a leadership role
Weapons of mass destruction, especially the possibility of renewed nuclear proliferation between states
Effective risk response is not only about proactively reducing the downsides associated with global risks; it is also
about seizing the opportunities for innovation and growth that may arise. Throughout this report, a series of risk
response strategies are explored that can help stakeholders achieve both goals.
4
Unless otherwise noted, in this report experts refers to the Global Agenda Council members and other contributors who are acknowledged at the end of this report.
They provided input through various means, including participating in the Global Risks Survey, taking part in workshops, reviewing the report and providing individual
advice and counsel.
Global Risks Landscape 2011 Global Ris Landsca sks ape 2011
Risks Interconnection Map 2011
Retrenchment
from globalization
Space security
Extreme consumer
price volatility
Threats from
new technologies
Ocean governance
Online data and
information security
Economic disparity
Extreme energy
price volatility
Climate change
Geopolitical conflict
Fiscal crises
Migration
Air pollution
infrastructure
breakdown
Slowing Chinese Economy
Weapons of
mass destruction
Regulatory failures
Food security
Extreme commodity
price volatility
Infectious
diseases
Earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions
Storms and
cyclones
Biodiversity loss
Flooding
Terrorism
Illicit trade
Corruption
Organized crime
Fragile states Demographic challenges
Chronic diseases
Water security
Global imbalances and
currency volatility
Liquidity /
credit crunch
Higher perceived
likelihood
Higher perceived
impact
Economic
Risks
Societal
Risks
Technological
Risks
Higher perceived
interconnection
The illegal economy nexus The waterfoodenergy nexus The macroeconomic imbalances nexus
Geopolitical
Risks
Environmental
Risks
Fiscal crises
currency volatility
Fiscal crises
currency volatility
Illicit trade Illicit trade
Corruption Corruption
Organized crime Organized crime
Fragile states Fragile states
Extreme energy
price volatility
Climate change
Food security
Water security
Retrenchment
from globalization
Space security
Extreme consumer
price volatility
Threats from
new technologies
Ocean governance
Online data and
information security
Economic disparity
Extreme energy
price volatility
Climate change
Fiscal crises
Migration
Air pollution
infrastructure
breakdown
Slowing Chinese Economy
Weapons of
mass destruction
Regulatory failures
Food security
Extreme commodity
price volatility
Earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions
Storms and
cyclones
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Terrorism
Illicit trade
Corruption
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Fragile states Demographic challenges
Infectious
diseases
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Water security
currency volatility
Liquidity /
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Geopolitical conflict
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Global_Risks_2011_Ex_Summary17.qxp:Layout 12/22/10 11:08 PM Page 1
1 I 2011
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Glbal_Ri"k"_2011_E%_S$mma!&17_ZH:La&$# 07/01/11 11:21 P'gina 1

Glbal_Ri"k"_2011_E%_S$mma!&17_ZH:La&$# 07/01/11 11:21 P'gina 2

Global_Rik_2011_E#_S"mmar$17:La$o"! 23/12/10 10:57 P%gina 1

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