ABSTRACT.

The traditional basis for advocating

ethical business conduct has been morality defined in
philosophical or religious terms. However, fairness
and moral obligation have provided little incentive for
anything like universal ethical business behavior.
The idea that good ethics is good business as an
incentive is looked upon with skepticism by those
with bottom line responsibility. However, if managers
were aware of the extent to which certain business
behaviors impose significant costs on individual trans-
actions and relationships, a valid incentive would exist.
The need for such standards has intensified with
the fundamental shifts in business philosophy, struc-
ture, and practice along with profound changes in
product markets and supply sources. The universal
standards, ISO 9000 for product and service quality,
and ISO 14000 for environmental issues were created
and implemented to cope with problems in their
respective areas and they provide a model which can
be adapted to the realm of ethics.

Introduction
Imagine a scenario in which a Canadian manu-
facturer of machine tools is seeking to outsource
stamped, high impact plastic enclosures for its
new line of robotics. The company, with little
experience in foreign sourcing, sent its chief
purchasing executive to visit potential vendors in
several newly industrialized countries in order
to invite bids. A bid was received from a Korean
firm which was, clearly, technically qualified and
was also the low cost bidder. A contract was
negotiated and received authorized signatures
from both parties. Then the relationship
promptly began to come apart at the seams.
Why? Because of a failure to take account of
interorganizational (IO) ethics.
IO ethics is a concept conceived to help close
the gaps that are likely to exist in the trust rela-
tionships between any organizations doing or
considering doing business together. These
include connections between a firm and its
suppliers and customers, and embraces relation-
ships involving non-profit organizations and
governmental units. The concept also includes
any firms with which the company has, or may
develop, direct affiliations such as mergers, acqui-
sitions, joint ventures, outsourcing relationships,
strategic alliances, and partnerships. In
addition, it includes complementors; those
companies that are or may become related to
another organization through trade associations,
buying groups, research consortiums and other
direct or indirect connections (Brandenberger
and Nalebuff, 1996).
1
Trust, in turn, is the
complex of business behaviors that organizations
mutually rely upon as a basis for committing to,
entering, and sustaining a business relationship.
Interorganizational Ethics:
Standards of Behavior

Jerold B. Muskin
Journal of Business Ethics 24: 283297, 2000.
2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Jerold B. Muskin is Professor Emeritus, Drexel University
(1967present). Formerly: Professor of Marketing,
Director, Masters Programs, College of Business, Drexel
University (19921995). Government service: Chief,
Motor Carrier Policy Group, Interstate Commerce
Commission (197879); Consultant, U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee (1980); Consultant, U.S.
Congress Office of Technology Assessment (198586).
Private sector: Management positions, Consolidated
Freightways (195863); Private consultant (196378
and 1980prsent). Education: Temple University,
Ph.D., Economics, 1976 (Dissertation, The Economics
of Federally Imposed Aircraft Noise Regulations);
Northwestern University, MBA (1958); Lehigh
University, AB (1952). Publications: Various publica-
tions on public policy and transportation issues.
Violations or fear of violations of IO ethics are
costly intrusions on business activity. Unaccept-
able risk exposure or the time and expense of
developing risk reducing information stop
desirable business relationships from developing
or cause delays to occur while assurances of
acceptable business conduct are sought.
Concerns about IO ethics deal only with
those adverse business behaviors that can impose
economic costs on the parties to the activities
conducted between organizations. This means
that issues of morality, corporate social responsi-
bility, official corruption, and those ethical
matters that might apply within the firm itself lie
outside this approach. While those are of obvious
importance to the firm, they are issues that are
confronted through different interventions (i.e.,
by boards of directors, professional groups, and
governmental action).
Generally, where the IO ethics issue is raised,
it is treated in terms of morality. For example,
Donaldson (1996),
2
settling on universal core
values; (i.e., morality) as the universal ethical
criterion, says:
. . . Lying about product specifications in the act
of selling may not affect human lives directly, but
it . . . is intolerable because it violates the trust that
is needed to sustain a corporate culture in which
customers are respected.
Confronting lying about product specifications in
economic terms would seem to be a more robust
way of gaining support for universal standards.
While trust is a moral issue it is, in this case, an
economic issue and can therefore be approached
objectively analytically.
Several contemporary developments under-
score the need for the prompt, assured nature of
trust between suppliers and customers. Among
these are the increased pace of business activity,
the heightened level of competition, globaliza-
tion, outsourcing, and just-in-time manufac-
turing and inventory practices. Partnering and
the related concept of value chain management
are two recent business concepts involving buyer-
seller bonding that are highly trust dependent.
Indeed, the philosophy of business in many firms
is shifting from adversarial to trust relationships.
For a culture of trust to become widespread and
entrenched in the business culture, clean costs
(i.e., costs that are not burdened with tainted
costs those imposed by unethical IO behavior)
must prevail.
The organizing principle of this article is that
achieving the clean cost condition depends, in
part, on the identification and wide acceptance
of prescribed standards for a list of IO ethical
behaviors. Models for establishing and gaining
compliance with standards in other facets of
business activity exist and provide analogs for IO
ethics. These are the international standards for
quality (ISO 9000) and environment (ISO 14000)
established by the Geneva-based International
Organization for Standardization. This article will
conclude with a discussion of the relevance of
these models for IO ethics and the recommen-
dation that an international standard for IO ethics
along those lines be developed and then adopted
by a broad base of buyers and sellers.
I. The Foundations of Business Ethics
I. (Why firms behave as they do)
The term corporate culture has become well
accepted as an amalgam of beliefs, attitudes and
behaviors that distinguish firms as employers,
suppliers, customers, competitors, and commu-
nity members. The principal facet of corporate
culture to be treated is the nature of the stan-
dards which an organization applies in its dealings
with customers, suppliers, and those others with
which they might affiliate and the consistency
with which the standards are applied. Integrity,
the term which might seem to apply here (rather
than the nature and consistency of standards)
is avoided because it is a culture laden term.
To behave with integrity in one culture may
be to violate standards of integrity in another.
Dunfee and Nagayasu (1993)
3
cite a situation
which demonstrates this. An American company
attempted to put the number of directors on a
board of a Japanese firm that reflected its degree
of ownership customary; a practice in the U.S.
The attempt was rejected. The owner of the
American company claimed that the rejection
. . . epitomized unfair Japanese corporate tactics,
[while] his behavior was no doubt seen as
284 Jerold B. Muskin
unethical in the eyes of the Japanese business
community, because of the group normative
logic.
This example grew out of the authors dis-
cussion of the four concentric circles paradigm
characteristic of Japanese business culture. The
four circles represent (1) family, (2) fellows or
close associates, (3) a combination of open com-
petition and long-term give-and-take and (4) the
world. In this visualization of Japanese business
behavior, Managers tend to view the inner
circles as operation bases supported by coopera-
tive behavior while the outer [circles] are seen
as battle-grounds of intense competition.
This insight into the cultural basis for Japanese
IO business behavior in which firms are treated
differentially based on their cultural distance from
the core firm seems to relate closely to a bio-
logical basis for differential treatment based on
genetic distance. Naturalist, Loyal Watson
(1995),
4
provides convincing evidence that a
parallel to the four concentric circles exists in
nature. The biological paradigm is, according to
Watson, . . . (1) be nasty to outsiders, (2) be
nice to insiders, and, (3) cheat whenever
possible. All of these are, according to Watson,
intended to assure the sustainability and enhance-
ment of the core unit; the gene pool or, in this
discussion, the organization.
Fukuyama (1995)
5
cites Gordon Reddings
evaluation of the nature of business structure in
Hong Kong. The following quote states this issue
very nicely:
The key feature would appear to be that you trust
your family absolutely, your friends and acquain-
tances to the degree that mutual dependence has
been established and face invested in them, With
everybody else you make no assumptions about
their goodwill. You have the right to expect their
politeness and their following of social proprieties,
but beyond that you must anticipate that, just as
you are, they are looking primarily at their own,
i.e., their familys best interest. To know your own
motives well is, for the Chinese more than most,
a warning about everybody elses.
To characterize certain intercultural behaviors as
failures of integrity is to open oneself to the crit-
icism of moral imperialism. Nor is this stance
one of ethical relativism. Cultures develop values
important to their stability from their histories
and environmental circumstances (Fallows,
1995).
6
Values, the concept of integrity which is
high among them, are among the very things that
cause distinctive cultures to exist.
The value system existing within the organi-
zation underlies its culture. Whether a firm
demonstrates good citizenship or competitive
rapacity reflects the collective beliefs of those in
whose hands behavioral choices are placed. The
value system of the organization is imposed at the
top and expressed hierarchically (if sometimes
with distortion), down through the layers of
management. Of course, the faith and consis-
tency with which the value system-based
behaviors are applied depends on the extent to
which those values are shared and enforced. If
the values are not basic to those in whose hands
the firms decisions and actions are placed, the
commitment with which those values are trans-
mitted and enforced will undermine that faith
and consistency. The determination of what is
ethically acceptable and necessary is likely to
be influenced by the values and rules of the
dominant culture of the community with which
the firm is associated.
But there are other determinants of value
systems that operate within an organization.
Baron (1995)
7
notes, for example, that Levi
Strauss, a privately owned firm, has integrated
the core values of the Haas family into its internal
policies and earned a reputation for adherence to
ethical principles and concern for its stake-
holders.
A comment regarding the premise that
economic outcomes, rather than morality, is the
measure of IO ethical behavior is appropriate
here. Levi Strauss withdrawal of production
capacity from China because of the failure of its
suppliers there to observe that U.S. firms
employment and other standards has been cele-
brated as an example of moral responsibility as,
indeed, it should be. But, as Baron notes:
Implementation of this strategy means higher costs
and some deterioration in competitiveness. For
some Levi Strauss executives, the higher costs are
simply the price of abiding by its ethical princi-
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 285
ples. For others, the costs are the price of
protecting its brand name from adverse publicity
about its suppliers practices.
If human rights and other violations of moral
values that are embraced by links in the value
chain are likely to have costly consequences, they
should be subjected to the proposed universal IO
standards because of their economic conse-
quences as well as coming under scrutiny of
boards of directors, governments, and industry
groups because of their offense to moral values.
Likewise, the profession in which executives
received their education and professional devel-
opment can be expected to affect the values they
bring to the organizations behavioral code.
Burton (1990)
8
cites the substantial differences
between lawyers and engineers codes of ethics
in describing a conflict over negotiations con-
cerning violations of environmental standards.
Engineers, Burton points out, are bound by a
code of professional ethics that calls for using
their knowledge and skill for the enhancement
of human welfare. The code further calls for
their being honest and impartial, and serving
with fidelity the public, their employers and
clients. There is nothing in either the
American Bar Associations Model Code of
Professional Responsibility or Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Burton goes on to say,
that binds attorneys in their negotiating
behavior to anything like the engineers obliga-
tion. The principal professional obligation of the
attorney is to the client and in negotiating
situations (1) to effectively represent the clients
interests and, (2) to faithfully fulfill the clients
wishes, at least insofar as their fulfillment does
not assist clients in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
Burton continues, This is the discontinuity
problem in a nutshell: Different codes, different
client allegiances, and resultant dysfunctional
negotiation. This conclusion could be extended
to explain the dysfunction in any business
relationship that results from disparate behavioral
codes.
II. Contemporary conditions calling for
II. universal ethical standards to exist
II. between organizations
The globalization phenomenon is perhaps the
most obvious of the reasons for establishing and
adopting universal, IO ethical standards. Legally
imposed standards vary from country to country
allowing business practices that are defined and
enforced in one country to be observed as ethical
options in another. National and even regional
cultural differences that affect business practice
exist. These may rise out of historical experi-
ences, the religious teachings and convictions, or
the family, political and economic structures
dominant in those countries or region
(Fukuyama, 1995).
9
The result is often that
certain behaviors that are sanctioned in one
country or region may be proscribed in others.
An illustration of differences in national
culture and law arose from a conflict over
intellectual property between IBM and its
strategic partner, Fujitsu (Badaracco, 1995).
10
During the course of the agreement Fujitsu
incorporated IBM proprietary computer code
into its own product. U.S. law would have
allowed IBM to recover damages and barred
Fujitsu from further violation of IBMs rights.
When submitted to arbitration, however, the case
turned on a fundamental difference in the
business culture (incorporated into the law) of
the two countries. (Note also that Korean
practice all but prohibits arbitration and, when
invoked in Korea, is very time consuming,
expensive, and, when concluded, probably favor-
able to the Korean side.) (DeMente, 1994)
11
Monopoly intellectual property rights, Badaracco
explains, are granted in the U.S. to encourage
companies to innovate. In Japan, innovation is
seen as a public good to be applied to broaden
the advance of technology by all. The innovator
may receive royalties but does not have sole claim
to the technology. IBM was granted royalties but
Fujitsu was permitted to continue to employ the
IBM code.
As Fallows (1995)
12
points out, Japanese
practice has traditionally been to methodically
learn and adopt foreign industrial practice while
stubbornly forbidding access to their own
286 Jerold B. Muskin
technologies. Fallows cites contemporary
evidence of this in noting the behavior of
Japanese firms participating in strategic alliances
with American firms involved in the manufac-
ture of flash memory chips:
Could the American company learn [Japanese
manufacturing techniques] from the partnership
. . . ? In principle they could, especially by studying
Japanese manufacturing techniques. In reality,
however, reciprocal learning was unlikely; the U.S.
business system arranged to send information out,
and the Japanese system to take it in.
Fallows notes that Hitachi, offering courses to its
American employees to allow them to improve
themselves, excluded Japanese language courses
from the offer.
That such arrogation of intellectual property
is not unusual behavior is inferred in a seminal
article on core competence (Prahaladad and
Hamel, 1990).
13
Here the authors discuss a firms
goal of entering into strategic alliances; gaining
access to, and then incorporating knowledge of
their partners core competencies into their
own products and processes later to terminate the
relationship with the ally. The authors quote
an official of a technology purloining firm as
saying From an investment standpoint, it was
much quicker and cheaper to use foreign tech-
nology. There wasnt a need for us to develop
new ideas.
Another globalization issue is that of multi-
nationals; those business organizations that
operate across national borders but, as a matter
of business principle, have no nationality.
While such a firms headquarters may be in Hong
Kong, it could as well be in San Francisco or
Zurich. Are its business values British? Asian?
American? Swiss? If a particular venue becomes
economically, morally, politically or legally
uncomfortable it can move. Leadership of firms
engaged in international business, are drawn
increasingly from many nations and therefore
from many cultures adding to the problematic
nature of anticipated business practices.
Such developments as just-in-time ( JIT), total
quality management/continuous improvement
(TQM/CI), and outsourcing have contributed to
raising the trust requirement to a new level. The
degree of customer dependency in each of these
cases is of such a magnitude that, in the absence
of trust, the customer would either be in the
position of having to provide the product or
service itself (vertically integrate) or would be
denied the business opportunity anticipated by
the arrangement with the supplier. Deliveries that
are not on time, every time, according to spec-
ifications can be disastrous for the customer com-
mitted to JIT. Customers that rely on arriving
materials entering their production stage without
inspection (a standard TQM/CI requirement)
can, if this expectation is not met, incur sub-
stantial costs including loss of their customers on
down the value chain.
Outsourcing contractors must not only
perform according to expectations but, because
their personnel are entrusted with sensitive
customer information, high trust is essential. At
the same time, the customer should not exploit
the situation in which it becomes very familiar
with the suppliers personnel by hiring them
away. Ethical performance between supplier and
customer is always important. The unified value
chain concept; the virtual corporation in
which all the supplier-customer links, from
extractive through disposal processes, are har-
monized, is utterly dependent on ethical buyer-
seller performance.
Electronic data interchange (EDI) is a tech-
nological development of recent vintage. The
very purpose of this computer-to-computer
technique is to share information directly and
electronically between buyer and seller. The
information may include design changes, prices,
unit costs, material availabilities, lead times in
production, forecasts, financial transactions, and
capacity availability. The sensitive, proprietary
nature that some of the information may have
can make both parties vulnerable to one another
and to the informations being insufficiently
protected from those outside the relationship.
The need for trust on both sides is clear.
The evolving business relationship that best
exemplifies the shift occurring in management
philosophy is that of partnering. In this model,
(and unlike the Japanese keiretsu or the Korean
chaebol forms in that the partnering firms are
financially and managerially autonomous) com-
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 287
panies create environments in which they
function as a single entity for the joint domain
covered by the partnering agreement. They
establish common goals within the defined range
of their agreement and may engage in joint
product and process design, and in joint facility
location decisions, may assist in the financing of
partners capital investments, may exchange per-
sonnel, and otherwise function in a unified way.
Singular features of partnering are (1) a
supplier is likely to commit major portions of its
production to its customer partner and a
customer may commit to single sourcing,
(2) gains are shared equally without regard to the
relative size or power of the companies and risks
are shared equitably, (3) the partnering agree-
ments may or may not be contractual and,
(4) the critical point here; partnering depends on,
indeed, is defined as, a long-term relationship
based on trust. In these latter three respects
partnering represents a distinct departure from
joint ventures, strategic alliances, and out-
sourcing.
Adding to the powerful impact of the shift to
collaborative relationships between firms (and
feeding its growth) is the awareness of some com-
panies that the real competition is frequently not
between firms at the same level of supply. Rather,
the real competition is at the level of final
demand of the entire value chain. For those
organizations that accept this reality, the logical
channel structure for them to become part of is
the unified value chain in which the trust and
other dimensions of the partnering model hold
sway throughout the value chain.
Fundamental shifts in corporate cultures are
yet other factors calling for an increased emphasis
on trust that can be universalized by a set of
shared standards. Pursuing a goal of racial,
gender, and cultural diversity has put Honeywell
in a position in which . . . Ethics awareness
training has been a growing preoccupation. . . .
(Singer, 1993).
14
Also, as with many organiza-
tions, Honeywell has sought greater employee
empowerment, transferring issues to the
people in the company who are closest to the
production process on the one hand and the
customer on the other. As a result, the company
has found itself with fewer checkers and
watchers, a more diverse workforce, and newly
empowered employees who are being asked to
make decisions that they didnt make before.
The article also presents a shift that represents
an intensification rather than a basic change in
the setting for ethical response:
. . . Honeywell, like other concerns, faces growing
economic pressures: global competition, more
demanding customers, the need to provide more
complex responses for customers. . . . Such an
environment often presents dangers. The competitive
pressures which drive people to do things that are wrong
become stronger. (emphasis added)
III. The concept underlying the
III. standards to be applied
Technology and the development of collabora-
tive business principles are reducing the barriers
to the kind of business relationships that can lift
aggregate business performance. This prospect
would be advanced by reducing the tainted costs
that exist in business conduct and lead to the
increased tangible costs of organizations with an
existing relationship. But tainted costs are not the
only burden inflicted on firms and value chains
(and also on industries as well as regional and
national economies). There are also transaction
costs and opportunity cost consequences (to be
discussed later).
Entering into any business relationship
depends on the net benefits expected from the
relationship. The anticipated effects of the con-
nection on production, distribution, and man-
agerial/administrative costs are, of course,
important considerations. Likewise, long-term
market results expected from the relationship
such as sales volumes, profit margins, and market
position are factors that will determine (1)
whether the relationship should be entered into
and (2) the extent to which the firm will commit
itself. The firm will also consider the likely effect
of the relationship on the value of its assets.
These include intellectual property, brand equity,
and corporate reputation as well as the effect on
its personnel and its capital assets.
The functional, technical, and operational
aspects of these elements can be positively or
288 Jerold B. Muskin
negatively affected by the managerial and tech-
nical competence and the complementary
resources of the firm targeted for a relationship.
These are standard matters confronted by any
firm in deciding whether to do business with
another firm. Due diligence requires that the
responsible managers assess the factors to provide
best estimates of the outcomes.
The evaluation process may be straightforward
with respect to the managerial prowess, resources,
and technical capabilities of the subject firm.
Industry reputation, accounting records, and
published information as well as direct discussions
and observation can be employed to determine
the extent to which the prospective association
should be made. Indeed, to handle broad based
concerns with uncertainties regarding product
and service performance, the international
product quality standards, ISO 9000 series, as of
1995, had been adopted by an estimated 127 000
firms around the world; over 10 000 in the U.S.
alone (Morrow, 1997).
15
Increased material and operating costs, lower
revenues, and reduced asset values attributable
to the relationship entered under the faulty
presumption of clean costs are tangible costs (i.e.
costs that immediately appear on the books of
account) imposed on the firm. To this should be
added the projected lost earnings from the assets
that have been lost or otherwise reduced in value.
These assets would include personnel that had
been lured away, impaired product and firm
image, and loss of profit and market position
formerly assured by intellectual property status,
reduced brand equity values, and impairment of
other assets.
Transaction costs reflect the value of resources
committed by the firm to unearthing the infor-
mation needed to produce the clean bill of
health. The costs of preparing, negotiating, and
monitoring contracts that might deal with IO
ethical issues or arbitrating or litigating conflicts
over such issues also fall within the transaction
cost category. These are transaction costs in the
sense that entry into a business relationship,
whether it is a simple, one-time purchase of a
product, a long-term supply arrangement or a
corporate merger, is a transaction.
Lost benefits over time, including the foregone
profits and market position that result from
deferring entry into a desirable business rela-
tionship; entering into such a relationship
gradually; of failing to enter the relationship
altogether because of insufficient information
regarding IO ethics all fit under the opportunity
cost definition. Had the trust question been
nullified in advance, the preferred option may
have been to enter the relationship immediately.
However, the less preferred option, deferral, is
followed because of the need to avoid the risk
inherent in an untested relationship. The differ-
ence in profit between the preferred option and
the option selected because of lack of immedi-
ately available, valid information is opportunity
cost.
Both firms, being subject to deferral, would
incur opportunity costs. In fact, each, being
unfamiliar with the other, might well be
checking one another out. Further, a desirable
relationship that is not taken up without delay
has effects on the entire value chain, and, if of
sufficient scale, the economic region or nation.
Those losses are also opportunity costs that, like
tangible costs and transaction costs, would be
avoided if the required information were already
available. If the inquiry reveals adverse informa-
tion, the only cost incurred will be the infor-
mation cost component of transaction cost.
All three categories of cost at the firm and
value chain levels are relevant for developing,
evaluating, and using information to engage in
IO transactions. National governments might, for
example, consider the magnitude of these costs
in confronting endemic ethical violations and
official corruption recognizing that they impair
economic development.
IV. Interorganizational (IO) behaviors
IV. candidate for standard setting
The behaviors listed here are first defined in
terms of the domains of concern in the proposed
standards setting context. Examples of such ethics
violations or discussions of the applicable prin-
ciples are presented followed by indications of the
costs likely to imposed on the various parties
affected by the violations. The examples, of
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 289
course, are only suggestive of the kinds of cost
imposing behaviors which may be encountered
in dealings between organizations.
Conflict of interest. (Definition An affiliation
maintained by one person in an organization
with another person or organization that has the
potential of causing unmerited benefits to flow
to one or another of the organizations or to
either person.)
In the opening scenario, a robotics manufac-
turer awarded a contract to a Korean plastics
manufacturer which was associated with a
chaebol, a fact unknown to the Canadian firm.
To extend the scenario, another member of the
chaebol was also a robotics manufacturer. Given
Korean firms disregard for intellectual property
as a matter of business culture (DeMente, 1994),
16
the Korean plastics manufacturer passed the
designs and timetables received from the
Canadian firm to its robotics producing affiliate.
As one result of this, the Canadian firm lost its
first to market profit and long term market
share opportunity because the Korean robotics
firm reverse engineered the product from the
CAD/CAM software the Canadian firm had
provided to its affiliate and responded with its
own advanced version quickly. Denied the flow
of profits and the technological leadership
position it would otherwise have received, the
victims profitable growth was stunted. The
Korean plastics manufacturer, as a consequence,
wound up providing enclosures to both the
Canadian firm and its chaebol affiliate until the
Canadian firm discovered the linkage.
Bribery. (Definition Any form of payment [or
other valuable, extra-business consideration]
offered or demanded as part of a transaction that
may result in unmerited, negative business
consequences for others directly or indirectly
connected to the transaction. Buyers or sellers
may exact or offer bribes which may take the
form of kickbacks, gifts, favors, and other such
inducements to engage in behavior that is
counter to normal business obligations or
economic reasonableness.)
The customer, faced with a stockout situation
and industry-wide shortages in a product
category, offers a supplier a premium price for
immediate delivery of a sizable order. Accepting
the order under these conditions resulted in the
suppliers other customers being placed back in
the queue with adverse cost and revenue conse-
quences. If the supplier were to demand such a
payment, it would either be inducing the
customer to (1) accept a lower margin,
(2) diminish its product or service quality in an
attempt to retain its profit margin, or (3) charge
a higher price than it would charge in the
absence of the bribe. The suppliers standing with
the customers whose shipments have been
delayed in the tight market described is also likely
to be damaged. All of these bribe induced actions
and their outcomes impair the market perfor-
mance of all of the firms and the value chains of
which they are a part.
Misrepresentations of various types. (Definition
Any purposefully misleading or false statement or
action engaged in by one party beneficial to itself
but resulting in business behavior harmful to
another party. The term applies to withholding
information that, if revealed, would induce
behavior different from that brought about by
misrepresentation.)
The American corporate icon, Coca Cola, was
caught with its hand in the cookie jar (Harris,
1996).
17
Coke was shown to be engaging in
pipeline stuffing, a practice by which, in order
to show high quarterly sales and profits to the
investment community, a company will overload
its customers with inventory. Sales and profit
figures misrepresent actual demand leading to
overvalued securities. When the supplier is con-
fronted with its customers inability to accept
more shipments and, consequently, sales drop,
security values drop penalizing the investors. But
this isnt the point here. As the author of that
article states:
But at bottom it [pipeline stuffing] is a dumb
business tactic even if it does keep the share price
high. To stuff a pipeline is to force someone, perhaps
a wholesaler that must eat the costs because it is
dependent on the company for a lot of business,
to carry an inventory that is bigger than necessary.
And that ties up capital and raises costs. If the
inventory is perishable, it can also harm relations
290 Jerold B. Muskin
with customers as that unneeded inventory turns
stale and buyers turn to competitors. (emphasis
added)
The use of the term force in the quote estab-
lishes this behavior as an example of another
unethical practice: exploitation of relative power,
discussed later.
Appropriation of intangibles. (Definition Any
unauthorized taking of ideas, information,
designs, processes, secrets, or other intangibles
considered proprietary by the originally pos-
sessing party. The definition is not limited to
those items protected or protectable by intellec-
tual property rights applying in any jurisdiction
and may include such activities as industrial
espionage, reverse engineering by an organiza-
tion with which a relationship exists or is being
considered, or subversion of information sources
such as employees and agents.)
The earlier mentioned discussion of Fujitsus
appropriation of IBMs computer code and
NECs incorporating elements of their strategic
alliance associates core competencies would fit
under this rubric. The situation is one in which
the act is proscribed in one companys jurisdic-
tion while condoned in the other. Even where
such appropriations are illegal (and the law is
enforced) in both jurisdictions or both com-
panies are in the same legal jurisdiction, viola-
tions impose significant costs on all the parties
through the direct and indirect costs of negotia-
tion, arbitration, litigation, and penalties. Such
protective documents as confidentiality agree-
ments and agreements not to compete are costly
and time consuming to execute, monitor, and
enforce.
In most companies, particularly those with a
high technological or design component or
where marketing proficiency is a major differen-
tiating factor, proprietary information abounds.
R&D intentions and achievements, patented,
copyrighted, and secret processes as well as
pricing and promotional intentions are critical to
these firms. Providers of supposedly undifferen-
tiated products and services ranging from bulk
sulfur to window cleaning services are exposed
to the possibility of losing market advantage if
competitors gain access to cost-price informa-
tion, capacity availability, delivery/service dates,
and financial status.
A firms intangible assets are resources in as real
a sense as its tangible assets. They are simply
more transportable and easier to appropriate.
Appropriation of tangible resources are charac-
terized as a violation of the law in nearly every
jurisdiction in which a market economy exists.
Intangible assets are often the core of a companys
ability to establish and then maintain a sustain-
able, preferred position in the market place or
merely to survive at an acceptable level of
profitability. Their loss can impose damages that
include wasted expenditures, lost customers,
revenues, and profitability; failed market intro-
ductions; lost security values; and the costs of
regaining ownership of the assets and compen-
sation for their loss.
Disavowal or non-performance of agreements.
(Definition Parties to a business transaction
each have certain expectations regarding the
performance of the others. Where verbal or
written commitments reflecting these expecta-
tions of the business arrangement fail to be
observed, unless substitute provisions are satis-
factorily negotiated in advance, a violation of an
agreement exists. Even though no specific agree-
ment may have been made, certain expectations
of performance, such as timely delivery of
products or services of acceptable quality, and
prompt, complete payment, are part of the com-
mercial code [written or unwritten and enforced
or not enforced] in all exchange economies.)
The Canadian firm in the introductory
scenario is without recourse through any attempt
it might make to get termination of the appro-
priation of its intellectual property or restitution
of losses or rights it might claim based on
enforcement of existing contractual provisions
with its Korean supplier (DeMente, 1994).
18
Exploitation of relative power. (Definition Using
buying, market, financial, or other sources of
power that induces behavior contrary to the
reasonable interests of the party exposed to the
power. Here, even the application of legitimate
power, i.e. power granted by contract or con-
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 291
vention, or earned by expertness or relative
status where used in a manipulative or coercive
way, may be considered unethical.)
Aware that a prospective supplier has cash flow
problems and underutilized facilities, a large
customer waves a big order under the suppliers
nose. The price demanded by the customer
barely covers the suppliers out-of-pocket costs
and the contract, with substantial penalty provi-
sions, calls for a completion date that prevents
the supplier from accepting other business. The
supplier, perhaps unwisely, but in hopes of a
rescue or perhaps of future, remunerative business
from the customer, accepts the order. Shortly
after completing contract, the supplier declares
bankruptcy. The customer goes on to the next
needy victim. And then the next.
The cost implications of this behavior are the
loss of earnings and asset values of the now
defunct or financially impaired businesses. Other
customers of those suppliers (indeed, the value
chains of which they were a part) are confronted
with fewer sourcing options as well as the
reduced innovation and higher prices that are
associated with reduced competition in a field.
When the customers vulture-like proclivities
become widely known, it may become more
difficult to find takers but the costs of the
ethics violations have already been imposed.
Whipsawing of price or conditions. (Definition
Inviting proposals, quotations or bids for the
purpose of inducing present [or other prospec-
tive] suppliers to give concessions to retain [or
gain] business rather than giving serious consid-
eration to placing business with whichever
organization provides the objectively preferred
response. Such requests are also made to check
up on the prices and conditions being applied
by the current supplier. Such practices may be
recognized as legitimate as long as they are not
used repeatedly, frivolously, or manipulatively.
The costly consequences are that the firms that
respond without a chance of succeeding on the
merits incur the expenses of the resources com-
mitted to the response as well as the opportunity
costs associated with profitable efforts foregone
due to the effort. In addition, the current
supplier may be forced into price and condition
concessions to protect its position from com-
petitors offering an initial, low ball price and
conditions meant to get into the account. The
current suppliers compliant reaction will cut into
its profitability each time the ploy is exercised
and could result in its abandonment of the
business harming the customer.
Body snatching. (The practice of hiring key
personnel of suppliers or customers unless the
employment offer is cleared with the current
employer in advance of any contact. A further
criterion that might make this an acceptable
practice is that the current employer not be
subjected to any manner of pressure to approve
the contact because of the relative power position
of the job proffering organization. This also
conforms to the exploitation of relative power
issue covered earlier.)
The purchasing manager for a mid-level steel
service center is approached by the regional sales
manager of a major international metals
producer, the service centers largest supplier of
product, and offered a sales position with a sig-
nificantly more lucrative compensation package
than she presently enjoys. After some delibera-
tion and without discussing the offer with her
present employer, she accepts the offer and
tenders her resignation. Her employer is in no
position to counter the offer or inform her that
she was about to be designated as its vice presi-
dent-materials management with significantly
broader responsibilities and much higher com-
pensation. The firms CEO rejects these as
options because of his concern that these actions
will compromise its position with the metals
company during a long term product shortage
phase.
This is the third raid the supplier has made
on its customer in the last two years. Both
previous events resulted in less qualified
employees being moved into the empty slots with
negative effects on the profitability of the firm.
With the most recent occurrence, the planned
reorganizing of the companys management
structure had to be deferred until a suitable
replacement could be recruited or developed
internally. Because of these key personnel losses,
service quality, the principal competitive appeal
292 Jerold B. Muskin
in this business, falls with consequent effects on
reputation, market position, revenues, and unit
costs.
Market Displacement. (Definition Market
Displacement occurs when one member in the
supply chain engages in subverting practices that
displaces another member from its primary
position in the minds of its customers.)
A nationwide automotive parts distributor
approaches a leading automotive belt (fan belts,
etc.) manufacturer with a proposal that would
make the manufacturer its principal source of
belts. The manufacturers brand has long domi-
nated the OEM market but it had not pursued
sales vigorously in the after-market. This
proposed arrangement, management reasoned,
would give it a good beachhead in that market
and consummated the deal with the distributor.
The initial, joint promotional program com-
mitted to in the agreement succeeded very well
and soon the distributor had doubled its share
of the belt market in its service areas with the
subject manufacturer providing almost all of the
product.
Sales and margins for the manufacturer were
so good that it did not establish a separate depart-
ment or marketing program for the after-market.
It did, however, extend its line beyond its OEM
list to cover the universe of belts required in the
market. In addition, it acquired, equipped, and
staffed additional facilities to handle the increased
sales already experienced and anticipated for the
future.
After five years of solid growth in sales volume
and profits, the manufacturer experienced a
sudden drop in orders. The distributor was now
marketing a line of automotive belts produced for
its label in a country with materially lower pro-
duction costs using designs and processes of the
manufacturer which were no longer patent pro-
tected. The distributors sales message was that
these belts were the performance equivalent of
the line that customers had been buying from
them with satisfaction for years but now, for
two-thirds the price.
Perhaps this behavior cannot be faulted on
legal grounds given the lack of a contract, nor,
perhaps, under certain circumstances, on ethical
grounds. In this case, the charge of unethical
behavior can be made. The manufacturer found
that the distributor had been following a pattern
in which it chose leading manufacturers in several
of its most important product categories with
which to enter into distribution arrangements
offering them large margins and volumes. Then,
as with the belt manufacturer, a large joint
marketing effort would launch the distributor as
a dominant factor in its market areas for the
product category. The distributor, on the strength
of its suppliers attributes, would become pri-
marily identified with the product. At that point
the distributor would introduce its private label.
Unit costs rise because of the now under-
utilized facilities and equipment acquired to
handle the business. The unsold belts held in
inventory add to the (unproductive) assets side of
the balance sheet, are sold at a loss or are written
off affecting earnings. The loss in revenue is a
further blow to the earnings statement. All of
these create a diminished return on investment
for the manufacturer. A further blow might also
have occurred involving the morale of manage-
ment. Recriminations might have been
exchanged over the failure to anticipate this type
of behavior from the distributor and for not
taking steps to protect the company from the
uncertainties inherent in such an arrangement.
Management, by failing to accept the informa-
tion costs associated with risk avoidance, incurred
the almost certainly higher tainted and opportu-
nity costs.
Commitments beyond ability to perform. (Definition
Both suppliers and customers should be able to
rely on acceptable performance standards from
those organizations with which they deal. The
acceptance of responsibility to perform extends
beyond the firm making the commitment to
include those direct and ancillary organizations
relied upon by that firm to satisfy the commit-
ment [ J. Jackson, 1992
19
and Durand et al.,
1997
20
]. If there is a degree of uncertainty
regarding performance, this should be specifically
stated at the time of commitment.)
A biomedical instrumentation start-up
company was stymied in its development efforts
by a seemingly intractable technical problem
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 293
involving optics. The start-ups literature search
indicated that there was a company that had
developed a solution to a problem similar to the
one being experienced. Discussions with that
company lead to an agreement that it would
produce the required technology for the start-
up company. The start-up was assured that the
solution would be supplied in an acceptable time
frame as the company had recently achieved the
needed technological breakthrough.
Repeated delays and deliveries of devices that
failed to perform impaired the continued exis-
tence of the start-up. Of course, the agreement
was terminated. Failure to perform came at
substantial cost to both organizations. If the
supplier had indicated that there was uncertainty
involved, the start-up may have taken another
path to its problems solution. As it was, the
start-up was utterly dependent on the suppliers
performing according to expectation.
One need not accuse the supplier of mis-
representation in this case. (For example, doing
R&D for its own account by having its customer
paying for expected useful output.) Its ethical
failure was, more likely, its insufficiently evalu-
ated and,therefore,irresponsibly expressed tech-
nical capability.
Favoritism. (Definition This behavior includes
any activity [such as cronyism or nepotism]
carried on by an organization which, knowingly,
because of a family, friendship, ethnic or other
non-business relationship favors a less economi-
cally meritorious customer or supplier over one
of greater economic merit [A. M. Porter,
1996].
21
)
Manufacturer A was the principal supplier of
office equipment and store fixtures to a large and
expanding retail grocery chain headquartered in
an adjacent EU member nation. The manufac-
turer gained its position with its customer over
many years by continually innovating products
and processes which it made available to that
company often before its other customers, by
holding responsive inventory levels, and by
accepting deferred payment of invoices during
periods in which the grocery chain was enduring
adverse financial conditions.
Sales records revealed that over the period of
the past three years, its business volume had been
shrinking and this at a time of growth for the
customer when the manufacturer had introduced
several major new products which the customer
had adopted ahead of its competitors to its great
advantage. The volume decline was in its high
margin product lines. Inquiry showed that the
sales decline occurred shortly after the owners
nephew was employed as managing director of
the organization of which manufacturer As chief
competitor was a subsidiary.
A, without the profit justification for providing
exemplary service of various types to that
customer was incurring an outright loss in pro-
viding that level of service to the customer. Had
A redirected those efforts to other market oppor-
tunities, it could have created compensating
profits. A finally withdrew from the account. The
grocery chain, faced with the withdrawal of As
highly favorable offering, lost that source of its
success and incurred the costs of recreating a
relationship with another supplier probably
inferior to A.
V. Conclusion: Universal standards for
V. interorganizational ethics: concepts
V. and processes
Trust is a characterization that is earned over
time. Trustworthiness is a reputation that comes
with demonstrated consistency of ethical perfor-
mance tested under circumstances in which
disappointing behavior is possible but positive
behavior occurs. In the absence of trust or its
unreliable surrogates; laws and contracts, the
acceptance of possible negative outcomes
becomes the basis for business relationships. All
of the alternatives to trust are costly. The concept
presented here is that organizations can minimize the
effects of tainted, opportunity, and transaction costs by
requiring compliance with a set of universal ethical
standards. Further, this outcome can be achieved at
minimal cost.
The universal product quality standard, ISO
9000, gained popularity initially as a result of the
ECs intention to eliminate commercial hurdles
between its member countries. The single market
plan would, it was feared, be harmed by disparate
294 Jerold B. Muskin
product and service qualities seen to exist within
the national markets of the countries involved.
ISO 9000 is now, in the 10+ years since its
publication, accepted as a standard for manufac-
turing, service, and administrative practice
throughout much of the world. For customer
organizations, ISO 9000 is a means of assuring
product and service quality standards between
firms without regard to national boundaries.
Supplier firms see certification under ISO 9000
as a way to differentiate its products from its
competitors as well as a way of improving pro-
ductivity performance within the organization.
The international standard series for environ-
mental management, ISO 14000 published in
1996, is composed of management, documenta-
tion, and operating practices whose implemen-
tation are intended to help assure that processes
involving the manufacture, storage, transporta-
tion, distribution and disposal of materials with
potentially harmful environmental consequences
are carried out in environmentally benign ways.
Certification under ISO 14000, as with ISO
9000, have cost reduction, and market acceptance
effects. Companies throughout the world have
immense liability exposure for imposing envi-
ronmental insults whether locally or over wide
regions and this exposure exists throughout the
products unified value chain. Improperly
processed, labeled, packaged or formulated
products moving between organizations hold
great potential for inflicting harm internal or
external to the organization. The imposition of
environmental regulations are spreading through-
out the world. ISO 14000 certification is a way
firms have of complying with such regulations.
There are clear parallels between the basis for
universal ethical standards and for environmental
standards.
There are many similarities between the ISO
9000 and ISO 14000 standards (S. L. Jackson,
1997).
22
According to Jackson, all management
systems, whether focused on quality, safety, or the
environment, share certain core elements,
including:
Policy;
Document control;
Records management;
Corrective action;
Management review for continual improve-
ment;
Control of critical operations;
Training;
Internal audits;
Defined organization and responsibilities;
Defined and documented standard practices.
Both universal standards demand the com-
mitted involvement of executive management
and require significant employee involvement.
Policies, processes, and procedures designed to
assure the level of performance committed to
must be documented and verified by an ISO
certified third party auditor in order to comply
with the requirements for certification under the
universal standard. A suppliers particular quality
standards may deviate from the ISO prescribed
standards for individual customers (and may be
either more or less stringent) based on contract
provisions. Continuing internal and external
audits are required in order to assure the level of
conformity needed for recertification. (Environ-
mental standards must, however, conform as a
minimum, to applicable laws in the jurisdictions
in which products are processed, through which
they are transported, in which they are stored, or
where disposal occurs.)
The adoption of an ISO series for IO ethics
would call for a set of management systems
common to the elements listed in the just refer-
enced Jackson article. Emphasis, as in both
existing universal standards, is placed on execu-
tive commitment and employee involvement. If
different ethical standards seem appropriate to the
parties to a business relationship, provisions for
side agreements might be provided.
The one significant conceptual difference
between ethical standards and the ISO standards
already in place is that the latter are unidirec-
tional. Quality standards commit a supplier to
meet the customers expectations. Environmental
quality requirements imposed by a governmental
body impose the obligation on all producers
within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, where
ethical behavior is the issue, the flow of obliga-
tion is two-way. The performance expectations
require mutual trust. Ethical violations may be
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 295
perpetrated by either the supplier or the
customer. It would seem unacceptable for one of
the parties to require conformity to ethical
standards without committing to ethical standards
itself.
The broad acceptance of a method for uni-
versal business facilitation provided by the ISO
9000 series of standards provides a solid basis for
similar acceptance for an ethics standard serving
the purpose of international and domestic
business facilitation. Both ISO 9000 and ISO
14000 provide tested models for the develop-
ment, implementation, and monitoring of
standards for the conduct of business affairs.
Evidence that the benefits that apply to the
certification and continuous monitoring of
performance under the standards outweigh the
costs is provided by ISO 9000s adoption rate and
the anticipated acceptance rate of ISO 14000.
If the adoption of an ethics standard com-
parable to the existing quality and environmental
standards is determined to be unacceptable by
an empowered international body or its adoption
is deferred, some options are available to orga-
nizations which see the concept as important to
their success. The approach parallels actions taken
by some organizations in adopting TQM/CI and
JIT practices unilaterally, and, in some cases,
dealing only with suppliers that adopt those
standards.
1. Incorporate IO ethics standards into its
code of ethics. This will provide an internal
control mechanism and, if publicized and
followed, will provide evidence of trustworthi-
ness to its suppliers and customers. Further, this
action might encourage other organizations to
adopt standards unilaterally or, perhaps, observe
them informally.
2. Adopt ethical standards themselves and
require that its current and prospective suppliers
and/or customers adopt and enforce those stan-
dards.
3. Take the lead in promoting the adoption of
a code of IO ethics by industry groups and trade
associations. This action could be limited to the
members within the groups or extended to a
requirement that the standards be required of
suppliers and/or customers.
4. Trading blocs could require the adoption
of the standards by all organizations within the
bloc engaged in cross-border trade. Again, this
could be limited to suppliers or include those
firms importing goods and services from nations
within the bloc. The bloc authority might also
require that suppliers and/or customers from
outside the bloc conform to the standards when
dealing with their member nations. The parallel
to the creation and adoption of ISO 9000 by the
EC and the subsequent diffusion of that universal
standard is clear.
Is the time for the creation and adoption of a
universal standard for IO ethics here? Trust is
hard won and costly when misplaced. Sup-
planting trust with contracts is not always possible
and is costly when that which is agreed to is
violated. The continuous shift in the principles
under which business operates and rapid growth
of cross-border enterprise point to the need for
a reliable surrogate for trust. The history of business
reveals that the marketplace fails as a guarantor of trust-
worthy behavior between organizations even within a
single national culture. Even less does the market have
the capacity to yield an ethical business environment
for a globalized economy.
Notes
1
The term, coined to represent the range of com-
plementary, interorganizational relationships that lie
outside the standard buyer-seller arrangements and
business affiliations, is developed and analyzed in
A. M. Brandenberger and B. J. Nalebuff: Co-opetition
(Doubleday, New York, 1996), pp. 1122.
2
T. Donaldson: 1996, Values in Tension: Ethics
Away from Home, Harvard Business Review 74(5)
(September-October), 5354
3
T. W. Dunfee and Y. Nagayasu: 1993, Global
Business Ethics and Japanese Economic Morality, in
T. W. Dunfee and Y. Nagayasu (eds.), Business Ethics:
Japan and the Global Economy (Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht), pp. 9, and 3540.
4
L. Watson: 1995, Dark Nature: A Natural History
of Evil (HarperCollins, New York), pp. 4876.
5
F. Fukuyama: 1995, Trust (The Free Press, New
York), p. 75.
6
See Fallows discussion of Japans reaction to per-
sistent Western nations incursions on other Asian
nations autonomy and the effects it has had on Japans
national values and behaviors. J. Fallows: 1995,
296 Jerold B. Muskin
Looking at the Sun (Vintage Books, New York), pp.
72116.
7
D. P. Baron: 1995, The Nonmarket Strategy
System, Sloan Management Review 37(1) (Fall), 76.
8
L. Burton: 1990, Ethical Discontinuities in Public-
Private Sector Negotiation, Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 9(1) (Winter), 2338
9
F. Fukuyama: 1995, Trust (The Free Press, New
York), pp. 2532.
10
J. L. Badaracco: The IBM-Fujitsu Conundrum,
in W. M. Hoffman, J. B. Kamm, R.E. Frederick and
E. S. Petry (eds.), Emerging Global Business Ethics
(Quorum Books, Westport Conn.), pp. 7988
11
Note also that Korean practice all but prohibits
arbitration and, when invoked in Korea, is very time
consuming, expensive, and, when concluded,
probably favorable to the Korean company. B. L. De
Mente: 1994, Korean Etiquette & Ethics in Business
(NTC Business Books, Lincolnwood, IL), pp. 8990.
12
J. Fallows, op. cit., pp. 416420.
13
C. K. Prahaladad and G. Hamel: 1990, The Core
Competence of Corporations, Harvard Business
Review 68(3) (May-June), pp. 80 and 8384.
14
A. W. Singer: 1993, Honeywell Talkes Its Own
Ethics Message Overseas, Ethikos 6(6) (May/June), 3.
15
M. Morrow: 1997, ISO 9000 Registration
Growth Around the World, in R. W. Peach (ed.),
The ISO 9000 Handbook, 3d edition (Richard D.
Irwin, Chicago), pp. 689691.
16
B. L. De Mente, op. cit., pp. 6364.
17
F. Harris: 1996, At Coke, Less Fizz Than Meets
the Eye, New York Times (sec. 3, Oct 27), 1.
18
B. L. De Mente, op. cit., pp. 6567.
19
In establishing the ability to perform, as an ethical
issue, the author points out that while the firm which
is directly responsible may itself be trustworthy
(competent to deliver), it cannot be relied upon if
the firms it relies upon are not, in turn, trustworthy.
An organization must, in Jacksons terms, have the
requisite motivation to be competent themselves
as well as have the requisite skill to select others
which are likewise competent. See: J. Jackson: 1992,
Preserving Trust in a Pluralist Society, in J. Mahoney
and E. Vallance (eds.), Business Ethics in a New Europe
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht), pp. 3032.
20
The requirement exists, for organizations con-
forming to ISO 9000 standards, that they must,
among other things, have mechanisms in place to
assure that they can meet all the requirements. . . .
It should also be remembered that fulfillment of
requirements often goes beyond initial deliverables and
extends into product support on a medium- or long-
term basis. See: I. Durand, A. Cormaci and R.
Goult: 1997, A Basic Guide to Implementing ISO
9000, in R. W. Peach (ed.), The ISO 9000 Handbook,
3d edition (Richard D. Irwin, Chicago), p. 227.
21
A. M. Porter: 1996, Buylines: Ethical Dangers
Multiply, Purchasing (Oct 17), p. 20. Due to an
increase in face time (occasioned by the era of
supplier partnering) . . . friendship now competes
with bribes, kickbacks, and other gross acts of fraud
as one of the greatest threats to procurement per-
sonnel.
21
S. L. Jackson: 1997, Integrating ISO 9001 and
ISO 14001, in R. W. Peach (ed.), The ISO 9000
Handbook, 3d edition (Richard D. Irwin, Chicago), p.
496.
Drexel University,
Department of Marketing,
College of Business and Administration,
32nd and Chestnut Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19104,
U.S.A.
E-mail: muskinjb@drexel.edu
Interorganizational Ethics Standards of Behavior 297